



*Ivan Krastev*

## Utopian Dreams of Life Beyond the Border

*Ekaterina Schulmann*

The Future of the State  
and the State of the Future

*Dorothee Bohle*

Resilient  
Neoliberalism?

*Can Journalism Survive?*

Digital Media  
and Democracy

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Editorial

Wirtschaftskrise, Finanzkrise, Medienkrise, Griechenland-krise, Ukrainekrise, Flüchtlingskrise – Die Krise scheint zum Dauerzu-stand geworden zu sein. Die aktu-elle Ausgabe der IWM*post* versucht, diese Entwicklungen kritisch zu be-leuchten und miteinander in Verbin-dung zu setzen.

Ivan Krastev bezeichnet die Mi-gration als die Revolution des 21. Jahrhundert, die sich mithilfe neu-er Medien rasant ausbreitet. Welche Folgen das für die Zukunft der EU und das Verhältnis zwischen west-und osteuropäischen Mitgliedsstaa-ten hat, ist Gegenstand seines Eröff-nungstextes.

Mit den Auswirkungen einer ganz anderen Krise – nämlich der Finanz-krise – beschäftigt sich der Artikel von Dorothee Bohle. Sie zeigt am Beispiel privater Wohnbaukredite, wie unterschiedlich die Strategien einzelner Länder in der Bewältigung dieser Krise waren und warum sie der Neoliberalismus scheinbar un-beschadet überstanden hat.

Eine Branche, die sich ebenfalls massiv im Umbruch befindet, ist die Medienlandschaft. Digitale und so-ziale Medien haben den klassischen Journalismus tiefgreifend verändert – ob diese Entwicklung als Chance oder als Gefahr für die Demokratie zu werten ist, hängt von den politi-schen wie gesellschaftlichen Rahmen-bedingungen ab, wie die Beiträge von Journalisten aus Deutschland, Ma-zedonien, Rumänien, Russland und der Türkei in dieser Ausgabe zeigen.

Ekatarina Schulmann geht ei-nen Schritt weiter und wagt einen Blick ins Jahr 2030: Wie wird der Staat der Zukunft aussehen? Wird sich der traditionelle Nationalstaat, wie wir ihn kennen, auflösen oder wird sich eine Form des „neuen So-zialismus“ durchsetzen?

Die Verhandlungen rund um das transatlantischen Freihandels-abkommen TTIP werden als eine solche Weichenstellung betrachtet. In der ersten Burgtheaterdebatte der Reihe *Europa im Diskurs* kamen so-wohl Befürworter als auch Gegner zu Wort. Ihre zentralen Aussagen sind in dieser Ausgabe zusammengefasst.

Großes Verhandlungsgeschick bewies auch der tschechische Phi-losoph und Politiker Thomas Masa-ryk, der sein Land 1918 aus der Krise und die Tschechoslowakei zur Un-abhängigkeit geführt hat, wie And-ré Liebich anschaulich zeigt.

Um das Erbe des tschechischen Philosophen Jan Patočka und seine Bedeutung für das IWM geht es im Interview, das Jakub Homolka mit Klaus Nellen geführt hat.

Abschließend haben David Jen-kins, Steven Lukes und Katherine Miller als erste Krzysztof Michal-ski Fellows am IWM unterschied-liche Zugänge zum Thema Moral, Gerechtigkeit und soziale Normen einander gegenübergestellt <

Economic crisis, financial cri-sis, media crisis, Greek crisis, Ukrainian crisis, refugee crisis—it seems that the state of crisis has be-come the new normality. The current issue of the IWM*post* takes a criti-cal look at these developments and explores their interconnectedness.

Ivan Krastev argues that mass mi-gration is the revolution of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, rapidly spreading thanks to digital media. In his opening ar-ticle, he analyzes the refugee crisis’ impact on the stability of the Eu-ropean Union and on the relation-ships between its Eastern and West-ern member states.

The consequences of another crisis—the financial one—are ad-dressed by Dorothee Bohle. Taking different countries’ policy responses to large-scale mortgage defaulting as a case study for comparing the va-riety of approaches to dealing with the crisis, she also explores why neo-liberalism seems to have survived it unscathed.

At the same time, technological innovations, such as digital and social media, have utterly transformed the media business. In this issue, jour-nalists from Germany, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Turkey com-ment on the profound changes in their profession and show that wheth-er these are perceived as a risk or an opportunity depends very much on a country’s specific political and so-cial conditions.

Ekatarina Schulmann goes a step further and dares to peep into the future: How will states be governed and organized in 2030? Will the tra-ditional nation-state dissolve in fa-vor of a “new socialism”?

A crucial element setting the course for the future will be the out-come of the current negotiations between the US and the European Union on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The arguments for and against were de-bated in the first of three *Debating Europe* panel discussions at the Vi-enna Burgtheater in 2016, and are summarized in this issue.

As André Liebich explains in his essay, diplomatic skills were also needed in 1918, when Czech philosopher and politician Thom-as Masaryk succeeded in gaining allied support for an independent Czechoslovak state. Jakub Homolka’s interview with Klaus Nellen focuses on the legacy of another Czech phi-losopher, Jan Patočka, and the im-portance of his work for the IWM.

Last but not least, David Jen-kins, Steven Lukes and Katherine Miller—the three inaugural Krzyszt- of Michalski Fellows at the IWM—report on their work together, using the cross-fertilization of philosophi-cal, sociological and anthropologi-cal approaches to tackle questions of morality, social norms, and justice. <

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# Utopian Dreams of Life Beyond the Border

BY IVAN KRASTEV

*Mass migration is the 21<sup>st</sup> century's revolution—leading, in turn, to a counter-revolution which threatens the core idea of the European Union. The refugee crisis has resulted in the reinforcement of stereotypes that Eastern and Western Europe already held about each other.*

A decade ago, the Hungarian philosopher and former dissident Gáspár Miklós Tamás observed that the Enlightenment, in which the idea of the European Union is intellectually rooted, demands universal citizenship. But universal citizenship requires one of two things to happen: Either poor and dysfunctional countries have to become places in which it is worthwhile to be a citizen, or Europe has to open its borders to everybody. Neither is going to happen anytime soon, if ever. Today the world is populated by many failed states nobody wants to be a citizen of, and Europe neither has the capacity nor will its voters ever agree to keep the borders open. So the real debate in Europe is not whether the European Union should make its borders harder to cross—it is clear that it should; the split is over whether we should feel morally right in doing so and how we should best help the most vulnerable people in the world.

## Dictatorship of Global Comparison

In 1981 when researchers at the University of Michigan conducted the first World Values Survey they were surprised to find that nations' happiness was not determined by material well-being. Back then Nigerians were as happy as West Germans. But now, 35 years later, the situation has changed. According to the latest surveys, in most places people are as happy as their GDP would predict. What has happened in the intervening years is that Nigerians have gotten TV sets and the spread of the Internet has made it possible for young Africans or Afghans to see how Europeans live and what their schools and hospitals look like. Globalization has made the world a village, but this village lives under a dictatorship—the dictatorship of global comparisons. People do not compare their lives with the lives of their neighbors anymore: they compare themselves with the most prosperous inhabitants of the planet.

In this connected world of ours migration is the new revolution—not the 20<sup>th</sup> century revolution of the masses, but a 21<sup>st</sup> century exit-driven revolution enacted by individuals and families and inspired not by the pictures of the future painted by ideologues but by Google Maps' photos of life on the other side of the border. It offers radical change now. This new revolution does not require ideology, political movements



Caspar David Friedrich: *Two men by the sea*, 1817, Alte Nationalgalerie, Berlin

or political leaders to succeed. So we should not be surprised that for many of the wretched of the earth crossing the European Union's border is more attractive than any uto-

tional culture and that they will destroy our liberal societies. Fear of Islam, terrorism, rising criminality and a general anxiety over the unfamiliar are at the core of Europe's

borders. It signaled that the threatened majorities that have emerged as a major force in European politics fear and loathe a "world without borders" and demand a Europe-

What we witness today is not what Brussels describes as a lack of solidarity, but a clash of solidarities: national, ethnic and religious solidarity chafing against our obligations as human beings. The refugee crisis made it clear that the European East views the very cosmopolitan values on which the European Union is based as a threat, while for many in the West it is precisely those cosmopolitan values that are the core of the new European identity.

"I can comprehend only with difficulty," German president Joachim Gauck confessed, "when precisely those nations whose citizens, once themselves politically oppressed and who experienced solidarity, in turn withdraw their solidarity for the oppressed."

## Coalition of the Unwilling

Three decades ago "Solidarity" was the symbol of Central Europe and dissident intellectuals claimed that the difference between the East and the West is that the East truly believes in the European Union while the West only belongs to it. So why is it that today Central Europeans have become so estranged from the fundamental values that underpin the European Union and unwill-

*For a growing number of people the idea of change means changing the country where you live, not the government you live under.*

pia. For a growing number of people the idea of change means changing the country where you live, not the government you live under.

The problem with this migrants' revolution is that it has a worrying capacity to inspire a counter-revolution in Europe.

## 'Open Door Policy' under Threat

The myriad acts of solidarity toward refugees fleeing war and persecution that we saw months ago are today overshadowed by their inverse: a raging anxiety that these same foreigners will compromise Europe's welfare model and tradi-

moral panic. Europeans are overwhelmed not by the more than one million refugees who have asked for asylum but by the prospect of a future in which the European Union's borders are constantly stormed by refugees or migrants.

Even before Cologne, the majority of Germans had started to doubt their government's open door policy. Chancellor Angela Merkel, who until recently was the symbol of the European Union's self-confidence and resilience, is now portrayed as a Gorbachev-like figure, noble but naïve, somebody whose "we can do it" policy has put Europe at risk.

The refugee crisis has forced the EU to confront the question of its

Union with clearly defined and well-protected borders. These threatened majorities fear that foreigners are taking over their countries and threatening their way of life, and they are convinced that the current crisis is brought on by a conspiracy between cosmopolitan-minded elites and tribal-minded immigrants.

In short, the refugee crisis is changing European politics and threatening the European project in a way that neither the financial crisis nor the conflict with Russia has.

If the financial crisis divided the EU between creditors and debtors, opening a gap between North and South, the refugee crisis re-opened the gap between East and West.



ing to show solidarity with the sufferings of others?

The scandal of East Europeans' behavior as viewed from the West is not their readiness to build fences to keep out refugees at the very places where walls were destroyed only 25 years ago, but their claim that "we do not owe anything to these people". While in Germany almost 10% of the population took part in various volunteer initiatives aimed at helping the asylum seekers in Eastern Europe, the public in Eastern Europe remains unmoved by the tragedy of the refugees, and leaders there have lambasted Brussels's decision to redistribute refugees among European Union member states. Prime Minister Robert Fico of Slovakia has asserted that his country would be prepared to accept only Christians (there are no mosques in Slovakia, he argued, so Muslim have nothing to do in his country). The leader of the governing Law and Justice party in Poland, Jarosław Kaczyński, warned that accepting refugees is a health risk because they would bring unknown and dangerous diseases with them. Hungary's Viktor Orbán argues that the European Union's moral duty is not to help the refugees, but to guarantee the security of its own citizens. If in most West European countries the refugee crisis polarized societies, pitting advocates of an open door policy against its critics, causing a confrontation between those who open their houses to the refugees and those who are burning refugee camps, in Central and Eastern Europe, the crisis united otherwise fragmented societies in their almost unanimous hostility towards the refugees. It is one of the few times in recent years that governments are saying what the overwhelming majority of people think. While Germans were trying to make sense of East Europeans' compassion deficit, East Europeans were puzzled why Germans who were not ready to foot the bill for the Greeks are eager to help Syrians and Afghans.

The Central European resentment of refugees looks odd if we take into account two things: first, that for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century people in Central and Eastern Europe were preoccupied either with emigrating or with taking care of immigrants. Second, that at present there are simply no Syrian refugees in most Central and East European countries. In 2015, the number of refugees who entered Slovakia, for example, was 169 people and only eight of them asked to stay.

The return of the East-West divide in Europe is not an accident or bad luck. It has its roots in history, demography and the twists of post-communist transition, while at the same time representing a Central European version of popular revolt against globalization.

### Historical Reasons

History matters in Central and Eastern Europe and very often the region's historical experience contradicts some of the promises of globalization. More so than any other place in Europe, Central Europe is aware of both the advantages but also the dark sides of multiculturalism.

While in the Western half of Europe it was the legacy of the colonial empires that shaped encounters with the non-European world, Central European states were born of the disintegration of empires and the processes of ethnic cleansing that followed. The 19<sup>th</sup> century ethnic landscape of Western Europe was harmonious, like a Caspar David Friedrich landscape, whereas that of Central Europe was more like a Kokoschka. While in the pre-war period Poland was a multicultural society where more than a third of the population was German, Ukrainian, or Jewish, today Poland is one of the most ethnically homogeneous societies in the world with 98% of the population being ethnic Poles. For many of them the return to ethnic diversity is a return to the troubled times of the interwar period. And while the European Union is founded on the French notion of the nation (where belonging is defined as loyalty to the institutions of the Republic) and the German notion of the state (powerful *Länder* and a relatively weak federal center), Central European states were built on the reverse: they combine

contrast, the refugee, who could have been yesterday's tourist, is the symbol of the threatening nature of globalization. He comes bringing with him all the misery and trouble of the larger world.

### Demography

Curiously, demographic panic is one of the least discussed factors shaping East Europeans' behavior towards refugees. But it is a critical one. Nations and states have the habit of disappearing in the recent history of Eastern and Central Europe. In the last 25 years around 10% of Bulgarians have left the country in order to live and work abroad. According to United Nations projections, Bulgaria's population is expected to shrink by 27% by 2050. Alarm over "ethnic disappearance" can be felt in many of the small nations of Eastern Europe. For them the arrival of migrants signals their exit from history, and the popular argument that an aging Europe needs migrants only strengthens the growing sense of existential melancholy. When you watch on television scenes of elder-

or the Middle East quite often end up as competitors on the Western job market do not make East Europeans more open to the politics of integrating those refugees. Citizens of the Western Balkan countries are probably the most powerful example of the collateral damage of the current crisis—according to the plan to deal with the growing influx of refugees entering Germany they are to be sent back home without the hope that they can one day return to the EU.

### Resentment of Cosmopolitanism

But at the end of the day, it is Central Europe's deeply rooted mistrust towards a cosmopolitan mindset that divides East and West. The current resentment of cosmopolitanism, which in many aspects reminds us of the successes of the anti-cosmopolitan campaigns in Stalin-dominated Europe, is well captured by the growing eagerness of voters to support nativist political leaders whose major advantage is that they do not speak foreign languages, have no in-

acy of Nazism, while it could be argued that Central Europe's anti-cosmopolitanism is partially rooted in an aversion to communist-imposed internationalism.

### The Return of the East-West Divide

So, how important will the West-East divide in Europe caused by responses to the refugee crisis be for the future of the European Union? Is it going to fade away in the way the division between Donald Rumsfeld's "old Europe" and "new Europe" faded away at the very moment Central Europeans turned against George W. Bush's war in Iraq, or will it lead to the emergence of a two-tier European Union? Is European solidarity possible in the absence of solidarity with the most vulnerable people in the world?

Many in Central Europe today point to the hardening of anti-refugee sentiments in Western Europe, arguing that Europe is no longer divided and that European unity is only one election away (elections that Chancellor Merkel would lose). Now, when Germans have become disillusioned with open-door policies, the differences will be easily bridged. Many Central Europeans celebrate that change of mood in the West as a victory for Eastern Europe's hard-nosed realism over the hypocritical moralism of the West. You can sense a malicious pleasure when reading Central Europeans commenting on the "jewelry law" consensually adopted by the Danish Parliament. According to this law the government will confiscate any valuables of the refugees exceeding slightly more than 1000 euro. Is this what West Europeans' compassion looks like?

But the paradox of the refugee-crisis split in the EU is that the convergence of anti-immigrant sentiments will not bring Western Europe and Central Europe closer. It has even separated them further. Unlike "Germany for the Germans" or "Bulgaria for Bulgarians", the slogan "Europe for Europeans" cannot fly politically. To many conservative Germans who oppose the direction in which German society is heading, Romanians or Bulgarians are no less alien than Syrians, while for the cosmopolitan-minded Germans who embraced Chancellor Merkel's culture of refugee integration, tribal-minded Central Europeans are perceived as the major obstacle to an open-society European Union. In a sad way the split over refugees has reconfirmed all the prejudices that East and West held against each other.

This crisis also demonstrates that European solidarity cannot be divorced from its Enlightenment roots. At the same moment that East Europeans claimed that "we do not owe anything to the refugees", many in the West realized that they owe nothing to Eastern Europe either. <

**Ivan Krastev** is a Permanent Fellow at the IWM and chairman of the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia. The German translation of this article was first published by *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on March 1, 2016 ("Die Utopie vom Leben jenseits der Grenze").

## Attracting tourists and rejecting migrants: that's a short summary of Eastern Europe's view of the ideal world.

a French admiration for the centralized and all-powerful state with the idea that citizenship means common descent and shared culture, as held by the Germans.

In the view of the French political scientist Jacques Rupnik, Central Europeans have been particularly outraged by Germany's criticism directed against them during the refugee crisis, because it was precisely from 19<sup>th</sup> century Germans that Central Europeans borrowed the idea of the nation as cultural unity.

### Post-Communist Transition

But Central Europe's resentment of the refugees is rooted not only in its long history but also in the experiences of post-communist transition. What came after communism and liberal reforms was pervasive cynicism. Central Europe is a world champion in the mistrust of institutions. Faced with an influx of migrants and haunted by economic insecurity, many East Europeans feel betrayed in their hope that joining the European Union would mean the beginning of prosperity and life without crises.

Being poorer than Western Europeans, they point out, how can anyone expect solidarity from us? We were promised tourists, not refugees. The tourist and the refugee have become symbols of the two faces of globalization. Tourists represent the version of globalization we like. Attracting tourists and rejecting migrants: that's a short summary of Eastern Europe's view of the ideal world. The tourist is the benevolent foreigner. He comes, spends, smiles, admires and leaves. He makes us feel connected to the larger world, without imposing its problems on us. In

ly locals protesting the settlement of refugees in their depopulated villages where not a single child has been born for decades, your heart breaks for both sides—the refugees, but also the old, lonely people who have seen their worlds melt away. Is there going to be anyone left to read Bulgarian poetry in 100 years? Moreover, communist-imposed secularism made Central and East Europeans very sensitive to the risk of the destruction of their Christian identity. One does not need to be a believer today to be worried about the future of Christianity and its culture in Central and Eastern Europe. It is also worth remembering that Central and Eastern Europe is the part of Europe that has probably the most complex relationship with Islam. In that region you have two types of countries: countries like Bulgaria, which has the biggest Muslim minority in Europe and is on the border with the Muslim world, and countries like Slovakia, a country without a single mosque. For opposite reasons, both Bulgaria and Slovakia feel very nervous at the idea that most of the refugees are Muslims.

The failed integration of the Roma also contributes to Eastern Europe's compassion deficit. East Europeans fear foreigners because they mistrust the capacity of their society and state to integrate the "others" already in their midst. In many East European countries the Roma are not simply unemployed but unemployable because they drop out of school very early and fail to acquire the skills needed for the 21<sup>st</sup> century job market. It was the failure of Roma integration that makes East Europeans believe that their countries "cannot do it". And the fact that East Europeans and refugees coming from Asia

terest in foreign cultures and avoid visiting Brussels.

Writer Joseph Roth spent most of the interwar years wandering around Europe and taking refuge in the lobbies of grand hotels because for him hotels were the last remnants of the old Habsburg empire, a postcard from a lost world, a place where he felt at home. Some Central European intellectuals do share Roth's nostalgia for the cosmopolitan spirit of the empire, but ordinary citizens of Central Europe do not. They feel comfortable in their ethnic states and deeply mistrust those whose hearts are in Paris or London, whose money is in New York or Cyprus and whose loyalty is to Brussels. In Tony Judt's words, "from the outset eastern and 'central' Europeans, whose identity consisted largely in a series of negatives—not Russian, not Orthodox, not Turkish, not German, not Hungarian and so forth—had provinciality forced upon them as an act of state making. Their elites were obliged to choose between cosmopolitan allegiance to an extraterritorial unit or idea—the Church, an empire, Communism, or, most recently 'Europe'—or else the constricting horizon of nationalism and local interest". Being cosmopolitan and at the same time a "good Pole", "good Czech" or "good Bulgarian" is not in the cards. And it is this historically rooted suspicion of anything cosmopolitan and the direct connection between communism and internationalism that partially explains Central Europe's sensitivities when it comes to the refugee crisis. In this respect the legacies of Nazism and Communism significantly differ. The Germans' drive for cosmopolitanism was also a way for them to flee the xenophobic leg-



# Can Journalism Survive? Digital Media and the Future of Democracy

COMMENTS BY VLAD ODOBESCU, SAŠO ORDANOSKI, GEMMA PÖRZGEN, MARIA STEPANOVA AND GÜNEY YILDIZ

*Once heralded as innovative tools for promoting democracy and enhancing civic participation, digital media quickly started to provoke serious criticism. With armies of paid internet trolls roaming social networks and users selecting their online news portals according to their pre-existing political and social views, it is very hard to maintain the image of digital media as a virtual space for truly open public debate. But it would be hard to deny that in countries where newspapers and TV stations become megaphones for political leaders and oligarchs, digital media very often remain the only source of truly independent information and opinion. Under financial and political pressure conditions of journalists has become increasingly precarious—will social media help them survive or become another nail in their coffin?*



Photo: Margot Kessler / pxiello

## Reviving Romanian Journalism: The Strange Case of Casa Jurnalistului

BY VLAD ODOBESCU

When Vlad Ursulean decided to leave the newsroom of a major Romanian newspaper, the editor-in-chief barely noticed his absence. He was just another kid disappointed by mainstream media, with its hierarchy, its political and business ties and its lack of creativity. He just didn't fit in the pages. But soon after, Vlad rented an old attic in the center of Bucharest, which he named *Casa Jurnalistului*—"The House of Journalists". It was a cold and messy place, but it contained a spirit not to be found in "real" newsrooms. Vlad invited some friends to live there with him. They brought in some donated couches, plugged in their laptops, and start-



Photo: Private

ed dreaming about the journalism they want to do.

