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Modern Cruelty
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Wolfgang Müller-FunkClemens Ruthner
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Tsimtsum as a Political Theology for the Secular Age
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Ludger HagedornRafał Zawisza
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Enver Hoxha: Biography of a Balkan Tyrant
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Nikolai AntoniadisRobert AustinMisha Glenny
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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The Rebel's Clinic: The Life, Work, and After-Lives of the Psychiatrist Frantz Fanon
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Adam ShatzAyşe Çağlar
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Grounding a ‘Geopolitical Europe’
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Ayşe ÇağlarLuiza BialasiewiczMisha Glenny
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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“Blame-Games” and “Blame Avoidance”
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Markus RheindorfRuth WodakMiloš Vec
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the world both dramatically and irrevocably. For months, politics and media have focused on COVID-19 and the countless facets of its impact of ever more uncertainty and insecurity in our lives. Following Zygmunt Bauman’s Liquid Fear (2006) and Wodak’s The Politics of Fear (2021), it has become evident that a “politics of fear (and hope)” has been reinforced and instrumentalized by numerous national governments, in significantly different ways. Accordingly, the range of discourses appear to have changed equally dramatically, in terms of both subject matter and discursive practices. Has the pandemic truly altered the strategies and mechanisms of mediatized politics? Which well-understood/well-studied discursive patterns and trends – including interdiscursivity, (re)nationalization, securitization – and which discursive strategies – like the blame-game (Rheindorf & Wodak 2018) and blame avoidance (Hansson 2015) are still to be found in times of COVID-19, perhaps in altered forms? Some may have been marginalized, while the pandemic may have acted as a catalyst for others. Drawing on the Discourse-historical Approach (DHA) in Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), we will raise such questions and attempt to answer them through theoretical considerations and empirical evidence.
Read more
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
The COVID-19 pandemic has changed the world both dramatically and irrevocably. For months, politics and media have focused on COVID-19 and the countless facets of its impact of ever more uncertainty and insecurity in our lives. Following Zygmunt Bauman’s Liquid Fear (2006) and Wodak’s The Politics of Fear (2021), it has become evident that a “politics of fear (and hope)” has been reinforced and instrumentalized by numerous national governments, in significantly different ways. Accordingly, the range of discourses appear to have changed equally dramatically, in terms of both subject matter and discursive practices. Has the pandemic truly altered the strategies and mechanisms of mediatized politics? Which well-understood/well-studied discursive patterns and trends – including interdiscursivity, (re)nationalization, securitization – and which discursive strategies – like the blame-game (Rheindorf & Wodak 2018) and blame avoidance (Hansson 2015) are still to be found in times of COVID-19, perhaps in altered forms? Some may have been marginalized, while the pandemic may have acted as a catalyst for others. Drawing on the Discourse-historical Approach (DHA) in Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), we will raise such questions and attempt to answer them through theoretical considerations and empirical evidence.
Read more
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Forced Migration, the Antinomies of Mobility, and the Autonomy of Asylum
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Ayşe ÇağlarNicholas de Genova
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
Rather than seeing the ever more devious reaction formations of border policing and militarization, migrant detention, immigration enforcement, and deportation by state powers as if these were purely a matter of control, it is instructive to situate this economy of power in relation to the primacy, autonomy, and subjectivity of human mobility on a global (transnational, intercontinental, cross- border, postcolonial) scale. This is true, I contend, as much for refugees as for those who come to be derisively designated to be mere “migrants.” If we start from the human freedom of movement and recognize the various tactics of bordering as reaction formations, then the various tactics of border policing and forms of migration governance can be seen to introduce interruptions that temporarily immobilize and decelerate human cross-border mobilities with the aim of subjecting them to processes of surveillance and adjudication. Indeed, it is this dialectic that reconstitutes these mobilities as something that comes to be apprehensible, alternately, as “migration,” or “asylum-seeking,” or the “forced migration” of “refugees” in flight from persecution or violence – which is to say, as one or another variety of target and object of government. Yet, even under the most restricted circumstances and under considerable constraint, these human mobilities exude a substantial degree of autonomous subjectivity whereby migrants and refugees struggle to appropriate mobility. Even against the considerable forces aligned to immobilize their mobility projects, or to subject them to the stringent and exclusionary rules and constrictions of asylum, the subjective autonomy of human mobility remains an incorrigible force.
Read more
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
Rather than seeing the ever more devious reaction formations of border policing and militarization, migrant detention, immigration enforcement, and deportation by state powers as if these were purely a matter of control, it is instructive to situate this economy of power in relation to the primacy, autonomy, and subjectivity of human mobility on a global (transnational, intercontinental, cross- border, postcolonial) scale. This is true, I contend, as much for refugees as for those who come to be derisively designated to be mere “migrants.” If we start from the human freedom of movement and recognize the various tactics of bordering as reaction formations, then the various tactics of border policing and forms of migration governance can be seen to introduce interruptions that temporarily immobilize and decelerate human cross-border mobilities with the aim of subjecting them to processes of surveillance and adjudication. Indeed, it is this dialectic that reconstitutes these mobilities as something that comes to be apprehensible, alternately, as “migration,” or “asylum-seeking,” or the “forced migration” of “refugees” in flight from persecution or violence – which is to say, as one or another variety of target and object of government. Yet, even under the most restricted circumstances and under considerable constraint, these human mobilities exude a substantial degree of autonomous subjectivity whereby migrants and refugees struggle to appropriate mobility. Even against the considerable forces aligned to immobilize their mobility projects, or to subject them to the stringent and exclusionary rules and constrictions of asylum, the subjective autonomy of human mobility remains an incorrigible force.
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The Afghan Crisis Reconsidered
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Ludger HagedornNergis CanefePaula Banerjee
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
When the U.S. government announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Afghan government folded, the president abandonend his people and the army surrendered to the Taliban. Many people, including the U.S. president looked askance at this development. Banerjee argues that such a development was hardly surprising. When the U.S. attacked Afghanistan, it was to create a client state that would protect U.S. interests, not those of Afghanistan or its neighbours. In fact, the nascent process of nation-building was halted. The US wanted to impose its values and most Afghans who went along with it did so out of self-interest. At best, the U.S. created a “creamy layer of collaborators” that in no way had deep rooted impact. When the U.S. left, there was nothing to hold the amorphous group together and they could not think of themselves as one nation. Many have fled, the others have surrendered to the Taliban, portraying clearly that it was never their war. Rather, it was another episode of the great game.
Nergis Canefe discussed the history of the Afghan refugee crisis that predates the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and the regional containment and redistribution of the dispossessed Afghan populations.
Read more
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
When the U.S. government announced its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Afghan government folded, the president abandonend his people and the army surrendered to the Taliban. Many people, including the U.S. president looked askance at this development. Banerjee argues that such a development was hardly surprising. When the U.S. attacked Afghanistan, it was to create a client state that would protect U.S. interests, not those of Afghanistan or its neighbours. In fact, the nascent process of nation-building was halted. The US wanted to impose its values and most Afghans who went along with it did so out of self-interest. At best, the U.S. created a “creamy layer of collaborators” that in no way had deep rooted impact. When the U.S. left, there was nothing to hold the amorphous group together and they could not think of themselves as one nation. Many have fled, the others have surrendered to the Taliban, portraying clearly that it was never their war. Rather, it was another episode of the great game.
Nergis Canefe discussed the history of the Afghan refugee crisis that predates the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and the regional containment and redistribution of the dispossessed Afghan populations.
Read more
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Parenting and Education
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Biray KolluogluLudger Hagedorn
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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What is Wrong with Economics?
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Robert Skidelsky
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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