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# Newsletter 74

IWM BOSTON |

In November 2001, the IWM launched a joint venture with Boston University, establishing the Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University. The Institute aims to develop primarily policy-oriented research projects and to strengthen in this way the collaboration of the IWM, its European partners and scholars, intellectuals, politicians and respective institutions in the US.

## IWM and Boston University launch joint venture in Boston

IN COLLABORATION with and supported by Boston University, the Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University, a bridgehead of IWM on the other side of the Atlantic, has become operational as of November, 2001.

Over the past decade the IWM's purview has increasingly encompassed the United States. The mission of the Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University is to initiate policy-oriented projects with an American-European scope and help to achieve their implementation. The Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University will work in collaboration with, and draw on the resources of, the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM) in Vienna.

After the collapse of the bi-polar world order at the end of the 20th century and with the imminent Enlargement of the European Union at the beginning of the 21st, the



Fareed Zakaria



James Hoge



Krzysztof Michalski

## IWM BOSTON

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relations between the New and the Old World undergo profound changes. The activities of the Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University aim at offering analysis and reflection of these processes both to those working in the field and the interested public.

Among the first projects will be a series of public debates to be held in Washington, DC and New York, bringing together leading European politicians with scholars, journalists and practitioners to discuss issues of immediate relevance to international politics and domestic public policies.

In addition, the Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University will help develop further fellowship programs – beyond the currently existing Junior Fellows program at the IWM in Vienna – and initiate international, interdisciplinary research projects.

The new Institute is not attached to any particular department at Boston University, though it will be a resource for many. It will be managed by an international Board of Directors – chaired by Krzysztof Michalski (Director, IWM Vienna, and Professor of Philosophy, Boston University) – and will be run by its Executive Director, Kirsten S. Wever.

Im November 2001 eröffnete das IWM als Gemeinschaftsprojekt mit der Boston University das **Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University**. Es soll – vor allem gesellschaftspolitisch orientierte – Forschungsprojekte entwickeln und dadurch die Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem IWM und seinen europäischen Partnern einerseits und nordamerikanischen Institutionen, Forschern, Intellektuellen und Politikern andererseits stärken.



**Kirsten S. Wever**  
Executive Director of the  
Institute for Human  
Sciences at Boston  
University

**Kirsten S. Wever** received her Ph.D. in International Political Economy and Management at MIT in 1986. She has been a consultant to the International Labour Office in Geneva, the U.S. Department of Labor, and a variety of private sector organizations, and, most recently, was a professor at the School of Management and Labor Relations at Rutgers University. Her publications include *Negotiating Competitiveness: Employment Relations and Organizational Innovation in Germany and the United States* (Harvard Business School Press, 1995), as well as two edited volumes and many research articles in, for example, *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, *International Labour Review*, *The Journal of Public Policy*, *Die Mitbestimmung*, and the *Harvard Business Review*.



Pierre Rosanvallon



Michael Mertes



Timothy Garton Ash



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Ira Katznelson

On October 24, Edward W. Said, Professor of Comparative Literature at Columbia University, delivered, at the IWM's and the Renner Institute's invitation, the 15th Jan Patocka Memorial Lecture. Read extracts from a speech that attracted over 500 people to the Palais Schwarzenberg in Vienna.

## The Public Role of Writers and Intellectuals

IN EVERYDAY USAGE in the languages and cultures with which I am familiar, a "writer" is a person who produces literature – that is, a novelist, poet, dramatist. I think it is generally true that in all cultures writers have a separate, perhaps even more honorific, place than do "intellectuals"; the aura of creativity accrues to writers as it doesn't at all to intellectuals, who with regard to literature belong to the slightly debased and parasitic class of "critics".

Yet at the dawn of the twenty-first century the writer has taken on more and more of the intellectual's adversarial attributes in such activities as speaking the truth to power, being a witness to persecution and suffering, and supplying a dissenting voice in conflicts with authority.

In that wider setting, then, the basic distinction between writers and intellectuals need not be made. Insofar as they both act in the new public sphere dominated by globalization (and assumed to exist even by adherents of the Khomeini *fatwa*), their public role as writers and intellectuals can be discussed and analyzed together.

First we need to take note of the technical characteristics of intellectual intervention today. To get a grasp of the speed to which communication has accelerated in the past decade, I'd like to contrast Jonathan Swift's awareness of effective public intervention in the early eighteenth century with ours. Swift was surely the most devastating pamphleteer of his time, and during his campaign against the Duke of Marlborough in 1711-12 was able to get 11,000 copies of his pamphlet *The Conduct of the Allies* onto the streets in two months. This brought the Duke down from his high eminence but nevertheless did not change Swift's pessimistic impression that his writing was basically temporary, good only for the short time that it circulated.

In the age of electronic media such considerations are mostly irrelevant, since anyone with a computer and decent Internet access is capable of reaching numbers of people quantum times more than Swift did, and can also look forward to the preservation of what is written beyond any conceivable measure. Our ideas today of discourse and archives must be radically modified and can no longer be defined as Foucault painstakingly tried to describe them a mere two decades ago. Even if one writes for a newspaper or journal, the chances of digital reproduction and (notionally at least) an unlimited time of preservation have wreaked havoc on the idea of an actual, as opposed to a virtual,

audience. These things have certainly limited the powers that regimes have to censor or ban writing that is considered dangerous, although there are fairly crude means for stopping or curtailing the libertarian function of online print.

As things stand, an article I might write in New York for a British paper has a good chance of reappearing on individual websites or via e-mail on screens in the United States, Japan, Pakistan, the Middle East and South Africa as well as Australia. Authors and publishers have very little control over what is reprinted and recirculated. For whom then does one write, if it is difficult to specify the audience with any sort of precision? Most people, I think, focus on the actual outlet that has commissioned the piece or on the putative readers we would like to address. The idea of an imagined community has suddenly acquired a very literal, if virtual, dimension.

All of us should therefore operate today with some notion of very probably reaching much larger audiences than any we could conceive of even a decade ago, although the chances of retaining that audience are by the same token quite chancy. This is not simply a matter of optimism of the will: It is in the very nature of writing today. This makes it very difficult for writers to take common assumptions between them and their audiences for granted, or to assume that references and allusions are going to be understood immediately.

On one side, a half-dozen enormous multinationals presided over by a handful of men control most of the world's supply of images and news. On the other, there are the independent intellectuals who actually form an incipient community, physically separated from each other but connected variously to a great number of activist communities shunned by the main media but who have at their disposal other kinds of what Swift sarcastically called oratorical machines. Think of what an impressive range of opportunities is offered by the lecture platform, the pamphlet, radio, alternative journals, the interview form, the rally, church pulpit and the Internet, to name only a few.

So, rapidity is a double-edged weapon. There is the rapidity of the sloganeeringly reductive style that is the main feature of "expert" discourse, and there is the rapidity of response and expandable format that intellectuals and indeed most citizens can exploit in order to present fuller, more complete expressions of an alternative point of view. I am



Edward Said

Seit 1987 veranstaltet des IWM jährlich eine öffentliche Vorlesung zum Gedenken an den tschechischen Bürgerrechtler und Philosophen Jan Patocka. Die 15. Vorlesung in der Reihe hielt auf Einladung des IWM und des Renner Instituts im Oktober 2001 der Literaturwissenschaftler und politische Kommentator Edward W. Said. Sein Thema: Die Rolle von Schriftstellern und Intellektuellen in der heutigen Gesellschaft. Wir bringen Auszüge aus Suids Rede, die mehr als 500 Zuhörerinnen und Zuhörer im Wiener Palais Schwarzenberg versammelte.





Prince Schwarzenberg welcoming the audience



Karl Duffek, Director of the Renner Institute, introducing the speaker



suggesting that by taking advantage of what is available in the form of numerous platforms, an intellectual's alert and creative willingness to exploit them creates the possibility of initiating wider discussion. (...)

The emancipatory potential and the threats to it – of this new situation must not be underestimated. Let me give a very powerful example of what I mean. There are about 4 million Palestinian refugees scattered all over the world, a significant number of whom live in large refugee camps in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and in Gaza and the West Bank. In 1999 an enterprising group of young and educated refugees living in Dheisheh camp, near Bethlehem on the West Bank, established the Ibdāa Center, whose main feature was the *Across Borders* project; this was a revolutionary way, through computer terminals, of connecting refugees in most of the main camps, separated geographically and politically by impossibly difficult barriers, to one another. For the first time since their parents were dispersed in 1948, second-generation Palestinian refugees in Beirut or Amman could communicate with their counterparts inside Palestine.

On August 26, 2000, all the computers in Dheisheh were destroyed in an act of political vandalism that left no one in doubt that refugees were meant to remain refugees, which is to say that they were not meant to disturb the status quo that had assumed their silence for so long. It wouldn't be hard to list the possible suspects, but it is hard to imagine that anyone will ever be named or apprehended. In any case, the Dheisheh camp-dwellers immediately set about trying to restore the Ibdāa Center, and seem to some degree to have succeeded. To answer the question "why" individuals and groups prefer writing and speaking to silence is equivalent to specifying what the intellectual and writer confront in the public sphere. The existence of individuals or groups seeking social justice and economic equality – and who understand, in Amartya Sen's formulation, that freedom must include the right to a whole range of choices affording cultural, political, intellectual and economic development – ipso facto will lead to a desire for articulation rather than silence.

The intellectual's role generally is to uncover and elucidate the contest, to challenge and defeat both an imposed silence and the normalized quiet of unseen power, wherever and whenever possible. For there is a social and intellectual equivalence between this mass of overbearing collective interests and the discourse used to justify, disguise or mystify its workings while at the same time preventing objections or challenges to it. In this day, and almost universally, phrases such as "the free market," "privatization," "less government" and others like them have become the orthodoxy of globalization,

its counterfeit universals. They are staples of the dominant discourse, designed to create consent and tacit approval. From that nexus emanate such ideological confections as "the West," the "clash of civilizations," "traditional values" and "identity" (perhaps the most overused phrases in the global lexicon today). All these are deployed not as they sometimes seem to be – as instigations for debate – but quite the opposite, to stifle, pre-empt and crush dissent whenever the false universals face resistance or questioning.

The main goal of this dominant discourse is to fashion the merciless logic of corporate profit-making and political power into a normal state of affairs. Behind the Punch and Judy show of energetic debate concerning the West and Islam, for example, all manner of antidemocratic, sanctimonious and alienating devices (the theory of the Great Satan or of the rogue state and terrorism) are in place as diversions from the social and economic disorientations occurring in reality. In one place, Hashemi Rafsanjani exhorts the Iranian Parliament to greater degrees of Islamization as a defense against America; in the other, Bush, Blair and their feeble partners prepare their citizens for an indeterminate war against Islamic terrorism, rogue states and the rest.

The intellectual can offer instead a dispassionate account of how identity, tradition and the nation are constructed entities, most often in the insidious form of binary oppositions that are inevitably expressed as hostile attitudes to the Other. Pierre Bourdieu and his associates have very interestingly suggested that Clinton-Blair neoliberalism, which built on the conservative dismantling of the great social achievements (in health, education, labor, social security) of the welfare state during the Thatcher-Reagan period, has constructed a paradoxical doxa, a symbolic counterrevolution that includes the kind of national self-glorification I have just mentioned. This, Bourdieu says, is conservative but presents itself as progressive; it seeks the restoration of the past order in some of its most archaic aspects (especially as regards economic relations), yet it passes off regressions, reversals, surrenders, as forward-looking reforms or revolutions leading to a whole new age of abundance and liberty.

All intellectuals carry around some working understanding or sketch of the global system; but it is during the direct encounters with it in one or another specific geography or configuration that the contests are waged (as in Seattle and Genoa) and perhaps even winnable. There is an admirable chronicle of the kind of thing I mean in the various essays of Bruce Robbins's *Feeling Global: Internationalism in Distress* (1999), Timothy Brennan's *At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now* (1997) and Neil Lazarus's *Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial World* (1999), books whose

self-consciously territorial and highly interwoven textures are in fact an adumbration of the critical (and combative) intellectual's sense of the world we live in today, taken as episodes or even fragments of a broader picture, which their work and that of others is in the process of compiling. What they suggest is a



map of experiences that would have been indiscernible, perhaps invisible, two decades ago, but that in the aftermath of the classical empires, the end of the cold war, the crumbling of the socialist and non-aligned blocs, the emergent dialectics between North and South in the era of globalization, cannot be excluded either from cultural study or from the somewhat ethereal precincts of the humanistic disciplines. I've mentioned a few names not just to indicate how significant I think their contributions have been but also to use them in order to leapfrog directly into some concrete areas of collective concern, where, to quote Bourdieu for the last time, there is the possibility of "collective invention". He observes that the whole edifice of critical thought is thus in need of reconstruction. This work of reconstruction cannot be done, as some thought in the past, by a single great intellectual, a master-thinker endowed only with the resources of his singular thought, or by the authorized spokesperson for a group or an institution presumed to speak in the name of those without voice, union, party, and so on. This is where the "collective intellectual" can play its irreplaceable role, by helping to create the social conditions for the collective production of realist utopias.

My reading of this is to stress the absence of any master plan or blueprint or grand theory for what intellectuals can do, and the absence now of any utopian teleology toward which human history can be described as moving. Therefore, one invents goals abductively, that is, hypothesizes a better situation from the known historical and social facts.

So in effect this enables intellectual

performances on many fronts, in many places, many styles, that keep in play both the sense of opposition and the sense of engaged participation. Is there some non-trivial way of generalizing about where and in what form such struggles are taking place now? I shall limit myself to saying a little about only three, each of which is profoundly amenable to intellectual intervention and elaboration.

The **first** is to protect against and forestall the disappearance of the past, which in the rapidity of change, the reformulation of tradition and the construction of simplified bowdlerizations of history is at the very heart of the contest described by Benjamin Barber as "Jihad versus McWorld." The intellectual's role is first to present alternative narratives and other perspectives on history than those provided by the combatants on behalf of official memory and national identity – who tend to work in terms of falsified unities, the manipulation of demonized or distorted representations of undesirable and/or excluded populations, and the propagation of heroic anthems sung in order to sweep all before them.

At least since Nietzsche, the writing of history and the accumulations of memory have been regarded in many ways as one of the essential foundations of power, guiding its strategies and charting its progress. Look, for example, at the appalling exploitation of past suffering described in their accounts of the uses of the Holocaust by Tom Segev, Peter Novick and Norman Finkelstein or, just to stay within the area of historical restitution and reparation, the invidious disfiguring, dismembering and disremembering of significant historical experiences that do not have powerful enough lobbies in the present and therefore merit dismissal or belittlement. The need now is for deintoxicated, sober histories that make evident the multiplicity and complexity of history without allowing one to conclude that it moves forward impersonally according only to laws determined either by the divine or by the powerful.

**Second** is to construct fields of coexistence rather than fields of battle as the outcome of intellectual labor. There are great lessons to be learned from decolonization; first, that, noble as its liberatory aims were, it did not often enough prevent the emergence of repressive national-

ist replacements for colonial regimes; second, that the process itself was almost immediately captured by the cold war, despite the non-aligned movement's rhetorical efforts; and thirdly, that it has been miniaturized and even trivialized by a small academic industry that has simply turned it into an ambiguous contest among ambivalent opponents.

