

*Timothy Snyder*

## Sovereignty and Survival: Lessons of the Holocaust

*Jurko Prochasko*

Putin's Sirens  
and the West

*Katherine Newman*

New Fronts in  
Modern Inequality

*Jacques Rupnik*

Osteuropa und die  
Grenzen der Solidarität

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Editorial

Für die Patočka Gedächtnisvorlesung, die im April 2015 stattfand, wählte der Polnische Soziologe Zygmunt Bauman den markanten Titel „Diasporic Terrorism“. Er sprach über die Herausforderungen multi-kultureller Gesellschaften, die Angst vor dem Fremden und die „Glokalisierung“ von Konflikten. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt konnte niemand ahnen, dass sich Baumans Befürchtungen nur wenige Monate später mit den Anschlägen von Paris auf so tragi-sche Weise bewahrheiten sollten. Umso wichtiger sei es daher, so Bauman, aufeinander zuzugehen und in einen ernstgemeinten Dia-log zu treten. Dies trifft in ganz be-sonderem Maße auf den Umgang Europas mit der aktuellen Flücht-lingsthematik zu, über die Jacques Rupnik aus Perspektive der osteu-ropäischen EU-Staaten schreibt. Er versucht Antworten auf die Frage zu finden, warum sich ausgerech-net diese gegen die Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen sträuben. Um das The-ma Solidarität und wachsende Un-gleichheit geht es auch in den Bei-trägen von Katherine Newman und Ulrich Brinkman, die aus der neun-ten Konferenz der Reihe „On Solida-rity“ im Juni hervorgegangen sind. Die Kommentare von Kinga Göncz, Ulrike Lunacek und Jan-Werner Mueller, die im Zuge einer weiteren großen Tagung in der ersten Jahres-hälfte entstanden sind, beleuchten den Wandel Ungarns vom einstigen Musterschüler zum Sorgenkind innerhalb der EU, das immer mehr autoritäre Züge annimmt. Parallelen zu Russland sind hier augenschein-lich. Während Dmitry Dubrovsky die Rolle von neuen Gesetzen bei der staatlichen Kontrolle von un-liebsamen NGOs in Russland auf-zeigt, geht Thomas Eder der Frage nach, wie sich die Sanktionen ge-gen Russland auf den internationa-len Energiemarkt und die Handels-beziehungen zu China auswirken. Der ukrainische Psychoanalytiker Jurko Prochasko ergründet hinge-gen die Anziehungskraft von Pu-tins Sirenen auf die westliche Hörer-schaft. Das neue Ukraine-Projekt am IWM, das um Dialog und eine kriti-sche Auseinandersetzung bemüht ist, wird in dieser Ausgabe ebenso vor-gestellt, wie ein erstes Resümee des 2014 begonnen Forschungsprojekts zur wirtschaftlichen Ideengeschichte im Kommunismus. Der Beitrag von Albena Shkodrova nimmt sich hier eines ganz speziellen Phänomens an – nämlich der Macht des Kellners im kommunistischen Bulgarien. Lehren aus der Geschichte zieht auch Timo-thy Snyder in seinem neuen Buch *Black Earth*, das im Oktober 2015 in Wien vorgestellt wurde. Warum sich der Holocaust in Zukunft wie-derholen könnte und welche Rolle Staaten in diesem Zusammenhang spielen, ist gleich zu Beginn dieser Ausgabe nachzulesen. <

This year’s Patočka Memori-al Lecture, held by the Polish Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman in April 2015, was devoted to the sub-ject of “Diasporic Terrorism”. Bau-man addressed the challenges faced by multicultural societies, the ‘fear of the stranger’ and the ‘glocaliza-tion’ of conflicts. At that time no-body could anticipate the series of horrific attacks that would hit Par-is only a few months later. From to-day’s perspective, Bauman’s appeal to engage in serious dialogue and to go beyond tolerance towards solidari-ty, seem more important than ever. That applies particularly to the cur-rent refugee crises in Europe which Jacques Rupnik analyzes from an East-ern European perspective. He tries to provide an answer to the question why the central and eastern Euro-pean countries refuse to host larg-er numbers of refugees. The issue of solidarity and growing inequality is also addressed by Katherine New-man and Ulrich Brinkman in their articles based on the 9<sup>th</sup> Solidari-ty conference. Another meeting on Hungary’s “System of National Co-operation” focused on that country’s troubled relationship with the EU. Kinga Göncz, Ulrike Lunacek und Jan-Werner Mueller discuss how an EU member state—once seen as a forerunner of democratization—has increasingly taken on author-itarian characteristics. Analyzing another regime using state power to suppress any opposition, Dmitry Dubrovsky reflects on the Kremlin’s battle against “undesirable” NGOs. Jurko Prochasko, in turn, critically examines the strong appeal ‘Putin’s sirens’ have to western audiences. Thomas Eder tackles another as-pect of EU-Russia relations by ask-ing if China will replace Europe as Russia’s main gas customer. Also in this issue, we report on two IWM projects: Ukraine in European Di-alogue, a new program launched at the IWM, aims to support Ukrai-nian scholarship, quality journal-ism, and civil society through fel-lowships, events and publications. Launched in 2014, Between Bukha-rin and Balcerowicz, a multination-al project aimed at preparing a com-parative history of economic thought under communism presents its first results. Albena Shkodrova’s essay on the surreal power of the commu-nist waiter illuminates the every-day consequences of such thinking. Last but not least, Timothy Snyder’s new book *Black Earth* finds parallels between the prehistory and precon-ditions of the Holocaust and current developments, such as Putin’s geo-political ambitions, but also the fu-ture consequences of climate change. The chapter, presented in this issue, argues that there are very immedi-ate and pressing lessons we need to learn from the past in order to avoid another holocaust. <

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# Sovereignty and Survival: Lessons of the Holocaust

BY TIMOTHY SNYDER

*Our world is closer to Hitler's than we like to admit, says Timothy Snyder in his most recent book Black Earth: The Holocaust as a History and Warning, which was partly written at the IWM and presented at Wien Museum on October 21. In this excerpt of the book, Snyder argues that the extermination of Jews was premised on the destruction of states.*



Photo: Marco Maccarini / iStock

Jews who were citizens of Germany's allies lived or died according to certain general rules. Jews who maintained their prewar citizenship usually lived, and those who did not usually died. Jews usually lost citizenship through regime change or occupation rather than by law; slow legal depatriation on the German model was the exception, not the rule. Jews from territories that changed hands were usually murdered. Jews almost never survived if they remained on territories where the Soviet Union had been exercising power when German or Romanian forces arrived. German occupation of states that were trying to switch sides led to the massive killing of Jews, including those who lived in countries where there had been little or nothing of a Final Solution. In all, about seven hundred thousand Jews who were citizens of Germany's allies were killed. Yet a higher number survived. This is a dramatic contrast to the lands where the state was destroyed, where almost all Jews were killed.

