


# Europe's Futures

# Eutopian Communities

# What is at Stake

# Remember Marikana

# Rethinking Democracy





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Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen  
Institute for Human Sciences

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# Editorial

Die Krise der Demokratie ist längst in aller Munde. Doch was können wir dem entgegensetzen? Anlässlich des 100-jährigen Jubiläums der Gründung der Republik Österreich setzt sich die IWMpost in der 121. Ausgabe mit der Frage auseinander, wie Demokratie, Menschenrechte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Zukunft nicht nur bewahrt, sondern gestärkt werden können. Während **Anna Baar** die Antwort im Wandel des Bildungssystems hin zu einer humanistisch-moralischen Bildung jedes Individuums sieht, braucht es nach **Ivan Vejvoda** zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement und eine Stärkung demokratischer Strukturen. **Philippe Narval** ruft zur „freundlichen Revolution“ auf und präsentiert neue Formen partizipatorischer Demokratie in Europa. Die Pfade von „Eutopian Communities“ beschreitet **Indira van 't Klooster**, indem sie alternative Lebensgemeinschaften abseits des kapitalistischen Mainstreams vorstellt. **Philipp Blom** nimmt die Metapher der Flut als Ausgangspunkt um das gegenwärtige Gefühl der Unsicherheit und Ohnmacht darzustellen. **Kenichi Mishima** schreibt über die Gefahren, die von Arroganz und Vergesslichkeit in westlichen Demokratien ausgehen. **Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou** setzt sich für eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Phänomen Terrorismus im wissenschaftlichen und medialen Diskurs ein. Was *Neue Kriege* von herkömmlichen Methoden der Kriegsführung unterscheidet, ist Gegenstand von **Mary Kaldors** Forschung. Welche Rolle internationale Sanktionen bei der Eindämmung von Konflikten spielen, erläutert **Thomas Biersteker** im Interview mit **Aurel Niederberger**. Das Kolonialismus und Apartheid in Südafrika bis heute spürbar sind, zeigt **Kylie Thomas** am Beispiel des Marikana Massakers an streikenden Minenarbeitern. Um das Thema Revolution ging es sowohl bei der Präsentation ukrainischer Avantgarde-Filme und -Poster der 1920er-Jahre, kuratiert von **Konstantin Akinsha**, als auch beim Vienna Humanities Festival mit mehr als 40 Veranstaltungen im Herbst 2017. Eines der Highlights war ein Gespräch mit dem wenige Monate danach verstorbenen Historiker **Moishe Postone** über die heutige Bedeutung von Karl Marx. Während **Martin Schürz** sich mit den oft fragwürdigen Legitimationsversuchen von Reichtum beschäftigt, beleuchtet **Ling Li** die Ziele und Hintergründe der großangelegten Anti-Korruptionskampagne in China. Vor Attacken auf die Wissenschaft und den Humanismus warnte hingegen **Michael Ignatieff** in seiner Festrede anlässlich des 35-Jahr-Jubiläums des IWM, das im November 2017 feierlich in der Hofburg begangen wurde. <

The crisis of democracy has long been the subject of much discussion. But what can we do to counteract it? In conjunction with the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the Republic of Austria, the 121<sup>st</sup> issue of the IWMpost tackles the question of how democracy, human rights and the rule of law can be not just preserved, but strengthened. Where **Anna Baar** sees the answer in changing the focus of the education system to the humanistic, moral formation of each individual, according to **Ivan Vejvoda** what is needed is the engagement of civil society and stronger democratic structures. **Philippe Narval** points to a “friendly revolution” and presents new forms of participatory democracy in Europe. **Indira van 't Klooster** explores the idea of “Eutopian communities,” considering alternative living communities outside the capitalist mainstream. **Philipp Blom** uses the metaphor of a flood as a starting point to depict the contemporary sense of uncertainty. **Kenichi Mishima** writes about the dangers that stem from arrogance and inattention to the past in Western democracies. **Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou** calls for a critical debate about the phenomenon of terrorism in scholarly discourse and in the media. What differentiates *New Wars* from traditional means of waging war is the subject of **Mary Kaldor's** research. The role of international sanctions in containing conflicts is explicated by **Thomas Biersteker** in an interview with **Aurel Niederberger**. Using the example of the Marikana massacre of striking miners, **Kylie Thomas** shows that colonialism and apartheid are still palpable in South Africa today. The subject of revolution was taken up both by the presentation of Ukrainian avant-garde films and posters from the 1920s, curated by **Konstantin Akinsha**, and by the Vienna Humanities Festival, which comprised more than 40 events in Autumn 2017. One of the highlights was a conversation with the historian **Moishe Postone**, who passed away a few months later, about the contemporary significance of Karl Marx. Where **Martin Schürz** deals with the often-questionable attempts to legitimate wealth, **Ling Li** elucidates the goals and background of the large-scale anti-corruption campaign in China. **Michael Ignatieff** warned against attacks on scholarship and humanism in his speech on the occasion of the IWM's 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary, which was celebrated in November 2017 in the Hofburg. <

Anita Dick  
Marion Gollner



# Placebo oder Am Anfang war das Wort. Am Ende auch.

VON ANNA BAAR

Der Protagonist der Erzählung, an der ich seit einigen Wochen schreibe, ruft sich gleich zu Beginn der Geschichte ein seltenes Phänomen in Erinnerung: die rätselhaften Lachen an den sehr heißen Tagen, wenn die Luft über dem Asphalt der Freilandstraße schwelte, meist um Mittag und immer in scheinbar leicht zu überwindender Entfernung. War er bei der vermeintlichen Lache angekommen, war sie jäh verschwunden, oder nur in die Ferne gerückt, denn siehe da, dort...! Erst viel später hörte er das Wort *Fata Morgana*, gesagt von einem Erwachsenen, und dazu die nur gedachte Antwort – *Traumzerstörer du!* Alles setzte er daran, sein Stauen gegen die Angriffe der Besserwisser zu verteidigen, die mit einem einzigen Wort den Zauber zerstören konnten, der um das Unausgesprochene war. Keiner sollte die wunderbare Ahnung mit schaler Gewissheit durchkreuzen!

Ein bisschen geht es mir wie ihm, wenn ich gedankliche Expeditionen in die Zukunft unternehmen soll. Auch ich habe meine lieb gewonnenen Schimären, brähe lieber gar nicht auf, bliebe ruhig im Hier und Jetzt, von wo aus alles möglich scheint, aber nichts entschieden. Und was erkennen hinter der Zeit? Ich glaube nicht an Hellscherei. Und wäre es doch möglich, einen Blick ins Morgen zu werfen, ich würde mich nicht erdreisten. Warum? Weil Prophezeiungen die Eigenschaft haben, sich irgendwann selbst zu erfüllen. Die Geschichte der Medizin kennt unzählige Fälle, in denen Menschen exakt zum Ende der durch Ärzte, Scharlatane oder Zauberpriester gewissagten Frist starben – oft genug nicht infolge einer tödlichen physischen Erkrankung, sondern infolge der durch „Kenntnis“ ihres Sterbetages bedingten Gemütsdepression, die sie durch andauernde Angst und Anspannung aller Lebenskraft beraubte. Auch weltgeschichtlich ist manche Weissagung tatsächlich eingetreten, was wohl weniger auf den hellseherischen Fähigkeiten der Kündler, als auf der Macht der Suggestion beruht. Diese lenken die Macht wirkt freilich auch in gewünschte Richtung, denken wir nur an Wunderheilungen durch Zaubersprüche, wirkstofflose Pillen, Amulette, geweihtes Wasser, Wallfahrten zu heiligen Orten... Was aber, wenn wir Glauben und Ahnung verlieren – und damit Zuversicht und Sinnempfinden? Wie hoffnungsvoll in die Zukunft schauen, wenn man schon gegen die Übel der Gegenwart kein geeignetes Mittel weiß? Wie gesellschaftliche Leiden heilen, oder das Leiden an der Gesellschaft? Wohin mit dem drängenden Verdacht, dass



Photo: olegreslavtsev, arthobit (Montage) / iStock

die Wohlstandsgesellschaft gar keine ist, wo doch Gesichtern auf Straßen, Plätzen und in öffentlichen Verkehrsmitteln fortwährend Unwohlsein anzusehen ist, und auf dem Boden, den sie bereitet, Gemütskrankheiten und Süchte pandemisch gedeihen?

Wenn wir heute die Weichen für morgen stellen, gilt es, einen ganzheitlichen Wohlstandsbegriff zu finden, der die Erfüllung nicht länger in einer die wahren menschlichen Bedürfnisse missachtenden Konsumkultur sucht. Die totale Ökonomisierung sämtlicher Lebensbereiche mit ihren Auswüchsen Materialismus, Egoismus und Gier, produziert am laufenden Band Versager und Verlierer, deren Not perfiderweise nicht als gesellschaftliches Problem gewertet und als solches ausgeglichen, sondern als persönliches Versagen hingestellt wird. Bei den zu kurz gekommenen entfacht dieser Fehlschluss einen tief empfundenen Wunsch nach Veränderung, der aber aufgrund einer ebenso tief empfundenen Ohnmacht nicht in Tatkraft und zielgerichtetem Handeln mündet, sondern im Zuspruch politischer Demagogen und fragwürdiger Heilsversprecher.

Ob europäische Grundwerte wie Frieden, Freiheit, Demokratie und Achtung der Menschenrechte gewahrt werden können, hängt davon ab, ob es uns glückt, den neuen Eli-

ten der Ungebildeten, die das System der Rücksichtslosigkeit blindwütig anfeuern, einen Geist der Humanität entgegenzusetzen. Dazu braucht es einen radikalen Wandel des Bildungssystems, ausgerichtet auf die humanistisch-moralische Entwicklung des Individuums statt auf die Heranzüchtung von Fachidioten und Technokraten. An die Stelle der reinen Kompetenzvermittlung, deren eigentliches Ziel nicht der kritikfähige, mündige, idealistische und, ja!, zu Mitleid, Achtsamkeit und Barmherzigkeit fähige Mensch ist, sondern der wettbewerbsfähige Unternehmer seiner selbst, muss ein ganzheitliches Bildungsverständnis treten, das Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten nicht vorrangig dem wirtschaftlichen und arbeitsmarktpolitischen Nutzenkalkül unterwirft, sondern vor allem nach ihrer Relevanz für Einzelwesen, Umwelt und Gesellschaft fragt. Der Weg führt über soziale, geschichtliche, politische und künstlerische Bildung – und lassen Sie mich da von Berufs wegen speziell die Literatur herausstellen. Wo kommen wir denn hin ohne Geschichten und Gedichte, die uns beim Leben helfen, uns lehren, die Welt aus ungewohnten Blickwinkeln zu betrachten, Irrtümer, aber auch Auswege in andere Wirklichkeiten und Möglichkeiten aufzeigen, Phantasie befeuern, aufklären? Wo

wären wir heute ohne die großen Werke und ihre Schöpfer, wo ohne Stefan Zweig, Alfred Polgar, Arthur Schnitzler, Josef Roth und all die anderen, deren Sprachkunst und kritische Haltung für das österreichische Geistesleben gar nicht hoch genug eingeschätzt werden kann? Gilt Belesenheit nicht länger als Synonym von Bildung? Wir Schriftstellerinnen und Schriftsteller sind gefordert, für den Erhalt der literarischen Bildung einzustehen, indem wir unseren erzieherischen Auftrag ernst nehmen, anstatt uns einer Unkultur der Absatzmarktpolitik und Unterhaltungsindustrie anzubiedern. Nur wenn wir uns nicht korrumpieren lassen, wird es gelingen, die Freiheit der Kunst und ihre gesellschaftspolitische Bedeutung zu wahren, wachsam gegen eine Politik, die darauf aus ist, Unbequeme mundtot zu machen, indem sie ideelle oder materielle Unterstützung versagt, wachsam auch gegen literaturbetriebliche Marktschreier, Kampfrichter und Kritiker, die ihre Verantwortung als Schleusenwärter und Kulturvermittler verkennen, indem sie den Blick einer breiten Öffentlichkeit hauptsächlich auf gut verkäuflichen Massengeschmack lenken und dadurch den sprachlichen und inhaltlichen Tiefflug fördern.

Wie der Verlauf von Krankheiten unterliegt gesellschaftliche Ent-

wicklungen der heilenden und zerstörerischen Kraft des Worts. Wenn es uns gelingt, für das Schöne und Gute empfänglich und für das Unrecht empfindlich zu machen, wachsam gegen die medialen, politischen, religiösen und marktwirtschaftlichen Verführungen von heute, lernbereit im Rückblick auf die Irrgänge von gestern, dann, ja dann!, wird Besserung sein. <

**Anna Baar**, geb. 1973 in Zagreb (ehem. Jugoslawien). Kindheit und Jugend in Wien, Klagenfurt und auf der dalmatinischen Insel Brač. Studium der Publizistik und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit an den Universitäten Wien und Klagenfurt. Ihr Debütroman *Die Farbe des Granatapfels* (2015 im Wallstein Verlag erschienen) stand drei Monate auf Platz 1 der ORF-Bestenliste. Für die Arbeit an *Als ob sie träumend gingen* (2017 ebenfalls bei Wallstein erschienen) erhielt sie den Theodor Körner Förderpreis. Anna Baar lebt in Wien und Klagenfurt.





# Wie wird unsere Republik in 100 Jahren aussehen?

SONNTAG, 28. JANUAR 2018

Die Republik Österreich feiert 2018 ihr 100-jähriges Bestehen. Anlässlich dieses Jubiläums widmete sich die Debatte der Reihe Europa im Diskurs nicht nur der Erinnerung an die Gründung der demokratischen Republik am 12. November 1918, sondern auch anderen tiefen Zäsuren in der Geschichte des Landes. Wie ist Österreich zu dem geworden, was es heute ist? Welche Zukunftsvision lässt sich mit dem Wissen um die Erfolge, aber auch Katastrophen des vergangenen Jahrhunderts entwickeln? Welche politischen und gesellschaftlichen Entwicklungen zeichnen sich ab? Diese Fragen diskutierten auf der Bühne des ausverkauften Wiener Burgtheaters die österreichische Schriftstellerin **Anna Baar**, Altbundespräsident und Regierungsbeauftragter für das Gedenkjahr 2018 **Heinz Fischer**, der ehemalige tschechische Außenminister **Karel Schwarzenberg** sowie der Soziologe und Gründer von FUTURZWEI – Stiftung Zukunftsfähigkeit **Harald Welzer**. Die Moderation übernahm STANDARD-Innenpolitik-redakteurin **Lisa Nimmervoll**. Die Debatte in voller Länge auf [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)




*Wie wir Angriffe auf die Demokratie bekämpfen?  
Indem wir uns angegriffen fühlen und ihnen entgegentreten.*

Harald Welzer



*Auch die dramatischsten Lehren verdampfen.  
Nächste Generationen müssen womöglich wieder Lehrgeld zahlen.*

Heinz Fischer



*Wir in Europa müssen aufwachen.  
Wir fallen zurück, und wir vernachlässigen die Zukunft.*

Karel Schwarzenberg



*Ich wünsche mir einen Aufstand der Lehrer, einen Bildungsaufstand für einen humanistischen Geist.*

Anna Baar



# Europe's Futures

BY IVAN VEJVODA


*"The European Union is facing a great challenge; perhaps its greatest thus far". So wrote Krzysztof Michalski, founder of the IWM, in 2006 in the introduction to the book What Holds Europe Together? Over the next decade, the challenge became even greater, with the economic and financial crisis and the rise of nationalism and populism in Europe and the West as a whole, exemplified by the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union and the victory of Donald Trump in the US. On top of this came a rising and more powerful Asia and an assertive Russia. Prophesizing the demise of the European Union became for many a daily routine. The idea of the end of the West and the end of Europe have persisted up until the present.*

Without a doubt, there has been a worrying increase in manifestations of an "eclipse of reason" and a slide toward tribalism and identity politics, endangering the liberal democratic order based on the rule of law and basic rights. Europe has been deeply affected by these political and societal dynamics.

Economic and financial crises, together with the nefarious effects of globalization, have given rise to a world of volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity ('VUCA' in management jargon) and deeply unsettled the existing order. The refugee/migration wave of 2015 and dire demographics has been a major source of disquiet and anxiety in many countries. Individuals and societies now fear for their present and future existence. Parts of societies are abandoning common goals and looking inwards, believing that a return to full national sovereignty, to some lost golden age, to splendid isolation, will shield them from the perceived evil.

The European Union is at a crossroads. After decades of peace and prosperity, it is confronted with deep questions about its future. Old methods are insufficient for dealing with the present challenges. Beyond frequent pronouncements of a will to change ingrained habits, there is a stultifying lack of leadership. Yet, if Europe is to survive, it must address its challenges—internal and external—without pause. It must consolidate its achievements thus far. More importantly still, it must stem the dynamics responsible for the divides that could tear it apart. The citizens of Europe are angry about their predicament and fearful of the future. They do not trust elites and are allowing themselves to be seduced by the Siren song of quick and easy fixes.

The European Union arose as a political peace project to end all wars on European soil. Thanks to its leaders, who understood that it was time to change the course of history, and thanks to the United States Marshall Plan and the security umbrella that it provided during the Cold War, since 1945 Western Europe has experienced the longest period of peace and prosperity in its history. After 1989, the Central and Eastern part of the continent that at Yalta was deprived of democracy and freedom wasted no time in "returning" to Europe. This part of Europe had not enjoyed the same peace and



prosperity as the West. It had lived through totalitarianism—sometimes harder, sometimes softer—and two invasions by the Soviet Union (Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968). For post-communist Europe, joining the Euro-Atlantic community after the fall of the Berlin Wall was motivated first and foremost by a desire for open societies, basic rights, democracy and the rule of law.

Having lived for so long in peace, at least in the West, with predictability and the knowledge of prosperity, successive elected governments commanded the trust of their citizens. However, as social, political and economic conditions took a turn for the worse, there emerged a growing sense of uncertainty. Mistrust of elites, of mainstream political parties, elected officials, experts, and "Brussels"—the perceived epitome of alienated power—began to settle in.

A democratic deficit had already been identified in the European con-

struct in the late 1970s. Yet the EU and its member states remained complacent. Their incapability to strategically address the growing multiplicity of crises led to deepening divides between North and South, East and West. A wedge has now been driven between the people and their elected officials, creating wholesale mistrust in democratic institutions.

The current feelings among publics is that democracy and the democratic order are not delivering on the promise of security, protection and the creation of the conditions necessary for a decent, dignified existence. The reaction across the continent (most recently in Italy) has been to vote for rightwing and leftwing populists and, in certain states, notably Hungary and Poland, for governments that reverse democratic checks and balances. Civil societies have protested, yet the ruling parties in these two countries still receive majority support. Interestingly, public attitudes to the EU in these

countries remain overwhelmingly positive. It is clear that people also see the EU as a bulwark and potential savior, should things go further down an authoritarian path.

The EU is struggling to find a response to this encroachment upon fundamental democratic values and institutions. It is determined to preserve the bloc's integrity. Publics in almost all of the member states support the existence of the EU, all the more so since Brexit and Donald Trump. It is as though citizens have suddenly been reminded of the possibility of non-Europe, of non-EU. They have suddenly remembered the fundamental, original reason for the Union's existence and what it would mean to go back to a pre-war Europe of national enmities.

There have been dark times in European history, much darker than the ones that we are going through today. Yet the danger lurks that a return of evil—radical evil—is possible if we do not act. The unexpected,

the unwanted is only so far away, if we succumb to complacency and naively believe that the kind of evil that Europe experienced in the last century cannot return.

'Europe's Futures' is an innovative three-year project at the heart of which lies the deep-seated conviction about the need to *think, act and voice* the importance of the continuing existence of the European project and of liberal democratic values in Europe, through a process of consolidation, democratic renewal and restoration of legitimacy.