**Third**, in the various contests over justice and human rights that so many of us feel we have joined, there needs to be a component to our engagement that stresses the need for the redistribution of resources and that advocates the theoretical imperative against the huge accumulations of power and capital that so distort human life. Peace cannot exist without equality: This is an intellectual value desperately in need of reiteration, demonstration and reinforcement. The seduction of the word itself – peace – is that it is surrounded by, indeed drenched in, the blandishments of approval, uncontroversial eulogizing, sentimental endorsement. The international media (as has been the case recently with the sanctioned wars in Iraq and Kosovo) uncritically amplify, ornament, unquestioningly transmit all this to vast audiences for whom peace and war are spectacles for delectation and immediate consumption. It takes a good deal more courage, work and knowledge to dissolve words like "war" and "peace" into their elements, recovering what has been left out of peace processes that have been determined by the powerful, and then placing that missing actuality back in the center of things, than it does to write prescriptive articles for "liberals", à la Michael Ignatieff, that urge more destruction and death for distant civilians. The intellectual can be perhaps a kind of counter-memory, putting forth its own counterdiscourse that will not allow conscience to look away or fall asleep.

Still, just as history is never over or complete, it is also the case that some dialectical oppositions are not reconcilable, not transcendable, not really capable of being folded into a sort of higher synthesis. The example closest to home for me is the struggle over Palestine, which, I have always believed, cannot really be simply resolved by a technical and ultimately janitorial rearrangement of geography allowing dispossessed Palestinians the right (such as it is) to live in about 20 percent of

their land, which would be encircled by and totally dependent on Israel.

Nor, on the other hand, would it be morally acceptable to demand that Israelis should retreat from the whole of former Palestine, now Israel, becoming refugees like Palestinians all over again. No matter how I have searched for a resolution to this impasse, I cannot find one, for this is not a facile case of right versus right. It cannot be right ever to deprive an entire people of their land and heritage or to stifle and slaughter them, as Israel has been doing for the thirty-four years of its occupation. But the Jews too are what I have called a community of suffering, and brought with them a heritage of great tragedy. Yet unlike Zeev Sternhell, I cannot agree that the conquest of Palestine was a necessary conquest—the notion offends the sense of real Palestinian pain, in its own way also tragic.

Overlapping yet irreconcilable experiences demand from the intellectual the courage to say what is before us, in almost exactly the way Adorno, throughout his work on music, insisted that modern music can never be reconciled with the society that produced it; but in its intensely and often despairingly crafted form and content, music can act as a silent witness to the inhumanity all around. Any assimilation of individual musical work to its social setting is, says Adorno, false. I conclude with the thought that the intellectual's provisional home is the domain of an exigent, resistant, intransigent art into which, alas, one can neither retreat nor search for solutions. But only in that precarious exilic realm can one first truly grasp the difficulty of what cannot be grasped, and then go forth to try anyway.

Previous Jan Patocka Memorial Lectures:

- 2000 Czeslaw Milosz (Cracow)
- 1999 William Julius Wilson (Harvard)
- 1998 Elie Wiesel (Boston)
- 1997 Tadeusz Mazowiecki (Warsaw)
- 1996 Albert O. Hirschman (Princeton)
- 1995 George Soros (New York)
- 1994 François Furet (Paris)
- 1993 Mario Vargas Llosa (Lima and London)
- 1992 Jacques Derrida (Paris)
- 1991 Charles Taylor (Montreal)
- 1990 Paul Ricoeur (Paris)
- 1989 Zbigniew Brzezinski (New York)
- 1988 Leszek Kolakowski (Oxford/Chicago)
- 1987 Hans-Georg Gadamer (Heidelberg)

A selection of Jan Patocka Memorial Lectures has been published in German since 1993 by **Passagen Verlag**, Vienna.

Wie kein anderer Denker verbindet Paul Ricoeur die französische Tradition mit der deutschen Phänomenologie und angelsächsischen Ansätzen. Ricoeur, Mitglied des wissenschaftlichen Beirates des IWM, ist dem Institut seit dessen Gründung verbunden und hielt im Oktober die *IWM Vorlesungen zu den Wissenschaften vom Menschen*.

## Recognising and Being Recognised Paul Ricoeur zum Prozess der Anerkennung

DIE BEGRIFFE *recognition*, *reconnaissance* oder *Anerkennung* haben in den letzten Jahren immer mehr Beachtung gefunden. Die Beschäftigung ihnen reicht von der begriffsgeschichtlichen Analyse des „Kampfes um Anerkennung“ bei Hegel bis hin zur Forderung nach einer „Politics of Recognition“. Verschiedene Autoren haben sich an der Debatte um die Begriffe *recognition*, *reconnaissance* oder *Anerkennung* beteiligt, unter ihnen prominente Denker wie Jürgen Habermas oder Charles Taylor.

In letzter Zeit hat sich ein weiterer zeitgenössischer Philosoph diesem Thema zugewandt: Paul Ricoeur stellte im Rahmen der Reihe „IWM-Vorlesungen zu den Wissenschaften vom Menschen“ in drei Vorträgen (1.-3. Oktober 2001) seine Überlegungen zum Thema *The Process of Recognition* vor. Ricoeur, am 27. Februar 1913 in Valence (Frankreich) geboren, gilt als Nestor der zeitgenössischen französischen Philosophie.

Wie wird das Wort *recognition* in der Alltagssprache verwendet? Entspricht dieser Gebrauch auch der Verwendung der Wörter *reconnaissance* oder *Anerkennung*? Und welche Bedeutung kommt diesem alltäglichen Gebrauch in Hinsicht auf den philosophischen Diskurs zu? Diese Fragen bildeten den Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen Ricoeurs. Das Verb *to recognize* findet in seiner aktiven und passiven Form Verwendung. Die aktive Form beschreibt eine Gedankenoperation, die wir zu beherrschen meinen: Ich erkenne etwas, jemanden oder mich selbst (wieder); ich erkenne eine Schuld oder ein Kind an. Dagegen wird durch die passive Form *to be recognised* das „anerkannt werden“ im Sinne Hegels angesprochen, das wir von den anderen verlangen. Für Ricoeur bezeichnet dieser Übergang von der aktiven zur passiven Form des Verbs *to recognize* einen semantisch bedeutsamen Umschlag und bildete daher die Leitlinie seiner Vortragsreihe.

Der erste Vortrag befasste sich mit dem Verhältnis von *recognition* und Identifikation von



Paul Ricoeur

Under the general title of *The Process of Recognition*, Paul Ricoeur in his three „IWM Lectures in Human Sciences“ (October 1-3, 2001) addressed the topics of „Recognition and Identification“, „Recognition and Selfhood“ as well as „Social and Political Recognition“. After Charles Taylor, who spoke in 2000, Paul Ricoeur was the second speaker in this new lecture series. The lectures will be jointly published in 2003 by Suhrkamp (Frankfurt/Main), Harvard University Press and ZNAK (Warsaw).



Sachen und Personen, wobei theoretische, aber auch praktisch-philosophische Überlegungen im Vordergrund standen. Den zweiten Vortrag widmete Ricoeur dem Verhältnis von *recognition* und Selbstheit (*selfhood*), das heißt der Frage nach der personalen Identität. Im letzten Vortrag behandelte Ricoeur schließlich die soziale und politische Dimension des *recognition*-Begriffs.

Zunächst bezeichnet *recognition* in seiner aktiven Form das gedankliche Erfassen eines Objektes – sei es eine Sache oder eine Person – als ein Ganzes, indem eine Vielzahl verschiedener Vorstellungen in Zeit und Raum zueinander in Beziehung gesetzt werden. In diesem Sinne meint *recognition* letztlich die Identifikation des Objekts: Der über einen Zeitraum hinweg erfasste Gegenstand erweist sich als derselbe und kein anderer.

Ricoeur griff in diesem Zusammenhang auf den Begriff der *Recognition* zurück, wie ihn Kant der ersten Auflage der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* verwendet. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist für Ricoeur dabei die Nähe des Kantischen *Recognition*-begriffs zu dessen Zeit-Konzept. Ricoeur knüpfte an dieses Konzept an, um wie schon in *Du texte à l'action* (1986) einen eigenen sprachpragmatischen Ansatz zu entwickeln. Über die bloße Aussage bezüglich des Gegenstandes hinaus lässt sich das allmähliche Erfassen eines Objekts im Prozess der *recognition* als ein performativer Akt, als Sprechakt auffassen.

Für Ricoeur ist es insbesondere die Illokution dieses Sprechaktes, die den Unterschied zwischen *recognition* und *cognition*, *acknowledgement* und *knowledge* sowie *Anerkennung* und *Erkenntnis* ausmacht. Neben dieser Differenzierung von Aussage und Illokution betonte Ricoeur weiter den Unterschied zwischen der Äußerung selbst und demjenigen, der diese Äußerung tätigt. Durch diese Unterscheidung wird ein subjektives Element in den Prozess der *recognition* eingeführt, das die persönliche Verflechtung des Sprechers mit dem Diskurs zum Ausdruck bringt und den Raum für weitere Wertungen eröffnet.

Im zweiten Vortrag rückte Ricoeur das Problem der *self-recognition* von Personen in den Vordergrund. Ausgangspunkt war der Begriff der Identität, wobei allerdings deutlich wurde, dass sich die

Identität eines Menschen nicht in der gleichen Weise wie die Identität einer Sache bestimmen lässt. Wie in seinem Werk *Soi-même comme un autre* (1990) stellte Ricoeur zunächst die Frage, woran wir eine bestimmte Person als diese Person erkennen. Die spezifischen Züge einer Person erschöpfen sich nicht in ihrer Körperlichkeit. Vielmehr müssen andere, für Personen spezifische Eigenschaften wie die Empfindung von Liebe, Hass oder Angst hinzukommen, die Ricoeur als mentale Prädikate bezeichnete. Problematisch erwies sich in diesem Zusammenhang, wie die Zuschreibung mentaler Prädikate in angemessener Weise vollzogen werden kann. Ricoeur führte aus, dass Empfindungen wie Liebe, Hass oder Angst Wirkung auf die Person entfalten und Spuren hinterlassen. Diese Spuren verweisen auf ein abwesendes, vergangenes Ereignis. Durch ihre Interpretation können die mentalen Prädikate ermittelt und der Person zugeschrieben werden.

Besondere Bedeutung kommt für Ricoeur der Erinnerung (*recollection*) zu, die er als radikal persönliche Erfahrung charakterisierte. Im Anschluss an Augustinus und Locke erweist sie sich als das eigene Medium personaler Identität. Wie bereits in seinem Werk *La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli* (2000) verwies Ricoeur erneut auf die von Aristoteles eingeführte Unterscheidung zwischen Gedächtnis und Erinnerung, wobei die Erinnerung die dynamische Komponente bezeichnet, und dessen Bestimmung, dass das Gedächtnis mit Zeit verbunden ist. Mit Bergson hob Ricoeur die Tiefendimension des Gedächtnisses hervor: Das Gedächtnis ist ein Vermögen zwischen Reproduktion und Imagination, das ein Andauern der Vergangenheit ermöglicht. Durch den Prozess der Erinnerung kann die Wiederentdeckung der Vergangenheit erfolgen.

Für die personale Identität stellt die Frage der gespaltenen Erinnerung (*split memory*) allerdings ein großes Problem dar. Personale Identität – im Sinne von Selbigkeit (*sameness*) verstanden – steht der Verschiedenheit (*diversity*) der Akte entgegen, die eine Person ausmachen. Wie lassen sich diese beiden Pole miteinander vermitteln? Wie kann die Aneignung dieser Akte durch die Person erfolgen? Und wie lassen sich die verschiedenen Akte schließlich einer Person zurechnen? Für Ricoeur kann diese Vermittlung nur

im Bewusstsein geschehen. Dabei bedarf es zunächst der Anerkennung einer inneren Verschiedenheit: Das „ich kann“ der Person kann sich auf ein Sprechen, ein Handeln oder ein Erzählen beziehen. Ricoeur prägte in diesem Zusammenhang den Begriff der narrativen Identität, der die Verschiedenheit der Akte zu umfassen vermag. Mit Hannah Arendt formulierte Ricoeur daher, dass eine Geschichte die Frage nach dem *Wer* einer Handlung beantworten kann. Hierauf aufbauend kann dann auch die moralische Zurechnung einer Handlung erfolgen. Ricoeur verwies hier auf MacIntyre, der von der narrativen Einheit des Lebens spricht. Der zweite Vortrag schloss mit zwei Fragen: Kann der Prozess der *self-recognition* erfolgreich verlaufen und kann er ohne den Anderen vollzogen werden?

Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen des dritten Vortrages, der sich mit dem Prozess der *recognition* aus sozialer und politischer Sicht befasste, war das Bedürfnis der Menschen, von anderen anerkannt zu werden. Anhand zweier literarischer Beispiele erläuterte Ricoeur dieses Bedürfnis: Bei seiner Rückkehr nach Ithaka wird Odysseus von seinem Sohn als Vater anerkannt. Das Ende der *Odysee* stellt daher einen erfolgreichen Fall der *recognition* dar.

Dagegen schildert Shakespeares *King Lear* anhand der Beziehung zwischen dem König und Cordelia das Scheitern der *recognition*. Anhand dieser beiden Beispiele verdeutlichte Ricoeur das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen *recognition* und Verweigerung der *recognition* sowie zwischen *self-recognition* und *recognition* durch andere. Für Ricoeur bedarf es zur Vermittlung zwischen diesen Polen der gesellschaftlichen Institutionen. Einen entsprechenden Ansatz für die Begründung dieser Institutionen findet Ricoeur im Anerkennungsbegriff Hegels.

Hegel entwickelt den Anerkennungsbegriff in Auseinandersetzung mit Hobbes und setzt ihn der Lehre vom Naturzustand des Menschen entgegen. Hegel antwortet auf Hobbes mit dem von Fichte rezipierten Anerkennungsbegriff, den er in das Verhältnis von Selbstreflexion und Bezug zu anderen einstellt.

Ricoeur führte aus, dass Hegel auf diese Weise eine moralische Verpflichtung zur Anerkennung begründet, deren Pole die „Missachtung“ und die „Nachsichtig-

keit“ darstellen. Auf der Grundlage dieser moralischen Verpflichtung entwickelt Hegel nun verschiedene Institutionen der Anerkennung: die Familie, die bürgerliche Gesellschaft und den Staat. Ricœur betonte zum einen den Zusammenhang zwischen dieser institutionellen Struktur der Anerkennung und ihrer Negativität (der Kriminalität). Zum anderen hob er hervor, dass sich im Prozess der Anerkennung die Verletzlichkeit des menschlichen Selbstbezugs zeigt. Im Anschluss formulierte er daher die folgenden Fragen: Wann können wir davon sprechen, dass wir anerkannt worden sind, und warum bestehen Schwierigkeiten bei der Bestimmung hinreichender Anerkennung?

Zuletzt wies er auf die Asymmetrie des Anerkennungsbegriffs hin, die sich beispielsweise bei der Anerkennung einer Autorität aufgrund ihrer Überlegenheit ergibt. Wie lässt sich in diesen Fällen Reziprozität erreichen? Mit dieser offenen Frage beschloss Ricœur den dritten Vortrag.

