




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Contents:

Castelgandolfo Colloquia  
*At the End of the  
Millennium*

IWM Lectures in Modern  
Philosophy  
Gertrude Himmelfarb:  
*Democratic Remedies for  
Democratic Disorders*

Discussion  
*The German Elections*

IWM-Working Report  
Kazimierz Poznanski:  
*Transition and Recession*

Call for Applications  
*Junior Visiting Fellowships*

In Addition  
Guests  
Publications  
Tuesday Lectures  
Travels and Talks  
Varia

Guest Contribution  
Zbigniew Brzezinski: *The  
Global Dilemmas of  
Triumphant Democracy*

# Newsletter 62

## Castelgandolfo Colloquia VIII

### At the End of the Millennium: Time and Modernities

The colloquium was held as usual at the summer residence of the Pope. Krzysztof Michalski's introductory remarks are presented here.

## The Year 2000

The year 2000 is drawing closer. The Catholic Church is intensively preparing for the new millennium, as are countless institutions throughout the world.

Why exactly?



*At the VIII Castelgandolfo Colloquium*

One could indeed say that the year 2000 is coming only for those who measure the passage of time in this particular fashion. As is well known, there are any number of ways to measure time. There are a large number of calendars. Some are to be sure better or worse, but there is no single one which would, independently from any particular standpoint, be better in an absolute sense. The inner differentiation of time is not objective in the same sense as the organization of the atom or the human body; its discovery is not exclusively the result of universally available capacities for knowledge. Some measure time this way, some another way.

This does not mean of course that choosing a calendar is a completely arbitrary affair left up to individual choice. It is clear that such a choice depends on how we regulate our life with others; for this reason different epochs and cultures have given rise to different calendars.

Thus, at least at a first glance, when we celebrate the year 2000 it seems that we are really only celebrating a particular convention. To be sure, this is not an individual, but a cultural convention. Furthermore, this year 2000, when measured with another calendar, could come out as the year 2008 or 16 — not to mention the fact that this divisibility of a number by 1000 does not appear at first to be anything particularly special.

Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that all this is rather more complicated. Above all we come upon the question: what do we actually calculate when we calculate time? To count moments is not to count anything in particular, that is, things or objects that would be distinct from others. We do not count something in time, but time itself.

But what is time? To be sure, it is not a thing among things, an object among objects. Time — let us make an attempt at a definition — is an ordering of the reality we experience. As we divide up time, arranging it so and not otherwise, we order the world in a particular way; and because of this arrangement the world is experienced as something that can change, something transitory.

Yet, one could reply, not the whole world, not everything. Along with mutable and transitory things there are still others that neither change nor pass away; along with weather and fame there is also mathematics. And more: it is only thanks to such immutable and eternal things that we are able, apparently at least, to understand that which changes and passes away. So, for example, it is mathematics which in the final analysis enables us to truly grasp changes in weather.

But does this not mean that the immutable and the everlasting, the eternal and the timeless, is the true form of the world, and that time is only an appearance, an illusion, a shadow or at most a difficulty, a problem, a riddle? Does this not mean that we discover truth, even the truth about ourselves, only when we discover in the flow of time something timeless? Or that the riddle of time can itself be solved only through relating it to something timeless?

An ancient tradition of which Plotinus, following Plato, is a beautiful and compelling expression, directs us precisely toward such ideas. According to this tradition, time, along with the changeable world and mortal life, is completely incomprehensible if taken by itself. Time can be understood only from the perspective of eternity, the changing form of the world only from the vision of the unchanging, the lasting, the eternal. History, a succession of events, is also according to this tradition only comprehensible insofar as it can be fit into a framework which for its part does not originate in such events: alpha and omega, beginning and end, expulsion from paradise and last judgment. One could also characterize this framework as "history" but only in a derivative sense, for it would then no longer be a history which happens, which passes and changes. If we also call "historical events" the beginning and end of the world, the expulsion from paradise and the last judgment, it is only because it is thanks to such "events" that history, as we know it, has meaning.

The Neoplatonic tradition provided Christianity with the conceptual instruments with which it understands itself. (To be sure, these are not the only instruments that have been used, for Christianity has understood itself in a

variety of different ways and continues to do so today.) It provided the interpretive schema for such contrary pairs as "God" and "World"; "Creator" and "Creation"; "World History" and "mundane history." Yet this tradition continues to survive in European thought to this day in other, non-Christian forms and in places where the words in which it is formulated no longer have an explicit religious connotation. So for example in the historical-philosophical constructions from Hegel to Marx; in the concepts of "progress" and the "iron laws of history"; as well as in the concept of a universal history, history simpliciter. Plotinus lives on everywhere where the course of hours and days takes on meaning only from the perspective of a goal or end towards which it moves, or of a potential it realizes, or of the whole of which it is a part — in short, everywhere where time can be understood only from the perspective of structures that have nothing to do with time.

Yet Neoplatonism is not the only possible interpretation of time. Perhaps it is not necessary to ossify time into a timeless structure or logical concept in order to understand it. Perhaps it is not necessary to look at it from what is usually understood to be an "external" standpoint (or "transcendent," a word often used to ward off nagging questions). Perhaps the time that one can calculate is not the only form of time, perhaps there is another form of time which escapes our notice as we calculate. Perhaps this form of time which withdraws away from us does not lend itself to being calculated, perhaps it is a time without measure, which can neither be longer nor shorter (time as "kairos," as moment). And perhaps this dimension of time, and not some external structure alien to time, is what continually renews the conditions for the possibility of understanding time, even its calculability. Perhaps eternity, thanks to which we can understand time, is present in time, not beyond it; perhaps it does not lie in time like a foreign body, like a stone at the bottom of a stream. Beginning and end, alpha and omega, damnation and salvation would then be elements of each and every moment — not the external limits of time as a process that begins somewhere and ends somewhere else.

There is another tradition, just as old and perhaps even older than the Neoplatonic, which would open for us such a perspective on time. This tradition includes both the author of the apocalyptic texts and St. Paul, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, Bergson and Heidegger.

In the perspective of this tradition, time is the manner in which reality comes to light in the course of our life. It is the intrinsic order of this reality. It is not only the order of a part of reality (for example "mutable" things), but the order of reality as such. "Time" is just as incomprehensible without "reality," as "reality" is without "time." Thus the conditions of its comprehensibility do not lie somewhere "outside," in some unchanging and everlasting structure of relations (because there is no such structure, no "outside"), but are constantly formed in the course of life itself, at each moment anew. The rhythm of time is the rhythm of our life. Thus we understand (and calculate) time according to the way in which we live. Even the Neoplatonic attempt to counter time with an eternity that is timeless, "divine," and "mathematical" ought to be understood from the perspective of its origin and function in a particular context of life.

If this is correct, then it is nonsense to believe that the measurement of time is simply a matter of convention. The ways in which we arrange time express the experience of our life. And we call something "experience" precisely when it is not completely arbitrary, just as the bitter taste of wormwood, pain or something known through pain are not arbitrary. The differences between calendars, as well as the different ways we interpret the same calendar in the way we think and behave, are not fully comprehensible without an understanding of the differences between the various modes of human life. And these modes are reducible to a common, trans-temporal denominator just as little as the differences between calendars. There is no such denominator.

The way we calculate time is thus not completely arbitrary; it is to a certain extent an image of our life. A reflection on our life, on its changes and the differences which divide it from the lives of others, is simultaneously a reflection on the particularity of the culture in which we live. Does the fact that we hold the year 2000 to be special imply something more than a preference for round numbers, which would also account for the fact that we celebrate with particular enthusiasm someone's one hundredth birthday? Perhaps the answer is yes — if one thinks of that passage in Revelations about the coming thousand-year reign of Christ. Of course this does not mean that every thousand years we should expect that this reign is about to begin (and busy ourselves in the other 999 years with other things) but we should instead be conscious that the beginning of this thousand year reign is a possibility that lies implicit in each moment of our life.

In the *Timaeus*, Plato calls time a "moving image of eternity." Perhaps he understood under "eternity" not an everlasting, transtemporal, "transcendent" reality, but the time we live, time in the form in which our past, our present, and our future take in accordance with the way in which we live.

