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Editorial


Außerdem finden Sie in dieser Ausgabe der IWM Post wie gewohnt Informationen über alles, was sonst noch in den Monaten April bis August am Institut stattfand. Eine gute Lektüre wünscht

Andrea Roedig

Bronislaw Geremek, the Professor of Medieval History, adviser to Solidarnosc, former Polish Foreign Minister and holder of more than 20 honorary doctorates, was more than just a member of the IWM Board of Patrons, he was, above all, a friend. Since 1989 he has taken part in numerous conferences and seminars of the IWM, the last of which was the Summer School in Cortona. Shortly after that, Geremek was killed in a car accident. The sadness of all of us at the IWM and, in particular, those who saw him last in Cortona, cannot be satisfactorily expressed in the obituaries on pages 6 and 7 of the newsletter. The IWM mourns the loss of a wise and also an extremely human politician and scholar.

Jan Patočka is not easy to grasp. The oldest research focus of the Institute is dedicated to his work. The uncompromising nature of his thought can, for example, be demonstrated in his idea of war as a fundamental condition of modernity. A critical essay from Sandra Lehmann, which evolved out of an IWM workshop on “War and Peace”, gives a taste of Patočka’s ideas, with all their strengths and weaknesses.

Patočka is not the only weighty issue in this edition of the newsletter. Tim Haughton, Visiting Fellow in the spring, gives us an insight into his research project, on the political decision making process of new EU member states. Jennifer Hochschild, in a guest commentary, compares French and American approaches to promoting social justice and argues for giving migrants access to “first class citizenship”. Finally Peter L. Berger demonstrates, in his essay, that democracy and Christianity can, but do not necessarily, have something in common; the connection binding the two together is looser than many Christian apologists from the West would have us believe.

As always this edition of the IWM Post also contains information about everything else that has taken place at the Institute from April through to August. I hope you enjoy reading.

Andrea Roedig

Nachtrag: In der letzten IWM Post Nr. 97 fehlte die Angabe des Fotografen der Titelseite, Andreas Altmann (Andreas Altmann/ sponsored by Allianz)
The Polish-German reconciliation in the early 1990s was heralded as a remarkable success story. The paradigm shift in the relationship appeared to confirm the pacifying and ‘normalizing’ role of the post-War institutional order, with NATO and European integration now helping to transform relations between former adversaries, the nominal Cold War rivals and Central Europe’s historical nemeses, Poland and Germany. The then Chancellor Helmut Kohl quipped that without the Franco-German embrace the European project would have never begun, adding that without the Polish-German reconciliation it would never be complete. Indeed, many believed Poland’s accession to the EU would further the Polish-German rapprochement. Instead, since 1998 – just as Poland began negotiating its accession to the EU – the growing list of spats and clashes between Warsaw and Berlin challenged the positive expectation of a linear progression towards deeper integration. During the Kaczyński government’s tenure analysts referred to the relationship as one in a state of a ‘stable crisis.’ Instead of a ‘community of values and interests,’ marked by the two countries’ adherence to liberal-democratic norms and their shared interest in a free and united Europe, the Polish-German relationship is now frequently described as a ‘community of conflict.’ (Relations have seen a significant improvement since the PiS’s electoral downfall, but sceptics ask, not without reason, whether warmed rhetoric is lined with anything more than blank smiles.)

Alas, to a student of Polish-German relations in the post-Cold War world, one factor appears inexorable: today the two countries are allies, members of the same institutions, they negotiate their differences, and most importantly, share a fundamental commitment to the same values that underpin the broader framework of the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, conflict still characterises Polish-German relations. Why the renewed tension? This is the question students at the Cortona Summer School grappled with: Poles and Germans, together with participants from other countries, discussed the troubled bilateral relationship and its EU dimension.

The Return of History
There exists a tendency to ascribe the conflict between the two countries to the reflexive historical animosity and a score of unsettled bilateral issues. This view is both attractive for its simplicity and, in large measure, not incorrect. What is intriguing is the seeming consensus that the historical dialogue is more difficult today than it was in the 1990s. This poses an interesting question about the source of the ‘return of history’ to the bilateral relationship. As Marcin Zaborowski argued, in the area of EU policy relations between Poland and Germany became ‘domesticated’ by the sheer growth of actors and traction points: growing interdependence has led to the articulation of hereto unvoiced differences. But why did history return? Has a similar ‘democratisation’ of historical discourse taken place? Was the Polish-German reconciliation a project of the elites, enjoying little popular support? Or are we witnessing a clash of two distinct processes, Poland’s consolidating identity — its soul-search for a role as a mid-sized EU Member State, but also its challenge of the ‘old’ EU essentialism — and a paradigm shift in Germany — the break of the supposed taboo to discuss the German victims of the war, and the embrace of a more public ‘constitutional patriotism’?

Two discernible but not always clearly separate threads dominate the bilateral conflict.
between Poland and Germany. On the one hand, historical memory continues to play a role, and is most clearly visible in the conflict surrounding the planned centre against expulsions. On the other, there exists a set of issues with more material consequences, including the expellees’ compensation claims and the question of cultural treasures. The students at Cortona argued in large measure in favour of a pragmatic approach that clearly demarcates between memory and more tangible if not amoral questions that plague the Polish-German relationship. Dialogue is necessary in both cases, but megaphone diplomacy should give way to technocratic negotiations outside the political marketplace.

**Beyond the bilateral**

The tendency to explain most of the differences between the two countries through recourse to some form of historical determinism extends beyond the sphere of bilateral conflict. Historical explanations are frequently supplemented by arguments about socialization and its discontents – the ‘Europeanisation’ literature appears to support the causal role of history, culture and identity as variables that explain the divergence between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. The problem with these arguments is that they tend to mask the more material sources of state preferences, and can thereby be seen to de-legitimise divergent interests. This in turn, compounds the mistrust visible between sections of the elites in both countries.

In foreign policy, or more generally in the area of high politics, more than a function of history, the divergence in the two countries’ interests appears to derive from asymmetry: be it the size of the economy, demographics, geopolitical location, or more mundanely, institutional capacity, or representation within the EU policy networks. This asymmetry is masked by the discourse of equality among the EU member states. In turn, the gap between rhetoric and perceived reality appears to further aggravate mutual suspicions.

During the Cortona Summer School, participants discussed three areas of foreign policy where Poland and Germany show divergent preferences. First, we focused on Europe’s relations with the US, deconstructing the simplistic and, in the participants’ view, erroneous idea of Poland’s ‘reflexive Atlanticism’ and Germany’s increasing ‘Gaullism.’ Poland’s contribution to ESDP missions and often-reiterated interest in common European armed forces muddles the picture of America’s model ‘Trojan ‘donkey.’ Most importantly, Poland’s or other new Member States’ Atlanticism should be seen in relative terms. Western Europe, in particular West Germany, developed close ties to America over the span of the Cold War. Indeed, the level of integration between their societies, economies, military-industrial complexes, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US interventionism, pales next to the complex, etc, is unique. This is not to argue that there exists a natural point of saturation with America, but Poland’s strive to develop closer ties with Washington, its offer to host the missile shield, the bid to strengthen its air defence system, and its support of US intervent…
In the seminar room

B. Bricker; J. Baar; C. Törö

European Challenges (Summer School, 7–18 July)

Chair: Krzysztof Michalski

Seminar I: On European Foreign Policies

Week 1

Bronislaw Geremek:
- Major Objectives of European Foreign Policies

Lilia F. Shevtsova:
- Russia and its Domestic Challenges
- Russia and the Former Communist Countries
- Russia and the EU

Bronislaw Geremek:
- European Politics towards Russia and Other Post-Communist Countries in Eastern Europe

Week 2

Markus Meckel:
- German–Polish Relations and European Foreign Policy
- Legacy of the World War II and Communism as a Challenge for Europe

Rainer Lindner:
- European Neighbourhood and Security Policy – EU’s and NATO’s Policy Towards Ukraine and Belarus
- Russia–Ukraine: Common Past, Divided Memories in Eastern Europe

Anne–Marie Slaughter:
- Europe and the USA
- New Beginning?

Seminar II: On Integration of European Societies

Week 1

Marcin Król:
- Religion and Social Solidarity

Ira Katznelson:
- Toleration, Multiculturalism, and the Western Liberal Tradition

- I: Can Locke’s “Letter Concerning Toleration” Instruct us about Social Solidarity and Integration Today?

- II: Rawls’ ideas about reasonable pluralism

Rainer Münz:
- Integration of Immigrants
- Modes of Intergenerational Solidarity in an Aging Society

Week 2

Claus Offe:
- After Eastern Enlargement. The Post-Communist New Member States and the EU

Reiner Klingholz:
- Demographic Future of Europe
- Demographical Trends and Social Integration in Europe

Evening Lectures:

Giuliano Amato: Building Unity upon Diversities

Adam Rottfeld: European Security & the Future of NATO and EU

Supported by Bosch-Foundation

Rules of the Game

The geopolitical asymmetry is compounded by an asymmetric leverage vis-à-vis Russia. Germany enjoys an unmatched level of interdependence in its relations with Moscow, and bereaves Berlin’s default on the EU’s collective action dilemma.