Bereits zu Beginn der Vortragsreihe hatte Ricœur seine Bereitschaft zur Diskussion bekräftigt. Mit großer Offenheit stand er den Fellows sowie den auswärtigen Gästen des IWM Rede und Antwort. Dabei nutzte er die lebhafteste Diskussion, um die in den Vorträgen entwickelten Thesen zu verteidigen und weiter zu vertiefen. Wie schon in den Vorträgen war sein produktiver Umgang mit der philosophischen Tradition bemerkenswert, der es ihm erlaubte, klassische Positionen für die aktuelle Diskussion fruchtbar zu machen. In den letzten Jahrzehnten hat Ricœur immer wieder die Vorarbeiten zu seinen Werken dem interessierten Publikum vorgestellt, um die Anregungen der folgenden Diskussion in sein Schaffen mit einzubeziehen. In diesem Sinne war bereits sein letztes Werk *La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli* (2000) ein Zeugnis der besonderen Schaffenskraft Ricœurs. Die Beschäftigung mit dem Thema *The Process of Recognition* lässt allerdings hoffen, dass schon bald das nächste Werk folgen wird: Der Veröffentlichung der Vorträge durch das IWM können wir in jedem Fall mit Spannung und Interesse entgegensehen.

*Henrik Richard Lesaar, Freiburg i. Br.*

Die Vorlesungen erscheinen im Frühjahr 2003 zeitgleich beim **Suhrkamp Verlag, Harvard University Press** und **ZNAK** (Warschau). Die ersten Vorlesungen in dieser neuen Reihe hat Charles Taylor im Jahr 2000 gehalten. Sie erscheinen in Kürze bei den genannten Verlagen.

A Symposium organised by the *Institute of Contemporary History (USD, Prague)* and the *Institute for Human Sciences (IWM, Vienna)* under the auspices of IWM's Partner *Institutions Program* supported by the *Bosch Foundation* aimed at comparing the Czech and Polish way of dealing with the recent past, especially communism, to see if there are lessons to be learned from each other.

## The Memory of Communism in the Czech Republic

### Program

**October 19**

Mala aula, Karolinum

### Public keynote speech

**Charles of Schwarzenberg**

**October 20**

Charles University

### Morning Session

**Chair: Janos Matyas**

**Kovacs, Vienna**

### Welcome

**Oldrich Tuma, Prague**

**Klaus Nellen, Vienna**

### Politics of Memory after

**1989**

**Jacques Rupnik, Paris**

### Memory of Communism

**in the Czech Republic**

**Vilem Precan, Prague**

### Commentaries:

**Andrzej Paczkowski,**

*Warsaw*

**Eva Hahn, Oldenburg**

**Samuel Abraham,**

*Bratislava*

### Afternoon Session

**Chair: Oldrich Tuma, Prague**

### Memory of Communism:

**The Case of Poland**

**Andrzej Paczkowski,**

*Warsaw*

### Commentaries:

**Jiri Vykoukal, Prague**

**Michal Kopecek, Prague**

### Participants

**Samuel Abraham**

Director, Institute for

Higher Learning,

Bratislava

**Muriel Blaive**

Centre français de

recherche en sciences

sociales (CEFRES), Prague

**Marie Cerna**

Institute for Contemporary

History, Prague

**Adela Gjuricova**

Institute for Political

Studies, Faculty of Social

Sciences, Charles

University, Prague

**Eva Hahn**

Historian, Oldenburg

**Michal Kopecek**

PhD Candidate, Institute

for Contemporary

History, Prague

**Janos Matyas Kovacs**

Permanent Fellow, IWM,

Vienna

**Klaus Nellen**

Permanent Fellow, IWM,

Vienna

**Andrzej Paczkowski**

Professor of History,

Institute of History, Polish

Academy of Sciences

**Vilem Precan**

Founding Director, Insti-

tute of Contemporary

History, Prague

Czechoslovak

Documentation Center

**Charles of Schwarzenberg**

**Jacques Rupnik**

Research director, CERI -

Centre d'études et de

recherches internatio-

nales, Paris

**Jana Starek**

Director, Austrian

Science and Research

Liaison Office Brno

**Miloslav Tejchman**

Professor of History,

Historical Institute, Czech

Academy of

Sciences, Prague

**Oldrich Tuma**

Director, Institute for

Contemporary History,

Prague

**Jiri Vykoukal**

Director of Russian and

Eastern European

Studies, Institute of Inter-

national Studies, Faculty

of Social Sciences,

Charles University, Prague

**Pavel Zacek**

former Member of the

"Office for investigation

and documentation of

the crimes of

communism"; now Insti-

tute for Contemporary

History, Prague



Excerpt from Jacques Rupnik's contribution:

### The Politics of Coming to Terms with the Communist Past

WHAT IS NEEDED is not rhetorical statements about the criminal nature of the communist totalitarianism or more police files in pirate editions at every bookstore, but a history which will try to address the difficult and somewhat embarrassing question about the indigenous sources of Czech communism, about the role of nationalism, about the vulnerabilities of Czech political culture (an egalitarian democracy, not a liberal one) to the totalitarian temptation: How come the most economically advanced democratic country in Central Europe produced the most rigid, entrenched and lasting brand of communism in the region?

All over Central Europe it used to be said that "the most difficult thing to predict is the past". That era is not quite over yet. In reclaiming and reinterpreting their history all the nations of the region ask: When did the "tragedy of central Europe" (Kundera) start? Who is responsible? Everywhere there is a search for the "original sin", and the answer carries considerable political implications. In the Czech case should we start searching in 1968 (the Russians), or in 1948 (the Czech Communists), or in 1938 (Franco-British betrayal to Hitler), or even in 1918 (i.e. nationalism). How far back should we go to understand the roots of "our present crisis" (Masaryk)? And each of the above-mentioned answers is politically loaded.

The historian is thus placed in front a gratifying yet uncomfortable role: he is to provide the tools to confront the communist legacy and at the same time help to recompose a traumatised identity, to chose a usable past for a democratic future. In so doing the task of the Central European historian today is not completely dissimilar to that of the French historians helping the society at large cope with the past of the war time Vichy regime. In France, it took almost thirty years (the eclipse of De Gaulle and of the Communists) for a new generation to be able to confront old political clichés and taboos. In Prague, as in the rest of Central Europe, the "Vichy syndrome" has only begun.

The complete text will be published in Transit – Europäische Revue 22 (see page 32).

Im Rahmen des durch das Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen getragenen und durch den FWF finanzierten Forschungsprojektes *Der andere Weg in die Moderne. Jan Patockas Beitrag zur Genealogie der Neuzeit* wird ein bisher unbekannter Teil des Nachlasses Jan Patockas einer systematischen Auswertung und Bearbeitung unterzogen.

## Unbekanntes aus dem Nachlass Jan Patockas

DER BEDEUTENDSTE TSCHECHISCHE PHILOSOPH des 20. Jahrhunderts, Jan Patocka (1907-1977), hinterließ bei seinem tragischen Tod einen umfangreichen literarischen Nachlass. Ein Teil dieses Nachlasses entging jedoch lange der Aufmerksamkeit der Herausgeber seiner Werke. Es sind Manuskripte, die Patocka im Jahre 1971 dem Literarischen Archiv des Prager Museums der nationalen Literatur anvertraut hatte. Erst Ende der achtziger Jahre wurden diese Manuskripte entdeckt, blieben jedoch für lange Jahre unbearbeitet.

Dabei hat sich herausgestellt, dass dieser Teil des Nachlasses Jan Patockas, der Manuskripte aus den Jahren 1929-1964 beinhaltet, umfangreiche Handschriften unvollendeter Werke birgt, an denen Patocka während des zweiten Weltkrieges gearbeitet hatte. Die Sichtung der Manuskripte ergab, dass es insgesamt drei groß-angelegte philosophische Werke waren.

### Die Philosophie des Menschen

Das erste ist ein systematisches Werk, das eine transzendental begründete Philosophie des Menschen und der Welt zu erarbeiten trachtet. Von diesem großen Projekt existieren freilich nur Teile, etwa die programmatische Einleitung mit dem Titel *Über die zweifache Art des Philosophierens* oder die Kapitel *Das Innere, die Zeit, die Welt; Das Innere und der Geist; Die Welt und die Gegenständlichkeit*. Eine besondere Stelle nimmt unter diesen Manuskripten das über 150 Seiten umfassende Kapitel VIII ein, das eine phänomenologische Theorie der Subjektivität entwickelt. Ihr vorausgehen sollte offensichtlich eine philosophische Deutung des nicht-menschlichen organischen Lebens, ihr folgen ein Kapitel über die Fragen des speziellen Metaphysik, z.B. über die Theorie der Idealitäten. An diesem Manuskript arbeitete Jan Patocka in den Jahren 1942-1944. Es

trägt inhaltlich deutliche Spuren des Einflusses von Heideggers *Sein und Zeit*, und es bricht mit zahlreichen Exzerpten aus dem 1943 erschienenen *L'Être et le Néant* von J.-P. Sartre ab.

### Geschichtsphilosophie

Das zweite, nicht weniger breit angelegte Werk trägt den Titel *Philosophie der Geschichte*. Auch zu ihm liegt eine Einleitung vor, der man die Zielsetzung des Projektes entnehmen kann. Patocka wollte in diesem Werk einen grundsätzlichen philosophischen Beitrag zur Genealogie der Neuzeit leisten. Die leitende Frage der Schrift war: „Was spielte sich eigentlich während jener Jahrhunderte ab, in deren Laufe aus dem christlichen Menschen der nachchristliche Mensch geworden ist?“ Die Vorarbeiten zu diesem Werk umfassen mehrere tausend Seiten, die sich mit der europäischen Geistesgeschichte vom 15. bis zum Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts befassen, darunter Untersuchungen über Autoren wie Marsilio Ficino, Pico della Mirandola oder Pietro Pomponazzi, Kapitel über den literarischen und wissenschaftlichen Renaissance-Humanismus, über die Naturphilosophie der Spätrenaissance, über die Aufklärung in Frankreich und in Deutschland, bis hin zu Abhandlungen über Herder und Kant. An diesem Werk arbeitete Patocka allem Anschein nach in den Jahren 1940-1943.

### Mythologica

Das dritte unvollendete Werk, ein Manuskript von 290 Seiten, ist mit dem Titel





10 Upon his tragic death after a police interrogation, the Czech philosopher Jan Patocka (1907-1977) left a substantial amount of unpublished works. The project „The Other Way into Modernity: Jan Patocka's Contribution to the Genealogy of Modern Age“ discovered three major unfinished philosophical texts have recently been discovered among the manuscripts: A philosophy of man, a philosophy of history, and a text of 290 pages on the role of myth and mythology in Czech and German romanticism.

*Der Mythos in unserer Romantik und bei Erben insbesondere* versehen und knüpft an die *Philosophie der Geschichte* an. Sein Thema ist breiter als der Titel ahnen lässt. Es befasst sich mit dem Interesse an Mythos und Mythologie in der deutschen und in der tschechischen Romantik. Das einleitende Kapitel macht klar, dass Patocka dadurch den Zugang zur Eigenart der Epoche des ausgehenden 18. und der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhundert gewinnen wollte, die er der positivistischen zweiten Hälfte gegenüberstellte. Der ganzen Studie schickt er eine eigene Abhandlung über die Philosophie des Mythos voraus. Im dritten Teil verfolgt er das Thema des Mythos in der deutsche Literatur von Goethe über Novalis bis Hölderlin, im vierten das selbe Thema in der deutschen Philosophie und Wissenschaft von Fichte zu Schelling und Görres. Unvollendet blieb leider das Kapitel, das dem Thema des Mythos bei den tschechischen romantischen Schriftstellern und Wissenschaftlern gewidmet ist, zumal K. J. Erben und seiner *Slawischen Mythologie*, die das Pendant der *Deutschen Mythologie* Jacob Grimms bilden sollte. An diesem Werk arbeitete Jan Patocka spätestens ab dem Jahre 1943.

### Die philosophischen Tagebücher

Alle diese Manuskripte sowie die im Nachlass ebenfalls enthaltenen *Philosophischen Tagebücher* sind von hohem philosophischem und allgemein kulturhistorischem Interesse. Sie warten zuerst auf eine tschechische Edition – sämtliche Texte sind auf Tschechisch verfasst –, auf deren Grundlage Übersetzungen in andere Sprachen, insbesondere ins Deutsche, in Angriff genommen werden können.

Filip Karfik

### Pressezeit

#### Späte Würdigung des Geschichtstheoretikers Jan Patocka


**Wien/Prag** – Eines der zentralen Anliegen des Wiener Instituts für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM) ist die Aufarbeitung des Werkes von Jan Patocka (1907-1977). Der tschechische Phänomenologe sowie Geschichts- und Ästhetiktheoretiker hat in zahlreichen Schriften die europäische Geistesgeschichte zu ihren Wurzeln zurückverfolgt und alternative Deutungen insbesondere des mitteleuropäischen Denkens vorgeschlagen.

Eine Projektgruppe am IWM arbeitet nun in Kooperation mit dem Prager Zentrum für phänomenologische Forschung einen zentralen Strang in Patockas Denken auf: seinen Vergleich zweier Protagonisten der frühen Moderne, Descartes und Comenius, in Hinblick auf ihre Relevanz für die nachfolgenden gesellschaftlichen Formationen. Zu diesem Zweck werden die Schriften Patockas in einem vom Wissenschaftsfonds geförderten, auf drei Jahre anberaumten Projekt erfasst, übersetzt und nach Themen gesichtet.

#### Frankreich-Vergleich

„Descartes und Comenius“, sagt der Slawist und Philosoph Ludger Hagedorn, „unterscheiden sich durch ihre Ansätze – der erstere mathematisch orientiert, Comenius eher universalistisch. Ein Vergleich der Entwicklungen in Frankreich und in Mitteleuropa zeigt, wie relevant dieser Unterschied geblieben ist; siehe etwa den deutschen Idealismus, Schelling, Herder, Hegel – dieser Geist blieb in Mitteleuropa lebendig, ganz anders als in Frankreich.“

## Jan Patocka-Gedächtnisvorlesungen



**William Julius Wilson**  
**Soziale Ungleichheit in den USA.**

**Plädoyer für eine multi-ethnische Bündnispolitik**

Passagen Verlag; Wien, Herbst 2001

Ca. € 14,-, DM 27,40/OS 193,-;

ISBN 3-85165-508-7; 96

Seiten, Broschur

Die zugleich analytische und politisch-praktische Vorlesung bietet eine Diagnose der heutigen USA und eine Therapie zur Behandlung ihres drängendsten Problems – der zunehmenden Ungleichheit und, in der Folge, des Herausfallens immer größerer Teile der Bevölkerung aus der Gesellschaft. Wilson

fordert nicht weniger als eine neue Bewegung für soziale Gerechtigkeit, deren politische Strategie auf ein breites, ethnische Differenzen übergreifendes politisches Bündnis aller fortschrittlichen Kräfte zielt und so das Erbe des tief verwurzelten amerikanischen Rassismus überwindet.

**William Julius Wilson**, Professor of Social Policy an der John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, zählt zu den angesehensten und politisch einflussreichsten Sozialwissenschaftlern in den USA.

Man kenne den Mähren Comenius/Komenský bei uns hauptsächlich als den „Vater der Pädagogik“, sagt der Phänomenologe und Verantwortliche des IWM-Patocka-Archivs, Klaus Nellen, und dieses Bild soll durch die Brille Patockas korrigiert werden – wie im Übrigen auch die Definition „Philosoph“ Jan Patocka nur zum Teil gerecht werde. Er war darüber hinaus ein engagierter Intellektueller, der ab 1950 in der CSSR nicht mehr universitär arbeiten durfte (später aber immerhin zur Mitarbeit an der tschechischen Comenius-Ausgabe zugelassen wurde) und der in seinem letzten Lebensjahr noch die berühmte *Charta 77* mitunterzeichnete.