None of Germany's sovereign allies was indifferent to the traditional concern of preserving the state. Most of the sovereign states allied with Germany altered their foreign policy in 1942 or 1943 or 1944, as it became clear that Germany was losing the

war. This meant reversing anti-Jewish policies, attempting to switch sides in the war, or both. If leaders slowed or halted their own anti-Jewish policies, it was in the hope that the Allies would notice the signal and would treat them more favorably after the war was over. Sometimes attempts to switch sides succeeded and thereby aided the Jews, as in Romania and Bulgaria. Sometimes they failed, as in Hungary and Italy. But it was this very ability to make foreign policy that distinguished sovereign states from puppet states created during the war and from the stateless zones.

This same capacity for diplomacy distinguished Germany's allies from Nazi Germany itself. Until 1942, the Jews of Germany were in a position not so different from that of Germany's allies. From 1942, however, the position of Germany's Jews worsened radically, whereas that of the Jews of Germany's allies generally improved (until and unless Germany itself intervened). Unlike the leaders of Germany's allies, Hitler was indifferent to the fate of his own state, and viewed the extermination of Jews as a good in and of itself. He thought that the world was a planet covered by races rather than a globe covered by states—and acted accordingly. Germany did not have a conventional foreign policy, since its

*Führer* did not believe in sovereignty as such and could imagine state destruction as the proper end of the war just as easily as he could see it as the proper beginning.

When the war turned against Germany, the killing of Jews under German control was not slowed, as with Germany's allies, but accelerated. Because the German leadership was pursuing what it saw as colonial (anti-Slavic) and decolonial (anti-Jewish) campaigns from the beginning, Hitler and others could shift emphases from one war to another, and from one definition of victory to another. The leaders of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Italy had to contemplate the actual military conflict as it unfolded on staff maps. Hitler understood the minutiae of war; indeed, he grasped its details far better than any other head of state and better than most of his generals. But the way he synthesized the data was his alone. For him the German defeats revealed the hidden hand of the planetary Jewish enemy, whose destruction was necessary to win the war and redeem mankind. The extermination of the Jews was a victory for the species, regardless of the defeat of the Germans. As Hitler said at the very end, on April 29, 1945, Jews were the "world poisoners of all nations." He was sure of his legacy: "I

have lanced the Jewish boil. Posterity will be eternally grateful to us."

Hitler was seeking to lift a Jewish curse from the planet. This categorical Nazi approach, once it was realized as policy, made possible ethnic cleansing from other countries, since it created a place, Auschwitz, where European Jews could be sent. The German mass murder of Jews created an unusual opportunity for ethnic cleansers elsewhere in Europe, creating possibilities for removing one (of many) unwanted minorities. Such an interaction was possible only because the makers of the Holocaust were realizing the desire to remove all Jews from the earth.

Hitler was not a German nationalist, sure of German victory, aiming for an enlarged German state. He was a zoological anarchist who believed that there was a true state of nature to be restored. The failed campaign in the East brought useful new knowledge about nature: It turned out that the Germans were not, in fact, a master race. Hitler had accepted this possibility when he invaded the Soviet Union: "If the German people is not strong enough and devoted enough to give its blood for its existence, let it go and be destroyed by another, stronger man. I shall not shed tears for the German people." Over the course of the war,

Hitler changed his attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Russians: Stalin was not a tool of the Jews but their enemy, the USSR was not or was no longer Jewish, and its population turned out, upon investigation, not to be subhuman. In the end, Hitler decided, "the future belongs entirely to the stronger people of the east."

In the European states linked by military occupation to Hitler's strange sense of destiny, the proportion of Jews who survived varied greatly. The greatest confusion arises over the contrast between European states with significant prewar Jewish populations: the Netherlands, Greece, and France. About three-quarters of French Jews survived, whereas about three-quarters of Dutch Jews and Greek Jews were killed.

Here, as with Estonia and Denmark, intuitions fail to explain this enormous difference. In general, neither the Dutch nor the Greek population was regarded as antisemitic, whereas observers then and historians now chronicle a major current of antisemitism in French popular and political life. In the Netherlands, Jewish refugees were admitted without visas until 1938. In Greece, German-style antisemitism had almost no advocates. Antisemitism was less



resonant in interwar Greek politics than just about anywhere in Europe. In the Netherlands, uniquely, there were public manifestations against the introduction of anti-Jewish laws after the German occupation. Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands had almost no public support. And yet a Dutch Jew or a Greek Jew was three times more likely to be murdered than a French Jew.

The Netherlands was, for several reasons, the closest approximation to statelessness in western Europe. The sovereignty of the Netherlands was compromised in several ways that were unusual in this part of the continent. There was no head of state once Queen Wilhelmina left for London in May 1940. The Dutch government followed her into exile. The bureaucracy, in effect decapitated, was left with the instruction to behave in a way that would best serve the Dutch nation. Uniquely in western Europe, the SS sought and attained fundamental control of domestic policy. Arthur Seyß-Inquart, an experienced state destroyer, was made *Reichskommissar* for the occupied Netherlands. He had served as the chancellor of Austria during the days when that country had ceased to be. He was then deputy to Hans Frank in the General Government, the colony created from Polish lands where, according to the Nazi interpretation, there had never been a Polish state. Such reasoning was never applied to the Netherlands, whose people were seen as racially superior to the Poles, and indeed as part of the same racial group as the Germans. It was nevertheless the state destroyers of the SS who filled the vacuum of the missing Dutch government.

