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Newsletter 70

POLITISCHE DISKUSSION |

The political changes in Europe in the past few years have not only changed the face of the Old World but have also transformed its relationship with the USA. Relations between Europe and the United States will continue to be of crucial economic and political importance in the new century. Against this backdrop, IWM in conjunction with Erste Bank held an American-European Debate at Vienna's Museum of Applied Arts (MAK) on September 14, 2000.

Strained Friendship? Europe and the USA in the 21st Century

WHILE PUBLIC INTEREST IN AUSTRIA was consumed by the strained relationship between Austria and Europe – the measures taken by the 14 EU members were to be lifted a few days after the event – more than 200 people attended the debate on the future relationship between Europe and the USA. After Erste Bank CEO Andreas Treichl had welcomed the audience, Krzysztof Michalski, Director of IWM, took the floor in order to outline the evening's topic.

"Anti-Americanism used to be a specialty of the French," said Michalski, "one of these numerous French oddities like eating frog's legs, something nobody considered really threatening. Neither did the occasional outbursts of impatience on the other side of the ocean with these too clever Europeans who, unwilling to protect themselves, yet always finding a way to doublecross their American benefactor, rob anybody's sleep. Ultimately, the great shadow of the Evil Empire united everybody.

But now the Empire is gone and so is its shadow. The Europeans are trying to redefine their own identity with new institutions: with a common currency, a common security policy, common trade policies, with a European (i.e. non-American) social model. Germany in particular – slowly discovering its new strength and the new responsibilities which follow it – is struggling to find its new role in the new power context.

Nobody can deny that these developments entail potential conflicts of interest with the U.S., possibly on a much larger scale than has so far been the case, and in the absence of



Unüberwindbare Missverständnisse oder verhandelbare Positionen? Gemeinsame außenpolitische Interessen oder selbstzufriedene Nabelschau? Gleichberechtigte Partner oder wirtschaftliche Konkurrenten? Die Erste Bank und das Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen baten Robert Zoellick und Ulrich Cartellieri zur Debatte. Moderator war James Hoge.



James Hoge



Robert Zoellick



Ulrich Cartellieri

a common danger facing both adversaries.

At the same time, American interest in Europe is clearly weakening. This may have cultural reasons; the American elites have become more diverse, more multicultural, less European oriented. It may have also political reasons: the American establishment and American public opinion seem to be more than ever preoccupied with domestic problems. Logically enough, after the demise of the Soviet Union, Europe does not dominate what little of the American people's attention is left for the outer world and has to share this attention, at best equally, with other regions.

In this new cultural and political situation the unavoidable tensions between Europe and the US can develop without the familiar limits. Can they become strong enough to undermine the European-American alliance in any serious way? We believe this to be a fascinating question, not only for intellectual, but also for practical reasons.“

To discuss these key issues, three intellectuals and politicians had been invited:

Robert Zoellick, Chief foreign policy adviser to US presidential candidate Governor George W. Bush, spoke for the American side, while **Ulrich Cartellieri**, President of the German Council on Foreign Relations and federal treasurer of the CDU, represented the European perspective. The panel was chaired by the Editor-in-chief of *Foreign Affairs*, **James Hoge**.

In his introductory remarks Hoge had to admit that there are strains in the transatlantic relationship – there will always be strains in a strategic alliance. The question remains whether they are getting sufficiently strong to be threatening to the effectiveness of the very alliance. One could still ask whether the alliance is still necessary now that the conditions that produced it are gone. Hoge considered the relationship between the United States and Europe as somewhat schizophrenic from the beginning. The Americans are either seen as too dominating or as too disengaged, sometimes both at the same time. As main European complaints (which are not necessarily correct, he added) Hoge listed the following:

- The US is given to a unilateral exercise of its power, i.e. they do not consult with the Europeans but take a position and expect the world to follow
- The American popular culture spreads all over the world and drives out local cultures
- The economic system does not take enough care of the socially and economically disadvantaged
- The political system is too corrupted by special interest money
- The political system is less democratic than it appears at a first glance
- The Americans are a violent nation (gun culture, death penalty)

People in the USA, on the contrary, think that the European nations lack cohesion in order to play a major partnership role, keep their defense budgets irre-

sponsibly small and hold on to an inefficient and expensive economic and social system.

Fundamental misunderstandings

Ulrich Cartellieri took the failure of the WTBO meeting in Seattle as an example for the strains Hoge had addressed. The failure was one of both Europeans and Americans due to a lack of basic mutual understanding: The American administration was out to easily realize short term deals, while the Europeans were thinking in fundamental terms of establishing a long-term framework. But there was no communication on this issue. During the last half century, the mutual affinity has been taken for granted. Nowadays, as a new generation has taken over, the Europeans find their counterparts less interested in Europe and also much less informed than the elders were. European media focus on the excesses of gun ownership, on death penalty, on social inequalities between excessive manager pay and social hardships. But what is more serious is the fundamental misreading of European development and especially the Euro.

China – a matter of perception

Ulrich Cartellieri noticed how China's possession of missiles was perceived differently by the US and Europe. The USA fear a shifting of the balance of power in Asia and see China's defense strategy as a source of provocation and instability. Cartellieri agreed that there is a particle of truth in this, but was also convinced that this point of view is shared by almost no one in Europe. Political and public debates have a tendency to be simplified once they reach the mainstream and this has happened in this case as well. The question arises how similarly simplified impressions can be prevented from taking center stage in a political debate on Europe.

Bob Zoellick on the other hand thinks that one of the potential tensions in the relationship between US and Europe is that Europe looks at China primarily through the commercial lens, while the US has massive security and political interests in Asia and the Pacific that it must take into account, namely the security treaty with Japan, interests of the Taiwanese and South Koreans, as well as economic considerations. Europe is only preoccupied with Europe, though they certainly have some interest in Russia and the Balkans.

Though Americans and Europeans need not always agree, to create a partnership between US and Europe it is important that the US treat Europe like a partner and that Europe begin looking outside its own borders and problems, at larger issues in the world. The USA clearly expects Europe to broaden its viewpoint regarding these issues.

The future of the Euro

James Hoge saw Europe optimistic about its present economic situation, but also pessimistic regarding its

long-term ability to compete with US businesses and private sector, due in large part to the US's lead in advanced technology.

Ulrich Cartellieri, in contrast, argued that the current optimism is by and large superficial, and dismissed the idea of long term pessimism. Europe currently enjoys an upswing of the economic cycle, with good growth rates and low inflation. A major restructuring program – including monopolies – has been going on all across Europe for the past 10 years. The introduction of the Euro is key to the restructuring and internationalization of national economies necessary for Europe to compete in the global marketplace.



James Hoge, Ulrich Cartellieri, Robert Zoellick, Krzysztof Michalski, Andreas Treichl



James Hoge, Fürst Schwarzenberg



It is important that national regulations be reformed or abolished in due time; otherwise, they will become obsolete after the common currency is implemented in 2002.

Bob Zoellick agreed that the Euro has not only led to positive effects both in prices and the benchmarking of costs within companies. The latter is especially important insofar as business costs are streamlined due to the elimination of currency differentials. There is a new generation of European entrepreneurs who are very international, and who are leading European companies towards a global economy; however, governments nevertheless must relax their regulations. Someone once joked that Microsoft could never have originated in Europe, because there is a law that says workplaces have to have windows, and a garage has no windows.

The role of government

Cartellieri holds that the convergence of the USA and Europe as regards the basic role of government is an extremely positive development. While the United States has a federalist system of limited government, Europe has always had governments burdened with a specific ideology and sweeping agendas for re-engineering society. But increasingly, European governments are no longer able to govern in the old style, but must now react to new situations. For example, the German government has dealt recently with both social and tax reform because the present situation has pushed these issues to the forefront.

The future of the European Union

How does Europe make the next leap forward? James Hoge argued that the voting process for letting new members in must be reconstituted. The European Union cannot merely make technical changes, but must re-evaluate the way in which Europeans understand themselves.

There are, Hoge said (quoting journalist Martin Wolf), three ways to integrate Europe:

1. German – Maximum integration with some form of federalism
2. French – Maximum integration with strong governmental control
3. British – Minimal integration with minimal governmental control

However, objections can be raised to all three: Federalism is unworkable, bureaucratic intergovernmentalism is intolerable, and minimal integration is unavailable. What are the possibilities for creating a common European political value entity?

An American friend of Cartellieri's observed that while Europeans constantly seem to mess things up, in the end they always work them out. Cartellieri offered this as an example of French and German continental dogmatism mixed with British realism. Although they have messed up a lot, Europe has become a fairly workable proposition that benefits everyone who is a part of it.

„Auf dem von der Erste Bank mit dem Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen veranstalteten Debattenabend trat für die USA Robert Zoellick, der außenpolitische Chefbeauftragte des Präsidentschaftskandidaten George W. Bush, in den Ring, während Europa durch Ulrich Cartellieri, CDU-Bundesschatzmeister und Präsident der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, vertreten wurde. ... Einig waren sich die Diskutanten jedenfalls in einem: Von einem verstärkten Pflegebedarf der transatlantischen Beziehungen darf in den kommenden Jahren ausgegangen werden.“
Christoph Winder, (Der Standard)

In Verbindung mit dem Österreichischen Nationalkomitee der Europäischen Kulturstiftung veranstaltete das IWM am 20. Oktober im Palais Schwarzenberg ein Symposium, das der Frage nach der Ablöse des Politischen durch Kultur gewidmet war.

From Class to Culture: On the Changing Social Divisions in Society

Cultural cleavages have started to transform or replace traditional conflicts, symbols and practices, and are increasingly instrumentalized to redefine existing or to create new political dichotomies. The symposium, which was organized in collaboration with the National Committee of the European Cultural Foundation and took place at Palais Schwarzenberg on October 20, aimed at exploring the global shift from politics to culture.



Lord Dahrendorf



Cornelia Klinger



MIT EINEM STATEMENT zu aktuellen kulturellen Entwicklungen, die dazu angetan sind, dem kritischen Beobachter Sorge zu bereiten, eröffnete **Lord Dahrendorf** (London) das Symposium. Was gemeinhin als zunehmende Verflachung der Kultur, insbesondere auf dem Gebiet der Medien wahrgenommen wird, wird im englischsprachigen Raum unter dem Schlagwort des „dumbing down“ intensiv diskutiert. Erstaunlicherweise scheinen sich aber gerade die politisch Verantwortlichen nicht zum Gegensteuern entschließen zu können. Die Förderung jener Institutionen, die tonangebend sind und nachhaltigen Einfluss auf das kulturelle Gesamtklima einer Gesellschaft ausüben könnten, wird vernachlässigt gegenüber der Hinwendung zu einer nivellierenden populistischen Kultur, die sich eher am „human interest“ der breiten Masse orientiert. Gerade hochqualitative Kulturinstitutionen sind nach wie vor insbesondere ökonomisch auf die Unterstützung durch die Politik angewiesen. Vor dem Hintergrund zog Lord Dahrendorf den Schluss, dass es den politischen Führungsschichten offensichtlich an Mut und Willen mangelt, eindeutige Vorgaben zu machen oder zumindest richtungsweisende politische Linien vorzugeben, die das kulturelle Leben zu beeinflussen imstande sind. Um den Mechanismus des eigentlichen demokratischen Wechselspiels zwischen Vorgabe und Kritik wieder in Gang zu setzen, müssen, so Dahrendorf, sowohl die politische Führung zu mehr bestimmendem Selbstbewusstsein angehalten als auch die Parlamente in ihrer Aufgabe als Institution konstruktiver Kritik bestärkt werden.

Um eben das Ausmaß der gegenseitigen Einflussnahme von Kultur und Politik näher auszuleuchten, stellte **Aleksander Smolar** (Maitre de recherche, EHESS, Paris, und Präsident der Stefan Batory Foundation) in seinem Beitrag die Frage ob, und wenn ja, wie sich Kultur in nachhaltig ernst zu nehmende politische Optionen übertragen lässt. Zweifellos hat nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg eine kulturelle Revolution stattgefunden, die viele Zeithistoriker in den 60er Jahren verorten. Doch dieser Wertewandel wurde, so Smolar, nicht auf die politische Ebene übertragen. Die politischen Kategorien des industriellen Zeitalters, rechts und links, bestehen unverändert, von geringfügigen inhaltlichen Modifikationen einmal abgesehen. Neue mächtige Gruppierungen, die dem kulturellen Umbruch Rechnung tragen würden, konnten sich dagegen nicht etablieren, was von einem sehr eingeschränkten Übersetzung kultureller Entwicklungen in die politische Repräsentation zeugt. Als zweiten

Aspekt diskutierte Aleksander Smolar die kulturelle Globalisierung, der als Reaktion eine Politik der Identitäten und der lokalen Interessen entgegengesetzt wird. Auf die Krise des Nationalstaats versuchen insbesondere rechtsgerichtete politische Gruppierungen durch das Bestehen auf und das Neuabstecken von Grenzen zu reagieren. Kultur wird dabei zum Vehikel der Etablierung und Naturalisierung von Differenzen.

Cornelia Klinger (Permanent Fellow, IWM) hob in ihrem Vortrag weniger auf die Interdependenz von Kultur und Politik ab, sondern versuchte vielmehr die Spannung, die der Entwicklung des Kulturbegriffs selbst eigen ist, in zehn Thesen komprimiert herauszuarbeiten. Zentral war dabei die Kontrastierung des selbst relativ jungen Begriffs der Kultur, der an das Projekt der Moderne gekoppelt ist, und des Konzepts der ‚Culture‘. Hierbei ist eine grundlegende strukturelle Ähnlichkeit festzustellen, was die Funktionsweise der Begriffe ‚Kultur‘ und ‚Culture‘ betrifft, denn beiden kommt ein Schließungscharakter zu, der den universalisierenden und globalisierenden Tendenzen der jeweiligen Epochen entgegenwirkt, wobei allerdings die konkreten Inhalte beider Begriffe und insbesondere deren Rahmenbedingungen, die diese Inhalte bestimmen, völlig unterschiedlich sind.

Galt der (alte) moderne Kulturbegriff eher als eine Art Sehnsuchtsformel auf der Suche nach Sinnintegration unter dem eindeutigen Primat des Politischen wie auch Nationalen, so nimmt sich das neue Konzept der ‚Culture‘ vorgeblich als Grenzen niederreißend aus, indem es die Markierungen zwischen dem Innen und Außen verschwimmen lässt, politische wie soziale Grenzziehungen unmöglich macht und letztlich den Bankrott des Politischen durch den Primat der Ökonomie anzeigt. Doch indiziert eben gerade diese Hegemonie der Ökonomie und jener Verlust der Innerlichkeit bzw. der Subjektinstanz gerade das Aufrichten neuer Grenzwälle.

Die Mitglieder des Österreichischen Nationalkomitees der Europäischen Kulturstiftung nahmen diese drei Beiträge als Impulse für eine intensive Diskussion, die sich bis weit in den Abend erstreckte.

On October 27-29, 2000, New Europe College (Bucharest) and the Institute for Human Sciences

(Vienna) organized, in the framework of the Robert Bosch Program, a joint workshop in Bucharest to revisit old and discover new frontiers within Eastern Europe.