Viele seiner Manuskripte, auch zum Thema Comenius, hatte Patocka in der Staatsbibliothek versteckt, sie wurden viel später entdeckt, sodass die Sichtung erst vor kurzem beginnen konnte.

### Geschichte nicht linear

Für Ergebnisse ist es noch zu früh, aber, so Hagedorn, zunächst ist man sich in der Projektgruppe einig, dass sich der Blick auf die geistigen Traditionen Mitteleuropas lohnt. „Wir vergewissern uns hier einer gemeinsamen Identität und entfernen uns von einem linearen Geschichtsmodell. Es geht darum, miteinander auszukommen, ohne eine Tradition über die andere zu stützen.“

Eine Konferenz zum Thema Patocka gab es bereits im Frühjahr, weitere werden folgen. Und seit vielen Jahren zeigt das IWM seine Verbundenheit mit dem tschechischen Philosophen und Husserl- und Heidegger-Schüler: in Form der jährlichen Patocka-Gedächtnisvorlesungen und der gleichnamigen Junior Visiting Fellowships für junge Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler.

*Michael Freund, Der Standard, 18. Dezember 2001*

The comparative, interdisciplinary seminar *Europe or the Globe?* builds on the results of IWM's previous *State and Globalization* seminar series and will be continued in 2002. Please visit the IWM website for details.

## Europe or the Globe? Eastern European Trajectories in Times of Integration and Globalization

WHY IS THERE A NEED to choose between the two paths? Should Eastern European societies necessarily abandon the benefits of globalization when joining the European Union? Or is it precisely the accession that will help them catch up with global processes? Brussels promises both of the possible best worlds: a refuge for the newcomers against the adverse effects of globalization, as well as a partnership in which they can exploit the advantages of global development more efficiently.

However, as the years pass by, and the gates of the Union open up rather slowly, the countries of the former Eastern bloc have no other chance but to face global challenges in their own ways. They are making efforts to adjust to the plethora of

EU requirements but also find their societies transforming to global (US?) patterns. By joining NATO, hosting multinational companies, introducing American-style capital markets and welfare regimes, or following global trends of mass culture, etc., some of the new democracies in Eastern Europe could become, in a few important fields, different from the societal model(s) offered by Western Europe. All the more so because in the takeover of global features the danger of producing peculiar hybrids with communist legacies arises. These may, in turn, impede the accession, for the incumbents will fear too much, whilst the entrants will fear too little “diversity amidst unity”.

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### Seminar Sessions, Fall 2001

September 19

**Miglana Nikolchina**, *literary science, feminist theory, Sofia*

**The Transitional Ironies of the Community: Feminism after Communism**

September 26

**Fatos Lubonja**, *journalism, Tirana*

**Changing Perceptions of the “West” in Albania after Communism**

(co-organized by the *Kulturni Centar*, Vienna)

October 10

**Reinhard Engel**, *business journalism, Vienna*  
**Integrating Central and Eastern Europe. The Role of Industrial Pan-European Networks**

October 31

**Jodi Dean**, *political science, Geneva, N.Y.*  
**Communicative Capitalism**

November 14

**Peter Biegelbauer**, *political science, Vienna*  
**The Shaky Future of Corporatism in the European Integration Process**

November 21

**György Lengyel**, *sociology, Budapest*  
**Action Potential of Hungarian Entrepreneurs: Who Is Afraid of the European Integration?**

November 28

**Maria Todorova**, *history, Urbana-Champaign*  
**Remembering Communism. Issues and Methodology**

November 29

**Augustina Dimou**, *history, Florence*  
**Paths to Modernity. Intellectuals and Socialism in the Balkans**



Every Tuesday evening the IWM hosts a speaker, often a current fellow or monthly guest, who holds a public lecture related to one of the Institute's projects or research fields. An e-mail information service on upcoming events is available on IWM's website

[www.iwm.at](http://www.iwm.at)

Jeden Dienstag ist die Bibliothek des IWM Schauplatz eines öffentlichen Vortrags, gefolgt von einer informellen Diskussion. Fellows und Gäste des Instituts sowie internationale Wissenschaftler und Intellektuelle werden eingeladen, ihre aktuellen Forschungsergebnisse zu präsentieren. Einen e-mail-Informationsservice zu bevorstehenden Veranstaltungen bietet die Website des IWM, [www.iwm.at](http://www.iwm.at)

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## Tuesday Lectures

25 SEPTEMBER

**Maria Todorova**  
**Are National Heroes Secular Saints?**  
**Vasil Levski And The Making Of The Bulgarian National Pantheon**

VASIL LEVSKI, the undisputed and most venerated pinnacle of the Bulgarian national pantheon, has long attained a mythical status and has served as a coveted symbol for political legitimation. His recent canonization by the alternative synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox church embroiled him also in the church split. At the same time, there is a grass-roots process directed at the official acceptance of his sainthood. At the moment, there exists in the church a Janus-like Levski: one face already with a *nimbus*, the other a saint in the making. Analyzing the recent events in the *longue durée* framework of ecclesiastical and national history, this paper seeks to address a number of methodological issues: the correlation between hero worship and sainthood in general but especially in the era of nationalism; the narrative and other genres that



effectuate this interplay; finally, the symbolic repertoire of nationalism in the era of post-communism.

Maria Todorova is Professor of History at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and IWM Visiting Fellow.

9 OCTOBER

**David Simon**  
**Enlargement – The Challenges Of Economic And Institutional Reform**

Commentator: Gerhard Jordan, Die Grünen

IN THE LAST TWO YEARS, the Lisbon Summit in March, 2000 and the Nice Summit in December, 2000 have set the agenda for the most radical change programme the European Union has seen since its first decade.

The Economic reform programme targets the European Union as the most competitive knowledge driven economy in the world by 2010.

This presents a formidable challenge to private and public sectors. Nothing less than to educate and train life-long, a flexible skilled workforce capable of mastering and exploiting the e-Economy, as well as providing and improving services to all customers.

Sustainable growth, low inflation and full employment will be the rewards. How will the Council and Governments inspire companies across Europe to lead this amazing project forward? How will the applicant countries adapt to this chosen path for the EU?

Having insisted on its radical economic strategy for wealth creation and jobs, the Council at Nice turned to Constitutional reform. Clearly the political organisation of the new enlarged Union will provide greater challenges than the economic programme. If the political will is successful, the private sector will provide most of the answers to Economic reform; constitutional reform is in the hands of the political leadership and less clearly described in planning terms.

It is recognised that a new balance between Council, Commission and Parliament is necessary. It is clear that each of these institutions can also be reformed from within. Answering the simple question what is the European Union for, is



perhaps a helpful precursor to deciding the shape of its organisation. The electorate of the existing Union needs to see more open, accountable and efficient institutions. No doubt these judgements will also be present in those countries seeking to negotiate entry. The 2004 IGC has a remarkable remit.

In Zusammenarbeit mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt.

David Simon (Lord Simon of Highbury), Former Adviser to Cabinet Office. Currently also a Member of the Advisory Boards of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (Europe), LEK, Unilever, Fortis and Suez Group. Former Minister for Trade and Competitiveness for Europe at the Department of Trade and Industry and H.M. Treasury 1997 - 99. Former Chairman of British Petroleum from 1995-97, Group Chief Executive from 1992-95, having joined the Board in 1986. He was appointed CBE in 1991, knighted in 1995 and created a Life Peer in 1997.

16 OCTOBER

### Sidonia Blätler Identitätspolitik: Nation und Geschlecht im philosophischen Diskurs der Moderne

VOR DEM HINTERGRUND der umfassenden These, dass sich die Konzeptualisierungen von Nation und Geschlecht im Diskurs des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts vielfach verschränken, soll die Konstruktion von Nationalstaatlichkeit, von nationaler Identität und nationalem Gegensatz am Beispiel von Fichtes „Reden an die deutsche Nation“ (1807/1808) analysiert werden. An Fichtes „Reden“ lässt sich exemplarisch rekonstruieren, wie Vorstellungen von „Männlichkeit“ und „Weiblichkeit“ das Modell des Nationalstaats mit seiner forcierten Betonung der Nationalität in seiner sozial-, staats- und geschichtsphilosophischen Dimension strukturierten, wodurch nationale und nationalistische Politik auch für Frauen zu einer wichtigen Quelle von Identität werden konnte, obwohl sie an ihr nicht unmittelbar als Staatsbürgerinnen partizipierten.

Sidonia Blätler ist wissenschaftliche Assistentin am Institut für Philosophie an der freien Universität Berlin und war Gast des IWM im Oktober.

23 OCTOBER

### William Wallace After Enlargement: Rethinking European Order

Commentator: Ulrike Lunacek, Die Grünen

THE EU IS NOW committed to an ambitious programme of eastern enlargement, which is likely to bring in 10 new member states within the next 3-5 years. Alongside this, the question of the further enlargement of NATO is on the agenda for the North Atlantic Summit planned for June 2002, with some in Washington arguing for a 'big bang' to bring in 7 new members at once, including the Baltic states. By 2005, therefore, institutionalized Europe may constitute a security community and single market of some 470 million people, with a dependent periphery of hopeful later applicants (Turkey and the Western Balkans) and excluded and insecure 'near-neighbours' – from Russia and Belarus to Algeria and Morocco. What foreign policy capabilities will the enlarged EU need to manage its relations with its dependent periphery? What is the future of NATO in



a transformed and institutionalized European region? How is enlargement likely to affect relations with the United States, given that the Bush Administration has already signalled its intention to reduce US troops in Europe further?

In Zusammenarbeit mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt.

William Wallace (Lord Wallace of Saltaire) is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. He was Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, 1978-90, and Walter F. Hallstein Fellow, St. Antony's College Oxford, 1990-95. From 1994-97 he was concurrently Professor of International Studies at the Central European University in Budapest.

30 OCTOBER

### Jean-Louis Bourlanges Le traité de Nice et la gouvernance d'une Europe élargie

Commentator: Franz Floss, Die Grünen

LES ANNÉES 80 AVAIENT été marquées par le développement parallèle de l'élargissement et de l'approfondissement de l'Union européenne, chaque vague d'adhésions nouvelles entraînant, en une sorte de cycle vertueux, une extension significative des compétences communautaires et une adaptation appropriée du cadre et des procédures institutionnels. L'adhésion britannique s'est ainsi traduite, quoique avec un solide retard, par la mise en œuvre du grand marché intérieur et le développement de la majorité qualifiée au Conseil. L'extension à l'Espagne et aux autres pays de l'Europe du Sud s'est accompagnée de la mise en œuvre d'une grande politique de développement régional et de l'augmentation massive des moyens financiers et des pouvoirs budgétaires du Parlement européen. Enfin, l'intégration de l'Est de l'Allemagne s'est accompagnée de la mise en place de la monnaie unique et des institutions et procédures nécessaires.

Depuis lors, rien ne va plus et les élargissements successifs paraissent exercer sur la cohésion politique et sur les capacités institutionnelles de l'Union des effets centrifuges de plus en plus frappants. L'élargissement en 1994 à trois Etats neutres ne

s'est accompagné d'aucune tentative de clarification politique alors même qu'à Maastricht les Douze venaient de proclamer leur détermination à bâtir ensemble une politique extérieure, une politique de sécurité et même, à terme, une politique de défense communes.

Quant aux élargissements à l'Europe centrale, orientale et méridionale, ils se préparent dans la plus grande confusion. Confusion géographique d'abord puisque à Helsinki le principe de l'adhésion turque a été admis sans débat sur les frontières souhaitables de l'Union. Confusion politique ensuite car la répartition des responsabilités entre l'Union européenne et l'Alliance Atlantique ne fait actuellement l'objet d'aucune approche commune entre les Quinze et les futurs adhérents, ni même d'ailleurs entre les Quinze eux-mêmes. Confusion institutionnelle enfin dans la mesure où l'élargissement va multiplier les résistances souverainistes à l'intégration tout en rendant plus nécessaire que jamais une intégration institutionnelle ambitieuse.

Les trois rendez-vous de Maastricht, d'Amsterdam et surtout de Nice ont eu pour double effet de démembrer les institutions européennes, désormais partagées entre un système communautaire traditionnel et une concertation intergouvernementale institutionnalisée, et de briser les équilibres fondamentaux de la Communauté européenne: égalité des Grands, sureprésentation des Petits. A Nice, on a choisi d'avantager simultanément l'Allemagne Fédérale au Conseil et au Parlement et les tous petits Etats à la Commission et de créer par-là une surmarginalisation institutionnelle préoccupante des grands Etats de l'Arc Atlantique et méditerranéen. Au terme de ces réformes à la fois timides et dévastatrices, le consensus émergent ne peut que se faire autour du modèle intergouvernemental de prise de décision. Résultat paradoxal si l'on songe que plus l'Europe s'élargit plus difficile est la recherche d'un consensus entre ceux qui la composent.

In Zusammenarbeit mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt.

Jean-Louis Bourlanges is Member of the European Parliament for the Union pour la démocratie française (UDF) and has been, together with Daniel-Cohn-Bendit and others, a founding member of SOS-EUROPA.