In the end, what matters is not whether Russia’s use of energy means for political ends and divide-and-rule tactics are real or imagined, but rather that the EU has failed to grasp the importance of unity when it comes to dealing with an actor as confident as the ‘new’ Russia. Indeed, although Russia depends on the EU as its largest oil and gas consumer, currently Russia and not Brussels sets the rules of the game. As a result, Nordstream might not significantly alter Poland’s energy security, but it diminishes the country’s role as a transit state, challenges its hope for greater diversification, and puts a dent in its hope to ‘Europeanise’ both the energy policy and relations with Moscow more generally.

Finally, the discussions in Cor­tona revealed one more crucial asym­metry in Polish-German relations. The Poles are relatively more concerned by the relationship with their neighbour than are the Germans. A similar pattern is reflected in statistics on student exchange, foreign language study, and more generally, on popular attitudes towards the other. Relative indifference appears to present the crucial challenge to the Polish-German relationship.

Stefan Sawed is Ph.D. candidate for International Relations, St Antony’s College, Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford.
Bronislaw Geremek, a supporter, collaborator and friend of the Institute for Human Sciences, almost from its inception, died a day after leaving the Institute’s Summer School in Cortona, where he had been teaching. An eminent scholar and a leading politician, an historian of the excluded and a leader of a revolt by the suppressed, a passionate Pole and an exemplary European - Geremek showed us how to combine, into an organic whole, reflection and public involvement and responsibility for both a particular and a universal cause. Geremek was a source of intellectual inspiration as well as a model of prudent action and moral decency. The Institute lived from this source. We will have to live with its memory from now on.

Krzysztof Michalski
Rector of the IWM

Courage and Endurance

On July 13 2008, Bronislaw Geremek, Historian and former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, died in a car accident near Nowy Tomył, Poland. He was a member of the Institute's Board of Patrons and a member of the Editorial Board of Transit.

Bronislaw Geremek, a supporter, collaborator and friend of the Institute for Human Sciences, almost from its inception, died a day after leaving the Institute’s Summer School in Cortona, where he had been teaching. An eminent scholar and a leading politician, an historian of the excluded and a leader of a revolt by the suppressed, a passionate Pole and an exemplary European - Geremek showed us how to combine, into an organic whole, reflection and public involvement and responsibility for both a particular and a universal cause. Geremek was a source of intellectual inspiration as well as a model of prudent action and moral decency. The Institute lived from this source. We will have to live with its memory from now on.

Krzysztof Michalski
Rector of the IWM


Heinz Fischer
Bundespräsident der Republik Österreich


Vor einer Stunde haben wir die entsetzliche Nachricht über seinen Tod bei einem Verkehrsunfall erreicht. Ich habe keine Worte, um dieses schreckliche Ereignis zu kommentieren, und was für ein Kommentar könnte das überhaupt sein?

Leszek Kolakowski
Philosoph, Mitglied des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats des IWM


Karl Schwarzenberg
Außenminister der tschechischen Republik, Vorsitzender des IWM Kuratoriums

Das Faszinierende an Bronislaw Geremek war die Verbindung von Intellektuellem und Politiker einer Person. Die Politik aus einer historischen Perspektive zu betrachten, ermöglichte ihm, ihr gegenüber eine kritische Distanz zu behalten. Sein Blick auf die Politik war tiefgründig.


In mourning Bronek Geremek, I mourn a wonderful friend and a unique historical figure. The world should know what he achieved in and for his native country, which he knew in all its brightness and shame. What also needs to be remembered was his courage and endurance combined with a quiet modesty, his wisdom and serenity were suffused with a deep sense of civic, liberal responsibility, his gentleness with unbending strength. He was a perfect European, anchored in his own country, immersed in the culture of all of Europe, though with an admirable, critical bias for France. He had a fine grasp on reality and a clear idealistic compass as well. We shall miss his eloquent, passionate voice of reason.

He was the first great historian since Tocqueville to become the foreign minister of his country, and in his life and work there was a strong Tocquevillian element. The loss is tragic and immense.

Fritz Stern
Historian, Member of the IWM Academic Advisory Board
Dans cette conférence, M. Pomian expliquait d’abord deux aspects de l’Europe: la diversité de langues, religions, nations et États, d’un côté, et, de l’autre, l’unité de civilisation manifestée dans la présence des traits communs à tous les groupes d’Européens et qui les distinguent de leurs voisins: des croix sur certains bâtiments et dans certains lieux, plans des villes et architecture, écritures alphabétiques d’origine romaine ou grecque, séparation de la politique et de la culture de la religion, statut des femmes etc.

En suite, M. Pomian faisait une longue excursion dans l’histoire de l’Europe, en insistant sur l’alternance des périodes d’unification et des périodes de scission.

De ce relevé de différences entre l’Europe et ses voisins, et du constat de l’individualité de l’histoire de l’Europe qui diffère de celles de ses voisins par les traditions romaines, le rôle du christianisme, la Réforme, la modernisation, les révolutions politiques et la révolution industrielle, M. Pomian passait à la question d’une identité européenne. L’identité européenne, selon lui, est une réalité historique. Il montrait, que si le mot identité et les expressions connexes ont fait récemment l’objet d’un certain nombre de critiques et de dénonciations. Il démontrait, qu’il s’agit d’une réalité historique qui se distingue de leurs voisins: des croix sur certains bâtiments et dans certains lieux, plans des villes et architecture, écritures alphabétiques d’origine romaine ou grecque, séparation de la politique et de la culture de la religion, statut des femmes etc.

Krzysztof Pomian est directeur de recherche honoraire du Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), à Paris; professeur de philosophie à l’université Nicolas Copernic de Torun (Pologne); directeur scientifique du musée de l’Europe, à Bruxelles.

In cooperation with the Institut Français de Vienne

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**Monthly Lectures**

Mai 20

Krzysztof Pomian

Identité européenne: trait historique et problème politique

**Transit—Presentation**

June 9

José Casanova

Western Secularization and Globalization

In times where global conflicts are constructed around concepts of fundamentalism and secularity, the idea of secularization itself has to be critically revised. Secularization is not a universal dynamic of human development, said José Casanova in his lecture, but a specific concept emerging from the transformation of the “seculum” in medieval European Christendom. He added that there was a need to further distinguish between Protestant and Catholic regions, which have quite different histories of secularization. The specifically European process of secularization has led to what Casanova calls a “stadi-al” consciousness – the view of secularization as a process of maturity in societies, associated with modernization. Furthermore, Casanova showed that the way structural secularization occurred in a region influences the current role of religion in society. How can we talk about secularity in societies that not only did not undergo the same process of European secularization but were confronted rather with specific European post-Christian secular modernity through colonialism? It is unlikely, said Casanova in closing, that our “secular age” will be theirs.

José Casanova is Professor of Sociology and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University. Previously he served as Professor of Sociology at the New School for Social Research in New York for twenty years, from 1987 to 2007.

April 25

Ivan Krastev

Putin’s Russia

„Centralized power is in Russia’s DNA”, the former Russian President and current Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, is reported to have said. Ivan Krastev analyzed this “Russian-style” model of “sovereign democracy” established by Putin. The Russian nationalization of the energy sector, the fact that the government exercises total control over the media, the de facto criminalization of western-funded NGOs and the criminal persecution of the Kremlin’s opponents has been criticised a great deal in the West. But if Russia resembles a dictatorship so much, then why did Putin resist becoming President-for-life? Krastev pointed out that the complex relationship between authoritarian policies and democratic structures in the Russian sovereign democracy model has to do with Russia’s relationship to Europe. What is at stake is this: how can Russia revive its status as a “world power” if not by taking an anti-western stance? But that leads to a paradox: The Kremlin needs the West as an enemy to keep its hold on power.

Ivan Krastev is a political scientist and Chair of Board of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria. Since 2004 Mr. Krastev has been the executive director of the International Commission on the Balkans. Mr Krastev is a regular contributor to Transit—Europäische Revue. You can read more about Putin’s Russia in: Transit Volume 35, published in summer 2008 (see also: www.iwm.at/transit)
Redefining the State?
An International Comparison of Modern Conservative Politics

Den Staat neu denken?
Moderne konservative Politik im internationalen Vergleich

In cooperation with the Politische Akademie – the party academy of the Austrian Christian Democrats – the IWM is organising a lecture series on "modern conservative politics" with particular emphasis on positions concerning the role of the state. The aim is to present and compare recent changes and developments of conservatism which are underway in various European countries.

April 23
Marek Cichocki
Past and Future of the National State in European and International Policy

Marek Cichocki is advisor to the Polish President and Director of the European Centre Natolin

May 16
Jan Jacob van Dijk
Goods and Ends: How to Improve the Welfare State from a Christian-Democratic Perspective

The lecture concentrated on the subject of solidarity and answered several questions as: What is solidarity, why is it so important, with whom does one have to share certain goods and to what extent? How is solidarity related to responsibility and who is responsible for the realisation of solidarity in society: civil society, government or individuals? Is the actual welfare state the best way to realise solidarity? Mr van Dijk argued that obligatory solidarity causes a decline in voluntary solidarity. Therefore the welfare state should concentrate on its elevating, connecting, and anticipating functions. Concluding, Mr van Dijk also gave some recommendations for improving the actual welfare state in the Netherlands.

Jan Jacob van Dijk is member of the 2nd Chamber of the Dutch Parliament

In Zusammenarbeit mit der Politischen Akademie der ÖVP
The Decline of the Occident?

Der Untergang des Abendlandes?