Recomposing Eastern Europe? Inner Frontiers: Real and Imagined

TWO DECADES AGO, a number of leading non-communist intellectuals representing the Western borderlands of the Soviet Empire made an enormous effort to revive a not too old regional identity, „Central Europe“. In taking the first insecure steps on the slippery road of cultural/political geography at that time, Vaclav Havel, György Konrad, Milan Kundera, Czeslaw Milosz and others could hardly suspect that their fragmented thoughts full of historical intuition and tactical finesse would evolve into a semi-official political doctrine of the West, culminating in Samuel Huntington's theory of civilizations during the 1990s. Today, the terms „Central Europe“ or „East-Central Europe“ (ECE) serve as names of departments in foreign ministries, international organizations, multinational firms and NGOs, as well as appear in titles of a great variety of research programs, media projects and cultural initiatives. Even the rival acronym, CEE (Central and Eastern Europe), emphasizes the difference in some kind of uniformity.

Back in the 1980s, the idea of dividing Eastern Europe into two regions also divided the dissenters: it created a deep cleavage not only between the lucky few included in the concept of Central Europe and the majority excluded from it (cf. the debate between Kundera and Brodsky), but also among those born in the imagined *Zentral/Zwischen/Mitteuropa*. Here, these scholars and politicians who subscribed to historical arguments supporting the dichotomy of a European Center and its Eastern/Southern periphery confronted those who considered Yalta and sovietization more important than say, the tradition of the Habsburg Empire in understanding the post-war development of the Eastern Bloc.

The concept of Central Europe was criticized from another perspective as well. In Poland, for instance, quite a few intellectuals were reluctant to accept it, fearing that instead of full rehabilitation (i.e., Europeanness without an adjective), such a concept may legitimize a sort of second-rate position between Europe proper and „Asiatic“ Soviet rule. In their view, „Central Europe“ as an ideological construct would have remained still too close to „West-Asia“. Anyway, we do not have to return to Europe through the concept of Central Europe, they contended, since we *are*, have always been, Europe.

The ensuing discussion about the relevance and the limits of the concept (*Traum oder Trauma?*, etc.) lost its fervor by the end of the 1980s and seemed to be invalidated for good by the 1989 revolutions. At first

glance, the very fact of the collapse of communism washed away the alleged boundaries between the „Central“ and the „non-Central“ regions of Eastern Europe. The revolutions, in particular, after the fall of Gorbachev, seemed to corroborate the thesis of those who were unhappy with the way in which the notion of „Central Europe“ was reinvented and celebrated. The fact that Eastern European nations broke with communism and started dismantling it at the same time and in a similar manner created the impression that sovietization had left deeper traces on this part of the world than pre-communist history. Soviet-style homogenization, even if it lasted only four decades, seemed to offset many century-long heterogeneities. Furthermore, in light of the then prevailing expectations regarding a quick accession of the ex-communist countries to the European Community, „Europe“ overshadowed „Central Europe“, which seemed to remain an operational concept only in the framework of the „Europe of Regions“ discourse.

Thus, the notion of „Eastern Europe“ won a battle and withdrew from the war of concepts in the hope of going back to geography. During the first half of the 1990s, however, it became clear that the European integration of ex-communist countries would take decades rather than years. Moreover, the idea of Central Europe (or East-Central Europe) was reinforced by obvious differences in post-communist transformation on the two sides of the central versus non-central divide. The „good“ and „bad“ transformers, the states under „liberal“ and „national communist“ rule, the „Westernizers“ and the „orientalists“, the Visegrad countries and their „less-developed“ ex-communist neighbors, the candidates for „first“- or „second track“ accession to the European Union and the NATO, etc. – by and large, all these distinctions seemed to correspond with that divide.

One can, of course, discuss for ages whether or not (or to what degree) the distinctions are realistic. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to dispute that, as so frequently in the past, they partly (sometimes predominantly) follow Western perceptions, let alone, geopolitical prescriptions. The logic of these distinctions does not essentially differ from that inherent in the centuries old division between the concepts of Western and Eastern Europe. Before anyone can suspect a high dose of anti-imperialist sentiments here, let us emphasize that the „Western gaze“ at Eastern Europe as a compound of at least two regions, its West and the rest, has often been a result of an interplay



„Mysterious Russia“: from Eastern Europe to Eurasia? Alexei Miller, Anatoly Khazanov, Sorin Antohi, Petre Guran

Von 27. bis 29. Oktober trafen sich Mitglieder des IWM Partner-Netzwerks, das von der Robert Bosch Stiftung unterstützt wird, und internationale Osteuropa-Experten in Bukarest zu einem vom New Europe College (Bukarest) und dem IWM organisierten Workshop. Thema war die Frage, was und wo Osteuropa eigentlich sei. Die Fülle der Akronyme und vermeintlich historischen Etiketten, die seit 1989 die Debatte um die regionale Identität der ehemals kommunistischen Länder beherrschen, belegt, dass es dabei um mehr als um bloße Geographie geht. Wenn Sie mehr zum Thema lesen möchten: Die Frage nach den Grenzen in und von Osteuropa diskutiert unser Gastautor Jacques Rupnik im Hinblick auf die EU-Osterweiterung auf S. 28ff. dieses Newsletters.

between Western and certain Eastern European actors. Currently, in the process of EU enlargement, most local actors have huge vested interests in a „rush to the center“. As a consequence, the fine-tuning of the classification of regions within Eastern Europe is constantly delayed.

No matter who has invented the decomposition (or re-composition?) of Eastern Europe during the past decade, no matter if it has had to be invented at all, today „Central Europe“, „the Balkans“ and Russia (accompanied by the Baltic countries, Ukraine and Belarus) are more and more often put in separate pigeon holes by policy-makers and scientific/cultural analysts alike. The taxonomy may undergo minor changes any time while its main inner frontiers remain almost the same. Following the recent changes in government, for instance, Slovakia and Croatia can probably get back to „Central Europe“ more easily than Romania or Bulgaria would ever be able to leave the „Balkans“. During the past couple of years, Ukraine may have avoided being identified with Russia but this did not result in an accession to the imagined community of Central Europe.

At the same time, most of the historical arguments *against* compartmentalizing Eastern Europe, which were enumerated in the discussions of the 1980s have not lost their relevance. What is more, a series of new counter-examples occur in the process of post-communist transformation (e.g., is voucher privatization in the Czech Republic more „European“, therefore more „Central-European“, than direct sale of state assets to foreigners in a „Balkan“ country?). Also, the concept of the „West“, which has always served as a measuring rod to define „Centralness“ as against „Easternness“ in Europe, is embodied in different models of capitalism. If, for example, Hungary followed North-American rather than German patterns in constitutional or social welfare reform, and Croatia took just the opposite route, would there still remain sufficient ground for a reasonable concept of Central Europe? And conversely, should Estonia, that is, a geographically North-European country that may (or may not) assume important features of Scandinavian capitalism in the future, belong to „Central Europe“ to a larger extent just because it was invited to the first round of EU enlargement?

The main objective of our workshop was to examine the frictions between the „imagined“ and the „real“ decomposition of Eastern Europe. In other words, what we expected was not a forced re-composition of the concept but a critical view of the way in which it has been decomposed with the help of old-new classification schemes. We departed from the trivial designations, which became popular again during the 1990s and checked their meanings against some of the actual processes of the post-communist transformation. The agenda covered the following three issues in separate sessions:

1. West moving East: The Revival of „Golden Central Europe“?
2. The „BloodyBalkans“: Leaving or Joining the „Center“?
3. „Mysterious Russia“: From Eastern Europe to Eurasia?

The sessions were introduced by two to four papers each. They focused on conceptual issues, while the other participants of the workshop (predominantly Romanian academics) were asked to subject the concepts to scrutiny using their specific knowledge of a certain field of the transformation.

Janos Matyas Kovacs

Program

October 28
Introductory Remarks:
Janos Matyas Kovacs

Morning Session:
West Moving East: the Revival of “Golden Central Europe”?

Daniel Chirot: Returning to Reality: Culture, Modernization and Various Europes
Mircea Mihaies: Eastern Europe: the Place where the Center Hates the Margin

Attila Melegh: Maps of Global Actors: Narratives, Identities and the Representation of Eastern Europe
Jacek Kochanowicz: Poland and the West: In or Out?

Afternoon Session:
The “BloodyBalkans”: Leaving or Joining the Center?

Sorin Antohi: Romania and the Balkans: From Repression to Sublimation
Ekaterina Nikova: The Balkans: Old Myths and New Realities

Keynote Address:
György Konrad and **Andrei Plesu**: The Dream of Central Europe Revisited

October 29
Morning Session:
“Mysterious Russia”: from Eastern Europe to Eurasia?

Anatoly Khazanov: Contemporary Russian Nationalism between East and West
Petre Guran: “Saint Russia”: Mystical Representations of the State
Alexei Miller: The East of Europe or to the East of Europe. Russia, Her Western Neighbors and the Borders of Europe

List of Participants

Sorin Antohi Department of History, Central European University, Budapest; **Daniel Chirot** School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle; **Petre Guran** Institute for Southeastern European Studies, Bucharest; **Anatoly Khazanov** Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin/Madison
Jacek Kochanowicz Department of Economics, University of Warsaw, Erasmus Chair, University of Warsaw; **György Konrad** Akademie der Künste Berlin, Budapest; **Janos Matyas Kovacs** Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna; **Attila Melegh** HCSO Demographic Research Institute, Budapest; **Mircea Mihaies** Department of Literature, University of Timisoara; **Alexei Miller** Institute for Scientific Information of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Central European University, Budapest; **Josef Moural** Department of Philosophy, Charles University; Center for Theoretical Study, Prague; **Ekaterina Nikova** Institute for Balkan Studies of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences; **Anca Oroveanu** New Europe College, Bucharest; **Ingo Peters** Freie Universität Berlin, FB Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften; **Andrei Plesu** New Europe College, Bucharest; **Peter Ucen** International Republican Institute, Society of Higher Learning, Bratislava

Sechsmal hat das Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Verbindung mit der Körber Stiftung (Hamburg) seit 1995 den Hannah Arendt Preis an innovative akademische Reformprojekte in Mittel- und Osteuropa vergeben. Lord Dahrendorf, der Vorsitzende der Jury, hat nun einen kritischen Rückblick verfasst und ihn am 21. Oktober in Wien in einer Podiumsdiskussion mit Andrei Plesu und Dieter Simon der Öffentlichkeit präsentiert.

Die Universitäten nach dem Fall des Kommunismus

DAS INSTITUT FÜR DIE WISSENSCHAFTEN VOM MENSCHEN hat sich schon kurz nach der Wende mit der Reform des Hochschulwesens in Zentral- und Osteuropa auseinandergesetzt. Mit Unterstützung der Europäischen Kommission wurde beispielsweise das Projekt der „European Chairs“ ins Leben gerufen, das es Universitäten in den postkommunistischen Ländern ermöglichte, führende europäische Wissenschaftler als Gastprofessoren zu gewinnen. 1995 wurde in Verbindung mit der Körber Stiftung (Hamburg) der Hannah Arendt Preis für herausragende reformorientierte Institutionen auf dem Gebiet des Hochschulwesens in Osteuropa ins Leben gerufen.

Der Hannah Arendt Preis ist 1999 zu Ende gegangen, im Jahr 2000 folgte als Abschluss ein Projektwettbewerb unter den ehemaligen Finalisten und Preisträgern, aus dem fünf Institutionen erfolgreich hervorgingen:

- Center for Studies in the Classical Tradition/Inter-Departmental Studies in the Humanities, Warsaw
- Department of Cognitive Science, New Bulgarian University, Sofia
- Graduate School for Social Research, Warsaw
- Institute for Contemporary History, Prague
- Institute of Fundamental Learning, Prague

Lord Dahrendorf selbst charakterisierte anlässlich der Präsentation am 21. Oktober sein jüngstes Buch als die Beschreibung eines kleinen, aber wichtigen Beispiels für ein Dilemma auf dem Weg in die Freiheit für Länder, die aus totalitären Erfahrungen kommen. Das Dilemma bestehe darin, dass der Weg in die Freiheit nicht nur die Wiederherstellung von zwischenzeitlich verlorenen Institutionen bedeute oder auch nur die Schaffung, die dem Muster anderer Länder folgen. Vielmehr müsse man sich auf die ständige Notwendigkeit von Reform und Veränderung einlassen, was eine schwierige Doppelaufgabe darstelle. Für die osteuropäischen Länder war die Wiedergewinnung der Freiheit eng verbunden mit der Wiedergewinnung der Souveränität nationaler Staaten, in denen die Freiheit garantiert werden kann. Das Projekt der europäischen Integration suggeriere den jungen Demokratien Osteuropas jedoch das Ende der Souveränität des Nationalstaats, was in manchen osteuropäischen Ländern als Bedrohung empfunden werde.

Im kleineren Maße, aber doch, gelte Ähnliches für den Bereich der Universitäten. Es ging eben nicht nur

um die Wiederherstellung einer klassischen akademischen Freiheit in autonomen Institutionen, sondern auch darum, diese für Veränderungen offen zu halten. Und das, so Lord Dahrendorf, sei ein beträchtliches, nur selten gelöstes Problem.

Der Sinn des Hannah Arendt Preises war es, einige wenige Einrichtungen zu finden, die diese Kriterien exemplarisch erfüllen. Die Verbindung von klassischer Qualität und Reformfähigkeit komme aber in aller Regel nicht aus dem Zentrum der bestehenden Institutionen. Vielmehr entstehe sie an deren Rand, durch Initiativen, die sehr oft nur mit Zögern akzeptiert oder eher gar zurückgewiesen würden. Ausnahmslos verdankten sich diese Initiativen herausragenden Persönlichkeiten, die den Mut haben, im Zweifel auch gegen die Mehrheitsstimmung neue Wege zu erkunden; die Geschichte des Hannah Arendt Preises sei daher zu einem Teil die Geschichte bemerkenswerter Personen.

Einer kritischen Betrachtung unterzog Lord Dahrendorf den Erfolg der prämierten Initiativen. Zu groß sei erstens in manchen Fällen die Abhängigkeit von finanziellen Zuwendungen gewesen, zu häufig das Ausbleiben von Geldern. Zweitens hätten sich die Reforminitiativen mit teilweise massivem Widerstand seitens der bestehenden akademischen Einrichtungen konfrontiert gesehen. Drittens schließlich verlange diese Art von Initiative einen Enthusiasmus und einen Mut, der sich oft nicht auf sehr lange Zeit durchhalten lasse.