In January 2012, Vlad covered the violent anti-government pro-

tests in Bucharest for the new platform. He wanted to know who the young people were who were fighting against the police and what motivated them. His article became an instant Facebook hit, with more views and shares than the stiff accounts published by the newspapers. Soon after that, a community started gathering around the platform, attracted by the idealism and fresh tone of this weird new journalism. *Casa Jurnalistului* would rely on this community to pay the rent and finance bigger projects.

In September 2013, *Casa Jurnalistului* covered in depth the huge protests against a gold mine in Rosia Montana, breaking the silence of

the TV stations and newspapers that were full of ads paid for by the mining company. Romanians who felt unrepresented and betrayed by the media found a voice they could identify with. Some started using the "donate" button at the end of the articles. The reporting was always personal and honest: Vlad and his colleagues were there to represent only themselves and their generation. Since it was a learning process, mistakes were allowed.

Since then the young reporters have moved into a new building with two floors and a big newsroom, full of laptop parts and cameras. Designers and artists joined the community, creating graphics and making the

stories look better and easier to read. *Casa Jurnalistului* travelled on the refugee route from Greece to Austria, wrote about the shale gas explorations, collected the stories of people living in the Bucharest underground system, of drug addicts and children hidden in mental hospitals, and many more. Many of these stories won awards.

The money coming from readers isn't always enough to cover expenses, so they are constantly applying for grants and fellowships and working as fixers for foreign journalists. No one said freedom was going to be easy.

*Casa Jurnalistului* is a perfect example of the huge opportuni-



Vlad Odobescu continued from page 5

ties open to journalism in the digital age. What would have happened to Vlad and his colleagues if they hadn't lived at a time when such a crazy project was possible? All they needed was an idea, enthusiasm and a laptop. Online databases allowed them to create or complete their stories. Free editing tools refined their photos and videos. Facebook, with its "like" and "share" buttons, gave them access to a huge public at zero cost. Online fundraising platforms helped them pay, at least in part, for research trips.

Money is always an issue. Dark forecasts about the future of journalism always come to this part: there isn't enough money online, since most articles are available for free, and there are just too many organizations fighting for a slice of cake. There is no perfect recipe yet, but no options should be rejected: partnerships, fundraising campaigns, paid events, grants, ads. But what is for sure is that people are willing to pay for quality journalism, if they feel part of the story.

In a non-digital age, Vlad Ursulean would have a desk in some shrinking newsroom, listening to a bored editor trying to keep his stories "safe". Or, more probably, he would be doing something other than journalism. In that parallel world, fewer voices are heard; and silence is a natural enemy of good journalism. <

**Vlad Odobescu** is a freelance journalist and member of the Romanian Centre for Investigative Journalism in Bucharest. From October to December 2015 he was a Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

## Journalism Is Dead: Long Live the Vox Populi!

BY SAŠO ORDANOSKI

I belong to a minority of journalists who believe that our profession is doomed. At least journalism in the way we understand it as the preparation of news stories, according to certain professional standards, for publication in the mass-media. Soon, probably not more than a couple of decades from now, that type of journalism will simply become obsolete.

The decline of the journalism might be compared with the role of the horses in modern society. Some hundred years ago, life was unimaginable without horses. They were a central part of everyday human life, essential to agriculture, transport, winning wars and building peace. However, if the last horse were to die tomorrow, nothing would change in our way of life. Horses are wonderful, elegant, beautiful creatures, but their "profession" is outdated. Just like journalism will be, soon.

The Internet changed the world in a way that nobody could have predicted several decades ago, when it was invented. Not only has it changed the way we communicate and gather news and information (through a "democracy of distribution", as Om Malik would put it), it has also influenced our daily habits and basic concepts of privacy, anonymity, the rules of public debate, and political participation.

An older type of news consumption, consisting of prolonged viewing of TV news and the morning ritual of the daily newspaper, is vanishing. The younger public no longer



Photo: Privat

gets its news from traditional platforms. Recent research has shown that two-thirds of British kids own tablet computers and spend more time on the Internet than in front of the TV. Yes, they may still watch TV on their tablets and mobile phones, but they search on-demand content, not live TV. Of course, the debate about program formats and content is still open—but media platform trends are undeniable. In two decades, kids will not even know that TVs were once transmitters of news and information.

And who knows what Apple is "cooking up" in its laboratories. But whatever the next hot tech invention is, it's likely to be even more mobile, more personalized, smaller and better connected than anything we know now.

This change of platforms is essential for changes in the journalistic profession. The "news cycle" of the new digital platforms is measured in hours, and more often in minutes.

The new digital format is screen-frame fixed, measured in words and short videos, not in paragraphs. Fact-checking and backgrounding is improbable, if not impossible. Context doesn't matter much anymore—what is important is speed and attraction. Presidents, supranational organizations and businesses tweet their positions on even the most complicated matters! The race to break news is more important than the competition for well-balanced news with integrity of sources and facts.

Okay, the BBC and CNN, although transformed in ways still unpredictable, will probably survive beyond next two decades. But most of the others will not. Even the giants will have to reduce their own journalistic input for the sake of "civic journalism" and the "you-get-your-say" approach. The result will be ever more shocking, exclusive and scandalous news content.

This rapidly changes the way that advertising money flows through the media, forever crushing the business models of traditional media. For instance, sport and entertainment attracts the biggest advertising budgets on TV, while the news is, comparatively speaking, the biggest spender. That is, if news is not done as merely as the aggregation of whatever is on the Web at any given moment.

Elaborated my views on this at a recent conference, a young member of the audience "jumped" at me, saying that journalists were the very reason why he became a blogger. He saw his role as being to inform the

public about various subjects and "truths" that the traditional media were refusing to inform about, or were doing so dishonestly. "So", he passionately demanded to know, "why is the vanishing of journalism such bad news?"

The news is neither good nor bad as such. It is simply how things are. However, for liberal democracy as we know it, the decline of journalism is certainly bad news. The craft of journalism facilitates public debate, that essential tool of democracy: facts are identified and context is reported, sources and interlocutors are consulted, space and time is given to minority views and less popular opinions, content is "packed" in a credible and responsible way. Without that, democracy rests on a *vox populi* approach, where vocal majorities dictate political decisions increasingly rooted in extreme, intolerant values.

That is why populists, with their easy answers on complex matters, dominate debates on many important issues. To paraphrase Ivan Krastev: you can tweet the revolution, but to reform society you need good, old journalism. Good luck, democracy! <

**Sašo Ordanoski** is a freelance journalist writing for the daily newspaper *Sloboden Pecat* and the *Strengthening Media in Macedonia Project* (USAID) in Skopje. From August to October 2015 he was a Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

## Is Journalism on the Decline? Thoughts From Germany

BY GEMMA PÖRZGEN

Democracy needs people who are well informed and who trust information. In Germany, this has been guaranteed for a long time by public service radio and TV, as well as by a huge variety of newspapers or magazines. Historically, a very specific role in this media landscape was played by the large number of regional newspapers, who were local and close to the people, but also offered reporting from correspondents nationally and abroad.

Digitalization has led to changing reading habits and to an erosion of traditional business models. Today, all media finds itself in a period of fundamental change whose outcome we cannot predict. It remains to be seen whether quality, professional journalism survives this phase, or whether it declines to a degree that could endanger democratic society. So far, the picture is mixed: digitalization offers great chances for journalists and media, but at the same time poses major risks.

Money plays a crucial role. Publishing houses have lost their traditional business model, where ad-



Photo: Privat

vertising foots the bill and where independence for newsrooms and journalists is guaranteed. Advertisers have increasingly lost interest in print; at the same time, circulation figures have shrunk. Publishers must invest in online media and have less money to spend. Online advertising brings in nothing like the same income as print advertising once did. Few readers are willing to pay for online content, because people are used to free consumption. The German media has developed very different approaches to deal with this financially threatening situation.

Some, like the tabloid *Bild Zeitung*, have put up a paywall, offering their digital version *Bild.de* only to subscribers. A new trend is to use native advertising, which is attractive to advertisers, but undermines journalistic standards by mixing journalism and ads in a way which is not transparent to readers.

Journalistic quality is already spiraling downwards. Newspapers like *The Financial Times Deutschland* have closed, around 1000 jobs have been lost since 2012, and the growing number of freelancers are badly paid and live under precarious conditions. Foreign reporting has been reduced and the number of under-reported areas is growing, because research trips are costly and correspondent posts are disappearing. The new trend in the German media is that everything can be reported on by anybody in the news room. This means that research tends to be Internet based and second hand—a disturbing development. Users notice this decline in quality and lose trust in the media, as several recent surveys have shown. A growing number of Germans believe that

the press lies (*Lügenpresse*) and hides facts from its readers.

At the same time, there are some very creative and interesting new media-projects in online-journalism. These show that there is also reason for optimism. Data-journalism has developed as a new field, making huge data understandable and transparent to readers. The individual journalist can now reach his or her readership directly via their own platform, without needing a publishing house. Digitalization offers new opportunities for individuals and media organizations to start a fruitful dialogue with their read-

ers. The biggest German newspaper, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, invites its readers to suggest topics of interest; journalists then work on articles based on these proposals. The media are looking for new sources of finance via crowdfunding and through the support of foundations. There is a new generation of journalists which could still win the game by combining proper journalism with new digital forms and techniques. <

**Gemma Pörzgen** is a freelance journalist based in Berlin. She was a Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow at the IWM in 2015.



Photo: Bernd Matscheding

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# The Manmade Crisis: How Russian Media Ceased Being a Business

BY MARIA STEPANOVA

My colleagues have reflected on the fundamental changes that have occurred in the ways the media functions in recent years. These multilayered changes—which have completely transformed our notions of journalism as both a product and a profession—affect everyone. Nonetheless, the Russian situation is entirely unique.

I often have to think and speak about the systemic crisis that independent media outlets in Russia are facing. In contrast to the tectonic shifts that are happening in the Western media, this crisis is manmade. It is the result of deliberate efforts, of calculated policy, which over the 15 years of the Putin regime has led to a more or less total substitution of classical media outlets by phantom or sham television channels, newspapers, or internet projects, the sole objective of which is to imitate the existence of a free press under unfree conditions. Even now, against a backdrop of political and economic crisis, so much money is invested in the creation of these projects that it could fund the budget of a small state. As the Brezhnev-era ideologue Mikhail Suslov once said, “We don’t skimp on ideology.” In this way, as in so many others, the realities of Putin’s Russia are a parodic copy of its predecessor—the Soviet Union.

The methods used to destroy the independent press are designed to dismantle, one by one, any and all publications that could compete with the phantom media. Fifteen years have passed since the destruction of NTV (the leading independent television channel)—and in the meantime the biggest television channels, publications, and even entire publishing houses have been shut down or forcibly reformed. Now the focus is on a new and complex task—attempting to control the internet.

The real picture of what has happened is this: media has essentially ceased to be a business. For owners and investors, the risks associated with such dangerous properties outweigh the financial and reputational gain; they are looking to divest themselves of their media concerns, and they make strategic and personnel decisions without taking into account the business component. Journalism education (like the entire system of humanities education) is as good as destroyed, and professional standards are eroding or being done away with. State media outlets essentially grow out of the yellow press, in every sense: organizationally, stylistically, ideologically. At the same time, laws are being adopted at many levels that make a journalist’s work impossible: laws on revealing sources, against foreigners working in the media, on foreign agents, on undesirable organizations. Their name is legion.



Photo: Sergey Melnikov

But now what is at stake above all is the internet—and first and foremost social networks, which fulfill the function of the news media when real media outlets cannot fulfill their functions professionally.

But with everything I have detailed, the worst type of deformation that can happen in journalism and to journalists is an internal deformation. In Soviet times this was called “self-censorship” or the “internal editor.” This is a shaky moral situation, when the decision whether to report facts has to be made anew every time, weighing not only the reliability of your sources and the importance of the information you have gotten, but also the problems that the publication of dangerous information can create for a publication and its employees. Won’t they shut down the site, won’t they fire the editor in chief, won’t journalists lose their jobs? As a result, journalists and editors don’t even need to be controlled by the presidential administration—they are already censoring themselves, constructing a difficult balance of truths, half-truths, and silences. Where there should be a single task—finding and reporting information—a second, contradictory one arises: interesting information is dangerous; it needs to be concealed or at least meted out in doses.

In this way, the entire media system as a whole is ailing—it’s just that some are corrupted by money and power, and others fall victim to constant external arm-twisting and internal censorship.

What does this situation mean for Europe? That all the information that they get—from official or unofficial sources—needs to be subjected to a careful reading and corrective. And above all this affects the main information bubble of recent years: the myth of massive support for Putin, that Russia and Putin are one and the same. Millions have been spent to convince the West of this. The reality is far from being so straightforward—but there are fewer and fewer opportunities to see this.

What does this situation mean for Russia? That in the very near future there will be almost no remaining sources of information that can be trusted—and this against the backdrop of a mass societal depression,

a growing economic crisis and the complete lack of any prospects for the future. In essence, the country could return to Soviet standards, to times when the only way to find out what is happening in the country and the world was to arbitrarily interpret official publications. The only thing that can counteract this is a system of free, “partisan” media outlets.

The authorities, as the experience of the last 15 years demonstrates, have their own logic of reaction—and they first go after everything big (judging mainly by audience numbers), after everything that caves under direct pressure (ideally speaking, media = an owner who can be controlled or who needs to be replaced). Publications that haven’t been roped into the system of briefings and agreements, that don’t participate in presidential administration meetings, fall outside the authorities’ comfort zone. To put it bluntly, they’d rather not notice them.

But now the balance of power is shifting. Small, new-style outlets—with small budgets and small staffs, with a limited menu of services, often existing as (and with the legal status of) individual blogs—are on the leading edge, in the front row, so to speak. They have no masters, they have comparatively small audiences, they are diversified (each one is trying to reach its own—relatively sparse—niche audience). But the total audience for this eclectic group of sites is very big—and it is united by a mistrust for official sources of information. Broadly speaking, the audience for this internet archipelago is made up of that official 14% (although there is reason to assume that there were many more than that) that didn’t support Putin in the last elections—that subset of Russians who are political conscious and active and ready for a productive dialogue with the rest of the world (for whom this dialog was never interrupted).

This is a fairly new thing. For the first time in two and a half decades, independent journalism in Russia lacks a flagship publication (and if one appeared, its days would be numbered—it would be marked as enemy number one). This demands work and responsibility from the reader, who is simultaneously an interpreter. And it also demands effort to preserve the little that remains of Russian media—it could become the beginning of a new phase. <

**Maria Stepanova** is an essayist, journalist and poet. She is the editor-in-chief of *COLTA.RU*, a media website dedicated to cultural and social issues launched in 2012. In October 2015, she was a Russia in Global Dialogue Guest at the IWM.

# The Difficulty of Criticising Journalists under Repression

BY GÜNEY YILDIZ

There is abundance of analysis pointing to the loss of public trust and respect in my profession: journalism. The loss of credibility of journalists is more evident in authoritarian countries where journalism is vital for the exercise of political liberties and improvement of human rights.

On the other hand, many mainstream journalists have a higher profile than ever before; with millions of followers on social media and many more followers via prime time TV debate programmes. Yet despite the growth of social media, journalists are still dependent on the platform provided to them by media organisations in order to earn a living and have an influence on the public opinion.

The case of Turkey is very illustrative of how this cycle of diminishing credibility of journalism, the celebrity status of journalists and dependence of journalists on large news organisations effect the style and quality of journalism especially in the mainstream media.

Turkish media have never been free and independent throughout its modern history. Journalists reporting views of political dissidents or ethnic and religious minorities have always been under severe pressure, losing their jobs, facing imprisonment and even death.

But within the last decade, something unique started to take place in the country, where previously mainstream journalists who were approved and encouraged by the previous (and present) governments started to lose their jobs and face imprisonment and even physical attacks. During this period, the number of journalists who lost their jobs in Turkey exceeded hundreds with over a dozen dissident newspapers and TV stations were taken over by the state and dozens of journalists were put in jail.

Surprisingly, the repression faced by these journalists, who were previously treated as celebrities, did not cause a significant public outcry in Turkey. In fact, effects of sacking of journalists from newspapers and TV stations were generally negligible and the ruling AK Party increased its share of votes despite the ceaseless judicial campaign of taking over dissident media organizations.

How can we explain the public apathy towards the suffering of these mainstream journalists? Why Turkish people do not indicate much sign of caring when these journalists fall from government’s or their employers’ favour?

Some of the mainstream journalists who lost their jobs in recent years used to join senior members of the government in their foreign or domestic visits (which is a sure sign of government approval in Turkish context) and penned praising arti-



Photo: BBC

cles and TV commentaries. They positioned themselves as mainstream journalists through the media outlets they work and through their articles in support of the government. With the changing political context, many of them tried to reposition themselves as dissident journalists by appearing in the small independent media outlets and voicing their criticisms of the government. However, repositioning oneself in such a way is not always successful. In the case of Turkey, it did not necessarily translate into the public support.

This situation indicates that the celebrity status that the journalists enjoy and public trust do not necessarily coincide. Although a prominent role given to a journalist by a media institution is crucial for them attain public prominence, continued public support requires a consistent high quality journalism.

This loss of credibility goes hand in hand with the inadequate level of self reflection in the industry. Such a self reflection or criticism is particularly difficult under authoritarian governments. When journalists are under government repression, it often becomes extremely difficult to criticize the quality of their journalism. Although the reason for their repression is not the quality of their journalism, journalists who keep repositioning themselves with the changing political context is one of the reasons for the decline of independent journalism.

Journalism in Turkey suffers from the lack of a tradition of independent and free press and thus unable to gain the trust of the public. In the absence of strong institutions and rule of law, what can protect Turkish journalists against government repression is a broad public support for independent journalism that would make it costly for a government to repress critical journalists. Defending journalists facing repression in Turkey should not necessarily prevent criticisms of the current situation of journalism in Turkey. <

**Güney Yıldız** is a reporter, producer and analyst working for BBC London. From January to March 2016 he was a Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow at the IWM.



# The Future of the State and the State of the Future

BY EKATERINA SCHULMANN

*In a new economy, the contours of which we are only beginning to grasp—post-industrial, post-scarcity, post-work—what might the state look like? How will a society of people who do not “go to work” in a 20<sup>th</sup>-century sense be governed? Are we in for a “new socialism” or for the dissolution of the traditional nation-state, and are these two scenarios really different? What will happen to those who do not fit into this brave new world?*

In the marketplace of predictions for the future of the state, there are currently two lines of thought that are best represented. There is the notion of the impending state-as-service, which brings together producers and consumers of services, thereby minimizing or automating itself almost completely. This networked state, the UBER-state, is not a “vertical of power,” but a coordinator of horizontal structures of civic self-government and self-service. In this libertarian scenario, the government retains only the functions of legitimate violence (border protection, army, police, penitentiary system)—although even here traditional armies and battle lines will be replaced by military companies, operators of drones and pilotless planes, and hybrid conflicts, in which the main component is not direct violence, but propaganda and the media. Even the state’s fiscal duties will be shrunk as much as possible—to the level of the concrete taxpayer, because after all that taxpayer is a consumer of government services.

This notion makes sense: new technologies are capable of thoroughly individualizing civic life, both through the return of elements of direct democracy (as a permanent referendum through networked resources) and via technological means. For example, the true “vertical of power” in big cities are the central heating pipes. If an individual energy source is responsible for delivering heating and energy to each house, it changes both the system of city government and civic consciousness.

## “New Socialism”

The second popular scenario appears to be headed in the opposite direction; it is possible, however, that it does not differ so strongly from the first, but rather dovetails with it (or envelops it entirely, depending on your point of view). This is the notion of so-called “new socialism”—an order of things in which the citizens of developed countries receive a direct monetary income based solely on the fact of their citizenship. News from Finland that caught the attention of many Russians—“the government has decided to pay each citizen 550 Euros per month”—has so far turned out to be a variant on the familiar concept of the monetization of welfare benefits, the replacement



Photo: Gremil / iStock

of social guarantees with monetary payments. There will be a referendum on an analogous proposition in Switzerland in June 2016: the proposal is to pay every resident of the country, including minors, a “citizen’s income” that enables a “dignified existence.” Since January 2016, every resident of the Dutch city of Utrecht has received a “guaranteed basic income.”