Translation: James Dodd

## Program

Monday, 17 August

### Morning Session

Chair: Leszek Kolakowski  
Krzysztof Michalski

Introduction  
Jaroslav Pelikan  
Time and Trinity in the Christian Tradition  
Charles Taylor  
Modernity and Secular Time

### Afternoon Session

Chair: Pierre Rosanvallon  
Leo Ou-Fan Lee  
Modernity and Secular Time in Chinese History  
Bernard Lewis  
Time, Space and Modernity in the Middle East

Tuesday, 18 August

### Morning Session

Chair: Ira Katznelson  
Arlie Russell Hochschild  
The Rationalization of Time in Everyday Life  
Lord Dahrendorf  
Life-Time and Work-Time

### Afternoon Session

Chair: Bronislaw Geremek  
Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Some Reflections on the Global Dilemmas of Triumphant Democracy  
Ruud Lubbers  
Globalization and the Social Fabric: Realizing Human Values in the New Millennium

## Participants

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC; Lord Dahrendorf, House of Lords, London; Patron of IWM; Dilip Gaonkar, Professor of Communication Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston; Bronislaw Geremek, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs; Patron of IWM; Stanislaw Grygiel, Professor of Philosophy, Lateran University, Rome; Arlie Russell Hochschild, Professor of Sociology, University of California at Berkeley; Ira Katznelson, Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History, Columbia University, New York; Member of the IWM Academic Advisory Board; Leszek Kolakowski, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, University of Chicago; Fellow at All Souls College, Oxford; Member of the IWM Academic Advisory Board; Benjamin Lee, Professor of Anthropology, Rice University, Houston; Leo Ou-Fan Lee, Professor of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University, Cambridge; Bernard Lewis, Professor Emeritus of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, Member of the IWM Academic Advisory Board; Ruud Lubbers, Minister of State, the Netherlands; Professor of Globalization Studies, Tilburg University and the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; Krzysztof Michalski, Professor of Philosophy at Boston University and the University of Warsaw; Director of IWM; Jaroslav Pelikan, Sterling Professor Emeritus of History, Yale University, New Haven; Pierre Rosanvallon, Professor of Political Science, EHSS, Paris; Director of the Raymond Aron Centre for Political Research; and President, Fondation Saint-Simon, Paris; Stephan Sattler, Cultural Editor, FOCUS magazine, Munich; Hans-Ludwig Schreiber, Professor of Law and President of the University of Göttingen; Vice President of the Board of Trustees of the Volkswagen Foundation; Prince Schwarzenberg, Patron of IWM, Vienna/Prague; Dieter Simon, President of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities; Director of the Max-Planck-Institute for European Legal History, Frankfurt; Member of the IWM Academic Advisory Board; Robert Spaemann, Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at the University of Munich; Member of the IWM Academic Advisory Board; Charles Taylor, Professor of Political Philosophy and Political Science at McGill University, Montreal; Vice-Chair of the IWM Academic Advisory Board; Ulrich Voswinckel, Chair of the Managing Board, Körber Stiftung, Hamburg; Lord Weidenfeld, Publisher, London; Patron of IWM; Elizabeth Weymouth, Contributing Editor, Newsweek; and Columnist, The Washington Post.

The Castelgandolfo Colloquium was sponsored by the Körber Foundation and the proceedings will be published by Klett-Cotta (Stuttgart) in the Castelgandolfo-Gespräche series

## IWM Lectures in Modern Philosophy

# Gertrude Himmelfarb: Democratic Remedies for Democratic Disorders

The historian Gertrude Himmelfarb is renowned for her works on Victorian England and on the history of poverty. In the framework of the IWM Lectures in Modern Philosophy the prominent critic of cultural and ideological fashions gave three lectures in the IWM Library. On 16 September she spoke on the topic of "The De-Moralization of Society," on 17 September on "Civil Society and the Polity," and on 18 September on "Religion and Culture". An excerpt of her second lecture is presented here.

Last evening, after describing the aftermath of the cultural revolution of the 1960s which left the United States in a state of moral disarray, I concluded by saying that the task for America today, paraphrasing the Federalist Papers, is to seek democratic remedies for the diseases of democratic society. The most serious attempt at such a remedy is the restoration of civil society — families, communities, churches, civic and cultural associations. This remedy has been greeted with near universal acclaim. Civil society has become the mantra of our time. Liberals and conservatives, libertarians and communitarians, academics and politicians agree about little else but this: that civil society is a solution to our problems.

I am always made uneasy by ideas that evoke so much enthusiasm on the part of so many different kinds of people. I am also disturbed by a common terminological confusion: the frequent use of "community" as a synonym for "civil society". From being a sub-set of civil society, "communities" in the plural have been elevated into "community" in the singular. Yet the two terms, civil society and community, have very different histories and, until recently at least, very different connotations. The term "civil society," which includes communities and much else, has the function of mediating between the individual and the state, restraining the excessive individualism of the one and the overweening designs of the other, socializing the individual — that is, giving him a sense of duties and responsibilities — without subjecting him to the coercive will of the state. Community, on the other hand, in the singular, has traditionally had a more collectivist, organic, integral character, recalling a tribal or feudal society (or perhaps a mythicized tribal or feudal society) in which individuals are socialized by being fused together into a single entity — a "solidarity" as they say. The modern idea of civil society corresponds to what the 19<sup>th</sup> century German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies identified as *Gesellschaft* in contrast to *Gemeinschaft*, or community. Today, that distinction is a historical memory, community having lost its essentially organic character even for those who now call themselves "communitarians." The Israeli *Kibbutzim* in their prime and the American radical communes in the 1960s were, I think, the most serious attempts to revive that old romantic sense of community. In contemporary parlance a much emasculated community retains some of the evocative appeal of the old term with little of its substance.

If community harks back to premodern times (or a much idealized version of those times), civil society has a distinctively modern pedigree. The analyst of civil society takes pride in citing Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Burke, Hegel or Tocqueville, as progenitors of the idea. But apart from Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, where civil society does have a precise meaning, the other usages are casual, imprecise and inconsistent. Even in Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* which is commonly assumed to be the source of the term, it appears only once in passing and not at all in the English edition where, until very recently, the term *la société civile* was translated as "social intercourse". It was not until 1966 in the new English translation of *Democracy in America* that the term "civil society" finally made an appearance, and not until then, and in fact well after then, that the term became identified with the voluntary associations that Tocqueville speaks of so frequently and so admirably.

One might have expected the concept "civil society" to emerge earlier in response to nazism and communism. If Hannah Arendt was right (as she surely was) in saying that the atomization and isolation of the individual was the distinctive strategy of totalitarianism, it would be reasonable to look to civil society as a countervailing force, the area where the individual can find some refuge from the overweening might of the state. In Eastern Europe, the concept did arise, although belatedly, in the late 1970s and '80s as a protest not against nazism but against communism. Thus, one of the demands of the Solidarity Movement in Poland was for "the rebirth of civil society". Instead of seeking to reform or democratize the political structure of the communist state, the dissidents adopted the strategy of bypassing the state by building a democratic, pluralistic order in civil society itself — a "parallel society," as they put it.

In the United States and England, however, it is not the horrors of totalitarianism that has prompted a call for the revival of civil society. It is the moral and social disorders of democracy itself. Thus it is only in the past decade or two, as a remedy to these disorders, that the idea of civil society has become so fashionable. It is a very attractive ideal because it calls upon nothing more than such natural, familiar, universal institutions as families and communities. Moreover it is preeminently a democratic idea, it is democracy on the smallest scale, the "little platoon" that Edmund Burke described as the "first principle (the germ, as it were) of public affections." It is

also an attribute of democracy on the largest scale: Tocqueville's voluntary associations which have the crucial task of mediating between the individual and the state. In addition it serves as a corrective to that other democratic flaw identified by Tocqueville, the tyranny of the majority, the power of the collective mass of the people which may be inimical to the liberty of individuals and minorities.

Today, civil society is asked to assume yet another task, that of repairing the moral fabric of democratic society. The institutions of civil society, we are told, are "the seed beds of virtue". It is here, in families, communities, voluntary associations, and churches, that character takes shape, children become civilized and socialized, people acquire a sense of social as well as individual responsibility, rights are complemented by duties, self-interest is reconciled with the general interest, and civility mutes the discord of opposing wills. And all of this is achieved naturally, organically, without the artificial contrivances of government, without the passage of laws or the intrusion of bureaucracies, without recourse to the coercive, punitive power of the state. It sounds too good to be true, and it is, I think, too good to be true.

The principle itself is admirable. Today more than ever we have need of a mediating structure between an unrestrained individualism and an overpowerful state. Yet civil society alone in its present condition is no remedy for our ailments. Civil society has been described as "an immune system against cultural disease." But the fact is that much of civil society today has been infected by the same virus that produced that disease — the ethical and cultural relativism that reduces all values, all standards, all authorities to expressions of personal will and power. If civil society is to become an effective instrument of social mediation and reformation, it will only be by resisting that relativism and reaffirming those moral principles that give civil society its distinctive purpose. And it can do that only by restoring the authority of the institutions of civil society and using all the social sanctions at the disposal of those institutions — sanctions that may be as coercive, psychologically if not physically, as the legal sanctions enforced by the state.

Some of the advocates of civil society know this and are prepared to enforce such sanctions, but all too many pay lip-service to the idea of civil society while lacking the will or conviction to implement it. They are pleased to acclaim charity and compassion as virtues but they balk at stigmatizing egotism and hedonism as vices. Indeed, they are uncomfortable with the very words "vice" and "stigmatize." Yet it is precisely



*Gertrude Himmelfarb*

the function of civil society to encourage virtue and to discourage, which is to say to stigmatize, vice. These mechanisms of approbation and disapprobation are all the more necessary in a liberal democracy, for the more effective the social sanctions, the less need there is for the legal and penal sanctions of the state. If the advocates of civil society are serious in their desire to limit the excesses of individualism and statism, they have to be as candid in censuring vice as they are in applauding virtue. They have to restore not only the institutions of civil society but the force of social and moral suasion, even if this means limiting the freedom of the individual.

While some proponents of civil society emasculate the idea by depriving it of its social authority, others (those who call themselves communitarians especially) do so by making it in effect an adjunct of the welfare state. Instead of strengthening civil society by transferring to civil society (that is, families, communities, churches, and private groups) some of the functions currently exercised by the welfare state, they regard civil society itself as a corollary or complement to the welfare state. The civic or communitarian impulse that sustains civil society, they argue, is also the basis of the welfare state, which is simply the community writ large. Thus they tend to be more solicitous of community in the abstract than of particular communities that may challenge the authority of the welfare state. It is revealing, it seems to me, that the singular "community" is featured far more prominently in the literature of the communitarians than the plural "communities."