Und dennoch: „Im Kern ist dies eine Erfolgsgeschichte ist, die zeigt, wie vieles sich in den früher kommunistischen Ländern geändert hat. In der Tat bin ich derjenige, der vielleicht am stärksten der Meinung war, dass die zeitliche Begrenzung des Hannah Arendt Preises auf fünf Jahre bzw. sechs Preise ihren guten Grund hatte. Ich bin nicht der Auffassung, dass alles, was in der Bürgergesellschaft geschieht, für immer existieren muss. In der Tat ist einer der wichtigsten Unterschiede zwischen der Bürgergesellschaft und den staatlichen Einrichtungen der, dass die Bürgergesellschaft in ständigem Fluss ist, dass es in ihr immer Neues gibt, aber dass auch Bestehendes einmal aufhört.“

Obwohl der Prozess der Normalisierung noch keineswegs abgeschlossen sei, plädierte Dahrendorf dafür, dass ein allfälliger neuer Preis im gleichen Maße für Einrichtungen im früher kommunistischen und im früher nicht kommunistischen Europa ausgelobt wer-

Democratic political mechanisms have been installed rather easily after the fall of communism, but they do not by themselves produce active citizens in vibrant political communities. Education, notably higher education, is of crucial importance in this reform process. Lord Dahrendorf's book „Universities after Communism“, which was presented to the public on October 21, is intended to tell the story of the battle between innovation and inertia in post-communist Europe, and an attempt to intervene in this battle on the side of the innovators. The entirely non-military weapon for such intervention was a prize, the Hannah Arendt Prize, and the particular battlefield was that of universities, and of higher education more generally. The Hannah Arendt Prize was first awarded in 1995, and discontinued in its original form in 2000. These past six years are therefore the time horizon of the story.



Lord Dahrendorf: „Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis von Initiativen der Bürgergesellschaft.“



Krzysztof Michalski: „Ein herzlicher Dank an die Körber Stiftung.“



Andrei Plesu: „Danke für die Möhren!“



den müsse – Reformen in der Wissenschaftslandschaft seien mittlerweile überall gleich preiswürdig.

Andrei Plesu, der Gründer und Leiter des New Europe College in Bucharest, das im Jahr 1998 den Hannah Arendt Preis gewonnen hatte, kommentierte Lord Dahrendorfs Buch aus der Sicht eines „Betroffenen“. Plesu, der frühere Kultur-, dann Außenminister Rumäniens, verglich die Reform des akademischen Lebens in Osteuropa mit dem Heilen einer Krankheit...

„... und wenn es um eine Krankheit geht, scheint alles klar zu sein: wenn wir eine gute Diagnose haben und wenn wir die Symptome kennen, dann haben wir die Lösung.“ Genau das sei freilich nicht der Fall. Man nehme nur drei Symptome als Beispiel: Zentralisierung, Armut, Ideologisierung. Die Erfahrung zeige jedoch, dass das Rezept ‚Dezentralisierung, Sponsoren, Entideologisierung‘ nicht immer seine Wirkung täte:

„Nach dem Missbrauch des Zentralismus erscheint die Dezentralisierung zwangsläufig als die perfekte Lösung. In der Praxis aber ist der Erfolg einer solchen Strategie bei weitem nicht gesichert. Es ist sehr schwierig, eine dezentralisierte Organisation auf der Basis der zentralistischen Trägheit aufzubauen, die in der Regel die Transitionsperioden charakterisiert. Einen autonomen Kern in einem inflexiblen Netz von Interdependenzen zu bilden ist ein Abenteuer mit unvorhersehbarem Ausgang. Man geht das Risiko ein, unter keiner Rubrik klassifiziert werden zu können und aus diesem Grunde nicht in das bestehende institutionelle System integriert zu werden. Weil es dich nicht einbeziehen kann, weist das System dich ab – eine spontane Abwehrreaktion. Das Ergebnis ist eine gewisse institutionelle Einsamkeit. Man möchte normal innerhalb eines Umfeldes funktionieren, das sich gerade am Anfang der Normalisierung befindet. Jede auch noch so banale verwaltungstechnische Handlung erfordert einen großen Energieaufwand, einen wahren Kampf gegen die Behörden, die – selbst wenn sie wohlwollend sind – nicht daran gewöhnt sind, mit einer neuen, im Verhältnis zum vorhandenen Rechtsrahmen exzentrischen Struktur in Dialog zu treten.

Die Dinge komplizieren sich, sobald der westliche Sponsor mit dem Organisationstyp im Hinterkopf, an den er gewöhnt ist, z.B. fördert, dass ein neugegründetes Hochleistungszentrum eine möglichst enge Bindung an die vorhandenen akademischen Institutionen anstreben und auf diese Weise auch deren Modernisierung ankurbeln soll. Rein theoretisch ist diese Forderung durchaus legitim und kann als Ziel künftiger Entwicklungen gelten. Solange aber die staatlichen Universitäten noch nicht radikal umstrukturiert sind und die universitäre Autonomie nur teilweise funktioniert, kann eine zu enge Zusammenarbeit mit ihnen zu einer unerwünschten umgekehrten Kontamination führen.

Nicht die akademischen Institutionen bewegen sich auf das Modell eines Hochleistungszentrums zu,

sondern dem Hochleistungszentrum drohen Blockierung, Unterwerfung, Bürokratisierung. Aus eben diesem Grund ist in einer ersten Etappe eine gewisse Distanz durchaus begrüßenswert. Die Universität muss als Partner in Betracht gezogen werden, aber mit der strikten Einhaltung einer hygienischen institutionellen Trennung.

Leichter zu bekämpfen als übermäßiger Zentralismus ist die Armut, die prekäre finanzielle Situation der osteuropäischen Hochschulen. Ein gutes Zusammenwirken zwischen Großzügigkeit der Sponsoren und haushälterischem Geist der Empfänger kann zu hervorragenden Ergebnissen führen. Aus westlicher Sicht stellt die finanzielle Hilfe für die Hochleistungszentren im Osten kein sehr teures Unterfangen dar. Die Suche nach der Wahrheit ist im Osten immer noch billiger als im Westen. Das Problem, das sich mitunter stellt, besteht darin, in den Hochleistungszentren Budapest, Sofia, Prag oder Bukarest Stipendien zu gewähren, die einen Anreiz darstellen, gleichzeitig aber zu vermeiden, dass sie arrogant hoch im Vergleich zum Durchschnittseinkommen des betreffenden Landes oder beschämend niedrig im Vergleich zu der Bezahlung sind, die eine entsprechende Fachkraft in einem entwickelten Land bekommt.

Darüber hinaus existiert ein Mentalitätsproblem, das mit sehr viel Vorsicht angegangen werden muss. Die östliche institutionelle Psychologie legt größeren Wert auf Finanzierung der Infrastruktur als auf Projektfinanzierung. Die langen Jahre des anti-ökonomischen Denkens kommunistischen Typs haben das Vorurteil gefestigt, wonach Projekte bloß Vorwände für das ungetrübte Weiter- und Überleben einer Institution sind. Die einfache Insistenz der Forschungsinstitute beziehungsweise die triumphalistische statistische Aufzählung wurde als wichtiger betrachtet als ihre tatsächliche wissenschaftliche Produktion. Diese Denkweise hat die Wende von 1989 überlebt, was den Ost-West-Dialog auf diesem Gebiet manchmal erschwert. Meiner Erfahrung nach passiert es etwa in dieser Art: Der Osteuropäer sagt: ‚Ich brauche eine gute Lokomotive – gebt mir das Geld dafür! Anschließend werden wir schon sehen, wozu wir die Lokomotive verwenden.‘ Der Westeuropäer antwortet: ‚Zeig mir im Detail, wie ihr die Lokomotive nutzen wollt, dann werde ich sehen, ob es sich auszahlt, sie zu finanzieren.‘

Eine Aussöhnung dieser beiden unterschiedlichen Haltungen erfordert viel Geduld und gegenseitiges Verständnis. Beide Positionen haben ihre eigene Logik. Der Westeuropäer sieht nicht ein, weshalb er ein Werkzeug finanzieren sollte, ohne genau zu wissen wozu es verwendet wird, während der Osteuropäer nicht versteht, warum er eine Gebrauchsanweisung schreiben soll bevor er das Werkzeug hat. Im Grunde genommen haben wir es hier mit zwei verschiedenen Kulturen des Handelns, der Interaktion, zu tun, bei denen es zu einer gegenseitigen Anpassung kommen

Dieter Simon: „Plädoyer für dieses Buch!“

muss. Die auf Projekte und nicht auf Infrastruktur ausgerichtete Finanzierung ist durchaus passender aus funktioneller Sicht, doch erwachsen dabei einige sensible und delikate Probleme betreffend das durchaus begründete Bedürfnis des Forschers im Osten, von jedweder ideologischer Eingrenzung und Einengung freizukommen.

Damit ein Projekt Chancen auf Finanzierung hat, muss ein gewisser Standard eingehalten, müssen Themen behandelt werden, die den sozialpolitischen Belangen der letzten Stunde entsprechen, und es muss eine gewisse Anzahl von Schlüsselkonzepten, um nicht zu sagen magischen Wörtern, enthalten sein. Das Projekt muss politisch korrekt und aktuell sein, es muss mediengerecht vermarktet werden können. Ein gutes Projekt über das Verhältnis Wissenschaft/Theologie im 17. Jahrhundert hat weniger Chancen auf Finanzierung als ein mittelmäßiges Projekt über europäische Integration. Wenn man Ausdrücke wie ‚Umweltschutz‘, ‚Menschenrechte‘, ‚ethnische und sexuelle Minderheiten‘, ‚Gender‘ und andere aus dieser Kategorie geschickt verwenden kann, selbst wenn dies heuchlerisch und interessengeleitet sein mag, ist man sofort von liebevollem Finanzierungswillen umgeben, was nicht unbedingt der Fall ist, sollte man sich für Gebiete und Termini wie ‚Poesie der Minnesänger‘, ‚Dalmatische Archäologie‘ oder ‚Rheinische Mystik‘ entscheiden.

Ich möchte nicht falsch verstanden werden bzw. so, als ob ich Themen der ersten Kategorie verachtete. Ich will nur auf die Tatsache hinweisen, dass eine gewisse Hierarchie der Vorlieben, die vom Weltmarkt auf den osteuropäischen Forscher zukommen, sich auf dessen angeschlagene Empfindsamkeit auswirken und unangenehme Erinnerungen und Assoziationen hochkommen lassen. Eben noch freut der Forscher sich, dass er sich nun endlich jenen Bereichen und Fragen widmen kann, die ihn wirklich interessieren, da wird ihm durch eine Art ökonomischer Zensur angedeutet und beigebracht, dass es eigentlich andere Prioritäten gibt. Was meiner Ansicht nach festgehalten werden muss wäre, dass die Prioritäten des Westens nicht unbedingt mit den Prioritäten des Übergangsuniversums übereinstimmen, in dem die ehemaligen kommunistischen Länder immer noch festsitzen.

Das Ignorieren dieser Unterschiede führt oftmals dazu, dass zwischen unseren Bedürfnissen und dem Angebot des Westens ein unlösbares Dilemma herrscht: Wir brauchen Möhren, man liefert uns Kiwi. Wir brauchen Modernität, uns wird schon Postmoderne vorgetischt. Und es kommt noch schlimmer: Um am Ende nicht mit leeren Händen dazustehen, verstellen wir uns manchmal und tun, als würden wir genau das brauchen, was uns angeboten wird. Es gibt natürlich Ausnahmen, und ich muss sagen, der Hannah Arendt Preis hat uns die Möhren gegeben, die wir gebraucht haben, und dafür sind wir wirklich allen dankbar, die dazu beigetragen haben.“

Dieter Simon, der Präsident der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, lieferte schließlich die eigentliche Rezension des Buchs. Als er gebeten worden war, die Neuerscheinung zu kommentieren, habe er sich erst einmal gefragt: „Warum schreibt er [Lord Dahrendorf] ein Buch über einen Preis, hat er nichts Besseres zu tun?“

Natürlich liege es im ureigensten Interesse von Stiftungen, dass über ihre Preise geschrieben werde. Diese Art von Publikationen werde gern einem bestimmten Typus des Auftragschreibers anvertraut, und der habe, so Simon, so gar keine Ähnlichkeit mit Lord Dahrendorf: „Das ist ein bezahlter, etwas bleicher, dickbrilliger, schwitzender Mensch, der hinter den Stiftern herläuft und Notizen macht und es am Schluss dann in einem Buch niederlegt. Ich dachte, das kann nicht sein: Wenn Lord Dahrendorf so etwas schreibt, dann muss in dem Buch etwas anderes stehen – und in der Tat!“, zeigte sich Simon erleichtert.

Zum einen lerne man als Leser viel über die Beteiligten, zentral erscheinen Simon aber zwei Aspekte: Die schonungslose Offenheit, mit der nach der Langzeitwirkung des Unternehmens gefragt wird (was in der Regel kaum passiert, ist das Geld einmal ausgegeben), und die Skepsis gegenüber den realen Möglichkeiten für Strukturveränderungen.

Die Frage nach dem Nutzen des Preises beantwortete Simon ebenso pointiert wie überraschend: Am meisten profitiert habe die Jury, die durch die Begegnungen im Verlauf der Besuche vor Ort zweifellos eine einzigartige Lebenserfahrung gemacht habe. Es entstanden Verbindungen auf Dauer und ein Austausch zwischen den beiden Welten, die da aufeinandergeprallt waren, der eine dauernde Veränderung auf beiden Seiten bedeute.

Was ist institutionell erreicht worden? Lord Dahrendorf sei zu Recht skeptisch, konstatierte Simon. Es sei klar, dass Strukturen vom Rand her, an dem alle mit dem Hannah Arendt Preis ausgezeichneten Institutionen angesiedelt sind, nicht aufgebrochen werden können. Der Impact sei in dieser Hinsicht daher sicher marginal gewesen, aber die Veränderungen seien auch nicht an dieser Stelle zu suchen. Die Veränderung habe vor allem bei den Begegnungen stattgefunden, wo ein unumkehrbarer Prozess in Gang gekommen sei.

Auf der Suche nach der Verbesserung der Strukturen unter der Voraussetzung von Forschung und Lehre wird freilich die Idee der Universität virulent – Lord Dahrendorf widmet ihr das Schlusskapitel seines Buchs und beurteilt sie zunächst „enttäuschend negativ“, wie Dieter Simon referierte: Die alten Universitätsideen seien nicht mehr vorhanden. Dahrendorf vertrete jedoch nicht die Negation der Einheit, sondern das Zulassen und Fördern der Vielfalt.

Dieter Simons Resümee: „Der Bericht strotzt vor Ehrlichkeit, und das hat man selten.“

Originally intended to be a seminar accompanying IWM's current research project „The Other Way Into Modernity“, which is devoted to Jan Patocka's research on and criticism of the genealogy of modern times, the regular discussions on “Phenomenology and Modernity” have come to attract philosophers and academics from a broader context.

Phenomenology and Modernity

IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER the seminar “Phenomenology and Modernity” was held at IWM as part of the research project “Jan Patocka: The Other Way into Modernity.” It was attended by philosophers from the United States and Europe. The goal of the seminar was to assess the so-called “breakthrough” of phenomenology by considering a selection of texts by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Emmanuel Levinas.

What is it that phenomenology breaks through, and in order to get to what? The question opens a flood of answers: the breakthrough is epistemological, or perhaps existential; it is a break with modernity, or perhaps only with modern science. Or maybe it is a break with technology and industrial civilization as such; or a break with reason, or maybe then only on the “old rationality” in favor of a renewed life in truth. Or perhaps it breaks with something at play in science, technology and modernity as a whole – an underlying insensitivity to the richness of life, a levelling out of anything that could count as an “authentic” motivation for human life. Or perhaps all of this is mistaken, and phenomenology is really the final break with an older, non-modern conception of the world, in favor of a life in radical historicity. Or perhaps phenomenology is not a breakthrough at all, but the anticipation of one; that is, perhaps phenomenology is merely the breakthrough of a promise.