New attention-grabbing research in the fields of sociology and political science disproves the old truism about teaching a man to fish: the best results in the struggle against poverty are yielded not by social programs (which demand an expensive and extensive accounting and monitoring apparatus) but the direct distribution of money to households.

This is usually explained through humanitarian arguments: the rich thought that the poor were poor because of their own laziness and depravity, and thus they made the receipt of welfare dependent on fulfilling complicated and demeaning conditions, assuming that without them the recipients would drink it all away or otherwise waste it. But it turned out that the poor are poor because they have been unjustly excluded from the global system of wealth distribution, and if we simply give them money, they will spend it like all normal people—on additional food and items for their children.

But if we put aside these moral considerations, it becomes clear what this policy leads to: the direct stimulation of consumer demand. The automation and roboticization of production, simultaneously increasing its efficiency and the productive power of labor, render first-world societies richer, while also destroying thousands of jobs. In a post-scarcity economy, a citizen’s first duty becomes not production

but consumption—participation in the consumerist food chain, encouraging blood flow through the vessels of the economy. It is this very “societal system of distribution” from which the poor are excluded. This is precisely what one of the world’s most successful investors, Ray Dalio (the head of Bridgewater), recently spoke about, discussing the idea of “helicopter money”—direct payments to households as a means for stimulating demand.

## An Era of Post-Statism?

It is interesting that in both scenarios it becomes clear that the centralized state is dissolving, giving way, on the one hand, to a system of increasingly “small-scale” local self-governance, and on the other to supranational economic and political unions between states. This is most reminiscent of the situation from the Late Middle Ages to the dawn of the Age of Absolutism: free cities, small kingdoms and duchies within a structure like the Holy Roman Empire (whose head was elected) or the Hanseatic League, and above all of this the unifying notion of Christendom (with the related idea that its values must be spread among all still-unenlightened nations).

A recurring aspect of these forecasts is that the hallmark of the future increasingly tends to be the replication of medieval practices on a new technological level. The cult of manual labor, “makerism” and artisanship, working from home (with the computer as the new spinning wheel), self-regulating organizations as new guilds, and even new hybrid private-state services, suspiciously reminiscent of good old tax farming. On the other hand, everything that might remind us of the “big state” of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries seems

to be leading to backwardness and defeat in a competition that spans the globe: big armies, state-financed industries, hierarchical bureaucracy, and the unitary state.

We do not fully realize the degree to which our implicit conceptions of the state and civic life are shaped by the absolutist period. The ideas of nationalistic patriotism, dreams of enlightened monarchy (masquerading in our times under the guise of “authoritarian modernization”), the association between centralization and efficiency, the enchantment of “greatness”: all of this adds up to the ethics and aesthetics of the absolutist European monarchies and their successors, national industrial states.

Thus, all these various scenarios for the medium-term future can be read as a unified scenario for moving into an era of post-statism. Will the new state be invisible or all-pervading, or will it be both at the same time? After all, it is evident that total transparency, electronic document management and all variations on the theme of “open government” and the proverbial Big Brother, the all-seeing eye of the state, are one and the same. The state of the future will be transparent—but the citizens of the future will also become completely transparent. Every moment of their lives will be recorded by numerous video services, but even more than that: they themselves will describe it all, entirely voluntarily, on social media—those new arenas of civic life, where we might well soon run for office, and vote, and hold protests, and use government services.

For Russia the prospect of a “post-work state” sounds, on the one hand, like a fairy-tale of a communist future—“from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs”—and, on the other hand, suspiciously familiar. In a cer-

tain way, we have already showed the world what it would look like to have a state that distributes economic rent (though produced not by advanced technology, but by the export of natural resources) between an army of pensioners, state employees, and the pseudo-employed—people working for numerous inspection, control, monitoring, and special services. Under this system citizens’ primary virtue is in no way their high labor production—no one needs their work—but their loyalty, which expresses itself as passivity. The twilight of the era of carbon fuels is forcibly driving Russia out of its rosy oil-fueled paradise into reality, where you have to adapt to circumstances, rather than making circumstances adapt to you. Has it not (yet again) managed to show a bureaucratized Europe, clinging to its traditional leftist sympathies, a negative example?

The prospect of missing the train bound for a bright tomorrow is frightening. Of course, historical time flows for everyone—you cannot wall yourself off from it. No actor of a historical process can bury his head in the sand of the comfortable present, having declared that he does not like the changes that are happening and that he does not want to take part in them. The future will come for everyone, but not everyone will hold an equal place in it. From this point of view contemporary Russian statehood, built on a paternalistic model of the centralized distribution of resources, looks audaciously archaic. Civilized humanity’s loss of interest in what little Russia can offer external markets—carbon fuels and metals—threatens to turn a rich autocracy into a poor autocracy, without changing its essential nature. And that is a recipe for decline. In the “brave new world” of post-deficit and post-work, countries that lag behind may turn out to be not only zones of lower levels of consumption—that can be survived—but zones of higher levels of violence. <

**Ekaterina Schulmann** is a Senior Lecturer of Political Science at the Department of Public Administration at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). In January 2016 she was a Russia in Global Dialogue Fellow at the IWM. This article, translated and edited by Kate Younger, was partly published in the Russian daily *Vedomosti* on February 23, 2016.



# Resilient Neoliberalism?

BY DOROTHEE BOHLE

*Policy responses to the great recession among countries on Europe's periphery have varied—and have had varying degrees of success. What does this diversity tell us about the theory of “resilient neoliberalism”?*

Historically, major economic crises have always been turning points. Crises are typically moments for critical choices, when established policy paradigms collapse and alternatives are tested. The Great Depression sounded the death knell for economic liberalism. The victorious alternative, Keynesianism, was itself discredited half a century later, with the end of Fordism and the emergence of a new version of economic liberalism—neoliberalism. However, the Great Recession seems to be an exception. A growing literature has grappled with the surprising resilience of neoliberalism, even after its spectacular failure. It asks why, despite the clear limitations of neoliberalism and the obvious need for closer regulation, there has been no apparent change of course. One explanation points to the strength of neoliberal ideas and the absence of alternatives; another connects the resilience of neoliberalism to dominant economic interests, especially those of banks and corporations ‘too big to fail’; a third argues that austerity places heavy constraints on democratic politics. Persuasive as these explanations are, an alternative analysis is required; one that looks at variations and policy experimentation in a number of countries instead of stressing a common trend.

Most literature on the policy responses to the Great Recession focuses on public debt and the politics of austerity. My research instead looks at private debt—especially mortgage debt—and banking crises. Ever since the 1980s, governments have moved away from providing public social housing and have instead promoted private home ownership. At the same time, mortgage markets have been deregulated and households have accrued increasing mortgage debt in order to finance their homes. The Great Recession was, as is well-known, triggered by US subprime lending and financial speculation around mortgages. It is therefore fair to say that house price explosions, mortgage debt and banking crises are at the core of the neoliberal failure. However, it is often overlooked that soaring property prices and unsustainable mortgage debt caused economic breakdown not only in the US, but also in many peripheral countries, especially in Europe. There, home ownership rates of between 70% and 90%, transnational deregulation of finance, abundant international liquidity and poor banking controls have conspired to produce housing, mortgage and banking crises of unprecedented dimensions. Finding themselves at the brink of sovereign default, these countries have

turned to the IMF or the *Troika* for support. Meanwhile, over-indebted homeowners have faced losing their homes. How have governments on Europe's Eastern and Western peripheries reacted to this situation?

## Hungary and Iceland

The answer is: in vastly different ways. Take the cases of Hungary and Iceland, whose governments have, for different reasons, declined to play by the rules of the neoliberal textbook. In autumn 2011, Hungary's rightwing government famously proclaimed its “fight against debt slavery”. Hungary subsequently severed its ties with the IMF and squeezed the banks. It imposed a bank levy and transaction costs, and forced the banks to swap foreign currency mortgage loans—most Hungarians had taken out mortgages in Swiss Francs—into Hungarian forints, partly at preferential rates. The Orbán administration also declared a moratorium on the repossession of homes whose owners were lagging behind with their mortgage payments. A large number of these homes have been acquired by a National Asset Management Company, and former owners now live in their homes as tenants.

In Iceland, the crisis swept a Social Democratic-Green coalition into power for the first time in the country's history. The new government actively intervened in financial and housing markets. As in Hungary, a substantial part of the costs of mortgage loan restructuring was pushed

onto the banks. Iceland's government considered its banks to be too big to be rescued. All three major banks were nationalized and the government appointed a special prosecutor to investigate bankers' responsibilities. Nor did the bankers themselves get away with the mess they had created: since the crisis, a total of 26 bankers have received prison sentences. The government also waived mortgage debt and undertook steps towards creating a more diversified housing market, and used social policies to mitigate the costs of the mortgage and debt crisis.

## Ireland and Latvia

The Hungarian and Icelandic policy responses could not be more different from those of the countries that embraced neoliberal solutions, such as Ireland or Latvia. Indeed, Iceland's crisis management is the polar opposite of Ireland's. While Iceland let its banks go bust, Ireland saved them at tremendous cost. While Iceland's economy profited from the substantial devaluation of the krona, Ireland accepted the straight-jacket of the European Monetary Union and pursued internal devaluation. While Iceland pushed some of the costs of the crisis onto foreigners, Ireland internalized the costs to save German and French bondholders. The Irish government issued a blanket guarantee of all liabilities of its troubled bank, and had to engage in massive austerity as a consequence. Very little has been done to help indebted homeowners or to

create a more equal balance between public and private housing. That the housing crisis has not yet morphed into a major social crisis in Ireland is mostly down to the banks' reluctance to carry out mass evictions, and to massive emigration.

The Latvian government mostly focused on the macroeconomic aspects of the crisis. Its priority was to defend its currency peg at all costs, in order to qualify for euro accession. The government saw this as the only way to shield indebted homeowners—most of whom had taken loans in euros rather than lats—from the massive exchange-rate risk. However, the Latvian government was less concerned with helping over-indebted homeowners; facing opposition from the banks, it quickly abandoned the idea of a household mortgage restructuring scheme. Instead, debt restructuring was left to the banks, which typically granted longer grace periods on repayments or extended loan maturities, but set these off through higher interest rates. As a result, the overall value of debt remained the same. Worse still, as housing prices collapsed, many home owners were still indebted, even after banks had repossessed their homes. As in Ireland, many over-indebted homeowners were pushed into emigration.

## Conclusion

What do these policy responses tell us about the resilience of neoliberalism? Two things stand out. First, policy experimentation on

Europe's periphery defies some of the explanations for neoliberal resilience. Banks were important players in all four cases; yet while some countries confronted them, others gave in to their interests. Neoliberal policy has not been victorious everywhere, and in some cases democratic politics have swept governments into power that were ready to break with the economic orthodoxy. Second, and arguably more importantly: in none of the four countries has the crisis been resolved. While policy solutions differ, banks everywhere have become reluctant to lend, and access to affordable housing has remained a major social issue. As Antonio Gramsci wrote, “the crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” Are both neoliberalism's resilience and its alternatives the morbid symptoms of an interregnum, rather than the harbingers of a post-crisis order? <

**Dorothee Bohle** is Professor of Political Science at the Central European University in Budapest. In June 2015 she has held a Monthly Lecture on *Resilient Neoliberalism? Policy Responses and Innovation after the Great Recession in Europe's Periphery* at the IWM.



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# TTIP: Freihandel auf Kosten der Demokratie?

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG VON MARION GOLLNER

Seit beinahe drei Jahren verhandeln EU und USA über ein transatlantisches Freihandelsabkommen (TTIP). Dieses soll durch den Abbau von Handelshemmnissen und die Angleichung gesetzlicher Regelungen die Wirtschaft auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks ankurbeln und zusätzliche Arbeitsplätze schaffen. Kritiker befürchten jedoch eine Erosion von Sozial-, Umwelt- und Verbraucherschutzstandards sowie eine Aushöhlung demokratischer und rechtsstaatlicher Strukturen. Zum Auftakt der diesjährigen Europa im Diskurs-Reihe diskutierten Éva Dessewffy, Lutz Güllner, Petra Pinzler, Franz Schellhorn, Peter-Tobias Stoll und Shalini Randeria über die Chancen und Risiken dieses umstrittenen Abkommens.

Die Veröffentlichung vertraulicher TTIP-Unterlagen durch die Umweltorganisation *Greenpeace* im Mai 2016 hat die Debatte um das geplante transatlantische Freihandelsabkommen erneut angeheizt und vieles von dem bestätigt, was bereits am 17. Januar im Wiener Burgtheater diskutiert wurde. Der Umstand, dass das Haus am Ring an diesem Sonntag beinahe auskauft war, zeigte, wie groß das Bedürfnis nach Information vonseiten der Öffentlichkeit ist. Die unterschiedlichen Positionen der Diskussionsteilnehmer machten aber auch deutlich, wie komplex die Materie ist und wie wenig Einigkeit selbst unter Experten über die konkreten Verhandlungsinhalte herrscht.

Lutz Güllner, Referatsleiter in der Generaldirektion Außenhandel der Europäischen Kommission, wies in seinem Eröffnungsstatement darauf hin, dass TTIP kein Einzelfall, sondern ein Handelsabkommen unter vielen sei. Was sich verändert habe, seien die Rahmenbedingungen des globalen Handels. Wie er am Beispiel des Wimbledon-Tennisballs erklärte, an dessen Produktion 13 Länder quer über den gesamten Globus beteiligt sind, hätten sich die Produktionsketten heute längst globalisiert bzw. „zusammenentwickelt“, wie Güllner betont. Hinzu komme der Umstand, dass sich die Kräfteverhältnisse weltweit verschieben und regionale Wirtschaftsblöcke – nicht zuletzt durch die Schwächung multilateraler Handelssysteme wie der WTO – an Einfluss gewinnen. Europa stehe daher vor der Wahl, diese Entwicklungen passiv abzuwarten oder aktiv mitzugestalten. Entscheide man sich für Letzteres, sei es absurd, ausgerechnet Europas größten und wichtigsten Handelspartner, die USA, außen vor zu lassen, so Güllner. Ob diese Strategie allerdings zum gewünschten Ziel führe, die Wohlfahrt zu mehren, Arbeitsplätze zu sichern und die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas zu erhöhen, wurde von den übrigen Diskussionsteilnehmern äußerst skeptisch beurteilt.

**Wenig zu gewinnen, viel zu verlieren**

Petra Pinzler, Wirtschaftsjournalistin (*Die Zeit*) und Autorin des Buchs *Der unfreie Handel*, meinte beispielsweise, dass sie den Ver-



Photos: Matthias Cremer

sprechungen der Kommission als bekennende „Freihändlerin“ gerne Glauben schenken würde. Ihre jahrelange Beschäftigung mit dem Thema habe sie jedoch zu der Einsicht gebracht, dass die Liberalisierung der Märkte nicht nur Gewinner,



*So zu tun, als wäre TTIP ausschließlich auf technische Standards beschränkt, ist ein absoluter Irrglaube.*

Éva Dessewffy

sondern auch Verlierer hervorbringen. „Handel macht Länder tendenziell reicher, aber man darf nicht glauben, dass etwas gut ist, nur weil es sich Freihandelsabkommen nennt. Das wäre dumm und kurzfristig ge-

dacht.“ Und selbst der prophezeite Wohlstandsgewinn – Studien der EU-Kommissionen gehen von einem Wirtschaftswachstum von max. 0,5% in zehn Jahren aus – ließe sich schwer auf seriöse Weise quantifizieren, so Pinzler, und bezeichnete derartige Spekulationen in Anlehnung an den SPD-Parteivorsitzenden Sigmar Gabriel als „Voodoo Economics“.

In dieselbe Kerbe schlug der frühere Wirtschaftsjournalist und nunmehrige Leiter der wirtschaftsliberalen Denkfabrik *Agenda Austria* Franz Schellhorn. Auch er sieht in TTIP kein großes Wachstumsprogramm, wohl aber „Europas letzte Chance“, die Spielregeln des globalen Handels mitzubestimmen: „Europa und die USA hatten im Jahr 2000 einen Anteil von 50% an der gesamten Weltwirtschaftsproduktion, 2015 waren es nur noch 33%. TTIP ist vermutlich die letzte große Chance, europäische Standards zu etablieren und als Vorbild durchsetzen“, so Schellhorn. Wohlwissend, dass er damit eine „egoistische, europäische Sichtweise“ vertritt, sei es ihm lieber Europa setze die Standards als beispielsweise China.

Für den Rechtswissenschaftler Peter-Tobias Stoll vom Institut für Völkerrecht und Europarecht an der Universität Göttingen sind in der Diskussion um TTIP zwei Fragen von essentieller Bedeutung:

Welche Ambitionen stehen hinter dem Freihandelsabkommen und wie ist es um die Balance zwischen den zwei Vertragspartnern bestellt? Während in den 50er Jahren das Ziel einer Wirtschaftsintegration klar mit dem Wunsch einer Werteintegration



*Europa steht vor der Wahl, Entwicklungen passiv abzuwarten oder sie aktiv mitzugestalten.*

Lutz Güllner

verbunden war, sei es für die meisten Menschen heute schwer zu beurteilen, ob TTIP immer noch „Ausdruck der transatlantischen Freundschaft“ sei, oder ein „08/15-Abkommen“ unter vielen vergleichbaren Verträgen.

Petra Pinzler befürchte zudem, dass nichts aus der Vergangenheit gelernt wurde und sich die Fehler der Finanzkrise wiederholen könnten. Anstatt jedem globalen Trend blindlings zu folgen, sei die Zurückhaltung und Skepsis Europas in vielen Bereichen durchaus angebracht, wie die Diskussion um *Big Data* und das damit verbundene *Safe-Harbor*-Abkommen gezeigt habe, so Pinzler. Gleichzeitig forderte Sie vonseiten der EU mehr Entschlossenheit und eine aktivere Verhandlungsposition: „Ich erwarte mir von der Kommission, dass sie jene sozialen Rechte, die uns wichtig sind, durch TTIP offensiv vorantreibt.“

In den Verhandlungen um TTIP sind es in erster Linie europäische Arbeits- und Umweltstandards, die Gegner des Freihandelsabkommens in Gefahr sehen. Eine dieser kritischen Stimmen ist Éva Dessewffy von der Bundesarbeiterkammer Wien. Aus den Positionspapieren der Europäischen Kommission, welche die Handelsexpertin eingehend studiert habe, ließen sich viele Absichtserklärungen herauslesen, die Fakten würden jedoch eine andere Sprache sprechen. Von den vier Kernarbeitsnormen der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO), welche das Recht auf Kollektivverhandlungen und Gewerkschaftsbildung sowie das Verbot von Zwangsarbeit, Kin-



derarbeit und der Diskriminierung am Arbeitsplatz beinhalten, seien von den USA bislang nur zwei internationale Konventionen ratifiziert worden – nämlich jene zum Verbot von Kinder- und Zwangsarbeit. Die Verhandlungen zu TTIP wären eine gute Gelegenheit, die Implementierung und Einhaltung dieser zentralen Menschenrechte einzufordern,



Die Liberalisierung der Märkte bringt nicht nur Gewinner, sondern auch Verlierer hervor.

Petra Pinzler

so Dessewffy. Eine Gelegenheit, die bislang jedoch nicht genutzt wurde: „Wir reden hier von zwei großen Staatenbünden, die für sich in Anspruch nehmen, die höchsten Menschenrechtsstandards dieser Welt zu vertreten. Dennoch gelingt es uns seit Jahren nicht, die USA hier zu verpflichten.“

Ob sich in den aktuellen Verhandlungsunterlagen zu TTIP tatsächlich Forderungen zur Umsetzung der ILO-Standards finden – wie von Lutz Güllner versichert – oder nicht, blieb ein strittiger und zuletzt offener Diskussionspunkt.

Ebenso uneinig war man sich bei der Frage, inwiefern die beabsichtigte Regulierungszusammenarbeit im Rahmen von TTIP neben der Anerkennung technischer Verfahren und Standards auch sensible Bereiche wie den öffentlichen Dienstleistungssektor umfassen könnte. Während Güllner dies klar verneinte und bekräftigte, dass es hier lediglich um



Mir ist es lieber Europa setzt die weltweiten Standards als China

Franz Schellhorn

die „Anerkennung technischer Verfahren“ in „ausschließlich jenen Bereichen“ ginge, in denen beide Partner „vergleichbare Regulierungsziele“ verfolgten, wie dies in der Luftfahrtindustrie beispielsweise der Fall ist, äußerte die Vertreterin der Arbeiterkammer erhebliche Zweifel. Dessewffy bezeichnete die Regulierungskooperation als „extremes Risiko“,

weil sie – anders als von der Kommission behauptet – Harmonisierungen „ohne Einschränkungen“ erlaube, u.a. auch in Sektoren wie der chemischen Industrie, wo es bereits jetzt erste Sondierungsgespräche mit den USA gäbe. Das Schlimmste, was hier passieren könne, so Dessewffy, wäre der Import amerikanischer Produkte nach Europa, die als gleichwertig anerkannt werden.