#### Previous speakers

1991 [Peter Winch](#) (London / Illinois)

Überreden und Argumentieren. Vier Vorlesungen über Wittgenstein

1992 [Bruce A. Ackerman](#) (Yale)

The Future of Liberal Revolution

1993 [Richard Rorty](#) (Charlottesville)

Aspects of Pragmatism

1994 [Michael J. Sandel](#) (Harvard)

Liberalism, Community, and Virtue

1995 [Clifford Geertz](#) (Princeton)

The World in Pieces: Culture and Politics at the End of the Century

1996 [Bernard Williams](#) (Oxford / Berkeley)

Truthfulness as a Political Ideal

1997 [Martha Nussbaum](#) (Chicago)

Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory

Since 1993 the lectures have been published in German by Passagen Verlag, Vienna.

## Discussion

# The German Elections: Consequences for its Neighbours and for Europe

On September 30, three days after the elections in Germany, Klaus von Beyme, Professor of Political Science in Heidelberg, Jiri Grusa, Czech novelist and Ambassador to Austria, Istvan Eörsi, Hungarian novelist, and Rainer Münz, Professor of Demography, Humboldt University, Berlin, discussed the consequences of the elections for the neighbouring countries. The discussion was moderated by Josef Kirchengast from the Austrian daily "Der Standard" in which it was also printed.

Josef Kirchengast: What do the German election results mean for European integration?

Jiri Grusa: This is the first government with no direct



*Jiri Grusa*

links to the German past. That means that Germany might be prepared to play a clearly defined, integrative role in Europe.

Kirchengast: Didn't Kohl as a committed European already fulfil this role?

Grusa: Yes, but a leading integrative power in Europe needs more than its own history. By that I don't mean to say, that Kohl's enthusiasm for Europe disguised a new imperialism, but that

his decisions were guided by a reaction to the past. I would hesitate to call it an inferiority complex, but instead of saying: "We want this because we are strong and good", they said, "We want this so that we won't be bad again."

Rainer Münz: Precisely because the incoming government of SPD and Greens won't fear being suspected of pursuing a German "Sonderweg", they will not need to play the European card so strongly.

Kirchengast: In his European policy Gerhard Schröder wants to put more emphasis on German concerns.

Grusa: The SPD is living up to its commitment to its core voters, the employees, because the voters could be of importance with reference to the question of transitional periods in the negotiations on the membership of Eastern European countries. Of course German interests will be looked after, but we all know the difference between rhetoric and practical politics, and European interests will not be forgotten.

Kirchengast: Is the attitude of the SPD better than a pronounced and passionately committed European policy?

Klaus von Beyme: A realistic attitude is always better because it curbs exaggerated expectations. By "realistic" I mean "as far as Hungary is directly concerned" or "as far as the Baltic states are concerned." Schröder's government with its cool and rational policy would be less ready to call for Estonia to be admitted to NATO because it would want to take Russia's concerns into consideration. It is a very good thing that politics is no longer a matter of male bonding, which cracks under pressure. When Yeltsin came to power, Kohl's old friendship with Gorbachev was soon forgotten.

Kirchengast: There is a pragmatic approach to maintaining stability in Central and Eastern Europe which favours admission of the applicant states as soon as possible. This would speed up the process of economic normalisation and counter pressure on our labour market.


Münz: The strategy of admitting as many countries as possible as soon as possible would undermine the project of an integrated Europe. The present institutions would be unable to handle 30 member states and we would revert to a simple free trade zone.

Istvan Eörsi: The real problem is conflict between the East-Central European countries. There are large Hungarian minorities in Romania. Hungary can't deal with the problem because it is not a European problem, but it will produce enormous conflicts. Because apart from economic backwardness the only other reason to exclude a state is if it is at war.

Grusa: The only proper response to the complexity of the present is an expansion of the system on a non-military and non-economic basis. And that has to proceed step by step. Dikes have to be built where flooding can be expected.

Kirchengast: Thirteen out of 15 countries in the European Union have a Social Democratic government or a government with Social Democratic participation. It seems that the moment of truth has come for employment policy. What can we expect?

von Beyme: It is good to have harmony with respect to immigration



*Istvan Eörsi*



*Klaus von Beyme*

and asylum laws, but distributive policies will remain national for a long time to come.

Münz: It is possible to pursue a European policy with respect to production, for instance by standardising products, but the welfare states have different pension and education systems and different health care systems. As yet there is no Europe-wide minimum wage, there is only a ban

on dumping prices below national minimum wages.

Eörsi: At present reforms reflect a certain helplessness in the face of globalisation. It is impossible to rebuild, quickly enough, the large national structures, which have been destroyed by globalisation. But we need national structures to protect the socially disadvantaged.

Schröder's government doesn't have a strategy to combat this huge historical process either. The biggest problem, with a view to globalisation, is how to carry on the process of integration while maintaining the national framework.

Kirchengast: The Euro is a strategic instrument of integration. With the turmoil on the Asian markets it has passed its first test magnificently. Is the Euro sufficient to take Europe into the next century in a cultural-political and a social sense or do we also need personalities?

von Beyme: The common market is a European cradle which is primarily rocked by the hand of reason and not by emotional identification. In the long term, however, an awareness of common identity will grow. Travelling will be easier because we will be able to pay in the same currency everywhere, exchange and exchanges will increase therefore.

In the medium term, the reality is an interim union of states which will not become an integrated state until there is conflict between the parliamentary majority in Strasbourg and the Commission. Until now they have both been united in their opposition to the Council of Ministers, so there has been no parliamentarisation. The European Parliament elections currently rank in importance with regional elections and this will only change when we have an integrated political system. For the time being the majority is not in favour of this because it cannot find a political identity. The faster we expand, the less we can concern ourselves with the required development in depth.

Münz: A common currency, as, for instance, the dollar is de facto in South America, does not automatically lead to an identification with a kind of 'home' or a political formation, it is something entirely practical. A problem arises as soon as one of the EU's member states breaks budget discipline. There is no centre of power equivalent to the central bank, which can make coherent decisions in the field of economic policy. There is no ministry of justice which could enforce the payment of membership contributions in an emergency.

The expansion of the European Union eastwards will mean that a smaller proportion of states uses the Euro. Because the Euro is still out of reach for EU applicants in central and eastern Europe.

Eörsi: A unified currency doesn't produce unity. Unity can only be achieved if there is an effort to find answers to the great questions of our time. First, we have to distinguish between goals for the near future and what is in fact feasible. Second, as long as it remains divided Europe will be in a state of conflict, and that may entail the threat of war. Europe must be a perspective for all European nations, and consequently expansion should take place on the basis of an awareness of social and ecological problems.

Kirchengast: Would a common European cultural policy make sense?

Grusa: That depends on how we define culture. If culture doesn't stand for a distinction between "cultured" and "primitive" people the answer is yes. But if it means endless decisions about the direction of projects, the answer is no.

von Beyme: Culture has now become so globalised that a veil is nothing but a folkloristic relic. Consequently culture is not an appropriate vehicle for the idea of Europe.

Münz: A European cultural policy is superfluous, because on the one hand, with Hollywood and MTV, culture is global, on the other hand it is local. If fears of a uniform European state are to be checked, culture and language must remain local. Cultural self-determination increases acceptance of the European project on a political and economic level. It also facilitates solutions for minority issues. But this is no answer at all to the question of the borders of an integrated Europe. Are Turkey or Russia European states? The question cannot simply be answered geographically by referring to the location of the Bosphorus or the Ural mountains. Because of its pragmatism the Schröder-Fischer government probably has fewer visions in this respect than the Kohl-Kinkel government ever had.



*Rainer Münz*

Translation: Esther Kinsky



*v. Beyme, Kirchengast, Eörsi, Münz*

## Seminars

# The State After the Party State Eastern Europe in Search of New Forms of Government

Director: Janos Matyas Kovacs

Eastern European scholars and politicians are searching for a new — ideal — type of state, which is relatively small but efficient; which does not mistake empowerment for tutelage, guidance for dirigism and social commitment for paternalism, protectionism and populism; which does not hurt human and citizenship rights under the aegis of Realpolitik; which supports rather than limits the market through soft and sophisticated interference.

Eastern Europe is looking for new patterns of government in an era of growing uncertainties in the West caused by political fatigue in liberal democracies, ethnic and cultural cleavages, and the declining performance of the welfare state in global competition. Hence, in the ex-communist countries, the imitation of Western models should be replaced or supplemented by simultaneous experimentation. The seminar will examine the parallel searches for new forms of government in the East and the West in a comparative and interdisciplinary way.

14 October

Paul Gillespie, Irish Times, Dublin, Visiting Fellow of IWM  
State-Building and Multiple Political Identities in an Enlarging European Union

21 October

Elzbieta Kaczynska, University of Warsaw, Visiting Fellow of IWM  
Criminality as a Challenge to Democratic State-Building in Poland

28 October

Kazimierz Poznanski, University of Washington, Seattle, Visiting Fellow of IWM  
Post-Communist Transition as Institutional Disintegration: State Crisis and Economic Distress



*Elzbieta Kaczynska*

11 November

Andras Török, The National Cultural Fund, Budapest  
Arms Length Away from the Hungarian State? How to Finance Literature in a Mid-Size Postcommunist Country

18 November

Martin Butora, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava  
State Concepts in Slovakia after 1989

25 November

Jack Burgers, Erasmus University, Rotterdam; Visiting Fellow of IWM  
State Care and Communal Share: Substitutes or Communicating Vessels? The example of Illegal Migrants in Contemporary Dutch Cities

9 December

Jerzy Szacki, University of Warsaw; Guest of IWM in December  
The Troubles with Citizenship in Contemporary Poland: The Quest for Social Rights without Political Participation

## Gender Studies Work Group

Director: Cornelia Klinger

Since 1993 the participants of this work group have been meeting regularly once or twice a month to read and discuss texts in feminist theory and literature or to present their own projects.