The Vortagsreihe, die das IWM zusammen mit dem Renner Institut organisiert, fragt, ob in der „tyrannischen Richtung auf die Zukunft“ (Oswald Spengler), nicht auch Ängste und eine latente Untergangsstimung mitschwingen. Mit einem Vortrag von Jan Zielonka schloss das IWM die Reihe im Mai ab.

May 27

Jan Zielonka

Europe as Empire
The Nature of the Enlarged European Union

The EU is on its way to becoming a kind of “neo-medieval empire” with a polycentric system of government, multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, striking cultural and economic heterogeneity, fuzzy borders, and divided sovereignty. This is not fully recognized by academics and politicians who continue to emphasize state-like features of the EU: common currency, external borders and central European institutions in Brussels. But the latest wave of enlargement has transformed the EU beyond recognition. Mr Zielonka stressed that we need to recognize the “neo-medieval” reality and make it work. In his lecture he tried to comprehend the evolving nature of the EU and to suggest more effective and legitimate ways of governing Europe than through empowering the European Parliament, the creation of a European army, or the introduction of a European social model.

Jan Zielonka is Professor of European Politics at the University of Oxford and Ralf Dahrendorf Fellow at St Antony’s College.

In Zusammenarbeit mit dem Renner Institut

Umweltpolitik und Solidarität

The climate change confronts the existing democratic institutions and the instruments of traditional politics with an unprecedented challenge.

Together with the Grüne Bildungswerkstatt the IWM launches this series of lectures on “Ecopolitics and Solidarity”.

June 4

Lukas Mayer

Klimawandel und Gerechtigkeit


Lukas Mayer ist Dozent für Philosophie an der Universität Bern


In Kooperation mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt
Fellows Meeting

Each year, the IWM invites its fellows, friends, and supporters to an informal celebration. This year’s lecture, held by Cornelia Klinger at the fellow’s meeting on May 30, dealt with new gaps in modern society under the title “Spektakuläre Gegensätze oder die Einheit des Elends?” (Spectacular contrasts or the unity of misery?) Among other things, she spoke about the blurring of distinctions between the “natural” and the “artificial” and about life becoming more and more “canned.”

Junior Visiting Fellows’ Conference

At the end of each term, the Junior Visiting Fellows present the results of their research at the institute. The conference of the first term 2008 took place on June 12.

Events at IHS Boston:

Following the March 18 Max Kade Lecture by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who discussed the legacy of 1968, the Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University hosted three more events. On April 24, Polish gender researcher Agnieszka Graff gave a presentation entitled “Our Innocence, Foreign Perversions: Gender and Sexuality in Nationalist Discourse” in which she explored the impact of growing nationalist sentiment on women’s rights. On April 28, Italian philosopher Paolo Flores D’Arcais debated “The Ethics of Atheism” with Alan Wolfe, political scientist and Director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College. The conversation focused on the role of religion in a secular society, with D’Arcais arguing that the neutrality of the state with regard to each citizen, regardless of creed, does not allow a place for God in the public sphere. Wolfe, himself an atheist, disagreed, arguing that the views of believers enrich our political discourse. Finally, on May 1, in conjunction with the literary magazine AGNI, the Institute organized a panel discussion on “Fiction and Possibility” with Polish fiction writer Magdalena Tulli, American nonfiction writer Lawrence Weschler, AGNI editor Sven Birkerts and Institute director Irena Grudzinska Gross. Weschler and AGNI senior editor Bill Pierce read excerpts from Tulli’s novels “Dreams and Stones”, winner of Poland’s Koscieslaw Foundation Prize in 1995, and “Flaw”, which was short-listed for the 2007 Nike Prize, Poland’s most prestigious political award.
Das dunkle Wissen

Krieg, Tod und Leben in Jan Patoˇckas Ketzerischen Essais.
Von Sandra Lehmann


Die Tücke der modernen Lebensideologie besteht in Patoˇckas Augen darin, dass sie das individuelle Todesgewahren gleichsam gegen sich selbst laufen lässt und es in der Rede vom Dienst des Einzelnen an den „zukünftigen Generationen“.


Die Tücke der modernen Lebensideologie besteht in Patoˇckas Augen darin, dass sie das individuelle Todesgewahren gleichsam gegen sich selbst laufen lässt und es...
damit für einen überindividuellen Zusam-
menhang funktionalisiert. Indem die Moder-
ne das Leben als höchsten Wert setzt, blen-
det sie den sein erschließenden Charakter
des Todes aus. Vom Tod bleibt nur die Dro-
hung der Vernichtung, gegen die es anzule-
ben gilt. Das Seinsinteresse des Menschen
regiert so zum Interesse an der eigenen
Lebenserhaltung. De facto bedeutet der Pri-
mat der Lebenserhaltung die Selbstaufgabe
des Menschen als eines Wesens, das im
Todesgewahren die unteilbare Verantwor-
tung für das eigene Leben erfährt. Aus die-
ser Selbstaufgabe resultiert ein gesellschaf-
licher Organismus, der die Lebenserhaltung
sich kontinuierlich steigernde Produk-
tion und Expansion gewährleistet, aber
zugleich wortwörtlich unmenschlich ist. Das
im Sinne von Erhaltung organisierte Leben
gehört niemandem. Es ist das Objekt eines
anonymen, gesichtslosen Apparates, der sich
in der Dynamik ständiger Mobilisierung
durch sich in der Modellsituation des
modernen Seins-tum-Apparates einfasst,
und bestimmt, die Wiederkehr mythischer
Selbstaufgabe resultiert ein gesellschaft-
tung für das eigene Leben erfährt. Aus die-
ner Generation (etwa solche im Umkreis der
Frankfurter Schule) sieht Patocka in dem
Apparat, der das moderne Leben einfasst
und bestimmt, die Wiederkehr mythischer
Gewalt, die im Durchgang durch die
Erkenntnisse neuerzeitlicher Naturwissenschaft
ihrer selbst gewahr geworden ist und sich
damit perfektioniert hat.

Entprechend fasst Patocka das inhuma-
ne Subjekt der modernen conditio
mit einem frühen naturwissenschaftlichen Begriff, der
hypertexto das Schriftbild beherrscht: Das
tatsächliche Subjekt eines entstellten Lebens
ist „KRAFT“. Die KRAFT kennt den Tod
nicht, denn sie ist kein Mensch. Gleichwohl
braucht sie den Tod, denn sie potenziert sich
durch die vom Todesgewahren genährte Existenzangst
der Menschen freigesetzt werden. Darin liegt
Patocka zufolge die Bedeutung des Krieges
für das 20. Jahrhundert. Der Kriegszustand
ist ein Zustand ununterbrochener Existenz-
angst. Entsprechend muss er im Interesse des
expansiven Apparats aufrechterhalten
werden, und zwar über den aktuellen Kriegsfall
hinaus.

Der Kriegszustand
ist ein Zustand ununter-
brochener Existenzangst. Entsprechend muss er im
Interesse des expansiven
Apparats aufrechterhalten
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für das 20. Jahrhundert. Der Kriegszustand
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angst. Entsprechend muss er im Interesse des
expansiven Apparats aufrechterhalten
werden, und zwar über den aktuellen Kriegsfall
hinaus. Mit der Entgrenzungstendenz der KRAFT wird also auch der Krieg entgrenzt.
Er wird zur totalen Ordnung des Lebens,
dessen liberale Bürgerlichkeit oder Zivilität
sich in der Dynamik ständiger Mobilisierung
aufgehoben hat. Patocka nennt die Liebe
sowohl anti-liberal wie anti-totalitar. Anti-
liberale gibt es gegen den ständig pro-
duzierten Ausnahmezustand einer un-
menschlichen Souveränität, anti-liberal gegen die Glauben an eine bürgerschaft-
gen hässchen Marktwirtschaft, deren fallweise
„sozialer“ Charakter nur das Feigenblatt für
die sie sonst offensichtliche Existenzangst
der Einzelnen ist.

Patockas Diagnose, die Moderne ver-
stan te ein umfassendes „Rechnen“ mit dem
Tod, enthält ein beachtliches kritisches
Potential, nicht zuletzt, weil sie zeigt, dass
alles bisherige Emanzipationsbewusstseins in
der Projektion der Aufklärung das Leben tatsäch-
lich nicht erreicht, sondern es als ideologi-
es Versatzstück stehen gelassen hat, um
es schließlich in Theorie wie Praxis zugrun-
den gehen zu lassen. Der Ausweg, den
Patocka aus der modernen Situation
konkreter Todesverges-
sehenheit und abstrakter
Todesverfallenheit
sucht, ist jedoch eben-
so gewaltig wie irre-
hässchen, was negativ
auch auf Patockas
polemische Ontologie
zurückweist. Patocka
sieht die Möglichkeit
einer epochalen (also dezidiert gegen-modern-
en) Bewusstseinswende darin, dass der Ein-
zeilbe sich den individuellen Tod wieder
aneignet. Wie diese Wiederaneignung aus-
sehen kann, entwirft Patocka sechs Essays
an der Frontstation des Ersten Weltkriegs,
die gewissermaßen die Modellsituation des
modernen Seins-tum-Apparates darstellt.
Der Einzelne scheint in ihn gänzlich zum Objekt
ihm verbrauchender Prozesse geworden zu
sein und reagiert hierauf zunächst – Patocka
rekurriert auf Berichte von Ernst Jünger und
Théodore de Banville – mit einem Gefühl von
„Sinnlosigkeit und unerträglichem Grauen“, von
„Absurdität“, das sich jedoch schlagarti-
gig umkehrt. Es stellt sich nämlich das „dun-
kle Wissen“ ein, „dass das Leben nicht alles
ist“, und in der Folge die „absolute Erfah-
rung (…) absoluter Freiheit“: „Die absolute
Freiheit meint die Einsicht, dass hier bereits
tatsächlich etwas erreicht ist, etwas, das kein Mittel zu
etwas anderem, keine „Stufe zu...“ ist (…) Der
Gipfel ist genau hier, in diesem Sich-
Hingeben, zu dem die Menschen unter
Zurücklassung ihrer Berufe, Talente, Mög-
lICHkeiten, ihrer Zukunft berufen worden
sind. Dies zu vermögen (…) in einer Welt,
bei dem Konflikt Kraft mobilisiert und so
ein vollkommen verdänglicher und verdäng-
liehender Quell von Energie zu sein scheint,
bedeutet zugleich, die Kraft zu überwinden“