Franz Schellhorn versuchte diese Sichtweise zu relativieren und wies darauf hin, dass der VW Abgas-Skandal nicht in Europa aufgedeckt wurde, sondern in den USA. Die Frage, welche Standards höher bzw. besser sind, sei letztlich subjektiv, so Schellhorn: „Ich weiß nicht was besser ist, ein Huhn mit Antibiotika hochzuzüchten oder anschließend in Chlor zu baden, um die Bakterien abzutöten?“ Ob es bei TTIP, wie von Schellhorn gefordert, vorrangig um die Akzeptanz unterschiedlicher Standards geht, oder doch um eine Angleichung komplett verschiedener Systeme, wurde von Shalini Randeria als zentrale Frage in die Diskussion eingebracht. Gerade in sensiblen Bereichen wie der Lebensmittelproduktion oder der Gentechnik sei es wichtig, über die praktischen Auswirkungen und realen Befürchtungen der Bevölkerung nachzudenken. Während die Europäische Union gemäß dem Vorsorgeprinzip Produkte erst dann zulässt, wenn sie für Mensch und Umwelt nachweislich unschädlich sind, gilt in den USA das Risikoprinzip. Dieses besagt, dass ein Produkt so lange zugelassen bleibt, bis die Regulierungsbehörde zweifelsfrei nachweisen kann, dass von dem Produkt eine Gefahr ausgeht. Diese unterschiedlichen Werte und Regulierungskulturen würden in der Debatte um TTIP aufeinandertreffen, ohne diesen Konflikt in dem Abkommen auflösen zu können, so der Rechtsexperte Stoll. Vielmehr überwiege für ihn der Eindruck, dass die Position der USA in den Verhandlungen dominiert. So sei es der Europäischen Union „nicht einmal gelungen, das Wörtchen ‚Vorsorge‘ als ihre Position zu nennen“, wie Stoll hinzufügt.

Eine Gefahr für die Demokratie?

Neben inhaltlichen Bedenken hat vor allem die Art und Weise, wie die Verhandlungen bislang geführt wurden, für teils heftige Kritik gesorgt. Erst durch erhebliche Proteste war es überhaupt erst möglich, Einblick in die bis dato geheimen Verhandlungsunterlagen zu bekommen. Aus demokratiepolitischer Sicht seien in diesem Zusammenhang drei Prinzipien von entscheidender Bedeutung, so Pinzler: 1.) Wie transparent ist das Verfahren? 2.) Welche Möglichkeiten der Partizipation gibt es? 3.) Ist das Ergebnis letztlich zufriedenstellend?

Obwohl der öffentliche Druck mittlerweile zur Offenlegung zentraler Verhandlungsinhalte geführt habe, sei es immer noch nicht möglich, auf die Inhalte der Verhandlungen Einfluss zu nehmen, wie die Wirtschaftsjournalistin hinzufügt. Während man nationale Regierungen abwählen könne, sei es äußerst schwierig, aus völkerrechtlichen Verträgen auszusteigen. Die

se Gefahr sieht auch Éva Dessewffy. Sie bezeichnete sowohl die *Ratchet Clause*, wonach einmal erfolgte Privatisierungen nicht mehr rückgängig gemacht werden können, als auch den Umstand, dass es sich bei TTIP um ein „living agreement“ handelt als „höchst undemokratisch“. Im Zuge dieser „lebenden Vereinbarung“ müssten sich beide Vertrags-



Alleingänge großer Wirtschaftsmächte schwächen das Forum der WTO und die internationale Demokratie.

Peter-Tobias Stoll

partner dazu verpflichten, alle zukünftigen Gesetze dahingehend zu überprüfen, ob sie Auswirkungen auf den transatlantischen Handel haben. Güllner bezeichnet diesen Einwand als „faktisch falsch“ und versicherte, dass Parlamente auch in Zukunft über Regulierungen entscheiden würden.

Uneinigkeit herrschte auch bei der Frage, wie die Rolle von Schiedsgerichten und der Schutz von Investorenrechten zu beurteilen sei. Während Dessewffy den Umstand, dass ausländische Unternehmen Staaten auf Schadenersatz verklagen können – wie der Fall Philip Morris gegen Australien bzw. Vattenfall gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland gezeigt hätten –, als bedenklich bezeichnete, hält Schellhorn diese Regelung für einen „demokratiepolitischen Fortschritt“, der es ausländischen Investoren im Falle eines Vertragsbruchs,



Geht es um die Akzeptanz unterschiedlicher Standards oder deren Angleichung? Das ist für mich die zentrale Frage.

Shalini Randeria

einer Ungleichbehandlung oder einer Enteignung erlaube, rechtsstaatliche Mittel zu ergreifen. Rechtsexperte Scholl plädierte in diesem Fall

für eine pragmatische Lösung: „Entweder gelingt es, Rechtsstaatlichkeit inklusive Investitionsschutz für alle in einem Staat sicherzustellen, oder man investiert in einem Land nur dann, wenn es einen temporären Investitionsschutz gibt.“

Spaghetti-Schüssel-Effekt

In einer Sache waren sich alle Diskussionsteilnehmer einig: Multilaterale Abkommen sind bilateralen Lösungen grundsätzlich vorzuziehen. Die Kommission habe über die letzten Jahre versucht, diesen „Königsweg“ über die Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) einzuschlagen, jedoch mit „moderaten Ergebnissen“, wie Güllner einräumt. Daher sei es notwendig gewesen, auf bilateraler Ebene aktiv zu werden. Ein Schritt, der von vielen Beobachtern als negative Entwicklung gewertet wird – u.a. auch von Peter-Tobias Stoll. Alleingänge großer Wirtschaftsmächte wie der USA oder Europas würden letztlich dazu beitragen, das Forum der WTO und die internationale Demokratie zu schwächen. Zudem seien „Minikoaitionen“ in einer globalisierten Welt mit komplexen Lieferketten und länderübergreifenden Produktionsprozessen – Stichwort Tennisball – wenig zielführend und ineffizient. Dass Europa nun in einer Dreiecksbeziehung separat Handelsabkommen mit Kanada (CETA) und den USA (TTIP) abschließt, ob-

wohl beide in der Nordamerikanischen Handelszone (NAFTA) sind, bezeichnete er als eine „Ironie der Geschichte“.

So schwierig und zäh Verhandlungen auf internationaler Ebene auch sein mögen, sie hätten gegenüber bilateralen Lösungen auch einen entwicklungspolitischen Vorteil: Neben aufstrebenden Wirtschaftsmächten wie China, Indien oder Brasilien hätten in diesem Prozess auch Entwicklungsländer ein gewisses Mitsprache- und Gestaltungsrecht. Besonders Letztere seien durch die Vormachtstellung westlicher Wirtschaftsgroßmächte in der Vergangenheit häufig benachteiligt und in ihrer Entwicklung gehindert worden. Güllner meinte dazu, dass Nachteile für Drittstaaten noch lange nicht bewiesen seien. Was sich an diesem Beispiel aber sehr wohl zeige, sei folgender Widerspruch: „Entweder wollen wir unsere hohen Standards in Europa verteidigen und möglichst viele Partner dazu einladen, oder wir senken unsere Standards, damit die Entwicklungsländer exportieren können. Beides zusammen wird nicht funktionieren.“

Am Ende des Tages blieb nicht nur dieser Widerspruch ungelöst, sondern auch die Frage offen, wie die Verhandlungen schlussendlich ausgehen werden. Diskussions- und Aufklärungsbedarf wird es jedoch auch in Zukunft geben, wie die jüngsten Enthüllungen gezeigt haben. <

Debating Europe / Europa im Diskurs 17. Januar / 14. Februar / 15. März 2016 Burgtheater, Wien

Seit dem Jahr 2008 bringt die Veranstaltungsreihe „Debating Europe/ Europa im Diskurs“ – eine Kooperation von IWM, Burgtheater, Erste Stiftung und *Der Standard* – führende Politiker, Wissenschaftler und Intellektuelle auf die Bühne des Wiener Burgtheaters, um über aktuelle Fragen von gesellschaftlicher Relevanz zu diskutieren. Die nächste Veranstaltung der Reihe ist für Januar 2017 geplant.

Sonntag, 17. Januar

Wozu brauchen wir TTIP?

**Éva Dessewffy**  
Expertin für internationalen Handel, Bundesarbeiterkammer, Wien

**Lutz Güllner**  
Referatsleiter in der Generaldirektion Außenhandel, Europäische Kommission

**Petra Pinzler**  
Autorin (*Der Unfreihandel*) und Journalistin (*Die Zeit*)

**Franz Schellhorn**  
Direktor, Agenda Austria, Wien; ehemaliger Wirtschaftsjournalist

**Peter-Tobias Stoll**  
Rechtswissenschaftler, Institut für Völkerrecht und Europarecht, Universität Göttingen

**Moderation:**  
**Shalini Randeria**  
Rektorin, Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen

Video on: [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

Sonntag, 14. Februar

Zukunft der Demokratien

**Giorgos Chondros**  
Mitglied des Zentralkomitees der griechischen Regierungspartei Syriza

**Kinga Göncz**  
Ehemalige ungarische Außenministerin (2006–2009)

**Rebecca Harms**  
Fraktionsvorsitzende der Grünen im Europäischen Parlament

**Peter Keller**  
Schweizer Journalist und Politiker der Schweizerischen Volkspartei (SVP)

**Adam Krzemiński**  
Polnischer Journalist und Publizist

**Moderation:**  
**Alexandra Förderl-Schmid**  
Chefredakteurin, *Der Standard*

Video on: [www.w24.at](http://www.w24.at)

Sonntag, 15. März

Flüchtlinge in Europa: Wie schaffen wir das?

**Melissa Fleming**  
Sprecherin des UN-Flüchtlingshilfswerks UNHCR

**Johannes Hahn**  
EU-Kommissar für Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik und Erweiterungsverhandlungen

**Randall Hansen**  
Politologe an der Munk School of Global Affairs der Universität Toronto

**Kilian Kleinschmidt**  
Berater der österreichischen Bundesregierung in Flüchtlingsfragen

**Gerald Knaus**  
Vorsitzender der Europäischen Stabilitätsinitiative (ESI)

**Moderation:**  
**Franz Karl Prüller**  
Vorstandsvorsitzender, *ERSTE Stiftung*

Video on: [www.w24.at](http://www.w24.at)



# Events in Retrospect 07–12 2015

## July / August



**Democracy, Post-Democracy, or Counter-Democracy? The Future of Popular Sovereignty Seen from Sideways On**

**Paolo Costa**  
Senior Researcher, Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Trento; Visiting Fellow, IWM



**[Dis]Obedience in the Algerian War: The Churches, the State, and the Duty to Obey**

**Rachel White**  
PhD candidate in History, Yale University; Guest, IWM

## September



**Have Ukraine's Reforms Failed?**

**Katya Gorchinskaya**  
Managing editor for investigative programming, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, Kyiv; Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow, IWM  
**Cathrin Kahlweit**  
Correspondent for Central and Eastern Europe, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Vienna



**Die unsichtbare Faust des Marktes: Warum wir Arbeit und Unternehmen kaum wieder-erkennen**

**Ulrich Brinkmann**  
Professor für Soziologie, Technische Universität Darmstadt; Visiting Fellow, IWM (siehe IWMpost 116)



**The Dragon and the Bear: A New Great Game for Central Asia? Chinese Academic Discourse on Energy Security**

**Thomas Stephan Eder**  
PhD candidate and Research Associate in International Law, University of Vienna; Junior Visiting Fellow, IWM (see IWMpost 116)

## October



**Can Journalism Survive? Digital Media and the Future of Democracy**

**Vlad Odobescu**  
Freelance journalist, Romanian Centre for Investigative Journalism, Bucharest; Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow, IWM  
**Saso Ordanoski**  
Freelance journalist, Sloboden Pecat and USAID Project, Skopje; Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow, IWM  
**Gemma Pörzgen**  
Freelance journalist, Berlin; Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow, IWM  
**Maria Stepanova**  
Essayist, journalist, poet; editor-in-chief, *COLTA.RU*; Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue, IWM (see p. 7)



**Das Angewandte Innovation Laboratory (AIL) Ein interdisziplinäres Ideen- und Innovationslabor**

**Gerald Bast**  
Rektor, Universität für angewandte Kunst, Wien



**The Haunted House. Contemporary Russia between Past and Past**

**Maria Stepanova**  
Essayist, journalist, poet; editor-in-chief, *COLTA.RU*; Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue, IWM



**The Arab Spring and the Disintegration of the Middle East State System**

**Shlomo Avineri**  
Professor of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem  
**Paweł Marczewski**  
Head of Publications, IWM  
**Christian Ultsch**  
Head of the Foreign Politics Department, *Die Presse*  
Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)



**Contemporary Ukraine: Borderland—Bloodland—Neverland?**

**Valeriya Korablyova**  
Associate Professor of Philosophy of Humanities, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv; Visiting Fellow, IWM



**Black Earth. Der Holocaust und warum er sich wiederholen kann**

Ort: Wien Museum  
**Timothy Snyder**  
Bird White Housum Professor of History, Yale University; Permanent Fellow, IWM  
**Dirk Moses**  
Professor für Global- und Kolonialgeschichte, European University Institute, Florenz  
**Philipp Ther**  
Professor für Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas, Universität Wien  
*In Kooperation mit dem Wien Museum und dem Verlag C.H.Beck* (see IWMpost 116)  
Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)



**Competing Asian Visions China's Expansion, India's Response and Chinese-African Encounters**

**Ranabir Samaddar**  
Director, Calcutta Research Group  
**Helen F. Siu**  
Professor of Anthropology, Yale University



**Bulgarian Mental Maps: Past and Present**

**Dessislava Lilova**  
Associate Professor of Cultural History, Sofia University; Visiting Fellow, IWM



**Nuclear Nonproliferation From the Cold War to the Post-September 11 Era: Legal Harmonization or Change in Regimes?**

**Grégoire Mallard**  
Associate Professor, Department of Anthropology and Sociology of Development, Graduate Institute, Geneva

## Events Colorkey

**Fellows' Seminars**  
In the course of the semester, Junior and Senior Visiting Fellows present their research projects in the Fellows' Seminars.

**Ukraine in European Dialogue**  
Understanding Ukraine and the nature of the current conflict with Russia is vital for the future of the European endeavor. This series seeks to contribute to this exchange.

**Monthly Lectures**  
Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.

**Seminars Faces of Eastern Europe**  
This seminar series is a forum to discuss issues connected to the economies, politics and societies of Eastern Europe in an interdisciplinary, comparative perspective.

**Russia in Global Dialogue**  
This series of events aims at intensifying intellectual debate between Russia and Europe.



Events in Retrospect 07–12 2015

November



Those Who Come Late Will be Punished by Life: Economic Reform Thinking in the GDR

**Hans-Jürgen Wagener**  
Professor em. of Economics, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder; Founder, Frankfurter Institut für Transformationsstudien (FIT)



No Self-Determination Without Justification: The Case for Czechoslovak Independence in the First World War

**André Liebich**  
Honorary Professor of International History and Politics, Graduate Institute, Geneva; Visiting Fellow, IWM (see p. 15)



In Search of Enemies: Russian NGOs as ‘Foreign Agents’

**Elena Iarskaya-Smirnova**  
Professor of Sociology, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow; Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue, IWM



The Syrian Revolt: An Insider Perspective

**Sadik al-Azm**  
Professor em. of the History of Modern European Philosophy, University of Damascus  
**Adam Baczko**  
PhD candidate in Political Science, EHESS, Paris; Junior Visiting Fellow, IWM  
**Christian Ultsch**  
Head of the Foreign Politics Department, Die Presse  
Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)



The Cunning of Uncertainty: Why Science and Society Should Remain Open to the Unexpected

**Helga Nowotny**  
Professor em. of Social Studies of Science, ETH Zurich; President, Board of Trustees, IWM  
**Matti Bunzl**  
Director, Wien Museum  
Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)



Macht und Widerstand

Ort: Wien Museum  
**Ilija Trojanow**  
Schriftsteller, Übersetzer, Verleger und Filmproduzent  
**Philipp Blom**  
Buchautor, Journalist  
In Kooperation mit dem Wien Museum und dem Fischer Verlag



Thank God We Are Creatures: Hannah Arendt vs. Political Theology

**Rafat Zawisza**  
PhD candidate in Cultural Studies, University of Warsaw; Józef Tischner Visiting Fellow, IWM



Membership and Identity

Venue: University of Warsaw  
**Steven Lukes**  
Professor of Sociology, New York University; Krzysztof Michalski Visiting Fellow, IWM  
**Jyotirmaya Sharma**  
Professor of Political Science, University of Hyderabad; Visiting Fellow, IWM  
**Małgorzata Fuszara**  
Professor of Social Sciences, University of Warsaw; Secretary of State, Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment  
**Konstanty Gebert**  
Journalist and political commentator, Gazeta Wyborcza; Associate Fellow, European Council for Foreign Relations  
**Marcin Król** (Chair)  
Professor of History of Ideas, Dean of the Faculty of Applied Sciences, University of Warsaw  
**Shalini Randeria** (Chair)  
IWM Rector; Professor of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Graduate Institute, Geneva (see p. 14)



Law without the State: The Taliban Courts in Afghanistan since 2001

**Adam Baczko**  
PhD candidate in Political Science, EHESS, Paris; Visiting Fellow, IWM



Kondycja weimarska dzisiejszej Europy

**Cezary Michalski**  
Slawistic philologist, writer and publisher; Member, Polish Writers’ Association; Guest, IWM



‘The Moment We Realized What Democracy was About’: Nuclear Controversies During German Re-Unification

**Sergiu Novac**  
PhD candidate in Sociology and Social Anthropology, CEU, Budapest; CEU Junior Visiting Fellow, IWM



Heine, Wagner, Nietzsche

**Alexander Soros**  
Founder, Alexander Soros Foundation; Global Board Member, Open Society Foundations; Guest, IWM  
Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)



Zeit und Ewigkeit: Deutsche Philosophen und der Erste Weltkrieg

**Christian Sternad**  
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Husserl-Archiv, KU Leuven



Victims, Beneficiaries, Consumers: Social Mobility, the Holocaust and the Economics of Destruction in Croatia (1941–1945)

**Rory Yeomans**  
Visiting Fellow, Vienna Wiesenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies  
**Ljiljana Radonić** (Commentator)  
APART Fellow, Institute of Culture Studies and Theatre History, Austrian Academy of Sciences



Art and Reality: On the Institutionalization of Contemporaneity

**Keti Chukhrov**  
Associate Professor, Department of Art Theory and Cultural Studies, Russian State University for the Humanities; Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue, IWM



Deconstructing the Debates on Investment Treaty Arbitration

**Zachary Douglas**  
Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute, Geneva; Barrister and Arbitrator, Matrix Chambers, London



The Socialist Calculation Debate: Viennese Origins, London Refinements

**Peter Boettke**  
Professor of Economics and Philosophy, George Mason University; Director, F.A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Mercatus Center, GMU



Economic Policy and the 2016 Presidential Race

**Peter Boettke**  
Professor of Economics and Philosophy, George Mason University; Director, F.A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Mercatus Center, GMU  
**Ivan Krastev**  
Permanent Fellow, IWM; Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia  
**Christoph Prantner**  
Senior Editor Opinion Pages, Der Standard  
Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

**Books in Perspective**  
Books written or edited by fellows or related to the Institute’s research fields are presented to a wider public.

**Political Salons**  
The Political Salons, jointly organized with Die Presse and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, are a discussion forum on current political and social questions.

**Tischner Debates**  
This series of public debates in Warsaw was jointly launched by the IWM and the University of Warsaw in 2005 in memory of IWM’s founding President Józef Tischner.



# Religion, Solidarity and the Limits of Belonging

REPORT BY PAWEŁ MARCZEWSKI

*In November 2015, the IWM organized the 23<sup>rd</sup> Tischner Debate at the University of Warsaw followed the next day by the Kotakowski Symposium, a joint effort of the IWM, University of Warsaw and University of Oxford, devoted to a critical appraisal of the renowned Polish philosopher's work on religion.*



People light candles in remembrance of the victims of the Paris attacks

**M**embership and Identity, the topic of the Tischner Debate jointly organized by the University of Warsaw, *Kultura Liberalna* and the IWM was decided upon long before the Paris attacks of November 13, 2015. Speaking only five days after the barbaric attacks, participants referred to these tragic events but went far beyond them to discuss the general question of who can be said to belong to a society and how ideas and practices of belonging change. “Reality bites and it compels us to empirically verify certain ideas of identity and belonging”, said Konstanty Gebert in his opening statement and added: “After the attacks many people repeated *We are all Frenchmen now!* President Hollande stated boldly that it was Frenchmen who killed other Frenchmen. If that is the case, the question poses itself: which Frenchmen are we ex-

actly? The answer seems to be intuitive—it is “true” Europeans versus barbarians living in Europe. But it does not bring us closer to clarify the question who is a ‘true European’, and on what grounds.”