The project will bring together individuals and institutions from a variety of fields—academic research, think-tank policy work, civil society, arts and culture—who share the belief that a common Europe of shared sovereignty is the only one capable of navigating the tumultuous global challenges.

The project is also innovative in that it will be a permanent gathering of people from the East and West, listening to each other, understanding differences, but acting with a common purpose to foster a values-based approach that responds to citizens' concerns in a fast changing world.

Work will take place in groups of varying size to address a number of related questions:

- How to confront nationalist, populist rhetoric and politics that are anti-liberal, anti-European?
- How can a rational politics regain trust and how can democratic legitimacy be restored?
- If the European project is to retain its credibility, what must be done about enlargement and the possibility for other nations to join?

This endeavor is supported by the ERSTE Foundation and based at the IWM in Vienna. It is founded in the deep-seated belief that only together, and not separately, can the half-a-billion people and (at the time of writing) 28 member states of the European Union look clearly and soberly towards the new multi-polar world, so as to tackle head-on internal and external challenges through strategic and practical approaches. <

**Ivan Vojvoda**, former Senior Vice President for Programs at the German Marshall Fund (GMF) of the United States, is a Permanent Fellow at the IWM and director of the research project "Europe's Futures" which was launched as a joint initiative by IWM and ERSTE Foundation in 2017.



# Free Thought and Knowledge as Care of the Soul

BY MICHAEL IGNATIEFF

*On the invitation of Austria's Federal President **Alexander Van der Bellen**, the IWM celebrated its 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary with a festive reception in the Viennese Hofburg on November 6, 2017. The evening's lecture, delivered by CEU Rector **Michael Ignatieff**, addressed the question, "What would it mean if we defined IWM's purpose as the care of the soul?"*



We celebrate the 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary of an institution created to serve as a bridge of free thought between an East then behind the Iron Curtain and a West free but uncertain of its European destiny. 35 years later, it is more important than ever to build bridges between an East where democracy is still insecure and a West tempted to cut its losses in respect of a transition that never seems to arrive at its destination. IWM can be one of these vital bridges. It is dedicated to the proposition that there is one Europe, a Europe of the mind and heart, based in an ideal best expressed when the Czech philosopher, Jan Patočka, spoke of philosophy and knowledge being devoted to the care of the soul.

Patočka never lived to see the birth of IWM, but his students did and the preservation of the Patočka archive has been IWM's longest ongoing project. *Plato and Europe*, the lectures Patočka gave in the Czech underground on Aristotle and Plato, are among the greatest works of Eastern European thought in the time of resistance to Communist

oppression. Patočka himself died at 70 after police interrogation. On this anniversary, we owe Patočka the gratitude that takes the form of close attention.

I wanted to spend a moment arguing that the care of the soul is the ultimate *raison d'être* of institutions like IWM, of universities like mine

ask, if we defined IWM's purpose was the care of the soul? If we took these words seriously?

The soul, of course, is not the linguistic preserve of the religious. Communists used to speak of artists and intellectuals as 'engineers of human souls.' They used propaganda to refashion people in the image

place we struggle to keep whole against the pressures of our own instincts and desires and the impulses of generosity, hatred, cupidity and fear that invade us from the political world. It is the one place, where emotion and reason, thought and desire find their unity.

Those who are religious would

lives we can justify to ourselves and those dearest to us. This implies some idea of moral risk: that we could do things or be forced to endure things that would kill our soul.

When people who have been tortured tell you it kills their soul, you know what they mean even if you cannot know what it feels like. When Saint Mark asks what does it profit a man to win the world but lose his soul, we have been warned that it is possible to achieve power and wealth in ways that leave us dead inside.

Care for the soul means avoiding these dangers as best we can by understanding our deep vulnerability. There are human harms that cannot be expressed by displaying only the physical or psychological scars. A person can look whole, sound whole, continue to perform their roles and yet their souls are damaged.

Care for the soul means avoiding such terrible harms, but also seeking those experiences that refresh and renew our deepest well-springs. There are things that are good for the soul—a fantastic concert, a walk in the woods, a long exhilarating climb,

*Our emotions are being re-inscribed, re-written, re-worked and the result is a coarsening, a deadening of the emotions that lays the road clear for cruelty and even tyranny.*

Michael Ignatieff

and places of research and science around the world. Patočka's phrase lifts us up above the utilitarian justifications of knowledge and science to the role that universities and institutes like IWM can play in a world that tries to banish the word 'soul' from its vocabulary.

What would it mean, I want to

of the party. The use of soul, in this context, was fearful in its implication that such techniques could reach the deepest, most intimate sources of moral feeling and emotion within us.

So that is what the soul is: the deepest place inside us, the place where mind and body meet, where moral impulses are anchored, the

say the soul is immortal. Those who are not religious would simply say, whatever happens after we die, the soul is our moral self, the site of the struggle to be less who we actually are and more who we could be.

To care for our soul is to believe that it exists, and that we cannot be whole without some attempt to live



laughter with our loved ones—and when we call them good for the soul we mean something more than they gave us pleasure or profit. We’re trying to say they renewed and reaffirmed our inner core.

To care for is to watch over, to take responsibility for, to attend to, to sooth and to comfort. We do this willingly for our children, sick parents, our loved ones. Why not pay similar attention to our own souls? Care is not an individualistic or quietist duty, a devotion to the self to the exclusion of others. Once you care for your own soul, you tend to want to take care of others too.

Our souls need care because we are vulnerable, we can be hurt, we

care for the soul in institutions devoted to the critical and skeptical pursuit of science and knowledge?

Patočka taught difficult courses in the philosophy of Aristotle and Plato in small apartments in Prague in the late 1960’s to men and women like Václav Havel hungering for an experience that would point a way beyond the deadening, soul-destroying experience of tyranny. Care of the soul was the essence of Patočka’s teaching. It affirmed that free thought and knowledge were the very condition of a soul’s health.

In those days of Communist tyranny, the soul was truly on the line. But today? Can we still speak in these ways?

my. The challenge has gone beyond attacks on our freedom. At every point, the authority of the sciences we teach is contested, the civil discourse in which we hope to insert our arguments and facts is challenged and our innermost emotions, as teachers and students are structured by the modern engineers of human souls, the political technologists whose specialty is fake news, disinformation and the cultivation of hatred in the service of political power. Doing our jobs in this environment is difficult, for the legitimacy of our jobs and the reflective civility our jobs need are both challenged.

No free institution, like ours, should ever escape the burden and

roads of Europe, as citizens helped frightened strangers with blankets, water and sometimes a bed for the night. Then the political technologists went to work and now these emotions have been widely confiscated: to be generous to a stranger is to be a fool, compassion is naïveté, and solidarity towards refugees and migrants is disgraced as a betrayal of the nation.

We need to understand this confiscation of emotions as something more menacing than standard political partisanship. A whole new climate, a whole new political environment has been normalized. Our emotions are being re-inscribed, rewritten, re-worked and the result is a

to insist that our students graduate with the understanding that there is such a thing as knowledge, that it is hard to come by, that there are techniques by which it may be found and that once found, however discomfoting it may be, it is the only reliable guide to responsible action in this world. We need to do more: to warn our students to the danger to their soul of believing that compassion, mercy and generosity are the province of dupes and traitors, the danger to their soul of believing that science is an elite conspiracy against the sound instincts of the majority, and that a democracy needs many things, but chief among them, is a citizenry with the independence of



can lose our better natures and the surest sign of this is the belief we have no such thing anyway.

So you may be beginning to ask, what can this have to do with IWM, with universities like mine? What can it have to do with science, with knowledge, with research and teaching? Hasn’t science itself questioned

Free institutions like universities may well think we should leave the soul alone. Our job is training people in the skills they need in order to succeed at certain functions. To shape the soul is to take on a role that is not ours and may even compromise the freedom we must allow each of our faculty and students to

responsibility of justifying itself to the society at large. But what we face goes well beyond the standard questions that democracies often ask of the institutions they support.

What is new is the aggressive delegitimation of knowledge by populist partisans and the concerted cultivation of hatred towards the

*Image above: Margit Fischer, Vesna Pusić, George Soros; Image below: Knut Neumayer, Alexander Van der Bellen, Shalini Randeria, Michael Ignatieff*

coarsening, a deadening of the emotions that lays the road clear for cruelty and even tyranny.

A university cannot counter a political technology of this sort with one of its own. That would contra-

mind and the resilience of heart to care for their own souls, and the souls of those around them. If we understood the stakes in this way, we would, I think, be truly worthy of the heritage of Patočka and the

*Today’s major fault lines of political and social conflict do not run along national borders across Europe, but equally through each and every one of our societies in all regions of the world.*

Shalini Randeria

the very existence of the soul? Hasn’t medicine pared back the envelope of the skin, pored deep inside the body and failed to find it?

Isn’t Western knowledge, especially social science, a particularly deadly foe of those doctrines that believe there is such a thing as a soul?

If this is the case, how can we

find their own way. A place for critical, skeptical inquiry should put everything into question including the very idea of an inner moral core called the soul.

But let us look at the pressures on our students and faculty today. It is not enough to defend academic freedom or institutional autono-

vulnerable by the new engineers of human souls, the propaganda masters of the new social media.

Our emotions are under a continuous re-shaping by political technologies. Two years ago in September 2015, generosity, compassion and mercy were on plentiful display in the railway stations and

dict the freedom on which our enterprise is built. But we do need to recover the sense that the defense of the civil and critical pursuit of knowledge IS the care of souls. Our work, never more important than now, is not simply to defend the archipelago of knowledge from deniers of climate change and Darwin, not simply

great men and women who created this institution. <

**Michael Ignatieff** is the Rector and President of the Central European University in Budapest and a member of IWM’s Academic Advisory Board.



# The Amplitude of Uncertainty: Some Thoughts About the Coming Flood

BY PHILIPP BLOM

*During his fellowship at IWM, historian and writer Philipp Blom worked on his forthcoming book, What is at Stake, in which he examines how Western societies' self-imposed stasis in the face of climate change and digitization is unleashing dangerous energies threatening democracy, liberal ideas, and human rights.*



A few months ago I had occasion to speak to an engineer involved in the planning of Dutch flood defenses, building up dams against the rising sea levels. “It is not an easy task,” said the engineer. “Our experts agree that we have to increase the height of our coastal installations, but they are divided on whether it should be by thirty centimeters or by six meters.”

The threatening flood is a very real prospect in a country much of which already lies several meters below sea level. Nothing concentrates the mind like a metaphor becoming true, nothing mobilizes the community like a clear and present threat.

As a metaphor, the idea of a rising tide has become ubiquitous. From global migration to the crisis of democracy—an inexorable flood

appears to threaten the stability of postwar liberal societies, drawing together escalating concerns about the environment, population growth, climate change, globalization, national-

ism of new immigrants and new norms, about being flooded by immigration or liberal ideas and having to seek the safety of higher ground to escape the threatening waves already

on very different concerns and be expressed along very different lines of argument, but which always carries with it a brutal uncertainty, a monstrous possibility: what if the

*Liberal democracy is surprisingly vulnerable  
to the fluidity of the globalized present.*

ist populism—or, depending on the point of view, the “flood” of refugees.

It seems remarkable that the idea of the flood may be the only area of basic agreement in a series of increasingly polarized social and political debates. Conservatives are frequently concerned about the influx

lapping at their heels. Many liberals, meanwhile, identify their fears with environmental concerns, or with the idea that corporate money and influence have begun to undermine the democratic system.

A shared, underlying fear unites both sides, a fear which may center

change is catastrophic and sudden, not slow and limited? Will the flood walls have to be increased by thirty centimeters or by six meters?

The amplitude of this uncertainty is vast, and it illustrates why not only the voters of new populist movements cast their votes against

change. Many if not most voters in Western societies would prefer a never-ending present to a future that may bring uncontrollable change. It is also true, however, that the vectors of change most powerfully working on these societies—global warming, digitization, liquid modernity—are already changing the face and the fabric of these societies. The reality of change cannot be voted away.

Living with a rising tide, a flood even—this metaphor is so alluring, so intuitively sensible that it masks a problem that is different in kind. Rising sea levels apart, societies in the West are experiencing not so much the flooding as the fluidity, the liquefaction of certainties and borders.

As Zygmunt Bauman suggested, a new fluidity seems to inform the

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# Up The Friendly Revolution: New Beginnings for Democracy in Europe

BY PHILIPPE NARVAL

*Our model of representative democracy, based on free and fair elections, fundamental rights and the rule of law, is under threat in Europe and contested globally. However, for every trend, there are countertrends. Still small yet growing, a friendly revolution is sprouting up across Europe. It is connecting citizenry and politicians in a new form of participatory democracy. Could these real-life experiments offer solutions and ways out of our current predicament? During my fellowship at the IWM, I decided to follow the traces of this nascent, constructive revolution—to go and find people who are trying to do things differently.*

For those seeking to improve democracy, Switzerland has often been considered a Holy Grail. So I went there to find out if the Swiss system of direct democracy, in which citizens can initiate referenda on constitutional change at the national level, as well as plebiscites in cantons and communes, could offer a perspective for a wider Europe. However, I found out that the Swiss model seems to be in crisis itself. Intended to give ordinary citizens a voice in law making, it is being abused by parties for political campaigning between national elections.

However, in Switzerland I did come across an extraordinary campaign group called *Operation Libero*. Launched by a couple of university students just four years ago to defend the rule of law and constitutional rights, the crowd-funded organisation confronts populism with an astute combination of facts, digital savviness and appealing iconography. All those who thought that people could not be mobilized for constitutional rights were proven wrong when, as a result of campaigning by *Libero*, an anti-immigrant referendum with serious repercussions for constitutional rights was voted down in February 2016, even though polls had shown the populists far ahead months before the vote.

Direct democracy must be “used” wisely. It seems to work best when it deals with people’s immediate needs and concerns. If it is abused for political propaganda, it can create more division. For Europe, this poses a substantial threat: common policies become next to impossible if continually put to vote in national referenda. As Ivan Krastev argues in *After Europe* (see IWMpost 120), the hindrance of EU policy by national referenda might even lead to the breakup of the Union.

However, new forms of participatory democracy are emerging that put consensus building at the centre and bridge the gulf between politics and citizens. This caught my interest. Rather than taking a theoretical approach, I decided follow the stories of pioneers who were bringing



Urban planning initiative “nordwärts”, Dortmund

change to their communities. The protagonists I met on my journey come from all walks of life. Among them was a civil servant from Dortmund, a former minister of digital affairs in France, and two Irish academics who had successfully lobbied their government to institute a citizens’ assembly to push forward political reform.

## Democratic Kindergartens

Rosi Lamprecht, the head-teacher at a kindergarten in Vorarlberg in

western Austria, showed me that participation and responsible citizenship can be learnt at an early age. A couple of years ago, she decided to transform her kindergarten into a democratic organization with children’s rights defined in a constitution and with the three to six year-olds deciding how to run their day. Crazy? Well, not as much as it might sound, especially when implemented by a seasoned educator. Rosi’s eighty kids meet at the morning assembly, where they discuss the day’s priorities. They vote on topics or issues

they want to cover in their curriculum, which rooms to use and when to get a snack and when not. They decide on projects they want to embark on, for example a play written and directed by the children, and become competent problem solvers when challenges arise.

Democracy and participation, Lamprecht thinks, should not be taught theoretically but practiced and experienced from an early age. For her and other change-makers, participation not only means including students or citizens in de-

cision making, but also encouraging these groups to become part of implementing solutions.

## Participatory Platforms

This was also the thinking behind *Nordwärts*, an innovative urban regeneration programme in the city of Dortmund, Germany. Deindustrialization and the decline of the coal and steel industry have affected the entire *Ruhrpot* region. So called “structural adjustments” have left industrial ruins and lasting scars to the landscape. The northern part of Dortmund is among the areas most hit by deindustrialization. In the eyes of local citizens, the area is much more disadvantaged than the south. Higher unemployment and less political engagement mark the area, which makes up 40% of the city.

Shocked by low turnout in municipal elections and the success of right, in 2015 the mayor of Dortmund decided something had to change. In Michaela Bonan, a civil servant and first ombudswoman of the city, he found somebody who could drive neighbourhood development in an unconventional fashion. Usually, cities pour money into marketing and PR to boost the reputation of an area. This time it would be different. *Nordwärts* became a participatory platform that engages citizens in the development of their own neighbourhoods. For its efforts, the platform was awarded with the prestigious European Public Sector Award (EPSA) in December 2017.

Citizens submit project ideas to *Nordwärts* after an ideation phase in local “citizen cafés”, which are then reviewed by an interdisciplinary working group made up of members of the city administration. After that, an independent advisory board comprised of “active citizens” such as church leaders and individuals from civil society and business gets to have a say in which projects are funded.

Today, *Nordwärts* has over 200 active projects, which overall it can fund with up to three million euros annually. It functions as a coach

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Some Thoughts About the Coming Flood  
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experience of life in the countries of the rich global north, a sense of identities and categories being blurred, territories being infringed, taboos transgressed, locations changed, whole populations on the move, entire economies being disrupted and cultures entering new, frequently uneasy constellations.

Rapid technological change does much to reinforce this sense of upheaval. Based on research into cultural transformation in Europe during the Little Ice Age (ca. 1570–1680), I would even argue that the evident everyday experience of climate change is contributing to the sense of ominous unfamiliarity, of an uncontrollably rising tide of unknown and unwelcome transformation.

During the Little Ice Age, an average drop in temperatures of two degrees Celsius, corresponding to a loss of three weeks of vegetation period, confronted European societies with a century-long cycle of bad harvests, famines, epidemics, social unrest, and political uncertainty. This crisis of agriculture in mainly feudal societies eventually also contributed to intensifying trading connections, strengthening markets, and incentivizing the study of the nat-

shifts towards the fear and resentment that always accompany surges of nationalist feelings, the voices of these self-anointed saviors are resonating more strongly.

Liberal democracy reveals itself to be surprisingly vulnerable to the idea of the flood, to the fluidity of the globalized present. For the first time since the Second World War it no longer seems the only option especially for younger voters within Western democracies, and alternatives are growing—from Viktor Orbán’s “illiberal democracy” in Hungary to Austria’s FPÖ in government, and to Germany’s nationalist populists, who have claimed the word “alternative” for their party’s name to suggest a new way out of the current political and economic order to which chancellor Merkel famously said there is “no alternative”.

This debate about democracy and universalism will become more polarized as global warming and its main side effect, migration, will pressure societies from without, while the immense social and political repercussions of digitization increase the stakes from within.

The rising flood of circumstance, and of fear, intensifies the long-smoldering debate about the legacy of the Enlightenment. Not only have cli-

What is the intellectual consequence of the fear of a great flood? How will the legacy of the Enlightenment hold up to the rising tide? Which social interest will assert itself and its ideals? The Enlightenment will come under pressure from the politics of fear, and the outcome of this confrontation seems entirely open. Liberal, representative democracies are already on the defensive, and their appeal may wane further. The economic and social changes made inevitable by climate change and digitization seem immense and are often greeted with hostility. The result may be a backlash against historical achievements and a retreat—temporary at best—behind borders and walls.

Connected to this political process is a more properly philosophical challenge. Can it be assumed that the experience of the transformations that are already taking place will create intellectual consequences comparable in magnitude to the debates begun by the Enlightenment? And would this process leave the Enlightenment behind as a less developed, deficient way of thinking, just as the Enlightenment itself attacked theology as antiquated?