Amsterdam was the only west European city where the Germans considered creating a ghetto. That such a discussion even took place suggests the unusual dominance of the SS. German authorities withdrew the plan after the Amsterdam city council and the Dutch government objected. This reveals the difference between the occupied Netherlands and occupied Poland, where no meaningfully autonomous local or national authorities existed. The Dutch police, like the Polish police, was however directly subordinate to the German occupier. As in Poland, the Dutch police was purged, and its top leadership generally removed. A large number of German policemen, some five thousand, monitored Dutch subordinates. In the Netherlands, as in Poland, fragments of the previous state order—indeed, institutions that had once represented toleration—could be turned to the task of extermination. In Poland, the legal Jewish councils of the 1930s were transformed under the Germans into the *Judenräte*. In the Netherlands, all religions had been organized into communities for purposes of legal recognition, and all citizens were registered according to religion. This meant that the Germans could make use of precise pre-existing lists of Jewish citizens. Dutch citizens protested, but it made little difference. The Dutch underground resisted, but this, if anything, only brought more harm to Jews. The German and Dutch police attended to districts where they

believed the underground functioned and, in the process, found Jews in hiding.

The situation of rescuers and dissidents was quite different in the Netherlands than in Poland. People who hid Jews in the Netherlands, for example, were usually either not punished or punished lightly. People who



Book presentation with Timothy Snyder, Dirk Moses and Philipp Ther at the Wien Museum on October 21

protested anti-Jewish laws in public, such as Professor Rudolph Cleveringa at Leiden University, were sent to camps but were not killed. His Polish colleagues in Cracow or Lwów, meanwhile, were murdered for doing nothing other than being professors.

The Dutch were treated as citizens of an occupied country, unless they were Jewish. Because the Netherlands lacked basic institutions of sovereignty, and because Dutch institutions were fragmented on the east European model, the outcome for the Jews was similar, although not quite as awful, as in the stateless zones. The first transport of Dutch Jews to Auschwitz was in July 1942. Because there was no sovereign state functioning, there was no foreign policy, and no ability to change course in 1943. The Germans determined what happened to Jews, which meant that the trains from the Netherlands to Auschwitz kept running through 1944.

Greek sovereignty was also severely compromised, although in a different way. Greece was originally invaded by Italy in late 1940. The Greek army fought the Italians to a standstill, forcing Hitler to rescue Mussolini. The Greek dictator died at what proved to be a critical moment. Germany invaded Greece on April 6, 1941. The king and the government had fled the country by the end of the month. The Germans did not seek to destroy the state in Greece as they had done in Poland, but in these unusual circumstances created an occupation regime in which the Greek puppet government was powerless. Greece lost territory and was occupied by three separate powers: the Germans took the north, allowed the Italians to control the south, and granted part of Macedonia to Bulgaria. No Greek government exercising any real authority was formed during the war. Its head had to submit his nominations for ministerial positions to both the German and the Italian authorities. There was never a Greek foreign minister. The Germans and the Italians did not allow the Greek government to apply for the international recognition of the new regime in its new borders. Greek authorities were unable to control food supplies. Some forty thousand Greeks starved in the first year of the war.

The murder of Greek Jews pro-

ceeded where the Germans were in control. Italians saw the Ladino-speaking Jews of Greece, descendants of people who had fled centuries before from Spain, as members of their own Latin civilization. Italian officials provided many such people with bogus attestations of Italian nationality. Salonika, the ma-

major Jewish city in Greece, was under German occupation from April 1941. Although the Germans found that “for the average Greek there is no Jewish question,” local political and professional elites understood that lawlessness and German priorities could be used to fulfill their own desires. If Jews were no longer citizens of what was no longer really a state, others could make good on prewar claims and satisfy half-hidden desires.

In summer 1942, as the Germans were desperate for labor, local Greek authorities suggested that it might be more politic to use only Jews. This stigmatized one section of the population and confirmed its vulnerability. Later that year in Salonika, the German authorities satisfied a long-standing local postulate by ceding the property of the Jewish cemetery to the city. Such a major property transfer generated a sense of material complicity between Germans and locals as well as a new moral barrier between non-Jewish Greeks and Greek Jews. The destruction of the ancient cemetery and the desecration of hundreds of thousands of remains was painful enough in the present, but also raised a question about the future. If Salonika’s Jews were no longer welcome to die in their home city, where would they die?

In the first weeks of 1943, some of Adolf Eichmann’s closest colleagues arrived in Salonika with the goal of arranging rapid deportations to Auschwitz. They found little public sympathy for their ideology, it seems, but more than sufficient willingness to exploit the separation of Jews from other Greeks. As Salonika Jews were ordered to wear stars and forced into ghettos, others took their movable property and sometimes their houses. The deportations began on March 15, 1943, the Jews exchanging their Greek drachmas for counterfeit Polish currency. Some 43,850 children, women, and men were sent from Salonika to Auschwitz between March and June 1943. The timing was unusual: right after the German defeat at Stalingrad, when German allies were generally trying to switch sides, or change their Jewish policy as a signal to the Allies. But Greece, although regarded by the Germans as an occupied state, was much more like a stateless territory. It had no

army in the war that might change sides, and no foreign minister who might send peace signals.

The French case was very different. The very notion of “collaboration” with Germany, although it has taken on other meanings since, was coined by the French to denote a policy of one sovereign state

choosing to cooperate with another. France, in contrast to the Netherlands and to Greece, did retain the basic institutions of sovereignty, and its leaders chose a policy of friendship with the German victors. After Hitler’s armies crushed the French in spring 1940, he expressed the wish that “a French government continue to function on French territory.” Because France, unlike the Netherlands and Greece, was placed under a traditional military occupation, there was no clear opening for the SS and its state destroyers. The new regime, with Philippe Pétain as head of state and with Vichy as the administrative center, was regarded as the legitimate continuator of the prewar republic, both at home and abroad. High officials in all ministries remained in their positions. Indeed, the number of French bureaucrats increased quite impressively during the German occupation, from about 650,000 to about 900,000. The contrast here with Poland is instructive: For every educated Pole who was murdered during the war, an educated Frenchman got a job in the civil service.