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## Visiting Fellows

### Jodi Dean

Associate Professor of Political Science, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva/New York



**Length of Stay:** July – December 2001

**Specialization:** Feminist theory, contemporary political theory

**IWM Projects:** Feminist Theory in Global Technoculture; an article on September 11, "Representation and the Event"; IWM working paper, "Communicative Capitalism" (see www.iwm.at); finished her book, *Publicity's Secret*

**Publications:** *Aliens in America*, Cornell University Press 1998; *Feminism and the New Democracy*, Sage 1997 (ed.); *Solidarity of Strangers*, University of California Press 1996

### Zoltán Halasi

Translator, Poet and Essayist, Budapest; Paul Celan Visiting Fellow

**Length of Stay:** July – December 2001

**IWM Project:** Johann Gottfried Herder: *Kleinere Schriften. Vier Studien*, Übersetzung ins Ungarische

**Publications:** "Heartviolin" (an essay about Robert Walser), in: *Robert Walser: A séta*, Budapest 1998; "Three Facets of Time. A Comparative Study of the Autobiographical Works of Elias Canetti, Witold Gombrowicz and István Vas," in: *2000*, July-August 1995; "'Hier kann ich mich fügen': Kafka in Zürau", in: *Átváltozások*, Budapest 1991; "Gott in der Mühle. Über Goethe und die Entstehung des Divans", in: *J.W. Goethe: Nyugat-keleti-díván*, Budapest 2001

### Filip Karfik

Assistant Professor, Institute of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Charles University, Prague; IWM Research Associate

**Length of Stay:** July – October 2001

**Specialization:** Ancient and modern philosophy, especially phenomenology

**IWM Project:** Patocka Project: The Other Way into Modernity

**Publications:** "Seelenlehre und Kosmologie in Platons Phaidon", in: A. Havlíček and F. Karfik (eds.), *The Phaedo of Plato. Proceedings of the 2nd Symposium Platonicum Pragense*, Prague 2001; "La philosophie de l'histoire et le problème de l'âge technique chez Jan Patocka", in: *Études phénoménologiques*, 23-30, 1999; "Die Welt als das 'non aliud' bei Jan Patocka", in: *Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 1998/1

### Zsófia Mihancsik

Journalist and translator, Budapest; Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow

**Length of Stay:** October – December 2001

**IWM Project:** Professional, ethical and methodological analysis and criticism of the Hungarian Public Radio program "Sunday Journal"

**Publications:** Translations into Hungarian: Francois Furet: *Le passé d'une illusion – Egy illúzió múltja*, Budapest 2000; Roland Barthes: *Système de la mode – A divat rendszere*, Budapest 1999; Roland Barthes: *Le plaisir du texte – A szöveg öröme*, Budapest 1996; regular contributor to *Lettre Internationale*

### Kiril Miladinov

Übersetzer, Zagreb; Paul Celan Visiting Fellow

**Length of Stay:** Juli – Dezember 2001

**Specialization:** Geschichte der Philosophie; Systemtheorie

**IWM Project:** Niklas Luhmann: *Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft – Übersetzung ins Kroatische*

**Publications:** Übersetzungen ins Kroatische: Ulrich Beck: *Die Erfindung des Politischen – Pronalazenje politickoga*, Zagreb 2001; Donald Davidson: *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation – Istrazivanja o istini i interpretaciji*, Zagreb 2000



### Anna Politkovskaia

Journalist, Moscow; Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow

**Length of Stay:** October – December 2001

**Specialization:** Social morale, anti-corruption investigations, judicial system of Russia; the war in Chechnya

**IWM Project:** Russians 2001. Russia after the Chechen War

**Publication:** *Voyage to an Inferno. Chechen journal*, Paris 2000 (in French; also translated into English and Norwegian)

**Maria Todorova**

*Professor of History,  
University of Illinois at  
Urbana-Champaign*

**Length of Stay:** July – December 2001

**Specialization:** Modern Balkan history (19<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> centuries), nationalism, cultural anthropology

**IWM Projekt:** Bones of Contention:

The Making and Meaning of Vasil Levski as National Hero/Book-length project on the making and meaning of a national hero in the Bulgarian context, based on the mythology and symbolism around Vasil Levski from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century until the present

**Publications:** *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford 1997 (translations into German, Italian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek, Romanian, Slovenian, and forthcoming in Turkish, Albanian, Macedonian, Croatian, Hungarian); *Balkan Family Structure and the European Pattern: Demographic Developments in Ottoman Bulgaria*, Washington 1993; *England, Russia and the Tanzimat*, Sofia 1980 / Moscow 1983; "Does Russian Orientalism Have a Russian Soul?", in: *Kritika*, 1 (4), Fall 2000

**Raymond Weber**

*Premier Conseiller de Gouvernement, chargé de mission,  
Centre Universitaire de Luxembourg*

**Length of Stay:** September – Dezember 2001

**Specialization:** Elemente für eine europäische Kulturpolitik: Analyse der bestehenden Situation und der aktuellen Partner; "Hinterfragung" dieser Politik durch die geschichtlichen Entwicklungen und durch die neuen Herausforderungen; institutionelle Antworten und Vorschläge, seitens der Nationalstaaten, der europäischen Institutionen und Organisationen und der "Zivilgesellschaft"; philosophisch-anthropologische Analyse der Evolutionen von einigen Grundbegriffen: Kultur, Zivilgesellschaft, "cultur governance", "cultural citizenship", kulturelle Globalisierung, kulturelle Menschenrechte

**Publications:** "Kultur und Konfliktverhütung", in: *Kulturaustausch*, Nr. 2 (2001); "Die europäische kulturelle Zusammenarbeit", in: *Observatoire des Politiques Culturelles*, Herbstnummer (2001)



Piki Ish-Shalom,  
Colin Heydt,  
Patrick Kernahan

## Junior Visiting Fellows

Junior Visiting Fellows for the second half of 2001 and their research topics:

**Die Junior Visiting Fellows der zweiten Hälfte 2001 und ihre Projektthemen:**

**Dobrochna Maria Bach-Golecka**

*Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy and Sociology at the Graduate School of Social Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow*

**Specialization:** Public international law, administrative law, Catholic social teaching

**IWM Projekt:** Democratic Governance in Public International Law

**Publications:** *Gabinety polityczne w Polsce 1996-2001 (Political Cabinets in Poland 1996-2001)*, Cracow 2001 (forthcoming); "The Holy See as a Subject of International Law", in: *Przegląd Zachodni*, nr. 300, 2001 (in Polish); "Might and Right in Relations Between the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and Russia", in: *Thesaurus Acroasium. Annual Courses of the Institute of International Public Law and International Relations of Thessaloniki*, vol. 28, 1999; "Remarks on the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ in Case Concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons", in: *Panstwo i Prawo*, nr 9, 1997

**Colin Heydt**

*Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University*

**Specialization:** Ethics, political philosophy and the work of John Stuart Mill

**IWM Projekt:** Aesthetic and Moral Education in the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill, moral perception in Mill's philosophy, the relationship of forms of aesthetic perception to forms of ethical perception

**Pinhas (Piki) Ish-Shalom**

*Ph.D. candidate in Political Science and International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem*

**Specialization:** Political science and international relations, especially the interrelations between ideologies, theories of international relations and the conduct of foreign policy

**IWM Projekt:** Statesmen, Theoreticians and Ideologues: The Theoretic Construction of Democracy in American Foreign Policy, during the Cold War and After/American foreign policy toward Latin America, and the role that theoretical concepts played in it; the role of Walt Rostow and the theory of modernization in the constructing of the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy's administration

**Publications:** "Studying International Relations: A Discipline in a search for Reflexivity and Paradigmatic Pluralism", in: *Politika*, no 7, Summer 2001 (in Hebrew)

**Slavica Jakelic**

*Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Religion, Boston University*

- Specialization:** Sociology of religion, religious studies  
**IWM Project:** Religion and Collective Identity  
**Publications:** Slavica Jakelic and Lori Pearson (eds.), *The Future of the Study of Religion* (forthcoming, Brill N.V.); "The Public Role of Religious Institutions and the Privacy of Faith" (in Croatian), in: *Svetlo Rijeci*, February 1999; "Faith and Reason: The Two Faces of Responsible Christianity" (in Croatian), in: *Svetlo Rijeci*, November 1998

**Patrick Kernahan**

*Ph.D. candidate in Political Philosophy, Boston College*

- Specialization:** Political philosophy and American politics  
**IWM Project:** Public Intellectuals: Plato and the Sophists. By taking account of the dramatic structure of the dialogues as well as the doctrines attributed by Plato to specific members of the Sophistic movement, Patrick Kernahan hopes to provide a more accurate account of Plato's complicated and nuanced view of Sophistry

**Carla Lovett**

*Ph.D. candidate in European History, Boston University*

- Specialization:** Social and religious history of modern Europe  
**IWM Project:** Front Altars and Back Alleys: Religion and Society in Late Nineteenth Century Vienna

**Elissa Mailänder**

*Doktorandin (Romanistik, Germanistik), École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris; Stipendiatin im Rahmen des Doktorandenprogramms der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*

- Specialization:** Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus, Holocaust/Genozid Studien und Geschlechtergeschichte  
**IWM Project:** Der kulturelle Aufbau der Grausamkeit: Die SS-Frauen in den Vernichtungslagern, Arbeit am Fall der Hermine Braunsteiner und ihrer Gerichtsverhandlung in Wien (1946-1949)

**Darrin McMahon**

*Postdoctoral research fellow in history, Remarque Institute, New York University*

- Specialization:** European intellectual history (18<sup>th</sup> century to present); history of European political thought; history of modern France  
**IWM Project:** In Pursuit – A History of Happiness in the West  
**Publications:** Florence Lotterie and Darrin McMahon (eds.), *Les Lumières européens dans leurs relations avec les autres grandes cultures et religions du XVIIIe siècle*, Paris 2001; "Edmund Burke and the Literary Cabal", will appear in a new edition of Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, ed. Frank Turner, Yale University Press; "The Road to Happiness:




Deism, Atheism, and materialism", in: Martin Fitzpatrick, Peter Jones, and Christa Knellwolf (eds.), *The Enlightenment World*, London 2002 (forthcoming)

**Meike Schmidt-Gleim**

*Doktorandin am Institut für Philosophie der Universität Wien; Stipendiatin im Rahmen des Doktorandenprogramms der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*

- Specialization:** Political Philosophy  
**IWM Project:** Grenzlogiken und Europa  
**Publications:** „Ich will Teil einer Antirassismusbewegung sein“, in: *Agenda 2000*; „Das Unpolitische am Rassismus“, in: *Kulturrise* 1999; „Die Demonstration der Demokratie“, in: *Springerin* 5, Heft 4 (1999)

**Guests****Lothar Probst**

*Direktor, Institut für kulturwissenschaftliche Deutschlandstudien, Universität Bremen*

- Month of stay:** August 2001  
**Publications:** *Von der Staatspartei zur Regierungspartei. Die PDS in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern*, Hamburg 2000; *Bündnis 90/Die Grünen: Eckpunkte künftiger Politik* (hg.), Köln 1994; *Ostdeutsche Bürgerbewegungen und Perspektiven der Demokratie*, Köln 1993

**Marek Rymza**

*Associate Professor at the Institute of Applied Social Sciences, Warsaw University*

- Month of stay:** September 2001  
**Publications:** *Samotne macierzynstwo i polityka społeczna' (Lone Motherhood and Social Policy)* (ed.), Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw 2001; *Urynkowanie państwa czy uspołecznienie rynku? (Marketization of the State or Socialization of the Market?)*, Warsaw 1998

**Sidonia Blättler**

*Wissenschaftliche Assistentin am Institut für Philosophie, Freie Universität Berlin*

- Month of stay:** Oktober 2001  
**Publications:** "Hannah Arendts Konzeption der Pluralität und das Projekt feministischer Politik", in: Heike Kahlert und Claudia Lenz (Hg.), *Aus eigener Initiative etwas Neues beginnen. Impulse Hannah Arendts für feministische Gesellschaftstheorie*, Königstein 2001; "Nation und Geschlecht im philosophischen Diskurs der Moderne", in: *Feministische Studien*, 2, 2000; *Der Pöbel, die Frauen, etc.. Die Massen in der politischen Philosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin 1995



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Im Oktober 2001 starb in Prag nach  
langer Krankheit der tschechische  
Philosoph und Bürgerrechtler Jiri  
Nemec. Er war in den 80er Jahren am  
ersten Forschungsprojekt des IWM  
zum Werk des tschechischen Denkers  
Jan Patocka beteiligt.

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## Jiri Nemec

18. 10. 1932-4. 10. 2001

EIN SCHÜLER JAN PATOCKAS, trug Nemec wie dieser wesentlich dazu bei, die philosophischen Debatten jenseits des Eisernen Vorhangs daheim zu vermitteln. Nach der Niederschlagung des „Prager Frühlings“ wurde das intellektuelle Leben der Tschechoslowakei in den Untergrund gedrängt. Nemec hielt informelle Seminare, die eine weitgespannte Szene von Wissenschaftlern, Literaten und Künstlern zusammenführten. Zu den Denkern, auf die er sich bezog (und deren Schriften er z.T. übersetzte), gehörten Heidegger, Ricoeur, Levinas, Foucault und Teilhard de Chardin. In der Philosophie war er ebenso streitbar wie in Glaubensfragen, die er oft mit Anders- oder Nichtgläubigen diskutierte. Nemec war ein engagierter Katholik, unbequem gleichermaßen für seine Glaubensgenossen wie für die Kirche.

Vor allem auf die jungen Leute übte Nemec eine große Anziehungskraft aus, darunter die Rockgruppe *Plastic People of the Universe*, der 1976 ein politischer Prozess gemacht wurde. Aus dem Protest ging die *Charta 77* hervor, die Nemec mitbegründete. Als Unterzeichner verlor er 1977 seine Arbeit und war fortan Repressalien ausgesetzt.

Als er 1983 als politischer Flüchtling nach Wien kam, konnte er dank österreichischer Förderung am Jan Patocka-Projekt des IWM mitwirken. Ohne Nemec' Wissen und seinen Rat hätten die fünfbandigen *Ausgewählten Schriften* (Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta 1987-1992) nicht erscheinen können. Er ist Mitherausgeber dreier Bände, die die wichtigsten geschichtsphilosophischen und phänomenologischen Texte Patockas zugänglich machen.

1990 konnte Nemec nach Prag zurückkehren, wo er für kurze Zeit an der Karlsuniversität lehrte. Doch mit seiner Gesundheit stand es bereits in Wien nicht gut. Es muss bitter für ihn gewesen sein, nach all den Jahren des Kampfes und dann des Exils endlich in eine freie Gesellschaft zurückzukehren, aber nicht mehr aktiv an der Erneuerung des intellektuellen Lebens teilnehmen zu können.

Wir danken Jiri Nemec und werden seinen Beitrag zur Arbeit des Instituts, seine Inspiration und seine Freundschaft nicht vergessen.

## Publications

### Jan Patocka Memorial Lectures

**William Julius Wilson**

**Soziale Ungleichheit in den USA. Plädoyer für eine multiethnische Bündnispolitik**

Passagen Verlag, Wien, Herbst 2001  
(siehe Anzeige Seite 10)

### Transit 21

Siehe Anzeige Seite 29

**Zsófia Mihancsik**

Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow, 2001

**Anti-Semitic Discourse in Hungary in 2000**

Budapest 2001

**"Political Changes in Hungary and the Hungarian Film",**

in: Filmvilág, Budapest, October 2001

**Jodi Dean**

Visiting Fellow, 2001

**"Publicity's Secret",**

in: Political Theory, vol 29, no 5, October 2001

**"Laws and Societies",**

co-authored with Paul Passavant,  
in: Constellations, vol 8, no 3, September 2001

**Maria Todorova**

Visiting Fellow 2001

**National Identities and National Memories in the Balkans (ed.)**

London /New York (in press)

**"The Balkans as a Category of Analysis",**

Geschichte und Gesellschaft 2, 2002

**"Public Memory and the Hero: Vasil Levski (1837-1997)",**

in: S. Ramet, J.Fellak (eds.),  
Festschrift in Honor of Peter Sugar,  
Slavica Publishers (in press)

**Darrin McMahon**

Junior Visiting Fellow, 2001

**Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity**

Oxford University Press, 2001

**Publications under the auspices of the Paul Celan Translation Program**




**Jacob Burckhard**

**Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen**

Atlantisz, Budapest, 2001

Translated into Hungarian by Csaba Báthori, Paul Celan Fellow 1999.



**Niklas Luhmann**

**Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft**

Politicka kultura, Zagreb 2001

Translated into Croatian by Kiril Miladinov, Paul Celan Fellow 2001.

## Travels and Talks

**Jodi Dean**

Visiting Fellow, 2001

Speech "Postmodern Republicanism",  
Critical Legal Conference, Kent University, U.K. (7 – 9 September).

Invited Lecture "Multiple Reality", at a course "Better than Fantasy: Reality Engineering and the Computer", sponsored by Maastricht Summer University and the Mediamatic Foundation in Amsterdam (31 August – 2 September).

Radio interview on the situation at the campuses in the U.S. after September 11, Radio FM 4, "Reality Check", (29 September).

**Slavica Jakelic**

Junior Visiting Fellow, 2001

Conference: "Laity in the roman catholic church in Croatia", paper on "Faith and Reason: A Historical and Theological Perspective" in the conference panel on "Intellectuals and the Roman Catholic Church", Osijek, Croatia (5 – 6 October).