The flood, the liquefaction of social reality, has become a master met-

New Beginnings for Democracy in Europe  
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and enabler, helping to get the right stakeholders to the table. For Michaela Bonan, participatory democracy is not a shopping list where citizens get all they ask for. Done properly, it involves all stakeholders, politicians, citizens and administration on equal footing. Tapping into the know-how of citizens who are already engaged in their neighbourhood and encouraging a culture of participation within civic administrations are among the factors that make *Nordwärts* a role-model for participatory democracy.

But can these ideas work on a larger scale up? Can citizens be trusted to advise on complex policy issues that go beyond their immediate local needs? Rarely does the chance occur to experiment with democratic decision making at a larger scale.

Citizen Assemblies

The deep political and financial crisis that Ireland experienced ten years ago offered a window of opportunity for change. Trust in political institutions and politicians was at an all-time-low when, in 2008, two political scientists, Jane Suiter and David Farrell came up with what they were convinced was way to bridge the gulf between politics and the citizenry. Inspired by an earlier exercise in deliberative democracy—a citizens’ assembly working on electoral reform in British Columbia—they proposed holding a nationwide citizen assembly in Ireland.

The proposal was simple: a number of important issues of constitutional reform would be debated by a group of randomly selected Irish citizens. They got funding to organize a prototype assembly based on the theories of American political theorist Jeremy Fishkin. After the test run had been completed, they successfully lobbied the main political parties to include citizen participation in their election manifestos.

After the 2012 election, the first national citizen assembly ever to have taken place anywhere became a reality. It was called the “Convention on the Constitution”. Between December 2012 and March 2014, 66 randomly selected citizens representative of society at large, together with 33 parliamentarians, gathered over several weekends to debate constitutional reforms. Under an independent chairman, guided by a group of facilitators and receiving impartial expert advice, all delegates put forward recommendations on issues such as electoral reform and the outdated blasphemy clause. The most contested question, however, was on the legalization of same sex marriage.

Politicians had avoided the issue in the preceding years and instead passed the buck on to the convention. The media saw it as just another deferral tactic and were sceptical. In the end, everybody was surprised by the seriousness and matter-of-factness of the debates. After intense deliberation, the participants voted in favour of same-sex marriage and recommended that the conservative government hold a referendum on the issue. Enda Kenny, then prime

minister, felt forced to act. In August 2015, Ireland became first country ever to hold a referendum on same sex marriage. The country voted in favour with a 62% majority.

Deliberative citizens’ assemblies like Ireland’s are based on the belief that citizens can reach consensus on questions where party politics is too entrenched in ideological battles or fails to recognize longer term societal needs. In 2016, Ireland’s new parliament voted in favour of a second series of citizens’ deliberations. The “Citizens’ Assembly” started work that year and is still running. It opens up a public space for fact-based debate and deliberation, helps strengthen consensus-based decision-making on “hot topics”, and increases trust in political decisions.

While citizens in Ireland were peacefully debating same-sex marriage, street protests were raging in Paris over François Hollande’s plans to liberalize the existing law. For Axelle Lemaire, then member of French Parliament, this was too much. She vowed to do things differently if she ever got the chance.

That chance came about sooner than expected when, in 2014, she was named Minister for Digital Affairs. In this function, she implemented the first participatory law-making process in France. Funded out of her own travel budget, because her government did not want to commit a budget, she launched a ground-breaking process of digital consultation on a new “digital Republic” bill, in which 8000 citizens ended up making over 20,000 contributions. Many useful suggestions not previously considered by lawmakers were included in the law.

Lemaire is one of a growing number of politicians who want to “do” democracy differently in Europe. Like the other protagonists of the friendly revolution in Europe, she is convinced that democracy can only survive when people are able to contribute beyond placing a ballot in occasional elections.

Participatory democracy offers a new public sphere for dialogue on contested issues. It encourages compromise over conflict. It thrives where citizens feel that they are being taken seriously and that their ideas are welcome. These and many other innovations show that we have moved far beyond the prototype stage. So what are we waiting for? Up the friendly revolution across Europe! <

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Resistance to rapid transformation  
leads many to question the validity the Enlightenment  
ideals of universalism and equality.

ural sciences, beginning with botany and astronomy.

These innovations were carried out by urban professionals, whose influence and power grew in the process and who eventually adopted universalism, human rights and individualism as the philosophical articulation of their social attitudes. This formed a constitutive part of the early Enlightenment. The great Western intellectual revolution of the Enlightenment was at the very least accelerated by the experience of climate change.

Here Bauman’s idea of liquid modernity is of immense utility in enabling us to understand the transformations due to climate change, digitization and economic globalization in the present. Powerful but diffuse currents of capital, data, people, news, weather systems, pollution, market intervention and terrorism can no longer be kept beyond the horizon of attention of Western societies. The consequences of far-away actions and involvements have become mobilized, liquefied. Controlling or at least adapting to their impact will be one of the great challenges of the coming decades.

The fear of being flooded has already put pressure on Western liberal democracies. Populist politicians make political capital out of staging themselves as defenders, building walls, closing migration routes, reasserting differences, very much in opposition to the liberal vision of global culture and pluralism. As the climate of opinion

mate change and digitization raised once again the power and possible horrors of instrumental reason—a pervasive sense of unease, of unwillingness to change, of resistance to rapid transformation leads many to question the validity of the Enlightenment project as a whole, and with it the validity of core ideals such as universalism and equality.

It is a historical irony that the Enlightenment found part of its historic dynamism in the social, economic and intellectual upheaval created by the Little Ice Age, and that now, during another period of social upheaval related to climate change, the legacy of this philosophical sea change is being renegotiated. But vast changes in social experience and technological possibilities (both constructive and destructive) always result in a change of philosophical perspective.

The decisive and very probably unanswerable question in the context of philosophy is to understand the structures of change underlying this revolution of thinking about being human. This is not the place to discuss the relationship between the canonical Enlightenment and its marginalized and suppressed authors, but it does seem pertinent that Enlightenment ideals only gained in intellectual currency and eventually in political power because they were associated with a social force—the rise of the educated bourgeoisie. Only this dynamism gave a set of ideas as old as human thought the power to become intellectually dominant.

aphor of social and political discussion. It remains to be seen whether the current episode of climate change will produce a philosophical transformation akin to the impact of the Enlightenment, or if the resilience of aspects of Enlightenment thought proves sufficient to weather the fear and resentment caused by the onset of systemic transformation. In view of the history of the Enlightenment, however, there is every reason to assume that the amplitude of change is inestimable, that the changes to the outlook on what it means to be human might be so significant as to be unimaginable at present. <

Philipp Blom is a historian, author, translator and journalist based in Vienna. From October 2017 to February 2018, he was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM working on the translation of his current book *Was auf dem Spiel steht* (Hanser Verlag, 2017).





# Forgetting and Arrogance in Democracies

BY KENICHI MISHIMA

*The liberal political architecture that proved to be more or less stable during the last 70 years is now being shaken to its foundations. Tectonic shifts in political discourses can no longer be ignored; neither can the resurgence of the “lunacy of nationality” (Nietzsche), whether in classic nations or misplaced ethno-nationalist passions. Japan is no exception, says Kenichi Mishima. The long-term efforts of conservative powers seem to be succeeding in making a relatively peaceful state into a nation capable of waging war.*




Photo: mediaphotos / iStock

Democracy is subjected everywhere to a great many critical discourses. The party system is criticized for being based on protectionist networks and cliques that are prone to corruption. The continuous intervention of lobbyists is criticized and thus too structural corruption, in the sense of that term which I developed. Powerful corporations are criticized for the grip they have on practical and political life. According to the Leipzig sociologist Oliver Decker, the object of identification for those of an authoritarian persuasion has meanwhile become the economic performance of the national community to which these people belong. This is not a climate that is favourable to the spread of democracy. Jürgen Habermas speaks of façade democracy, by which he means

that the decision-making process steered by financial capital undermines, hollows out and incapacitates processes of deliberative and procedural democracy.

No wonder that, according to a couple of credible empirical studies,

more likely to trust a government run by experts or possibly the military than on the basis of politically arduous, often chaotic debates and negotiations in parliament. “In the past three decades, the share of US citizens who think that it would be

whole in comparison to the United States, indicators in many countries already provide cause for concern. According to Foa and Mounk, the younger and better off the respondents are, the more intensive and extensive this attitude proves to be.

address two kinds of false self-conception. One instance of mistaken self-perception rests upon the naive assumption that there is an intrinsic nexus between democracy and prosperity. The other false self-image rests upon the repression effects (*Verdrängungseffekte*) from which discourses of the democratic public sphere in advanced industrial countries suffer. One could also speak of hypocrisy and forgetfulness.

## *The assumption of a nexus between democracy and prosperity is naive and illusory.*

potential support for military government is growing. In an article in the *Journal of Democracy*, Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk argue that a growing proportion of young people, both in the United States and in western European countries, are

a ‘good’ or ‘very good’ thing for the ‘army to rule’ has steadily risen. In 1995, just one in sixteen respondents agreed with that position; today one in six agree.” Even if Germany comes out relatively well and western Europe does better as a

At least a third of so-called millennials in the United States born in 1980 display this attitude and turn their backs on democracy. Democracy is being gnawed away at from within; it is crumbling from within.

As a social philosopher, I wish to

### Democracy and Prosperity

Ever since the founding of the United States, a myth has circulated in the West that democracy brings with it *eo ipso* prosperity. In fact, the founding fathers of US-American democracy like George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were among the richest men in the west-



ern hemisphere during their lifetimes. Meanwhile, it is a matter of basic historiographic knowledge that the wealth of American farmers would have been unthinkable without the exploitation of black people on an unimaginable scale, indeed, of a kind that in no way fits with the word democracy understood as the push for equality. The pursuit of happiness, as it is expressed in the American constitution, was not always reconcilable with the egalitarianism of democracy. The proverbial rich uncle from America was something of an illusion.

Moreover: a glance at the liberal 19<sup>th</sup> century suffices to show that capitalist growth—we can read about this in Marx—caused the gap between the captains of industry, who had become an almost feudal upper class, and the working population of the towns and cities to expand continuously. An additional consequence was poverty in rural areas. Every reader of the great authors of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, whether Charles Dickens, Emil Zola or Gerhard Hauptmann, is familiar with

growth in the political West. One can describe this policy of securing natural resources as neo-colonialism or as a new form of dependency, as Andre Gunder-Frank once remarked. Be that as it may, this was a decisive moment for prosperity in the democratic West, as political misery simultaneously reigned throughout much of the South, dependent as it was on the North.

Of course, the contribution of the democratic public sphere to the effective equalization of wealth and a politics of redistribution in the successful West cannot be ignored. Yet this alone would not have sufficed. Regardless, these diverse factors led to the permanent dilemma between the normativity that is prerequisite for and rooted in democracy on the one hand and, on the other, economic functionality. The dilemma expresses itself in a typical manner when western politicians skirt around the issues in statements about their relation to China or the human rights situation there.

However: even in the face of all evidence to the contrary, this nex-

“the shared European cultural heritage emanating from Greece and Rome through the Renaissance to the shared values, beliefs and civilisations of our own century.” Huntington simply erases the memory of the violence and terror that Europe generated. This narrative is characterized by a discursive strategy that is only enabled by a process which lies somewhere between repression and denial.

While this dominant narrative has a narcotic effect within the West, anger rages outside the West at the associated repression or denial and the use of rhetorical pleasantries to veil special interests, as well as the two-facedness and self-contradiction. Beyond western democracy, there is everywhere a preference for a strategy of exposing these things. Within the West, it was Nietzsche who sometimes used his own unmasking strategy to point tellingly to the blind spots of western discourse and thus caused the West's good conscience pain. He says in *Ecce Homo*: “At this very moment, for example, the German Kaiser calls it his ‘Christian duty’ to liberate slaves in Africa.” Here, Nietzsche's unmasking operation is directed against the strategy of justification repeatedly practised in power politics, against the outwardly universalistic discursive strategy that is in fact the veiling of the fundamentally particularistic will to power in universalistic garb, whether in terms of exporting civilization (France) or of manifest destiny (USA).

What amounts to the sarcastic self-critique of the West in Nietzsche has its counterpart outside of the West in the form of anger at the forgetfulness with which the West has elaborated its own modernization narrative, as well as indignation at the often unintended imperialistic attributes of universalism and at the West's moral superiority complex. The Indian cultural theorist and writer Pankaj Mishra drew a parallel in his book *The Age of Anger* between this external anger and the old German anger directed at Napoleon: “Napoleon was an imperialist in the modern sense, a prototype for European colonialists in Asia and Africa: he not only extracted resources from the territories he conquered; he also politicized the Enlightenment notion of universal rationality, imposing the metric system and the Code Napoléon on all subjugated peoples.” This parallel is certainly poorly chosen, for Napoleon had after all destroyed the old European internationalism of the aristocracy. Yet it does serve as an illustration of how universalism is perceived, namely as aggression wrapped in the garb of power, a garb woven out of reason. Everyone knows that exclusionary and discriminatory practices, as well as discontent, spread easily within a state structured along authoritarian lines like Japan. Not everyone is so quick to realize that the forgetfulness and lunacy of moral superiority produces exclusionary effects outside the polity that is oriented towards equality. And this lack of imagination makes democracy itself fragile and shaky; a democracy that can no longer recall what happened, and continues

to happen today, in its shadow can easily perish as a result of its own susceptibility to hysteria.

What is now required is sober analysis, a change of perspective on the part of the democratic West. The gaze has to shift from being directed toward others to being directed at oneself. This sobering change of perspective must not by any means be allowed—and this is important—to narrow the normative meaning of democratic universalism. After all, we have modernity to thank, despite

the bloody historical episodes, for the entire catalogue of normative principles. <

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## Democracy at Risk: Exit and Voice

CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 9–10, 2017



Photo: IWM

Once again, democracy is at the centre of our collective political anxieties. Unlike in the past, however, it is neither the compatibility of newly independent countries in Africa and Asia with democratic governance, nor the efficacy of democratisation in post-communist societies in Eastern Europe, that keep us occupied. What is at stake at the current moment is how well-established democracies seem to be regressing in both the global North and South. The common thread linking the contemporary transformations occurring across countries such as the US, UK, Hungary, Poland, Turkey and India seems to be a departure from previously held values of liberalism and/or the rise to power of majoritarian and nationalist forces to the detriment of pluralist constitutional checks and balances.

This has indeed summoned the spectre of ‘democracy at risk’—the theme of the 2017 IWM conference organised by and at the IWM, Vienna, in cooperation with the Graduate Institute, Geneva, and supported by the Swiss State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation (SEFRI). The conference aimed to examine this contemporary predicament from an inter-disciplinary perspective, while also drawing upon the theoretical framework offered by Albert Hirschman's treatise on ‘Exit, Voice, and Loyalty.’ Over two days a group of scholars at various stages of their academic careers and representing a wide range of disciplinary and theoretical orientations were brought together by their shared concerns

around the vicissitudes of contemporary democracy.

The keynote lecture was delivered by David Sylvan, Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. His talk explored questions of democratic accountability and foreign policy, a theme that is pursued more broadly in his ongoing research project on Lasswell's ‘garrison state’ in modern times. He demonstrated how established Western democracies since the second world war have developed a ‘democratic black hole’: vast areas of the state's functioning brought under the umbrella of ‘national security’, which escape the accountability of democratic governance and public scrutiny by the media and citizens. This ‘garrison state’, Sylvan argued, is thus colonizing ever more sites of democratic life.

The discussions of the five panels underscored the fact that democracy, especially in the wake of the current challenges thrown up in different parts of the world, is far from a foregone conclusion. It has no necessary historical teleology. Democracy requires our constant and collective attention and effort—scholarly and political—to keep its transformative potentials alive. <

For a detailed report see [www.iwm.at](http://www.iwm.at)

**Lipin Ram** is a PhD candidate in Anthropology and Sociology of Development at the Graduate Institute, Geneva. From September 2015 to January 2016 he was a SEFRI Junior Fellow at IWM 2016.

*A democracy that can no longer recall what happened, and continues to happen today, in its shadow can easily perish as a result of its own susceptibility to hysteria.*

the portrayal of unspeakable misery in urban settings and villages. Examples such as China and the period of dictatorship in South Korea show that economies at rock bottom can also generate swift growth without democracy. The assumption of a nexus between democracy and prosperity is therefore naive and illusory. Even a man like Jürgen Habermas argued more than twenty years ago that, at least with reference to developing countries, the relation between “the development of the democratic constitutional state and capitalist modernization is by no means linear.”

What further contributed to this nexus illusion was the contemporary experience in many countries of the political West after 1945 that democracy generally brought with it prosperity in accordance with the American model. It was above all the examples of the old German Federal Republic and Japan that were drawn upon to support this nexus thesis. Democracy was, as such, “successful.” In the process, it was often forgotten and repressed that prosperity had not only come about in these countries as a result of democracy. Many other factors were at play. The terrific advances made in the productivity of the rural economy, which tripled on average in comparison to pre-1945 levels, as well as of industry were just as decisive as the creation of the system of international trade and associated payments. At the same time, industrial countries secured resources in the Global South as the basis for their own economic

us narrative is whispered about, explained and propagated as the dominant narrative of western global policy. And with such stubbornness that, for example, on the eve of invading the country, the then American president George W. Bush predicted an economic upturn for Iraq, once Saddam Hussein's regime was overthrown, comparable to that experienced in Germany and Japan after 1945.

### Hypocrisy

A small dose of historical imagination suffices in order to grasp the price that first had to be paid for modernization *within* Europe. One thinks of the enormous number of victims of the religious wars as well as the suffering caused to the population during the numerous wars in modern Europe, including the First and Second World Wars. There is no region on Earth in which more blood was spilt in such a short time than Europe. The misery that accompanied industrial modernization can be read about in Friedrich Engels. Then there is the colonial devastation visited upon regions *outside* the centres of world history, triggered by these very same centres.

Nevertheless: in the dominant narrative, the discourse of glossing over one's own involvement remains widespread. For example, Samuel Huntington struck precisely the tone that continues to dominate today when citing the then English defence minister Malcom Rifkind, who said that the Atlantic community is



# Rethinking ISIS (and Terrorism)

BY MOHAMMAD-MAHMOUD OULD MOHAMEDOU

*Ritual western responses to ISIS terror attacks do not only prevent deeper examination of the political and social conditions behind the group’s rise; they contribute to the making of a neo-imperial culture, argues political historian Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou. Meanwhile, the reasons for such recurring violence are scarcely addressed.*



Photo: Adrian Hancu / iStock

In mid-June 2017, the Russian Defence Ministry released a statement in which it announced that an air strike its forces had conducted over Raqqa, Syria on May 28 might have killed Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State (IS)—the radical Islamist armed group that had been holding the city since the spring of 2014. A month later, on July 21, both the US Defence Secretary James Mattis and the director of the US National Counter-Terrorism Centre, Nicholas Rasmussen, declared that they believed al Baghdadi to be alive. A similar claim had been expressed a few days earlier by a top Kurdish counter-terrorism official who indicated that he was “99 per cent certain” that the IS leader was still alive. Combined with wall-to-wall media coverage of the long-awaited retaking of the Iraqi city of Mosul on July 10, a town also controlled by IS since June 2014, the focus on the killing or arrest of the

group’s leaders means that, revealingly, readings of what IS actually is, are limited by a short-term, uncritical and ultimately unsophisticated perspective that is no longer tenable.

on the group’s extreme violence and its alienating discourse has prevented deeper examination of the political and social conditions behind its rise. Close to two decades after the

“crisis”, “attack” or “terror”. Captive to a self-imposed normative *cul-de-sac* on the issue of radical Islamism generally and Al Qaeda and the Islamic State specifically, the social

in New York, Washington, London, Paris, Brussels, Berlin or Barcelona, a ritual of denial of the deeper political issues raised plays out in an increasingly familiar fashion. The sequence of responses is performed thus: shock gives way to fear followed by anger; security experts step up hurriedly in television studios and on social media to denounce the lack of preparation by the authorities; specialists of radical Islamism (or simply Islam) subsequently declare that IS (previously Al Qaeda) has been weakened, is on its way to being defeated and is merely lashing out with desperate attacks; Muslim communities in Western countries are called out and racist and violent attacks against them sometimes take place; there are urgent calls for tougher legislation (concerning surveillance mechanisms, detention conditions, nationality measures, immigration procedures, travel regulations, dress codes, access to pools, prayer sites,

*The social sciences have so far failed to initiate a historically contextualised, global and nuanced discussion on the phenomena of terrorism.*

Since emerging in the early 2010s, IS has so far been overwhelmingly studied using a reductionist mainstream journalistic and sensationalist approach along with policy-oriented security expertise—the same twofold perspective used previously for analysis of Al Qaeda in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. Specifically, focus

9/11 attacks conducted in New York and Washington by the transnational non-state armed group Al Qaeda and several years into the Islamic State’s own saga, the patterns of a transforming form of globalised political violence are cementing and the longer-term impact of the Al Qaeda/Islamic State story is vividly perceptible beyond the latest episodic

sciences have so far failed to initiate a historically contextualised, global (not merely Western or Westernised) and nuanced discussion on the phenomena at hand.