France did introduce anti-Jewish legislation on its own initiative. A “Jewish statute” was passed on October 3, 1940, breaking the long French tradition of treating all citizens in metropolitan France as equal members of the state. (Algeria, though at this time part of the French state, was a different story.) In March 1941, a General Commissariat for Jewish Questions was established to coordinate Jewish policy with Germany. The legalized theft of Jewish property began in France that July. In November, the French government created an official Jewish organization that all Jews in France were required to join. The prevailing idea among French authorities was that Jews could eventually be removed to somewhere distant—such as Madagascar. The new laws were implemented by people who had served the prewar republic.

The reasoning behind French Jewish policy was different than that of Nazi Germany and closer to that of, for example, Slovakia or Bulgaria. In Bratislava and Sofia, as in Vichy, a domestic constituency for ethnic cleansing found itself in an unusual situation: Another state, Germany, actually wished to take some (not all)

of the people deemed undesirable. In the late 1930s, before the war, the French Republic had already passed a law permitting the creation of “assembly points,” for Jewish and other refugees. The first of these camps had been established in February 1939.

Under the Vichy regime in 1940, the prewar aspiration to limit and control immigration became the open plan to make France an ethnically homogeneous state. Jews without citizenship, along with others who lacked citizenship, were to be removed. After the passage of the “Jewish Statute,” foreign Jews were sent to camps. About 7,055 French Jews were denaturalized and thereby placed in the category of greater risk, that of foreign Jews. Policy in France then followed the logic of escalation that was visible in eastern Europe. Major raids and roundups of Jews by the French police were timed with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in summer 1941, with the reversal of the German offensive that winter, and then as retaliation for (very real) French communist resistance in March 1942. By summer 1942, the French roundups included Jewish women and children. Jews in Paris were taken to Drancy, where they were selected for transport to Auschwitz and death.

French and German policies met at a certain precise point. The French placed Jews without French citizenship in camps. The Germans wanted to take such people, but only insofar as the Germans themselves could consider them stateless. Crucially, Nazi malice stopped at the passport: As much as Nazis might have imagined that states were artificial creations, they did not proceed with killing Jews until states were actually destroyed or had renounced their own Jews. The French were willing to round up Jews from Hungary and Turkey, for example, but the Germans were unwilling to kill such people without the consent of the Hungarian and Turkish governments. Germany was entirely willing to murder Jews of Polish and Soviet citizenship, since it considered these states to be defunct. Germany was also willing to take and murder French Jews, but only under the condition that French authorities first stripped such people of citizenship. This the French authorities at first showed a certain inclination to do, although complications of law and bureaucracy delayed the process considerably.

In summer 1942, when the Germans demanded a greater number of French Jews, the highest French authorities reconsidered the question of depriving their own citizens of citizenship. Depatriation was not, for them, a Jewish question, but rather a sovereignty question. After the tide of war visibly turned at Stalingrad in February 1943, French authorities decided not to depatriate any more French Jews. In July 1943, efforts to strip French citizenship from Jews nationalized after 1927 (about half of the Jews who were French citizens) were abandoned. The Holocaust continued in France as a German policy executed with a certain amount of local French collaboration, bringing general terror to French Jews in hiding but achieving



relatively little success. A large majority of French Jews, about three-quarters, survived the war.

The decisive matter, here as everywhere, was sovereignty. For French authorities, the Jewish question was subordinate to that of the well-being, as they saw matters, of their state. They certainly wished to remove Jews from France—foreign Jews to be sure and, no doubt, most or all Jews. But they could see the inherent problem of allowing German preferences to determine their own citizenship policy. The moment a state no longer determines internal membership, it loses external sovereignty. By the same token, French authorities had recourse to foreign policy and could react to the course of the war. Unlike the Dutch and the Greeks, who had lost these elements of sovereignty, the French could respond to Allied pressure about the Jews and anticipate a British and American occupation, which was indeed coming.

The Holocaust in France was mainly a crime against Jews who, from a French perspective, were foreign. As François Darlan, head of government in 1941 and 1942, put it: “The stateless Jews who have thronged to our country for the last fifteen years do not interest me.” Jews without French citizenship were about ten times more likely to be deported to Auschwitz than were Jews with French citizenship. At Drancy, Jews were selected for deportation according to the vitality of their state. Jews in France understood this perfectly. In 1939, when Poland was destroyed by the joint German-Soviet invasion, Polish Jews living in France flocked to the Soviet embassy in Paris. This was not out of any love for the Soviet Union or communism. They simply knew that they needed state protection. Between September 1939 and June 1941, documents from Hitler’s Soviet ally were of great value. But when Hitler betrayed Stalin, and Germany invaded the Soviet Union, these Jews’ new papers were suddenly useless.

Considerably more Polish Jews resident in France were killed than French Jews resident in France. Statelessness followed these thirty thousand murdered Polish Jews to Paris, to Drancy, to Auschwitz, to the gas chambers, to the crematoria, and to oblivion.

The likelihood that Jews would be sent to their deaths depended upon the durability of institutions of state sovereignty and the continuity of prewar citizenship. These structures created the matrix within which individual choices were made, the constraints upon those who did evil, and the possibilities for those who wished to do good. ◀

**Timothy Snyder** is the Bird White Housum Professor of History at Yale University and a Permanent Fellow at the IWM, Vienna. He is the author of five award-winning books including *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin*, which received the literature award of the American Academy of Arts and Letters, the Hannah Arendt Prize, and the Leipzig Book Prize for European Understanding. His new book *Black Earth: The Holocaust as a History and Warning* was published by Tim Duggan Books in September 2015 (see p. 26). The German version of the book, which came out one month later with C.H.Beck, was presented at Wien Museum on October 21.