The variety of answers points to the enormous difficulty in understanding just what the core insight is, what the “breakthrough” actually represents. The seminar shed some light on the nature of these difficulties, but in the end the question remained: does phenomenology have a future at all? Will it fulfill its promise, or fade into history? How can we approach such a question in such a way that we point towards the future, and not only the past?

The seminar will continue in December with discussions of the work of Michel Henry.

James Dodd



Ludger Hagedorn and James Dodd

Program

4. und 7. September: **Edmund Husserl**

Literatur:

Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie

11. und 14. September: **Martin Heidegger**

Literatur:

Die Zeit des Weltbildes, in: *Holzwege*

23. und 25. Oktober: **Emmanuel Levinas**

Literatur:

Totalité et infini

En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger

De Dieu qui vient à l'idée

Dr. James Dodd is Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Boston University and is currently Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellow at the Husserl Archives, Cologne.

Was ist der „Durchbruch“ der Phänomenologie? Husserl und Heidegger verstanden sie als eine Antwort auf die „brennenden Fragen“ unserer Zeit. Andere Denker wie Jan Patocka, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida und Michel Henry haben den Durchbruch als Orientierungspunkt für ihre verschiedenen Projekte benutzt. Aber durch was „bricht“ die Phänomenologie, und um wohin zu gehen? Die Vielzahl der Antworten selbst weist darauf hin, dass der phänomenologische Durchbruch sehr verschiedene Reflexionen gefördert bzw. ermöglicht hat. Andererseits zeigen schon die Schwierigkeiten, die spezifische, zentrale Einsicht der Phänomenologie zu fassen und zu bestimmen, worin eigentlich ihr Durchbruch besteht. Darüber hinaus macht es gerade die Ergiebigkeit dieser Tradition schwierig, ihre zukünftige Bedeutung zu ahnen. Worin liegt die Zukunft der phänomenologischen Philosophie? Hat sie überhaupt eine? Wie ist überhaupt eine solche Frage zu stellen, ohne nur in die Vergangenheit zu blicken, sondern vielmehr zukünftig orientiert zu sein?

The opening seminar of this semester's "State and Globalization" series was held by **Katherine Verdery** on September 27. The other speakers included **Aleksander Smolar** ("New Global Order and National Identity", October 4) and **Andrew C. Janos** ("East-Central Europe in the Modern World", October 11).

Privatization and the Global Transformation of Property Rights

THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS that has been occurring over the past decade in the former Soviet bloc is of unprecedented magnitude in the history of property. It is not, however, the only such change: it participates in a larger wave of change in property regimes that includes privatizations in western countries as well, new property claims concerning intellectual and cultural property rights, the property implications of new reproductive and medical technologies, and so forth. Taken as a whole, these phenomena suggest a worldwide reorganization of property rights. Commentary on post-socialist privatization rarely places it in this global context – the task of this seminar.

First I discuss changes in the definitions and major forms of property, from the territorial use-rights of hunter-gatherers to the contemporary emphasis on control or management that generate profit-taking and reduces risk. Because every property system is relative to some set of authorities, when those change, so do the conception and organization of property. Today, authority is increasingly lodged in *capital markets* (rather than landownership, as in earlier times, or wealth derived from manufacturing). Concomitantly, the emphasis in property becomes less a matter of *rights* to be *claimed* than of *risks* to be *managed*. As a consequence, the role of states becomes increasingly to cushion risk, rather than to guarantee property rights.

The search for new sources of profit-taking and capital involves two interlinked processes, which can be called *enclosing the commons* and *privatization*. Both are aspects of a broad assault on public goods and collective resources.

"Enclosing the commons" refers to a process in which resources *not* previously recognized as sites of commodity values come to be seen as repositories of them. Whereas these may formerly have been seen as *open-access* resources, now ever-more-stringent access rules are developed. Examples include crop varieties and other biological resources that genetic engineering makes exploitable in new ways, indigenous medical practices and substances now being converted into profitable drugs, the "mining" of musical, artistic, and literary forms, not to mention data banks holding personal information, etc.

Although commons have been created, bounded, and finally enclosed throughout human history, two things make the present commons-enclosures unusual. One is the new technologies (and the scale of their

possible application) that have so expanded the realm of perceivable commons. Another is the growing importance of *ideas* and of *signification itself* as sites of commodification. As a result, thoughts, techniques, signs, and symbols of all kinds - which we have tended to see as simply givens of life in human communities, more or less available to all - have come rather to be seen as resources in a commons and made targets of enclosure.

While the privatization of state-socialist property does not involve a commons in the usual sense, it too entails an assault on public resources. It helps to bring onto world capital markets the funds that had been locked up in socialism's welfare bureaucracies (for education, medical care, subsidized housing and cultural access, etc.), as well as the population's savings (the "monetary overhang") that were lying underutilized in low-interest accounts. Obtaining new post-socialist consumers for western products both absorbs excess production and diverts (in one way or another) former government funds into western banks.

Privatization participates in another way in global transformation, by *devolving accountability* for the management of property and financial resources downward from the state bureaucracy onto lower-level actors. The main economic actors under socialism, "the whole people" and "the Party-state," were not entities that could easily be held to account for mismanagement. Privatization, as conceived by the developed countries, aimed instead to locate accountability where it could be effectively enforced. We might understand this as the attempt of global corporations to minimize their own risks by creating a thick stratum of less powerful actors upon whom risk can be "spread."

Privatization thus individualizes responsibility for property that consists more of *liabilities* than of assets. It also creates a realm of ideological justification by drawing into its orbit persons who had been constituted primarily as *dependents of socialist paternalism* rather than as capitalism's autonomous agents. Thus, western corporations can explain these people's "incapacity" to turn their liability-laden property rights into profitable assets by "legacies of socialism", rather than by movements of capital on a global scale.

Katherine Verdery



Katherine Verdery was guest of IWM in September.

Die Anthropologin **Katherine Verdery** (University of Michigan) stellt die gleiche Diagnose wie der Cyberlaw-Experte **Lawrence Lessig** (vgl. Newsletter 69): Gemeint wird zunehmend in Privatbesitz übergeführt, und zwar weltweit. Dies betrifft nicht nur Ackerland in den ehemals kommunistischen Ländern, sondern auch den genetischen Code, bestimmte Heilpflanzen oder auch – den Cyberspace. Unter den Bedingungen der Kapitalmärkte ist Eigentum nicht mehr so sehr eine Frage von Rechten als eine von Risiken, die gemanagt werden müssen.

SOCO Project Papers on the following projects will soon be available. They will also be included in the internet depository of SOCO studies at the IWM web site. The numbers in the list refer to the numbers in the series.

Die Abschlussberichte zu den hier vorgestellten SOCO Forschungsprojekten werden in Kürze erhältlich und auch auf der Website des IWM (www.univie.ac.at/iwm) verfügbar sein. Die angeführten Nummern entsprechen den Nummern der Reihe.

Recently completed SOCO projects

No. 75

Mieczyslaw Bak, Przemyslaw Kulawczuk and Anna Szczesniak:

Providing Assistance to Women in Rural Poland: The Perspective of Providers and Beneficiaries

THE ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION, which started in the early 1990s, significantly influenced the living conditions of rural inhabitants. One of the most affected groups were rural women, as they suffered from high unemployment, a decline in living standards and reduced personal development opportunities. Numerous NGOs tried to arrange special assistance programs. Some were successful. The majority of them, however, organized assistance programs aimed at broader target groups, but with the participation of women. Within the period of the 1990s, assistance programs for rural women were started in numerous regions of the country focusing mostly on entrepreneurship support, self-help building, and increasing skills and educational opportunities. This research project aimed at measuring how both rural women and assistance organizations evaluated the given support. In general, program beneficiaries tended to evaluate favorably the outcomes of most of the assistance programs provided by NGOs. Problems were reported with regard to the accessibility of assistance programs. In this context, the authors stress the need for the improved dissemination of information about programs for women in rural areas. The research also included the perspective of NGOs, who are the program providers or distributors. The research report concludes with a list of concrete recommendations aimed at further improving the living standards of rural women in Poland for public authorities.

No. 76

Stefan Jurajda and Jan Planovsky:

The Gender Wage Gap and Workplace Segregation in Late Transition Economies

COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION and hoping to join the European Union are in the process of introducing western-style anti-discrimina-

tory policies aimed at reducing the gender wage gap. The efficacy of these policies depends upon the relative size of those elements of the gap which they target. It is, therefore, important to quantify these components. In this paper, large matched employer-employee data sets from the Czech Republic and Slovakia are used to provide the requisite detailed gender wage gap decomposition. On average, female wages are about 30% lower than male wages in both countries. This difference is somewhat lower in the public sector. The research results, based on 1998 data, suggest that various forms of workplace segregation of women into low-paying occupations, companies and job cells are related to about one third of the overall pay difference between genders in both countries. A substantial part of the gender pay gap is attributable to the differences in the educational attainment of men and women in the public sector. In the non-public sector, however, almost two thirds of the total gap remain ascribed to the individual's gender. These findings suggest that wage inequalities are primarily a within-occupation, within-establishment phenomenon, and therefore stress the importance of policies targeted at reducing potential within-establishment pay discrimination, especially violations of the equal pay clause.

No. 82

Angela Dobrescu, Cosima Rughinis and Catalin Zamfir: Coping Strategies in Three Regions of Romania Affected by Mass Redundancies

THIS RESEARCH REPORT analyses the interaction of employment policies and the coping strategies of the unemployed in three urban areas affected by the mass redundancies caused by large factory restructuring. The three areas are Brasov, Galati and the Jiu Valley. The research takes an exploratory qualitative approach and uses methods such as semi-structured interviews, analysis of secondary data, mass media reports and relevant legislation and socio-economic programs. The analysis focuses on the incentives created by existing support for the unemployed, such as severance payment schemes, programs to promote self-employment and labor mobility, means-tested social assistance,

vocational training courses, etc. Problems related to each of these policy areas are identified, and policy implications of the findings are laid out. Policy recommendations include the need for increased targeting of more conditional benefits and increased co-ordination of support policies to avoid poverty or dependency traps.

No. 83

Mihaela Miroiu:
The Gender Dimension of Education in Romania

THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE of this project was to draw attention to the negligence of the gender dimension in the current educational system in Romania. Using a variety of methods, such as content analysis from a gender perspective applied to textbooks, education plans, school papers and school counseling material, combined with a case study analysis of teaching environments and in-depth interviews with pupils, students, teachers and educational experts, this paper presents a comprehensive picture of the presence and the specific manifestations of the gender dimension in education. The majority of teachers do not consider that textbooks include gender prejudices or contain discriminatory messages, which might also be related to the fact that the curricula for teacher training programs do not address the gender perspective. In contrast, the content analysis of textbooks performed within the framework of this project reveals the prevalence of traditional and stereotypical gender messages. The paper presents specific medium to long term objectives of gender public policies in education, such as the training of primary, lower and upper secondary school teachers for the implementation of equal opportunity strategies, the balancing of the gender structure in teaching and education administration, the organization of gender-related workshops for school inspectors - focusing on the outlining of strategies for disseminating and monitoring the equal opportunity policies through non-sexist education or the establishment of a department in the Ministry of National Education responsible for non-discriminatory education.

No. 84

Marta Zahorska and Elzbieta Putkiewicz:
Rural Schools and Education Reform in Poland

SINCE 1989, the Polish school system has been undergoing various steps of transformation. As local governments are becoming increasingly responsible for maintaining the education system, these processes of reform are bound to create regional differences in the educational opportunities for students, particularly between urban and rural areas. This research project examines disparities in the access to education and in the academic performance of schools in urban and rural settings. The student's geographical background was found to be important – urban areas tend to have a stimulating effect, while rural communes restrict students' opportunities and ambitions. Nevertheless, the division into rural and urban communities is not sufficient to explain the differences in educational opportunities. The research results suggest that the differences in levels of student competence and ability result mainly from the differences in the economic status and cultural models in their families. In this context, the authors suggest that educational inequalities could be remedied through the development of job counseling and local scholarship programs.

No. 85

Daniel Münich and Randall K. Filer:
Responses of Private and Public Schools to Voucher Funding: The Czech and Hungarian Experience

FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM in Central Europe, state monopolization of education has been abandoned throughout the region. Systems comparable with the educational voucher scheme, also known as the school choice system were introduced in the Czech Republic and Hungary in the early 1990s. The analysis is introduced with a review of the development of non-state schools in the Czech Republic and Hungary during the 1990s. Drawing on detailed school level data covering the whole school population, as well as data relating to regional conditions, this empirical analysis aimed at testing the fundamental theoretical predictions of the voucher model. The research results in-

dicate that non-state schools emerge at locations with excess demand and lower quality of state schools. Further, it is found that greater competition from non-state schools creates incentives for state schools, so that the latter slightly improve the quality of educational inputs used and significantly improve the quality of their graduates. As far as technical schools are concerned, non-state schools are found to react to regional labor market conditions in terms of the premium available in the market for technically literate school-leavers, and they also react to the local unemployment rate. No similar reactions to market signals are found among the state schools.

No. 86

Merje Feldman:
Gentrification and Social Stratification in Tallinn: Strategies for Local Governance

ESTONIA HAS WITNESSED sharpening social polarization throughout the period of post-socialist transformation. The paper focuses on the spatial element of social stratification, providing an analysis of gentrification in the inner city of Tallinn. Further, the role of urban policy (particularly development policy and spatial planning) and social service provision in increasing or reducing social polarization and marginalization is analyzed. Data are drawn from government statistics, policy documents, the media, as well as interviews with city government officials, social workers, representatives of non-profit organizations, property developers and local residents. Even though this inner city neighborhood is being upgraded, living standards of a large share of long-term residents, particularly the elderly, have deteriorated seriously throughout the last decade. The restitution of real estate, in particular, has produced a group of residents who are in danger of being displaced as rents increase. Due to low credit-worthiness and low levels of savings, the majority of the population cannot afford to purchase accommodation. Policy recommendations focus on restructuring the city's housing and social welfare policies in order to (1) better assist the population who cannot afford commercial mortgage; (2) better tackle problems of not just the city as a whole but of specific neighborhoods; and (3) better incorporate non-profit groups into providing social welfare services.

Every Tuesday evening, the IWM hosts a speaker, often a current fellow or monthly guest, who holds a public lecture related to one of the Institute's projects or research fields. Detailed accounts of most of the Tuesday Lectures as well as an e-mail information service on upcoming events are available on IWM's website www.univie.ac.at/iwm.

Jeden Dienstag ist die Bibliothek des IWM Schauplatz eines öffentlichen Vortrags, gefolgt von einer informellen Diskussion. Fellows und Gäste des Instituts sowie internationale Wissenschaftler und Intellektuelle werden eingeladen, ihre aktuellen Forschungsergebnisse zu präsentieren. Ausführliche Berichte zu fast allen Dienstagsvorträgen sowie einen e-mail-Informationdienst zu bevorstehenden Veranstaltungen bietet die Website des IWM www.univie.ac.at/iwm.