**Rituals of Denial**


For every time a new radical Islamism-related attack takes place




etc.); arrests are made in neighbourhoods where Muslim migrants are known to reside and bombing is redoubled in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen or Libya.

In such a context, ethos becomes pathos. Above and beyond IS itself, and its extremism and violence, this situation has deeper and more problematic roots for the social sciences to examine. In accordance with contemporary political geography, terrorism has in effect been not-so-subtly placed in the middle of a canvas painted in the vivid green and black colours of “Islam”. As a result, *the notion of terrorism is now in a state of conceptual deformation*, whereby the elasticity it has been given in recent years allows it to serve almost exclusively the purpose of identifying threats against Western states and societies that come primarily from “Islam” and “faceless Muslim attackers”. To be sure, terrorism suffered by other regions is reported regularly and portrayed in the same way, as an ill of our times to be dealt with urgently. Indeed, according to the Global Terrorism Index released annually by the Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP), the first casualties of terrorism in this period were Iraqis, Afghans and Nigerians. However, the core representation of terrorism *per se* in the well-embroidered media and policy drapery clearly concerns above all the menace it represents to the West. An illustration of this only partially coded reality is the inconsistent use of the term “terrorism” by mainstream media: it is used reflexively when attacks have “Muslims” associated with them, whereas other terminology (“attack”, “shooting”, “security incident”, “assault”, “situation”...) is used when events of a similar nature involve a different type of perpetrator. When, on June 19, 2017, Darren Osborn drove a van into a crowd near the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, re-enacting a terrorist modus operandi seen earlier in London, Berlin and Nice, the BBC and CNN refrained from using the term terrorism for several hours, initially depicting the attack as a “collision”.

Regularly replayed and patterned in such de-politicised and culturalised ways, the contemporary presentation of political violence has not evolved significantly beyond this static dimension. For the majority of commentators, the Manichean problematic has remained one of “terrorism and counter-terrorism”, “them against us”, “Middle East strife” (a region portrayed only in terms of its “unreadability”, of being an “enigma” and a “riddle”) and “the problem of Islam”. The actual political archaeology of IS has been sidelined, displaced by a Pravda-like focus on religion and rah-rah presentism that is highly reductive when it comes to the historical context. Going beyond the important domestic and regional story of the evolution of radical Islamism, the Islamic State can more importantly be seen as *the historical manifestation of the persistent dystrophies that have long been playing out politically between the West and the Middle East* (and, beyond, the Islamic world). In time, the problem



GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2016—Measuring the Impact of Terrorism by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); The five countries most affected by terrorism are Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan. These countries account for three quarters of all deaths from terrorism.



Deaths from terrorism continued to decline with total deaths decreasing by 22% from the peak in 2014.

emerged thus: to understand Western terrorists of the 1970s such as the German Red Army Faction or the Italian Red Brigades, one must examine the societal conditions of post-war Germany and Italy, the ambient malaise in these countries twenty-five years after Nazism and fascism and their relationship with their rebellious youth; to make sense of Al Qaeda or the Islamic State, one is asked to read the Qur'an.

A Non-history of Terrorism

The more this story was monotonously told, the more visible its intellectual contradictions became: historians, political scientists and sociologists were only dealing minimally and peripherally with asso-


ciated acts of political violence. In effect, media vigilantism, pronouncements by terrorism experts and condescending interrogations of Islam and its long-awaited *aggiornamento* have joined hands to produce a non-history of one of the dominant forms of contemporary non-state violence. The larger setting of this inconsistent call-and-response construct is characterised by the absence of a dispassionate, intelligent framework for understanding the question of contemporary terrorism and resulting permutations, away from a unilateral and (Western) state-centric stance. Such work also has a direct, if unspoken, relationship with the contemporary practice of power and the projection of force in long-skewed international relations. The

wider discussion that has not been tapped into and was indeed kept at bay when it comes to understanding the origins of the contemporary transnational violence of the Islamic State, and before it Al Qaeda, concerns two important ongoing phenomena of our times that have been termed respectively the “decolonisation of international relations” and the “decolonising of war”. For indeed, who’s-up-and-who’s-down score-keeping accounts of the rise of IS are not sufficient to make sense of the incubating, asynchronous and dysrhythmic transformation of terrorism taking place at the hands of IS or other new groups. The pantomime of stylised rituals and storytelling about IS partakes, more importantly, of the making of a neo-imperial

culture that ascribes irrational barbarity to extreme political violence so as to avoid addressing the reasons for that violence’s recurrence. As noted, with each new attack, the same set of arguments is restated tirelessly to establish authoritatively the apocalyptic nature of the actor. Arguing that we are missing the point if we delve too much into history, such instant narratives decouple the actors from their context to endow them with a maximal dangerousness underwritten by the unshakably evil character that these super-predators display. The result is not so much the advancement of knowledge as emotional release and ethical pronouncement.

The straight-jacketing of the terrorism discussion evidences a larger problem of the paternalism, chauvinism and Orientalism that sit atop security discussions on issues playing out in the Middle East and North Africa, the wider Muslim world and Africa more generally. One route to remedying these shortcomings is to give the presence of alternative histories their due and reintroduce a thoroughgoing political history perspective on the question of violence. More specifically in the case of IS, for instance, what is neglected is the central notion that the Islamic State inherently functions at multiple levels; the security lens can only inform on one aspect of this predicament. The pluriversal, hybrid and forward-moving radical project of the Islamic State as a twenty-first century tech-savvy producer of post-modern globalised violence cannot be accounted for by zombie explanations that proceed merely from the hermetic sheet anchors of Orientalism and securitisation. It is time to decouple the respective yet related histories of IS and of Al Qaeda from the security and securitisation narrative they have been captive to. Relocating those histories in a context beyond these tested confines is no easy task, given how entrenched that narrative has become internationally. Such an intellectually disobedient rupture can however help establish a richer genealogy of the non-state armed groups currently projecting themselves beyond states, borders and societies and re-defining the nature and meaning of contemporary violence. ◀

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# New Wars as a Social Condition

REPORT BY KATHARINA HASEWEND

*Since the publication of Mary Kaldor's influential book *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* almost two decades have passed, yet her theses stand the test of time as she proved once again in her talk at the IWM. The lecture, entitled *War as a Social Condition*, was part of an interdisciplinary workshop held in cooperation with the Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung that revolved around the question of how new wars affect today's understanding of the human condition.*

Mary Kaldor began her lecture with a dire diagnosis: "I think we are living through a period where we have a very deep sense of foreboding. We are feeling something terrible is going to happen. But I actually think that something terrible is *already* happening". Worrying developments in the conduct of war that we can observe at the moment include the deliberate bombings of hospitals, schools, and markets, famines and starvation caused by sieges, the proliferation of hideous weaponry, and the reintroduction of sexual slavery, among others. Today, she argued, we are faced with a 'global new war' that consists of 'new wars' as she defined them in 1999, combined with the 21<sup>st</sup> century war on terror. They constitute social conditions that are, at heart, an attack on civility. The crucial question that needs to be asked under these circumstances is whether there is a way to restore norms and taboos which we thought were well established.

The term 'new wars', as Kaldor coined it in her book *New and Old Wars*, stressed the fact that the logic of warfare had fundamentally changed in all respects—in its actors, goals, methods, as well as forms of finance. Her analysis was based on armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the South Caucasus, and Sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly influenced by her extensive fieldwork in Bosnia. In her talk at IWM, she contrasted new wars not with wars of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century, as she had done back in 1999, but with the civil wars of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s to illustrate the shifts that have occurred since the middle of the last century. While the latter were political contests fueled by ideological aims and usually directed against authoritarian or colonial regimes, she argued that the 'new' wars, by contrast, are about access to the state for political or economic gain. They are post-Clausewitzian in the sense that they can no longer be understood as contests of wills. Instead of being centered on winning or losing, they have become mutual enterprises of armed forces which benefit from the existence of war both economically and politically. A new form of political economy has evolved that is to a large extent based on mechanisms of predation: looting, pillage, extortion at checkpoints, smuggling, and taxation of humanitarian aid have become major sources of income. More importantly, violence is now a key part of identity politics as identities are constructed through war and violence. Likewise, in these



Photo: TABBystreetarts



Photo: IWM

'new' wars control over the population is established through fear and hatred, not by trying to win hearts and minds as the anti-colonial revolutionaries of the civil wars of the 1950s–1970s sought to do.

Since 9/11, according to Kaldor, the situation has worsened as these new wars are now further exacerbated by the war on terror, together constituting a 'global new war'. Under General McChrystal's command, US counter-terrorist efforts focused on campaigns against presumed terrorists and those deemed the 'irreconcilables', a term General Petraeus had previously introduced. At the root of these developments lay Obama's eagerness to take American

troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq, which resulted in the creation of 'a monster' of a new military-industrial infrastructure, as Kaldor phrased it. This involved thousands of private security contractors, and in the US led to a proliferation of intelligence agencies, the enormous growth of Special Forces for *kill or capture-operations*, and a plethora of defense industries. Taken together, this created a social condition in which the emergence of terrorism legitimizes the war on terror, and the continuation of the war on terror produces new wars.

Existing peace efforts seem to be unable to break this cycle. Liberal concepts of peace and peace-

building were designed to address 'old' wars in Europe that were essentially contests of wills. According to this conception of war, peace can be established through talks and compromise agreements between the warring parties. But instead of resolving current conflicts, Kaldor argued, peace agreements actually subvert all efforts to try to shift the nature of the social condition she describes. Thus we are faced with a reality in which the logic of war has changed fundamentally, whilst approaches to peace-building are still very much based on 'old' war assumptions. To resolve 'new' wars, we have to recognize their changed nature and adapt our approaches to

peace-building accordingly. Most of all, any progress needs to involve countering the nature of the social condition of new wars. For Kaldor, at the heart of that lies the construction of legitimate institutions which are able to control armed groups and establish lasting order.

The current situation might seem somber, but Kaldor emphasized that all is not lost. The fragmented and decentralized nature of 'new' wars also contains potential for change. Amidst these war zones, there are still 'islands of civility' to be found. As an example, Kaldor referred to Hama, the fourth-largest city in Syria, 46 kilometers north of Homs. There, as in some other places, people have successfully refused to allow armed groups in. If we want to tackle the social condition new wars pose and to shift the dynamics they yield, we also need a new peace, she concluded. We have to make the upholders of these islands of civility the liberal peace partners of the future because 'the only way we can recover is by reconstructing civility using the spaces that already exist'. <

**Mary Kaldor** is Professor of Global Governance, director of the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and CEO of the DFID-funded Justice and Security Research Programme.

**Katharina Hasewend** works as a Research Assistant at the IWM.



# Hitting the Target? Effectiveness of UN Sanctions

INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS BIERSTEKER BY AUREL NIEDERBERGER

*International sanctions have become the instrument of choice for policy-makers dealing with a variety of different challenges to international peace and security. In this interview, Thomas Biersteker talks about the political and economic impact of these measures and their unintended consequences.*

**IWMpost:** The sanctions imposed against Iraq by the UN Security Council in 1990 were responsible for massive human suffering and the rise of ISIS. Today, the UN is again imposing sanctions. Have any lessons been learned?

**Thomas Biersteker:** The most dramatic difference is that today all sanctions are targeted in some form. This is the result of the unacceptably high humanitarian consequences of the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s, which blocked all trade. They were relatively easy to implement, but punished the entire Iraqi population for the behavior of its leadership. The sanctions also actually strengthened Saddam Hussein. It is important to keep this in mind when beginning to impose new sanctions on roughly the same scale. Comprehensive sanctions impose a set of economic constraints and cause scarcity; authoritarian leaders will decide how the costs are borne domestically. Saddam Hussein strengthened his core supporters in the Sunni heartlands, while the burden of sanctions disproportionately affected the Shia population in Basra. So, the comprehensive sanctions against Iraq had unacceptably high humanitarian consequences and benefitted the regime in a perverse sense. And then there is the normative critique: why should a population pay for the policies of a leadership that they probably cannot influence? To cut a long story short: after Iraq, the UN started applying targeted sanctions only.

**IWMpost:** How are sanctions targeted today?

**Biersteker:** They can be targeted at individuals or at corporate entities like firms, political parties, or factions in control of government. They can also be targeted against activities like arms imports or diplomacy. Or they can be targeted at particular sectors of the economy: for example, one that is contributing disproportionately to the resources that fuel the conflict, such as diamonds in Angola or charcoal in Somalia. While sanctions on these sectors still have negative consequences for people working in them and sometimes on a region, they do not affect the entire economy. There are also territorial sanctions, for instance on areas under ISIS control, or on the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most targeted sanctions regimes involve a combination of arms restrictions

and financial sanctions against individuals or corporate entities, including the freezing bank accounts and an interdiction on funds being submitted to the targeted entities. The third common ingredient are travel bans on targeted individuals, meaning that states have to make sure that those persons do not leave their current country of

residence. It is not just UN sanctions that are targeted, but all EU and US sanctions imposed since 2000. The African Union (AU), another important source of sanctions, also imposes targeted measures.

**IWMpost:** There are many conflicts and security threats in the world. Which become subject to UN sanctions and who pushes for that?

**Biersteker:** Most UN sanctions are focused on armed conflict. But the UN also imposes sanctions on states that support terrorism and, more recently, on non-state armed groups engaged in acts of terrorism. In 2006, the UN began to impose sanctions in support of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. About 60% of UN sanctions concern armed conflict, 10% terrorism, 10% nuclear proliferation, and 10% support for transitional governments or for opposition to non-constitutional change of government. The rest is R2P (Responsibility to Protect) and other purposes.

Typically, the UN only imposes sanctions after a regional organization requests its intervention. The Organization of American States

(OAS) preceded the UN in Haiti, the Arab League in Libya in 2011, and the AU and African regional organizations in many of the African conflicts. Once it gets to the UN, there is another ques-

tion: who is taking the lead in writing the resolution? In African conflicts, it will be the former colonial power, typically the British or French. But overall, about 56% of the resolutions are drafted by the US. The French are the second most frequent author, and the British the third.

**IWMpost:** Can a single tool really be applied to such different situations?

**Biersteker:** In theory, sanctions are used because you can tailor them to the particular conflict and your goals with regard to it. In theory, the UN analyzes the situation on the ground and designs a set of targeted measures. There is a large menu: in our *SanctionsApp* (see below), we have identified 76 different types of sanctions applied by the UN over the past 26 years. But in practice, decision-making involves a number of different states that often have very different interests. Different parties to the conflict have different stakes. Targeted measures are therefore the product of political negotiations and calculations by member states, particularly the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

**IWMpost:** Are sanctions effective? North Korea continues with its nuclear program and conflicts persist in numerous

countries, despite their being subject to sanctions for more than a decade.

**Biersteker:** First, sanctions have multiple purposes that we need to separate out before we ask whether they work. Most of the discourse is focused on whether sanctions force a change of behavior in the target. Will North Korea give up its nuclear program? Will Muammar Qaddafi stop attacking his own population? However, goals like this are not the only purpose. Many sanctions simultaneously attempt to do two other things: first, to constrain an actor from engaging in some proscribed activity by raising the costs of that activity; second—and this is under-appreciated—to send signals. Historically, sanctions have tended to be dismissed as merely symbolic gestures of concern. But sending normative signals is more than just a gesture, since when you apply sanctions you're not only affecting the target but also your own commercial interests. This is most apparent with the EU sanctions on Russia after its annexation of Crimea. These are very costly measures that, I would argue, are largely understood to be

sending a strong signal about the annexation of the territory of another sovereign state.


Second, we need to bear in mind that sanctions are applied to the most intractable conflicts in the world. We shouldn't expect that sanctions are suddenly going to be effective, because we're dealing with cases where everything else has failed. Our research on the efficacy of UN Sanctions shows that when it comes to changing behavior, they are only successful about 10% of the time. But when it comes to constraining actors, sending an effective signal or stigmatizing an actor in a community, the success rate is up to 28%.

**IWMpost:** If I end up on a sanctions list of the UN Security Council, how do I learn of it and what can I do?

**Biersteker:** It depends on what list you're on. If you're "lucky" enough to be on the counter-terrorism list, then you can go directly to an ombudsperson and request that your case be investigated and discussed. You may present evidence, and even if the evidence doesn't prove your innocence before you were listed, it can be taken into consideration if it proves that you have changed your behavior since. The Ombudsperson then can take up your case. Up to now, the Security Council has accepted every single one of the Ombudspersons' recommendations for delisting. For all other sanctions regimes, you have no direct channels of communication through which to appeal your case. Since you cannot go to the Security Council, you would send your protest to a so-called 'focal point' in the secretariat. The focal point will send your dossier on to the Sanctions Committee, which will then decide whether or not it wishes to take up your case. <

**Thomas Biersteker** is Gasteyer Professor of International Security and Director of Policy Research at the Graduate Institute, Geneva. He is the co-editor of the book *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action* (2016), presented at the IWM in October 2017. He was the principal developer of *SanctionsApp* ([www.sanctionsapp.com](http://www.sanctionsapp.com)), a tool for mobile devices created in 2013 to increase access to information about targeted sanctions by the UN.

**Aurel Niederberger** holds a PhD in Political Science and International Relations from the Graduate Institute, Geneva and is a post-doctoral researcher at McGill University. From September to December 2017, he was a Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM.





# Reading the Writing on the Wall

BY KYLIE THOMAS

*The Marikana massacre was the first to take place in South Africa after the end of apartheid. In many ways, it can be understood as marking the end of the first period of the South African transition and the ideal of the new democratic “rainbow nation”, and it has been followed by waves of protests against the persistence of colonial and apartheid-era ideologies and structures and against the corrupt practices of the current state.*

On the 14<sup>th</sup> of February 2018 Jacob Zuma, who was serving his second term in office as the President of South Africa, resigned from his position, effectively ousted by his own party, the African National Congress (ANC), which has held power since the end of apartheid in 1994. The following day, Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, who under apartheid was the leader of the National Union of Mineworkers and then a key figure in the negotiated transition to democracy, became President.

In 2012, thirty-four of the thousands of miners who were participating in a strike at Lonmin Platinum Mine in the Marikana area near Rustenburg, South Africa were killed by the police. The workers were demanding that the Lonmin mining company, which earned an average of six million dollars a day in 2012, pay them the wages equivalent to the wages the company pays workers at its mines in Australia (R 12,500 or 850 Euros). Rock drill operators at Lonmin were earning R 5000 per month (340 Euros). The miners, who had been striking for a week, assembled on a rocky outcrop in the veld that came to be known as “the mountain” and refused to leave the area. At the time of the massacre, Ramaphosa served as a non-executive director of Lonmin and used his position within the ANC to call on the police to “treat the strikers as ‘plainly dastardly criminal’”.