# Budapest and Brussels: A Troubled Relationship

BY JÁNOS MÁTYÁS KOVÁCS AND BALÁZS TRENCSENYI

*In the 1990s, Hungary was celebrated as a post-communist success story. Today, it serves as an example of “inverse transition”. The second government of Viktor Orbán (2010–2014) replaced the republican regime with a so-called “System of National Cooperation” (SNC). The SNC is increasingly considered as prototypical of the potential “new right” regimes in Europe. How has it become possible that an EU member state shows conspicuous similarities to Putin’s Russia?*

In June 2015, the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) and the Central European University organized a conference on Hungary today. The participants—scholars in- and outside Hungary from various disciplines in the social sciences and humanities—analyzed the main features of the SNC, ranging from re-nationalization and social exclusion

to the dismantling of the democratic constitution. One aim of the conference was to find an appropriate description for the SNC, be it “authoritarian”, “populist”, “illiberal”, “nationalist”, similar to a mafia regime, or otherwise. Beyond the question of labels, the idea was to offer interpretations of the historical prerequisites for the SNC and its specifics

in comparison with other post-communist systems in Eastern Europe.

The first session focused on how the EU has responded to the Hungarian government’s repeated attempts to radically remodel the country’s legal and political arrangements. Below, we publish shortened versions of the three introductory statements to the session, by **Kinga Göncz**,

**Ulrike Lunacek** and **Jan-Werner Mueller**. In the light of these contributions, one is prompted to re-think both the ominous success and triumphant failure of the Orbán regime in dealing with the refugees in a European context. ◀

## The Games the EU and Hungary Play

BY KINGA GÖNCZ



Photo: IWM

Hungary, a forerunner of democratization in 1989 and erstwhile champion of EU accession, has introduced systemic change over the past five years. The European Union has observed this with growing anxiety, however seems to be paralyzed and unable or unwilling to intervene.

Hungary is deeply divided in terms of its value structure. A substantial majority of the population are paternalist and anti-liberal, willing to accept a strong leader, are xenophobic, intolerant and closed-minded. This value orientation meant that people did not question democracy for about fifteen years, because they were hoping for a higher living standard after 1989. The gradual loss of hope in a better life went hand in hand with a growing disappointment in a corrupt political class and in democracy in general. Since those who are more open-minded and competitive can leave the country, their share among the citizenry is decreasing. As a current joke has it, “if you’re bored with democracy, come back home to Hungary”.

Viktor Orbán was a strong candidate for the role of charismatic leader. In well-established democracies, charismatic leaders don’t make a substantial difference; in times of transition, however, they do—for better or for worse. If they strengthen the self-esteem and identity of society, without excluding and stigmatizing certain groups, their influence is for the better; if they scapegoat certain groups in order to create group cohesion, it is for the worse. The majority of Hungarians are willing to follow Orbán down the latter route. Orbán believes in a black-and-white world and in win-lose outcomes, understands only the language of power, and is unable to cooperate. In his family, all the men are called Viktor (his father’s and brother’s name is Győző, the Hungarian version of Viktor).

Hungarian society has not reckoned with its past. Historical traumas (Trianon, the Holocaust, communism) have led to a competitive sense of victimhood, in which guilt is projected onto others. Orbán reinforces this paranoid tendency. He

encourages a view of the EU as one of Hungary’s main enemies. For the Hungarian government, the Union is not a shared value system but a cash cow for Orbán’s clients. European transfer payments are for Hungary what oil incomes are for certain resource-rich illiberal democracies.

The assumption in Brussels was that once the accession countries had met the Copenhagen criteria, democracy would be a one-way street. In the meantime it has become clear that an anti-democratic backlash is possible, however an effective response has yet to be developed. The EU is able to reprimand candidate countries, but interdependency and the need for consensus requires it to be generous towards member states. The growing number and diversity of member states are another factor making problem-solving difficult. Moreover, as Brussels learned from Austria in 2000, exclusion can provoke anti-EU sentiment among citizens.

The EU’s credibility as a community of values and an embodiment of economic success was shattered by the financial crisis. This was exploited by politicians like Orbán. Although the Lisbon Treaty included sanctions in the case of a serious breach of values (article 2), the implementation of these sanctions requires a large majority (article 7). The European People’s Party still backs the Hungarian government, partly because FIDESZ MEPs are badly needed for its majority in the European Parliament, and partly because it thinks that it can influence Orbán more when FIDESZ remains in the conservative camp.

The EU sees its task in connection with Hungary as being to “return the lost sheep to the fold”. Orbán, on the other hand, asks: “Who can outsmart the other?” Any attempt by the EU to initiate dialogue and cooperation with the Hungarian prime minister is interpreted by the latter as a sign of weakness and an encouragement for further violations of EU rules. A vicious circle emerges: the more the EU seeks dialogue and provides funds, the greater Orbán’s chance to demonstrate that he can “bash” Brussels.

If EU criticism aims at systemic problems, Orbán asks for concrete examples. If the EU provides evidence, Orbán produces unknown data (usually false) and accuses the EU of ignorance of the Hungarian situation. If no other argument works, he speaks of “double standards” and the “unique spirit of the Hungarian people”. Brussels is bound by the rule of law, Orbán is not—with his two-thirds majority, he makes that law. If new legislation is unconstitutional, he changes the constitution. If resistance is too strong, he takes a step back without giving up the essence of the policy in question. While the EU distinguishes between Hungary and its government, Orbán repeatedly equates the two, claiming that “the Hungarian nation is under attack” and that he has to “fight for the dignity of the nation”. He speaks a pro-European language in Brussels and an anti-European, politically incorrect, even extremist language in Budapest. Jean Claude Juncker’s greeting of Orbán with “Hello, Dictator” was an attempt to find an adequate reaction to this game. ◀



# Creating a New EU Mechanism to Protect Fundamental Rights

BY ULRIKE LUNACEK

The last vote we had on Hungary in the European Parliament was at the beginning of June. We thought that before taking a resolution we ought to give him a chance to respond to our criticisms. As always, Orbán's speech turned into a show directed towards his domestic audience. This is one of the problems we face: he is very good at using national media. At the same time, he has done a lot to constrain media freedom in Hungary. In the end, we succeeded in not having a vote by open ballot on the resolution. This allowed some MEP's in the European People's Party to vote in favor, or at least to abstain. The resolution was passed.

The title of this conference is *Mapping the "System of National Cooperation"*. It is important to analyze this system at a time when many of the member states, not just Hungary, increasingly favor nationalist decision-making. During the debt crisis, many states saw the strengthening of the EU not as the solution, but as the problem. The same goes for the refugee crisis today.