**Patrick Kernahan**

Junior Visiting Fellow, 2001

Paper "Callicles' View of Human Excellence" on a panel called "Politics and Individual Excellence", American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco (30 August – 2 September)

**Cornelia Klinger**

Permanent Fellow

Expertise für Forum Gender Studies Schweiz (25. September).

Teilnahme an der ORF-Diskussion

„Kreuz und Quer – Philosophicum“  
zum Thema „Liebe – Erotik – Sexualität“  
(19. Oktober).

**Elissa Mailänder**

Junior Visiting Fellow, 2001

Teilnahme an dem Deutsch-Britisch-Französischer Sommerkurs "Gewalt in Politik, Krieg und Alltag im 20. Jahrhundert", Max Planck Institut (3. – 14. September).

## Aufsätze zur politischen Philosophie



**Charles Taylor**

### **Wieviel Gemeinschaft braucht die Demokratie?**

Aufsätze zur politischen Philosophie

Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 2002

#### Inhalt

1. Wieviel Gemeinschaft braucht die Demokratie?
2. Demokratie und Ausgrenzung
3. Einige Überlegungen zur Idee der Solidarität
4. Die Beschwörung der Civil Society
5. Liberale Politik und Öffentlichkeit
6. Nationalismus und Moderne
7. Die Moderne und die säkulare Zeit
8. Humanismus und moderne Identität
9. Ursprünge des neuzeitlichen Selbst

Der soeben bei Suhrkamp erschienene Band des kanadischen Philosophen versammelt seine politische Schriften, die im Rahmen der **Castelgandolfo-Gespräche** des IWM diskutiert wurden (als Reihe herausgegeben von Krzysztof Michalski, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1985 - 2000) bzw. die in der Zeitschrift **Transit-Europäische Revue** erschienen sind.

### **Darrin M. McMahon**

*Junior Visiting Fellow, 2001*

**Radio interview** on happiness, Radio FM 4, "Reality check" (3 October).

### **Maria Todorova**

*Visiting Fellow, 2001*

Participation in the **dissertation** defense of Teuvo Laitila as official opponent: University of Helsinki, Finland (14 September).

Guest in radio broadcast: **Interview** for Radio Finland, taken by Kerstin Kronvall (14 September).

**Interview** for the Bosnian journal "Dani", Sarajevo, Nr. 218 (10 August).

**Presentation** "How we think about regions", at a Conference convened by the United World College of the Adriatic, Duino, Italy (13 October).

### **Raymond Weber**

*Visiting Fellow, 2001*

**Vortrag** "Kulturelle Vielfalt und Kulturrechte: Re-thinking Culture", Symposium in Athen und Olimpia (20.-24. September).

**Vortrag:** „Europa und Kultur: Herausforderungen und institutionelle Antworten“ auf der internationalen Europa-Konferenz "Was ist der Bürger in Europa wert? Europäische Grundfragen im Lichte der Integration", Eggenburg (18. Oktober).

**Paper** "Cultural governance and citizenship" at the Trans-Atlantic Conference "The Limits to Diversity? Implications for Democracies", Banff, Alberta (25 - 28 October).

Schlussfolgerungen zu "Culture and Globalisation", **Forum der europäischen Kulturnetzwerke**, Brüssel (4.-6. Oktober).

**Beitrag** "Die neuen Herausforderungen der europäischen kulturellen Zusammenarbeit" im Rahmen des Symposiums "Globalisation and Cultural Governance", Delft (30. September - 2. Oktober).

## Varia

**Amy Gutmann**, Laurence S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Provost of Princeton University, joined the IWM Academic Advisory Board. Professor Gutmann is author and editor of many books, among them *Democratic Education* (1987, second edition 1999), *Democracy and Disagreement* (with Dennis Thompson, 1996), and *Ethics and Politics* (third ed., with Dennis Thompson, Nelson-Hall, 1997). Her edited books include *Democracy and the Welfare State*, and *Freedom of Association* (1999). Her newest book, *Identity Groups in Democracy: A Humanist Perspective*, will be published in 2002.

**Mary Ann Glendon**, member of IWM's Academic Advisory Board and Professor of Law at Harvard University, has been appointed as a member of President Bush's newly established Council on Bioethics. Professor Glendon writes and teaches in the fields of comparative law, constitutional law and legal theory. Her publications include: *A Nation Under Lawyers* (1996); *Seedbeds of Virtue*, (co-edited with David Blankenhorn, 1995); *Rights Talk* (1991); *The Transformation of Family Law* (1989); *Abortion and Divorce in Western Law* (1987) and *The New Family and New Property* (1981).

**Zsófia Mihancsik**, Hungarian journalist and translator, could take up her Milena Jesenská Fellowship at the IWM thanks to the generosity of Austrian leading political commentator Hans Rauscher and Oscar Bronner, publisher of the daily *Der Standard*. Hans Rauscher, recipient of the Concordia Award for Freedom of the Press had donated the prize money, and Oscar Bronner had doubled the sum. Zsófia was thus enabled to finish her project about an openly antisemitic Hungarian radio show.

Am 4. Dezember 2001 wurde **Raymond Weber**, IWM Visiting Fellow und ehemaliger Direktor für Kultur und kulturelles Erbe beim Europarat in Strassburg, das Österreichische Ehrenkreuz für Wissenschaft und Kunst I. Klasse verliehen.



# Notes on books

**Transitional justice**  
**Andrzej Paczkowski**

THERE IS NO DOUBT that the series of events described in the spirit of Samuel Huntington as the third tide of democratisation was one of the most prominent phenomena during the last decades of the twentieth century. It encompassed tens of states from assorted cultural regions; almost without exception, the transition from dictatorship to democracy followed a pacific course (“negotiated revolutions”), and in certain instances – as in Central

America – it denoted an end, based on a compromise, to years-long, devastating civil wars. As a rule, such changes proved to be effective, and a reversal to dictatorship occurred extremely rarely. The tide swept away rightist and leftist dictatorships alike; when inaugurated by the peaceful struggle conducted by “Solidarity” it finally reached the communist camp, it resulted in an implosion of the Soviet Union, and thus actually terminated the Cold War (at least in its heretofore form). Ensuing changes affected not only particular states, but also the global configuration of forces.

Recently, the world has supplied us with so many – and such strong – impulses that studying the process which began almost thirty years ago, during the downfall of dictatorship in Portugal, Spain and Greece, is slowly becoming the domain of historians. Nonetheless, the phenomenon in question continues to be intensely analysed, and those realms which meet with special interest include the intricate complex of law and justice. A bold attempt at a general portrayal of the problem of the law during the period of systematic transformation was made by Ruti G. Teitel, who in the presented book discusses criminal justice, historical justice, reparatory justice, administrative justice and constitutional justice. Her reasoning audaciously reaches beyond the “third tide”, and refers to, i. a. examples of post-

World War II de-Nazification or the Reconstruction period in the wake of the American Civil War. She goes so far as to make references to Biblical models of behaviour.

Although *Transitional Justice* is written in a highly professional fashion it remains an excellent survey of attitudes concerning the functioning and role of the law during an epoch of profound social transformation, and considers certain detailed solutions (such as truth and reconciliation commissions or the “lustration” procedures). Naturally, one might point out assorted neglected or underestimated topics, such as “the opinions of the victims of dictatorial regimes”, particularly significant in view of the fact that by constituting pressure groups the victims exerted an impact on the letter of legislation and its interpretations, expressed in court verdicts. A slightly disturbing accent is the normative nature of the argumentation, which obliterates the fact that the fundamental and primary purpose of transformation was the achievement of such a stage of changes which would render impossible a return of dictatorship, and not a *hic et nunc* realisation of the democratic ideal and the high standards of human rights. Nevertheless, the emergent dilemmas are real and decidedly prominent not only for the theory of transitional justice, but also for political praxis and culture as such. They include such questions as the one asking which is more important: retribution, which a considerable part of society expects that the judges will provide, or the renewal of the rule of law, even if it makes it impossible to penalise the majority of the guilty? Or, whether, and to what extent, can truth replace justice? Obviously, this was the belief shared by the initiators of such institutions as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa) or such legal acts as the Law of National Pacification (Uruguay). Ruti G. Teitel cautiously attempts to guide the reader across a tangle of similar problems. A truly fascinating tour.

## **Transitional Justice**

Ruti G. Teitel  
*New York 2000, Oxford University Press,*  
*pp. 292*  
*ISBN 0-19-510064-6*

**Andrzej Paczkowski** is Professor of History at the Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw

## **Democracy without Subjects**

**Jodi Dean**

IN *EMPIRE*, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri analyze communicative capitalism as a global political formation. For them, “Empire” is a new form of sovereignty, a new logic of order and structure of rule, a machine that predetermines “the exercise of authority and action across the entire social space” (p. 14). This logic is perhaps best understood in terms of its spatialization, function, and political ontology. Spatially, Empire is boundless. Nothing is outside it. It envelops every element of social life in a milieu of maximum plurality and singularization. Functionally, Empire manages these singular, hybrid identities through modulating networks of command. Thus, its rule is decentered, deterritorializing, and flexible. Onto-politically, Empire is an empty parasitical machine that lacks the motor that propels its movement; it is a form of control over biopolitical production, a form that provides an empty unification of control over culture, politics, and economy as labor has become more communicative, cooperative, and affective. Here, of course, the concept of Empire is directly correlative to the concept of the multitude as precisely that bio mass that calls Empire into being, that generates it even as it is controlled by it.

This totalizing account might seem to eliminate political space altogether. But such a gloomy reaction is too quick. Hardt and Negri’s theory of postmodern republicanism is an exciting foray into the imagining of democracy after the subject. I say that Hardt and Negri provide a republicanism without subjects because they see what they call an “anthropological exodus” as an “extraordinarily important ... element in the configuration of republicanism ‘against’ imperial civilization.” They fill out the idea of anthropological exodus with reference to cyborgs, body modification, and gender transgression. But they add that these changes don’t hold a candle to what is really needed, namely, “a body that is completely incapable of submitting



to command ... incapable of adapting to family life, to faculty discipline, to the regulations of a traditional sex life, and so on," (p. 216).

Hardt and Negri's postmodern republicanism is useful primarily as a contribution to the critique of deliberative democracy and for the challenges it poses to the effort to think through democracy after the critique of the subject. Put somewhat differently, the weakness of Hardt and Negri's theory is the same as its strength: its attempt to theorize democracy absent a subject. This is particularly problematic because they locate the primary site of struggle in *Empire* on the terrain of the production and regulation of subjectivity, more specifically in the disjunction between the political subject and the economic subject. But herein lies the rub: while critical, indeed dismissive, of forms of political subjectivization, Hardt and Negri fail to consider the negative aspects of the economic production of subjectivity. Indeed, insofar as they theorize the multitude in terms of productive, cooperating, loving, desiring, biomass, they can't account for the problems presented by technoculture's new subjectivities. Were they to consider the imbrications of the economic and the political in modes of technocultural subjectivization, they would have to acknowledge the antagonisms rupturing the multitude and the ways that new communication technologies have effects far more dangerous than Hardt and Negri's celebratory evocation of cyborgs evinces.

### A critique of deliberative democracy

Three elements of Hardt and Negri's account of *Empire* demonstrate its power as a critique of deliberative democracy: their account of what Paul Passavant calls "communicative capitalism," their account of the incommunicability of struggle, and their account of the constitutive power of the multitude.

Hardt and Negri claim that "communication is the form of capitalist production in which capital has succeeded in submitting society entirely and globally to its regime, suppressing all alternative paths," (p. 347). Communications networks provide the means through which the deterritorialized sovereignty of *Empire* is exercised. Generally speaking, their discussion resonates with Manuel Castells's

account of the network society. Nevertheless, two specific components differentiate their analysis. First, in contrast to Enlightenment understandings, in *Empire*, information and communication are not simply means for the self-governance of the People. Rather, they justify their own proliferation and hence the continued expansion of *Empire*, the continued intensification of the society of control, and the continued submission of all contents to the demands of the society of the spectacle. Second, instrumental and communicative action fuse together. This fusion appears most clearly in the sphere of production and entertainment where the generation and circulation of information is itself an economic system. It is also present in the anthropological exodus. Hardt and Negri link this point to the cyborgean one whereby interactive and communicative machines become prostheses integrated into our bodies and minds.

These two components of communicative capitalism are crucial to a critique of deliberative democracy. They point to a changed notion of communication and information such that to argue that what democracy needs is more of both is to reproduce *Empire*. Furthermore, they hit on the uselessness of a liberal split between public and private, as well as any specific political or national territory, insofar as communication networks cut across all spaces and through all subjectivities.

With regard to the incommunicability of struggle, Hardt and Negri note that today's political struggles are not horizontally articulated. Rather than linking one to another or effectively entering the communicative sphere, they are incommunicable, isolated strikes at the heart of *Empire*. For some political theorists, this incommunicability is the problem of new social movements and contemporary political struggle, it is the failure to hegemonize the social field. But Hardt and Negri want to make what appears as the impossibility of politics its very condition of possibility: incommunicability, in other words, may well be a strength, not a liability in a social-political-economic realm managed in and through the communicative networks of the society of the spectacle. So, in their view, the incommunicability of struggles is accompanied by an increase in political intensity and an ability to attack the global directly.

I think this sounds promising – but I'm not sure what it means. It reminds me of viral circulation, the way that ideas and viruses circulate, attaching their code into the networks of communication, bypassing completely levels of understanding and argument. This seems to be what Hardt and Negri have in mind when they describe the movement of the multitude as "hybridizing new machinic systems." The idea of incommunicability makes a certain sense in the context of a critique of deliberative democracy – it draws our attention to modes of sequencing and sampling that aren't well suited to a theory of articulation that emphasizes the transformation of elements in the signifying chain and the need for a master signifier.

Finally, Hardt and Negri contrast what they see as the constitutive power of the multitude (good) with forms of political representation and mediation (bad). This kind of power refers to the creative imagination and productivity of the multitude, its self-constituting force. In effect, one of the central problems of *Empire* is the way it has become a fetter on the constitutive power of the multitude. It continues to try to contain the uncontainable.

This is important to a critique of deliberative democracy because, as an imagining of a totality of everyone, the concept of the multitude avoids the real problems of inclusion and communication that plague any attempt to theorize a participatory, democratic public. Since any deliberation among everyone is impossible, deliberative democracy is an unrealizable ideal, ultimately exclusive and anti-democratic. So, Hardt and Negri throw out deliberation and hold onto the everyone, now understood in terms of a community of cooperating, desiring, producing, singularities. Indeed, it makes sense that they would see no need for anything like deliberation given that cooperation is immanent to laboring activity, and that communication is now part of production.

### A critique of postmodern republicanism

The three components of *Empire* valuable to a critical reassessment of deliberative democracy in the information age also click on some key problems in Hardt and Negri's discussion.

Following Deleuze, Hardt and Negri argue that the present is marked by the demise of civil society, by the collapse of

the bounded institutions and logics of school, family, and prison and the spread of their logics throughout the social. They write: "The indefiniteness of the *place* of production corresponds to the indeterminacy of the *form* of the subjectivities produced" (p. 197). From their standpoint, the society of control is an advance over disciplinary society. The breakdown of institutions and increase in indeterminacy of subjectivities reaches throughout the social. Power becomes entirely biopolitical and the whole social body comes to be associated in an open, affective, and qualitative relationship. Similarly, the breakdown of the institutions of civil society has facilitated the anthropological exodus crucial to postmodern republicanism – the whole terrain is now open to mutation, hybridization, and mobility.