On the night before the killings, the police ordered four thousand rounds of live ammunition and called for mortuary vans to be present at the site: they clearly anticipated that some of the miners would be shot dead. The following day more than six hundred heavily armed police officers surrounded the miners and proceeded to encircle them with razor wire. Then the police opened fire, shooting at the strikers with automatic rifles. No fewer than fourteen of the miners were shot in the back, while others were hunted down and shot at close range as they fled. Thirty-four miners were gunned down by the police and seventy-eight others were seriously injured, while two hundred fifty-nine additional strikers were arrested.

## Remember Marikana

A year after the massacre, on the walls of the city of Cape Town the words “Remember Marikana” appeared, stencilled there by the members of the Tokolos Stencils Collective and later, and in different sites across the country, by other artists and members of the public who



Remember Marikana/Ramaphosa, Tokolos Stencils Collective, Langa Street Art Festival, Cape Town (2013).



Mgcineni “Mambush” Noki and comrades, Marikana (2012).

made use of the stencil that can be freely downloaded. The injunction to “Remember Marikana” seems at first a curious one. How is it possible to forget a massacre? And yet the memory of massacres is deeply

those who would rise up and resist the conditions that perpetuate injustice. Massacres perpetrated by governments against their own people manifest the power of the state and its monopoly on violence in abso-

sions that exculpate the police, the state, the mining company—everything that made the massacre not only possible, but inevitable.

The injunction to “Remember Marikana” is critical in a society as

biological weapons programme of the apartheid regime, is free to practice medicine. In our country, Nathi Mthethwa, Minister of Police at the time of the massacre, was demoted and became Minister of Arts and Culture instead. In our country, Cyril Ramaphosa, a man who was directly implicated in the massacre, has just become the President. Such erasures of history and culpability seem to have been built into the very planning of the massacre, according to the Marikana Report:

“The evidence indicates that R5 bullets tend to disintegrate when entering the body of a victim. This is what happened at Marikana. As a result it is not possible on the ballistic evidence to connect any member who shot at Marikana with any person who died. In the case of certain shooters there is prima facie evidence that the members concerned

*Massacres perpetrated by governments against their own people manifest the power of the state and its monopoly on violence in absolute form.*

contentious, for massacres lay bare the structures of domination that lie beneath the surface of political power and that are routinely disavowed. A massacre is a rupture in a time of ongoing oppression, and it marks both a warning and limit point to

lute form. The injunction to “Remember Marikana” implies that the massacre risks becoming forgotten: that there are those who will work to ensure that it is erased from history and who will seek to overwrite what occurred with their own ver-

adept at whitewashing atrocity as South Africa. In our country, the apartheid-era torturers and murderers are living out their old age in peace and dying off in secret, unashamed. In our country, Wouter Basson, the former Head of the chemical and





Photo: Rajesh Jantilal / AFP / picturedesk.com

may well have been guilty of attempted murder but it cannot be said that any shooter is guilty of murder because it cannot be shown which of the shooters actually killed anyone.”

In such statements, the commission uses the language of evidentiary proof to excuse itself from its obligation to justice. The report of the Commission asserts, “It is clear from the evidence that either none, or very few, of the strikers who were killed had been shooting at the po-

a summons, a demand for action, and it is perhaps in this sense that the Tokolos Stencils Collective, as self-identified radical disrupters of the post-apartheid state, intend their work to be understood: as a call to arms. Yet “Remember Marikana” also directs us to the task of thinking. It interrupts the amnesia capitalism demands and insists that we recognize that what is extracted from the miners is not only labour, but life.

The betrayal of the promise of

## The betrayal of the promise of the post-apartheid socialist state came about years before the massacre of the mine workers at Marikana.

lice. The obvious question, then, is why they were shot. The explanation is that this was a paramilitary operation, with the aim of annihilating those who were perceived as the enemy.” The task of ensuring that this question is not buried and forgotten has been taken up by the Tokolos Stencils collective, whose work insists that we recognize the dehumanizing structures within which the lives of miners are disposable and their resistance positions them as the enemy.

### Structural Violence under Capitalism

A “tokolos,” or “tokoloshe,” the mythical creature from which the Tokolos Stencils Collective takes its name, creates trouble without being seen. Their stencils, which have now appeared in public places across the country, present the phrase “Remember Marikana” and include the silhouette of Mgcineni “Mambush” Noki, the man with the green blanket, who was one of the leaders of the strike. He was shot fourteen times—twice in the head—by the police, who fired approximately 328 rounds of live ammunition at the small group of miners who were closest to them at the beginning of the massacre. Instructed to shoot at the feet or legs of those they are attempting to subdue, the police seemed to be shooting to kill in this case, since Noki had five gunshot wounds in his upper body. The stencil depicts Noki as he was in the hours before his death, standing resolute before the terrifying, naked violence of the state.


In one sense, then, the phrase “Remember Marikana” operates as

the post-apartheid socialist state came about years before the massacre of the mine workers at Marikana. It is evident in the unliveable conditions in which the miners are forced to dwell; it is evident in the catastrophe of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and in the bodies of those who continue to suffer hunger and deprivation, and who are at constant risk of being assaulted, raped, or killed. However, a massacre is distinct from other forms of slow, structural violence: it is the decisive sign of the forms of violence to which the state is willing to resort in order to preserve its power. To understand how a massacre could take place after the legislative end of apartheid entails recognizing the precarity of economically impoverished black people under capitalism, a position compounded by centuries of racist domination. It is to recognize the continuities between slavery (introduced by the Dutch colonizers in 1658, continued under the rule of the British, and kept in place for almost two hundred years), indentured labor, the migrant labor system, and the policies of the apartheid regime, and how these continuities have determined the post-apartheid condition. Marikana makes manifest the relation between black life and property. To remember Marikana is to name how the annihilation of black life forms part of the structure of the neo-liberal post-apartheid state. ◀

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
## Books by IWM Fellows and Alumni

**Timothy Snyder**  
*The Road to Unfreedom.*  
Russia, Europe, America  
New York: Tim Duggan Books, April 2018



With the end of the Cold War, the victory of liberal democracy seemed final. Observers declared the end of history, confident in a peaceful, globalized future. This faith was misplaced. Authoritarianism returned to Russia, as Putin found fascist ideas that could be used to justify rule by the wealthy. In the 2010s, it has spread from east to west, aided by Russian warfare in Ukraine and cyberwar in Europe and the United States. (On September 27, the book will be presented at the Vienna Humanities Festival, see p. 28)

**Marci Shore**  
*The Ukrainian Night.*  
An Intimate History of Revolution  
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018



In this lyrical and intimate book, Marci Shore evokes the human face of the Ukrainian Revolution. Grounded in the true stories of activists and soldiers, parents and children, Shore's book blends a narrative of suspenseful choices with a historian's reflections on what revolution is and what it means.

**Ivan Krastev**  
*After Europe*  
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017



**Ivan Krastev**  
*Europadämmerung – Ein Essay*  
Berlin: Edition Suhrkamp, 2017



In this provocative book, renowned public intellectual Ivan Krastev reflects on the future of the European Union—and its potential lack of a future. With far-right nationalist parties on the rise across the continent and the United Kingdom planning for Brexit, the European Union is in disarray and plagued by doubts as never before.

**Ivan Krastev**  
„Auf dem Weg in die Mehrheitsdiktatur?“  
In: Heinrich Geiselberger (Hg.): *Die große Regression – Eine internationale Debatte über die geistige Situation der Zeit*  
Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2017



In diesem Band untersuchen internationale renommierte Forscher und Intellektuelle die Ursachen der „Großen Regression“, verorten sie in einem historischen Kontext, erörtern Szenarien für die nächsten Jahre und diskutieren Strategien, mit denen wir diesen Entwicklungen entgegenzutreten können.

**Shalini Randeria**  
*Sustainable Food Consumption, Urban Waste Management and Civic Activism*  
(edited with Christine Lutringer)  
Graduate Institute Geneva, 2017



This special e-issue of International Development Policy focuses on practices and policies that link sustainable food consumption with challenges in urban solid waste management in one of India's fastest growing metropolises, Bangalore.

**Shalini Randeria**  
“Migration and Borders of Citizenship”  
(edited with Ravi Palat)  
*Refugee Watch—A South Asian Journal on Forced Migration*, No. 49, June 2017



This peer-reviewed journal publishes original research papers that broadly engage with issues of forced displacement and migration, refugees, statelessness, internally displaced people, development related displacement, climate change and demography.

**Charles Taylor**  
*Das sprachbegabte Tier*  
Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2017



In seinem neuen Buch bekennt sich Charles Taylor zum gegnerischen Lager der Romantik um Hamann, Herder und Humboldt und zeigt, dass der rationalistisch-empiristische Ansatz etwas Entscheidendes übersieht: Sprache beschreibt nicht bloß, sie erschafft Bedeutung, formt alle menschliche Erfahrung und ist integraler Bestandteil unseres individuellen Selbst.

**Tatiana Zhurzhenko**  
*War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*  
(edited with Julie Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro and Jussi Lassila)  
Hampshire Palgrave: Macmillan / Springer International Publishing, 2017



This edited collection contributes to the current vivid multidisciplinary debate on East European memory politics and the post-communist instrumentalization and re-mythologization of World War II memories. The book focuses on the three Slavic countries of post-Soviet Eastern Europe—Russia, Ukraine and Belarus—the epicentre of Soviet war suffering, and the heartland of the Soviet war myth.

**Paul Celan**  
Translation Program

**Michel Foucault**  
*Herméneutique du Sujet.*  
Cours au Collège de France, 1981–1982  
Translated by **Zlatko Wurzberg**  
(French > Croatian)  
Zagreb: Sandorf & Mizantrop, 2017



*The Hermeneutics of the Subject* is the third volume in the collection of Michel Foucault's lectures at the Collège de France, one of the world's most prestigious institutions. In the lectures comprising this volume, Foucault focuses on how the “self” and the “care of the self” were conceived during the period of antiquity, beginning with Socrates.



# China's New 'Big Brother'

INTERVIEW WITH LING LI

*The Chinese government, led by President Xi Jinping, is in the midst of a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that has led to thousands of arrests among Communist Party officials. In this interview, Ling Li reflects on the aims and objectives of this anti-graft crackdown.*

**IWMpost:** Only days after he came into power in late 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched a massive anti-corruption campaign targeting party, government, military and state-owned company officials suspected of corruption. In the past five years, more than 1.5 million officials, including both “tigers” and “flies,” were punished in a nationwide crackdown. How serious and widespread are bribery and corruption in China and why has Xi Jinping declared the fight against graft a top priority?

**Ling Li:** Corruption started to surface as a serious governance issue in China since the opening-up reform in the 1980s. In the 1980s, the main form of corruption was grafts and from the late 1990s grafts were overtaken by bribery as the dominant form of corruption. Although overt corruption, especially extortion, has become very rare, hidden corruption, facilitated through connections and favor-exchanges, is common in every public sector, including courts.

Corruption was one of the triggers of the democratic movement in 1989, which had developed, as we learned later, into the most threatening political crisis that confronted the Chinese Communist Party (the Party) since its coming to power in 1949. Ever since, the Party has been highly alert to the importance of the issue of corruption and to its implications upon the legitimacy of the Party's rule. It is of equal importance that after 1989 anticorruption has become a reliable instrument to settle political disputes among Party elites. President Xi Jinping's prioritization of anticorruption during his first term of office demonstrates the efficacy of anticorruption as a legitimacy-boosting policy and also as an indispensable instrument to quell political disputes between him and other Party elites, an issue that seemed to have presented itself as a matter of urgency when Xi Jinping took power in 2012.

**IWMpost:** In 2018, the National Supervision Commission (NSC), China's new anti-corruption agency, was formed at the first session of the 13<sup>th</sup> National People's Congress. What are the tasks and powers of this new supra-agency?

**Ling Li:** Before the establishment of the NSC, the Ministry of Supervision was mandated to monitor and examine only the conduct of civil servants who work in the executive branch of the government. The mandate of the newly established NSC is significantly broader. It is authorized to monitor and examine the conduct of not only civil servants in the executive branch of the government but



Photo: banana / iStock

also the staff of all other state institutions, including legislature, courts, procuratorates, people's consultative conferences, as well as the administrative staff of institutions that provide public services, such as public universities, hospitals and other social organizations that receive governmental funds.

In terms of investigative power, the reform authorized the NSC to apply coercive measures for anticorruption investigations, which legalized what used to be “extra-legal” practices. Through the reform, the NSC has also “annexed” two divisions of the procuratorate, which were mandated to conduct anticorruption investigation either independently or upon instructions of the Party before the reform. After the reform, the anticorruption investigative procedure becomes much more simplified, which will release a significant amount of human resources, that can be redeployed to expand the agency's coverage of investigation.

**IWMpost:** Human rights activists warned that the National Supervisory Commission will be used by

President Xi Jinping to consolidate his grip over the Communist Party and to eliminate political opponents. Are these fears justified?

**Ling Li:** The NSC will drastically increase the anticorruption investigative capacity of the Party-state, which President Xi can draw upon without doubt for purpose of disciplinary enforcement and power consolidation. However, it is too early to assess this empirically.

**IWMpost:** Another main point of criticism is that the work of the new commission will undermine existing anti-corruption initiatives that emphasize transparency and open government information. How is the anti-corruption crackdown perceived by the population and how does it relate to the concept of “guanxi” and other business practices in China which require gift giving in order to facilitate relationship building?

**Ling Li:** The anticorruption campaign, started in 2012, has significantly driven down overspending of public funds, raised the visibility of anticorruption activities and established a moralizing discourse of the Party's rule. At the same time, there

has been visible improvement of the quality of public services. Therefore, it is not surprising that the campaign has received wide popular support. However, due to the top-down approach of anticorruption activities and the fact that there is still considerable room for arbitrariness in decision-making in public institutions as a result of the unchanged nature of the political system, corruption cannot be uprooted. Hence, the deeply-rooted gift-giving practices might be subject to more restrictions but will continue in adapted shapes and forms.

**IWMpost:** What economic effects is China's largest anti-corruption campaign in recent history likely to have? Will it help boost China's economy or will it have a negative impact on the country's strong economic expansion and ambitions to transform China to a global superpower?

**Ling Li:** The relation between corruption and economic growth is a topic of controversy between economists. Some believe that corruption lowers economic growth because it inhibits investment, increas-

es transaction costs and misallocates resources; others consider that corruption does not necessarily hinder economic development as it provides a way to “get things done”, especially in places where public services underperform and overregulation erects too many red tapes. Similarly, a causal relationship between anticorruption activities and economic growth is difficult to establish with certainty. At the beginning of the anticorruption campaign, restaurants, karaoke bars and luxury goods providers suffered a blow because the campaign drove down the demand. However, it did not take long before these businesses changed their business models or taken over by other businesses that serve a middle-income or low-income clientele, the size of which and the growing purchasing power of whom is strong enough to support these businesses without the element of corruption. ◀

**Ling Li** is an external lecturer at the Department of East Asian Studies of the University of Vienna. From September 2017 to March 2018 she was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM.



# Revolution! Vienna Humanities Festival

SEPTEMBER 22–24, 2017

*The Vienna Humanities Festival, organized by IWM, Wien Museum and Time to Talk, was back for a weekend of discussion and debate around the theme of revolution.*

In its second year, the Vienna Humanities Festival once again brought together leading lights from the fields of academia, art and culture, attracting 3,600 visitors over the course of three days with a var-

ied and inspiring program. From Friday to Sunday, 40 lectures and discussions on revolution took place around Vienna's Karlsplatz, including contributions by Michael Chalupka, Ekaterina Degot, Heinz Fischer,

Cengiz Günay, Angelina Kariakina, Ivan Krastev, Moishe Postone (see p. 21), István Rév, Kathrin Röggla, Karl Schlögel, Heide Schmidt, Max Schrems, Anton Shekhovtsov, Marci Shore, Stephan Szabo, Ilija Tro-

janow, Ivan Vejvoda and many more. Taking the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Russian Revolution, which so radically altered the history of Europe and the world, as its point of departure, the second Vienna Humanities

festival explored the transformative power of revolutions—from the Scientific to the Industrial to the Digital Revolution. <

Full length recordings of all discussions can be found on IWM's YouTube channel: [www.youtube.com/IWMVienna](http://www.youtube.com/IWMVienna)  
In 2018, the festival will take place from September 27–30 (see p. 28).

Photos: Simon Brugner, Maren Jeleff





# Marx in the Age of Trump

INTERVIEW WITH MOISHE POSTONE BY RAIMUND LÖW

*In the Age of Trump, there is a renewed interest in the thought of Marx amongst American thinkers. What kind of questions do people have where they think that Marx' ideas might be helpful?*

For decades, the humanities and humanistic social sciences in the US were dominated by cultural studies. During the crisis of 2008 it then became evident that the so-called linguistic or cultural turn had led to a complete neglect of economic questions, and that this had been a mistake. The renewed interest in Marx is not associated with what you might consider traditional Marxist groups, which in small numbers had continued at universities all along. Instead, there is a strong reception of the Frankfurt School and of thinkers such as George Lukacs, and Marx is being re-read through those lenses. I certainly belong to this group.

**Raimund Löw:** In today's US politics, you don't only have Trump and the Tea Party, you also have Bernie Sanders and the Occupy Wall Street movement. Is there anything that links questions about capitalism and the search for Marxist answers to these political currents?

**Moishe Postone:** Most of the American Left, including the movements you just mentioned, use the word capitalism when they actually mean inequality, or racism, or sexism. Their thinking is not grounded in any detailed political-economic analysis. They focus on the fact that more and more wealth is concentrated in the hands of the rich, which is true, but they are not dealing with the fact that the American economy has been in structural crisis since the early 1970s. Even Bernie Sanders explains the current economic developments as the result of bad trade policy. However, the proportion of GDP produced by American manufacturing has not declined proportionately, what *has* declined are American manufacturing jobs. The real difference is automation: jobs are not declining because they are going to China or Mexico, but because they are now being done by machines.

**Löw:** So Bernie Sanders's reaction to the problem of capitalism is actually nationalist because international trade is seen as the main culprit?

**Postone:** Yes. Focusing on trade easily leads to a nationalist position, defending the domestic working class against foreign imports. In the course of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, due to the welfare state and similar developments, the communist dream of internationalism dissipated and working class movements became *de facto* nationalist. But if that's going to be your position, then the Right is much better at that. The Right are much better nationalists.

**Löw:** Let me ask you about your understanding of Marx. Do you consider yourself a Marxist?

**Postone:** No. I think Marx was



probably the greatest theorist of the modern period; *Das Kapital* is really a work of considerable genius. But most of what we call Marxism is really the writings of Marx' very good friend Friedrich Engels, who in my view misunderstood what Marx was about.

Engels' understanding of Marx made a lot of sense at a time when the political issue was the growth and strength of the industrial working

an explanation for current structural developments in the capitalist economies. In the US, the years between 1945 and 1973 saw a great rise in prosperity, and, more importantly, also an enormous increase in productivity. Productivity in capitalism before and after 1945–73 was much lower, but people took the middle period to be typical of capitalism, and thought that welfare-state capitalism had solved all problems. But

plus value, and declining levels of surplus value are related to a growing superfluity of labor. People become more and more superfluous. And the Left does not have an answer to that. The Right does, but it's a stupid and dangerous answer. They blame these developments on immigrants, on women, and in the US also on Blacks, or on China or Mexico. And the Left does not offer a viable alternative explanation. Occu-

*Marx didn't write a critique of society from the standpoint of labor; he wrote a critique of labor.*

class. It is a theory that glorifies the industrial working class. Now, however, the working class is in decline.