Ever since the first media law was passed in Hungary in 2010, the European Parliament has attempted to move in the opposite direction. It was in 2011, the year of Hungarian presidency, that the "strange non-communication" between the European Parliament and Viktor Orbán began. The Parliament already has

article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty at its disposal. I remember the sanctions against Austria fifteen years ago, when I was member of the Austrian parliament. Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel had formed a government with Haider's Freedom Party. In the opposition, we were very much in favor of the sanctions, although there was no exit strategy. In the end, the sanctions proved counter-productive; many citizens saw them as being directed against the country as a whole. Euroskepticism in Austria still has a lot to do with that conflict.

The Lisbon Treaty of 2008 introduced the means for punishing the violation of the treaty in article 7, in particular paragraphs 7.1 and 7.2. Ultimately, the Council has to take a decision; at the most, a member state forfeits the right to vote in the Council. The problem is that the decision must be unanimous, with the exception of the state concerned. When the first media law was passed in Hungary, we Greens put pressure on the Commission to identify it as an infringement of European law. This makes it easier to start a procedure against a member state; acting against infringement of European values in general is more difficult. We have learned our lesson from the hesitancy of the Barroso Commission.

We call this the "Copenhagen dilemma". The candidate countries are required not only to fulfill the Co-

penhagen criteria in legal terms but also to implement them, and the implementation is monitored in great detail. Once a candidate member enters the European Union, monitoring stops. With Romania and Bulgaria, some checks remained in operation. With the others, there is no comprehensive mechanism of control. Therefore, the Greens proposed that the European Parliament establishes a body similar to the Copenhagen Commission.

In July 2013, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs wrote a report on Hungary. It was my colleague Rui Tavares who prepared the document. Because Hungarian conservatives regard him as an enemy, he developed a clever strategy. He divided the report in five parts, for each inviting a co-rapporteur from one of the parliamentary groups, including the European People's Party. The report proposed setting up a commission similar to the Venice Commission in the Council of Europe. This body would deal not only with Hungary but also, for example, with the political measures of the Romanian prime minister, Viktor Ponta, or Lithuania's propaganda law prohibiting talk about homosexuality, a copy of Russian law on the same. The report was passed in the parliament with a majority.

Orbán's recent support for the reintroduction of death penalty in Hungary again raised the potential of



Photo: IWM

a Hungarian violation of the European Treaty. On several occasions, Orbán made one step forward and one step back. First, he said that he wanted to reintroduce the death penalty in the Hungarian penal code. Then, talking to Jean-Claude Juncker, he promised to drop the idea. The next day, he repeated his wish to reinstate the death penalty. Later, when visiting the European Parliament, he changed his mind again. Even the idea of introducing the death penalty infringes of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. No country with death penalty in its penal code may enter the European Union. The last words in Orbán's speech to the European Parliament were: "Well, that was the first step."

Then he came up with the immigration questionnaire. It insinuated that all migrants were criminals and blamed the European Union for the

rise in immigration. It stressed that migrants are unwelcome in Hungary, and that if they come to Hungary nonetheless, they were not to take the jobs of Hungarians. The European People's Party was very annoyed by that questionnaire. Parliament demanded that the Commission present a proposal for the establishment of a new mechanism on democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights that would serve "as a tool for compliance with and enforcement of the charter and treaties signed by all Member States". This mechanism would operate something like a peer review process, whereby member states and the European Union would monitor each other on a regular basis. A similar procedure exists in the OECD in cooperation on development. It would help counter the notion that "it's them up in Brussels to decide what we can and can't do". <

## Challenges to Democracy and the Rule of Law: What Should the Union Do?

BY JAN-WERNER MUELLER



Photo: IWM

I shan't recap the entire proposal for a Copenhagen Commission, because we have just heard from Ulrike Lunacek about the basic idea. It is an EU-specific democracy and rule of law watchdog, if you like. If I may extend the canine analogy, it would be a watchdog that not only barks, but also bites. Ideally, it would also be able to sniff around wherever it likes. In other words, this new institution would have the right to investigate possible problems with democracy and the rule of law, as well as the power to penalize member states and, in particular, impose financial sanctions.

Having said that, it's worth adding a word of caution. This is essentially a proposal for institutional design or, if you like, institutional redesign. There is always something dangerous about designing or redesigning institutions on the basis of one particular case. I don't think we want to end up in a situation where, in thirty years from now, people say "oh, that would have worked wonderfully for Hungary in 2011—but the new institution had all kinds of unexpected side effects that nobody foresaw". It's very important to understand the case of Hungary today, but it is also important to take some distance.

Let me now say something about the proposals usually discussed to address that case, and why I think they fall short.

First, the so-called "nuclear option", that is to say article 7 of the Treaty of the EU. What we have at the moment doesn't work. The majority needed for article 7 is simply too large. Even apart from that, there is something to be said about what article 7 actually is, and what it does structurally. The important thing is that it is not really about intervening in a country. It's a form of political, even moral, isolationism. In applying article 7, the EU would essentially be saying: "we want to have nothing to do with this government. We don't want to be subject to decisions which have been taken by a government that we do not consider to be democratic, or a government we think is violating fundamental values." Now, stripping people of rights is not such an outrageous proposal as one might think. Article 18 of the German Basic Law allows citizens to be stripped off their political rights. This has never happened, but it has been tried four times without success. Still, the question is whether

one can do this to an entire people—though, of course, the people of an EU member state would retain representation in the European Parliament, so this is not a case of a complete disenfranchisement.

There is another problem. An application of article 7 could in theory last forever. The government of the country concerned might say: "Ok, we no longer vote in the European Council, but, hey, we are a small country anyway, we don't care, we only care about domestic power." Then the Union could not ostracize the country altogether—there is no legal way of ejecting a member state. Ultimately, there is something incoherent about a quasi-federation that neither can kick a part out, nor intervene properly in one of those parts. There is no functioning federation which has similar features: either it allows a central authority to expel certain actors out, or it allows the central actor to intervene in a part of the country. So I think it is important both to push ahead with something like the Copenhagen Commission and also to create something like a mechanism for ejecting a country altogether

(even if, hopefully, this would never happen).

The following remarks will focus on refuting four common objections to the idea of a Copenhagen Commission.

