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WhatsApp Israel?
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Avrum BurgLudger Hagedorn
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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What We Gather
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Iryna ZamuruievaMariia Shynkarenko
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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What the EU can learn from the Habsburg Empire
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Panels and Discussions
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Ivan KrastevA. Wess Mitchell
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Series: Panels and Discussions
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Series: Panels and Discussions
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What is Wrong with Economics?
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Robert Skidelsky
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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What is Truth?
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Panels and Discussions
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Leszek Kołakowski, Wladyslaw Strozewski, Janusz Tazbir, Adam Zagajewski
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Speakers: Leszek Kołakowski, Wladyslaw Strozewski, Janusz Tazbir, Adam Zagajewski
Series: Panels and Discussions
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Speakers: Leszek Kołakowski, Wladyslaw Strozewski, Janusz Tazbir, Adam Zagajewski
Series: Panels and Discussions
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What is the outlook for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans?
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Panels and Discussions
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Ioannis ArmakolasIvan VejvodaSrdjan Cvijic
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Series: Panels and Discussions
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Series: Panels and Discussions
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What is Political Cruelty?
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Aishwary Kumar
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
“The important point for liberalism is not so much where the line is drawn,” Judith Shklar writes in a fascinating moment in her critique of cruelty, “as that it be drawn, and that it must under no circumstances be ignored or forgotten.” Where is this line? And who lives under its ambiguous constitutionality? Neither in her 1989 theses on the “liberalism of fear” nor in her 1982 demand that liberals start “putting cruelty first” does Shklar fully pursue the consequences of this morally unforgiving yet spatially uncertain line of liberal intolerance of cruelty. And while she does starkly pose the question “what is moral cruelty?” in terms of its debilitating effect on human freedom, the limit—border—that circumscribes liberalism’s constitutional response to extreme violence continues to waver. In this paper, Aishwary Kumar offers an archeology of this vacillating, political “line” that runs through liberal resistance against cruelty. By way of exploring its global implications, he follows Shklar on the cosmopolitical path she takes, along with BR Ambedkar and Hannah Arendt, into that “most ancient,” most exemplary form of organized violence and constitutional stasis known to legal and moral philosophy: the “Indo-European caste society,” which in her later writings Shklar sometimes replaces by the adjacent term “warrior society.” Her legalism is not causal. For it is in that trans-continental tradition that a relation is forged between caste and war, and the sovereignty of the line—maryada—attains its apotheosis. Might a semblance of political courage still be retrieved from that tradition of cruelty—a modern part of which becomes genuinely “anticolonial”—and rehabilitated into norms of democratic government today?
Read more
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
“The important point for liberalism is not so much where the line is drawn,” Judith Shklar writes in a fascinating moment in her critique of cruelty, “as that it be drawn, and that it must under no circumstances be ignored or forgotten.” Where is this line? And who lives under its ambiguous constitutionality? Neither in her 1989 theses on the “liberalism of fear” nor in her 1982 demand that liberals start “putting cruelty first” does Shklar fully pursue the consequences of this morally unforgiving yet spatially uncertain line of liberal intolerance of cruelty. And while she does starkly pose the question “what is moral cruelty?” in terms of its debilitating effect on human freedom, the limit—border—that circumscribes liberalism’s constitutional response to extreme violence continues to waver. In this paper, Aishwary Kumar offers an archeology of this vacillating, political “line” that runs through liberal resistance against cruelty. By way of exploring its global implications, he follows Shklar on the cosmopolitical path she takes, along with BR Ambedkar and Hannah Arendt, into that “most ancient,” most exemplary form of organized violence and constitutional stasis known to legal and moral philosophy: the “Indo-European caste society,” which in her later writings Shklar sometimes replaces by the adjacent term “warrior society.” Her legalism is not causal. For it is in that trans-continental tradition that a relation is forged between caste and war, and the sovereignty of the line—maryada—attains its apotheosis. Might a semblance of political courage still be retrieved from that tradition of cruelty—a modern part of which becomes genuinely “anticolonial”—and rehabilitated into norms of democratic government today?
Read more
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What Europeans Really Want
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Panels and Discussions
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Ivan KrastevIvan VejvodaPiotr BurasUlrike LunacekIngrid Steiner-Gashi
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Series: Panels and Discussions
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Series: Panels and Discussions
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What Did Russia Build Within—the Digital Gulag or the Cyberpunk?
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Seminars and Colloquia
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Andrei ZakharovClemena AntonovaKirill Rogov
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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Series: Seminars and Colloquia
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What Can We Learn from Early Modernity about Self-Learning Experiences? Key Questions, Remarks, and Research Paths
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Lecture
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Misha GlennyValentina Lepri
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Series: Lecture
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Series: Lecture
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