**Löw:** Your approach is a Marxism without the proletariat as the historical force to overcome exploitation, to overcome capitalism?

**Postone:** The Marx who has something to say to our current problems is not the Marx of the *Communist Manifesto*, but the one of *Das Kapital*. Marx actually didn't write a critique of society from the standpoint of labor; he wrote a critique of labor. In fact, he wrote a critique of the centrality of labor to modern capitalist life. Marx' idea of emancipation was not the realization nor the glorification of proletarian labor, but its abolition.

**Löw:** How does this reading of Marx help us to understand the Age of Trump?

**Postone:** Marx's analysis of surplus value and accumulation offers

this period of prosperity and ever-increasing productivity came to an end. Whereas between 1948 and 1967 people who entered the workplace earned more than their predecessors, those who entered the workforce in 1967 made less than those who entered the year before them. Real wages in the US have not risen since 1973.

**Löw:** One possible explanation for this is the weakness of the US trade union movement. The Trumpista answer, on the other hand, would be that this decline in productivity and real wages was caused by globalization, such as by jobs going to China.

**Postone:** I argue that we need to find a different answer. The current crisis of labor is actually a structural problem of capitalism that was foreseen by Marx. His analysis of relative surplus value and accumulation predicted that runaway growth would be accompanied by declining sur-

plus value, and declining levels of surplus value are related to a growing superfluity of labor. People become more and more superfluous. And the Left does not have an answer to that. The Right does, but it's a stupid and dangerous answer. They blame these developments on immigrants, on women, and in the US also on Blacks, or on China or Mexico. And the Left does not offer a viable alternative explanation. Occu-

py talks about inequality, but that is only a symptom. They cannot explain the underlying structural changes of the last half-century that Marx helps us to understand. These structural changes have left burnt-out places, like Detroit, and led to rising levels of opioid addiction mostly among the people who once were working class. They're now the opioid class and no one is addressing this. The Left talks about the environment, but never about the relationship of environment and work. In a sense, they leave all of these people out of the discourse, but these people worry about work, and they don't care about the environment.

**Löw:** What could a new discourse of the Left be? If I understand you correctly, then we are dealing with economic change that is caused by technological change, independent of policies and of what kind of government we have. You seem to be saying

that we can't do anything about it.

**Postone:** The strength of Marx is that he can help us to understand the situation; his weakness is that he gives us no answers as to how to get out of it. Previous generations of Marxists, and many social democrats as well, had a clear idea of what the future should look like: there should be full employment and living wages. Society was to be based on the just distribution of labor and should be rationally organized. This was a vision of a workerist society. We lack an imaginary of what a post-work society would look like. I see my work as a small contribution to start people thinking about this tremendous change that we're undergoing, the decline of the proletariat, that is as significant in human history as the destruction of the peasantry and the rise of wage labor. Less and less people work, ever more are unemployed or in jail.

**Löw:** What are the political consequences of the shrinking of the working class? In Europe, the organized working class was essential to the development of democracy. If it withers away, do you see a new era of authoritarian demagogues emerging, building their political power on the basis of giveaways from the government, the way a Roman consul did?

**Postone:** Looking at the swing to the right—Trump, Brexit, Le Pen, AfD, FPÖ, Orban, the PiS party in Poland—I think we've reached an age that is potentially as authoritarian as the interwar period. It is a very dangerous time, because the Left has no compelling imaginary of a different future. In this situation, the demagogues have it much easier.

**Löw:** Marx was sort of an historical optimist. You don't seem to share that part of Marxism, do you?

**Postone:** My analogy is: if you want to understand the significance of a great work of art, you don't necessarily interview the artist. I think what Marx developed through years of work on *Das Kapital* went beyond his own political horizon. If I were writing a biography of Marx I would write about this tension, between Marx the analyst and Marx the revolutionary. And it is Marx, the great analyst of the underlying forms of capitalist modernity, who, in my view, still has something to say to us. <

**Moishe Postone**, Professor of Modern History at the University of Chicago, was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM. In March 2018, he passed away at the age of 75 after a short but severe illness (see obituary on p. 26).

**Raimund Löw** is an Austrian historian and journalist. As a correspondent for the Austrian Broadcasting Cooperation he headed the ORF's office in New York.



# Filming the Revolution: Archeology of the Ukrainian Cinematic Modernism

BY KONSTANTIN AKINSHA

*The exhibition of late-1920s Ukrainian film posters and screenings of masterpieces of the Ukrainian cinematic avant-garde recently organized by the IWM and 21er Haus in Vienna could be defined as one of the first steps in introducing the European public to an important but forgotten page in the history of modernist culture. Why was it forgotten? Whereas the Russian avant-garde was “rediscovered” during the Khrushchev thaw, Ukrainian modernism has remained a terra incognita.*



Ukrainian avant-garde films 1929–1931; curator Konstantin Akinsha in conversation with Ivan Kozlenko at Blickle Kino

Memory of the artistic experiments of the 1920s was annihilated in Ukraine during the repressions of the 1930s, which proved to be even more bloody and severe than in other parts of the Soviet Union. In the eyes of Soviet ideological watchdogs, the Ukrainian avant-garde was doubly blasphemous: it was “formalistic” like its Russian counterpart, but it was also interpreted as a manifestation of “bourgeois nationalism”.

After the Bolsheviks consolidated power in Ukraine, Moscow introduced a policy of so-called “Ukrainization” to appease the Ukrainian population. A July 1923 decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of Ukraine, “On the implementation of the Ukrainization of educational and cultural institutions”, lay the groundwork for the de facto marginalization of the Russian language, which was not universally taught in schools until 1938. The policy of Ukrainization was akin to the nationalities policy practiced in other republics of the Soviet Union (as the country was called beginning in 1924). With the program of so-called *korenizatsia* (“putting down roots”), the Soviet leadership used nationalist sentiments as a powerful tool to destroy the resistance of the White Army, associated with the fallen empire, and to provide a contrast to the tsarist oppression of the non-Russian provinces. Until the early 1930s artistic and cultural organizations in Ukraine were practically independent from Union-wide structures such as Narkompros (the People’s Commissariat of Enlightenment); instead, they were managed directly by the Ukrainian government.

One such organization was the All-Ukrainian Photo-Cinema Administration (VUFKU), the cinematographic state monopoly established in 1922 that united the entire

film industry in Ukraine. VUFKU’s activities began with the nationalization of modest private film studios in Yalta and Odessa. Just three years later the All-Ukrainian Photo-Cinema Administration had been transformed into the second largest film production company in the USSR. By 1926 VUFKU was the second leading distributor of foreign films on the German market, behind only the United States. By 1929 Ukrainian films were distributed in the United States, Germany, France, Japan and other countries. VUFKU was vertically integrated: it controlled the production and distribution of films, the creation of film advertisements and the publication of cinema-themed periodicals.

It was not only Ukrainian film directors who collaborated with VUFKU. In the late 1920s, when the official war on so-called “formalism” was in progress in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Ukraine was still free of ruthless censorship, thanks to the efforts of Mykola Skrypnyk, the commissar of education. As a result, Ukraine became a temporary safe haven for leading figures of the artistic avant-garde such as Vladimir Tatlin, the creator of the famous Monument to the Third International, who came to teach at the Kyiv Art Institute in 1925–1927; and Kazimir Malevich, the pioneer of geometric abstraction, who returned to his native city to find refuge at that same institution in 1927–1929. Not only artists but also film directors migrated to Ukraine. In the late 1920s, film studios in Odessa and Kyiv became the last barricades of the Soviet cinematic avant-garde. During this time cinematic masterpieces were created in Ukraine by film directors like Oleksandr Dovzhenko, destined to become the most important representative of Ukrainian

cinematic culture, and Dziga Vertov, whose most radical creations were produced by VUFKU.

Today we are confronted with the attempted nationalization of the avant-garde, which is caught up in broader Russian-Ukrainian political strife. Often this struggle calls to mind the famous lines of the poet Thomas Heywood: “Seven cities warred for Homer, being dead / Who, living, had no roof to shroud his head.” Was Malevich a Russian or Ukrainian (or Polish) artist? Can Ukrainians appropriate Dziga Vertov and his brother Mikhail Kaufman and describe them as Ukrainian film directors? Questions like these, which reflect a state of affairs typical for an era of neo-nationalist agendas, require a dispassionate answer. The avant-garde artists and film directors who worked in Ukraine obviously left an imprint on the culture of the country, influencing the development of art and cinema. They became an integral part of the complicated tapestry of late-1920s cultural life.

There is another question that is much more important than the national attribution of the pioneers of the radical art and cinematography of the second decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Today when we watch “The Symphony of the Donbass” by Dziga Vertov or “The Unforgettable Campaign” by Mikhail Kaufman, we enjoy the brave aesthetic experimentation but cannot suppress a feeling of aversion provoked by the content, which borders on intimidating inhumanity. We face propaganda elevated to a modernist art form; the skillful styling makes the propaganda feel even more dangerous and threatening.

There is no doubt that the late 1920s were a period when propaganda could still be art. It is difficult not to note that the lyrical, not to say mystical, creations of such

Ukrainian film directors as Oleksandr Dovzhenko and Mykola Shpykovskyi are dedicated to collectivization, one of the most tragic and bloody pages in the history of Soviet Ukraine.

Today researchers of Ukrainian film culture of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century are faced with two problems. On the one hand, they have to unearth the actual material that has been lost or hidden for more than half a century, to reconstruct the factual narrative of the development of Ukrainian cinema. On the other hand, they are also obliged to offer a revisionist re-interpretation of the sugar-sweet oleography of the Soviet canon, with its attempt to falsify the legacy of modernist film directors as an unperfected form of socialist realism. The uncritical approach of left-leaning Western film historians, overexcited by the “construction of the true socialism” which inspired Vertov, Dovzhenko and others, must also be addressed.

The problem of the “archeologic” approach is more pressing than the unavoidable need for re-interpretation. For example, Russian avant-garde film posters have been researched and exhibited internationally since the 1960s. Nowadays it is difficult to name a major museum that collects modernist art—from MoMA in New York to the Tate Modern in London—which has no film posters by Aleksandr Rodchenko or the Stenberg brothers in its collection. In contrast to late-1920s Russian graphic design, Ukrainian film posters remain practically unknown to the broader public, both in Ukraine and internationally. Only in the last five years have publications on Ukrainian poster design of the 1920s–1930s begun to appear. Works of such gifted artists as Ibrahym Litynskyi, Myron Chepovskyi and Yosyp Kuzkovskyi

and posters designed by Oleksandr Dovzhenko, the famous Ukrainian film director, remain practically unknown to western art historians and curators.

Since 2014, the National Oleksandr Dovzhenko Film Center in Kyiv has become the main institution involved in researching the history of Ukrainian cinema. In many ways, the impressive success of this institution is thanks to the leadership of Ivan Kozlenko, a young Ukrainian film historian, who became the director of the center after the Maidan revolution. Kozlenko not only organized restoration of films from the center’s collection, but also managed to locate the footage of the Mikhail Kaufman masterpiece “The Unforgettable Campaign” (produced by VUFKU in 1931 and believed to be lost) in the center’s archives. Kozlenko believes that other missing Ukrainian cinematic masterpieces could also still be located. In the late 1920s, VUFKU distributed numerous films to foreign countries. According to the director of the Dovzhenko Center, some of them might be sitting in film archives around the world. Sometimes such films could be wrongly catalogued, making the search for them quite complicated. Kozlenko’s hypothesis was recently proven true: Last year a copy of the feature-length scientific documentary “A Man and a Monkey”, filmed by the Ukrainian film director Andrii Vinnytskyi in 1930 and believed to be destroyed, was found in the film archive in Tokyo. The quest to reconstruct the neglected history of the Ukrainian cinematic avant-garde is only just beginning. <

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# Radical Ruralities: Living Labs for a Better World

BY INDIRA VAN 'T KLOOSTER

*In Eutopian communities across Europe, people are seeking new forms of society and democracy and moving towards a more balanced relationship with natural resources, closer inter-human relationships, and alternative systems of exchange (of goods and money). These communities do not turn their back on the outside world, but look for ways of recreating Europe by experimenting and innovating on a small-scale.*

In the Galleria Nazionale d'Arte Antica in Rome hangs an oil painting by Giovanni Francesco Barbieri depicting two shepherds in a beautiful landscape, pondering over a tomb with a skull on it. Inscribed on the tomb are the Latin words "Et in Arcadia Ego"—"I too am in Arcadia". Arcadia refers to a perfect place where man lives in harmony with nature. "I" is death. The message is clear: no matter how beautiful your surroundings, death is always present. The painting is meant to make us reflect on the brevity of our time on earth and on how we should spend it in the best possible way.

Today, most of us need no such reminder. We know that our world and our lives are threatened by all sorts of dangers, no matter how beautiful our environments. The Global Risk Report 2017, published by the World Economic Forum, shows very clearly how, between 2011 and 2017, the top five global risks have shifted from economic risks (asset price collapse, economic breakdown in China) towards climate risks (flooding, extreme weather, biodiversity loss, water supply failure). The same report states that social and cultural polarization, and the influence of post-truth mechanisms on decision making by both politicians and electorate, have increased mutual distrust and hampered tolerance and open debate. The Global Risk Report also points out a close relationship between failing regional or global governance and food and water crises, extreme weather events and biodiversity loss.

It is no surprise, then, that people have been looking for alternatives to save the world, or at least to lead a life that is more fulfilling and less harmful to the Earth and its inhabitants. To stave off death, so to speak. And while they are at it, to improve their everyday living environments. Since cities are increasingly becoming more crowded and more polluted, growing numbers of people find these alternatives in communal, off-centered living. Although this is by no means a new phenomenon, there are various reasons to have a look at a few recently founded communities.

## A Vital 50% for Europe's Ecosystem

Data on how many people will live in cities worldwide in 2030 (60%) compared to today (54%) are pretty consistent. But if 54% lives in the cities,

then some 46% of the global population does not, and in 2030 still some 40% will not. The Food Organization of the United Nations (FOA) found that in Europe, most people actually live in small cities, or in environments that are peri-urban and semi-rural. Only 42% live in bigger, non-rural cities. On current population growth rates, we could be talking about some 430,500,000 people that will not live in a city in Europe in 2030. European cities also rely heavily on these semi-rural backlands for agriculture, biodiversity, climate control, recreation and farming. Europe's rurality is a vital element of its ecosystem for food and water supply.

## A Growing Unease With City Life and Neoliberal Capitalism

With the blurring of barriers between city and landscape, the increase in urbanized natural environments, and advances in new technologies, the European countryside is vital in the food and climate chain. Rural communities provide inspiration for new forms of self-steering and decentralized settlement, as well as vital hubs that make global systems more durable. Now that the benefits of individualism have lost some of their charm, a new sense of solidarity and communal living has evolved, combined with a stronger belief in organic and local chains of organization.

This phenomenon may be reflected in the growing number of rural communities, ecovillages, and co-housing communes. Most are self-centered, secluded settlements, but some of these communities function as small-scale living labs that look for alternatives to high-density city

living. They carry out experiments on alternative social relationships, decision-making structures, currencies, food production and product design. These experiments have proven valuable when it comes to diminishing CO<sub>2</sub> footprints, making innovations in permaculture, stimulating local and regional economic networks, developing new kinds of political and personal representation, and living a more self-full filling life. These radical rural settlements are the focus of my research.

## Twelve Living Labs for a Better World

In total, there are over 2000 communities in Europe today, of which some 450 can be identified through websites, post addresses or activities. They are divided over several databases and catalogues, all with different criteria. While at the IWM, I went through all these data, looking for communities in Europe found-

ed after 2008 based on communal principles (statutes, a constitution, house rules, etc.), with a minimum size of 15 people, a focus on innovation, and willingness to collaborate. The twelve that I selected go from small (15 people) to large (15,000 people), with focuses ranging from social and democratic transformation to agricultural innovation, self-sustainable living to creating regional and even global networks that aim to offer alternatives to neoliberal capitalist production methods. Several examples show how they are innovative and why they are relevant for broader society.

## Changing Bureaucratic and Inflexible Planning Regulations

Ecovillage Lammas in Wales (UK) and do-it-yourself urban-rural living area Oosterwold in Almere (NL) are intentional communities with a strong focus on eco-construction, self-sustainability and agriculture.

What makes them different and interesting as test cases is that they have been developed either by, or in close collaboration with local planning departments. The aim is to make it easier for individuals or groups to develop similar communities. Academics who have examined the *Lammas* project agree that it points towards a variety of ways to improve the adaptability and accessibility of planning regulations, but also to expand the scope of rural possibilities. Likewise, the municipality of Almere is willing to experiment. The big difference is the scale. Whereas in *Lammas*, the community numbers only 20 members, *Oosterwold* will (precisely when depends on how fast people take up to the challenge) offer living space to 15,000 people, organized in over 100 cooperatives. By improving accessibility and making it less complicated to apply for permits, both examples bring the ideals and exper-

*continued on page 25*



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Giovanni Francesco Barbieri,  
Et in Arcadia ego (1616–1620)



# Unverschämt reich? Fragwürdige Rechtfertigungen von Reichtum

VON MARTIN SCHÜRZ


*Ein Prozent der Weltbevölkerung besitzt rund ein Drittel des gesamten Privatvermögens. Dieser Anteil ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten in Europa moderat, in den USA stark angestiegen und hat sich in China und Russland sogar verdoppelt. Da Reichtum in Demokratien ohne eine Form von Legitimation ein ungerechtfertigtes Privileg bleibt, erlangen reiche Menschen erst durch Reichtumsbegründungen eine sozial akzeptierte Sonderstellung in der Gesellschaft. Welche Argumente dafür ins Feld geführt werden, erklärt Martin Schürz.*

Legitimationsversuche von Reichtum – sei es über erbrachte Leistungen und Verdienste, großzügige Spenden oder Kunstmäzenatentum – sind vielfältig und müssen nicht kohärent auf eine einzige Argumentationslinie hinauslaufen. Fabeln können sich mit vernünftigen Argumenten mischen und Fakten können mit Märchen seltsame Allianzen eingehen. Eine explizite Zustimmung der Armen zum Reichtum der Wenigen ist jedoch gar nicht erst notwendig. Solange die Bevölkerung nicht gegen hegemoniale Narrative aufbegehrt und eine gerechtere Verteilung fordert, bleiben selbst intellektuell brüchige Rechtfertigungen des Reichtums wirkungsmächtig.

## Mehr Geld für mehr Leistung?

Im Allgemeinen kann zwischen zwei Legitimationsebenen unterschieden werden: der Entstehung und der Verwendung von Reichtum. Während eine Rechtfertigung über Leistung die Entstehung von Reichtum begründet, rechtfertigt Philanthropie die spätere Verwendung von vorhandenen Vermögenswerten. Logischerweise gehören diese beiden Ebenen zusammen. Für die Verwendung von Reichtum kann es nicht egal sein, woher dieser stammt. Dementsprechend müsste Reichtum kohärenterweise sowohl über seine Quelle, als auch über seine Verwendung gerechtfertigt werden. Doch dies passiert fast nie.