Die Grenzen von Patockas Entwurf lie-
gen darin, dass er die Überwindung der ano-
nymen Souveränität, der KRAFT, auf ein subjektiv-individuelles Erlebnis beschränkt.
Der Einzelne erfährt also die absolute Frei-
heit und findet damit den Sinn des eigene-
en Todes wieder, er begegnet dem Einbruch
des Nichts, das heißt des poetischen Seins,
das kein einfaches Seiendes ist. Aber auch
wenn der Einzelne sich damit jenseits der
ontischen gegebenen Verhältniszusammen-
hänge bewegt, bringt er es nicht zum Zer-
reißen. Er wird weiterhin „nach Plan“ mobil-
isiert werden, wird unter wie auch immer
absurden Umständen leben, schließlich ster-
bren. Was er gewonnen hat, ist nur ein innerer
Abstand, der in eben dieser Innerlichkeit
nicht über sich hinausgreifen kann.

Gewiss ist hier zu
beachten, dass Patocka
seinem der absoluten Freiheit mit
anderen Einzelnen in einer „Solidarität der
Erschütterten“ zusammenfinden lässt und
ihm damit mit der Qualität ausstattet, in
Opposition zu gehen, „‘nein’ zu sagen zu
allen Mobilisierungsmaßnahmen“. Aber
auch dieses Nein ist passiv, es macht kei-
nen Vorstoß, es gestaltet nicht, mithin, die
politischen Entscheidungen werden über sei-
nen sich sträubenden Nacken gefallen. Auf
Diese Weise kann es nicht gelingen, die kri-
tisierte Vernichtungslogik aufzulösen, sie
wird vielmehr vertieft. Patockas Denken
erzwingt sich selbst, wohin es als Theorie
führt: zu einer Subversion, die die gegebe-
enen Verhältnisse nicht antastet.

Patockas Konzeption spiegelt eine große
Verlegenheit wieder, die bezeichnenderwei-
se Verlegenheiten gegenwärtiger politischer
und philosophischer Theorien vorweg-
nimmt. Die Verlegenheiten ergeben sich
immer dort, wo das Politische traditionskriti-
sch und zugleich jenseits spezifischer Ethik
en gedacht werden soll. Angesichts dessen
scheint es angebracht, noch einmal ein
„Denken des Tages“ aufzunehmen, das sich
in den Begriff des Lebens, nicht den des
Todes vertieft und sich von da aus dem Pro-
bem einer humanen Ordnung stellt.
For Business, for Pleasure or for Necessity?

The Czech Republic’s Choices for Europe.

By Tim Haughton

What shapes a Member State’s choices for Europe? Why do some countries appear enthusiastic about further integration, but others appear reluctant or downright hostile?

Previous explorations into national preference formation have generated a number of different explanations including ideology, dependency and the relative power of societal groups. But these accounts were largely focused on the older Member States of Western Europe. Do New Member States such as the Czech Republic, therefore, confirm these theories or require us to rethink our frameworks?

In his provocative account of European integration, The Choice for Europe, Andrew Moravcsik argued that the preferences of Member States were driven by powerful societal groups, especially big business. Although there is some evidence, for example, that energy giant CEZ has influenced the Czech Republic’s policies on CO2 emissions, on energy policy more broadly, the Czechs enthusiasm for what Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Vondra calls ‘European solutions’ lies in deeper vulnerabilities linked to geography.

More broadly, in line with Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos and Hussein Kassim’s critique of Moravcsik work, stress on business interests fails to appreciate the role played by domestic institutional arrangements. The process of policy coordination within governments is an elaborate and complex one which at the very least tends to ensure that non-governmental actors tend not to have their interests directly translated into policy.

What business influence has been detectable has been concentrated less on the macro-level European issues, such as the Lisbon Treaty, Euro entry and enlargement and much more on the more prosaic, but highly significant issue of EU funds. Business interests benefit from the distribution of EU funds to poorer parts of the Union and, like many others in the new Member States, countless businessmen and politicians at the local and regional level see the EU as a ‘cash cow’ to be milked, hence ensuring the flow of funds is their top concern.

The overlap between the declared interests of Czech companies and the position of the government in the Presidency priorities highlights, however, that perhaps rather than focusing on lobbying we should look more deeply at the economic structure of the Czech Republic. Indeed, dependency arguments might therefore suggest that economies might be structurally more or less inclined towards greater integration. Following the logic of the transactionalists, such Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz, we might suggest that the more an economy is dependent on trade – especially on trade with its EU partners – the more it may see the benefits of greater European integration.

The Czech Republic has a relatively high trade to GDP ratio and has amongst the highest trade dependency on its fellow Member States in the EU. In addition the country is a net recipient of EU funds and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Given the Czech Republic’s significant dependence on trade and handouts, the logic of the transactionalist arguments would suggest we would see a great degree of enthusiasm for European integration, especially in the socioeconomic sphere. Whilst there has been broad support for liberalization, however, there has been less enthusiasm for the harmonization of taxes, especially under the centre-right government led by current Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek.

Linking in to the arguments in the above section highlighting the power of big business it is notable that the press releases of the Czech Republic’s largest exporter, Skoda auto (which by itself amounts to 7.5% of the country’s entire exports), steers clear of political comment, but given the appreciation of the Czech crown against the Euro in 2007 and 2008, the company has voiced concerns about the impact on exports. Although not calling for entry into the Eurozone, the company was sending a clear message that exchange rate fluctuations can be harmful for Czech exporters, which links in to Jeffry Frieden’s comparative findings that the principal supporters of fixing European exchange rates were firms and industries with major cross-border investments, markets or other business interests. The salience of the Euro to Czech exporters was not lost on Former Prime Minister Jiri Paroubek who called in July for entry as soon as possible ‘in the name of keeping the stability and prosperity of Czech industry and therefore for the entire country’. But the impact on Czech exporters appeared to have had less impact on the Topolanek government. Does ideology, therefore, as Mark Aspinwall argued, hold the key to explaining preference formation?
An ideological vision has been central to the politics of Former Prime Minister and current President Vaclav Klaus. Although there was a marked gap between the rhetoric and the reality of Klaus’s neoliberal policies as premier his espoused belief in the merits of the market spilled over into his view of European integration. His euro scepticism – and that of other leading figures in the centre-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS) which he founded and led for a decade – is rooted in both what Sean Hanley described as an ‘Anglo-Saxon economic critique of the EU as an inefficient, over-regulated and “socialist” structure dominated by self-seeking bureaucratic elites’ and a ‘national critique’ of the EU as a threat to Czech national sovereignty.

Although Klaus’ influence within ODS has diminished under Topolánek’s leadership, the President still remains a powerful figure, albeit one who seems increasingly revel in being controversial. He could not contain his glee, for example, when Irish voters rejected the Lisbon Treaty. He even offered to write a new treaty in his hospital bed whilst recovering from an operation!

If ideology is central to preference formation, one area where we might predict there would be stark differences between ODS and the Social Democrats (CSSD) is liberalization. Whilst the CSSD-led government expressed some reservations about the liberalization of services which were rooted in ideological concerns about the market, but also influenced by the position of the unions and an appreciation of potential ‘social dumping’, the differences between the current and former administrations have not been that great. Indeed, during the first few years of membership the liberalization of services was a shared theme of Czech governments of different ideological hues. Furthermore, perhaps unsurprisingly, both ODS and CSSD advocated the opening up of the labour market in EU-15 to the citizens of the New Member States and the removal of discrimination in the Common Agricultural Policy towards the New Member States.

Moreover, many of the priorities outlined by the Czech government for the impending presidency of the EU, such as energy security, are also ones advocated by the opposition. Even the key priority of an open and competitive Europe with a stress on the Lisbon agenda, education and research and development was not one to which much of the opposition objected. The official document even made explicit reference to one of the buzz words of the centre-left: flexicurity. Indeed, a range of politicians, union officials and civil servants I interviewed in Prague in June all acknowledged that if a Social Democratic-led government were in power, the priorities would be largely the same with perhaps a slight rebalancing towards a vaguely defined social dimension.

Throughout much of the post-2004 period there has been a striking overall continuity of policy in the Czech Republic. Part of the reason lies with the notions of vulnerability to which I return below, but what also drives continuity is a lack of interest amongst the key politicians. Prime Ministers Stanislav Gross and Jiři Paroubek, for instance, showed little interest in European policy, leaving their European policy to Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda and his ministry.