In their discussion of the constitution of Empire as a universal communications network, Hardt and Negri present what they see as this constitution's fundamental disequilibrium, namely one between the production of subjectivity by power and the autonomous resistance of subjects. They pose the dilemma as the question: "Is it possible for the system to sustain simultaneously political subjection and the subjectivity of the producer/consumer?" (p. 320). Their answer is no. The constitutional framework of Empire requires a fleeting and passive political subject and a present and active producing and consuming agent. For them, moreover, this is good – it is the liberation of the producing and consuming subject from the mechanisms of political subjection.

Hardt and Negri are mistaken when they presume that the decline of the disciplinary institutions of civil society and the emergence of the society of control leads to an indeterminacy of forms of subjectivity, on the one hand, and the emergence of more potentially authentic and autonomous flows of productive subjectivities, on the other. They are mistaken for two reasons: they don't consider precisely the merger between the political and the economic they identify in communicative capitalism in terms of subjectivity. And they don't consider the impact of media technologies on subject formation. I'll make these points with reference to what I call conspiring and celebrity subjects.

One of the key aspects of technoculture is the way that it realizes, material-

izes, an Enlightenment ideal of publicity. Not only is access to information and communication networks in principle available to any and everyone, but the system itself justifies itself in terms of communicative ideals such as "the public has a right to know." One of the repercussions of the technocultural realization of this Enlightenment ideal of a participatory public is the way it brings to the fore the obscene supplement of democracy, namely, conspiracy. Conspiracy theory has always literalized the suspicion at the heart of the democratic approach to politics, the suspicion that an unseen power that undermines the public lurks behind the scenes and needs to be revealed. In technoculture, this conspiratorial mindset comes to be constituted as a primary form of subjectivity: we are enjoined to find out for ourselves, to link and search, to trust no one. We are supposed to searching for facts and information, to trace paths of evidence, always suspicious of unseen authorities, on the one hand, and the ultimate failure of authorization, on the other. So, again, my claim is that technoculture merges the political and the economic in the form of conspiring subjects. Conspiring subjects are interpellated politically as the suspicious subjects of democracy who have a right to know and should trust no one. And precisely this interpellation is a necessary condition for the legitimation and spread of communicative capitalism.

The celebrity modes of subjectivization also combines the political and economic aspects of technoculture. One of the ways that the ideology of the public materializes itself under conditions of communicative capitalism is through the sense that we are known. For example, a big fear is that all our secrets will circulate on the Net. But this is weird – who cares? Precisely because no one cares, this fear is both groundless and necessary for our sense that disparate communications networks somehow constitute some kind of collectivity that we might understand as a public, that is to say, a collectivity that might be akin to a nation, or, better, to a mass television audience. In technoculture, the ever present media, the screens and cameras, do more than surveil us; they also watch us, guaranteeing that someone is watching, that someone cares. This ever present but unidentifiable gaze interpellates us as celebrity subjects. And,

like the conspiring subject, the celebrity subject is one of technoculture's new modes of subjectivization bringing together the economic and the political. The presence of these modes of subjectivization demonstrates, *contra* Hardt and Negri, a *merging* of the economic and political, not an *unleashing* of the economic from the political. Additionally, it suggests that subject formation in the society of control is not as indeterminate as Hardt and Negri imply.

I close by considering how Hardt and Negri's discussion of the constitutive power of the multitude, while an asset when understood as part of a critique of deliberative democracy, becomes more problematic as a component of a more positive democratic theory. The problem stems from their understanding of this constitutive power in terms of production. In short, Hardt and Negri build an ideology of productivity into their notion of the multitude. In so doing, they both hold onto the old Marxist idea of "fetters" on the forces of production and buy into the worst aspects of capitalist ideology.

As Žižek argues in *The Fragile Absolute* one of the worst aspects of Marxism has been its emphasis on increasing productive capacities. On the one hand, unlimited production is an unrealizable ideal, an ideal that depends on its own impossibility. On the other, such an ideal fails to question the very meaning of productive: might we also mean productive of health, of environmental flourishing, of the respect of diverse modes of life? The notion of the multitude is too crude to allow for any of this.

At the same time, the emphasis on productivity is what communism shares with capitalism. The desiring, consuming, productive multitude seems to me to be the ideological form of Empire, the belief that the global economy with all its flows and productive increases is the hope for humanity. Doesn't capitalism rely on the cultivation and proliferation of desires? On the creation of needs? What's even worse – Hardt and Negri seem to celebrate its most depoliticized aspects, treating as politically emancipatory what may ultimately be an expansion and intensification of commodification. Finally, insofar as Hardt and Negri subsume democracy into production they presume that the market is democratic, that the productive



# Call for Applications

## Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators

January – June and July – December 2003



### Objective

The **Institute for Human Sciences** (Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, IWM) is an independent, international, and interdisciplinary center for advanced study. IWM regularly invites academics to translate important works in the humanities or the social sciences from an Eastern into a Western European language, or vice versa, or from one Eastern European language into another. To date over 60 translators from 14 countries have been invited to work at the Institute.

The purpose of IWM's Translation Program is to help fill the gaps in the relevant literature in these fields, thus promoting an exchange of ideas between the East and the West or within Central and Eastern Europe. The program bears the name of the poet and translator, Paul Celan, whose work – perhaps more than any other's in this century – thrives on the diversity of European cultures and also mediates between them.

A jury of experts meets each year to evaluate applications and select finalists. The Program is partly supported by the *City of Vienna*. In the past, it was also sponsored by the *European Cultural Foundation*, Amsterdam (1995 – 2000), *Central and East European Publishing Project*, Oxford (1987 – 1994), the *Getty Grant Program* (1994 – 1996) and the Ford Foundation.

### Conditions

As a rule, finalists are invited to spend six months – January-June or July-December – at IWM as Visiting Fellows in order to complete their projects. IWM places a stipend of € 11.600,- at their disposal, which covers the expenses of their stay in Vienna, and provides them with an office, a PC, and access to IWM's in-house as well as other relevant Viennese research facilities.

### Application Procedure

Applications should include the following materials:

- a curriculum vitae with a bibliography of translations and other publications, if applicable
- the author and work to be translated (from the original language) and an explanation for the choice thereof
- exact number of pages

- a contract with a publisher for the publication of the translation or a letter of intent from a publisher; proof that the translator/publisher holds the rights to the translation and its publication (or has an option for them); planned date of publication
- information on the program of the publishing house

Works which are thematically related to IWM's fields of research and ongoing projects will receive preferential treatment:

- Political Philosophy of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
- Equality and Difference
- The Philosophy of Jan Patočka
- History of Political and Economic Ideas in Central and Eastern Europe
- European Contemporary History

Applications for Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators for the year 2003 must be submitted in English or German before March 1, 2002. They should be addressed to

IWM  
Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators  
Spittelauer Lände 3  
A-1090 Vienna  
Tel. (+ 43 1) 313 58-0  
Fax (+ 43 1) 313 58-30  
celan@iwm.at

Applicants will be notified on the status of their applications by the beginning of May 2002.

For more information please visit IWM's website:  
[www.univie.ac.at/iwm/f-celan.htm](http://www.univie.ac.at/iwm/f-celan.htm)

capacity of the multitude is in and of itself inherently democratic. This presumption is market capitalism at its worst, an endorsement of the ideology that equates the best political interests of the people with advances in the stock market. Not

only does this logic yet again represent a conflation of economic and political reasoning, but it has the perverse effect of putting Hardt and Negri on the side of the worst sorts of neo-conservatives for whom whatever the market decides is a

democratic decision.

### *Empire*

Antonio Negri & Michael Hardt  
*Harvard University Press, 2000*  
ISBN 0-674-25121-0

## Call for Applications

# Milena Jesenská Fellowships for Journalists



The **Institute for Human Sciences (IWM)** in cooperation with **The Project Syndicate** have jointly established the Milena Jesenská Fellowships to enable Journalists from Europe to work in Vienna on long term projects, free of their daily obligations. The Milena Jesenská Fellowships are supported by the **European Cultural Foundation**, Amsterdam.

### Conditions

Milena Jesenská Fellows are invited to spend three months at IWM in order to complete their projects. Recipients of the fellowships are given a stipend of € 7.630 and provided with office space, a PC with Internet access, and access to IWM's in-house research facilities as well as other relevant sources in Vienna. Travel grants of up to € 1.820 will be available for research visits to neighbouring countries.

### Application Procedure

Applicants should submit a curriculum vitae and a concise project proposal (not more than 3 double spaced pages) in English. These materials must be sent by mail before the **deadline of March 1, 2002** to

Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen - IWM  
Milena Jesenská Fellowships for Journalists  
Spittelauer Laende 3, A-1090 Vienna, Austria  
e-mail: milena@iwm.at

### The Jury

**Sarmite Elerte**, Editor-in-chief, *Diena*, Riga  
**Helena Luczywo**, Managing Editor-in-chief, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Warsaw  
**Gerfried Sperl**, Editor-in-chief, *Der Standard*, Vienna (Chair)  
**Laura Starink**, *NRC-Handelsblad*, Rotterdam  
**Anita Traninger**, Managing Director, IWM, Vienna  
**Gottfried Wagner**, Secretary General of the European Cultural Foundation, Amsterdam  
**Roger de Weck**, Journalist, Berlin / Zurich

Applicants will be notified of the decision of the jury by the beginning of May 2002. The jury is not obliged to publicly justify its decisions.

Since its founding in 1982, the **Institute for Human Sciences** has laid a particular emphasis on the resurrection of an open exchange of ideas with academics, intellectuals and politicians from Central and Eastern Europe. The IWM's fields of research and ongoing programs are:

- Political Philosophy of the 19th and 20th Centuries
- Issues of Equality and Difference
- Political and Social Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe
- European Contemporary History
- The Philosophical Work of Jan Patočka

**Project Syndicate** is a global association of privately-owned general circulation newspapers and business journals designed to provide an international forum for debate and the exchange of ideas between East and West, North and South, on vital issues of the post-communist era.

Among Project Syndicate's objectives are the following:

- Developing an international forum for the broadening of debate and exchange of ideas between East and West
- Bringing unique international voices to the global public
- Strengthening the independence of printed media in transition and developing countries
- Upgrading the journalistic, editorial, and business capacities of newspapers in post-communist and developing countries

**Milena Jesenská** (1896-1944) was an outstanding journalist and mediator between the Czech and the German cultures in Bohemia as well as an astute political commentator. She was detained in the Nazi concentration camp in Ravensbrück for her political involvement and resistance, where she died in 1944. She is widely known for her correspondence with Franz Kafka.

For more information on the call for applications and on previous recipients of the Fellowship please visit the Institute's website  
[www.univie.ac.at/iwm/f-milena.htm](http://www.univie.ac.at/iwm/f-milena.htm)

The essentialization of cultural differences practised by both the Huntingtonian and the multiculturalist schools dismisses the majority of today's societies as incapable of joining the happy few. A plea for a comeback of Modernization Theory by Daniel Chirot.

## Culture and Modernization in Times of Globalization

CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGISTS have largely given up on the notion that there has been social evolution, despite the uncomfortable fact that their archeological colleagues are faced with the reality of evolutionary stages all the time. Most cultural anthropologists now favor a multicultural perspective that pronounces all cultures more or less equal. It might seem strange to equate this methodological approach with the one favored by Samuel Huntington's famous book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996) about the inevitable clash of civilizations caused by the near immutability of boundaries between major cultural traditions, but both follow a common logic. Huntington's "civilizations" are far broader than what most anthropologists would call "cultures"; and for Huntington there is a clear value hierarchy, with the West seen as a morally superior, if presently endangered civilization. Contemporary anthropologists reject such a hierarchy, and if anything, tend to reverse it. Both approaches, however, deny the validity of the old functionalist-evolutionary theory that sees humanity's history as a long march toward a common, modern type of society first reached by the West but accessible to all other humans.

### Huntingtonians vs. Multiculturalists

The history of how cultural anthropology shifted from its functional-evolutionary base in the late nineteenth century to an increasingly postmodernist rejection of any such notions is an interesting one but need not detain us here. What is important is, rather, to see how much this shift was produced by an ideological change that began in the late 1960s. It was not new knowledge as such that caused the old theory to be abandoned but a political reinterpretation that increasingly viewed Western European and American culture as imperialistic, alienating, and somehow inauthentic. This was not a new phenomenon in intellectual life as it had its roots in the anti-Enlightenment, anti-universalistic, and anti-modernist thought of Rous-

seau and especially Herder who believed that each culture has its own unique virtue and could only suffer from being polluted by the arrogant French.

The "civilizational" approach is equally ideological but much older. Long ago the Greeks consigned the Persians to an irremediably despotic and obscurantist but menacing Asian civilization, and most other non-Greeks (including the Macedonians) to the status of barbarians. The Greeks were hardly unique, however, as all the great classical agrarian cultures and religions, or at least their elites were quite certain that they possessed the one true way of organizing societies and leading the proper life.

In the end, then as now, it amounts to a question of one's taste. If it is the Western way, or now, the American way that one despises, then multicultural anthropology which privileges everything non-Western, non-modern, and anti-capitalist offers the theory of choice. If, on the other hand, one appreciates Western, especially American individualism, progress, and democracy as well as the material success brought by capitalism, then those parts of the world that have not, perhaps can never adopt the Western ways are either barbarians or hopelessly despotic "Asiatics." Underneath much of the rhetoric about such issues that is all there is – taste. The master ideologues on both sides of the discussion accuse the others of bad faith, bigotry, hypocrisy, or just plain blindness, but both Huntingtonians and multiculturalists in all their varieties agree that human societies are not, cannot evolve toward a roughly similar, single modern type of social structure with a broadly common modern culture. How good a representation of the world does either side of this ideological divide offer? Neither does a very satisfactory job, though for opposite reasons.

### The race to modernity

The multiculturalists have to pretend that there has been no progress, and more than that, they have to deny the nearly univer-

sal desire for a better material life and more personal freedom. Intellectual critics (including religious ones) may rail against crass American tastes and low brow culture, as romantic anti-modernists decried industrial England in the nineteenth century, but most people everywhere want to be as free, as rich, as mobile, and as easily able to enjoy carefree (or so it seems from American films, television, and popular music) sex as Americans. More than a century ago Nietzsche's deep hatred of his own increasingly bourgeois world, and his contempt of all things English captured the anti-modern intellectual's aristocratic disdain for industrial civilization and the way it spread material benefits as well as democratic privileges to the vulgar masses.

On the other hand, to insist that only Westerners can enjoy the fruits of modernization also misleads. It may have been that Greek and Roman notions of individual freedom and private property for a small elite ultimately gave Western Europe a head start in the race to modernity, as many, including David Landes, have suggested. Or, more likely, it may be that the rationalizing ethic of some Western Christians was the key to the early commercial, scientific, and finally industrial and political revolutions of the West, as Max Weber would have it. But to be first has never meant that followers cannot do as well or better. We are long past thinking that only Japan seems able to imitate the West because of the dubious proposition that its mixture of Shinto and Buddhism is somehow "Protestant." Now, as the pages of the Far Eastern Economic Review regularly attest, some substantial portions of China, not only Taiwan, but Hong Kong and the coastal cities from Canton to Shanghai have become some of the most dynamic economic parts of the globe, and that the area around Bangalore in India has become one of the world's centers of the software industry. Malaysia, Turkey, and Brazil have become major industrial economies with per capita GNPs that place them in the upper middle income ranks of countries in the world. This does not even



include the transformation of some of the most Catholic, previously backward parts of Europe that were once considered hopelessly unprogressive, such as Spain, Ireland, and Portugal, into advanced modern economies.