Historisch gesehen diente die Kategorie der Leistung dazu, den Kapitalismus zu legitimieren und soziale Unterschiede zu begründen, die vormals auf ständische Privilegien zurückzuführen waren. Dementsprechend bilden Arbeitseinkommen bis heute die Grundlage für allfällige Leistungsvergleiche. Einkommensunterschiede innerhalb einer Gesellschaft können zwar bis zu einem gewissen Grad rational begründet werden, wenn Faktoren wie Verantwortung, Ausbildung, Anstrengung und zeitliche Beanspruchung berücksichtigt werden, dennoch wird sich kein Konsens über den angemessenen Gehaltsunterschied zwischen einer Kindergartenpädagogin, einem Bauarbeiter



und einem Investmentbanker einstellen. Ein Vergleich kann bestenfalls dazu dienen, Verständnis für die unbezahlte Leistung vieler Menschen in der Gesellschaft zu wecken, nicht aber dazu, die immensen Vermögensunterschiede über das Prinzip Leistung zu legitimieren. Denn wenn einige Wenige ein Milliardenvermögen besitzen und viele andere von der Hand in den Mund leben, hat die Referenz auf Leistung nur eine – nämlich eine herrschaftsabsichernde, ideologische Funktion. Vermögensmilliardäre können in einer rationalen Evaluierung nicht milliardenfach leistungsstärker sein als Arme. Zudem werden

Menschen ohne Einkommen und Vermögen durch eine Leistungslegitimation entwertet. Ihr niedriges Vermögen würde dann belegen, wie einfallslos, mutlos, risikoscheu oder gar faul sie sind. Einigen reichen „Übermenschen“ stünden Milliarden von leistungsschwachen Menschen gegenüber.

## Der Markt als Legitimationsgrundlage?

Da Leistungen im Kapitalismus an den Prinzipien des freien Marktes gemessen werden, wird gerne behauptet, dass Verteilungsgerechtigkeit nicht zu haben sei. Über Gerech-

tigkeit könne nur subjektiv räsoniert werden. Doch ab einer gewissen Gehaltsstufe schwindet das Konkurrenzprinzip des Marktes und ab einer bestimmten Vermögenshöhe wird es komplett außer Kraft gesetzt.

Der Markt als Legitimationsinstanz für das reichste ein Prozent der Weltbevölkerung fällt aber auch deswegen aus, weil viel an privatem Vermögen diesen überhaupt nicht erreicht. Vererbte Immobilien und Besitztümer bleiben oft über Generationen hinweg im Familienverbund. Zudem ist eine Leistungsbestimmung über den Markt zirkulär: Die Leistung wird am Markt entlohnt und die Entlohnung am Markt wird

über die Leistung begründet.

Trotzdem werden reiche Menschen gerne als *Leistungsträger* der Gesellschaft bezeichnet. Da Leistung aber nicht getragen, sondern erbracht werden muss, entsteht dadurch ein seltsames Bild, das den Eindruck erweckt, reiche Menschen würden den Rest der Gesellschaft auf ihren breiten Schultern tragen.

Tatsächlich entsteht Reichtum jedoch selten aus Arbeitseinkommen, sondern resultiert aus Erbschaften und Schenkungen. Geerbtes Vermögen ist aber Vermögen ohne Leistung. Vermögenstransfers, meist innerhalb der Familie, ermöglichen damit eine stabile, generationenübergreifende soziale Privilegierung. Im Gegensatz zu anerkannten Leistungen von erfolgreichen Sportlern bedarf die Leistungsanerkennung von vielen Reichen jedoch einer ideologischen Deutung und Unterstützung von Politik und Medien, welche die soziale Verantwortung der Reichen betonen.

## Philanthropie im Wohltäterkapitalismus

Vermögende verweisen selbst gerne auf millionenschwere Investitionen in technologische Entwicklungen, deren Vorzüge der Allgemeinheit später zugutekämen, oder auf Philanthropie, die den Bedürftigen helfe. Gemäß der semantischen Bedeutung des Wortes wollen die Philanthropen unter den Reichen als Menschenfreunde und als vermögend in einem immateriellen Sinn geschätzt werden. Doch allein der Eventcharakter von *Charity* belegt, dass es vorrangig nicht um Mitgefühl geht, sondern um repräsentative Ziele. Galerien oder Museen bilden oft den kulturellen Rahmen, der reichen Wohltätern eine beruhigende Distinktion gegenüber den unteren sozialen Schichten erlaubt.

Bei der Philanthropie der Reichen werden eindrucksvolle Vermögensbeträge erreicht. Die Millionen- und Milliarden Spenden faszinieren auf Grund von deren Höhe. Doch die reichen Wohltäter zeigen mit ihren Spenden zuerst nur, dass sie unvorstellbar reich sind und nicht, dass sie unvergleichlich generös sind. Denn durch ihre Wohltaten erfah-



ren sie noch keine nennenswerten materiellen Einschränkungen in ihrem Leben.

Vor dem Hintergrund einer weit verbreiteten Bewunderung reicher Menschen genügen oft auch Anekdoten zu vermögenden Wohltätern, um deren gesellschaftliche Stellung und Relevanz zu legitimieren, wie das Beispiel des bekannten Räuberbarons und einst reichsten Mannes seiner Zeit, Andrew Carnegie, belegt. 1848 als Sohn einer armen schottischen Arbeiterfamilie in die USA ausgewandert, verlief sein Leben als eine amerikanische Bilderbuchkarriere. Carnegie machte Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts ein Vermögen in der Eisenbahn- und Stahlindustrie und betonte immer wieder, dass Reichtum sozial verpflichte. Die Realität sah jedoch anders aus. Der *Homestead Strike* 1892 in einer von Carnegies Fabriken war eine der blutigsten Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Arbeitern und Kapitalisten in der Geschichte

tus reicher Menschen zunehmend wichtiger. Und während die Wohltaten einiger weniger Privilegierten im Mittelpunkt der Aufmerksamkeit stehen, bleiben die negativen Folgen der Vermögenskonzentration auf Gemeinwesen und Demokratie weitestgehend im Verborgenen.

So nehmen Vermögende im *Wohltäterkapitalismus* Einfluss auf Steuersysteme und öffentliche Subventionen zugunsten ihrer eigenen Unternehmen. Herrschafts- und Privilegiensicherung durch demonstrative Wohltätigkeit wird dadurch zu einer vielversprechenden Strategie. Ein als ineffizienter Bürokratenapparat desavouierter Wohlfahrtsstaat weicht langsam aber stetig vor vermeintlich effizienten und effektiven reichen Wohltätern zurück. Reiche verfolgen so ihr Ziel, eine verdiente superiore soziale Stellung in der Gesellschaft einzunehmen. Für verdient hielten auch schon die aristokratischen Reichen des 18. und 19.

Bei den Rechtfertigungen von Reichtum – so unterschiedlich diese auch ausfallen mögen – handelt es sich um weiche Formen gesellschaftlicher Steuerung. Und auch in Zukunft gilt: Reichtum bleibt für die meisten Menschen unendlich fern. Abstrakte Vermögenszahlen von Superreichen erlauben keine Vergleiche mit der eigenen Lebensrealität. Und eine weit verbreitete Empörung über die enormen Anteile der Top 1% am gesamten Vermögen leitet noch nicht zu einer Gesellschaftskritik an den Herrschaftsverhältnissen über. Und sogar wenn eine bestimmte Legitimation von Reichtum rational widerlegt wird, ist man von einer gleicheren Verteilung in einer machtungleichen Gesellschaft weit entfernt. Die Kritik mancher Reichtumsbegründungen hilft vielleicht die Position der Reichen zu schwächen, entscheidend ist aber die effektive Unterstützung durch eine reichenfreundliche Politik.



Wien, Stephansplatz, Aktion der Freunde des Wohlstands, In Cash We Trust, Bankenrettung.

der USA. Er dauerte über vier Monate, beinhaltete Aussperrungen der Belegschaft und gewalttätige Auseinandersetzungen mit den Streikbrechern. Mehrere Arbeiter starben und

Jahrhunderts ihre superiore Stellung. Ihr Verständnis von Verdienst war jedoch ein anderes: Das Privileg resultierte aus der Geburt. Im 20. Jahrhundert wurde dann nicht mehr

Eine reichenaffine Politik meidet eine relationale Reichtumsbetrachtung, die auf beide Pole der Verteilung, arm und reich, innerhalb einer Gesellschaft achtet. Denn sichtbar

Vermögensmilliardäre können in einer rationalen Evaluierung nicht milliardenfach leistungstärker sein als Arme.

hunderte wurden verletzt. Die streikenden Arbeiter mussten schließlich der Gewalt weichen. Dieser Lebensabschnitt von Carnegie ist in der Öffentlichkeit allerdings weniger bekannt als seine wohltätigen Stiftungen und Spenden, die sich auf rund 350 Millionen US-Dollar belaufen haben sollen. Durch den Vorfall hatte seine Reputation gelitten und Schuldgefühle könnten mitunter der Grund gewesen sein, weshalb er seinen Namen durch Spenden reinwaschen und durch Stiftungen für die Nachwelt in positiver Erinnerung behalten wollte. Andrew Carnegie ist hier keine Ausnahme. Die Möglichkeit eines ideellen Weiterlebens im Andenken Anderer macht generell einen Reiz gemeinnütziger Stiftungen aus. Gerade deshalb weil Reichtum nicht kohärent über Leistung begründet werden kann, wird sichtbares karitatives Handeln für den sozialen Sta-

das „gemachte Nest“ hochgehalten, sondern ein Narrativ von Anstrengung und Chancengleichheit propagiert. Der Alleingang beim sozialen Aufstieg brachte mehr an Reputation als das Halten eines privilegierten sozialen Status über Generationen hinweg. Die Vermögenskonzentration im 21. Jahrhundert scheint nun eine hinreichende Güte der Reichen zu begünstigen, welche staatliche Umverteilung von oben nach unten obsolet macht. Doch die Hoffnung auf die Großzügigkeit der Reichen war schon bei Immanuel Kant zu recht nicht eben hoch angeschrieben. Kants Pflichtethik betonte, dass keine Großzügigkeit geschuldet wird, da diese für die Empfänger eine Form von Erniedrigung darstellt. Der Mensch muss seinen Mitmenschen aufgrund ihrer Rechte Respekt entgegenbringen. Dies wäre ein zutiefst demokratischer Zugang.

werden dann Leistungskürzungen bei Arbeitslosen, Einschränkungen bei der Mindestsicherung und eine gleichzeitige Ausweitung der Privilegien der Reichen. Dies bildet jene soziale Realität, die keine rationale Legitimation von Reichtum erlaubt. <

Martin Schürz ist Ökonom an der Oesterreichischen Nationalbank, wo er die *Monetary Unit* leitet und an Vermögenserhebungen arbeitet. Seine gemeinsam mit Pirmin Fessler verfasste Arbeit *Private Wealth Across European Countries* wurde mit dem renommierten Progressive Economy-Preis des Europäischen Parlaments ausgezeichnet. Von September bis November 2017 war er ein Albert Hirschman Visiting Fellow am IWM. Am 20. März hielt Martin Schürz einen Monatsvortrag zum Thema „Überreichtum – wann ist viel zu viel?“ Dieser bildete den Auftakt eines neuen Forschungsschwerpunktes zum Thema „Changing Justifications of Wealth“ am IWM (siehe Info-Box rechts).

Living Labs for a Better World continued from page 23

iments taking place in communities within the realm of ordinary planning. Thus they ‘demystify’ radical ruralities and learning from them.

Technological Innovations

In *Findhorn* in Scotland, the CO2 footprint is 2.7, while the average in Scotland is 5.3. In *Lammas*, the footprint is 1.5, while the average in Wales is 4.4. Most of this can be attributed to local, low-cost, do-it-yourself ways of living that don’t suit everybody. But the reduced CO2 footprint is also the result of technological and agricultural innovations. Suderbyn in Sweden is interesting because they have almost finished building a Closed-Loop system, which will be one of the first legal biogas plants in Europe. The results will be disseminated next year in form of an online manual for anyone willing to replicate the system. In Schloss Tempelhof in Germany, the process of personal and democratic transformation in group processes is part of the community’s work. The community bought a whole (deserted) village for its 120 members and has now become self-sufficient, while at the same time preserving heritage. In Russia, a wealthy businessman bought 700 hectares of land to share with up to 2000 people in the years to come. Although the community is founded on rather traditional views, it is at the same time one of the largest permaculture sites in the world, designed by the famous Austrian permaculture expert Sepp Holzer, and as such highly relevant.

Networks As Alternatives to Neoliberal Capitalism

Some communities are part of larger networks. *Lossehof* in Germany is, since 2012, one of the 33 communities that are part of the Kommuja Network. It works towards a society

in which money and possession are no longer predominant, while rejecting power structures and leadership. In Spain there is *Calafou*, which is part of the Catalan Integral Cooperative (CIC). Here, all communities work together on a set of common goals, which include abolishing materialism, guaranteeing social justice and equity, encouraging non-monetary forms of exchange, and calling for de-growth and integral revolution. This may sound far-fetched, but since 2008 the CIC has been very effective in setting up its own food production systems, currencies and housing networks. In Lithuania, the *IzReal* works globally on setting up companies based on money flows outside regular banking systems (loans, mortgages), all of which are coordinated from 500 hectares of land north of Vilnius. These and other Eutopian communities maybe idealistic, but are by no means fantasies. They could be described as living labs, operating from the countryside or the fringes of cities, working on alternatives to the economic and capitalist values with a smaller ecological footprint. They are radical in nature, but very real. They operate from the countryside but are applicable in cities too. Not all may be suitable for everyone, however these radical ruralities are here to stay and worthy of closer examination. Death may be in Arcadia, but at least these communities are there too. <

Indira van 't Klooster is an architecture journalist and director of the Dudok Architecture Center in The Netherlands. She is editor-in-chief and founder of the online platform for European architecture *A10 New European Architecture Cooperative*, which focuses on architecture in its political, cultural and economic context. The A10 Co-op is owned by 32 architecture journalists in 25 European countries ([www.a10.eu](http://www.a10.eu)). She was a Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow at the IWM in 2017.

Changing Justifications of Wealth: New Research Focus at the IWM

We know a lot about poverty and the poor but surprisingly little about the rich and highly privileged. While unearned wealth needs no justification in India or builds a basis for philanthropy in the USA, for instance, there has been a radical change in political discourses on accumulation of wealth in many post-socialist societies, albeit with fascinating differences between Russia and China. Understanding of these differences over time and across space could help place the question of a decent life for all on the political agenda once again.

Drawing on scholarship in political philosophy, economics, law, sociology, history, comparative religion and sociology/social anthropology, the IWM has launched a new research focus entitled *Changing Justifications of Wealth*. By addressing ideas of social responsibility stemming from old and new forms of wealth, the changing aesthetics of public display of wealth, and moral or religious legitimations of a duty to share or redistribute wealth, or the tensions between the legal and the moral normative orders it will focus on questions such as: How have justifications for wealth changed over time in various societies? Whom does wealth have to be publicly

justified to? How is deserved and undeserved wealth distinguished and what is seen to constitute too much wealth? Why and in what ways do such justifications vary across societies? How have they changed of late? What political discourses have accompanied recent changes in laws related to wealth tax, inheritance or gift tax and what challenges have these faced in constitutional courts? Since beliefs about economic inequality are shaped by views about the rich rather than about the poor, it would be interesting to look at the arguments advanced by the rich themselves to legitimize differences in wealth as well as to delineate varied public perceptions of their wealth. Addressing questions of justifications for concentration and familial transmission of wealth in a historical and comparative perspective may contribute towards a different public discourse on responsibility and redistribution on a national but also on a global scale.

The first exploratory workshop took place on May 4–5, 2018. Future conferences will explore the role of religion, political culture and legal norms in justifying unearned wealth and its inter-generational accumulation.



## Der König mit der schwarzen Krone Josef Wais (1944–2017)

VON KLAUS NELLEN

Als ich Josef Wais das letzte Mal besuchte, war er schon halb in einer anderen Welt, aber seine kreative Fantasie war ungebrochen. Wir haben ein langes, wunderbares Gespräch geführt, über Menschen, Dinge und Ereignisse – solche, die es gab, und solche, die es nicht gab.

Kennengelernt habe ich Josef Anfang der 1980er Jahre, als er damit beauftragt wurde, die Lampen des eben gegründeten Instituts für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM) zu entwerfen und zu bauen. Sie haben sich mit der Expansion des IWM im Laufe der Zeit vermehrt und hängen immer noch – keine wie die andere. Diese Lampen – oder besser schwebenden Skulpturen – stellen einen integralen Bestandteil der Corporate Identity des IWM dar. Über 1.000 Fellows aus der ganzen Welt hat das Institut seit damals beherbergt. Jede/r hat in ihrem oder seinem Büro unter dem sanften Licht der Wais-Lampen geforscht und unter ihrem Schein in der Bibliothek und der Mensa gelesen, diskutiert, gespeist.

Später kamen auch Möbel hinzu – Schreibtische, Regale, etc. Am bemerkenswertesten waren ein riesiger Tisch, genannt der Afrika-Tisch wegen seiner unregelmäßigen Form, ein Lesepult, an dem sich bis heute die Vortragenden festhalten, und



Afrika-Tisch und Lampe  
im IWM Besprechungszimmer

Photo: Philipp Steinlechner

Siggi – ein Arbeitstisch mit einem kokett geschwungenen Bein. Diese Möbel waren bereits Bestandteil des Programms der StilbruchAG von Graf+Zyx. Sie seien inspiriert, sagte Josef damals, von seiner „Sympathie zu fliegenden Lebewesen aus Transsylvanien“. Jedenfalls wird die unverwechselbare Innenarchitektur des Instituts bis heute von seinen Gästen und BesucherInnen bewundert, die dann ihre Eindrücke mit nach Hause nehmen.

Die Breite von Josefs Schaffen erschloss sich mir erst im Laufe der Zeit. Er war nicht nur in der angewandten, sondern auch in der bildenden Kunst zu Hause, insbesondere in der Fotografie. 1982 gründete er die bis heute bestehende Fotogalerie Wien mit dem Ziel, zeitgenössische Fotokunst zu zeigen – Arbeiten, oft auch von jungen KünstlerInnen, die offen für neue Medien sind und auf aktuelle Fragen reagieren.

1997 lud das IWM Josef Wais ein, die „Photoessays“ zu kuratieren, die in unserer Zeitschrift *Transit* erschienen. Er (und ich vermute, Susanne Gamauf wirkte da so manches Mal mit) brachte neue, unglaublich interessante Fotografinnen und KünstlerInnen mit, zumeist aus der österreichischen Szene, darunter (chronologisch) Leo Kandl, Helmut und Johanna Kandl, Mandana Eibegger, Brueckl/Schmoll, Heinz Ci-

bulka, Eva Brunner-Szabo und Gert Tschögl, Fiona Rukschcio, Lisl Ponger, Hubert Lobnig und Hermann Paul Huber. Aber auch Susanne und Josef selbst trugen fotografische Arbeiten in *Transit* bei. Bemerkenswert war Josefs Beitrag zum Heft „Ten Years After“, das 1999 erschien und ein erstes Resümee der Wende von 1989 zog. Ich erinnere mich an zwei geradezu prophetische Bilder – Vorausahnungen der kommenden Krisen: eine Burger-Semmel, gefüllt mit Dollars, und ein EU-Fähnchen unter einer Glasglocke.

Josefs kuratorische Vorschläge waren nicht immer unkontrovers, insbesondere der Herausgeber von *Transit* hatte öfter Schwierigkeiten, einen Zugang zu finden – aber er ließ ihn machen. 2011 legte Josef diese Tätigkeit nieder, ihm folgte dann Walter Seidl. Was blieb, war eine Freundschaft, von der ich, muss ich im Rückblick sagen, nicht genug Gebrauch gemacht habe. Und was bleibt, sind Josefs Werke, und unsere Erinnerungen an ihn – an den König Wais mit seiner schwarzen Krone. <

**Klaus Nellen** ist emeritierter Permanent Fellow am IWM. Von 1990 bis 2015 war er Redakteur von *Transit – Europäische Revue*.