The processing analysis has highlighted that there are some merits to the accounts which stress the importance of ideology, interest groups and dependency. In line with Alan Milward’s magisterial account of the early years of integration I argue the key to explaining a country’s choices for Europe is vulnerability and the perceived shortcomings of the nation-state. Indeed, every major step in European integration can be seen as driven by Member States’ need to compensate for perceived domestic weakness.

If the argument based on vulnerability and perceived shortcomings is correct, it is incumbent upon us to identify the perceived vulnerabilities of the Czech Republic. The first vulnerability lies in the sphere of security. Here history does play a role. The twentieth century taught Czechs of the benefit of European co-operation and the need to be perceived as part of the Western European club of established democracies, but also the need not just to rely on fellow Europeans, hence the need for strong transatlantic relations.

The second vulnerability lies in the Czech Republic’s geography. A small state in the centre of the continent is dependent on its neighbors not just for security, but for economics. Even Klaus, who was decidedly lukewarm in his attitude towards accession prior to 2004 pointedly failing to state whether he would vote in favour of accession and merely calling on his fellow citizens to cast their ballots, stated unambiguously during a presidential debate in 2008 that the Czech Republic had no alternative but to be in the EU; a statement which was in line with many of his and his party’s earlier pronouncements.

The third component to the vulnerability lies in the impact of globalization. Support for strengthening the EU as a global actor is seen by CSSD politicians, some commentators and non-governmental activists, such as the unions, as a means of protecting and helping foster the much cherished – if often ill-defined – European social model. Here, however, we can suggest that ideology helps explain variation. In contrast to the Social Democrats, the Klausite wing of ODS sees a threat from the EU rather than conceiving of the EU as a protective umbrella.

Although ideology, dependency and powerful societal groupings can contribute towards an understanding of what shapes a country’s preferences, the key lies in perceived vulnerabilities and shortcomings. In short, states choose to integrate not out of strength, but out of (perceived) weakness. The stress on perceived vulnerability does provoke some thoughts about future developments. Although such factors as the size of the state and its history are essentially fixed factors, other determinants of perceived vulnerabilities can change over time. Indeed, if vulnerability is at least partly dependent on trade dependency, handouts from Brussels and levels of economic growth, might we expect to see that support for further integration in the Czech Republic and other 2004 entrants will diminish over time as they move towards becoming richer net recipient Member States or if there is a significant economic downturn in the Eurozone?
Fellows

Clemens Apprich
Ph.D. candidate in Cultural Studies, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin; ÖAW DOC stipendiary


DIY or die
Historical Genealogy of the Network Society

Talking about as well as investigating networks has become a determining morphology of our society in recent years. The aim of my research will be to reveal new forms of subjectivation, which produce specific concepts of subjectivity (as in the arts, business or communications) within the digital context. „Do it yourself or die“ is therefore a credo committed to a certain type of knowledge production in which the collective intelligence of the users becomes the central resource of individual and community life.

Larissa Cybenko
Associate Professor of Literature, Ivan Franko University of Lviv

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (January – June 2008)

Roman Ingarden: „Das literarische Kunstwerk“
(German > Ukrainian)

Ingardens Untersuchung über das literarische Kunstwerk übte erheblichen Einfluss auf moderne Literaturtheorien sowie auf die Musik- und Filmwissenschaft aus. „Das literarische Kunstwerk“, in Lemberg verfasst, wurde in der sowjetischen Ukraine unterdrückt. Die Publikation der Übersetzung dieses klassischen Textes soll das Werk nun in breiten Kreisen der ukrainischen Geisteswissenschaft bekannt machen.

Krassimira Daskalova
Associate Professor of History, St. Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia

Körber Visiting Fellow (May – October 2008)

Why History Matters: Women’s Road to Citizenship in South Eastern Europe (1840s–2006) and the Construction of Historical Memory

The aim of my project is to uncover and trace the path leading to women’s citizenship in the Balkans. My book also addresses forces that foster inclusiveness in developing civil societies in South Eastern Europe by filling the gap between local-neglected feminist traditions and the reproduction of historical memory, and in doing so, rewriting the contemporary gender contract in the region. It builds bridges between the past, present and future, between history and memory.

Brigitte Bargetz
Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, University of Vienna, ÖAW DOC-Team stipendiary

Junior Visiting Fellow (April – September 2008)

Politics and Everyday Life. Rethinking the Political in View of Neoliberal Restructuring

Neoliberal tendencies such as the privatization of parts of the state, the exclusion of structural inequalities within public debates, and the economization and individualization of the social, profoundly transform the sphere of the “private”. Whereas in mainstream political sciences the political is often still reduced to the “public”, I aim at rethinking a concept of the political that is able to grasp these current transformations of the supposedly private. My reflections attempt to add theoretical depth to refine the feminist claim that the private is political.

Sofia Dyak
Ph.D. candidate in History, Ivan Franko University Lviv

Körber Junior Visiting Fellow (January – June 2008)


This project compares the integration of two Central European cities, Wroclaw and Lviv, into new symbolic systems of national and political belonging, imagination, and power after the Second World War by looking at the space of the cities, the cityscapes, which reflected the authorities’ efforts to impose their version of history, politics, and identity and, after the end of Communism, of overcoming (or not) the legacies of these efforts. This research combines two components, employed – to different degrees – in building new identities for Lviv and Wroclaw after 1944/45 and after 1989/1991, i.e. urban planning and the politics of memory.

Andreas Elpidorou
Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Junior Visiting Fellow (July – December 2008)

Attention and Judgment in Perception

I am interested in investigating the relationship between memory and perception through a comparative examination of the development of early modern and phenomenological accounts of attention and concept formation. I aim to provide a historically informed contribution to a number of contemporary issues, such as, ecological and direct perception, marginal awareness, and the transformation of non-conceptual to conceptual content.
Navid Fozi-Abivard
Ph.D. candidate in Cultural Anthropology, Boston University
Junior Visiting Fellow (July - December 2008)

Cultural Survival: The Transmission of Knowledge and Identity among the Zoroastrian Community of Tehran, Iran

This is an anthropological study investigating the Zoroastrian tradition’s survival over a millennium of Islamicization in Iran. Focusing on religious rituals, I examine how images of the past are understood, established as social reality and used by different social actors in contemporary Iran. The theoretical framework of the study merges historicity with social theories concerning the distribution of knowledge. I hypothesize that the Zoroastrian tradition’s resilience is due to a configuration of religious knowledge that provides members with an enduring identification despite unprecedented challenges.

Lauren Freeman
Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University
Junior Visiting Fellow (July - December 2008)

Ethical Dimensions in Martin Heidegger’s Early Thinking

My philosophical interests concern the relation between ethics and ontology in Martin Heidegger’s thinking. I argue that his unique conception of selfhood makes important contributions to ethical questions of recognition and responsibility. Moreover, his phenomenological investigation is fraught with ethical dimensions that call into question the normative-descriptive distinction. My interpretation provides a unique entry point into current debates in ethics and metaethics via Heidegger’s phenomenologico-ethical description of lived experience.
United in Failure: The Founding of New Europe and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia?

My work is situated on the intersection of international relations and comparative politics, and concentrates particularly on the involvement of the European Union and the United States in the Balkans. My dissertation project evaluates the process of creation of the new European political and security identity by looking through the prism of Europe’s involvement in the former-Yugoslav crisis.

Global Justice and the Reform of Bretton Woods: “New Institutionalism” Meets Democratic Governance

My project explores a recent argument on the extent to which global justice principles may shape the workings of the World Trade Organization and Bretton Woods’ lending institutions as interpreted by Robert Hockett. His “new institutionalist” defense of actual trade and financial regimes as potential cosmopolitan agents often overlooks the role powerful states have played in shaping structures and policies of the organizations over time. I argue that a cosmopolitan critique needs to engage in a discussion of basic flaws in Bretton Woods’ and WTO’s democratic governance that conspire against the realization of even moderate egalitarian values.

The Symbolic Power of Biology: Articulations of Biological Knowledge in “Naturphilosophie” around 1800

Biology, established around 1800 as the “science of life,” has developed in modernity as not only a specific scientific discipline but has also continuously served as a kind of social knowledge. The proposed research project will start from and explore the thesis that the re-configuration of philosophy at the beginning of modernity is crucial for the status that biological knowledge gained in the modern order of knowledge. The research project focuses on the writings in Naturphilosophie by Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Arthur Schopenhauer.

The Husserlian Concept of Intersubjectivity and its Interpretation by Patočka and Schütz

The central idea of my research project is to study the Husserlian concept of intersubjectivity and its application in Social Sciences done...
by several authors, mainly Patocka, Schütz, Berger and Taylor. I think it is possible to develop from Phenomenology a way of understanding human beings according to their reality as beings in the world – knowing and acting in it – and in a community, and therefore in intrinsic relation with other human beings. In this sense, Phenomenology shows to be a truly interesting alternative to both Liberalism and Post-modernism.

**Katarzyna Malecka**

Adjunct Professor of English/American Literature, Academy of Management, Lodz

Project Research Associate (April – June 2008)

"To die will be an awfully big adventure": Bibliotherapeutical Aspects of Young People’s Literature Dealing with Death and Loss.

In 1971, American poet Galway Kinnell published "The Book of Nightmares", a poetic sequence dealing with death and dying, which he dedicated to his children. I am interested in researching more examples of poetic and prosaic sequences like Kinnell's, such as the Harry Potter series and A Series of Unfortunate Events, and exploring the artistic techniques which might help children and adults to cope with the phenomenon of death.