Fear in the wake of the Paris attacks made nationalistic answers to this question more attractive even to those Europeans who are (or previously were) not exclusivist in their thinking about European identity. But as Jyotirmaya Sharma pointed out, even some earlier responses to the question of European identity considered as embracing diversity, such as multiculturalism, were not free from nationalistic undercurrents. In fact, argued Sharma, multiculturalism is in perfect harmony with nationalism. It is within the framework of a modern nation-state, which brings different “cultures” together, but does it in a strictly controlled fashion that keeps them insulated from one another. According to this concept “all cultural groups in a society should be separate, organized horizontally, and historically grounded. There should be as little room for cross-mixing as possible,” summarized Sharma.

“Hybridization” of ethnic groups was regarded with suspicion long before the current influx of refugees, or the Paris attacks, and even in social contexts not marked by violence. As Shalini Randeria pointed out, in Swiss public discourse she found in the early 2000s, that ‘good’

Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka were distinguished from ‘bad’ ones from Bosnia. While the former were seen as eager to learn German and integrate in the education system and the labour market, they were looked upon favorably as they preferred to marry women within their community. The Bosnians were perceived as a threat to the Swiss social fabric as they were keen to socialize with and marry Swiss women, a form of integration that was frowned upon. Selective societal integration as prescribed by the host society while remaining within the limits of one’s own community seemed to be an acceptable form of ‘otherness’, while seeking to assimilate through marriage was not.

Małgorzata Fuszara stressed that acceptance of difference depends on the political climate of the day. She pointed out that Poland accepted nearly 80,000 refugees from war-torn Chechnya in the 1990s. Public opinion at the time was not particularly concerned with cultural difference, while today accepting a quota of refugees that is but a fraction of that number provokes heated discussions. “The rules of the game have changed in Europe,” remarked Jyotirmaya Sharma. “They used to ask me *When did you come?*, now the most pressing question is *How long are you going to stay?*”

Answering a question from the audience about prospects for belonging that would not mean reducing

people to their culture or religion, nor impose a particular model of what constitutes a good life, several discussants touched on issues of solidarity. “I am always suspicious towards projects that assume people’s righteousness. We can achieve something only when we assume that altruism is a form of enlightened self-interest. Poland also depends on solidarity; it won’t be able to secure its future without assistance. By refusing to show solidarity now we are shooting ourselves in the foot,” replied Konstanty Gebert. “Yes, but we also need laws,” added Steven Lukes. “The idea that there is a way of life good for everyone is extremely dangerous. We need the rule of law to save us from other people’s good intentions.” Jyotirmaya Sharma also pointed out that the term ‘solidarity’ is deeply rooted in Polish social and historical contexts. “In a caste society like India two different terms were used to describe the necessity of cooperation and mutual understanding—brotherhood and friendship. They both failed for exactly the same reason that solidarity did. There can be no solidari-

ty among people who are unequal.”

Tellingly, none of the speakers referred to a phenomenon that often becomes a politicized tool for securing or imposing group identity and belonging—religion. After the Paris attacks the reluctance to discuss religion as a possible foundation for coherent societies is understandable. But speakers were equally reluctant to condemn religion as a source of violence or sectarian divisions. After the terrorist attacks of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001, Western (and not only Western) intellectual circles fiercely debated about the dangers posed by religious identities. The so-called Third Wave of Atheism, a term coined after a series of books criticizing religion as inherently intolerant and misguided by Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, Michel Onfray, and others, was widely discussed in the media. But misguided military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan or the killing of Osama bin Laden, did not in fact render Western societies safe from threats emerging from the explosive mixture of so-

*continued on page 24*

## 23<sup>rd</sup> Tischner Debate: Membership and Identity November 18, 2015, Warsaw University

### Panelists

- Małgorzata Fuszara**  
Professor of Social Sciences,  
University of Warsaw; Secretary of  
State, Government Plenipotentiary for  
Equal Treatment
- Konstanty Gebert**  
Journalist and political commentator,  
*Gazeta Wyborcza*; Associate Fellow,  
European Council for Foreign  
Relations
- Steven Lukes**  
Professor of Sociology, New York  
University; Krzysztof Michalski Visiting  
Fellow, IWM
- Jyotirmaya Sharma**  
Professor of Political Science,  
University of Hyderabad; Visiting  
Fellow, IWM

### Chair

- Marcin Król**  
Professor of History of Ideas and  
Dean of the Faculty of Applied  
Sciences at the University of Warsaw
- Shalini Randeria**  
Rector of the IWM and Professor of  
Sociology and Social Anthropology at  
the Graduate Institute, Geneva
- The 23<sup>rd</sup> Tischner Debate was jointly  
organized by the University of War-  
saw, Kultura Liberalna, and the IWM.  
The event, generously supported by  
the Polish Ministry of Science and  
Higher Education, was held under the  
honorable patronage of the Warsaw  
Mayor Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz and  
with the media support of Gazeta  
Wyborcza.*

## Kotakowski Symposium: On Religion November 19, 2015, Warsaw University

In 2015, the University of Warsaw, the Program on Modern Poland (POMP) at St Antony’s College, Oxford University, and the IWM decided to organize a yearly seminar commemorating the thought of Polish philosopher **Leszek Kotakowski**. The first seminar was held on 19

November 2015 at Warsaw University and discussed Kotakowski’s philosophy of religion. The second symposium entitled “Paradises Lost: Entzauberung, Utopia, and their Afterlives” will take place at the IWM in October 2016.

### Tischner Debates

The Józef Tischner Debates, a series of public debates in Warsaw, were jointly launched by the IWM and Warsaw University in 2005 in memory of the Polish priest and philosopher Józef Tischner, founding president of the IWM. After the death of IWM’s founding Rector Krzysztof Michalski, who used to chair the debates together with Marcin Król, the series was continued in 2014 and 2015 on the initiative of the Institute’s new Rector Shalini Randeria.



# No Self-Determination without Justification

BY ANDRÉ LIEBICH

*Allied support for Czechoslovak independence in 1918 was due in large part to the “propaganda” efforts of Thomas Masaryk. André Liebich identifies the reasons for the success of Masaryk’s rhetoric of Czechoslovak nationalism.*



People on a street outside Independence Hall examining a new map of Europe shortly before the end of World War I, Philadelphia, October 1918.

In 1914 the prospect of a Czechoslovak state was only slightly less remote than that of landing a man on Mars. Yet, within four years, Czechoslovakia was a reality. To paraphrase Benedict Anderson, what was it that made it possible to “think Czechoslovakia”?

The foremost proponent of the Czechoslovak idea was Thomas Masaryk, a 64 year-old professor, unknown outside his native Bohemia. Operating out of London during the War, however, Masaryk brought to his advocacy a number of advantages. Married to an American and with US academic experience, he spoke English fluently and enjoyed an easy familiarity with Anglo-Saxon ways. Moreover, “he changed his linen frequently and he kept his appointments.”<sup>1</sup> Small matters perhaps, but telling of how Central Europeans were perceived.

Masaryk was also fortunate in his London friends. He was closely associated with Henry Wickham Steed, then foreign editor of *The Times*. Steed was a passionate convert to the anti-Habsburg cause, having

been a *Times* correspondent in Vienna for a decade. Masaryk’s most steadfast helper on the spot was Robert Seton-Watson, an independent scholar knowledgeable about Austria-Hungary and a champion of the Slavs and other repressed peoples.

Aware of the handicap of defending an unfamiliar cause, Masaryk displayed a remarkable sense of the discourse likely to persuade his audience and a flexibility in argumentation. His initial case for an independent Czechoslovakia was an historical-constitutional one, founded on the rights of the crown of Saint Wenceslas. Quickly realizing that such a legalistic framing of the issue found no resonance in Britain, he radically altered the thrust of his rhetoric.

## Protestantism

Masaryk’s first success in generating sympathy between the Czech cause and the Entente, especially Britain, lay in his reference to their shared Protestantism. Drawing on the memory of Jan Hus, the

religious reformer whose 500<sup>th</sup> anniversary was celebrated in 1915, Masaryk reinvented “Bohemia” as a sort of Central European, Protestant England cut off in its prime by Habsburg clerical despotism. Czechs, it turned out, were not really Catholics but the victims of Catholicism. According to Masaryk, political absolutism derived from Catholic absolutism. The true choice for Bohemia, and indeed for a world at war, was between Catholic theocracy and Protestant democracy.

## Austria-Hungary

By construing the Czechs as a Protestant nation, Masaryk could form a critique of Austria-Hungary. This was his second argument in favor of Czechoslovak independence. Delegitimizing Austria-Hungary was an urgent task for Masaryk, especially since Britain had no fundamental quarrel with Austria-Hungary. He denounced Austria-Hungary as a decadent and corrupt misfit, unworthy of the modern world. Like Turkey, it was artificial and a-national. Vi-

enna’s rule was that of an antiquated dynasty, which had forfeited its right to rule Bohemia (and to enjoy Allied respect) through its repeated treachery. Austria-Hungary’s oriental, and hence unworthy essence was also a strong theme: Austria was the “Catholic Turkey” and, in Wickham Steed’s terms, Franz-Josef was “more a Sultan than a true constitutional monarch.”<sup>2</sup> Wickham Steed later put it, “Austria meant every device that could kill the soul of a people, corrupt it with a modicum of material well-being, deprive it of freedom of conscience and of thought, undermine its sturdiness, sap its steadfastness and turn it from the pursuit of its ideal.”<sup>3</sup> In Masaryk’s words, the choice for the future lay between a “degraded dynasty and seven oppressed nations.”<sup>4</sup>

## Pan-Germanism

If Austria-Hungary deserved contempt, the most formidable enemy was Germany. The danger of Pan-Germanism constituted Masaryk’s third argument.

Masaryk’s insistence upon Austria-Hungary’s corruption could not overcome an Allied strategy that sought to detach the dual monarchy from Germany, even at the price of preserving Habsburg power. Masaryk’s task therefore consisted in dispelling hopes of detachment and proving that Germany’s true ambitions lay in Central Europe. Acceptance of these arguments was the precondition for the idea—plausible at the time—that an independent Czechoslovakia would lead to the destruction of Austria and also arrest Germany’s expansion. According to Masaryk, Germany’s intention was to expand across the Balkans, and from there into Asia and Africa. “Berlin-Bagdad” was shorthand for the pan-German plan. If successful, Germany would become an Asiatic and African power, if not a world power. Pan-Germanism was a daring attempt to place the Old World under German rule.

Here, Masaryk was displaying a keen sense of what would touch British sensibilities. While British opinion was indifferent to the fate

Photo: Independence Park Library & Archive, B. Wallace



of the European continent, it was vitally concerned by Britain's imperial interests further away. A German threat to the Suez Canal and a creeping German advance towards India were nightmares. Masaryk also stressed that Austria was not innocent of Pan-Germanism. Depriving Germany of its Austro-Hungarian ally was the surest way of parrying Germany's ambitions: "To destroy Austria is to strike at Germany's heart," he maintained.<sup>5</sup>

### Small Nations

Masaryk's most brilliant intellectual feat, however, was to convince the Allies that one of their few original war aims, the restoration of small nations, meant the creation of a Czechoslovak state. This was his fourth argument.

The Entente had difficulty in explaining why it was fighting. The restoration of "little" Belgium and Serbia was one of the few aims that were generally agreed upon. As Prime Minister Asquith put it, the rights of smaller nationalities of Europe had

remained elusive. Most people in the Allied camp believed that some "measure of autonomy" would satisfy Czechoslovak aspirations. The issue was particularly acute in Britain, since the immediate association was Ireland. Progressive voices pointedly raised the question of why Britain should continue to shed its blood until the Czechoslovaks—sometimes even referred to as "foreign Sinnfeinists"—had achieved their demands. Masaryk made an effort to counter the disagreeable impression created by his "maximalist" claims. He linked the Czechoslovak cause with the idealist aim of the "final organization of the whole of mankind" and maintained that "internationalism can only rest upon satisfied nationalism."

Czechoslovakia has been called "the child of propaganda." Upon returning, triumphant, to his new state, Masaryk referred to his "propaganda voyage" that had gathered support from "the whole world for our political program." The successful conclusion of Masaryk's voyage was due to circumstance and good fortune.



T. G. Masaryk signing the Declaration of Independence of all oppressed nationalities from the Baltic to the Adriatic in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, October 26, 1918.

to be placed upon an "unassailable foundation." Despite having a strategic dimension, the moral, not to say paternalistic thrust of this policy was more significant. British public opinion responded to the notion that Britain was standing up for the underdog, for small nations bullied by great powers. As a *Times* editorial (no doubt penned by Wickham Steed) wrote, "the great liberal nations cannot ignore the duty of affording protection to the small."

For the Entente, "rights of small nations" meant the rights of former states to statehood. Masaryk's brilliant stroke was to seize upon the ambiguity of the term "nation" and redefine it as a people who had not enjoyed statehood but aspired to acquire it, such as the Czechoslovaks. Aiding Masaryk was the fluidity of contemporary discourse on the "rights of nationality." By 1914, the term had become a familiar one, mainly thanks to early developments in the Balkans. It underwent a renaissance with the outbreak of war, without being defined more closely. Allied officials struggled against the growing claims of the principle of nationality, stating "we did not set out on a Nationality Crusade."<sup>6</sup> As it turned out, they had.

### Nothing but Independence

Despite his best efforts, Masaryk's ultimate goal of a sovereign and independent Czechoslovak state

Both were beyond Masaryk's control. However, as Machiavelli put it, to have fortune smile, it must be courted. The arguments articulated by Masaryk were a masterly example of courting fortune. He convinced many that the Czechs were an upright nation of Protestant spirit; that Austria-Hungary was an unworthy state; that Germany's appetite had worldwide proportions; that the defense of small nations meant the defense of peoples without a state; that nations needed independence, not autonomy. The fruit of this campaign was the consensus that a well-ordered world required a sovereign and independent Czechoslovakia. <

<sup>1</sup> Z. A. B. Zeman, *The Masaryks: The Making of Czechoslovakia*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976, p. 54.

<sup>2</sup> Henry Wickham Steed, "The Quintessence of Austria," *Edinburgh Review* no. 454, October 1915, p. 225.

<sup>3</sup> Henry Wickham Steed, "Introduction" to T. G. Masaryk, *The Making of a State: Memories and Observations 1914–1918*, 1927, p. 15.

<sup>4</sup> *Christian Science Monitor*, 1 June 1918.

<sup>5</sup> *Le Matin*, 4 February 1916.

<sup>6</sup> Gábor Bátonyi, *Britain and Central Europe 1918–1933*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, p. 12.

**André Liebich** is Honorary Professor of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. From October to December 2015 he was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM. This article, based on his Monthly Lecture at the IWM on November 5, is part of his research project "Must Nations Become States?" which focuses on self-determination in the long 19<sup>th</sup> century.

# Architecture of Change

## PHOTO EXHIBITIONS AT THE IWM

In February 2016, a new photo exhibition, curated by Knoll Galerie Wien+Budapest, opened at the IWM. The photographic series 'Stolen Facades' by the Hungarian Artist Csaba Nemes continues the theme of the transformation of private and public spaces after the end of communism raised in the preceding exhibition, 'The Garages of Chervonograd', by Austrian-Ukrainian photographer Anatoliy Babiychuk. While the individual design and use of garages reflected their owner's new opportunities for self-realization in the former Soviet Union, the subsequent exhibition documented visible changes in the Budapest cityscape due to private ownership after 1989.



## The Garages of Chervonograd

### PHOTOS BY ANATOLIY BABIYCHUK

Large 'garage areas', mainly built between the 1960s and the 1980s, significantly and permanently (re-) shaped the urban landscapes of the former Soviet Union. The photos taken by Anatoliy Babiychuk in the Ukrainian city of Chervonograd document how these garages have been adapted—despite a standardized building code—to reflect their owners' needs and tastes. Not just the garages' forms, but also the uses to which they are put are highly diverse and individualized. Particularly after the *Wende* in the early 1990s, the garages became sites of refuge from everyday life, artists' studios, rehearsal rooms for musicians, love nests; they served—and still do—as storage facilities, exercise rooms, meeting places for friends, as well as sites for the production, trafficking and consumption of drugs and alcohol.

The changing function of the garages may be read as the quest—

mainly of the male part of the population—for a new private sphere out of the reach of family and/or state. Anatoliy Babiychuk's look behind the garage doors reveals a part of everyday culture and raises questions about the emergence and development of the concept of individual freedom in the Soviet system, as well as about its transformation under post-Soviet conditions. <

*The exhibition, supported by the Arts Section of the Austrian Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt) and conceptualized within the initiative Eyes On—Month of Photography Vienna, was shown from October 2014 to January 2016 at the IWM.*

**Anatoliy Babiychuk**, born 1975 in Sosnivka, Ukraine (former USSR), lives and works in Vienna and Chervonograd. In 2009, he was awarded the Theodor Körner Prize for Art and Artistic Photography. His works have been shown in various exhibitions—among others in Vienna, Linz and St. Gallen.  
[www.babiychuk.com](http://www.babiychuk.com)







## Stolen Facades

PHOTOS BY CSABA NEMES

Societal changes have immediate and rapid effects on the cityscape. In the early 1990s, after decades of state socialism in Eastern Europe, apartments were privatized, companies founded and private shops opened. This new ownership status was soon recognizable on the streets of Budapest. Where grey facades had dominated in the past, they were now adorned with bright advertisements. The new entrepreneurs sought to catch the attention of passers-by by painting and renovating facades, signaling both their presence, as well as the changed ownership and social structures. The new apartment owners, too, painted and renovated, but only their own apartments' exteriors, even if these were on the 4<sup>th</sup> floor.

As the exhibition's title suggests, after years of socialism this display of private ownership seemed a kind of theft to many inhabitants of Bu-

dapest, including the artist. The photos of Csaba Nemes document the first gradual, then accelerating changes to the Budapest cityscape in the 1990s. <

*The exhibition, launched in cooperation with Knoll Galerie Wien+Budapest, was opened on February 25, 2016. Future exhibitions at the IWM (see p. 24) will also be curated by Hans Knoll, who runs galleries in Vienna (since 1983) and Budapest (since 1989) which specialize in contemporary Eastern European art and offer guided art tours to different European cities. [www.knollgalerie.at](http://www.knollgalerie.at)*

**Csaba Nemes**, born 1966 in Kiszvárd, lives and works in Budapest. He has been interested in the societal processes in Hungary since the late 1980s, and uses nearly all fine arts techniques: photography, film, animation, painting and drawing. His work is well-known through various exhibitions in Hungary, Austria, Germany, Lithuania and many other countries. He currently has a big solo exhibition in the Krakow Museum of Contemporary Art, Mocak. [www.nemescsaba.com](http://www.nemescsaba.com)



# Fellows and Guests 07–12 2015

**Kristina Andelova**

Jan Patočka Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2015–February 2016)

PhD candidate in History, Charles University Prague

**The Intellectual History of Czech Democratic Left (1968–1998)**

**Adam Baczko**

Junior Visiting Fellow (September–December 2015)

PhD candidate in Political Science, EHESS, Paris

**Judging in a Time of Civil War**

**István Bárány**

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (September–November 2015)

Senior Lecturer of Art Theory and Media Studies, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

**Plato: *Parmenides***

(Ancient Greek > Hungarian)

**Eloisa Betti**

EURIAS Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2015–June 2016)

Post-Doctoral Fellow of History Culture Civilization, University of Bologna

**Gender and Precarious Work in a Historical Perspective: The European Context**

**Luiza Bialasiewicz**

Bronisław Geremek Visiting Fellow (October 2015–July 2016)

Jean Monnet Professor of EU External Relations, University of Amsterdam

**Other Empires, Other Europes: Europe, Beyond Territory**

**Agata Bielik-Robson**

Guest (December 2015)

Professor of Jewish Studies, University of Nottingham

**Another Finitude: Thinking Beyond Heidegger**

**Ulrich Brinkmann**

Visiting Fellow (July–September 2015)

Professor für Soziologie, Technische Universität Darmstadt

**Krise und Aufbegehren: Zum Wandel des sozialen Konflikts in der Post-demokratie**

**Ilya Budraitskis**

Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (July–August 2015)

Historian, activist, journalist (Moscow Art Magazine, *OpenLeft* and *LeftEast*)

**Maria do Mar Castro Varela**

Visiting Fellow (October 2015–July 2016)

Professor of General Science of Education and Social Work, Alice Salomon Hochschule Berlin

**Democracy, Education and Epistemic Change**

**Keti Chukrov**

Guest (December 2015)

Associate Professor, Department of Art Theory and Cultural Studies, Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow

**Non-Libidinal Economy and Reality of the Ideal**

**Dmitry Dubrovsky**

Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (July–August 2015)

Former Director, Human Rights Program, St. Petersburg State University; Visiting Research Scholar, Harriman Institute, Columbia University

**Human Rights Educational Discourse in Current Russia—Between Legal Universalism and Cultural Particularism**

**Thomas Stephan Eder**

Junior Visiting Fellow (May–September 2015)

PhD candidate and Research Associate in International Law, University of Vienna

**Eurasia Re-Negotiated: Chinese Academic Discourse on International Dispute Resolution and Sovereignty in Economic and Territorial Disputes**

**Katya Gorchinskaya**

Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (August–September 2015)

Managing Editor for Investigative Programming, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (REF/RL), Kyiv