First, it's often said that there are no real shared standards for evaluating national political systems. There might be a common market, but there is no common European political model; in fact, Europe prides itself on its diversity, and pluralism is often taken to be a value in itself. The most we might have is Viktor Orbán's approach to constitutional law. Recently, the Hungarian prime minister said that he couldn't explain what an illiberal state was, and cited the famous remark of the United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart on pornography: "you know it when you see it".

However, the claim about a complete absence of criteria for judgment is clearly false. The Venice Commission, for instance, regularly makes such judgments of whole constitutional systems. If you look, for instance, at the Venice Commission's opinion on the fourth amendment of the basic law of Hungary, it is very



clear that they construct an argument that cannot be dismissed as arbitrary. Rather than disaggregating a constitution and then claiming that many democratic countries exhibit these elements (the approach taken by the Hungarian government in its strategy of legal and normative self-defense), the Venice Commission insisted on seeing the whole picture, and on examining whether the whole does or does not function in a liberal-democratic fashion. Moreover, it's not the case that the EU itself never makes this kind of judgment. It makes it every single time that a country becomes a member state. That doesn't mean that the EU has a very convincing methodology. I am sure many of you have a good story about mistaken judgments in the process of accession. But the point is that the idea of an actor (usually the European Commission) making the call on whether the Copenhagen criteria have been fulfilled is not generally seen as illegitimate.

The second concern is this: you might come back to me and say "look, you keep lauding the Venice Commission, so why don't we just stick to that?" In fact, many critics claim that it is typical of the EU that, when it can't solve a problem, it invents new institutions that cannot really solve the problem either. So why don't we use what we have more effectively? Here are a couple of reasons. One is that the Venice Commission itself cannot actually sanction. It is a purely advisory body. Furthermore, it is not EU-specific, and I think the EU has reached a level of density and depth of integration that finds no equivalent in the Council of Europe. Above all, the Council of Europe simply doesn't have the resources, the actual power, including the normative power, that is remotely comparable to anything in the EU. I don't want to make a cheap point, but an organization that allows Azerbaijan to be in charge cannot be a credible defender of democracy and the rule of law.

Third objection: a Copenhagen Commission, critics often say, is going to cause a great nationalist backlash, pushing all kinds of countries in the direction of euroskepticism. Well, so far, this has not been true in Hungary: the "war of independence" launched by Orbán is not really a very popular measure. But what about Austria in 2000, you might ask? This is a sordid story that everybody remembers, an absolute trauma for the EU. The very fact that we talk about "sanctions against Austria" shows that Wolfgang Schäussel won out—because these were sanctions against a particular government, not the country and its people. Moreover, it was actually the EU 14 member states, and not the EU itself, that decided on the sanctions. We already had a mechanism in place at that time, but the governments did not want to use it. So instead they introduced rather dubious bilateral sanctions, while also making use of the Portuguese presidency of the EU for the purpose. Thus, the member states really didn't conform to any basic standards of the rule of law: the sanctions weren't predictable and didn't ac-

cord with what had been envisaged in existing procedures. In the end, there were many good reasons to have a problem with the sanctions, even if one had absolutely no sympathy for Haider.

Let me make one other point: any government that wants to do what Viktor Orbán has done during the last couple of years knows that it will enter on a collision course with Brussels. Therefore, it will preemptively stir euroskeptic sentiments. Governments intent on violating European values are not going to wait for Brussels to come along and sanction; in all likelihood, they will go on the attack. Moreover, if the EU does nothing, it lets down all those



Keynote Speech by Stephen Holmes

people who, in 2004, said "thank God we are in the EU. We basically locked ourselves in supranational liberal democratic structures, there will never be any backsliding, any return to authoritarianism, we are safe." They would now say today: "We have much better reasons to become euroskeptic now than other people, because the EU really let us down."

The fourth and last objection: I occasionally hear something along the lines of people saying, "look, a Copenhagen Commission policing countries will reinforce the image of the EU as an entirely punitive organization". This is what some call "authoritarian liberalism". In economic matters it's true that Brussels tells you that can't have a certain kind of budget. But that is not comparable to something like a potential Copenhagen Commission, which would leave the existing pluralism and diversity of the European model untouched. It is about saying that there is a limit to pluralism in any club.

Still, you might ask with Erich Kästner: "Wo bleibt das Positive?" Is there anything positive here, or is it all about punishments and disciplining? Here is a very modest proposal: the new body could also build up knowledge of European constitutional traditions. I have in mind something like the *Verfassungsgerichtsverbund* advocated by Andreas Voßkuhle, president of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. This would be a kind of clearing house that helps to share information and examines best practices. I don't want to make too much of this—"best practices", "benchmarking", etc., is often bureaucratese that over-promises. Still, the Copenhagen Commission could play a positive role in this regard, even if its main function remains that of a watchdog. The hope is that countries would conduct themselves in light of the fact that a watchdog is indeed watching them. <



Photos: IWM

# Conference HUNGARY 2015 Mapping the "System of National Cooperation" June 26–27, 2015, Vienna

## Program

### June 26, 2015

Welcome and Introduction:  
**János Mátyás Kovács** and  
**Balázs Trencsényi**

### Session I: Hungary and the EU

**Kinga Göncz**  
*Games the EU Institutions and the Hungarian Prime Minister Play*  
**Ulrike Lunacek**  
*Creation of New EU Mechanism to Ensure Fundamental Rights Upheld*  
**Jan-Werner Mueller**  
*Challenges to Democracy and the Rule of Law Within EU Member States: What Should the Union Do?* (see p. 6)

### Session II: System of National Cooperation (SNC): In Search of a Definition

**Bálint Magyar**  
*The Hungarian Post-Communist Mafia State*

Comments:  
**Stephen Holmes**  
**Balázs Váradi**

### Session III: SNC: Empirical Approaches I

**János Köllő**  
*Curing Failures by Means of Exclusion. On the Educational and Employment Policies of Orbán's SNC*  
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*Nationalism and Migration in a Historical Perspective. The Case of Hungary*  
**Peter Mihalyi**  
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*Political Holes in the Economy: The Business Network of Partisan Firms in Hungary*

