David Jenkins


PhD Graduate, London School of Economics

Krzysztof Michalski Junior Visiting Fellow
(September 2015 – June 2016)


Justice as It Has to Be

Opposing injustice is a large and necessary part of bringing about (more) justice. By analysing the ways in which the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theorising is employed in political philosophy, I will both expose the obfuscation that results from inadequately distinguishing between these two approaches, while also describing and evaluating the various permissions and obligations that emerge when individuals act to confront injustice.


Exceptions as Possibilities

The world is an unjust place. What sustain these injustices are the norms people follow in their day to day interactions, especially – but by no means exclusively – as these relate to consumption and production. Therefore, if justice – and morality more widely – are things with more than merely aesthetic or theoretical value the exceptions to these norms, as and when they occur, are the moments by which justice/morality are to be enacted. I attempt a survey of this thought via the work of the American political scientist/activist Frances Fox Piven.
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