**Saving a Bird of Prey. A Book About Ukraine's Revolution**

**Rohan Gudibande**

Junior Visiting Fellow (December 2015–February 2016)

PhD candidate in Development Economics, Graduate Institute, Geneva

**The Nexus Between Land Redistribution and Violence-Evidence from West Bengal**

**Gábor Halmai**

EURIAS Visiting Fellow (September 2015–June 2016)

Professor of Law, Department of European Studies; Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

**The Rise and Fall of Post-Communist Constitutionalism: The Case of Hungary and its Impact on the Future of Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe**

**Elena Iarskaia-Smirnova**

Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (November 2015)

Professor of Sociology, National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow

**Social Work in FSU Countries: Mapping ‘The Professional Project’**

**David Jenkins**

Krzysztof Michalski Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2015–June 2016)

PhD Graduate, London School of Economics

**Justice as It Has to Be**

**Adil Hasan Khan**

Junior Visiting Fellow (June 2015–February 2016)

PhD candidate in International Law, Graduate Institute, Geneva

**Temporality and Coloniality in International Legal Discourse**

**Valeriya Korablyova**

Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2015–June 2016)

Associate Professor of Philosophy of Humanities, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

**Euromaidan as the Trace of “Equaliberty”: Recapitulation of Modern European Values**

**André Liebich**

Visiting Fellow (October–December 2015)

Honorary Professor of International History and Politics, Graduate Institute, Geneva

**Must Nations Become States? The Birth of Self-Determination**

**Dessislava Lilova**

Visiting Fellow (July–December 2015)

Associate Professor in Cultural History, Sofia University

**The Homeland as Terra Incognita: Geography and Early Bulgarian Nationalism (1830s–1870s)**

**Steven Lukes**

Krzysztof Michalski Visiting Fellow (September 2015–July 2016)

Professor of Sociology, New York University

**The Sociology of Morals**

**Cezary Michalski**

Guest (December 2015)

Slavic philologist, writer and publisher; member, Polish Writers’ Association

**The Weimar Condition of Today’s Europe**

**Katherine Miller**

Krzysztof Michalski Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2015–June 2016)

Visiting Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Reed College / Portland, OR

**Particularity and Universality as Moral Orientations: Isma’ili Islamic Ethics in Northern Pakistan**

**Sergiu Novac**

CEU Junior Visiting Fellow (October–December 2015)

PhD candidate in Sociology and Social Anthropology, CEU Budapest

**Taming the Atom, Engineering Time. An Anthropology of Nuclear Decommissioning**

**Vlad Odobescu**

Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (October–December 2015)

Freelance journalist, Romanian Centre for Investigative Journalism, Bucharest

**The Hectares of our Nation. Identity and Agriculture in Eastern Europe**

**Sašo Ordanoski**

Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (August–October 2015)

Freelance journalist, *Daily Sloboden pecat* and USAID project, Skopje

**The Rise and Fall of Macedonian Rightist Populism (2006–2015)**

**Gemma Pörzgen**

Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (September–November 2015)

Freelance journalist, Berlin

**A Life in Moscow**

**Lipin Ram**

Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2015–February 2016)

PhD candidate and teaching assistant in Anthropology and Sociology of Development, Graduate Institute, Geneva

**Rethinking Democratic Politics: Affect, Violence and Communist Politics in North Kerala**

**Jyotirmaya Sharma**

Visiting Fellow (September 2015–June 2016)

Professor of Political Science, University of Hyderabad

**A Genealogy of Hindu Identity**

**Alexander Soros**

Guest (November–December 2015)

Founder, Alexander Soros Foundation; Global Board Member, Open Society Foundations; Advisory Board Member, Global Witness

**Heine, Wagner, Nietzsche**

**Maria Stepanova**

Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (October 2015)

Essayist, journalist, poet; editor-in-chief, *COLTA.RU*

**The Memory of Memory**

**Vesna Velkovrh Bukilica**

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (July–September 2015)

Freelance translator and researcher, Ljubljana

**Thomas Piketty: *Le Capital au XXI siècle*** (French > Slovenian)

**Rachel White**

Guest (July–August 2015)

PhD candidate in History, Yale University

**Résistance Spirituelle: Christian Political Action (1940–1962)**

**Zlatko Wurzberg**

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (October–December 2015)

Freelance translator, Zagreb

**Michel Foucault: Herméneutique du sujet. Cours au Collège de France, 1981–1982** (French > Croatian)

**Guzel Yusupova**

Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2015–March 2016)

Assistant Lecturer of Sociology, Department of Religious Studies, Kazan Federal University

**Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Tatarstan: Developing a Theoretical Understanding of Religious Nationalism**

**Rafał Zawisza**

Józef Tischner Visiting Fellow (July–December 2015)

PhD candidate in Cultural Studies, University of Warsaw

**Hannah Arendt’s Early Thought as a Response to the Political Theology**

## Fellows and Guests

The IWM offers a place for research and scholarly debate across borders and disciplines. Its various fellowship programs are thus a fundamental part of the Institute’s work. Each year, 50–60 Visiting Fellows and Guests—mainly from Eastern and Western Europe as well as from North America—are awarded fellowships to pursue their individual research projects at the IWM. Since its inception in 1982, the IWM has hosted more than 1,000 scholars, journalists and translators.



# „Patočka ist gestorben. Wir müssen etwas tun!“

## INTERVIEW

**Klaus Nellen** im Interview mit **Jakub Homolka** über den tschechischen Philosophen Jan Patočka (1907–1977), die Geschichte seines wissenschaftlichen Nachlasses, die klandestine Zusammenarbeit mit Patočkas Schülern und die Gründung des Instituts für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen.



Photos: IWM, Patočka Archiv

**Jakub Homolka:** Nach Patočkas Tod im Jahre 1977 begannen die Bemühungen um die Rettung und Erhaltung seines Nachlasses. Wie kam es dazu, dass Sie sich daran beteiligten?

**Klaus Nellen:** Der polnische Philosoph und spätere Gründer des IWM Krzysztof Michalski war mit Jan Patočka bereits seit 1973 in Kontakt. Ich lernte Michalski im Husserl Archiv der Universität zu Köln Mitte der 1970er Jahre kennen, wo er Humboldt-Stipendiat und ich wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter war. Am 13. März 1977 kam er zu mir und sagte: „Patočka ist gestorben. Wir müssen etwas tun!“ Es sollten jedoch einige Jahre vergehen, bis sich die Möglichkeit eröffnete, etwas für das Denken und den Nachlass von Patočka zu tun – und das hängt mit der Gründung des Instituts für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Wien zusammen.

**Homolka:** Inwiefern gibt es hier einen Zusammenhang?

**Nellen:** Die Idee zur Gründung eines *Institute for Advanced Study* hatte Michalski 1980 während eines Aufenthalts am Inter-University Zentrum in Dubrovnik, wo er zusammen mit Hans-Georg Gadamer und Gottfried Böhm ein Seminar veranstaltete. Dieses Zentrum war damals einer der wenigen Orte, der es Wissenschaftlern aus Ost und West ermöglichte, sich zwanglos zu treffen und auszutauschen. Zwei Jahre später, 1982, gründete Michalski das IWM in Wien, das eine ähnliche Funktion erfüllen sollte. Eines der ersten Projekte am Institut war der Forschungsschwerpunkt „Das philosophische Werk Jan Patočkas“,

der bis heute die Erforschung und Verbreitung des Denkens dieses bedeutenden mitteleuropäischen Philosophen zum Ziel hat.

**Homolka:** In welcher Beziehung standen Michalski und Patočka zueinander?

**Nellen:** Michalski war ein Schüler Patočkas. Er hatte Patočka in den 1970er Jahren dazu angeregt, sich mit der Philosophie der Geschichte zu beschäftigen, woraus Patočkas vielleicht wichtigstes Werk, die *Ketzerischen Essays zur Philosophie der Geschichte*, entstanden. Michalski hat sich seinem Mentor schon früh verpflichtet gefühlt und bewunderte dessen politisches Ethos. Man kann sagen, dass er diesem Vorbild sein ganzes Leben lang nachgeieft hat. Wie Patočka war Michalski nicht nur ein anerkannter akademischer Philosoph, sondern auch ein engagierter Bürger und Europäer. Dieser Umstand hat das Institut tief geprägt und zu einer zivilgesellschaftlichen Institution gemacht – zu einem Ort, an dem nicht nur über die Wirklichkeit reflektiert, sondern auch über deren Veränderung nachgedacht wird. Diesen Geist hat Jan Patočka maßgeblich verkörpert. Er war von Anfang an eine Leitfigur für uns und ist es – zumindest für die Gründergeneration – bis heute.

**Homolka:** Was war der Grund dafür, das Institut ausgerechnet in Wien zu gründen?

**Nellen:** Es war eine pragmatische Wahl, die zunächst wenig mit der Idee Mitteleuropas zu tun hatte. Sie hatte weder einen philosophischen noch einen ideologischen Grund. Die politische Teilung Europas hatte zu

einer immer tiefer greifenden geistigen Teilung Europas geführt. Folglich waren die Intellektuellen im Osten weitgehend von der Diskussion im Westen abgeschnitten und umgekehrt. Im Westen war das geistige Interesse an Osteuropa fast vollständig erloschen. In unseren Köpfen war Osteuropa ein grauer Monolith. Welche Arroganz! Die Idee war, mit unseren bescheidenen Kräften dazu beizutragen, die Intellektuellen und Wissenschaftler aus den zwei Welten, in die Europa zerfallen war, wieder zusammenzubringen.

Um unser Vorhaben umzusetzen, mussten wir einen Ort finden, der es unseren Gästen aus Osteuropa erlauben würde, eine Ausreiselerlaubnis zu erhalten. Österreich ist bis heute neutral. Für einen Polen war es damals sehr viel leichter, nach Wien zu reisen als nach Köln oder Berlin. So war das im Kalten Krieg. Es ist übrigens eine Schande für den Westen, dass es selbst nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs für viele Osteuropäer jenseits der EU-Grenze keineswegs leichter geworden ist, zu uns zu kommen. Früher machte man ihnen die Ausreise schwer, heute die Einreise.

**Homolka:** Mit welchen Schwierigkeiten war das Vorhaben verbunden?

**Nellen:** Damals folgte die sogenannte „Ostpolitik“ der Doktrin der Entspannung. Man glaubte, ideologische Gegensätze abbauen zu können, und setzte auf friedliche Koexistenz und auf Konvergenz. Während die Regierungen in Deutschland und Österreich in den Gesprächen mit osteuropäischen Regimen um Entspannung bemüht waren, gab es im

## Jan Patočkas Erbe

In der Erinnerung an Jan Patočka, der als einer der bedeutendsten modernen Philosophen Mitteleuropas gilt, wird häufig auf die Bedeutung des *Samisdat* für das intellektuelle Leben unter dem real existierenden Sozialismus hingewiesen. In Prag war es eine Gruppe um Ivan Chvatik, den heutigen Leiter des Prager Patočka-Archivs, die nach Patočkas Tod am 13. März 1977 damit begann, den Nachlass des tschechischen Philosophen im Untergrund herauszugeben. Das Resultat war u.a. die 27-bändige *Samisdat*-Ausgabe ausgewählter Schriften Patočkas. Weniger bekannt sind die parallel verlaufenden Aktivitäten am Wiener Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, wo man sich seit Anfang der 1980er Jahre um die Erschließung und Verbreitung von Patočkas Werk bemüht.

Eines der ersten großen Projekte des damals jungen Instituts war die Herausgabe einer deutschsprachigen Edition, der *Ausgewählten Schriften*. Dies ging einher mit dem Aufbau eines Patočka-Archivs in Wien. In den darauffolgenden Jahren erschien eine Auswahl der wichtigsten Schriften Patočkas in fünf Bänden bei Klett-Cotta (1987–1992) in Stuttgart. Daran waren Forscher aus Prag wie aus dem Westen beteiligt, darunter auch tschechische Dissidenten aus dem Exil, insbesondere der Patočka-Schüler Jiří Němec.

Das Interesse am Werk des tschechischen Philosophen beschränkte sich aber keineswegs auf die Herausgabe seiner Schriften. Der Patočka-Forschungsschwerpunkt besteht am IWM bis heute und hat zahlreiche Forschungs- und Publikationsprojekte zur europäischen Moderne, politischen Philosophie und Säkularismusdebatte hervorgerufen. Diese Projekte wurden mitinitiiert und maßgeblich mitgetragen von Ludger Hagedorn, der im Jahr 2015 die Leitung des Archivs von Klaus Nellen übernommen hat (siehe IWMpost 115). Das Archiv entwickelte sich über die Jahre immer mehr zu einem Ort für phänomenologische Forschung. Ein besonderes Augenmerk galt und gilt dabei politischen und zivilisationstheoretischen Fragen, die in Zukunft unter der leitenden Thematik *Europa – Nacheuropa* verstärkt untersucht werden sollen.

Osten Entwicklungen, die diese Bemühungen empfindlich störten. Auslöser dafür waren die Dissidenten. In Polen hatten sie in Gestalt der *Solidarność* einen alarmierenden Erfolg. Hier war der Widerstand gegen das kommunistische Regime auf die Gesellschaft übergesprungen. Das führte dazu, dass General Jaruzelski im Dezember 1981 den Kriegszustand verhängte. Ich erinnere mich noch gut, wie Helmut Schmidt, damaliger Kanzler der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, damals die *Solidarność* ermahnte, nicht den Weltfrieden zu gefährden. Ähnlich dachte man auch in Österreich. Allerdings gab es eine bemerkenswerte Ausnahme, und das war Erhard Busek, damals Vizebürgermeister von Wien, der schon längere Zeit Kontakte zu Dissidenten pflegte und das Institut in seiner Gründungsphase tatkräftig unterstützte.

Kurz, zu dieser Zeit war es nicht opportun, Kontakte zu Dissidenten zu haben. Daher war es nicht einfach, Unterstützung für die Idee des Instituts zu finden. Wir wollten den zahllosen Anstrengungen um einen Dialog mit Regimevertretern keine weiteren hinzufügen, wir wollten aber auch nicht das Gegenteil tun und eine Zuflucht für Dissidenten werden. Vielmehr wollten wir Menschen aus Osteuropa einladen, die trotz der damaligen Bedingungen eigenständig zu denken vermochten.

**Homolka:** War Patočka eine Symbolfigur für die Vermittlung zwischen West und Ost?

**Nellen:** Ja, Patočka war sein ganzes Leben lang ein Vermittler. Er hat in Freiburg bei Husserl und Heide-



gger studiert und die Phänomenologie nach Prag gebracht, wo er sie weiterentwickelte. Umgekehrt hat er den Beitrag Mitteleuropas zur Moderne erforscht. Er war davon überzeugt, dass die Tschechen eine besondere Verantwortung für Europa tragen. Daher war es ein wichtiger Teil unserer Aufgabe, Patočkas Denken im Westen bekannt zu machen.

**Homolka:** Wie sah das praktisch aus?

**Nellen:** Gleich zu Beginn, in den Jahren 1984/1985, organisierten wir zwei kleine Konferenzen, zu denen wir alle Leute einluden, die etwas zu Patočkas Werk zu sagen hatten (u.a. Walter Biemel, Ludwig Landgrebe und natürlich tschechische Philosophen wie Ilja Šrubař, Erazim Kohák und Václav Bělohradský). Patočkas Kollegen und Studenten, die damals in der Tschechoslowakei lebten, konnten allerdings nicht kommen. Auf diesen Konferenzen haben wir die Konzeption der *Ausgewählten Schriften*, einer fünfbändigen Ausgabe in deutscher Sprache, diskutiert. Für die Realisierung dieses Vorhabens konnte Michalski den Verleger Michael Klett gewinnen und Mittel des Österreichischen Wissenschaftsfonds (FWF) für die Übersetzung und Herausgabe der Bände akquirieren.

**Homolka:** Wie ging dann die Arbeit an den *Ausgewählten Schriften* weiter?

**Nellen:** Die Voraussetzung war, dass man Zugang zu einem möglichst vollständigen Korpus der Schriften Patočkas hatte. Daher habe ich schon sehr früh Kontakt zu seiner Familie und seinen Schülern in Prag aufgenommen. Nach Patočkas Tod hatte Ivan Chvatík den Nachlass aus dessen Haus an einen sicheren Ort gebracht und angefangen, ihn systematisch im *Samisdat* herauszugeben; gleichzeitig begann er, ihn zu kopieren, natürlich heimlich. Die wenigen Kopierer, die es zu der Zeit gab, unterlagen einer strengen Reglementierung, um die Verbreitung unbotmäßiger Schriften zu unterbinden. Nach und nach wurden alle Schriften Patočkas, die damals bekannt waren, kopiert und nach Wien gebracht.

**Homolka:** Wie wurden die Kopien von Prag nach Wien gebracht?

**Nellen:** Auf zwei Wegen: Zum einen bin ich zwischen Prag und Wien gependelt. Die Manuskripte transportierte ich in meinem Koffer. Natürlich wurde man an der Grenze überprüft. Auf die einschlägigen Fragen des tschechoslowakischen Zolls hin sagte ich immer, dass es sich um meine persönlichen Manuskripte handle. Die Grenzbeamten schienen nicht besonders interessiert, sie genauer zu inspizieren. Bis heute weiß ich nicht, wie stark sich das Regime in den 1980er Jahren noch für die Schriften Patočkas interessierte.

Die zweite Möglichkeit war auf diplomatischem Weg. Wir hatten Freunde unter den deutschen und österreichischen Diplomaten, die Manuskripte im Diplomatengepäck nach Wien brachten. Auf diese Weise konnten wir in relativ kurzer Zeit ein Archiv in Wien aufbauen, das den Prager Bestand in Kopie reflektierte. Und so konnten wir bald mit der Herausgabe der Schriften beginnen.

**Homolka:** Haben Sie umgekehrt auch etwas von Wien mit nach Prag genommen?

**Nellen:** Auf jedem Weg von hier nach dort habe ich wissenschaftliche Fachliteratur mitgenommen. Die *Jan Hus Foundation* finanzierte damals Bücher für Kollegen in Osteuropa, damit sie nicht von der westlichen Literatur abgeschnitten blieben. Bei diesen „Botendiensten“ wandte ich prophylaktisch einen simplen Trick an: Es lag immer ein Playboy-Heft bei den Büchern, das sofort die Aufmerksamkeit auf sich zog. Die Zöllner schauten mich dann vorwurfsvoll an, beschlagnahmten das subversive Produkt und händigten mir eine Quittung aus. Die Bücher durfte ich behalten. Auf dem Rückweg habe ich dann wieder Papiere mitgenommen – eine kleine, fleißige Ameise zwischen West und Ost.

**Homolka:** Wie änderte sich die Arbeit nach 1989, als das klandestine Jan Patočka-Archiv in Prag eine offizielle Institution wurde?

**Nellen:** Das Wiener Archiv war inzwischen zu einem Ort geworden, an dem zahlreiche Wissenschaftler zu Patočka arbeiteten. In Kooperation mit Prag haben wir das Archiv fortlaufend ausgebaut und aktualisiert. Zugleich folgten dem ersten Projekt – der Edition der fünfbändigen Ausgabe – weitere mehrjährige Forschungsprojekte zum Werk des tschechischen Philosophen. Und in der Zwischenzeit war eine neue Generation von Patočka-Forschern herangewachsen.

**Homolka:** Was hat sich seither geändert?

**Nellen:** Insbesondere hat das Interesse an der Generation von Dissidenten nachgelassen, die damals als Leitfiguren und öffentliche Intellektuelle galten. Dementsprechend wurde Patočka zu diesem Zeitpunkt weniger als Philosoph wahrgenommen, sondern eher als mutiger Bürgerrechtler, dessen philosophisches Werk noch kaum bekannt war. Die Postmoderne hat die von den Dissidenten verkörperten Werte plötzlich altmodisch aussehen lassen. Doch wenn man heute an den Maidan in der Ukraine denkt, sind die europäischen Grundwerte und die Idee eines gemeinsamen Europas, die für Patočka so zentral waren und die wir hier im Westen fast schon vergessen haben, plötzlich wieder da und entfalten eine große Kraft. Ich glaube, hier müssen wir einfach geduldig sein – Patočkas Zeit kommt erst noch. ◀

Bei diesem Text handelt es sich um Auszüge eines Interviews, das am 14. 03. 2015 in der tschechischen Tageszeitung *Lidové noviny* publiziert wurde. Die Originalfassung sowie die deutsche Version des Interviews sind auf [www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch](http://www.iwm.at/read-listen-watch) nachzulesen.

**Klaus Nellen** ist Permanent Fellow am IWM. Bis zum Mai 2015 leitete er den Patočka-Forschungsschwerpunkt. 2007 wurde ihm die Jan Patočka-Gedächtnismedaille der Tschechischen Akademie der Wissenschaften verliehen.

**Jakub Homolka** ist Doktorand der Karls-Universität in Prag. Er war von November 2014 bis April 2015 ein Jan Patočka Junior Visiting Fellow am IWM.