In the first half of the year the following lectures were presented and authors were discussed:

Visit to Vienna's Burgtheater to see Elfriede Jelinek's "Ein Sportstück" (15 March).

Discussion of the piece chaired by Katharina Pewny, Junior Visiting Fellow of IWM (30 March).

Selma Sevenhuijsen, Professor of Women's Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Utrecht, Visiting Fellow of IWM, presented her text for discussion "Too good to be true? Feminist considerations about trust and social cohesion" (27 April), published as IWM Working Paper No. 13 at [www.univie.ac.at/iwm/pub-wp.htm](http://www.univie.ac.at/iwm/pub-wp.htm).

Susanne Lummerding presented her text "agency@?" (11 May).

Iris M. Young, Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, gave three lectures in the framework of IWM's annual lectures in Gender Studies on the topic of "Inclusion and Democracy: Insights from Feminist Theory" (20, 27 May, 3 June).

Sabrina Dittus reported on her work on her dissertation (15 June).

In the second half of the year the following activities were scheduled:

Visit to the movie "Boogie Nights" and discussion with Heide Schlüpmann, Professor at the Institute for Theatre-, Film- and Media Studies, University of Frankfurt a.M., Guest of IWM (26 August).

Amy Colin, Professor of German Languages and Literatures, University of Pittsburgh, Guest of IWM in September, gave a lecture on "Writing from the Margins / Writing at the Margins: German-Jewish Women from the Bukovina (1900-1980)" (8 September).

Waltraud Ernst discussed the topic of "New Technologies – New Families?" drawing on Donna Haraway's new book "Modest\_Witness@Second\_Millennium" (14 September).

Beate Rössler, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Amsterdam University, Guest of IWM in October, gave a lecture entitled "Freiheit und Privatheit" (20 October).

Silke Wenk, Professor of Art Theory (Focus Gender Studies), University of Oldenburg, and Guest of IWM in November, lectured on "Geschlechterdifferenz und visuelle Repräsentationen des Politischen" (24 November).



*Michaela Adelberger, Maria Gomez and Katharina Pewny present the activities of the IWM field of research "gender studies" on occasion of the opening of a new campus of Vienna University.*

## Junior Visiting Fellows' Seminar

Director: Janos Matyas Kovacs

In the framework of its Junior Visiting Fellowship Program IWM organizes a working seminar for the Junior Fellows. At each session one of the Junior Fellows gives a presentation of his/her research project. The seminar ends with the Junior Fellows' Conference, at which the final results of the projects are discussed.

### Second semester 1998:

9. September

Philip Steger

The political style of the Roman Catholic Church as analyzed on the basis of several samples of concrete political issues in Poland since 1989 and in Austria since 1986 and the impact of that political style on the development of a civil society

23 September

Maria Gómez

Bodies that Mean: On (Mis)recognition of the Female Body

30 September

Ulrike Krampfl

The Seducers of the Credulous. Some Remarks on the Appearance of 'False Witches' in Early 18th Century Paris

7 October

Stefan Kalt

Obligation and Action in David Hume's Moral Psychology

14 October

Violetta Zentai

Exchange of Wealth and Circulation of Meanings: Discourses on Money, Market, and Morality in Post-Socialist Transformations

21 October

Ann Guthmiller

The Tragic Gift: Towards an Overcoming of Ressentiment through Affirmative Art

28 October

Margit Leuthold

Political Education in Times of Change

4 November

Michal Ivantysyn

The Main Features and Trends of Policy Making in Slovakia: An Openended Path Towards Stable Democracy

11 November

Jarmila Maresova

Labour Migration to Austria: Czech and Slovak Workers in Vienna

18 November

Franco Cirulli

Hegel's 'Logic' as a Theory of Personal Identity

25 November

Piotr Graczyk

Simone Weil: Love and Language



*Don Kalb and Philip Steger*

## Working Report

# Kazimierz Poznanski: Transition and Recession

Kazimierz Poznanski is Professor of International Studies, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, and Visiting Fellow of IWM.

There are many possible ways of studying the post-communist transition. The best, I think, is to begin by identifying something that appears to be a most striking related phenomenon. And then, to understand transition, we should focus on this selected phenomenon. To me the most amazing aspect of the ongoing reforms is that whenever there has been an attempt to implement them, these reforms produced an economic recession. After the political surprise of the communist collapse in the region, another surprise — this time economic — has followed: the region-wide recession. From 1989 on, Eastern Europe (including the European parts of the former Soviet Union) has been submerged in a recession that has cost about forty percent of the collective product. The least affected saw their production go down by twenty to twenty five percent (e.g., Hungary and Poland) but in many the losses reached fifty percent (e.g., East Germany, Russia) or more (Lithuania, with sixty percent).

This also happens to be a very long-lasting recession, with many countries not yet in a recovery (e.g., Russia and Ukraine) and some hitting their second recession (e.g., Bulgaria in 1997 and the Czechs in 1998). Most likely the region will not be out of the recession — or restore its pre-recession production level — before late in the next decade, meaning that technically speaking the recession will last at least fifteen years. With this production decline, the post-communist recession should be viewed as the worst downturn in modern history, a few times deeper and more durable than the Great Depression of the thirties. Given this fact, it would be best to call — after Kuczynski — the post-communist recession an "economic catastrophe".

But it is not only the extent of the catastrophe which is truly amazing, it is also the fact that this event gets almost no attention among economists working on the transition. And, when, infrequently, some comments are made, they tend to present the region-wide recession as something it actually is not. Specifically, there is a tendency to portray the recession as inevitable and not really as bad as it may look. Briefly speaking, recessions are said to be first of all, inevitable because the kind of deficiencies left behind by the communist-era system; and secondly, not so painful since the collapse mostly works to remove these deficiencies. These opinions come mostly from the post-communist reformers themselves, largely from the outspoken group of Polish economists linked to the region's first radical — shock-therapy — type of reforms.

This argumentation, while never fully articulated, can be traced in a number of sources, including the recent interesting book on transition by Balcerowicz. It is a representative work, also in the sense that it almost ignores the issue of recession. More than three-hundred pages long, this book devotes only one or two full pages to the recession. On one occasion, this is done to present

a downward re-calculation of Polish recession from some obscure secondary source, on another it is to remind the readers that the shock-therapy program of his own making allowed for the least damaging production decline. But there are also many brief remarks, which are consistent with the general view of recession as unavoidable and, in a way, useful or necessary.

The key point is that the communist system suffered from some hidden imbalances, most notably a repressed inflation, disguised unemployment and the so-called unwanted production (or, to use the words of Balcerowicz, "pure socialist production.") All these built-in imbalances are in place because of state interventions, so that, for instance, unwanted production is tolerated because of unconditional state subsidies. When transition begins, the state gives up its interventions, so that, keeping with the same example, subsidies are cut off and unwanted production is eliminated. This leads to a decline in production, which might be conceived as recessionary, but it is not. According to this argumentation, we cannot talk about a real recession since a loss of unwanted production — for which there was no effective demand — does not detract from the general wealth.

Not only is this a cost-free recession, but it is a very helpful one, since with the release of resources, say, capital, from unwanted production, there are possibilities for wanted production to expand with no additional capital input. This presumes an automatic recovery, so that it makes sense for the reformers to not to go for a wholesale



*Kazimierz Poznanski*

elimination of state interventions. In other words, this type of reasoning leads to the policy conclusion that radical — in the sense of removing the state — reforms are most desirable. Not surprisingly, this view of post-communist recession

is the favored one among the proponents of a radical approach to transition, including Balcerowicz.

Leaving aside the fact that the program for reforms adopted by Poland — under Balcerowicz's economic leadership — produced not only the shallowest recession but also a respectable recovery, this general line of argumentation (intended to address all transition economies) is, on its own merits, questionable. It is just not a credible argument, at least the way it is usually presented, and this is not only for some theoretical reasons but also due to its implausibility in the light of available empirical figures. For one, the collapse of production, even in Poland, was

universal, including the products that no one seriously could define as unwanted (e.g., cars in Poland, including some older models that later picked up once the recovery began). And the production declines in many cases have been so deep that for them to be attributed to the communist-era would require that unwanted production would have had to be at some impossibly high levels (e.g., fifty percent for Russia, or sixty for Lithuania).

Furthermore, while China (and Vietnam) started their transition with similar, possibly deeper, imbalances — including an unwanted production, it has not experienced a production decline but a strong, even phenomenal, growth of production. To say, as do some proponents of the recession-inevitability thesis, that this is because China is more rural, or agricultural is to imply that when a country is rural then somehow unwanted production does not matter anymore. This could well be because, presumably, this unwanted production is mostly concentrated in the industry. But then we are left with the following question, why it is that China has seen its industrial production — including the state sector — constantly expand, while Eastern Europeans have watched their economies suffer not only from an industrial downturn, but also from great production losses in agriculture (even in Poland where it has been private since the beginning of the transition).

We need a different explanation of the recession, and the one that I think fits the facts best, is — drawing from von Mises, Hayek and Schumpeter — the argument built into an evolutionary economics, where the role of institutions is seen as central. And also one which warns against any radical — termed “constructivist” — efforts to remake an existing system, or order, and regardless of what this system really is. The reason is that even if an inferior system, such as the communist one, is the only one with which economic agents can enter into a search for something more efficient, and, if changes are excessive, then the inferior system may be destroyed before the superior — theoretical — system is put in place. And when a system, whatever its relative efficiency, is allowed to disintegrate, then the economy will suffer grave consequences, i.e., recession.