Tuesdays in the IWM Library

19 September 2000

Katherine Verdery Ghosts on the Landscape: Restoring Private Landownership in Eastern Europe

THE PRIVATIZATION OF LAND in Eastern Europe has been proceeding for a decade. The results, however, show substantial variation by country in the procedures used for privatizing and in the distribution of different forms of agricultural enterprise. In some countries individually owned farms predominate,



while in others we find significant numbers of cooperatives and/or new corporations. The lecture explored some historical influences that might affect these outcomes. Described through the metaphor of ghosts, it asked what kinds of ghosts might haunt the de-collectivization process in the present and where the various ghosts are most likely to be powerful. The main kinds of ghosts discussed are: those of the pre-communist property order (which include ghosts of the former nobility and of other prior owners as well as the ghosts of Napoleon and the Habsburgs, who instituted different systems of land registration); ghosts of socialist agricultural policy (particularly the ghost of Stalin); and ghosts of ancestors – those whose land was taken by the collective and state farms, and the ghosts of Locke and Marx. One objective of considering these ghosts is to explore the longevity and extent of smallholding as possible causes of a “property mentality”, which would influence households to fight for their

land now. To what extent had landowning become ingrained in the peasantry of different parts of the region, as aspects of their very personhood? Another is to ask how reconstituting private landownership affects relations among kin, which were deeply altered during the communist period; restoring ownership re-creates vertical ties between seniors and heirs, while diminishing the importance of horizontal ties with neighbors and collateral kin. None of these considerations by itself, however, determines the outcome of property restitution, which is a process much more complex and multifaceted than was initially anticipated.

Katherine Verdery is Eric R. Wolf Professor of Anthropology at the University of Michigan and was guest of IWM in September.

26 September 2000

Birgit Mahnkopf Reihe: Ende des Politischen? Herausforderung für eine künftige Demokratie I Wo und wie kann Politik globale Transformationen beeinflussen?

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DAS 21. JAHRHUNDERT steht im Zeichen der ökonomischen Globalisierung und es bedarf keiner apokalyptischen Zukunftsszenarien, um zu erkennen, dass eine entgrenzte Ökonomie die Politik in den Grenzen des Nationalstaats obsolet werden lässt. „Unverfasste Mächte“ sorgen dafür, dass eine wesentliche Prämisse demokratischer politischer Prozesse im Zuge der fortschreitenden Globalisierung ins Wanken gerät, nämlich die Konzeption souveräner politischer Gemeinschaften, die innerhalb eines abgegrenzten Territoriums ein Selbstbestimmungs-



recht ausüben. In einer Welt von Finanz-, Medien- und Unternehmensnetzwerken und von Netzen der kriminellen Ökonomie, die ergänzt, überlagert, durchkreuzt und befördert werden durch regionale und internationale Politiknetzwerke, erscheint Macht zunehmend als diffus, gleichsam zermahlen in feinste Partikel. Die Zukunft der Demokratie wird allerdings nicht allein davon abhängen, wie die negativen Folgen der Aufweichung politischer Grenzen bearbeitet werden, sondern ebenso davon, wie mit der gleichzeitigen Verhärtung von Grenzen des Umweltraumes umgegangen wird. Denn wir haben es heute nicht allein mit der schwierige Frage des Verhältnisses von Markt und Demokratie in einer raum- und zeitkompakten Welt-Markt-Welt zu tun, sondern mit der sehr viel schwierigeren Frage einer demokratieverträglichen Politisierung der gesellschaftlichen Naturverhältnisse.

Birgit Mahnkopf ist Professorin für Europäische Gesellschaftspolitik an der Fachhochschule für Wirtschaft in Berlin, Mitglied des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats der „Vereinigung deutscher Wissenschaftler“ (VDW), der „Grünen Akademie“ der Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung sowie der Grundwertekommission der SPD.

3 October 2000

Luc Ferry Le sens du beau

COMMENT VIVRE BIEN sans la beauté, sans la multiplicité des symboles et des significations qu'elle offre à nos méditations, à nos conversations? "Des goûts et des couleurs on ne discute pas", prétend la sagesse des nations... et pourtant, ajoutait Nietzsche, on ne fait que cela! Sans doute, mais cependant pas depuis toujours... Dans l'Antiquité, la question des critères du Beau ne se posait guère. L'œuvre d'art possédait une certaine objectivité, définie par sa capacité d'incarner à notre échelle les propriétés harmonieuses de l'Ordre du monde, du grand Tout cosmique. Elle s'imposait donc aux hommes comme un "microcosme", doué de qualités incontestables. Le Moyen Age reconduira cette conviction que l'art a pour fonction de mettre en œuvre dans un matériau sensible une vérité *supérieure et extérieure* à l'humanité, celle de la splendeur des attributs divins. Il faut attendre le XVIIIème siècle pour

qu'advienne la "Révolution du goût": l'idée qu'il existe au plus intime du cœur humain un *sens du beau* et que l'œuvre a pour vocation, non plus d'incarner une vérité, cosmique ou divine, mais de *plaire à la sensibilité des êtres humains*. Et c'est au XVIIIème siècle, sur fond de cette première *laïcisation* de la culture, que la philosophie de



l'art prendra la forme d'une théorie de la sensibilité, d'une *esthétique*. L'œuvre n'apparaît plus comme le reflet d'un univers transcendant, mais comme une création de part en part réalisée par et pour les êtres humains. L'auteur et le spectateur, le génie et son réceptacle, deviennent ainsi les deux visages inséparables de cette subjectivisation de la beauté. C'est de cette singulière mutation, à l'origine de toute la culture moderne, que la conférence de Luc Ferry tente de retracer l'histoire et de dégager les enjeux. Plus largement, elle vise à éclairer nos débats actuels en les situant dans la perspective globale de la sécularisation du monde, de "l'humanisation du divin".

Luc Ferry ist Professor für Philosophie an der Universität Paris VII und Président du Conseil national des programmes, Ministère de l'Education Nationale, de la Recherche et de la Technologie, Paris.

10 October 2000

Andrew C. Janos Hegemony in East Central Europe: Franco-British, German, Soviet and EU Designs

THE POINT OF DEPARTURE for this lecture was Janos's recently published book, *East Central Europe in the Modern World* (Stanford University Press). In it the author argues that conventional categories of political sociology are inadequate to explain the politics of the region, since historically institutional agen-

das and the terms of political discourse have been set by external forces or examples. To be sure, the nature of international regimes alone does not tell the whole story, for hegemonic agendas are apt to clash with domestic habits and interests embedded in local socio-economic and cultural configurations. Politics, then, is largely a reflection of this clash. While the book itself compares five international regimes over two centuries, the lecture focused on contemporary affairs – on the reaction of the countries of East Central Europe to the hegemonic agenda of liberal universalism. This agenda embraces designs for economic liberalization, political democratization, post-modern reconstruction of social relations and the deconstruction of the ethnocentric and sovereign national state, which run into the legacies of both Communist and Pre-communist history. In econom-

ics, the agenda clashes both with the legacy of communist centralization and the historical legacy of backwardness. Post-

nationalist politics runs counter to traditional ethnic pride, as well as the communist cult of "progressive" national narratives. The postmodern agenda must cope with the traditionalism of peasant society strengthened by the neo-Victorian elements of communism. Significantly though, the western liberal project runs into different degrees of resistance from society to society. These differences are not haphazard, but correlate closely with the level of economic development *before* the advent of communism, certain qualities of culture associated with religious heritage, and with the degree of ethnic fragmentation. Inevitably, this analysis raises questions about the future. Is history destiny? The answer is that different countries face different futures, though even the better positioned ones are unlikely to succeed on their own. The success of the project of transition requires not only the free movement of capital, but that of labor and commodities as well.

Andrew C. Janos is Professor of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley.



17 October 2000

Ruth Wodak „Wir“ und die „Anderen“: Diskurs in/der Politik

AUSGEHEND VON DER PRÄMISSE, Sprechen bedeute unmittelbares Handeln, versuchte Ruth Wodak anhand verschiedener Beispiele diejenigen Symptome freizulegen, die sich innerhalb der politischen Rede manifestieren und die die Sprache als ein Mittel der eindeutigen Ausgrenzung und Stigmatisierung andersartiger Gruppen benützt. Grundlegend für die politische Sprache sei, durch eine Dichotomisierung in einfache Kategorien des „Wir“ und „die Anderen“ eine Politik der Identität und Differenz zu generieren, wodurch komplexe Vorgänge auf einfachere Zusammenhänge reduziert werden, ohne dabei allerdings in ihrem Urteil statisch sein zu können und zu dürfen. Denn die Kategorien der Ausgrenzung werden stets mit den jeweiligen Machtinteressen und Zielen der verhandelnden Parteien abgeglichen und den jeweiligen äußeren Anforderungen entsprechend verändert. Diesen immer wieder notwendigen und neu erfolgenden diskursiven Definitionen des „Wir“ und des „Anderen“ wies Ruth Wodak eine konstitutive Rolle innerhalb der politischen Sprache als persuasive Kommunikation zu und versucht jene unterschiedlichen Grenzmarkierungs-

mechanismen anhand parlamentarischer Debatten in verschiedenen EU-Ländern zum Thema der Immigration, des aktuellen politischen Diskurses in Österreich und aber auch anhand der Gender-Frage innerhalb der politischen Diskurses selbst offen zu legen.



Ruth Wodak ist Professorin für Angewandte Sprachwissenschaft an der Universität Wien.

24 October 2000

Richard B. Freeman Shared Capitalism and the Great American Job Machine

RICHARD FREEMAN'S LECTURE analyzed the growing trend in advanced capitalist economies towards shared capitalism – a system of labour management relations and compensation in which employees play a greater role in firm-level decision-making and receive compensation dependent upon company or group performance. This pattern is particularly advanced in the US high tech sector but is spreading throughout the West. By now, about one-fifth of American adults report holding stock in the company in which they work. A development like this is blurring the historic division between labour and capital in three ways: by making employee pay de-



pendent on company or group performance, by increasing the scope of employee decision-making through employee involvement committees, teams, and partnership arrangements with unions, and by making employee pension funds major providers and owners of capital. Shared capitalism will create a different form of capitalism in the foreseeable future – not a vague third way based on diverse stakeholders, but a firm-based alignment of employee financial interests and their influence upon decisions.

Richard Freeman holds the Herbert Ascherman Chair in Economics at Harvard University and is Program Director at the National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, MA). He is currently a visiting professor at the London School of Economics and the co-director of the LSE Centre for Economic Performance. He is rarely seen without his hat.

31 October 2000

Nira Yuval-Davis Reihe: Ende des Politischen? Herausforderungen für eine künftige Demokratie II Multi-layered Citizenship and the Struggle Against Racism

FOLLOWING THE DECLINE of class struggle and the rise of identity politics with their own particularistic agendas, citizenship discourse has gradually become the main inclusionary emancipatory discourse of the Left. None the less, racist immigration policies, and even the election of racist parties to government do not automatically fall outside the remit of democratic citizenship. If there is any common goal to anti-racist thought it is to enable all people in the society to be full and active citizens, to remove the fixed, immutable and naturalized boundaries of otherness that processes of racialization involved. The political and theoretical debates that are taking place concerning questions of equality and difference relate to the questions of what such an inclusive notion of citizenship might mean, as well as to the ways required to go about achieving it. Nira Yuval-Davis' main argument was that an anti-racist notion of citizenship is that of a multi-layered citizenship. Such a notion of citizenship recognizes, without essentializing and reifying, the different positionings of the different citizens. It also acknowledges that today, more than ever before, states are not the only polities in which people are citizens, although they often are still the most powerful ones. An anti-racist notion of citizenship is a dialogical transversal citizenship that takes into consideration power relations between collectivities as well as between individuals, but does not confuse positionings with identities.

Nira Yuval-Davis is Professor in Gender and Ethnic Studies at the University of Greenwich, London.



Call for Applications

Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators

January - June and July - December 2002



Objective

The **Institute for Human Sciences** (Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen or IWM) is an independent, international, and interdisciplinary center for advanced study. IWM regularly invites academics to translate important works in the humanities or the social sciences from an Eastern into a Western European language, vice versa or from one Eastern European language into another. To date over 50 translators from 15 countries have been invited to work at the Institute.

The purpose of IWM's Translation Program is to help fill the gaps in the relevant literature in these fields, thus promoting an exchange of ideas between the East and the West or within Central and Eastern Europe. The program bears the name of the poet and translator, Paul Celan, whose work - perhaps more than any other's in this century - thrives on the diversity of European cultures and also mediates between them.

A jury of experts meets each year to evaluate applications and select finalists. The Program is supported by the *European Cultural Foundation, Amsterdam*, and the *City of Vienna*. In the past, it was also sponsored by the *Central and East European Publishing Project, Oxford (1987 - 1994)*, the *Getty Grant Program (1994 - 1996)* and the *Ford Foundation*.

Conditions

As a rule, finalists are invited to spend six months (January - June or July - December) at IWM as Visiting Fellows in order to complete their projects. IWM places a stipend of ATS 160,000 at their disposal which covers the expenses of their stay in Vienna and provides them with an office, a PC, and access to IWM's in-house as well as other relevant Viennese research facilities.

Application Procedure

The applications should include the following materials:

- a curriculum vitae with a bibliography of translations and other publications, if applicable,
- the author and work to be translated (from the original language) and an explanation for the choice thereof,
- exact number of pages,

- a contract with a publisher for the publication of the translation or a letter of intent from a publisher; proof that the translator/publisher holds the rights to the translation and its publication (or has an option for them); planned date of publication,
- information on the program of the publishing house.

Works which are thematically related to IWM's fields of research and ongoing projects will receive preferential treatment:

- Political Philosophy of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries
- Gender Studies
- The Philosophy of Jan Patočka
- History of Political and Economic Ideas in Central and Eastern Europe

Applications for Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators for the year 2001 must be submitted in English or German before January 31, 2001. They should be addressed to IWM, Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators, attn: Ms Iris Strohschein. Applicants will be notified on the status of their applications by the end of April 2001.

For more information please visit IWM's website:
www.univie.ac.at/iwm/

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Visiting Fellows

The following Visiting Fellows have begun their stay at the IWM:

Die folgenden Wissenschaftlichen Mitglieder haben ihren Aufenthalt am IWM angetreten:

Ludmilla K. Kostova


Associate Professor and Head of the English Department, University of Veliko Turnovo; Andrew W. Mellon Visiting Fellow

Length of stay: October – December 2000

Specialization: Europe's Balkan in English Literature, Gender Studies

IWM Project: Celts and Slavs: Gender Politics and/in Cultural Identity in Europe

Publications: *Europe: Real and Imagined* (ed. Paul Brett, Martin Dangerfield, Glyn Hambrook and Ludmilla Kostova), Veliko Turnovo, 1998; *Tales of the Periphery: The Balkans in Nineteenth-Century British Writing*, Veliko Turnovo, 1997; "Fathers Good and Bad: Mary Shelley's 'Matilda' and the Issue of Female Education", in: *The Case for Women*, Sofia (forthcoming).