Nor are democracy and an increasing respect for individual rights exclusively Western. People all over the world, from Iran to Indonesia to Mexico are demanding political and legal rights that go far beyond those that were available to the vast majority of Western Europeans in the nineteenth century but are a fundamental part of the continuing liberal revolution that has been a basic part of modernization for two centuries.

### Resisting globalization

All of the world may not be on the verge of adopting a single cultural model, but many of the key elements of what has come to be defined as the modern, liberal Western, democratic, individualistic, capitalist way of life have spread very widely, and continue to do so. That is the true meaning of what is commonly called globalization, and that is why globalization appalls those who want to resist this trend. If this is so, and if the denials of this trend are largely ideological, is it worth debating an issue that boils down to a matter of willful distortions of fact and misunderstanding about the nature of modern social change? The answer is unequivocally yes, if only because policy decisions are made on the basis of such ideological tastes and misunderstandings. The debate itself shapes our understanding of what is taking place, and often distorts our perceptions of reality.

After the publication of Huntington's 1996 book, for example, some Turkish intellectuals took the position that since the West was consigning



them to eternal Muslim backwardness and obscurantism, they might as well abandon all efforts to join Europe and move closer to Iran and the Arab world. Fortunately, this tendency has lost ground in Turkey. As a demonstration of how wrong it is to classify groups by their seemingly deep cultural predispositions, in Turkey many Islamists want to join Europe which they see as protecting religious

and civil rights, while the supposedly Westernizing hard line Kemalists in the army are increasingly nationalistic and turning away from Europe for precisely the same reason. They want to maintain an authoritarian, militaristic system in place. In the 1970s the socialist Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit was fervently opposed to joining Europe because it was too capitalist and exploitative. Now, again as Prime Minister, the same Ecevit is fervently in favor of joining Europe.

Similar doubts about joining Europe have been voiced by some Russian intellectuals who took their being relegated by Huntington's analysis to Christian Orthodox barbarism as an excuse to promote a revived version of anti-capitalist, anti-democratic, and anti-Western Slavophilism. Russia was bound to fail and be rejected by the West anyway if



it tried to take a Westernizing approach, so it should develop its own, uniquely pure, communitarian, and native version of modernization. It was communism's adoption of this position that gave it considerable legitimacy among Russian nationalists, but the failure of communism left this "Russian idea" in limbo from which it is only slowly recovering. Now, there are voices in Russia claiming that it is happening all over again – the West is rejecting Russia, so Russia must find its own solution by rejecting Western modernization and going back to its genuine roots. Unfortunately, if such attitudes prevail, they will bring another century of backwardness and misery to Russia.

### A punctuated equilibrium

Here we can see that the Huntingtonian approach has much in common with what the multiculturalists are demanding. It is among intellectuals in India who most appreciate postmodernist ideas that one finds the same kind of anti-modernist response as among Islamic fundamentalists in some of the Muslim world countries, though they would deny this heatedly. That substantial portions of the population feel threatened by modernization means that these intellectuals have an audience and that policy errors could stop the recent, rapid economic growth in India by re-

Daniel Chirot zeigt in seinem Beitrag, dass die Positionen, die Samuel Huntington in seinem insbesondere nach den Ereignissen des 11. September wieder intensiv diskutierten Buch *Clash of Civilizations* (1986) vertritt, erstaunlich viel mit den Forderungen der Multikulturalisten gemeinsam haben. Der vollständige Text ist in der jüngsten Nummer von *Transit – Europäische Revue* nachzulesen.

turning it to the autarkic, failed policy that guided Congress during the first four decades of Indian independence.

In non-Western societies both those who accept a Huntingtonian interpretation and multiculturalists turn their backs on modernization as a Western import



that does not fit their conception of the good society, and both are sure that the Western model is wrong for them.

What is the reality, and what theoretical stance best explains the nature of progressive social change in the modern world? Strangely enough, it is the very functionalist-evolutionary perspective abandoned by cultural anthropology, and subsequently by sociology in the 1970s.

Taking an evolutionary-functionalist perspective on change alters the debate about the “clash of civilizations” because it suggests that seemingly irreconcilable cultural differences are more a product of different rates of modernization than of permanent cultural divisions.

Cultures are codes, like genetic codes, sets of rules that guide social organization and personal behavior. They may be less precise than genetic codes, and they certainly can be subjected to willful human change, so the analogy with biological evolution is only that, an analogy. Nevertheless, the similarities are important. Over generations people work out codes of conduct that are enshrined as customs and laws, tastes and preferences, and guiding concepts of how to react to various exigencies. New rules, tastes, and customs constantly enter into cultures, sometimes quickly, sometimes slowly. These may have little or no significant effect on a society, they may be beneficial and contribute to survival, or they may be harmful. The key to understanding social change is that the circumstances in which any society lives, even the most isolated and remote, are never permanently fixed. It turns out, more or less by accident, that certain cul-

tural patterns are more flexible and allow for easier adaptation as climates, social environments, technologies, and population densities change. Cultural patterns that are too inflexible, or that fail to provide successful solutions to serious new problems faced by a society provoke crises. These may be fatal, or they may lead to greater flexibility. As with biological evolution, the rate of change is almost certainly not constant, but irregular, a matter of “punctuated equilibrium” as periods of relatively slow change are followed by sudden clumps of serious new challenges.

### Accidental differences

Long ago Shmuel Eisenstadt tried to show that there were strong commonalities between all the classical agrarian empires of the past though he later fell into the error of insisting that at some time each of the major world religions set its sphere of influence on a path from which deviation was almost impossible. Indeed, agrarian kingdoms and empires all developed warrior aristocracies at one time or another because this was an efficient way to fight wars, and because those who became professional war lords possessed the physical strength to grab a surplus from their peasants. Only in remote mountains or otherwise protected regions did more democratic, tribal cultures survive. This was such a universal development that it overrode all the supposedly enormous cultural differences between the civilizations.

Similarly, urban merchants arose everywhere and they were more likely to quantify and rationalize their surroundings than lords or peasants. In the long run religious elites everywhere tended to



downplay the virtues of military bravura and the calculating greed of merchants, and the official clerks who served ruling dynasties emphasized the role of learning and administrative rationality. These combinations of classes and value predisposi-

tions arose over and over again with startling regularity because these types of occupations and attitudes were in demand and were best able to keep advanced agrarian societies functioning.

What have been called big cultural barriers between the major cultural clumps called civilizations were largely produced by accidental differences in the distributions of power between the same sets of competing kings, warrior aristocrats, merchants, clerks, priests, peasants, and neighboring hill or desert tribes hov-



ering on the edge of established agrarian states. Geography, the accident of being on a migratory or trade route, the quality of the land and the frequency with which it was subjected to natural catastrophes such as floods or droughts, the nearness of distance from nomadic and less civilized border tribes – these determined different outcomes. There were cultural differences, to be sure, but the basics were very similar in all agrarian states, except that accidents made some groups relatively more powerful in some places and not in others.

### Breaking out of the Middle Ages

To give a major example, it was the accidental independence of merchant cities in Western Europe combined with the fact that the best lands of Western Europe were not subject to frequent climatic extremes or exposed to nomadic raids that lay behind the “European miracle.” The greater independence of towns and merchants allowed the greater flowering of a rationalizing ethic, and the long term stability in agricultural production without too many interruptions built up a capital base unmatched elsewhere except to some extent in China. Finally, the failure to unite Europe (unlike China, which kept on coming back together), allowed more stimulating technological, economic, intellectual competition to push evolutionary change faster. But the cultural ele-

ments that made up Western civilization in the Middle Ages were the same as those elsewhere, and only small differences in the relative weight of each determined a different outcome.

No agrarian civilization solved the problem of population cycles. In good times, population growth outstripped technological progress and caused declining per capita returns in food production as well as the overproduction of grasping nobles. Wars, disease, and famines then erupted until the situation was redressed. This endless cycle made up much of the drama of classical history, from China to India to the Middle East to Europe and even to the Mesoamerican classical civilizations. This is why from the time when agrarian states first established themselves in antiquity until the late Middle Ages the human population grew relatively slowly.

The story of how the West broke out of this pattern was a mainstay of social science theorizing throughout the nineteenth and well into the middle of the twentieth century. Only in recent decades has this problem ceased to be the single most important one posed by the social sciences. Then, at least in sociology, World Systems theorists came along to sneer at the problem by claiming that Western European were only better thieves and not cultural innovators, and postmodernist multiculturalists began to deny that the West had invented anything worthwhile at all. Yet, something did happen in the West and it transformed the world as much as did the much earlier agrarian revolution that occurred in the millennia before about 3000 BC. As in the earlier revolution, the human population again began to grow very rapidly, and human societies were dramatically altered. The biggest difference is that this second great transformation has taken place in, at most, three or four hundred years rather than three or four thousand.

### No intervention necessary

Now, once again, humanity is faced with a new set of unprecedented challenges and it has been obliged to adapt to the new circumstances by creating new types of social organizations, new cultures. As in the agrarian past, however, only a fairly narrow set of workable options exist, though all sorts of experiments have been and will continue to be tried everywhere as people struggle to combine old habits with new requirements. In the modern transformation it turns out that the set of possible solutions are narrower than ever before because of the emergence of a single world market and because of the fantastic progress in the speed of communications. Societies and systems that do not adapt will fall behind, their people will become restless and rebellious, and they will fail.

# Transit

EUROPÄISCHE REVUE

## Westerweiterung? Zur symbolischen Geographie Osteuropas

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Daniel Chirot Osteuropa zwischen Kultur und  
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Timothy Snyder Die neuen Mitteleuropäer

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One difference now may be that evolutionary pressures exposing failures no longer need to manifest themselves mostly through military conquests, enslavements, famines, or forced expulsions as they did in the past. The customs, laws, ideologies, and forms of organization that block free exchanges of ideas and technologies, of



goods and capital, of labor and skills have only to produce slower economic growth for people to raise the level of discontent. Those hostile to the new requirements may think that the rich capitalist powers, now led by the United States, are plotting their destruction. But no plot or direct intervention is really necessary. Fundamentalist Muslim regimes, or right wing corporatist autocracies, or corrupt, closed plutocracies, or other such holdovers from the late agrarian age wound themselves by insisting on maintaining poorly adapted social and economic systems. Typically, their leaders understand this but hold on to power desperately, afraid that adaptation to the new requirements will sweep them away. That is why they are most afraid of



the free exchange of ideas and information as that will make their failures all the more apparent to the people they rule.

Where does this leave the “clash of civilizations”? An evolutionary-functionalist line of theorizing suggests that the “clash” is largely a function of uneven modernization, and is therefore unlikely to last very much longer, certainly not much more than through the present cen-

ture. It is not fixed eternally in either the historical past or the future. This makes both the Huntingtonian contention that modernization cannot occur in certain cultures appear as historically nearsighted and theoretically shallow. It makes the multiculturalist, postmodernist rejection of modernization as expression of temporary Western hegemony seem completely at odds with what is happening in the world. On the other hand, it suggests that we would do well to return to the older tradition of functional-evolutionary theorists that culminated in the 1950s with Talcott Parsons. If this is applied to problems of contemporary economic modernization, what used to be called “modernization theory,” as most succinctly summarized by Walt W. Rostow in his elaboration of a model of the stages of economic growth (1960) merits rehabilitation if we are to understand contemporary economic and developmental inequalities and what paths modernizing economies will take in the future.

Read more on how this applies to the debate about “Eastern” and “Central Europe” in the current issue of **Transit – Europäische Revue**: *Westerweiterung? Zur symbolischen Geographie Osteuropas* (see also page 29).

**Daniel Chirot** is Professor of International Studies and of Sociology at the University of Washington.

## Preview

In the next issue of the **IWM Newsletter (No 75)**:

### Workshop

**Strangers in a Strange Land? Migration, Multi-Ethnic Societies and Social Stability in Europe**

### International Conference

**The Century of the Avant-Gardes**

### IWM Lectures in Gender Studies 2001

**Wendy Brown: A Critique of Tolerance in the Age of Identity**

### Public Debate

**The Future of Conservative Politics**

Discussants:

**Andrzej Olechowski**, *Chairman, „Civic Platform”, and former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs*

**Jürgen Rüttgers**, *Deputy Chairman, CDU, and former German Minister of Education, Science, Research and Technology*

**Wolfgang Schüssel**, *Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria*

### Meeting of the Club of 3

**The Future Shape of the EU Institutions**

### The Sixth Central European Forum

**Approaching Europe – or Something Else? Social Policy Reform in East-Central Europe in a Global Perspective**

# Paideia – Die Zukunft der humanistischen Bildung



Hat die klassische Idee der **paideia** (Bildung), der ganzheitlichen Erziehung zum mündigen Bürger, noch Geltung für die Gegenwart?

Aspekte der Diskussion:

- Paideia: Anachronismus oder Notwendigkeit?
- Demokratisierung, Multikulturalismus und paideia
- Technologie und paideia
- Wirtschaft und paideia

Tagungsprogramm: [www.iwm.at](http://www.iwm.at)

Samstag, **26.01.2002**, 10.00 - 16.30 Uhr

Sonntag, **27.01.2002**, 9.30 - 17.30 Uhr

Ort: **Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen  
Spittelauer Lände 3, 1090 Wien**

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
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in Zusammenarbeit mit dem *Paideia Project*  
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EUROPÄISCHE REVUE

## Das Gedächtnis des Jahrhunderts

Wir erleben weltweit eine Konjunktur des Gedächtnisses. Allenthalben macht sich eine tiefgreifende Veränderung der traditionellen Beziehung zur Vergangenheit bemerkbar. Sie hat vielerlei Formen angenommen: Kritik der offiziellen Geschichtsschreibung und Wiedererwachen des verdrängten Geschehens; Einforderung einer zerstörten oder beschlagnahmten Vergangenheit; Pflege der historischen Wurzeln; Aufblühen aller möglichen Arten des Gedenkens; juristische Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit; Eröffnung der verschiedensten Museen; erhöhte Sensibilität für den Umgang mit Archivbeständen; neue Bindungen an das, was die Angelsachsen *heritage*, die Franzosen *patrimoine* und die Deutschen Erbe nennen. Es ist, als wäre eine Flutwelle der Erinnerung über die Welt hereingebrochen und hätte überall eine enge Verbindung zwischen Vergangenheit und Zugehörigkeitsgefühl, Kollektivbewußtsein und individuellem Selbstgefühl, Gedächtnis und Identität geschaffen.

Frankreich war wohl das erste Land, das in diese Ära des leidenschaftlichen, konfliktbeladenen, fast zwanghaften Gedenkens eingetreten ist. Dann, nach dem Fall der Mauer und dem Verschwinden der Sowjetunion, meldete sich das "wiedergefundene Gedächtnis" Osteuropas zurück. Und seit dem Sturz der lateinamerikanischen Diktaturen und dem Ende der Apartheid in Südafrika erleben wir eine wahrhafte Globalisierung des Gedächtnisses und der Vergangenheitspolitik.

(Aus dem Beitrag von Pierre Nora)

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