Photos: Josef Wais / Serie: Kriegen 1991; Ten Years After (rechts)

## Moishe Postone (1942–2018)

BY ISTVÁN ADORJÁN

A little more than a year ago, Moishe Postone (7"r) wrote to me with his characteristic mixture of wry humor and profoundly humane concern for alarming socio-political developments that we “could begin to discuss a sort of peripatetic reading group, shuttling between Wien and Budapest... in a small attempt to contribute to a model of Central European critical integration against the new Austro-Hungarian consortium of dangerous scoundrels”. This new “k.u.k.’ center for counter-hegemonic ruminations,” as he facetiously called it, would have been facilitated by his imminent return to Vienna as senior visiting fellow at the IWM during the 2017–18 academic year. As excited as he was about this prospect, our plans were thwarted by his busy fall schedule at first, and eventually by the inexorable ravages wrought by the illness he had been fighting on and off for a decade.

We already crossed paths in Vienna back in 2016 (I was a Junior Fellow at the IWM at the time), after I worked for many years with Moishe as a graduate student at the University of Chicago. While I had already been familiar with his magnum opus,



Photo: Private

*Time, Labour, and Social Domination*, when I originally moved to Chicago, his brilliant seminars on the Frankfurt School and Marx’s *Capital* still proved nothing short of a true intellectual revelation. At the same time, he would field even the most naïve questions from awestruck un-

dergraduate students (the few who dared sign up for his graduate courses) with exemplary patience and attention. His concern, above all, was to instill a sense of critical thinking and intellectual rigor in all his students—which I later also witnessed closely during a year of pedagogical apprenticeship with him.

Outside the classroom, he was just as invested in his students. The legendary Social Theory Workshop, which he had been running with his close friend and colleague, Bill Sewell for decades, drew dozens of dedicated members even at unusually late hours. And Moishe made absolutely sure every single time to devote all his energy to a painstakingly meticulous critical discussion of the papers presented therein, regardless of the topic or the speaker. His towering intellectual presence may have even appeared to be intimidating at times, and yet he was incredibly warm and caring. His kindness and generosity of spirit were immediately noted by those who had just encountered him for the first time. No person who ever met him could forget the benevolent smile and twinkling eyes that added a rare human touch to the most ar-

duous critical debates he happened to be engaged in.

He was certainly no stranger to theoretical controversy, albeit not the commonly practiced academic pettifoggery kind, which we have all grown accustomed to these days. Instead, he sought to redeem praxis-driven social theory from the clutches of ideologues (supporters and detractors alike) and show its continued relevance to the contemporary world. Hence, he was neither interested in solipsistic position-takings that would guarantee mere academic recognition or consecration, nor did he give in easily to the pseudo-revolutionary exuberance of many fellow leftist intellectuals for the sake of ensuring a steady mass of followers. Throughout his long career, Moishe ceaselessly insisted that he was not trying to convert anyone to Marxism, but was rather intent on adequately elucidating Marx’s mature critical social theory so that anyone could then decide whether they found it persuasive enough when stripped of all the misconceptions and distortions.

Faced with the changing epochal threats of the crises of work and the environment in contemporary

capitalism, he embarked with an acute sense of urgency on extending his groundbreaking reinterpretation of *Das Kapital*—an immense task that will now remain unfinished. As ever, the “tyranny of time in capitalist society” continued to be of central importance in his analysis, but the tyranny of a different kind of time cruelly defeated him in the end. Even as he was already battling his illness under the spectral threat of what we all stubbornly refused to acknowledge, he would wistfully, almost apologetically, express his disappointment that he would not be able to resume work for some time. And then all hope was extinguished... We may all pretend that his spirit will continue to live on in so many of us who were fortunate to have known him, but the sad truth is that we can only hope to pick up fragments (broken vessels, as it were) from his rich legacy at best. <

His last public talk was at the Vienna Humanities Festival in 2017 (see p. 21)

**István Adorján** is a doctoral candidate at the Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago. In 2016, he was a Krzysztof Michalski Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM.



# Liberal Transitions, Anti-Liberal Threats, and Intellectual Reflexivity. A Portrait of János Mátyás Kovács

BY BALÁZS TRENCSENYI

I first met János towards the turn of the millennium at the editorial board of the Budapest-based cultural journal *2000*, one of the flagships of Hungary's post-transition public sphere. He was among the editors and I was an ardent reader and occasional contributor. I knew some of his texts on the doctrinal underpinnings of economic transition in the region, but I did not know much about his professional and intellectual background. It also took me some time to grasp the multi-local life he led, based around the two former capitals of Kakanien and coloured by his somewhat surprising quasi-Narodnik predilection for a peasant house on the Danube, close to the border between Cis- and Transleithanien.

We came to meet more regularly in autumn 2002 when I was invited to spend a term at the IWM, after which I also joined the editorial board of *2000*. From then on, we spent every Monday evening for a decade and a half together. We discussed each new issue of our journal and, equally importantly, listened to the stories, historical anecdotes, political news, and cultural gossip of the distinguished group of intellectuals around the journal. They mostly represented the generation born after the Second World War to families deeply affected by the rise of competing totalitarian projects, both as victims prior to 1945 and as "true believers" in the communist experiment after the war.<sup>1</sup> These intellectuals matured in the late 1960s as generational conflicts exploded around 1968, a cathartic experience. They then became involved in the rather extensive grey zone of cultural dissent in the 1970s, emerging as important figures of the cultural and political struggles for democratization in the late 1980s, and eventually having a formative impact on cultural and academic transformation after 1989.

In the midst of this illustrious team, János was usually the most silent and most attentive participant—allowing the others to delve into complicated accounts to which he, from time to time, added highly ironic and often bittersweet comments about the complexities of the relationship between intellectuals and power. The main outlet for his essayistic and sentimental self have been the essays published in *2000* under the pseudonym Nick Elsdorf.<sup>2</sup> These essays implicitly but quite unmistakably draw on the Central European autobiographical feuilleton and travelogue tradition that stretches from Karl Kraus and Sándor Márai to Aleksander Wat and Danilo Kiš.

The voice of Nick is that of a timid but extremely perceptive *flâneur*, often hiding behind the mask of a modern Candide, wedged between two seemingly separate but, in reality, deeply interconnected lifeworlds. These cultural and political contexts are at once home and alien to him. His essays offer surprising parallels that provoked the Hungarian reader who grew up with various civilizational or identity narratives that pit these two countries against one other ("Western" Austria vs. "Eastern" Hungary, but also: the oppressing imperial centre vs. the freedom-loving "kuruc" Magyars); and the Austrian—virtual—reader who views "provincial" Hungary from the heights of his or her civilizational superiority while elegantly forgetting about the disturbing historical and social phenomena of "everyday fascism."

Beyond the sheer intellectual force of his witty observations, it becomes clear to the attentive reader that there is a rather rigorous *Weltanschauung* behind the seemingly airy and contextually highly specific texts—that of a dogged anti-totalitarian liberal whose commitment to a set of social and economic doctrines is rooted not in a belief in the "sovereign consumer" who came to be the central figure of neoliberal political economy; but rather in the conviction that the vast étatist economic programmes seeking to impose social justice on these highly differentiated societies always went hand-in-hand with left- or right-wing autocratic political practices and often also with brutal projects of social and ethnic homogenization. In contrast to which, János has maintained his conviction that the market might be a more humane regulator of economic relations (but not necessarily of all social and cultural processes) than any political elite, no matter how enlightened or determined, who claim to know better the *volonté générale*.

For those readers who are familiar with the history of economic thought, the field in which János has been working for 40 years, these ideas might well resonate with discussions of reform among economists in the socialist camp. In the wake of the grand theories of Oskar Lange and Włodzimierz Brus in Poland, or Ota Šik in Czechoslovakia, these economists sought a combination of market mechanisms and socialist redistribution that in many ways prepared the way for socioeconomic transformations after 1989. Their debates were very much the focus of public attention in Hungary in the late 1960s and early 1970s, especially following the introduction



Photo: Michael Jentler

in 1968 of the New Economic Mechanism, a daring but eventually only partially implemented reform package seeking to bring market incentives to the "Goulash communist" socioeconomic system. This provided the context for János's intellectual maturing. In 1973, he finished his university studies at the University of Economics in Budapest, an institution named after Karl Marx at the time, and became a research fellow at the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest. Two years later, he defended his doctoral dissertation on "The Market Economy of the New Economic Policy," a work that highlighted an important and obvious parallel to the 1968 New Economic Mechanism.

The choice of topic also demonstrated his interest in historicizing economic debates. János's Institute was indeed a hotbed for radical thinking on economic reform. While neoclassical economics increasingly provided most of his colleagues with their epistemological and methodological framework, János shared the critical take of the reformist economists on the increasingly dysfunctional late socialist economic system as entering into a deepening credit crisis but placed all this in a historical context. In a way, he represented a kind of "historical school" (albeit nothing to do with the German "historical school of economics") that offered a historical context to the debates of the macroeconomic analysts who in the late 1980s were increasingly falling for Thatcherite programs.

In the late 1980s, he became a leading analyst of the economic transformation of East-Central Europe, looking at transition scripts and economic doctrines. The expertise that he accrued as a result made him internationally visible. In 1987, he was invited to come to the IWM, then a new and dynamic, small but expanding institution that was seeking to combine philosophical reflection on the complex heritage of the 20<sup>th</sup> century with political and social analysis of the unexpected and fascinating process of democratic transformation in the "Other Europe." Upon becoming a Permanent Fellow at the IWM in 1991, János initiated

research projects on Eastern European economic and cultural transition. He published numerous articles and edited volumes, including the special issue of *Eastern European Politics and Societies* entitled "Rediscovery of Liberalism in Eastern Europe" (Winter 1991), the volume *Reform and Transformation: Eastern European Economics on the Threshold of Change* (co-edited with Márton Tardos, 1992) and a further edited collection of essays, *Transition to Capitalism? The Communist Legacy in Eastern Europe* (1994). In addition, he served as an editor of *Transit*, IWM's major journal for the publication of empirical research as well as interpretative essays on regional and global processes of transformation. While he spent most of his time in Vienna, János never abandoned his commitment to Hungarian academia, remaining an external fellow of the Institute of Economics in Budapest and teaching the history of economic thought as well as the political economy of communism at Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE). In the 2000s, he also repeatedly served as guest professor at the Central European University and, from 2009, taught the history of economic thought at ELTE's newly established Department of Economics.

Seeking to combine his global horizons and local knowledge, János mapped the dilemmas of globalization in the Hungarian context in a project that resulted in a voluminous edited collection of studies (*A zárva várt Nyugat / The West as a Guest*, 2002). This project sought to document the multifaceted adaptations and hybridizations of Western prescriptions and practices as well as new experiences in Hungarian society of complex transnational networks and processes such as migration, the transformation of the media space, the rise of the English language as a global means of communication, or the presence of American military facilities in Hungary. In 2004, he launched DIOSCURI, the next major project, concerned with the interplay of western and eastern patterns of development after 1989. The focus here was mainly on economics, with a clear outcome being that, for better or worse, East-

ern Europeans experienced much more radical market-oriented transformative policies than the ones implemented within the very Western models that their political elites were trying to emulate. The results of this project were published in the book he co-edited with Violetta Zentai, *Capitalism from Outside? Economic Cultures in Eastern Europe after 1989* (2012).

Like many of us who experienced the transition years as an apparently euphoric break with various totalitarian and post-totalitarian legacies, János was also deeply affected by the increasingly illiberal and autocratic backlash in the region that became all the more systemic in 2010 with the introduction of the "System of National Cooperation" in Hungary. At the same time, he emphatically rejected the increasingly fashionable criticism of transition coming both from the "new" Right and the "new" Left as being a fundamental mistake, not to mention a deliberate neoliberal plot. He remained committed to a highly reflexive liberal position, always pointing out that the track record of economic transition in the region was without a doubt mixed but definitely not completely negative. János argued that the often fervently criticized process of globalization had in fact created much more liveable lives for many members of non-Western societies than the various populist and state socialist regimes ever could. It is in this context that he sought to respond to anti-liberal critics, who focussed on the breakthrough of neoliberalism among the milieu of late socialist economic experts, by developing a new project on the history of economic thought in the region: "Between Bukharin and Balcerowicz: A Comparative History of Economic Thought under Communism," which he launched in 2017. In this sense, his retirement is definitely not a sign of his parting with academic research, János's intellectual curiosity is as acute as ever. At the same time, given that he is now the last from the team of the 1980s to leave the IWM, his departure doubtlessly marks a symbolic caesura in the institution's history and perhaps also signals a definitive end to the period commonly associated with the notion of "post-communist transition." Now a new historical phase is taking its course, with a very different system of coordinates and characterized by the phenomena of populism, illiberalism, "unorthodox economic policies," and the re-emergence of autocratic models in East-Central Europe and beyond. <

<sup>1</sup> The one exception was the dozen of the group, the late Endre Bojtár (1940–2018), a literary historian of East-Central Europe and a member of the board of the IWM's Paul Celan Fellowships, whose generational perspective and life experience was somewhat different.

<sup>2</sup> A not particularly veiled use of "Nickelsdorf", the name of the border village between his two countries of residence, a village present in Hungarians' collective memory as the site of a frantic outburst of consumerism in the late 1980s, when Hungarians could finally cross the border, often to spend their cherished hard currency on video players.

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# Krzysztof Michalski's Intellectual Legacy

The 8<sup>th</sup> of June 2018 would have been the 70<sup>th</sup> birthday of Krzysztof Michalski, the Founding Rector of the IWM. In order to honour his memory the IWM will launch the annual Krzysztof Michalski Memorial Lecture at this year's Fellows Meeting.

Furthermore, the IWM is happy to announce that the Jan Patočka Archive at the IWM will be extended by the literary estate of Krzysztof Michalski with the purpose of making his writings available for research and publication. Based on the bibliography established by Michalski himself, his publications and manuscripts have been catalogued and digitized with the help of Hanna Fischer, former IWM librarian. There are already plans for projects related to Michalski's oeuvre which can hopefully be realized in the coming years.

The new research site will be established next to the IWM's Patočka Archive which aims at collecting, exploring and disseminating the oeuvre of the Czech philosopher. Ever since it was established in 1984, it has provided a stable basis for international research and numerous editions of his works in various languages. Michalski considered himself a student of Jan Patočka who had studied with Husserl und Heidegger. In this way, the IWM will harbour the writings of two Central European thinkers and representatives of the second and third generations of phenomenologists.

Head of both, the Patočka and the Michalski Archives, will be Ludger



Photo: Philipp Steinkeller

Hagedorn, Permanent Fellow at the IWM since March 2018. The setting up of the Michalski Archive will be supported by Piotr Kubasiak who visited the IWM as a Junior Fellow in 2016/17. His forthcoming dissertation on Michalski's life and work will be the first monograph on the Polish philosopher. Kubasiak will join the IWM for another three months in 2018.

The IWM is grateful to Krzysztof Michalski's daughters, Kalina and Julia, for entrusting the Institute with taking care of their father's intellectual bequest.

Along with setting up the Michalski Archive, the Institute is presently

making an inventory of the records that document the research activities and history of the IWM since its inception in 1982. This collection includes materials of various kinds and in different formats, including correspondences, research project and conference files, records of lectures, working papers, photo and audio archives, the IWM*post*, and the IWM's publications. The Polish National Library has offered its generous support with professionally cataloguing and digitizing both the Michalski and the Institute papers in order to preserve and make them accessible to future international research. <

# Welcome New Board Members

The IWM is pleased to announce that four new members joined the Institute's Board of Trustees in 2017: **Ana Palacio, Wolfgang Petritsch, Vesna Pusić and Dariusz Stola**. We extend a very warm welcome to all of them and look forward to our future cooperation.



Photo: Ana Palacio

**Ana Palacio** is an international lawyer specializing in international and European Union law. She was a member of the European Parliament (1994–2002) and served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain (2002–2004) as well as member of the Spanish Parliament (2004–2006). She has been Senior Vice-President and General Counsel of the World Bank Group and Secretary General of ICSID.



Photo: Petra Spola

**Wolfgang Petritsch** is the President of the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation. He was the EU's Special Envoy for Kosovo (1998–1999), EU chief negotiator at the Kosovo peace talks in Rambouillet and Paris (1999), and then High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999–2002). Beyond that, he served as the Austrian ambassador to the UN in Geneva and to the OECD in Paris.



Photo: Vesna Pusić / Flickr / Wikimedia

**Vesna Pusić** served as a First Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia (2012–2016) and Minister of Foreign and European Affairs (2011–2016) in the Cabinet of Zoran Milanović. She is known as outspoken liberal and an advocate of European integration, gender equality and LGBT rights. She chaired the parliamentary committee for tracking the progress of Croatia's accession negotiations with the European Union and held the post of Vice-President of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR).



Photo: Magdalena Starowiejska / Muzeum POLIN

**Dariusz Stola** is the director of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw and Professor of History at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. He is a fellow at the Center for Migration Research, Warsaw University and has widely published on the history of Polish-Jewish relations, the communist regime in Poland and on international migrations in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

# Upcoming Events 05–09 2018

May

May 14

Podiumsdiskussion  
**Der eingewanderte Antisemitismus**

Der Künstler Arik Brauer löste mit dem Ausspruch, er habe als Jude vor den Nazis weniger Angst als vor den arabischen Zuwanderern, eine breite Debatte über alte und neue Formen des Antisemitismus in Österreich aus. Die in Kooperation mit dem Falter am IWM organisierte Debatte knüpft daran.

**Arik Brauer**  
Maler, Musiker und Dichter  
**Matthias Dusini**  
Leiter, *FALTER*-Feuilleton  
**Melissa Erkurt**  
Redakteurin, *das biber*  
**Theodor Much**  
Autor und Facharzt für Dermatologie  
**Milos Vec** (Moderation)  
Rechtshistoriker und IWM Permanent Fellow

June

May 17

Keynote Speech  
**The Polysemy of 'Religion'**

**Charles Taylor**  
IWM Permanent Fellow; Professor em. of Philosophy, McGill University, Montréal

What people mean by religion covers a wide spectrum: not only because of the differences between different faiths, but also because the category 'religion' is hard to separate from that of 'culture', and is also related to what we often call 'identity'. In his keynote speech at the conference "The End(s) of Religious Community", jointly organized by the IWM and the University of Vienna, the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor reflects on the co-existence of different religions.

June 12 / 19 / 26

IWM Lectures in Human Sciences  
**Reden wir über Reinheit: Normen, Körper, Bilder**

**Valentin Groebner**  
Professor für Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Renaissance, Universität Luzern

„Rein“ ist nicht dasselbe wie „sauber“. Rein ist nicht geputzt, sondern ein Zustand ursprünglicher Unbeflecktheit. Reinheit kann nicht nach Belieben wiederhergestellt werden, sondern ist durch ihre fragile Natur und ihr Bedrohtheit definiert. Valentin Groebner widmet sich im Rahmen der IWM Lectures in Human Sciences 2018 dem Begriff „Reinheit“ und seiner Verwendung aus historischer Perspektive.

September

September 27–30

Vienna Humanities Festival  
**Macht und Ohnmacht**

Das Vienna Humanities Festival – eine gemeinsame Initiative von IWM, Wien Museum und Time to Talk – versammelt zum dritten Mal in Folge führende Persönlichkeiten aus Wissenschaft, Kunst und Kultur zu einem inspirierenden Gedankenaustausch rund um den Wiener Karlsplatz. Timothy Snyder eröffnet das Festival mit der Präsentation seines neuen Buchs *The Road to Unfreedom* (siehe S. 18). Nähere Details: [www.humanitiesfestival.at](http://www.humanitiesfestival.at)

This is just a small selection of events (subject to change)—a complete list of all upcoming lectures, seminars and debates can be found on: [www.iwm.at/events](http://www.iwm.at/events)