The following Visiting Fellows have continued their stay at the IWM:

Die folgenden Wissenschaftlichen Mitglieder setzen ihren Aufenthalt am IWM fort:

Dusan Janic

Freischaffender Übersetzer, Belgrad; Paul Celan Visiting Fellow

Length of stay: Juli – Dezember

IWM Project: Norbert Elias, *Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation*; Übersetzung vom Deutschen ins Serbische

Publications: Zahlreiche Übersetzungen vom Französischen und Deutschen ins Serbische (u.a. Jean Piaget, Mircea Eliade, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber).

Richard Kulis

Professor für Philosophie und Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Geschichte der Philosophie, Lettische Universität, Riga;

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow

Length of stay: Juli – Dezember 2000

Specialization: Phänomenologie

IWM Project: Max Weber, *Die*



protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus; Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft; Übersetzung ausgewählter Kapitel vom Deutschen ins Lettische

Publications: (Mit M. Kule), *Philosophy* (in Latvian and Russian), Riga 1999; „Postmodernism and the Philosophy of Human Solidarity“ (in Latvian), in: *Kentaurs XXI*, Riga 1998; „National Identity and the Possibility of Inter-cultural Dialogue“, in: *Humanities and Social Sciences Latvia*, Riga 1994; sowie zahlreiche Übersetzungen aus dem Deutschen ins Lettische (u.a. Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger).

Eva Orosz

Associate Professor in the Department of Social Policy, Institute of Sociology and Social Policy, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

Length of stay: July – December 2000

Specialization: Inequalities in Health and Health Care, Comparative Studies of Health Care Systems

IWM Project: A Study of the Views concerning the Role of the State and the Market in Health Care

Publications: (co-author Andrew Burns) "The Health Care System in Hungary", in: *OECD Economics Department Working Papers*, 241, 2000; "Hungary", in: N. Johnson (ed.), *Private Markets in Health and Welfare. An International Perspective*, Oxford 1995; *Health Systems and Reform Endeavours*, Budapest 1992 (in Hungarian); "Inequalities in Health and Health Care in Hungary", in: *Social Science and Medicine* 8, 1990.



Pawel Spiewak

Associate Professor of Sociology at the Institute of Sociology, Warsaw University, and at the Higher School of Social Psychology, Warsaw

Length of stay: July – December 2000

Specialization: History of Contemporary Political Ideas, Sociology

IWM Project: The Political Discourse in Poland after 1989: Conflict of Elites or Conflict of Cultures?

Publications: *Polish Controversies* (ed.), Warsaw 2000; *The Communitarian Perspectives* (ed.), Warsaw 2000; *The Broken Promises of Contemporary Democracy*, Warsaw 2000; *The Idea of Common Good in Contemporary Political Thought*, Warsaw 1988 (all in Polish).

The following Visiting Fellows ended their stay at the IWM:

Die folgenden Wissenschaftlichen Mitglieder haben ihren Aufenthalt am IWM beendet:

Lindita Arapi

Correspondent for Radio Deutsche Welle, Köln; Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow

Length of stay: June – September

Specialization: Radio Journalism / Albanian Culture and Politics

IWM Project: Prospects for the Co-existence between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo

Marek Drwiega

Lecturer at the Department of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Cracow; Andrew W. Mellon Visiting Fellow

Length of stay: July – September

Specialization: Philosophical Anthropology

IWM Project: The Philosophy of the Human Body

Publications: "In Search of Human Subjectivity", in: *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 4, 2000; "From Axiology to Agathology. Some Remarks on Jozef Tischner's Philosophy", in: *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 2, 1999; *Paul Ricoeur gibt zu denken*, Bydgoszcz 1998 (all in Polish).

Julia Kalinina

Moskovskij Komsomolets, Moscow; Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow

Length of stay: July – September

Specialization: Issues connected with the Russian Army, National Conflicts, the War in Chechnya and Chechen Terrorism

IWM Project: Journalism and War in Russia

Junior Visiting Fellows

The following Junior Visiting Fellows have begun their stay at the IWM:

Die folgenden Junior Visiting Fellows haben ihren Aufenthalt am IWM angetreten:

Inna V. Naletova

Ph. D. candidate at the Department of Religious Studies, Boston University

Length of stay: October – March 2001

Specialization: Religion und Culture in Russia

IWM Project: Religion in Contemporary Russia: The Orthodox Church and its Impact on Russia's Political and Cultural Life

Publications: *Hermeneutics* (a textbook for graduate students), Novosibirsk 1995; "Changing Values of the Modern World" (an article in a volume of graduate students collected papers), Novosibirsk 1995; "Hermeneutics and Rhetoric" (an article in the proceedings of a conference) Novosibirsk 1994 (all in Russian).

The following Junior Visiting Fellows have continued their stay at the IWM:

Die folgenden Junior Visiting Fellows setzten ihren Aufenthalt am IWM fort:

Jeremy D. Bailey

Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Boston College

Length of stay: July – December 2000

Specialization: 19th Century American Thought and American Political Institutions

IWM Project: The Modern Executive: Jefferson's Constitutional Thought

David W. Bollert

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston College

Length of stay: July – December 2000

Specialization: 19th and 20th Century Continental Philosophy (Heidegger, Kant, Nietzsche)

IWM Project: The Theme of Wonder in Heidegger's Thought

Stephen M. Dawson

Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Department of Religious Studies, Boston University

Length of stay: July – December 2000

Specialization: Early American History, Political Philosophy

IWM Project: The Sacred Order of Liberty: Protestant Millennialism and Republican Utopianism in American Political Thought 1750-1805

Publications: *Intercultural Philosophy* (eds. Stephen M. Dawson and Tomoko Iwasawa), Vol. 12 of *Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy*, 2000.



Jaroslawn Kilijs

Ph.D. in Sociology, University of Warsaw

Length of stay: July – December 2000

Specialization: Sociology of the Nation, History of Czech Social & Political Thought, History of Sociology

IWM Project: Central European Nations as Abstract Political Communities: Towards a Pluralistic, Processual Theoretical Approach

Publications: *Nationality as a Sociological Problem. Nation as a Subject of the Czech Sociology of the Interwar Period*, Warsaw 2000; "Renan's Concept of the Nation and a Contemporary Sociology", in: *Sociologicky Casopis*, 4, 1999; *Nation and the National Idea: T.G. Masaryk's Nationalism*, Warsaw 1998 (all in Polish).

Jyoti Mistry

*Ph.D. candidate at the Department of Cinema Studies,
New York University*

Length of stay: July – December 2000

Specialization: Cinema Studies and Film Policy

IWM Project: The Use of Cinema in Imagining a New National Identity in a Post-Apartheid South Africa

Filmography: *anOther ny story* (USA/SA/A 2000), co-production commissioned by South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC-TV); *paw-paw* (USA/A 1998), *B.E.D.* (USA 1998).

Karel Novotny

*Doktorand der Philosophie, Karls-Universität, Prag;
Mitarbeiter am J. Patocka-Archiv am CTS Prag; Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow & Jan Patocka Junior Visiting Fellow*

Length of stay: July – December 2000

Specialization: Phänomenologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Hermeneutik

IWM Project: Das Problem der Freiheit in der Philosophie von Jan Patocka; Mitarbeit am Forschungs- und Editionsprojekt „Der andere Weg in die Moderne“

Publications: H. Blaschek-Hahn und Karel Novotny (Hg.), *Jan Patocka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem. Texte aus dem Nachlass*, München 2000; „L'Esprit et la subjectivité. Sur le status de l'époché dans les premiers écrits de Jan Patocka“, in: *Etudes Phénoménologiques* 29-30, 1999; „Geschichtlichkeit und Freiheit. Heidegger und Jan Patockas frühe Geschichtsphilosophie“, in: *Reflexe* 14, 1995.

Michael D. Thurman

Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Boston University

Length of stay: July – December 2000

Specialization: Comparative Politics and National Identity

IWM Project: The Impact of Politics: Dutch and Czech Responses to Nineteenth Century German Nationalism

Publications: Regular Contributor to *NIS Observed: an Analytical Review*, on-line journal of contemporary affairs of the countries of the former Soviet Union prepared by the Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy – Boston University (<http://www.bu.edu/ISCIP>).

Adrian Tokar

*Ph.D. candidate at the State and Law Department,
Slovakian Academy of Sciences; Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow*

Length of stay: July – December 2000

Specialization: Central Europe / Theory of the State

IWM Project: Problems of Sovereignty in the Process of European Integration

Publications: „The Relations between Church and State in Central European Theory of State“ (in Slovakian), in: *Pravny Obzor* 2, 2000.

Veronika Wittmann

Doktorandin der Soziologie, Universität Linz; Stipendiatin im Rahmen des Doktorandenprogramms der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

Length of stay: Juli – Dezember 2000

Specialization: Gender Studies und Politik in Afrika

IWM Project: Gender Empowerment im Transformationsprozess der Post-Apartheidgesellschaft Südafrikas

Publications: *Nehandas widerspenstige Töchter. Eine Analyse zimbabwesischer Frauenorganisationen*, Linz 1999; „Kritik am tanzanischen Modell des Ujamaa-Sozialismus“, in: *From Ujamaa to Structural Adjustment*, Linz 1997.

The following Junior Visiting Fellows have ended their stay at the IWM:

Die folgenden Junior Visiting Fellows haben ihren Aufenthalt am IWM beendet:

Ulrich Brinkmann

Doktorand am Institut für Soziologie, Universität Trier

Length of stay: September – October

Specialization: Transformation Theory, Organizational Sociology, Internet and Trust

IWM Project: (Re-)Constitution of Actors in East-German Enterprises in the Course of the Transformation Process

Publications: *Warum blüht der Osten nicht? Zur Transformation der ostdeutschen Betriebe*, Berlin 1999 (together with Paul Windolf and Dieter Kulke); „Verlust einer riskanten Ressource – Vertrauensverfall im Zuge des ostdeutschen Transformationsprozesses“, (together with Matthias Seifert) in: *Industrielle Beziehungen. Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management* 6 (2), 1999.

Urte Helduser

Doktorandin an der Universität-Gesamthochschule Kassel und Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Wissenschaftlichen Zentrum für Kulturforschung der UGH Kassel

Length of stay: July – September 2000

Specialization: Literatur und Geschlechterdiskurs

IWM Project: Weiblichkeit und Moderne um 1900

Publications: (Hg. mit Johannes Weiß), *Die Modernität der Romantik. Zur Wiederkehr des Ungleichen* (= Intervalle. Schriften zur Kulturforschung, Bd. 4), Kassel 1999; „‘Oh Dirnenstimme, die geschminkt gelacht!’ – Weiblichkeit, Großstadt und Moderne in der Literatur des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts“, in: Helmut Scheuer / Michael Grisko (hg.), *Liebe, Lust und Leid. Zur Gefühlkultur um 1900* (= Intervalle Bd. 3), Kassel 1999.



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Dr. phil., Wissenschaftlicher Assistent am philosophischen Seminar der Universität Mannheim

Length of stay: August – Oktober

Specialization: Ethik, Politische Philosophie, Medizinphilosophie / Bioethik

IWM Project: Humanitäre Intervention als moralphilosophisches Problem

Publications: *Patienten und Personen. Zum Begriff der psychischen Krankheit*, Frankfurt a.M. 2000; „Verteilungsgerechtigkeit ohne Verteilungsgleichheit“, in: *Analyse und Kritik* 21, 1999.

Guests

Detlef Horster

Professor für Sozialphilosophie, Universität Hannover

Months of stay: August

Specialization: Sozial-, Moral- und Rechtsphilosophie

Publications: *Postchristliche Moral. Eine sozialphilosophische Begründung*, Hamburg 1999; *Weibliche Moral – ein Mythos?* Frankfurt a.M. 1998; *Politik als Pflicht. Studien zur politischen Philosophie*, Frankfurt a.M. 1993.

Katherine Verdery

Eric R. Wolf Professor of Anthropology, University of Michigan

Month of stay: September

Specialization: Social Anthropology, Property, Eastern Europe

Publications: *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*, Columbia UP (NY) 1999; *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* Princeton UP 1996; “The Elasticity of Land: Problems of Property Restitution in Transylvania”, in: *Slavic Review*, 1994.

James Dodd

Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, Boston College; currently Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellow at the Husserl Archives, University of Cologne

Month of stay: September – October

Specialization: Phenomenology

Publications: *Body, Community, Language, World* (ed.), Chicago 1998; *Idealism and Corporeity: An Essay on the Problem of the Body in Husserl's Phenomenology*, Dordrecht 1997; *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* (ed.), Chicago 1996.

Aleksander Smolar

Maitre de recherche, École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris; President, Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw and member of the editorial board of Transit – Europäische Revue

Month of stay: October

Publications: *Globalization, Power and Democracy* (ed. with M. Plattner), 2000

Call for Applications

Milena Jesenská Fellowships for Journalists



The **Institute for Human Sciences (IWM)** in cooperation with **The Project Syndicate** have jointly established the Milena Jesenská Fellowships to enable Journalists from Europe to work in Vienna on long term projects, free of their daily obligations. The Milena Jesenská Fellowships are supported by the European Cultural Foundation, Amsterdam.

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Applicants should submit a curriculum vitae, three of their best articles and a concise project proposal (not more than 3 double-spaced pages) in English. These materials should be sent by mail before the deadline of February 15, 2000 to Dr. Anita Traninger, Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Spittelauer Lände 3, A-1090 Vienna, Austria.

The Jury

Roger de Weck, Editor-in-chief, *Die Zeit*, Germany

Sarmite Elerte, Editor-in-chief, *Diena*, Latvia

Helena Luczywo, Managing Editor-in-chief, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Warsaw

Frank Schirmmacher, Editor-in-chief, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Germany

Gerfried Sperl, Editor-in-chief, *Der Standard*, Austria (Chair)

Laura Starink, *NRC-Handelsblad*, The Netherlands

Rüdiger Stephan, Secretary General of the European Cultural Foundation, Amsterdam

Anita Traninger, Program Coordination and Public Relations, IWM

Applicants will be notified of the decision of the jury by the beginning of April 2000. The Jury is not obliged to publicly justify its decisions.

Since its founding in 1982, the **Institute for Human Sciences** has laid a particular emphasis on the resurrection of an open exchange of ideas with academics, intellectuals and politicians from Central and Eastern Europe. The IWM's fields of research and ongoing programs are:

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- Gender Studies
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Project Syndicate is a global association of privately-owned general circulation newspapers and business journals designed to provide an international forum for debate and the exchange of ideas between East and West, North and South, on vital issues of the post-communist era.

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- Developing an international forum for the broadening of debate and exchange of ideas between East and West
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Milena Jesenská (1896-1944) was an outstanding journalist and mediator between the Czech and the German cultures in Bohemia as well as an astute political commentator. She was detained in the Nazi concentration camp in Ravensbrück for her political involvement and resistance, where she died in 1944. She is widely known for her correspondence with Franz Kafka.