In my view, this is exactly what has happened in Eastern Europe, where at the outset of transition, in the absence of working markets, the economic system was really the state. Through neglecting this reality, the radical reformers caused too much damage to the state and with this very hostile conditions for economic agents have been created. For instance, by giving up import controls, they caused a loss of profits for domestic producers, and with banks — after their commercialization — left without financial insurance, credit availability dropped dramatically. And by announcing that public assets will be quickly given up by the state (or privatized) radical reformers raised the risk for the producers, unsure of their future status as managers and workers.

In other words, by quickly withdrawing the state from the system, reformers caused a dual crisis, with insufficient liquidity and with excessive risk. These elements are completely missing from the conventional account of the recession, where the focus is on the quality of prices and competitive setting. Not to mention that given its preference for radicalism, the possibility of the state rolling back too much is not taken seriously within this paradigm. But it

is exactly the lack of money and the high degree of uncertainty, both caused by the state's over-withdrawal, which produced this man-made and quite real recession. Affecting all sectors of production and very sharply, since systemic (here, state) collapse is almost always quite devastating (compared say to cyclical forces, or some external shocks).

Taking this view, seeing radicalism as it has been practiced in the region as a problem and not a solution, it is logical to take another step and ask how to account for the fact that countries have suffered from recession of often vastly different degree. To address this question it is useful to make a distinction between intended, or organized changes, like in Poland, where the state retained cohesion, or unintended — better, chaotic — changes, as, for instance in Russia, where the state lost control over the process, actually it disintegrated (losing power to other players). Then we have to recognize that reforms have differed also in terms of their radicalism, meaning that in some cases the state has been allowed to be damaged more deeply than in other cases.

If we combine these two dimensions, a typology can be created, where the more radical and more chaotic transitions — as in Russia — actually produce worse recession. And where less radical and more cohesive reforms, as in Poland and Hungary, have produced less pronounced recessions. In this typology, East Germany, due to the radical nature of its program, complete erasure of the existing — Eastern — state, though in an organized fashion — led by the Western state, falls somewhere in between. Bulgaria and Romania, with less radical reforms but executed — again, chaotically — by corrupt states, are other intermediate cases.

It should be obvious that depending on what happened initially, certain countries will find it easier to recover than others, in each case a reconstruction of the state — with different roles and instruments — is a precondition. But in the situation of Poland, and even more of East Germany, this rebuilding comes easier (in the East German case this means that the Western state completes the state replacement process). But in Russia, for example, the state has to be reconstructed almost from scratch, so it will have to take longer; and in fact as we have already seen, it does.

It follows that to properly analyze post-communist transition we have to give more attention to the critical role of the state, as an agent of reforms but also as a subject of reforms. That this simple fact has escaped the mainstream economists (with rare exceptions being the recent series of statements by Stiglitz) is truly amazing. The prevailing approach considers the state as replaceable and views transition basically as a substitution of states with markets. But markets cannot exist without states, and, in fact, the efficiency of markets is determined by the efficiency of the states. While the opposite is also true, on balance, as I see it, markets, though essential for economic welfare, are subsidiary to the state. Consequently, post-communist changes should be viewed as a process where both states and markets are reformed at the same time, with different states — less intrusive and more indirect — emerging at the end, as well as with different — more articulated and formalized — markets. And, when reforming of the state fails, the whole systemic process fails as well, for only deformed markets can be produced this way, and with so imperfect markets only lucklustre economic performance is possible.

## Guests

# Visiting Fellows

**Jack Burgers** (July - December)

Associate Professor of Sociology at Erasmus University Rotterdam, is working at IWM in the framework of the "Joint Research Fellowships for Scholars from the Netherlands and East Central Europe". His area of specialization is urban studies and he is currently finishing a book on illegal migration in the Netherlands.

Recent publications include: "Dutch Comfort. Post-industrieller Übergang und soziale Ausgrenzung in Spangenberg, Rotterdam" (together with Robert Kloosterman), in O. Backes, R. Dollase, W. Heitmeyer (eds.), *Die Krise der Städte*, Frankfurt/ M. 1998; and "Formal Conditions for Informal Arrangements: Housing and Undocumented Immigrants in Rotterdam," in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 24/No. 2.



*Paul Gillespie*

**Paul Gillespie** (October - December)

Foreign Editor, *Irish Times*, Dublin, and Milena Jesenska Fellow, specializes in European Integration, Northern Ireland and the British-Irish relations. During his stay at IWM he is working on a project on "Multiple Identities".

His publications include: Political Union (together with

Rodney Rice), Dublin 1991; *Maastricht: Crisis of Confidence*, Dublin 1993; *Britain's European Question: The Issues for Ireland* (ed.), Dublin 1996.

**Elzbieta Kaczynska** (July - December)

Professor of Sociology, Department of Applied Social Sciences, University of Warsaw. Her stay at IWM is under the auspices of the "Joint Research Fellowships for Scholars from the Netherlands and East Central Europe". She works in the field of social and economic history of the 19th and 20th centuries, looking at Poland in a European comparative perspective. During her stay she is working on the history of the middle class and the history of childhood between 1780 and 1850.

**Don Kalb** (January - December)

Associate Professor in General Social Sciences, Utrecht University, also part of the "Joint Research Fellowship for Scholars from the Netherlands and East Central Europe," specializes in anthropology and history as well as in historical sociology. He is continuing research on the problem of globalization and new inequalities, and, in connection with this, the post-communist restructuring "from below."

**Vera Koubova** (July - December)

Translator and Interpreter, Prague (Translation Program), is translating Nietzsche's *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (*On the Genealogy of Morals*) into Czech.

In September the bilingual edition (German and Czech) of Friedrich Nietzsche, *Dionysos-Dithyramben und andere Gedichte* appeared (Prague 1998); and in October her translation of Franz Kafka, *Tagebücher 1913-1923* (Prague 1998).

**Kazimierz Poznanski** (July - December)

Professor of International Studies, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle, specializes on institutional economics, economics of transformation, Austrian political economy and the economics of technological change. In his research project he links the economic crisis in Eastern Europe to the damage to the state agency caused by the radical marketization and/or inadequate political reforms. (Please see also his working report on p. 10)

**Pavel Pseja** (October - December)

Political Scientist and Translator, Faculty of Human Sciences, Masaryk University, Brno (Translation Program) is translating Eric Hobsbawm's *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality* into Czech.

His translations include John Carroll, *Humanism*, Brno 1995; Peter L. Berger, *A Far Glory. The Quest for Faith in an Age of Credulity*, Brno, 1996; and Paul Johnson, *A History of Christianity*, Brno 1998.

## Junior Visiting Fellows

July - December 1998

**Franco Cirulli**

Doctoral candidate in Philosophy, Boston University, works in the area of German Idealism focusing on Hegel's notion of a category. In his project he attempts to relate Hegel's answer to ancient logic.

**Maria Gomez**

Doctoral candidate in Political Science, New School for Social Research, New York, works in the field of political theory and gender studies. Her research project explores the tension between political and psychological recognition, proposing the social construction and the legal treatment of the women's body as a third term in this tension.

**Piotr Graczyk**

Doctoral candidate in Philosophy, School for Social Research, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw (Jan Patocka Junior Visiting Fellow), continued working on his dissertation entitled "Christianity, Nietzscheanism, and Scepticism" referring to the anti-philosophical currents in modern philosophy and their relation to Christianity.

### Ann Christine Guthmiller

M.A. candidate in Political Theory, New School for Social



*Franco Cirulli and Ann Guthmiller*

Research, New York, works in the field of political philosophy and aesthetics. Her current project is an inquiry into existential suffering and possible methods of transforming its meaning.

### Michal Ivantysyn

Doctoral candidate in Political Science, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava (Volkswagen Junior Visiting Fellow), specializes in political sociology. His research project is an analysis of the main features, conditions and trends of policy-making in Slovakia.

Forthcoming is his book *The Young Voters*, ed. together with Zora Butora, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava 1998.

### Stefan Kalt

Doctoral candidate in Philosophy, Boston University, is studying David Hume's moral psychology as well as topics in Hegel's Science of Logic.

### Ulrike Krampfl

Doctoral candidate in History, Vienna University / Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris (Stipendiary in the framework of the doctoral program of the Austrian Academy of Sciences), works in the field of social and gender history focusing on 18th century France. She continued working on her dissertation entitled "Belief and Gullibility in 18th century Paris: Magic, False Witchcraft, Deception".

### Jarmila Maresova

Research Associate, is working at IWM in the framework of the "Joint Research Fellowships for Scholars from the Netherlands and East Central Europe." She specializes in demographics and international migration. The main objective of her project is to provide information about labour migration of Czech and Slovak nationals to Austria.

Most recently her chapter on the Czech republic appeared in *Trends in International Migration: Annual Report of the OECD*, Paris 1998.

### Philipp Steger

Doctoral candidate in Law, University of Innsbruck / Jagellonian University Cracow (Stipendiary in the framework of the doctoral program of the Austrian Academy of Sciences) continued working on his doctoral thesis analyzing the political style of the Roman-Catholic Church in a pluralistic and democratic society.

### Violetta Zentai

Associate Professor at Janus Pannonius University, Pecs, and doctoral candidate at Rutgers University (Volkswagen Junior Visiting Fellow), works in the field of cultural anthropology. Her dissertation investigates current social discourses on wealth and forms of money in the Hungarian transition. The inquiry covers how discourses suggest and legitimate moral subjectivity in different social situations and serve to endorse or challenge political ideologies.