## Welcome



The IWM is pleased to announce that **Miloš Vec**, Professor of European Legal and Constitutional History at the University of Vienna, joined the IWM as Permanent Fellow in January 2016. His main research interests—the history of international law, regulatory regimes and multinormativity—will be part of a new research focus at the IWM. Vec received his habilitation in legal history, philosophy of law, theory of law, and civil law from the Johann-Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt am Main in 2005. Until 2012 he worked at the Max-Planck-Institute for European Legal History in Frankfurt and taught at the Law Faculty there. He has also taught at the Universities of Bonn, Hamburg, Konstanz, Lyon, Tübingen, and Vilnius. His awards include the Otto Hahn Medal of the Max-Planck-Society (1997), the Walter Kalkhof-Rose Memorial Award of the Academy of Sciences and Literature, Mainz (2006), the Academy Award of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences and Humanities (2008) and the UNIVIE Teaching Award (2015). Furthermore, he has been an Associate Member of the Cluster of Excellence “The Formation of Normative Orders” at Frankfurt University since 2013 and was a Fellow to the Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin (WiKo) in the academic year 2011/2012. Vec regularly contributes as a commentator and reviewer to various publications, particularly the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.



**Paweł Marczewski**, a former Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM, became the Institute's new Head of Publications in September 2015. In this position, he is in charge of IWM's journal *Transit – Europäische Revue* and the online platform *Transit online* (see p. 23), which provides articles by fellows and external commentators on specific issues—such as the refugee crisis and, more recently, East European protest movements. Marczewski studied sociology and history of ideas at the University of Warsaw (UW). He obtained his doctoral degree in 2011 and was subsequently appointed Assistant Professor at the Institute of Sociology at Warsaw University. Marczewski has held visiting fellowships at the Centre for Advanced Study in Sofia (2013), the Department of Politics at the Indiana University Bloomington (2010), and the Centre for Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (2009). He is a member of the editorial board of *Przegląd Polityczny* and a contributing writer at *Tygodnik Powszechny*. Furthermore, he was a staff writer at *Europa* magazine and co-founded the online weekly *Kultura Liberalna*. A book based on his dissertation *To Make Liberty Inevitable: Republican Concepts in the Writings of Alexis de Tocqueville* was published in 2012. He translated three books by Tony Judt, including *Thinking the Twentieth Century*, into Polish.

## Varia



The 2<sup>nd</sup> Vienna Ball of Sciences took place in the ball room of Vienna's town hall on January 30, 2016. IWM Rector **Shalini Randeria** (upper left) was one of this year's academic “ambassadors” who were nominated to represent Vienna's science and research community in its excellence and diversity.

The 2016 NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study) Annual Business Meeting and the 2016 EURIAS Fellows Annual Meeting was hosted by the Israel Institute for Advanced Studies (IIAS) on April 11–13. The IWM was represented by its current EURIAS fellows **Eloisa Betti** (University of Bologna) and **Gábor Halmai** (Eötvös Loránd University Budapest), as well as by the Institute's Executive Director **Knut Neumayer**.

**Paul Cristian Radu**, who was a Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow at the IWM in 2002, is one of the investigative journalists behind the *Panama Papers*. Currently, he is the Executive Director of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, a co-creator of the Investigative Dashboard concept and of RISE Project, a new platform for investigative reporters and hackers in Romania.

**Eilin Derakshan**, beloved “good soul” of the IWM for more than 20 years, went into her well-deserved retirement in December 2015. As a housekeeper she has been a tremendous help to keep the Institute running and to provide a perfect infrastructure and friendly environment. We thank her for her excellent work and wish her all the best for the future.

On January 20 2016, **Lord Weidenfeld**, the Vienna-born publisher and philanthropist, passed away at the age of 96. He had been an advisor to, and supporter of, the Institute for Human Sciences since its inception, and a long-standing mem-

ber of our Board of Patrons. He was, amongst others, a regular participant in the Institute's *Castelgandolfo Colloquia* and the publisher of *Jews and Christians in a Pluralistic World*, based on a Jewish-Christian encounter convened by the IWM in 1990. He was also the initiator of the *Club of Three*, an informal group bringing together leaders in the fields of politics, business and the media from the United Kingdom, France and Germany.

On March 31, the Hungarian writer, Holocaust survivor and Nobel literature prize winner **Imre Kertész**, died at the age of 86. During his time as a Paul Celan Visiting Fellow at the IWM in 1992, he worked on and completed his book *Galley Boat-Log* (Gályanapló), a record of his reflections on life, literature and the changing world around him, covering the period 1961–1991.

With deep sadness we also learnt that **Aleš Debeljak**, one of Slovenia's most renowned poets, died in a car accident on January 28 at the age of 55. From July to December 2013, he was a Robert Bosch Visiting Fellow at the IWM, working on the project “Writers of Yutlantis: Post-Yugoslav Literature and the ‘Common Cultural Space’”. Aleš Debeljak was an award-winning poet, essayist, translator, and sociologist of culture, who also held a professorship at the University of Ljubljana's Faculty of Social Sciences. The *IWMpost* (issue 112) featured one of his essays on the Serbian novelist Danilo Kiš and his library.



# The Right Thing to Do: Ethics and Moral Dilemmas

BY DAVID JENKINS, STEVEN LUKES AND KATHERINE MILLER

*Morality is an elusive topic. What is it and how are we to study it? Economists, political scientists, psychologists, legal and religious scholars all have their own ways of either avoiding or dealing with it. Our idea is that bringing together philosophical and anthropological approaches can help isolate the topic and shed light on some key questions.*

Philosophers, who typically reason from their armchairs, see morality as the subject matter of ethics, which consists, firstly, in reflecting upon moral principles that indicate what is right and good, and, secondly, in seeking foundations that ground our moral thinking. These principles and foundations will then guide practical judgments in personal, social and political life. Philosophers generally assume that there is one true morality with universal scope (applying to all humans or rational beings) and that the task is to arrive at the correct or best account of how to express and justify it, though they endlessly disagree about what that account is. For anthropologists, who typically do empirical ethnographic research, morality, while omnipresent in their research and writings, has not explicitly been a central object of study until quite recently, when some have responded to James Laidlaw's call for an 'anthropology of ethics and freedom' that would study 'ordinary ethics'. Anthropologists study people's norm-governed practices and beliefs and generally take cultural diversity for granted, both across the world and, increasingly, within any given culture. They see the question of what is universal and what is not as empirical, and expect and report on a diversity of morals. Philosophers prefer thinly described, imaginary thought experiments; anthropologists go in for 'thick description' of messy complexities of local contexts. Philosophers speak of morality, anthropologists of moralities.

One initial gain from combining these perspectives arises from encouraging each to question the other's assumptions. Thus an ethnographic stance prompts the question: from what local contexts do philosophers' universalizing assumptions and reasonings arise? When they use the word 'we' (as they very frequently do), who are 'we'? Friedrich Nietzsche was a rare philosopher who raised this challenge, writing that moral philosophers know moral facts merely 'as a chance abridgement, as morality of their environment, their class, their church, the spirit of their times, their climate and zone of the earth...'; arguing that philosophers should 'compare many moralities'. There are forceful responses to this challenge (for instance, denying that an argument's origin affects its validity), and, in return, there are sig-



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nificant philosophical challenges to an anthropological approach to morality. How is one to distinguish morality from *mores*, what is moral from what is merely customary or conventional (what distinguishes a moral code from a dress code?) without a *prior* demarcation criterion? What, if one is to follow Nietzsche's advice, is one to compare? And how does a study of 'ordinary ethics', which takes the essence of ethics to lie in the relatively inarticulate and unmediated domain of everyday life, connect with binding and obligatory normative systems and what Charles Darwin called the distinctively human capacity to use 'that imperious word *ought*'?

One striking feature of both these approaches to morality is their almost total neglect of power: of the ways in which moral norms and justifications are—more or less successfully—*imposed*, and become widely accepted as unquestioned, everyday commonsense; the ways in which those norms and justifications are *exposed* through different forms of resistance and protest; and finally, modes of *occlusion*: that is, ways in which viewing the world through moral lenses (whether by participants, or observers and analysts) can occlude the very relations and mechanism of power that ren-

der prevailing moral assumptions self-evident, and the ways in which contemporary ideologies (technocratic and neoliberal), as well as the approach of so-called 'political realists', can occlude the attribution of moral and political responsibility of individuals and groups in power.

Here are three examples that illustrate the bearing of these reflections on the study of morality.

First, Katherine Miller's ethnographic study of religious volunteering and neighborly gift-giving in Hunza (North Pakistan) neatly illustrates the inadequacy of an anthropology that takes freedom as definitive of the distinctively ethical dimension of life, but fails to take full account of the ways in which freedom both presupposes and is inseparable from binding social norms. In the context of Isma'ili Islam, people frame their acts of service simultaneously in this-worldly and transcendent terms; as both a voluntary gift of their time and effort for the welfare of their community and a solemn duty to God. In everyday agricultural labor, the generosity and affection said to characterize the sharing of tasks between neighbors is contrasted with the binding obligations owed to kin, but a prevailing moral vision of society as the expansion of kinship networks

rests equally on both principles. In both cases, specific forms of ethical freedom and moral obligation only make sense in relation to one another. Whether such appealing visions of communal harmony contribute to a local moral politics or whether they tend to occlude more fundamental realities of inequality and domination structuring village life is disputable, but it is in this uneasy terrain that an empirical investigation of ethical life must do its work.

Second, David Jenkins examines the use of 'ideal theory' in contemporary political philosophy. Ideal theory attempts to generate a system of rules that, in Brian Barry's words, could not reasonably be rejected under informed and uncoerced conditions. Political realists criticize such theorizing for abstracting from the profound difficulties of political life, the muck and mire which any practical guidance must confront. While realists offer important correctives to the direction and assumptions of much political theory, ideal theory remains a useful—if limited—way of interrogating the injustices with which all of us are surrounded. Recourse to this ideal of political association offers a way of interrogating the 'stuff' of politics that the realists believe should be brought front and centre to *all* theorizing. Realism and

ideal theory can thus interact with one another in productive and useful ways—it is a matter of correcting the current academic division of labour, nothing more. Ideal theory motivates an understanding of politics that *can* take oppositional politics seriously, is capable of engendering potentially deep ambivalence about the possibilities for justice within current conditions, while offering resources to advocate for necessarily profound and long-term transformation. It is a way of thinking about power that refuses to acquiesce to the demands of any contingent now.

Finally, Steven Lukes confronted the formidable task of arriving at an adequate explanation of mass killing, which seems to require that we attend to the social and political processes by which recognizably human beings are rendered inhuman. Perpetrators typically see themselves as virtuous and view their atrocities as morally justified; humans, unlike animals, kills their conspecifics on principle. Drawing on the work of Abram de Swaan, Steven points to the ways in which individuals are subjected to 'dysmentalization', processes by which 'moral sentiments'—such as sympathy or pity—that ordinarily feature as basic features of human agency, as well as the norms by which these are expressed, are purposefully and systematically undermined. Once this 'dysmentalization' is accomplished, certain members of the community—whether of the village, the nation or the human race—are excluded from the orbit of such concern. In such extreme circumstances, relations of power are revealed with startling clarity. A more troubling question Steven raises is how far these processes, in less extreme circumstances and in less extreme form, play out in the quotidian realities of society more generally. <

**David Jenkins** received his PhD in Political Theory from the London School of Economics in 2014.

**Steven Lukes** is Professor of Sociology at the New York University.

Before coming to the IWM, **Katherine Miller** was a Visiting Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Reed College / Portland.

Together, the three of them were the inaugural Krzysztof Michalski Visiting and Junior Visiting Fellows at the IWM during the academic year 2015–16.

The Krzysztof Michalski Fellowships were established in 2014 in memory of the IWM's founding rector and consist of one senior and two junior positions in the fields of continental philosophy or religion.



Books, Articles and Talks


Books by Fellows and Alumni

Jan-Werner Müller  
*Was ist Populismus?*  
Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2016



Jan-Werner Müller nimmt in seinem jüngsten Werk, das auf den IWM Lectures 2015 basiert, aktuelle Entwicklungen zum Ausgangspunkt, um eine Theorie des Populismus zu skizzieren und Populismus letztlich klar von der Demokratie abzugrenzen. Seine Thesen helfen zudem, neue Strategien in der Auseinandersetzung mit Populisten zu entwickeln.

Charles Taylor  
*The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity*  
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016



For centuries, philosophers have been divided on the nature of language. Those in the rational empiricist tradition assert that language is a tool that human beings developed to encode and communicate information. In his new book, Taylor explains that this view neglects the crucial role language plays in shaping the very thought it purports to express.

Thomas Hippler and Miloš Vec (eds.)  
*Paradoxes of Peace in 19th Century Europe*  
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015



‘Peace’ is often simplistically assumed to be war’s opposite, and as such is not examined closely or

critically idealized in the literature of peace studies, its crucial role in the justification of war is often overlooked. Starting from a critical view that the value of ‘restoring peace’ or ‘keeping peace’ is, and has been, regularly used as a pretext for military intervention, this book traces the conceptual history of peace in 19<sup>th</sup> century legal and political practice.

Claus Offe and Ulrich Preuß  
*Citizens in Europe: Essays on Democracy, Constitutionalism and European Integration*  
Colchester: ECPR Press, 2016



This interdisciplinary collection of essays by a constitutionalist and a political sociologist examines how fragmented societies can be held together by appropriate and effective constitutional arrangements providing for bonds of democratic citizenship.

Ludger Hagedorn and James Dodd (eds.)  
*Religion, War and the Crisis of Modernity*  
Special Issue, New Yearbook for Phenomenological Philosophy and Phenomenological Philosophy, Vol. XIV  
London/New York: Routledge, 2015



This volume comprises a number of studies on Patočka’s philosophical oeuvre, completed by two remarkable and hitherto unpublished English translations of his own essays: *Time, Myth, Faith*, written in the 1950’s, is one of his earliest and most explicit reflections on religion and historicity. The second is dedicated to the crucial question of meaning in a nihilistic age.

Ludger Hagedorn, Jason W. Alvis and Michael Staudigl (eds.)  
*Violence and the Gift: Challenging Continental Philosophy of Religion*  
Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2015



The papers of this special issue are based on the conference “Violence and the Gift: Challenging Continental Philosophy of Religion,” which took place at the IWM in April 2014 as part of the FWF project “Religion beyond Myth and Enlightenment”. Designed as an expert meeting of renowned scholars in the field, it sought to address the meaningful potential the confluence of the topics of “the gift” and “violence” could have for continental philosophy of religion today.

Paweł Marczewski and Stefan Eich (eds.)  
*Dimensions of Modernity: The Enlightenment and its Contested Legacies*  
Junior Visiting Fellows’ Conferences, Vol. XXXIV (2015)



Contributions by: Olga Baranova, Stefan Eich, Jakub Homolka, Paweł Marczewski, Magdalena Nowicka, Svitlana Potapenko, and Stanislav Zakharkin  
[www.iwm.at/publications/visiting-fellows-conferences/](http://www.iwm.at/publications/visiting-fellows-conferences/)

Selected Articles and Talks by Fellows and Guests

Eloisa Betti

“Making Working Women Visible in 1950s Italian Labour Conflict. The Case of the Ducati Factory”, in: K. H. Nordberg, H. Roll-Hansen, E. Sandmo, H. Sandvik (eds.): *Myndighet Og Medborgerskap*, Oslo, Novus, 2015.

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“Precarity and Gender within and outside Academia: A Historical Perspective”, Conference *Social Class in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Intersections Between Class, Gender and Sexuality Revisited*, Amsterdam, October 22–23, 2015.

“Gender and Precarious Labour in Industrial and Post-industrial Western Europe (XIX–XXI Century)”; Conference of the European Labour History Network (EHLN), Turin, December 14–16, 2015.

Luiza Bialasiewicz

“Where Do We Want Europe’s Borders to Lie?”, in: *Transit Online*, November 9, 2015.

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Workshop for Policy-Makers on “Europe in Crisis”, Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), The Hague, December 4, 2015.

María do Mar Castro Valera

„Internationale Beziehungen dekolonisieren“ (gemeinsam mit Nikita Dhawan), in: C. Masala/ F. Sauer (Hg.): *Handbuch Internationale Beziehungen*, Heidelberg: Springer, 2015.

„Klassenapartheid‘. Postkoloniale Perspektiven auf Klassenherrschaft“, in: *Kurswechsel. Zeitschrift für gesellschafts-, wirtschafts- und umweltpolitische Alternativen*, 4, 2015.

„Willkommenskultur: Migration und Ökonomie. María Virginia Gononzalez Romero im Gespräch mit María do Mar Castro Varela“, in: Z. Çentin/S. Taş (Hg.): *Gespräche über Rassismus. Perspektiven und Widerstände*, Berlin: Yilmaz-Günay, 2015.

„Bildung im Postnazismus und Postkolonialismus“, in: A. Hechler/O. Stuve (Hg.): *Geschlechterreflektiert gegen Rechts bilden!*, Leverkusen/ Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich, 2015.

„Von der Notwendigkeit eines epistemischen Wandels. Postkoloniale Betrachtungen auf Bildungsprozesse“, in: T. Geier/K. U. Zaborowski (Hg.): *Migration: Auflösungen und Grenzziehungen. Perspektiven einer erziehungswissenschaftlichen Migrationsforschung*, Wiesbaden: Springer, 2015.

„Akte Lampedusa. Migration und Rassismus“, in: B. Marschke/H. U. Brinkmann (Hg.): *„Ich habe nichts gegen Ausländer, aber...“ Alltagsrassismus in Deutschland*, Münster et al.: LIT, 2015.

“Angst und Hope on the Edge of Europe”, in: *New Eastern Europe*, February, 2016.

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Lectures, conference presentations, talks at the universities of Vienna, Tübingen, Salzburg, Berlin (HU/FU) etc.

Ludger Hagedorn

“Christianity Unthought: A Reconsideration of Myth, Faith, and Historicity” and “Fatigue of Reason: Patočka’s Reading of the Brothers Karamazov”, in: Ludger Hagedorn und

James Dodd (eds.): *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, Vol. XIV, London/New York: Routledge 2015.

“20<sup>th</sup> Century: A History of Wars and War as History” [in Slovak], in: V. Leško, Róbert Stojka: *Patočka a Filozofia 20. Storočia*, Košice, 2015.

“René Girard’s Theory of Sacrifice, or: What is the Gift of Death?”, in: *Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory (JCRT)*, Vol. 15, No. 1, Fall 2015.

„Europa da Capo al Fine. Jan Patočkas nacheuropäische Reflexionen“, in: *Transit – Europäische Revue*, Nr. 47, Frankfurt: Verlag Neue Kritik, 2015.

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“Love as Ereignis, Love as Institution. Arendtian Reflections”, Keynote, XX. *Jornadas Internacionales de Filosofía: Pensar el Amor*, ICAI Comillas/Madrid, October 29/30, 2015.

„Die Macht der Ohnmächtigen. Vom Versuch, in der Wahrheit zu leben“, Kathedralforum Dresden, 13. Oktober 2015/ Novalisforum Freiberg, 14. Oktober 2015.

Gábor Halmai

„Auswirkungen einer Übergangsjustiz auf die demokratische Konsolidierung in Mittel- und Osteuropa“, in: Detlef Marten, Hans-Jürgen Papier (Hg.): *Handbuch der Grundrechte in Deutschland und Europa, Band IX: Die Grundrechte in Ostmitteleuropa und Osteuropa*, Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2015.

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“The Refugee Crisis and the Public” [in Hungarian], in: *Élet és Irodalom*, October 22, 2015.

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munikationswissenschaft, Universität Wien, 2. Dezember 2015.

Valeriya Korablyova

“Pariahs and Parvenus? Refugees and New Divisions in Europe,” in: *Eurozine*, November 26, 2015.

„Ukraine & Europa: Warum die Begeisterung abgeflaut ist“, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, November 29, 2015.

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“Thinking Europe on the Edge: A Ukrainian Vision of ‘Europeanness’”, Conference *The European Union and the Politicization of Europe*, Anglo-American University, Prague, November 27–28, 2015.

*Carnegie Scholar Publication Program Training*, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Tbilisi, September 28–30, 2015.

*Vienna Congress 2015: In Search of Principles for a Stable World Order*, Vienna, October 22–25, 2015.

*Mapping Memories of Post-1989 Europe—Tracing the Past in a Shared Europe*, Vienna, November 29–December 1, 2015.

János Mátyás Kovács

“Traces in the Sand. Post-Communist Transformation and Economic Thought in the West”, Conference *Learning from Transition: Who’s Learning from Whom?*, Harriman Institute, Columbia University, September 18–19, 2015.

“The Long Shadow of the Iron Curtain. Economic Thought under Communism and East-West Exchange of Ideas”, Conference *Cold War Epistemics Revisited. Resistance and Legitimation in the Social Sciences*, CEU, Budapest, February 5–6, 2016.

Ivan Krastev

Several Articles and Comments in: *The New York Times*, *New Eastern Europe* etc.

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EHESS conference *Public Space Democracy*, Paris, November 19–21, 2015.

*Richard von Weizsäcker Forum*, Berlin, November 10–11, 2015.

*Valdai Discussion Club 12<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting*, Sochi, October 20–22, 2015.

*IPSP Conference: First Meeting of the Lead Authors*, Bilgi University, Istanbul, August 27–29, 2015.