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Eva Menasse, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt/M.), 1998

Paul Gillespie, *Irish Times* (Dublin), 1998

Dragan Bisenic, *Nasa Borba* (Belgrade), 1999

Danuta Beata Pawlak, *Gazeta Waborcza* (Warsaw), 1999

Masha Gessen, *Itogi* (Moscow), 1999

Szilvia Hamor, *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), 1999

Lindita Arapi, Correspondent for *Radio Deutsche Welle* (Cologne), 2000

Yulia Kalinina, *Moskovskij Komsomolets* (Moskow), 2000

Publications

Helga Blaschek-Hahn, Karel Novotny (eds.)
Karel Novotny is Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow & Jan Patočka Junior Visiting Fellow, July – December 2000

Jan Patočka: Vom Erscheinen als solchem. Texte aus dem Nachlass
Freiburg / München 2000

Detlef Horster
Guest of IWM, August 2000
„**Demokratische Kultur**“

in: Gerhard Schweppenhäuser, Jörg H. Gleiter (Hg.), *Philosophische Diskurse 3*, Weimar 2000

Krzysztof Michalski
Director of IWM
„**Politik und Werte**“
in: *Die Union. Vierteljahresschrift für Integrationsfragen* 1/00, Wien 2000

Thomas Schramme
IWM Junior Visiting Fellow, August – October 2000
Patient und Person. Zum Begriff der psychischen Krankheit
Frankfurt am Main 2000

IWM Junior Fellows' Conferences
New series published on the IWM website
www.univie.ac.at/iwm/jconf/

Vol. X
Adriane Rubeli, Nina Vucenik (eds.)
A Captured Moment in Time
IWM 2000

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Publications under the auspices of the Paul Celan Translation Program

Walter Benjamin
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Travels and Talks

Don Kalb
SOCO Program Director, IWM
Lectures: Three lectures on “Balkan Societies”, “Europeanization”, “Globalization” as Main Lecturer at the Summer University Plovdiv, Bulgaria (September 4-12)

Cornelia Klinger
Permanent Fellow, IWM
Lecture: „Inklusion und Exklusion. Das Konzept Mensch zwischen Universalitätsanspruch und Ausschluss-Strategien“ im Rahmen der Tagung: “Was ist der Mensch?” der Stiftung Lucerna (September 25)

Janos Matyas Kovacs
Permanent Fellow, IWM
Lecture: “Diversity and Unity in the Enlarged European Union”, European University Institute, Florence (October 19-20)

Krzysztof Michalski
Director of IWM
took part in a meeting of the Reflection Group on “Diversity and Unity in the Enlarged European Union: What Influences the Process of Transition and Adaptation in Central and Eastern Europe?”, jointly organised by The Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, Florence and The Forward Studies Unit, European Commission (Florence, Italy, 19-20 October 2000)

Klaus Nellen
Permanent Fellow, IWM
Visited this year's Frankfurt Bookfair in order to represent the Institute's journal *Transit - Europäische Revue* at the stand of *neue kritik* publishers (October 18-21)

Varia

Rosemarie Winkler, seit November 1990 im Sekretariat des IWM tätig, verließ das Institut mit Ende September, um sich neuen beruflichen Aufgaben zu widmen. Wir wünschen ihr alles Gute!

Kunjal Chaudhari joined the IWM Publications Department in October as an intern. She is studying International Relations and German Studies at Wellesley College, MA, and is currently attending the University of Vienna on an exchange program.

Roland Cvetkovski, der Luft- und Raumfahrttechnik an der Universität Stuttgart studiert hat und kürzlich sein Studium der Osteuropäischen Geschichte sowie der tschechischen und russischen Literatur an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main abgeschlossen hat, ist seit Anfang November als Praktikant in den Bereichen Publikationen, Öffentlichkeitsarbeit und Bibliothek tätig.

Robert Merten, der von Juli bis Oktober am IWM ein Praktikum absolviert hat, ist nach Bonn zurückgekehrt, um sein Studium fortzusetzen.

Recent political developments – the NATO intervention in Kosovo, the measures of the 14 EU members against Austria and the Russian atrocities in Chechnya – show that the decision whether an international intervention is justified is never easy. Shlomo Avineri pleads for a reasoned combination of *Idealpolitik* and *Realpolitik*.

Taking 'Never Again' Seriously

Shlomo Avineri diskutiert anhand der jüngsten Ereignisse im Kosovo, in Österreich und in Tschetschenien die Frage, wie die internationale Gemeinschaft, die sich mit der Parole „Niemals wieder“ gegen die Grausamkeiten des Holocaust stellt, mit bedenklichen Tendenzen in diese Richtung umgehen kann und soll. Avineri plädiert für eine am Einzelfall orientierte Kombination von *Idealpolitik* und *Realpolitik*.

'NEVER AGAIN' has become over the years one of the symbolic icons expressing a commitment that the kind of atrocities identified with the Holocaust would not happen again. Accompanying this commitment was also the notion that atrocities have to be prevented before they actually occur, as it is common understanding that once they are already perpetrated, it is politically more difficult to overcome them. The idea of prevention is thus tantamount to any serious commitment to the position identified with the statement 'Never again'.

Yet, recent political developments have shown that it is much easier to sign international conventions that create the mechanisms that will have both legitimacy and efficacy, when there is a suspicion that crimes against humanity are about to be perpetrated. The willingness to intervene, by a credible threat of the use of force or by the use of force if necessary, is not an easy political decision undertaken by democratic governments, for all their philosophical and rhetorical commitment to prevent mass atrocities. Yet a community of values that does not follow its credo with acts is a travesty and a hollow shell.

In the following, an attempt will be made to focus on merely three of the recent contexts in which the issues related to the commitment 'Never again' have surfaced politically. They are very different in their scope and general nature, but all three relate to the same experience of not having, post-1945, a recurrence of the atrocities experienced during, and even before, World War II.

The three cases are Kosovo, Austria and Chechnya. I want to emphasize again how different they are, but the discourse in each case also shows clear similarities. First, Kosovo. In this case, one clearly has to distinguish between the causes of NATO intervention and some of the problematic consequences of this intervention. The question is not whether innocent people in Serbia were hit by NATO. This has occurred, just as the bombings of Dresden and Hiroshima have killed thousands upon thou-

sands of innocent people; but this was not the moral issue which was at the root of the war; it was Nazi atrocities.

Similarly, the persecution and expulsion of Serbs and Roma by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are unacceptable, and UNMIK is not doing enough to prevent this. But again, this is not the issue. Just as the fact that millions of ethnic Germans were expelled from Central and Eastern European countries after 1945 is not the issue at the root of the moral context of World War II – the issue was again the Nazi atrocities, and in Kosovo it is the systematic expulsion, oppression, mass rapes and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Milosevic regime before and during the NATO operation.

It is sometimes argued that the NATO intervention lacked the necessary UN international legitimacy. This may be true, but the reasons for that are obvious (expected vetoes by Russia and China at the UN Security Council). Anyone criticising NATO's unilateralism has to confront the simple moral issue; what would have been worse – not to do anything but continue virtual negotiations with Milosevic while his forces were continuing to empty Kosovo of its Albanian population, or to intervene, as NATO did despite UN paralysis, and thus save a whole people from expulsion?

One would sometimes like to think how different, and better, the world would have been if there would have existed, say in 1936, an effective multinational military force that would have intervened against Nazi Germany as NATO did intervene against Serbia. Obviously some innocent people might have been killed – probably socialists, communists and



Jews, themselves victims of Nazi persecution. But perhaps World War II would not have occurred and the Holocaust would not have happened. I am not making a facile comparison between Hitler and Milosevic, but the context and the moral choices are comparable. The problem is that any use of force is messy; there are no clean wars, and the moral choice in such a case is to weigh the options, and in my view, this was done carefully and force was used with great reluctance. After the siege of Sarajevo and the massacres at Srebrenica the leaders of democratic countries had very little choice, unless they were to give up any pretence of having a moral ingredient in their policies.

Secondly, Austria. Again, one has to make distinctions. Haider is not Hitler, nor is Schuessel von Papen. Yet Haider is continuing an Austrian-specific xenophobic discourse that goes back a century to the racist, anti-Slav and anti-Jewish ideologies of Austrian politicians like Lueger and Schoenerer. The issue is not whether the decisions of the 14 EU members against Austria were carefully thought out, procedurally correct or effective. There is only one issue: Haider has re-introduced into the political discourse a kind of language (it is not just populist, it is colloquial) that one would have thought to be inadmissible in post-1945 Europe. Paradoxically, German legislating and judicial traditions would in all probability make such discourse unacceptable in the present German Federal Republic. For historical reasons, Austria lacks such internal mechanism, and the question is, what should the EU do? Nothing? Refer to the Austrian 'vox populi' as the ultimate arbiter? Obviously something had to be done if the Austrian political establishment did not think this was serious enough, and external pressure had and still has to be applied. To allow Haider-like discourse legitimacy because of popular vote is a travesty for democratic and liberal values.

Last, Chechnya. It is obvious that Russia cannot be treated like Serbia; to be effective, the realities of politics have to be taken into account. But because Moscow is not Belgrade, does it mean that nothing can be done, that it should be business-as-usual with Rus-

sia and Putin at a time that Russian forces are committing in Chechnya atrocities, which in some respect may be worse than those perpetrated by Serbian forces in Kosovo? Again, the question is not whether this is an internal Russian affair. Obviously it is; just as Algeria was an internal French Affair (Algeria being a French department) and German concentration camps previous to 1939 were an internal German affair. On the other hand, the Helsinki and Madrid accords give the international community some legitimacy in 'interfering' in what is happening in Chechnya. Similarly, the question is not whether or not there is Islamic terrorism in Chechnya and in other places. There is Islamic terrorism, but the way to fight it is not by fighting against an entire population.

The difficult choice for democratic countries in the case of Chechnya is to find mechanisms, and not merely rhetorical ones, to make it clear to the Russian government and the Russian people, who unfortunately have swallowed government propaganda that this is a war against 'bandits,' and also show some worrying aspects of anti-Chechen and anti-Caucasus-people sentiments, that there is a cost to what they are doing in Chechnya. Financial support should be, in a controlled way, denied to Russia, there should be an international intellectual campaign that makes the life of Russian diplomats abroad unpleasant, etc. If Russia is behaving in Chechnya in a manner reminiscent of Soviet behaviour, then (without going back to a Cold War situation) some of the instruments, which put pressure on the Soviet Union when it was oppressing Jews and other minorities, can be now used when Russia is oppressing, in a much more brutal way, a small minority like the Chechens. Chechen terrorism should be condemned, but again, this is not the issue; Russian repression is the issue, and the right of the Chechens not to live under Russian rule is no different from that of the Algerians or the Palestinians.


The three brief examples given here show how complex the issues are – far from the simplistic nostrums sometimes advocated by public officials or academics. The matter is basically how to match the

means employed to the concrete context under question; abstract denunciations will not suffice. A measured and reasoned matching of means to end, a combination of Idealpolitik and Realpolitik is the challenge facing all those who want to preserve human dignity and freedom in the international arena.

Shlomo Avineri



Shlomo Avineri is *Herbert Samuel Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for European Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and member of the IWM Advisory Board*



The EU enlargement process implicitly poses the question of the borders of Europe. They are clearly established to the West, to the North and to the South, but not to the East: Jacques Rupnik discusses the expectations, the prejudices and the criticism in connection with the re-drawing of the European map, both in the West and in the East.

EU Enlargement to the East: The Anatomy of a Reticence



Jacques Rupnik is Director of Studies at CERJ, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Bruges.

"The cold war is over but I don't remember any singing in the streets or church bells ringing. Are we too tired to sing? Or too dazzled by our luck? Has something crippled us on our way from there to here?"

John Le Carré

WHEN THE WALL CAME DOWN and Communism collapsed in what used to be known as the Eastern bloc, the hopes of the countries of Central Europe were identified with democratic change and the "return to Europe." More than a decade later they have established democracy as the only game in town but the prospect of joining "Europe", i.e. the European Union, like the Bermuda triangle, gets further removed the closer one approaches it. It was indeed striking to see last year Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic join NATO as the most tangible result of a decade of, on the whole, successful transitions to democracy and a market economy. A European dream was coming true under the banner of ... the United States.

As for the enlargement of the European Union, the mood in the Western capitals is not only far removed from the (verbal) euphoria welcoming the "velvet revolutions" in the "Other Europe", but also from the solemn promises of chancellor Helmut Kohl, who spoke of enlargement as a "moral duty"¹, or of President Jacques Chirac, who repeated in 1996-97 in the Polish, Hungarian and Czech Parliaments his commitment to see them join the EU by the year 2000. Indeed the French presidency of the EU has set two main goals for itself: to push through the unfinished institutional reform and to foster the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Although both can be presented as necessary prerequisites for a successful future enlargement, it is no less clear that the latter is, for the time being, put on the backburner.

To be sure, the official line from Brussels is meant to be reassuring, pointing to the Helsinki summit last December which opened the enlargement process to seven new countries (Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Malta and, last but not least, Turkey) as evidence. The inclusion of "new ins" in the process is good for the morale of these countries, but says little about the speed of the accession negotiations with the "old ins" (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia). No less importantly, the main consequence of the decision to open the enlargement process to a

dozen countries was not the announcement of a new Marshall Plan to prepare their accession, but to express the concern, voiced first by Jacques Delors, followed by the joint Giscard-Schmidt statement² and finally Joschka Fischer's manifesto about the possible dilution of an enlarged EU and thus the need to prepare a new leap forward in the federalist direction. In other words, a return to the enlargement vs. deepening debate of the early nineties which led first to Maastricht and the goal of the common currency, and only then, in June 1993, to the Copenhagen summit committing the EU to an eastward enlargement prospect.

What are the main reasons of this reticence? Perhaps the most important is the "lack of a vision" for a post-Cold War Europe, to use President Vaclav Havel's phrase during his visit to France last year. In the day to day management of the common market, successfully supervised by the often unfairly decried "Brussels bureaucracy," the wider sight of what is at stake in the shaping of the new European order has been lost. Was Maastricht the appropriate response to the most significant change in post-war European history? Some, like the former European Commissioner Lord Dahrendorf, doubt it, calling Maastricht "yesterday's future." Others, favourable to the treaty's main offspring, the Euro, believe that once again, in line with the well-tried Jean Monnet method, the common currency will produce almost mechanically a European political identity. The opposite, of course, is the case; the Euro is weak precisely because there is no European political identity. Such an identity cannot be shaped by central bankers and converging interest rates, but more likely by a common commitment not to tolerate ethnic cleansing in the Balkans or to a common project of historical significance; integrating East Central Europe, which for half a century was in the orbit of Russia, in the economic and political system of Western Europe.