## Guests

One month research stays

### Heide Schlüpmann (August)

Professor at the Institute for Theatre-, Film- and Media Studies, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt, works in the area of film history, theory and critique. During her stay she undertook preparatory work for a project entitled "Cinematographic Works in Science".

Recent publications include: *Abendröthe der Subjektphilosophie - Eine Ästhetik des Kinos*, Frankfurt/M. 1998; *Ein Detektiv des Kinos. Studien zu Siegfried Kracauers Filmtheorie*, Frankfurt/M. 1998; *Unheimlichkeit des Blicks. Das Drama des frühen deutschen Kinos*, Frankfurt/M. 1990.

### Amy Colin (September)

Professor of German Languages and Literature, University of Pittsburgh, specializes in German-Jewish literature in the Bukowina. During her stay she worked on two books: *Im Gegenlicht des Todes. Poetik der jüdischen Identität in der Bukowina*, and *A Double Bind: German-Jewish Women Authors in the Modernity*.

Publications include: *Bridging the Abyss: Reflections on Jewish Suffering, Anti-Semitism, and Exile*, co-editor and contributing author, Munich 1994; *Versunkene Dichtung der Bukowina: Anthologie deutschsprachiger Lyrik*, co-edited with Alfred Kittner, Munich 1994.

### Beate Rössler (October)

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Amsterdam University, works in the field of social and political philosophy and feminist theory. In her current research she investigates conditions of "privacy" in liberal democracies, specifically the normative relation between freedom, autonomy and privacy.

Recent publications include: "Feministische Theorien der Politik," in K. von Beyme / C. Offe (eds.), *Politische Theorien in der Ära der Transformation*, Opladen 1996; "Unglück und Unrecht. Grenzen von Gerechtigkeit im liberaldemokratischen Rechtsstaat," in H. Münkler (ed.), *Konzeptionen der Gerechtigkeit*, Berlin 1998; "The ache beneath the smile. Literarische Texte und philosophische Imagination," in E. Angehrn (ed.), *Interpretation und Wahrheit*, Bern 1998.

## IWM JUNIOR VISITING FELLOWSHIPS

JULY - DECEMBER 1999 / JANUARY - JUNE 2000

The Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) is accepting applications from doctoral and post-doctoral candidates from Central, Eastern and Western Europe and the United States for its Junior Visiting Fellowship Program. IWM is an intellectually and politically independent institute for advanced study supported by a community of scholars consisting of Permanent Fellows, Visiting Fellows and Junior Visiting Fellows.

The Institute's mission is to offer a place for research and discussion that crosses borders and disciplines. Since its founding in 1982, the Institute has laid a particular emphasis on the resurrection of an open exchange of ideas with academics, intellectuals and politicians from Central and Eastern Europe, an exchange that has increasingly included researchers from North America.

### THE JUNIOR VISITING FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

The program gives promising young scholars in the humanities and social sciences an opportunity to pursue their research in Vienna under the guidance of IWM's Permanent and Visiting Fellows. It is expected that the Junior Fellows will re-invest their newly acquired knowledge in their home institutions in order to further intellectual and educational activities there.

Permanent Fellows are:

Cornelia Klinger, Gender Studies, Philosophy  
Janos Matyas Kovacs, Economics, Political Science  
Krzysztof Michalski, Director of IWM, Philosophy  
Klaus Nellen, History of Ideas, Patocka Archive

### DOCTORAL AND POST-DOCTORAL CANDIDATES

Applications are especially encouraged from doctoral candidates who are in the concluding stages of their dissertations or have recently received their doctorates in Philosophy, Political Science, Modern History, Sociology, Economics, or International Relations. Preference will be given to research projects that are thematically related to IWM's fields of research or policy-oriented projects, in particular:

- Political Philosophy of the 19th and 20th Centuries
- Gender Studies
- Political and Social Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe
- Social Costs of Economic Transformation in Central Europe
- Transformation of National Higher Education and Research Systems of Central Europe

### JAN PATOCKA JUNIOR VISITING FELLOWSHIPS

Each term one fellowship is awarded in honor of the Czech philosopher Jan Patocka (1907-1977) to a young scholar working on the philosophy of Jan Patocka or in fields related to his work, especially Phenomenology, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of History, and Czech History and Culture. Fellows have access to IWM's Patocka Archive, which was founded in 1984.

### ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

In order to qualify candidates should:

- be either in the concluding stages of their dissertation or have recently received a doctorate;
- work on a research project that corresponds to IWM's fields of research or policy-oriented projects (see above);
- have a good working knowledge of German and/or English;
- not be older than 35 years of age at the commencement of the research term.

### APPLICATION PROCEDURE

There is no application form; the following materials are required to be submitted together by mail:

- a cover letter describing the reasons for applying for an IWM fellowship, and stating the preferred research term (this preference will be accommodated, if possible);
- a concise research proposal, in German or English, consisting of three to four double spaced pages;
- a curriculum vitae (including date of birth and citizenship);
- two letters of recommendation from established scholars in the candidate's field of study.

### STIPEND

For their six-month research stay at IWM, Junior Visiting Fellows receive a stipend of US\$9,000 to cover transportation, rent and living expenses. Recipients of the fellowships are provided office space and access to in-house and Viennese research facilities.

### DEADLINE

Applications should be sent before the closing date of February 20, 1999. Applicants are notified of the competition results roughly six weeks after the closing date; the reviewing committee is not required to justify its decisions.

Please address applications to:

Ms. Traude Kastner  
Junior Visiting Fellows Program  
Institut fuer die Wissenschaften vom Menschen  
Spittelauer Laende 3  
A-1090 Vienna

## Visiting Fellows 1999

IWM will host amongst others the following Visiting Fellows from January to June 1999:

### Csaba Bathori

Essayist and Translator, Budapest (Translation Program) will translate Jacob Burckhardt: *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen* from German into Hungarian.

### Tannelie Blom

University of Maastricht, Institute for Cultural Sciences (Joint Research Fellowship for Scholars from the Netherlands and East Central Europe).

Research project: The historical and systematic reconstruction of the idea of "civil society" in East and Central European countries.

### Adrian-Paul Iliescu

Professor of Philosophy, Bucharest University (Robert Bosch Visiting Fellow)

Research project: Liberalism and the "Encapsulation Supposition."

### Gabriella Ilonszki (January to March 1999)

Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Budapest University of Economic Sciences (Andrew W. Mellon East-Central European Research Visiting Fellow)

Research project: The Prospects of European Integration: A Parliamentary Perspective in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.

### Martin Kanovsky

Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Comenius University, Bratislava (Translation Program), will translate Claude Lévi-Strauss: *Anthropologie Structurale I et II* from French to Slovak.

### Lud'a Klusakova (April to June 1999)

Associate Professor of Modern European History, Charles University Prague (Andrew W. Mellon East-Central European Research Visiting Fellow)

Research project: Western/northern perspective of towns of south eastern europe in early modern and modern period.

### Jacek Kurczewski

Professor and Chair of Sociology of Custom and Law, Institute of Applied Social Sciences, University of Warsaw (Joint Research Fellowship for Scholars from the Netherlands and East Central Europe)

Research project: Political institutions of new democracies.

### Janusz Marganski

Translator and Editor, Publishing House "Studio Φ", Bydgoszcz, Poland (Translation Program)

Translation of Emmanuel Lévinas: *De l'existence à l'existant; Le temps et l'autre; Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* from French to Polish.

### Dobrinka Paroucheva (January to March 1999)

Researcher at the Institute for Balkan Studies, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia (Andrew W. Mellon East-Central European Research Visiting Fellow)

Research project: War and Peace on the Balkans. The Women's Perspective.

### Krystyna Romaniszyn (April to June 1999)

Associate Professor at the Department of Social Anthropology, Institute of Sociology, Jagiellonian University Cracow (Andrew W. Mellon East-Central European Research Visiting Fellow)

Research project: Gender and Migration

### Junior Visiting Fellows from January to June 1999

#### Paulina Bren

Modern History, New York University

#### Dan Gheorghe Dungaciu

Philosophy, University of Bucharest (Volkswagen Junior Visiting Fellow)

#### Aneta Gawkowska

Philosophy, School for Social Research, Warsaw

#### Roseanne Gerin

Business and Economics Journalism, Boston University

#### Petra Jedlickova

National Training Fund, Prague (Volkswagen Junior Visiting Fellow)

#### Piotr Korys

Economic History, University of Warsaw (R. Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow)

#### Iulia Motoc

Political Sciences, University of Bucharest (R. Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow)

#### Matthew Simpson

Philosophy, Boston University

#### Ana L. Stoicea

Political Sciences, University of Bucharest (R. Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow)

#### Daniel Vojtech

Czech and Slovak Literature, Charles University Prague (Jan Patocka Junior Visiting Fellow; R. Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow)

#### Piotr Wrobel

Psychology/Philosophy, Pedagogical-Artistic Institute, Warsaw

#### Karin Wetschanow

Feminist Linguistics, University of Vienna

# Publications

## Bernard Williams

Der Wert der Wahrheit  
IWM-Lectures in Modern Philosophy 1996  
Passagen Verlag, Vienna 1998  
104 pp., DM 24,80 / öS 178,-  
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Translated into German by Joachim Schulte

Truthfulness as an ideal shows itself in the passionate desire to lift the veil and to take to court false consciousness and mystifications. But how does this central issue of modernity apply to the concept of truth? And what political implications might follow? Only with confidence in the sincerity and accuracy of those on whom we depend for information about the world can we overcome the outer and inner resistance to the discovery of truth.