**Boyan Manchev**

Associate Professor in Philosophy, New Bulgarian University, Sofia; Director of Program and Vice-president of the International College of Philosophy, Paris


Alexandre Kojève, the Paradox of the End of Politics and the Philosophy of Political Action. European Project and European Praxis

Is the European project becoming a paradigmatic post-political project? The aim of the proposed research is to contribute to the analysis of the philosophical and political premises of the European project and at the same time to foster the critical reflection on its future. A departure point will be the analysis of the political visions of the Russian born French philosopher Alexandre Kojève who was also practically engaged in the construction of Europe. My working hypothesis: according to the logic of Kojève's philosophy of history, the European Union is the embodiment of the Hegelian "end of history".
Functionalism will prove to be useful, providing contemporary Russian scholars and journalists with new ways of understanding current ideological developments in Russia.

Teresa Novotna
Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Boston University
Junior Visiting Fellow (January – June 2008)

Democraticization through Common Polity Building: Examples of the Enlargement of the European Union and the German Unification

This project compares two parallel developments in the post-communist area from 1989 up to the present: the democratization of the CEE countries by building a common polity with their West European neighbors and the democratization of the former GDR through its integration into West Germany. The puzzle is that despite initially more favorable conditions in East Germany, the current results of the unification process appear to be unsatisfactory and disappointing in comparison to the situation in CEE. As a case study of EU enlargement, I have chosen the Czech Republic.

Piotr Nowak
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Bialystok University
Andrew W. Mellon Fellow (July – September 2008)

Violence and Words. The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt

During my stay at the IWM, I will investigate three topics in Hannah Arendt’s Political Philosophy. The first will be Arendt’s approach to Kant’s third Critique (the matter of taste as a criterion of political judgment); the second relates to the problem of Arendt’s understanding of her own Jewish roots, namely what the so called “Jewish Question” meant for her; the last topic I investigate will be the “problem of the origin of evil” as Hannah Arendt developed it in her philosophy.

Irina Papkov
Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest
Senior Visiting Fellow (July – December 2008)

The Missing (?) Fundamentalisms: Radical Orthodoxy and Catholicism in Eastern Europe

The project examines the causes behind the rise of Orthodox fundamentalism in post-communist South-Eastern Europe. Specifically, it compares the spread of fundamentalism within Orthodoxy to the absence of an analogous phenomenon within the Catholic Church in the same geographical area; such a systemic comparison should lead to the identification of factors which were present in the Orthodox but not in the Catholic case, and can thus be hypothesized to have contributed to the recent growth of Orthodox fundamentalism in South-Eastern Europe.
Jan Patočka: „Platon a Evropa“; „Nadcivilizace a její vnitrní konflikt“; „Europa und Nach-Europa. Die nacheuropäische Epoche und ihre geistigen Probleme“ (Czech, German > Russian)

In his later writings, Jan Patočka tries to reconstruct the spiritual roots of Europe as an ethical fundament of humanity. At the same time, he reflects on the possibilities and limits of an encounter between European and Non-European Civilizations.

The key texts that I will translate are aimed at intensifying the reception of Patočka in Russia. In light of the contemporary problems between Europe and Russia they may contribute to Russian public debate on the country’s notoriously difficult relationship to „Europe“.

Dan-Eugen Ratiu
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca

Andrew W. Mellon Visiting Fellow (April – June 2008)

Re-Imagining European Identity: An Unofficial Catalogue of European Civil Memory

The project addresses the process of social construction of European identity in Transylvania during the 18th and 19th century. The analysis focuses on identity forms related to civility, refinement and sociability, which are embodied in corporal habits and cultural practices as fashion and manners. In order to recollect a forgotten dimension of civil memory I examine written sources – philosophical, documentary or literary – as well as artistic representations – portraits, genre scenes – as forms of expressing identity and otherness.
develop a systematic analysis in

torical analysis of the early texts

Jan Patočka. Following a his-
asubjective phenomenology of

“theory of appearance” in the

establish whether we can find a

The present research intends to

nology of Jan Patočka

Asubjective Phenome-

study into

Transcendence. Study into

World, Movement, 

Istoric facts and partly on fiction-

accounts, into the evolution of the

ghetto of Lodz in

Poland during the Second

World War and the mind-set of

its Nazi-proclaimed leader

Mordechai Chaim Rumkows-

ki. The purpose of the investiga-

tion, which is carried out in

the form of a documentary

ovel, is to explore a tragic

and shameful historic event,

which also holds a key to our

understanding of present

diversities and divisions in

Europe.
and the West’s response. I plan to focus on energy and cyber security, and also on the question of historical memory – a highly contentious issue in the region.

Abram Trosky
Presidential Teaching Fellow, Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Boston University
Junior Visiting Fellow (February – June 2008)

Environmental Ethics and Cosmopolitanism

In his 1999 afterword to “Political Theory and International Relations”, Charles Beitz describes the tension between the cosmopolitan and social liberal conception of the morality of states as “the main challenge facing international political theory”. Beitz as well as John Rawls cast their lot with the former conception, intimating that complex interdependence ought not nullify the moral significance of the national community. However, environmental challenges and the fact of ecological interdependence demand substantive transnational cooperation more consonant with cosmopolitan liberalism. What insights can eco-phenomenology offer international political theory?

Vuksa Velickovic
Freelance journalist, contributor to B92 web portal, Belgrade
Fellow (July – September 2008)

Mixed Realities: Mapping the Balkan Alternative

My project explores alternative cultural practices in urban centers of former Yugoslavia. It focuses on electronic music and new media art forms as potential forces for shaping new identities and laying ground for a more dynamic intercultural dialogue among countries that once shared a unique political and cultural space. Comparing experiences in several Balkan and EU cities, from Pristina to Barcelona, the project emphasizes the role of ‘techno-culture’ as not only today’s signifier of global youth, but also a field of new social and political conflicts.
Travels and Talks

Brigitte Bargetz
Junior Visiting Fellow


Krassimira Daskalova
Körber Visiting Fellow

Participation: working meeting “Gender – Transitions in Central and South Eastern Europe”, organized by ERSTE Foundation in Vienna (June 26, 2008)

Participation: L’HOMME Tagung und Herausgeberinnen-Treffen in Prag (May 31, 2008)

Lauren Freeman
Junior Visiting Fellow

Lecture: “Hegel’s Legacy: A Heideggerian Account of Recognition”; North Texas Heidegger Symposium, University of Dallas at Irving (April 25-26)

Lecture: “Recognition Reconsidered: Leaping Ahead Toward a Heideggerian Approach”; 42nd Annual North American Heidegger Conference, Northern Illinois University, Dekalb (May 2-4)

Cornelia Klinger
Permanent Fellow

Lecture: „Was ist Solidarität? Entwirrung eines umkämpften Begriffs“ Vortrag bei der Frühjahrskademie der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt (April 26)

Lecture: „Über die Erfindung der Kultur und andere nostalgische Begriffsbildungen der Moderne“ in der Reihe Grazer Vorlesungen zur Kulturwissenschaft des Zentrums für Kulturwissenschaften der Universität Graz (May 7)

Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow


Lecture: „The Cultural Embodiment of Biology, Philosophies of Nature and Biological Knowledge Around 1800“, XXIInd World Congress of Philosophy: Rethinking Philosophy Today, Seoul National University, Seoul/Korea, (July 30 – August 5)

Klaus Nellen
Permanent Fellow

The meeting was hosted by the Estonian journal Vikerkaar, a member of Eurozine, a network of European cultural journals currently linking more than 70 partner journals and many associated magazines and institutions from nearly all European countries (www.eurozine.com)
Some new members and “comebacks” have joined the IWM staff: For the next two years, while Claudia Zimmer, who gave birth to a little girl named Ildiko (congratulations!) is on maternity leave, Maria Exel will be responsible for Office Management. Our Administrative Assistant Katharina Coudenhove-Kalergi is now back from maternity leave, and – without maternity questions – Karin Oberer serves as the new Assistant to the Rector.

Furthermore, some upgrading is to mention. Managing Director Susanne Fröschl completed her postgraduate studies in “Intra- and Entrepreneurship” and graduated in June. Congratulations to the Master of Business Administration.