The second related reason is the lack of leadership. Schroeder or Jospin are, in their own terms, successful middle of the road social democrats, thriving on a wave of American-led economic growth, but they hardly embody a political will for Europe. And without political will and vision, enlargement easily becomes a secondary preoccupation given that there do not seem to be strong economic interests pushing in that direction. Not that Eastern markets are not attractive enough, but the West Europeans are already in

the process of conquering them. They invest particularly in Hungary, Poland and the Czech republic, and run a massive 30 billion Euro a year trade surplus with the East-Central European candidates. The temptation is therefore strong to keep these economic benefits without taking on the political responsibility. A report by the German Chamber of Commerce released in April 2000 called for the process of enlargement to be slowed down arguing that “quality is more important than quantity.”³ Commenting on the lack of interest in enlargement among the EU countries, the head of the Polish Governmental Center for Strategic Studies, Jerzy Kropiwnicki, concluded, “The EU has already got all it wanted.”⁴

The political translation of this asymmetry of interests and motivations concerning the enlargement was particularly obvious at the March 1999 Berlin summit concerning the Agenda 2000 i.e. establishing the EU budget till 2006. Germany first stated it wanted to diminish its (admittedly considerable) contribution to the budget. France fought bravely against any substantial change in the Common Agricultural Policy (nearly half of the EU budget goes to support 4% of its population). Britain refused to backdown from the famous rebate obtained many years ago by Mrs Thatcher (after a lot of tough talk and handbag waving). Spain, Portugal, Greece and others would not accept a reform of the so-called structural funds to help less developed regions. They have greatly benefited from them for some twenty years, so why should they now share them with some even poorer relatives on the Danube?⁵ Everybody had “good” reasons not to touch the status quo (namely giving in to influential lobbies) and defend what they consider to be their “acquis” (not very “communautaire” though!). What follows from this is that keeping the same budget level without any substantial reform of the main common policies would leave simply no room for enlargement of the EU in the next five years. That, at least, is the conclusion derived from what could be called the “accountant’s way of enlargement”.

Without political will capable of articulating a political project for the Union’s eastward expansion, it is no wonder that West European public opinion is getting cooler. The latest Eurobarometer survey, released at the end of April 2000, is particularly worrying in this respect. It shows that while an absolute majority of Europeans consider their country’s membership as a “good thing”, 43% are in favour of the enlargement of the EU while only 28% consider this as a priority.⁶ The most favourable to the enlargement are the Scandinavians (over 60%) while the most reluctant are the French and the Austrians. Indeed, the diminishing support for the enlargement noted among the immediate neighbours of the Central European candidates, Germany and Austria, is probably the major factor in the EU slow-down on enlargement. Another Eurobarometer poll released in the spring of

1999 indicates that when asked about the possibility of the free movement of the labour force from Central Europe in the EU only 3% Austrians and 6% Germans were in favour. In other words, it is not just Haider’s supporters, but also Schroeder’s and the SPÖ’s electorate that is becoming reluctant on the enlargement issue. The rise of xenophobia in the EU, associating immigrants with rising criminality, goes hand in hand with old fashioned trade union protectionism.⁷

All this obviously has an impact on the way the enlargement process is perceived by the candidate countries; although public opinion in Western and Central Europe have different concerns, they are also communicating vessels. There is a parallel rise of “pre-mature euroscepticism” among some of the candidates and of “enlargo-scepticism” in the member states. While most of the political and economic elites of the candidate countries clearly share the goal of joining the EU as soon as possible, public opinion is increasingly differentiated between urban populations that strongly back the process, a rural population (particularly in Poland) that is becoming hostile and a growing proportion of people who are indifferent. Clearly, the pro-European momentum, which has dominated the first decade of post-communist transition, is being eroded and some observers do not even exclude an anti-European backlash if there are no tangible results of the “long march to Europe” in sight soon. Although such a change of heart seems unlikely, a serious debate about the implications of joining the EU is emerging among Central European candidates. Interestingly, it addresses some of the underlying suspicions among some of the Union’s founding members that, independently of their economic or legislative progress, the Eastern newcomers to the club might not be committed believers in an ever more integrated Europe. Three main themes are structuring the Central European debate and are fuelling this suspicion: 1. national sovereignty, 2. the socio-economic model and 3. European defence identity.

1. Sovereignty and Democracy

It is not easy to consider giving up a substantial part of a national sovereignty that has only just been reclaimed. While the demise of the nation-state in the context of globalisation has been much discussed in Western Europe, it is worth recalling that in 1989 the return of democracy in East-Central Europe was closely intertwined with that of national sovereignty. The end of the communist system was also that of the last colonial empire. Popular sovereignty and national sovereignty became indistinguishable. “Wir sind das Volk” (we are the people) the slogan of the East German demonstrators in October 1989 became “Wir sind ein Volk” (we are one people) after the Wall came down in November. This in large part accounts for a certain reluctance of influential voices among the candidates (in the ruling Solidarity coalition in Poland, in



Vaclav Klaus' party in the Czech republic and the Smallholders party now part of the Hungarian governing coalition) to move rapidly towards the abandonment of sovereignty in favour of an institution, which is seen as distant and whose democratic practice and transparency are not always obvious to all.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo in the Spring of 1999 and the sanctions against Austria after the entry of Haider's Party entry in the government a year later were seen by many in Western Europe as attempts by the "1968 generation" to re-define the meaning of sovereignty and of the European project in the post-Cold War era. In Central Europe both were met with ambivalence and even open opposition. Vaclav Klaus even lumped the three issues (Kosovo, Austria, enlargement) together as a threat to Czech national sovereignty: "Europe is now a fundamental challenge to nation-states, i.e. to their sovereignty."⁸ The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's invitation to Chancellor Schüssel, the first since the formation of the government, was interpreted by his liberal opponents at home and by some in Western Europe as an implicit criticism of EU's 'interference' policy. In the words of Miklos Haraszti: "The EU has, in effect, redefined the political conditions for membership. Now the Austrians and their eastern neighbours have to decide if they will hide behind an outdated notion of sovereignty or contribute to a European federation determined to exile extremism." The Central European debate on sovereignty and political conditionality of EU membership has only just begun.

2. The European Socio-Economic Model

Where will the Central European newcomers to the EU fit in the great debate between the anglo-saxon, liberal, free-market model and the continental welfare state model? Regardless of the merits of the argument it seems clear that the prime inspiration for the economic reforms in Central Europe (particularly in the first half of the 1990's in Poland under Leszek Balcerowicz, in the Czech Republic under Vaclav Klaus and later in Estonia) was mainly the 'free market' model. After half a century of state socialism considered as bankrupt, it seemed more tempting to turn to economic liberalism as a transition strategy rather than to the social-democratic welfare state model. The contrast between rapid growth in the United States and Britain and stagnation with over 10% unemployment in continental Europe in the early nineties only reinforced the Central Europeans' appeal of

the "shock therapy" approach.

On the other hand, although the so-called "European model" was not the inspiration, the practice in most of Central Europe after a decade of transition is still much closer to it, than it is to the Chicago School laissez faire capitalism. Vaclav Klaus policies were the most obvious illustration of the contrast between borrowed theories and domestic realities. The fear of Central Europeans getting out of sync with the mainstream European consensus of liberalism with a social-democratic face are vastly exaggerated. On the whole they share the same apprehensions, or expectations, towards the globalisation process as the mainstream EU members.

3. European Security and Defence Identity

The third underlying suspicion about the Central European candidates not being "good" Europeans concerns their attitude towards the emerging CFSP. The Central Europeans have, for understandable historical reasons, an acute (perhaps exaggerated) concern about their security. From Munich to Yalta, from Budapest 1956 to Prague 1968, they have good reasons to consider that security is paramount to everything else in the transition, be it democracy, the market economy or regional cooperation. What they saw as being "on offer" in Europe after 1990 was not altogether convincing, the CSCE collective security system equipped to deal with their old fears and new threats ("When everybody defends the security of everybody then nobody guarantees the security of anybody," as Henry Kissinger put it). The dismal performance of the EU in the Wars of Yugoslav Dissolution did not give much credibility to the prospect of a European security policy. In doubt, they turned to NATO for the good/bad old services it had provided the West Europeans with ("To keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down" as Lord Ismail put it). To be sure, these "old NATO" motivations have now been satisfied by the inclusion of three countries in the Alliance, while a recent summit in the Lithuanian capital has announced a new drive to keep the NATO enlargement process open. Is this suspiciously excessive 'americanophilia' incompatible with the EU's recent efforts to establish under Solana's chairmanship a European Common Foreign Security Policy following the Kosovo intervention? Not seen from Warsaw, Budapest or Prague it will be easier, they argue, to build such a policy with the strongly Western oriented Central Europeans than with some of the current EU

Der Prozess der EU-Osterweiterung wirft unweigerlich die Frage nach den Grenzen Europas auf. Nach Westen, Norden und Süden sind sie klar abgesteckt, nicht jedoch in Richtung Osten. Jacques Rupnik diskutiert in seinem Gastbeitrag die Erwartungen, die Vorurteile und auch die Kritik, die das Neuzeichnen der europäischen Landkarte begleiten, sowohl im Westen als auch im Osten. Eine deutsche Übersetzung des Beitrags erscheint in *Transit – Europäische Revue* Nr. 20 (Winter 2000).



members such as Greece or neutral Sweden and Austria.

Perhaps the most impending controversial debate concerning the Eastern enlargement is the debate on borders—the borders *in* Europe and the borders *of* Europe. The former issue concerns the nature of the borders in an enlarged EU. In short, to “sell” the enlargement within the EU it is important to keep the notion of “hard” borders within the Schengen system. To abolish internal borders, the EU needs to have proper external borders. In contrast, to “sell” enlargement in the countries of East-Central Europe one tends to opt for “soft”, more open borders between the “ins” and the “outs”. For Poland, it is difficult for old historical and new economic and political reasons, to accept a “hard” border with Lithuania or the Ukraine. The same goes for the Czechs vis à vis Slovakia. Hungary has conceived all its policy towards the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring Romania and Slovakia on the prospect of greater access and protection within an integrated Europe. To see a Schengen border established with these neighbours would produce the opposite and obviously be a major blow to that European strategy. In other words, while the adoption of EU standards is perceived as a positive, modernizing influence, the adoption of the Schengen system, even before joining the Union, is perceived negatively, as a reallocation of uncertainties and dangers by the EU on the new, weak, would-be member countries.

The enlargement process implicitly poses the question of the borders of Europe, although these should not be confused with those of the EU. They are clearly established to the West, to the North and to

the South, but not to the East. Toynbee used to distinguish between *limes*, the frontier of a decaying empire, and *limen*, the frontier of an expanding empire. East-Central Europe is at the crossroad between the two: a vanishing Soviet/Russian empire and a reluctant would-be empire, the European Union. In some respects the EU could be for the countries of East-Central Europe a substitute or a functional equivalent of the Habsburg empire, helping to neutralise the feuds and rivalries among them, on the one hand and on the other hand, to balance their relationship with Germany.

The Helsinki decision last December to extend the list of plausible candidates for enlargement sounded like good news to those who were worried about Europe not being able to suggest a credible European future for the countries of South Eastern Europe.⁹ However, the decision to include Turkey among the candidates left most of the Central European front-runners for enlargement perplexed. The EU has displayed for more than a decade extreme caution, to say the least, vis à vis its enlargement to Central Europe, and suddenly it makes a daring geopolitical leap to the Middle East. Including Turkey means prospective EU borders with countries such as Iran, Iraq or Syria. Not quite the reassuring club the post-Communist candidates had in mind. This debate about the borders of the EU and the “geopolitics” of enlargement is long overdue. Whatever its outcome, it is important that these borders remain shaped by the democratic nature of the European project and not the other way around; a project shaped by pre-conceived historical or cultural borders.

Jacques Rupnik

¹ Helmut Kohl said in the French Senate in October 1993: “For me, as a German, it is unthinkable that Poland’s and the Czech Republic’s Western frontiers remain once and for all the Eastern frontier of the EU,” quoted in *FAZ*, 14 October 1993. V. Rühle, then defense minister, spoke of Germany’s “vital interests” to make sure that the eastern border of NATO and the EU does not coincide with Germany’s borders, cf. *Le Monde*, 1 October 1994.

² V. Giscard d’Estaing and H. Schmidt, “Time to slow-down and consolidate around ‘Euro-Europe’”, in: *International Herald Tribune*, 11 April 2000.

³ B. James, “In Germany, firms call for slower EU expansion”, in: *International Herald Tribune*, 26 April 2000.

⁴ *Nasz Dziennik* (Warsaw), 27 March 2000.

⁵ The “structural funds” for the period 2000-2006 amount to 213 billion Euros. 70% of the amount is destined to regions with GNP below 75% of the EU average. Just as for the agricultural policy the enlargement implies a redefinition of the criteria and of the priorities for attribution.

⁶ Cf. *Eurobarometer* 52 (surveys conducted at the end of 1999 and released in April 2000 in Brussels). Interestingly, citizens of the EU would give priority to the enlargement to Norway and Switzerland who have, so far, turned down the offer. The “order of priority” for the „Eastern candidates” is: Hungary, Poland, the Czech republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, etc.

⁷ Needless to say these migration fears are vastly exaggerated. Moreover, with the ageing of the West European population, a period of labour shortage is predicted within a decade. Meanwhile the candidate-countries of Central Europe have themselves become countries of immigration from the former Soviet Union or the Balkans. Most of them are temporary workers (over 700 000 come to Poland each year). For a study of the implications for an enlarged EU see the report of the study group chaired by G. Amato, *The borders of an enlarged EU*, published by the European University Institute, Florence, 1999 and Heather Grabbe, *The sharp edges of Europe: security implications of extending EU border policies eastwards*, Paris, Institute for Security Studies-WEU, 2000.

⁸ V. Klaus speaking in Austria quoted in *Lidové Noviny*, 25 June 2000. Vaclav Havel took, predictably, the opposite view, criticizing the EU not for what it said about Haider, but for its silence on repression in Chechnya. Cf. V. Havel / J. Rupnik, “Dialogue pragois sur l’Europe”, in: *Europe magazine*, Summer 2000 (transcript of a Radio Prague broadcast of 26 February 2000).

⁹ cf. Vladimir Gligorov, *Delaying integration, the impact of EU eastern enlargement on individual CEECs not acceding or acceding only later*, Research report no 267 (July 2000), Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW).

Upcoming events

The following events will all take place at the IWM at 6 p.m, if not stated otherwise.

Die folgenden Veranstaltungen finden (wenn nicht anders vermerkt) um 18:00 Uhr in der Bibliothek des IWM statt.

Tuesday, December 5

Claus Offe

Professor of Sociology and Social Policy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Social Rights: Workers' Rights or Citizens' Rights?

Wednesday, December 6

Präsentation Transit 19 / Podiumsdiskussion

Wieviel Politik braucht der Markt?

Teilnehmer: **Claus Offe, Ferdinand Lacina, Lorenz Fritz**
Diskussionsleitung: **Janos Matyas Kovacs, Permanent Fellow IWM**

Tuesday, December 12

Grzegorz Ekiert

Professor of Government, Center for European Studies, Harvard University

Making Democracy and Markets: Lessons of Postcommunist Transformations

Tuesday, December 19

Gosta Esping-Andersen

Professor at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona

Re-building the Welfare State for the 21st Century

Wenn Sie Interesse an einer regelmäßigen Information über die Veranstaltungen des Instituts für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen haben, nutzen Sie unseren e-mail-Dienst (www.univie.ac.at/register).

Podiumsdiskussion

anlässlich des Erscheinens von

Transit 19

zum Thema:

Wieviel Politik braucht der Markt?

Es diskutieren:

Lorenz Fritz

Generalsekretär der Vereinigung der Österreichischen Industrie

Ferdinand Lacina

Ehemaliger SPÖ-Finanzminister

Claus Offe

Direktor des Instituts für Sozialwissenschaften an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Moderation:

Janos Matyas Kovacs

Professor für Wirtschaftswissenschaften,

Permanent Fellow des IWM

Datum: Mittwoch, 6. Dezember 2000

Zeit: 18:00 Uhr

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vom Menschen

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