“The New Assertiveness in Russian Foreign Policy: Problems and Prospects”, TUSIAD Conference Hall in Taksim, Istanbul, November 24, 2015.

“The Imitation Game: The West, Russia, and Ukraine”, Davis Center for Russian

and Eurasian Studies, Cambridge, September 22, 2015.

“Russia is ‘Reverse Engineering’ Western Foreign Policy”, Graduate Institute Geneva, November 12, 2015.

“Regional Security Orders in Comparative Perspective”, Conference *The Future of International Order*, Berlin, November 29–December 1, 2015.

“Good Putin”, *Central European Forum*, Bratislava, November 14, 2015.

“Europe, Compassion and Democracy”, *Richard von Weizsäcker Forum*, Berlin, November 10, 2015.

André Liebich

“La Minoranza russa e la crisi ucraina”, in: *Il Ponte*, 71, 8–9, August–September, 2015.

“Central Europe and the Refugees”, in: *Transit Online*, November 2, 2015 [French version in: *Choisir*, Novembre 2015]

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Comment on R. Bäcker, “The Evolution of the Contemporary Political System in Russia: Between Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism”, Polish Academy of Sciences, Scientific Center in Vienna, December 1 2015.

“Socio-Economic Challenges of Migration”, 25<sup>th</sup> *Vienna Roundtable*, Österreichische Kontrollbank, December 11, 2015.

Dessislava Lilova

“Education: Bulgarian”, in: J. Leerssen (ed.): *Encyclopaedia of Romantic Nationalism in Europe* (electronic version), Amsterdam: Study Platform on Interlocking Nationalisms, 2015.

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“Where is the Border of the West?”, Przemysł (Poland) and Lviv (Ukraine), October 2–4, 2015.

Marci Shore

“Jews and Cosmopolitanism: An Arc of European Thought”, in: *Historická Sociologie*, No. 2, 2015.

“An Antidote to the ‘Hegelian Bite’: Heidegger’s Special Meaning for Eastern Europe”, panel titled *Central Europe in Translation: Art and Thought Out of Context*, Association for Slavic, East European and Eurasian Studies Annual Convention, Philadelphia, November 20, 2015.

“Polin jako Bildungsroman”, in: *Dziennik Opinii*, No. 282, October 9, 2015.



Articles and Talks

“One Morning in Poland”, review of Anna Bikont, *The Crime and the Silence: Confronting the Massacre of Jews in Wartime Jedwabne*, in: *Wall Street Journal*, September 12, 2015.

“Reading Tony Judt in Wartime Ukraine”, in: *The New Yorker*, August 11, 2015.

“Everyone Complicit”, review of Heda Margolius Kovály *Innocence: Or, Murder on Steep Street*, in: *Times Literary Supplement*, July 29, 2015.

“Everything is PR”, review of Peter Pomerantsev *Nothing is True and Everything is Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia*, *Jewish Review of Books* (summer 2015). Reprinted in Kiev, Moscow and beyond, special English issue of *Springer* in 4 (autumn 2015) and in *Eurozine*. [Polish translation: “Putin Party”, *Dziennik Opinii* No. 227, August 15, 2015].

Shalini Randeria

„Zwischen Begeisterung & Unbehagen – Ein anthropologischer Blick auf den Begriff der Kultur“ (gemeinsam mit Evangelos Karagiannis), in: Sybille de la Rosa, Sophia Schubert, Holger Zapf (Hg.): *Transkulturelle politische Theorie – Eine Einführung* (Trans- und interkulturelle Politische Theorie und Ideengeschichte), Wiesbaden: Springer, 2016.

“Politics of the Urban Poor: Aesthetics, Ethics, Volatility, Precarity. An Introduction to Supplement 11” (with Veena Das), in:

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“Social Sciences and Public Debates: The Case of India” (with Veena Das), in: Socio, *Dossier: Inventer les sciences sociales postoccidentales* (expanded version of Das and Randeria, 2014) No. 5, 2015.

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“Normative Pluralism and Non State Actors of Justice”, Freie Universität Berlin, July 9, 2015.

“Glocalization of Law & the World Bank: Dilemmas and Challenges for Activists” Conference *The Glocalization of Development. How Global Institutions are Negotiated Globally*, Hannover, July 10–11, 2015.

„UnGleichheit“, Europäisches Forum Alpbach, 26. August, 2015.

“Fragmented Sovereignties in the Era of Globalization”, Kyiv Biennale, October 5, 2015.

“Decentering Europe”, Kyiv Biennale, October 6, 2015.

“Conversation on the Transnationalization of Law”, Bad Homburg, November 12–14, 2015.

“Fragmented Sovereignties in an Era of Globalisation: Challenges for Cunning States and Citizens”, CAS Rijeka, November 24–26, 2015.

“Fragmented Sovereignties and (Global) Normative Pluralism”, Conference *The Global Challenge of Human*

*Rights Integration: Towards a Users’ Perspective*, Ghent, December 8, 2015.

Timothy Snyder

“Integration and Disintegration: Europe, Ukraine, and the World”, in: *Slavic Review*, Winter 2015.

“Svetlana Alexievich: The Truth in Many Voices”, in: *The New York Review of Books*, October 2015.

“The Next Genocide”, in: *New York Times*, September 12, 2015.

“Hitler’s World”, in: *The New York Review of Books*, September 24, 2015.

“Ukraine’s Easy, Misunderstood Babel”, in: *Politico*, July 2, 2015.

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“Ukraine as Europe’s Dilemma”, The School of Kyiv, September 29, 2015.

“Ukraine: The End of Europe?”, Chautauqua Institution, August 19, 2015.

“The Transatlantic Forum on Russia”, CSIS, November 13, 2015.

Presentations and Lectures related to his latest book *Black Earth*: [www.timothysnyder.org](http://www.timothysnyder.org)

Miloš Vec

“Peace as a Polemic Concept. Writing the History of Peace in 19<sup>th</sup> Century Europe” (together with Thomas Hippler) and

“From Invisible Peace to the Legitimation of War. Paradoxes of a Concept in 19<sup>th</sup> Century International Law Doctrine”, in: Th. Hippler, M. Vec (eds.): *Paradoxes of Peace in 19<sup>th</sup> Century Europe*, Oxford University Press, 2015.

„Staatliche Aufgaben und private Akteure in der Rechtsgeschichte. Methodischer Etatismus als historiografisches Problem“, in: Claudia Fuchs et al. (eds.): *Staatliche Aufgaben, private Akteure. Band 1: Erscheinungsformen und Effekte*, Wien: Manz Verlag, 2015.

„Von Schlaghosen und Fußnoten. Avantgarde gibt es in der Mode und den Wissenschaften“ in: *Junge Akademie Magazin*, Nr. 20, 2015. [German and English version]

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“Juridification and Legal Avoidance: The Congress of Vienna and 19<sup>th</sup> Century European Law of Nations”, Conference The Congress of Vienna and the Transformation of International

Law, Poppelsdorfer Schloss, Bonn, September 2–4, 2015.

“Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue, and special codes in Finland’s queue”, Workshop *Speeding towards the Future: New Vehicles, Modernization and the Law in Finland*, Katajanokan Kasino, Helsinki, October 9, 2015.

“Mythical Constitutionalism: Magna Charta’s Anniversary and the Historical Argument”, Conference *Magna Carta 1215: Parallels and Influences*, Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, October 22, 2015.

“Mythical Positivism: Natural Law in 19<sup>th</sup> International Law Doctrine”, Workshop *The Law of Nations and Natural Law 1625–1850*, University of Lausanne, November 4–7, 2015.

Rafał Zawisza

“The Surreptitious Defiance of Giorgio Agamben”, in: Mikołaj Ratajczak, Rafał Zawisza (eds.): *Praktyka Teoretyczna*, No. 3/17, issue ‘Economic Theologies’, 2015.

“Truth and Semblance of the Politics of Hospitality” [in Polish], in: *Znak*, No. 727, 2015.

Tatiana Zhurzhenko

“Shared Memory Culture? Nationalizing the ‘Great Patriotic War’ in the Ukrainian-Russian Borderlands”, in: Małgorzata Pakier, Joanna Wawrzyniak (eds.): *European Memory: Eastern Perspectives*, Oxford: Berghahn 2015.

„Erinnerungskonflikte. Gedenkpolitik im post-sowjetischen Charkiv“, in: *Osteuropa*, 4, 2015.

“Limes of Europe, Limits of Europe: A Brief History of Ukraine’s Post-Soviet Borders”, in: *Eutopia. Ideas for Europe Magazine*, September 16, 2015.

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*Mapping Memories of Post-1989 Europe*, Conference, Vienna, November 30, 2015.

“Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands: The End of Ambivalence?“, *7<sup>th</sup> International Summer School in Ukraine on Borders in the Post-Socialist Space: Past*,

*Present, Future*, Chernivtsi, July 4, 2015.

“The New Geopolitics of Europe’s Borders. Ukraine and Beyond”, *The School of Kyiv*, Kyiv Biennial, October 2, 2015.

“Russia, Ukraine and ‘the West’: Rethinking Our Mental Cartography?“, *NECE Conference ‘Us’ and ‘Them’: Citizenship Education in an Interdependent World*, Thessaloniki, October 22–24, 2015.

„Neue Nationalismen vs. Europäische Integration? ‚Wieder unerwünscht?‘, Europa in der Zerreißprobe. 20. Deutsch-Russische Herbstgespräche, Berlin, 20. November 2015.

“Is Solidarity in European Countries Fading?“, The Red House, Sofia, November 24, 2015.

“Memory and Change in Europe: Eastern Perspective“, *Genealogies of Memory Workshop*, Warsaw, December 7–8, 2015.

“Neighborhood in Europe—Perspectives for a Common Future“, Kharkiv, December 10–12, 2015.

Ukraine in European Dialogue

Two years ago, protests against Viktor Yanukovich’s regime in Ukraine culminated in an uprising and regime change, followed by Russia’s swift annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas. Events in Ukraine triggered a major crisis in relations between the European Union and Russia. Over time, media attention concerning Ukraine has faded, shifting to the equally depressing topics of the Minsk process and the persistence of corruption. The new focal point **Ukraine in European Dialogue**, a cooperation between *Eurozine* and the IWM, aims to tackle Ukraine fatigue in the West and to offer deeper insight into post-

revolutionary Ukrainian society, with its unique mix of hope, enthusiasm, social creativity, collective trauma of war, radicalism and disillusionment.

**With contributions by** Zaven Babloyan, Kateryna Botanova, Mikhail Dubinyansky, Yustyna Kravchuk, Ekaterina Sergatskova, Anton Shekhovtsov, Sławomir Sierakowski, Konstantin Skorkin, Timothy Snyder, Iryna Solonenko, Maria Teteriuk, Katherine Younger, Volodymyr Yermolenko and Tatiana Zhurzhenko.

Further details: [www.eurozine.com/comp/focalpoints/ukraindialogue.html](http://www.eurozine.com/comp/focalpoints/ukraindialogue.html)

East European Protests in Focus

Recent developments in countries of Central-Eastern Europe—proposal of refugee quotas was met with utter reluctance by Visegrád countries, Hungary and Poland adopted policies aimed at building majoritarian regimes—prompted many analysts and commentators to question a widely shared assumption that the region was one of the few examples of successful democratic transformation. A series of articles in *Transit Online*, launched by Paweł Marczewski, focuses on protest movements in order to avoid simplistic generalizations and provide insight into the complex social landscape of the region and its neighboring countries. The image it conveys is of a battlefield for the future of democracy, rather than a majoritarian, anti-democratic monolith build on parochial, nationalistic foundations. Further details: [www.iwm.at/transit-online](http://www.iwm.at/transit-online)

Between ‘the Russian World’ and ‘the Ukrainian Nation’: Kyiv Pride before and after Euromaidan

Maria Teteriuk



Photo: Nazar Fuyk / iStock

Ukrainian LGBT movement is the logical product of the Ukrainian social, economic and political context. For queer politics to appear in Ukraine, different conditions and possibilities have to be created. It will take years for currently isolated queer activists to rearticulate the existing heteronormative order through many scattered tactical interventions into the public sphere.

Committee for the Defense of Democracy in Poland: Rebellion of the “Beneficiaries of the Transformation”?

Magdalena Nowicka



Photo: kicia\_papuga / iStock

KOD is avoiding sensitive subjects, which could divide its sympathizers, but it also discourages with its moderate postulates those Poles who blame the former centrist government for its cultural conservatism and economic neoliberalism. By integrating different party groups, KOD is building its political capital, but at the same time it pays a high price for it. It is easy for PiS to frame these social protests as a revolt by those who lost the election and cannot accept their defeat.

An Unruly Younger Generation? Student Protest and the Macedonian Crisis

Tom Junes



Photo: Studentski Plenum

Student protest has been a regular occurrence in the Balkans in recent years. While the actions of students against austerity policies and budget cuts at Greek universities or the Gezi protests in Istanbul gained wider international notoriety, it was the western

Balkan countries that provided for a model of student protest action that has been emulated throughout the region.

When Corruption Kills: A Romanian Tragedy

Vlad Odobescu



Photo: Groescu Alberto Mihai / iStock

In November 2015, around 30,000 demonstrators gathered in the center of Bucharest. They demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister, Victor Ponta, who had been accused of corruption-related crimes months before. There were cries of “Assassins” and “Shame on you”, and some people had banners reading “Corruption kills”. Next morning, Ponta announced his resignation.

Rückkehr der illiberalen Demokratie?

Mit Beiträgen von Vladimir Gelman, Gábor Halmai, Jan Werner Müller, Soli Özel, Maria Popova, István Rév, Paul Ricoeur, Oleg Senzow, Maria Tomak, Balázs Trencsényi



**Rückkehr der illiberalen Demokratie?**  
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*Tischner Debates Report by Paweł Marczewski continued from page 14*

cial despair, political radicalism, and religious fanaticism, as the Paris attacks have clearly shown. But skepticism towards religion does not imply a reluctance to discuss metaphysical, ethical, and political entanglements of religion.

Kořakowski Symposium on Religion

The 1<sup>st</sup> Kořakowski Symposium, jointly organized by Warsaw University, the IWM and the University of Oxford on the day after the Tischner Debate, was dedicated to discussing the Polish philosopher's understanding of religious experience, and the socio-political role he assigned to it, taking as a starting point his book *Religion*.

Two Kořakowskis as it were emerged from the heated discussions. According to one interpretation, he was ironically skeptical of dogmatism but seriously concerned about the crisis of values, and believed that the only way to overcome nihilism is to maintain arbitrary religious truths. The other interpretation saw him as first and foremost trying to uphold religion as a system of taboos and a source of authority after the collapse of the communist utopia. The first Kořakowski was an advocate of an open society, in which there should always be a place for core religious values. The second followed a political road similar to that of American neoconservatives, substituting one indubitable source of authority, for another—religion understood dogmatically. To some discussants, Kořakowski's turn to religion was a search for a mystical foundation on which pluralism should rest if it is to be protected from relativism and nihilism. To others, he was more like the early Marx, to whom the consequences of religion in the material world were more important than its mystical dimension; religion was something that helped people cope with the cruel world of alienation and inequalities.

Polarized views on Kořakowski's understanding of religion mirror the heated debates about the relation between the secular and the sacred in democratic societies; debates that are ongoing at least since the Reformation, but receive a new resonance every time a terrorist attack or military intervention is conducted under the banner of religion. Are these events a product of nihilism that can be overcome only by restating allegiance to core religious values? Or are they the inevitable consequence of remaining faithful to core religious values irrespective of which religion these derive from? If religion is to remain open to doubt, will it stand against those who harbor no doubts? If religion is to be made the only source of undisputed sense in the world, what will happen to those who cannot shake off their scepticism? Perhaps these questions are bound to remain unanswered and the only answers we can offer are partial and pragmatic—enlightened self-interest, the rule of law, and equality. <

Upcoming Events 05–07 2016

May / June	June	June / July	Events Colorkey
<div><div>May 31</div><div></div><div>Thinking Aloud/Allowed Against Silence: Freedom of Expression in Europe</div><div>Venue: Burgtheater, 1010 Vienna</div><div><div>Miklós Haraszti</div><div>Writer, journalist, human rights advocate; Adjunct Professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia Law School, New York</div><div>Agnieszka Holland</div><div>Polish-French film director and screenwriter; Chair, European Film Academy Board</div><div>Claire Fox (Chair)</div><div>Founder and Director, Institute of Ideas, London</div></div></div> <div><div>June 6</div><div></div><div>No Laughing Matter</div><div>Venue: Kabarett Vindobona, 1200 Vienna</div><div><div>Steven Lukes</div><div>Professor of Sociology, New York University; Krzysztof Michalski Visiting Fellow, IWM</div><div>Ivan Krastev</div><div>Permanent Fellow, IWM; Chair, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia</div></div><div>For his book <i>No Laughing Matter</i>, Steven Lukes collected over 600 political jokes from all over the world. He will try out the best of these on a Viennese audience, aided and abetted by political scientist Ivan Krastev, who will explain some of the jokes' historical background, as well as contribute tales of his own encounters with the powerful and mighty from Europe and elsewhere.</div></div>	<div><div>June 7</div><div></div><div>Thinking Aloud/Allowed Is Europe Taking a Right Turn?</div><div>Venue: Burgtheater, 1010 Vienna</div><div><div>Gilles Kepel</div><div>Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po and Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris</div><div>Chantal Mouffe</div><div>Professor of Political Theory, Westminster University, London</div><div>Philipp Blom (Chair)</div><div>Historian, writer, journalist and translator, Vienna</div></div></div> <div><div>June 9</div><div></div><div>'I have been very slow in writing this letter to you, Mahatma': Buber, Gandhi and the Efficacy of Non-Violence</div><div>Venue: Burgtheater, 1010 Vienna</div><div><div>Jyotirmaya Sharma</div><div>Professor of Political Science, University of Hyderabad; Visiting Fellow, IWM</div></div><div>In 1939 the Austrian-born Israeli Jewish philosopher <b>Martin Buber</b> wrote a letter to Mahatma Gandhi. Buber was reacting to comments made by Gandhi about the inability of Jews in offering non-violent resistance to the Nazi regime and characterizing it as helpless and weak. This lecture is an attempt to look at these complex issues and examine the efficacy of non-violence.</div></div>	<div><div>June 20</div><div></div><div>Gute Rechte für alle!? Chancen und Gefahren (menschen-)rechtsbasierter Entwicklungsstrategien</div><div>Ort: Volkshochschule Wiener Urania, 1010 Wien</div><div><div>Shalini Randeria</div><div>IWM Rektorin; Professorin für Sozialanthropologie und Soziologie, Graduate, Genf</div></div><div>Die Dialogreihe <i>Gutes Leben für alle</i> erkundet in Kooperation mit IWM und der Volkshochschule Wiener Urania, wie ein gutes Leben nicht nur für wenige, sondern für alle möglich wird. Im vierten Vortrag des ersten Halbjahres geht es um Gerechtigkeit, Menschenrechte und Entwicklungspolitik.</div></div> <div><div>July 5</div><div></div><div>Lakonische Verse in der Katastrophe – Zweisprachige Lesung</div><div>Ort: Alte Schmiede, 1010 Wien</div><div><div>Serhiy Zhadan</div><div>Ukrainischer Schriftsteller, Dichter und Übersetzer</div></div><div>Seit Sommer 2014 notiert Serhiy Zhadan, was ihm auf seinen Reisen ins ostukrainische Kriegsgebiet widerfährt. Im Rahmen des Wiener Lyrik-Festivals <i>Poliversale</i> werden Passagen aus seinem jüngsten Werk <i>Warum ich nicht im Netz bin</i> – <i>Gedichte aus dem Krieg</i> (Suhrkamp Verlag, 2016) vorgestellt.</div></div>	<div><div>Wiener Festwochen</div><div>This year, the IWM hosts two debates at the Vienna Burgtheater in cooperation with the European Network of Houses for Debate "Time to Talk" and Sheldon M. Chumir Foundation for Ethics in Leadership.</div></div> <div><div>IWM Pop-Up</div><div>This series of external events, organized in cooperation with the City of Vienna, intends to make scientific research and scholarship more visible at district level.</div></div> <div><div>Monthly Lectures</div><div>Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.</div></div> <div><div>Books in Perspective</div><div>Books written or edited by fellows or related to the Institute's research fields are presented to a wider public.</div></div> <div><div>This is just a small selection of events (subject to change)—a complete list of all upcoming lectures, seminars and debates can be found on: <a href="http://www.iwm.at/events">www.iwm.at/events</a></div></div> <div><div>Special: May 10–August 31</div><div></div><div>Art Exhibition at the IWM Parallel Films by Blue Noses</div><div>In cooperation with Knoll Galerie Wien+Budapest</div></div>

Call for Applications: Fellowships 2016/17

<div>The majority of IWM fellowships are awarded in open competition, involving calls for application and evaluation by expert juries. Research proposals are currently invited for the following programs. Further details on <a href="http://www.iwm.at/fellowship-programs">www.iwm.at/fellowship-programs</a></div>	<div>CEU Junior Fellowships → Deadline: June 1, 2016</div> <div>EURIAS Junior and Senior Fellowships → Deadline: June 8, 2016</div>	<div></div>
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