Dirk Rupnow
Visiting Fellow

Participation: Panel discussion on “Gratwanderungen. The Protestant Churches and National Socialism”, Evangelisches Gymnasium, Wien (April 7)

Lectures: „Judenforschung‘ im Nationalsozialismus”, at the conference Völkische Wissenschaften im 20. Jahrhundert, Technical University Berlin (April 12-14)

Participation: book launch “Nationen und ihre Selbstbilder. Postdiktatorische Gesellschaften in Europa” (ed. by Regina Fritz, Carola Sachse and Edgar Wollfrum), Institut for Contemporary History/University of Vienna (April 24)


Mieke Verloo
QUING-Project

Participation: Workshop leader at the workshop of the Dutch Organisation of Gender Studies on resistances against gender (with Yvonne Benschop), Nijmegen (April 2)

Participation: Expert meeting on gender training, TARGET project linked to QUING, Humboldt University, Berlin (May 16-18)

Lecture: “Stretching and bending gender equality: the dynamics of a discursive construction of gender equality”, Launch of the UNESCO Chair of Gender Research, Lancaster (June 2-4)

Presentation: “‘Essential’ Feminist Historical Writings? Problems Composing a Polyphonic Canon” (with Conny Roggeband), Roundtable: Getting “the Word” out: Feminism’s Histories on the Web, 14th Berkshire Conference on the History of Women, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, Minneapolis (June 12-15)

Lecture: “Gender equality policies at the crossroads: New and old politics of privilege and exclusion”, Women’s World Conference, Madrid (July 3-9)

Participation: Intersectionality Short Course APSA 2008, Boston (August 27)

Doris Urbanek
QUING-Project

Lectures: “’We are family’ – Thinking intersectionally about family claims in a neoliberal policy environment”, at the conference Worlds of Women, Universidad Complutense Madrid (July 5-6)
Publications of Fellows and Guests

Krassimira Daskalova
Körber Visiting Fellow


ASPASIA: International Yearbook of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern European Women’s and Gender History, vol. 2 (Women Writers and Intellectuals), June 2008, edited by Francisca de Haan (Central European University), Maria Bucur (Indiana University) and Krassimira Daskalova (Sofia University) and published by Berghahn Books (New York and Oxford)

Cornelia Klinger
Permanent Fellow


Angelo Luceri
Visiting Fellow 2007

Gli epitalami di Blosio Emilio Draconzio (Rom. 6 e 7; a cura di Angelo Luceri) Roma: Herder Editrice E Libreria 2007

Piotr Nowak
Visiting Fellow


Dirk Rupnow
Visiting Fellow


Michael Staudigl
Visiting Fellow


Publications from the Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators

Jürgen Habermas
Midis natyratzmit dhe religjionit (Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion) Übersetzung ins Albanische von Arber Celiku (Paul Celan Fellow 2007), Tirana (Shkup) 2008

Friedrich Nietzsche
Emberi, nagyon is emberi (Menschliches, Allzumenschliches) Übersetzung ins Ungarische von Géza Horváth (Paul Celan Fellow 2002), Budapest (Osiris Kiadó) 2008

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At the end of 2004, the Institute initiated the circle of *IWM friends* to ask those who encouraged us and who followed our work over the years to actively support the IWM. We want to express our sincerest gratitude to more than one hundred friends and donors who have contributed approximately €60,000 over the last three years, which has helped us to co-fund our work since then.

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Thank you!

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IBAN: AT50 2011 1280 5698 6103
Empfänger: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Spendenkonto
BIC: GIBAATWW
Verwendungszweck/Subject: IWM friends

Im Herbst 2004 haben wir die *IWM friends* gegründet, um all jene, die unsere Arbeit über die Jahre hinweg begleitet und uns ermutigt haben, darum zu bitten, das Institut auch finanziell zu unterstützen. An dieser Stelle möchten wir uns ganz herzlich bei den mehr als 100 Freunden und Förderern bedanken, die in den vergangenen drei Jahren mit etwa €60.000 zu unserer Arbeit beigetragen haben.


Vielen Dank!


www.iwm.at/friends
Being Part of A Valued Whole

On Promoting Social Solidarity and Avoiding Isolation. By Jennifer Hochschild

The best way to promote solidarity in a society is to foster a sense of solidarity among its residents. That is not quite a tautology, since there could be other ways to promote solidarity (I mention a few below), and there is a difference between the fact of solidarity and a sense of solidarity. The crucial point is that members of a society need to feel as though they are part of a valued whole, with a shared stake in public choices, a sense of at least some mutual respect, and a willingness to tolerate differences that are not directly related to the shared public goals.

Arguably there are many paths to such a sense of solidarity, some more attractive than others and some more available at this historical juncture than are others. Traditional pathways, which are no longer desirable and/or available, included a common religious identity involving the shared pursuit of salvation or conversion, a robust monarchy understood as the representative and ruler of the whole society, a dense network of mutual feudal obligations, a common pursuit of conquest or colonialism – or a common resistance to colonial domination or too-powerful neighboring states – and a fixed national boundary encompassing a homogeneous population and no geographic mobility across those boundaries. What are now modern western societies used all of those paths to solidarity in the past, but they are no longer viable for creating a sense of common goals.

Other pathways to solidarity have arisen in their place, however. For example, government policy and dominant public opinion in France seek commonality through an overarching republican ideal, being what Michael Walzer calls “French all the way down.” It is a political vision of a universalistic conception of equal individual rights, growing out of the ideals of the French Revolution and some of its successor regimes. The government of France refuses to recognize or permit official designations by race, religion, nationality, or immigrant background; these sorts of differences may flourish in the private arena, but not in the public one. As the High Council for Integration put it in 1991, “Integration is a way to obtain the active participation to society as a whole of all women and men who are lastingly going to live on our land while overtly accepting that specific, mostly cultural, features will be preserved and nevertheless insisting on the similarities and the convergence, with equal rights and duties for all in order to preserve the cohesion of our social fabric.”

This is an admirable ideal for promoting a sense of solidarity in theory. But like all other pathways it faces problems in practice, which can lead to a feeling of social isolation or the fact of physical isolation from other French men and women. For one thing, private or cultural differences cannot help but spill over into the public arena. Immigrant communities might seek government policies such as public support for mosques as for cathedrals, or individual rights such as wearing religious insignia like headscarves in public institutions. In addition, discrimination against individuals or disfavored groups contributes to residential concentration in poor neighborhoods, disproportionate levels of crime and unemployment, and inadequate schooling and failed transitions to the adult labor market. The absence of systematic data on group-based physical, social, and economic isolation makes it difficult to fight group-based mistreatment. France thus has not yet demonstrated that it is possible, in Patrick Simon’s words, simultaneously “to protect minorities (by maintaining their differences), integrate them (by creating

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Jennifer Hochschild is Henry LaBarre Jayne Professor of Government, Professor of African and African American Studies at Harvard University. She participated in the “Talking about Europe”- debates in Burgtheater Vienna in spring, and she will participate in the Institute for Human Sciences’ 4th Conference on Solidarity, “Isolation”, taking place on September 26-27 in Boston (see: www.iwm.at – events calendar).
The United States takes a different pathway to creating a sense of solidarity among its residents, with correspondingly different goals and problems. It recognizes publicly-salient differences among racial and ethnic groups, and has developed an array of policies based on that recognition and differentiation. The goal is essentially the same as that of France – a universalistic conception of equal individual rights – but the means to it has moved away from color-blind individualism in favor of programs such as group-based affirmative action in universities and public employment, or electoral districts drawn to ensure that a majority of voters are from one or several minority groups. To foster these policies, the government collects large streams of data that are or can be analyzed in terms of racial or ethnic identity.

Like the republican strategy, the strategy of promoting a sense of solidarity by seeking equalization among groups has problems (and has led to many Americans’ desire to return to the promotion of color-blind individualism). By some accounts, discrimination against disfavored groups persists, as does residential isolation and separation into poorly-performing schools, prisons, and low-paying workplaces. But by other accounts, the problem is not too little but too much attention to putative group-based inequalities, so that Americans are pushed into thinking in racial terms about problems that are not primarily racial. For example, blacks and immigrants or their descendents are being hit disproportionately hard by the recent wave of bank foreclosures on home mortgages; should that be understood and dealt with as a problem of racial or ethnic discrimination, or as an economic problem of the over-stretched working class (the majority of whom are white)? Another example: should immigrants follow the route of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, demanding their rights through protest and litigation against presumably racist elites – or should they follow a more assimilative route by seeking to learn English, move out of ethnic enclaves, become U.S. citizens, avoid isolation by connecting as much as possible with their native-born neighbors and co-workers? A strategy of promoting solidarity by contesting group-based discrimination may not give good answers to these questions.

Neither France nor the United States – nor any other country – has figured out the ideal way to promote solidarity. Perhaps the question isn’t as important as it is to avoid moving into a sense of solidarity. The key, as I noted earlier, is that members of a society need to feel as though they are part of a valued whole, with a shared stake in public choices, a sense of at least some mutual respect, and a willingness to tolerate differences that are not directly related to the shared public goals.

They need, in short, to have a stake in society, both symbolically through culture or religion and materially, through jobs and the acquisition of resources. How is that to happen?

With regard to immigrants and their descendents, the most important first step in developing a sense of solidarity is a clear pathway to full citizenship that does not require too much sacrifice of ties to the country of origin. What that pathway looks like, and how much sacrifice of ties is “too much,” will inevitably differ for each country – but the principle is, in my view, the same for all. With regard to ethnic or racial native-born minorities, legal citizenship is not an issue, but a sense of fully legitimate, first-class citizenship is. That implies a belief that the country is genuinely committed to abolishing discrimination, isolation, andascriptively-based inequalities. Again, the policies needed to bring about that belief will differ by country, but they will presumably involve everything from good education and jobs to visible representation in governance and the abolition of residential segregation.

Public opinion data give a quick snapshot of how far countries have to go in achieving a sense of solidarity among all residents. Here I have room only to give a few examples, with a focus on Austria because of IWM’s location in Vienna. A quarter of immigrants, a third of noncitizens, and almost half of the members of ethnic minority groups perceive discrimination against their group or people like them in Austria. Compared with other European countries, those figures are rather high. Looking at public opinion data from native-born, majority-group Austrians, it is not hard to see why. About two-thirds of Austrian citizens would prefer less immigration, and almost half say that it is “very important” to have been “born in this country” to be “truly Austrian.” That is higher than the comparable responses in every other western European country surveyed except for Ireland. Unusually high proportions of Austrians also agree that it is very important to have citizenship in the country in order to be truly Austrian, to have Austrian ancestry, or to share the customs of the country. Interestingly, the only dimension on which American public opinion is less demanding of immigrants than in other European countries comes in response to a query about “respect[ing] the laws and institutions of the nation – only two in five think that this is very important for being truly Austrian. In short, a substantial proportion of native-born, majority-group Austrians presents a profile that is rather suspicious of outsiders and that sets a high, perhaps insuperable, barrier to becoming a full-fledged member of the country.