Closely connected to this is the notion of freedom. Does freedom of speech imply the freedom to say anything, true or false? Or is it committed to the ideal of truthfulness?

Is the tradition of truthfulness as critique, which is closely connected to Enlightenment, still powerful today or has the ground finally been pulled from beneath its feet?

Bernard Williams is one of the leading philosophers in the world today. He taught at the Universities of London and Cambridge, Oxford and Berkeley. His works in the field of ethics, political philosophy and the history of philosophy from the ancient Greek to modern times show how vital the classical questions remain today.

## Transit 15

Vom Neuschreiben der Geschichte  
Erinnerungspolitik nach 1945 und 1989

It used to be easy to write contemporary European history. In the conventional story as thus told, everything changed after 1945. European history, in short, had come to an end and this was all to the good. In order for history to resolve itself in this convenient way, it was necessary for memory to conform. From 1945 through the mid-1960's at least, the experience of the first half of the European 20th century in general and the war years in particular was blurred: it suited almost everyone to forget.

In the course of the last decade all of this has changed, in ways which now make the post-war historiography of Europe curiously out-dated almost before the ink has dried. In the first place, and obviously of greatest importance, the collapse of the Soviet Empire in Europe has meant that one crucial pillar of the old story — the permanence of the post war divisions — has crumbled. Secondly, and intimately related to the events of 1989 and afterwards, there has been the now widely debated 'revival of memory'. If the division of Europe into East and

West on military, economic and ideological lines was but a temporary (albeit forty year long) hiatus in a longer European story, then the history of the post-war era has to be rethought.

## Contents:

Tony Judt

Europas Nachkriegsgeschichte neu denken

Pieter Lagrou

Die Wiedererfindung der Nation im befreiten Westeuropa

Claudio Pavone

Der verdrängte Bürgerkrieg. Die Erinnerung an Faschismus und Widerstand in Italien

Norman Naimark

Der Nationalismus und die osteuropäische Revolution 1944-1947

Istvan Deak

Revolutionäre oder Verräter? Politische Prozesse in Ungarn zwischen 1919 und 1958

Petr Pithart

Der Doppelcharakter des Prager Frühlings. Bürgergesellschaft und Reformkommunismus

Wolfgang Höpken

Kriegerinnerung und nationale Identität(en). Vergangenheitspolitik in Jugoslawien und in den Nachfolgestaaten

Ernst Hanisch

Wien: Heldenplatz

Heldenplatz, im Burgtor. Photographien von Leo Kandl

Heidemarie Uhl

Transformationen des österreichischen Gedächtnisses. Erinnerungspolitik und Denkmalkultur in der Zweiten Republik

Erinnerungsorte. Photographien von Susanne Gamauf

Rainer Münz und Rainer Ohliger

Vergessene Deutsche - erinnerte Deutsche. Flüchtlinge, Vertriebene, Aussiedler

Mark Mazower

Europa, dunkler Kontinent

Robert Menasse

Die Geschichte ist kurz und ewig

\*

Adalbert Evers

Soziales Engagement.

Zwischen Selbstverwirklichung und Bürgerpflicht

## Essays

Cornelia Klinger

"Essentialism, Universalism, and Feminist Politics", in Constellations. An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory, New York, September 1998.

"Feministische Philosophie," in Handbuch der philosophischen Disziplinen, ed. Annemarie Pieper, Leipzig 1998.

Articles: "Novalis," "Friedrich Schlegel," "K.W.F. Solger," "J.G. Sulzer," in Ästhetik und Kunstphilosophie in Einzeldarstellungen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, eds. Julian Nida-Rümelin/ Monika Betzler, Stuttgart 1998.

Krzysztof Michalski  
 "Rok 2000" (The Year 2000) in *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 16 August.

"A Short History of the Apocalypse and its Secularization," in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 8/9 August (in Polish); and in *Rechtshistorisches Journal* 17/1998 (in German).

## Tuesday Lectures

8 September  
[Amy Colin](#)  
 Professor of German Languages and Literature, University of Pittsburgh  
 Writing from the Margins / Writing at the Margins: German-Jewish Women from the Bukovina (1900-1980)

15 September  
 Political Discussion  
[Irving Kristol](#)  
 Co-Editor of *The Public Interest* and publisher of *The National Interest*, Washington, D.C.  
 The Future of American Politics  
 In cooperation with the Julius Raab Stiftung

22 September  
[Kazimierz Poznanski](#)  
 Professor of International Studies, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle  
 Explaining Post-Communist Recessions: Competing Explanations

29 September  
[Klaus von Beyme](#)  
 Professor of Political Science, Ruprecht-Karls University, Heidelberg  
 Politische Monumentalarchitektur und kollektives Gedächtnis

6 October  
[Jean-Claude Casanova](#)  
 Professor, Institut d'études politiques, Paris; Chief Editor, *Commentaire*  
 Quelles sont les frontières de l'Europe?

13 October  
[Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde](#)  
 Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Freiburg; former Judge of the Federal Constitutional Court, Karlsruhe; Chairman of the IWM Academic Advisory Board  
 Recht als Bedingung der Freiheit. Grenzen im Prozeß der Globalisierung

20 October  
[Beate Rössler](#)  
 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Amsterdam University  
 Freiheit und Privatheit

27 October  
 Political Ecology II  
[Gerburg Treusch-Dieter](#)  
 Professor of Cultural Sociology, Free University of Berlin  
 Andere Räume, andere Körper?  
 In cooperation with the Political Academy of the Austrian Green Party and with ProMedia Publishers

## Travels and Talks

of IWM Fellows, Guests and Staff

[Michaela Adelberger](#)  
 Panel discussion participant: "Die Macht der Meinungsmacher" at the 2nd Salzauer Literatur Symposium organized by the Cultural Ministry of Schleswig-Holstein, the Slavic Seminar of Kiel University and the Literaturhaus Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel, 8-10 Mai.  
 Transit stand at the 50th Frankfurt Bookfair, 7-10 October.

[Charles Bonner](#)  
 Participant at the World Philosophy Congress in Boston, 10-15 August.

[Jack Burgers](#)  
 Participant at the conference "The Middle Class and East-European Transformations, 19th - 20th Centuries", organized by the Institute of Applied Social Sciences, Warsaw University, in Madralin, near Warsaw, 1-3 October.

[Paul Gillespie](#)  
 Keynote lecture: "Multiple Identities in Europe and Ireland" at the conference "The Expanding Nation: Towards a Multi-Ethnic Ireland," Trinity College, Dublin, 23 September.  
 Lecture: "Turkey's Relations with the EU and multiple political identities in Europe" at the conference "Ataturk and Modern Turkey", Ankara 19-25 October.

[Maria Gomez](#)  
 Participated at the Symposium "Origin and Politics" organized by the Frauenhetz, Vienna, 16-17 October.

[Michal Ivantysyn](#)  
 Participant at the conference "The Middle Class and East-European Transformations, 19th - 20th Centuries", organized by the Institute of Applied Social Sciences, Warsaw University, Madralin, 1-3 October.

[Elzbieta Kaczynska](#)  
 Organized the conference "The Middle Class and East-European Transformations, 19th - 20th Centuries", Institute of Applied Social Sciences, Warsaw University, in Madralin, near Warsaw, 1-3 October.

[Don Kalb](#)  
 Participant at the conference "The Middle Class and East-European Transformations, 19th - 20th Centuries" organized by the Institute of Applied Social Sciences, Warsaw University, Madralin 1-3 October.  
 Lecture: "Globalization and the National State" at the Milan Simecka Foundation, Bratislava, 27 October.

### Cornelia Klinger

Lecture: "Zwischen sinnlichem Symbol und reiner Materie. Das Kunstwerk in einer nachmetaphysischen Welt" at the 2. Philosophicum Lech "Im Rausch der Sinne," 19 September.

### Klaus Nellen

Participant at the Literature Meeting in the framework of the series "Vienna – Moscow – Vienna" jointly organized by the journals Transit – Europäische Revue and Wespennest (please cf. the report in the last Newsletter), Moscow, 10-14 September.  
Transit stand at the 50th Frankfurt Book Fair, 7-10 October.

### Philipp Steger

Lecture: "Die Rolle der Kirche in der polnischen Gesellschaft" and panel discussion with Zbigniew Stawrowski on the same topic, Österreich Institut in Cracow, 24 September.  
Lecture: "Polen und die EU-Osterweiterung – Hoffnungen und Ängste," Österreich Institut, Cracow, 25 September.

### Violetta Zentai

Lecture: "Teaching Gender in Anthropology" at the conference "Gender Studies in the Transition Countries" organized by the Belgrade Women's Studies Center, Belgrade, 9-12 September.

## Varia

### Krzysztof Michalski

Director of IWM, was awarded a European Cultural Prize in Cracow on October 10. The prizes are jointly awarded by the Kultur-Fördergemeinschaft der Europäischen Wirtschaft, Fondation des Prix Européens de la Culture and the Europejskie Forum Kultury. Among the other prize recipients were, Bronislaw Geremek, Poland's Foreign Minister and one of IWM's Patrons; the Polish composer Krzysztof Penderecki; and Frank Wössner, former Chair of the Bertelsmann Buch AG.

In September Michalski took up his teaching at Boston University as in every winter semester. He is giving a course on Nietzsche and one on the History of Modern Philosophy.

## Guest Contribution

# Zbigniew Brzezinski: Some Reflections on the Global Dilemmas of Triumphant Democracy

Zbigniew Brzezinski is Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Professor of American Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC. The following text is an excerpt from his contribution to the recent Castelgandolfo Colloquium.