Another survey, however, offers a slightly more promising picture of how Austrians (and, mutatis mutandis, residents of other countries) can develop a mutual sense of solidarity. Compared with residents of twenty other European countries, Austrians are especially likely to agree that learning the country’s language, attaining a good education, and holding a high-skill job are important for immigrants “to be part of our society.” Conversely, Austrians are especially unlikely to demand that immigrants be of their race, religion, or culture in order to be part of the society. The traits that Austrians deem most important can be learned; the ones that cannot easily be acquired are relatively less important. By this measure, public policies can in fact promote a sense of solidarity by enabling immigrants and native-born Austrians alike to develop the skills needed to have a shared stake in society.

Whether the government should promote this development through French-style individualistic republicanism or an American-style group-based fight against discrimination, or some other strategy, is a topic for another day. But it seems clear that, although Austrians do not especially welcome newcomers, they do see a feasible pathway to developing a sense of solidarity. That is the essential beginning.

Americans are pushed into thinking in racial terms about problems that are not primarily racial.
The assignment I have been given here is to address the following question: How Christian can a democracy be? In the final analysis, this is a theological or philosophical question: How Christian should a democracy be? Obviously, this will be answered differently depending on one’s overall view of religion. Militant secularists will, of course, insist that Christianity or any other religion should have no public recognition in a democracy. But different answers will also be given in terms of different Christian traditions. There have been very specific ideas as to the desirability of a Christian state in Roman Catholic, Protestant and Eastern Orthodox terms, and historically these ideas have been hard to reconcile with democracy, which was seen as substituting popular sovereignty for the sovereignty of God. Gradually (and usually with initial reluctance) the major churches have accepted the secular democratic state, at least to the degree of accepting the de facto reality of the separation of church and state. As is well known, however, this separation takes quite different forms in the democracies of Europe and the Americas.

This is not the place to enter into the complex theological debates over the relation of Christianity and the state. In the interest of honest advertising, let me just say that my own theological approach to this issue comes out of an (admittedly heterodox) Lutheran understanding of the “two kingdoms”. In that understanding, the state (democratic or otherwise) neither can nor should be Christian. This was succinctly summarized by Luther when he said that he would rather be ruled by a just Turk than by an unjust Christian. The function of the church is to proclaim the Gospel, which refers to cosmic events that radically relativize all human institutions. The function of the state is to maintain a tolerable degree of order and justice in an as yet unredeemed world. The notion of a Christian state, then, is a theologically unacceptable oxymoron.

I take it that my assignment here was given to me, not as a lay theologian, but as a sociologist. Let me then without further ado put on my sociological hat. I think the issue here is not one of democracy as such, but rather of liberal democracy. There can also be illiberal democracies, where one can find the institutional mechanisms of elections, political parties and the competition between them, but where there is a consensus about values that are definitely not liberal. The question here is: What are those values? And what do they have to do with Christianity?

The great Rabbi Hillel was once asked whether one could state the meaning of Torah while standing on one leg. Hillel said yes and then formulated the original version of the Golden Rule. He added: “The rest is commentary”. I think that the values of liberal democracy can be stated while standing on one leg. In the words of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, “Die Würde des Menschen ist unantastbar” – “The dignity of man is inviolable”. And one may add: “The rest is commentary”. It goes without saying that such commentary can

The values of liberal democracy can be stated while standing on one leg: “The dignity of man is inviolable”.

There are no images in this document.
congenial to apologists for various autocratic regimes. To counter this argument it is useful to insist that these values are not primarily theoretical propositions but rather are the result of a distinctive perception. And, curiously enough, once this perception has been purveyed, people in cultures far from the West embrace it and the political institutions which embody it. A perception, not a theory, of human dignity: One of the best literary examples of this is the description by Mark Twain of how Huckleberry Finn came to see the escaped slave as a precious human being, and from this perception came to the conclusion that he must not be returned to his owner. Furthermore, the perception unavoidably intends universality. If slavery was unacceptable in the antebellum American South, it is unacceptable today in Darfur — and in retrospect it was unacceptable in classical antiquity, even if Aristotle and just about everybody else (including most slaves) did not recognize this at the time.

Since I am speaking about this in Europe, let me briefly turn to the context in which the question of democracy and Christiani- ty is being presently discussed here, and not only by political parties that still carry a Christian label, however vaguely defined. The context affects both domestic and foreign policies in the European Union.

Domestically, of course, there is the emotionally charged problem of the integration of Muslim immigrants: Allegiance to which behaviors must be insisted upon, even if they are alien to the original cultures of the immigrants? Conversely, which behaviors may legitimately be proscribed? It seems to me that one may think here of a kind of triage: Certain behaviors that clearly cannot be tolerated, such as honor killings or genital mutilation of women, certain behaviors that are clearly acceptable, such as the right to practice Islamic piety in public (including, in my opinion, the wearing of Muslim headgear). But then there are in-between areas, in which prudence rather than principle seems to me to be indicated, such as the questions of the location of mosques or of gender segregation in publicly funded Muslim schools.

It is important, I believe, to avoid two equally reprehensible attitudes: an arrogant ethnocentrism, and a masochistic multiculturalism.

Values are not primarily theoretical propositions but rather are the result of a distinctive perception.

In terms of foreign policies, there is the problem of the extent to which European governments will advocate the values of liberal democracy in countries whose regimes suppress them. Europeans have been critical — quite correctly, I think — of the Wilsonian propensities of American foreign policy “to make the world safe for democracy”. But the opposite of this can be a cynical readiness to refrain from criticism of any tyranny with which one can do profitable business and to be indifferent to the atrocities committed by the tyrants. Just how one could avoid the immorality of either position goes beyond the confines of these remarks.

Both with regard to domestic and foreign policies it is important, I believe, to avoid two equally reprehensible attitudes — an arrogant ethnocentrism, maintaining the absolute superiority of one’s own culture — and a masochistic multiculturalism, ready to be tolerant of any culture except one’s own. When it comes to the core values of Western civilization, I would recommend a certain robust self-confidence. There is an instructive episode recounted in the wonderful history of the British Empire by James Morris (he underwent a sex change operation and has been writing as Jan Morris — but that is another story). When General Napier conquered the Sind — now part of Pakistan — for the Raj, he did what the British did everywhere: he left indigenous institutions pretty much alone, except for a few that were clearly unacceptable. Among these was suttee, the burning of widows. After he proscribed this practice, he was visited by a delegation of Brahmins. They remonstrated: “You must not forbid suttee. It is an ancient tradition of our people.” He replied: “We British also have ancient traditions. When men burn a woman alive, we hang them. Let us all follow our traditions.” Napier, by the way, was no illiterate thug. After the conquest he sent a telegram to the Colonial Office consisting of one Latin word — “pec一回事” — I have sinned. This was a time when one could still assume that Whitehall officials understood Latin. No longer so. But that is yet another story.
Upcoming Events

Monthly Lectures:

**Timothy Snyder:** A Habsburg Ukraine. The Dream and the Nightmare of Archduke Wilhelm (1895-1948)  September 18

**Jens Alber:** Die Ungleichheit der Wahlbeteiligung in Europa und den USA  October 13

**Slavenka Drakulic:** New Europe Strikes Back. Should We Worry about the Rise of Populism in the East?  November 18

**Jürgen Kocka:** Mode und Wahrheit. Zum Wandel der Geschichtswissenschaft in den letzten fünf Jahrzehnten  December 2

Lecture Series:

**Den Staat neu denken? Moderne konservative Politik im internationalen Vergleich**

**Rocco Buttiglione:** As Much State as Needed; as Little State as Possible  October 6

**Umweltpolitik und Solidarität**

**Wolfgang Sachs:** Wem gehört, was übrig bleibt? Ressourcenknappheit und Menschenrechte  November 5

**Dirk Messner:** Wie der Klimawandel die Nord-Süd-Beziehungen verändert  December 10

**Kunst – Gesellschaft – Politik**

**Wolfgang Ullrich:** Designer als Interpreten: wie Konsumgüter unseren Alltag inszenieren  December 16

Other Events:

**On Solidarity 4:** Isolation. Conference at Boston University  September 26-27

**Lecture**

**Peter L. Berger:** Global Expansion of Protestantism  October 16

**Workshop:** Christianity, History and Europe

**Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz:** Postsäkulares aus der Postmoderne  October 30

**Political Salon**

Der Markt wird uns schon richten. Kann die Gesellschaft der fortschreitenden Ökonomisierung aller Lebensbereiche entgehen?

With **Kurt Biedenkopf** and **Johannes Hahn**  November 24

**Book-Presentation:**

„Achsen der Ungleichheit. Zum Verhältnis von Klasse, Geschlecht und Ethnizität“

With **Cornelia Klinger**, **Gudrun-Axeli Knapp**, **Birgit Sauer**  December 12

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