We are meeting 150 years after "the Spring of Nations" — the ecstatic effervescence of freedom that set in motion the democratic contagion. Today, many of the ideas associated with that eruption — and with the earlier but geographically remote American revolution — have gained global acceptance. With the defeat in the course of this century both of Nazism and of Communism, democracy appears to be triumphant doctrinally and on the march politically.

As a result, we have today a remarkable degree of global consensus regarding the norms that should govern global affairs. In contrast to a world cleft by doctrinal conflicts, as was the case during much of the twentieth century, there is at least a prevailing worldwide rhetorical agreement (with some exceptions) that the following four very general norms are binding:

- that peoples should live in self-governing societies based on the rule of law;
- that world peace must be based on respect for national sovereignty and not hegemony;
- that the free-market economic system is most productive;
- that the benefits of science must be accessible to all of humanity.

These are admittedly very vague notions, susceptible to different interpretations and applications. Nonetheless, they define a widespread doctrinal consensus derived from the basic notions of democracy. But one must immediately pause here and ask whether these norms are in fact an accurate description of our current reality. It is true that the majority of states are electoral democracies (117 out of 191), and that 1.3 billion people (or 22%) live in free societies, and another 2.3 billion (or 39%) live in partially free societies; but another 2.3 billion (or also 39%) are still ruled by blatantly anti-democratic systems. The global hierarchy of power is also quite vertical, with the USA visibly perched on top, followed by half a dozen or so powers that happen to be possessors of nuclear weapons. The East Asian financial crisis and continuing poverty justify serious concern, while global demographics underline the persistence of grave inequalities in longevity and health.

Nonetheless, the fact of the consensus cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. It may be anticipating our future. It may also be setting the normative standard for humanity's political conduct — and thereby exercise a guiding influence. Moreover, that consensus is very much related

to the unprecedented role of America in the post-cold war world. America is, indeed, a self-governing society based on the rule of law; it has a free-market economy; it pioneers in the dissemination of science (ranging from medicine to agriculture to space), and it is the only global super-power. As a result, international affairs are today dominated by three central realities: the primacy of



American power, the global attraction of the idea of democracy, and the success of the free-market economic system over the statist conception of centralized control. These realities are both interactive and interdependent.

They also represent a dramatic contrast with the principal political manifestations of the twentieth

century. That century deserves being labeled as the most criminal and lethal century in the history of humanity. It was a century dominated by utopian hubris, by fanaticism, and by ruthless dogmatism. Pseudo-rational conceptions of how to organize humanity on the totalitarian model were asserted to be universally valid. To achieve them, the self-appointed agents of history engaged in the extermination of those whom they a priori considered as socially unredeemable: in one case selected on the basis of race and in another on the basis of class.

Today, we can relish the global triumph of the idea of democracy. But how enduring and secure is this new reality? Does it usher in a new historical era or is it perhaps highly contingent and even vulnerable? That question pertains very directly to the nexus between American global stewardship and the critically important relationship between democracy and free market. It also pertains to an entirely new issue of increasing significance: the interaction between social control and the dynamically accelerating scientific momentum, particularly its growing capability to alter, improve, and perhaps even clone the human being. Posing the issue in brief: the triumph of democracy will depend on how democracy copes with the problems of political power, with the problematics of poverty — i.e. social justice — and with the ethically complex issue of how to enhance but also preserve human personality.

#### Preponderance vs. Democracy

The American role in the world is often described as involving “hegemony” and in a sense that is objectively a correct assessment of the current reality. It is true that at this stage in history American preponderance is the

central fact of international affairs. The military-political dimension of that assertion can be easily tested: is there any other state regarding which it could be said that the abrupt withdrawal of its forces from the Far East, from the Persian Gulf, and from Europe would instantly produce massively negative consequences for world peace?

America is also at the same time the locomotive of the global economy, the country providing the technological cutting edge in scientific innovation, generating a massive global cultural appeal (whether for worse or for better is a matter of taste). Again, that cannot be said about any other currently existing state.

Nonetheless, that state of affairs does not mean that America is omnipotent. The world is currently undergoing a massive political awakening, entailing the surfacing of unrealizable individual and collective aspirations. America’s ability to control this dynamic condition is limited, and it is self evident that American preponderance does not mean America’s capacity to dictate.

Moreover, the American political system itself is inimical to single-minded global dictation. It is not easy to marshal America’s resources for sustained international engagement, not to speak of public reluctance against the use of force in foreign adventures. America’s democratic system is inherently inimical to the global exercise of an imperial responsibility. Indeed, it is likely that with the passage of time domestic opposition to the exercise of American global leadership — especially to its perceived “burdens” — will mount.

There is growing evidence that increasingly Americans are becoming uneasy about and even resentful of America’s global involvement. Mass media pay growing attention to domestic affairs and so does the public. This phenomenon is related to the rise of multi-culturalism in America, which makes it increasingly difficult to define a shared sense of national interest, capable of the same degree of strategic cohesion that America enjoyed during World War II and the subsequent Cold War. Moreover, the spread of multi-culturalism is paralleled by the growing preoccupation of the American masses with what might be called “virtual reality” provided by television. Passive entertainment increasingly becomes the major absorption of American daily life. These manifestations rise to a considerable degree of uncertainty as to whether a democratic society, based on a mass culture of self-absorption, will have the capability of shouldering for a long period of time the obligations of global leadership.

#### Containing Anarchy

It should be noted, however, that in the foreseeable future — say, over the next generation or two — America is not likely to be confronted globally by any single power capable of challenging American leadership. Even a coalition of any likely powers is unlikely to have the capability of replacing American leadership with one of its own. Thus another aspect of the central reality of our time is that the only alternative to American leadership is global anarchy, a progressive fragmentation of global stability, a rise in international conflicts, with all of their negative social and political consequences. America is thus, at this stage of history, “the indispensable” global power, but its long-term stewardship may be undermined

by domestic — and largely cultural — impulses, rooted in its democratic system.

It is important, therefore to ask: can the current global preponderance of America be gradually transformed into some form of enduring international cooperation based on the realities of global power and not on idealistic formulas pertaining to an illusory world government, such as the United Nations? In some fashion, in addition to America as the only global power, other major regional powers have to be drawn into some form of structured international cooperation which can serve as the basis for stable political decision-making on a global scale. How can that arrangement emerge and be made compatible with the simultaneous, though perhaps also transitional, exercise of democratic America's global stewardship?

This is the essence in many respects of the current difficulties involving the relationship between the United States and China. China is becoming an increasingly significant regional power. Hence relations between the United States and China are going to be of increasing importance; indeed, within a generation that relationship could become the single most important bilateral relationship in the world. In that context, it is difficult to argue that the dominant consideration in shaping that relationship should be assigned to human rights and to the primacy of democracy. One might hope that over time the scope of democracy in China will expand and so will political respect for human rights. Nonetheless, the need to structure more stable international cooperation among major powers — as an alternative to either conflict or anarchy — dictates the prudent but expedient emphasis on the primacy of geopolitical stability. Yet such a compromise of principle could adversely affect the prospects for democracy by helping to legitimize stable authoritarian rule.

Global democracy is also likely to be threatened by another manifestation of international politics, namely the dispersal of power inherent in the spread of the weapons of mass destruction from major to minor political entities. Not only smaller powers, such as North Korea, are increasingly gaining access to weapons of mass destruction but it is also very probable that in the foreseeable future not only states but even fanatical political organizations may be able to gain access to such weapons.

Recent years have seen a growing concern over the rise of international terrorism. Yet the most striking aspect of such terrorism is the fact of its persisting technological obsolescence. To this day, the vast majority of terrorist acts have been pursued by means easy to obtain commercially and largely identical with the means used by anarchists one hundred and fifty years ago. Most terrorist acts still rely essentially on the revolver and the bomb. Until now, the only case of international terrorism that has involved the same degree of technological sophistication was the use of the gas sarin in the Tokyo metro. It is unlikely that such self restraint by terrorists will continue indefinitely, given the fact that the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is no longer inhibited either by technological complexity or massive costs. In brief, at some point in the future the world could be confronted by partisan or guerilla nuclear warfare.

That danger will thus require a degree of international policing and international cooperation that also may collide with the primacy of the democratic ideal. Moreo-

ver, one must acknowledge here that the American policy of opposing the proliferation of nuclear weaponry has only been superficially truly universal. In fact, U.S. policy has been selective and preferential. The United States has openly helped Great Britain to obtain a nuclear capability. There is trustworthy information to the effect that the United States has secretly helped France to pursue its nuclear arms program. The United States has obviously winked at the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel. But a selective and preferential policy of non-proliferation cannot be an effective obstacle to proliferation. This poses a dilemma which the United States itself has not been able to resolve.

A truly universal policy of non-proliferation would have to provide guarantees for those states which do not seek to obtain nuclear weapons; that they will be protected against neighbors that do obtain such nuclear weapons. Such guarantees would have to be binding. However, it is doubtful that democratic legislatures would be prepared to offer such guarantees, and it is almost certain that the U.S. Congress would not do so in advance even to otherwise compliant states. Yet without such guarantees, a global policy of non-proliferation has more in common with a political slogan than with effective policy.

The only practicable alternative in that context is some sort of a collective effort by the major nuclear powers — including authoritarian ones — designed to stabilize and limit the spread of weaponry of mass destruction. But that entails in turn a departure from the basic concept of democracy in international affairs. It will necessarily reinforce the hierarchy of power in global affairs, a hierarchy not in keeping with democratic aspirations.

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