### Session IV: SNC: Empirical Approaches II

**Virág Molnár**  
*Civil Society, Radicalism and the Rediscovery of Mythic Nationalism*  
**Renata Uitz**  
*Placing the Hungarian Fundamental Law in the SNC: National Cooperation as an Expository Framework*  
**Attila Bartha**  
*Politically Driven Policy-Making, Lobbying and Understanding the Role of Strategic Partnership Agreements from a Narrative Policy Framework Perspective*

Keynote Speech:  
**Stephen Holmes**  
**Illiberal Democracy**  
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### June 27, 2015

### Session V: SNC: Historical Analogies

**Gábor Egrý**  
*Beyond Electioneering: Minority Hungarians and the SNC's Attempt to Reconstruct the Unitary Nation*  
**János Mátyás Kovács**  
*The "Right Hand" Thinks. On the Sources of György Matolcsy's Economic Vision*  
**Ferenc Laczó**  
*Totalitarianism Without Perpetrators? On Fidesz' Politics of History in Comparative and Transnational Perspectives*  
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*Historical Politics and Regime-Building in Hungary*

### Session VI: SNC: Eastern European Analogies

**Ivan Krastev**  
*Comment on the Current Situation in Hungary*  
**Radosław Markowski**  
*Budapest in Warsaw!—The Dream Becomes True?*  
**Silvia Marton**  
*Is SNC Unique? Notes on Hungary and Romania*

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# Von der Postdemokratie zur Postsolidarität

VON ULRICH BRINKMANN

Die Phase nach dem 2. Weltkrieg war weitgehend von der Überzeugung geprägt, dass sich gleiche Chancen und umfassende Bürgerrechte immer weiter ausdehnen werden. Crouch nennt diese geschichtliche Epoche nicht ohne Grund den „Augenblick der Demokratie“, der bis Mitte der 1970er Jahre anhält. Dann setzt jener postdemokratische Umbruch ein, den wir heute als neoliberale Wende diskutieren: Die schleichende Aushöhlung demokratischer Prozesse durch eine Verlagerung der Entscheidungsorte auf „Experten-Gremien“ sowie eine unzweideutige Orientierung an neoliberalen Prinzipien wie Austerität, Deregulierung und Privatisierung. Tatsächlich lässt sie sich in ganz unterschiedlichen Zusammenhängen nachweisen. Zwei seien hier herausgegriffen.

## Der Fall Griechenland

Demokratische Defizite werden der EU zwar schon seit Jahrzehnten attestiert, spätestens mit der Gründung der Troika (später „Institutionen“, bzw. „Quadriga“) kann man jedoch mit Fug und Recht behaupten, dass die EU in ihre postdemokratische Phase eingetreten ist. Dabei ist es nicht – wie oft behauptet – der Euro an sich, der diese Entwicklung forcierte. Selbst die Deutsche Bundesbank, in deren Schriften der Begriff „Solidarität“ in der Regel nicht zu finden ist, schrieb in einer Stellungnahme zur Errichtung einer Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im September 1990: „Letzten Endes ist eine Währungsunion damit eine nicht mehr kündbare Solidargemeinschaft, die nach aller Erfahrung für ihren dauerhaften Bestand eine weitergehende Bindung in Form einer umfassenden politischen Union benötigt.“ Und tatsächlich war ein verhältnismäßig großer Anteil des EU-Etats in den vergangenen Dekaden für die Entwicklung strukturschwacher Regionen reserviert – eine Umverteilung, die auch Ausdruck eines solidarisch-egalitären Grundverständnisses ist. Es ist also nicht die Währung, sondern die eingeschlagene Wirtschaftspolitik, die den Wendepunkt markiert. Was bedeutet dies im Fall von Griechenland?

Private Banken (vor allem deutsche, französische, aber auch griechische) hatten über Jahre hindurch die Regierungen in Athen mit vergleichsweise billigen Krediten versorgt und davon immens profitiert. Im Gefolge der Finanzkrise wurden diese dann von der plötzlichen Zahlungsunfähigkeit des griechischen Staates „überrascht“. Wo war da der ökonomische Sachverstand im Bankensektor, möchte man fragen. Dies ist keine rhetorische Frage, denn den Banken war frühzeitig klar: Angela Merkel, Wolfgang

Schäuble und in ihrem Gefolge die europäischen Staats- und Regierungschefs konnten sich aufgrund der öffentlichen Empörung nach der Krise 2008/2009 keine zweite staatliche Schuldenübernahme („Rettungsschirm“) für die Banken erlauben. Statt eines Schuldenschnitts und Neuanfangs für Griechenland wählten sie den Umweg einer Kreditrückzahlung mit den Geldern der „Rettungspakete für Griechenland“. Wie clever dieses Vorgehen ist, offenbart sich erst im Nachhinein. Aus der politischen Bürde des skandalösen ersten Bailouts wurde gleich das Druckmittel für den nächsten: Letztlich zahlt wiederum die Öffentlichkeit für private Spekulationsrisiken, dieses Mal allerdings nicht mit der angeblichen Systemrelevanz der Banken kaschiert, sondern mit der „Sorge um den Zusammenhalt“ in Europa und zur „Rettung Griechenlands“, garniert mit einer gehörigen Portion Nationalismus. Festzuhalten bleibt: Der mit Abstand größte Teil des dritten „Rettungspakets für Griechenland“ in Höhe von 85 Mrd. Euro ist tatsächlich ein Rettungspaket für die privaten Geldgeber, das ihrer Rekapitalisierung und der Refinanzierung jener alten Kredite dient. Im griechischen Haushalt ist diese Summe lediglich ein Durchlaufposten. Mit Blick auf Crouchs Argument: Hier bedient die Politik die privaten Partialinteressen einer Kleinminderheit auf Kosten der Allgemeinheit. Dieser Taschenspielertrick untergräbt nicht nur die europäische Idee einer wachsenden Integration der Staatengemeinschaft, sondern damit auch den ihr innewohnenden Kern einer Grundsolidarität.

Orchestriert wird dieses Vorgehen vom Expertengremium Troika, das zwar ohne (juristische oder demokratische) Legitimation, dafür aber mit umso mehr Nachdruck in Griechenland eine neoliberale Agenda exekutiert: weitgehende Privatisierungen öffentlichen Eigentums – darunter auch die basale Infrastruktur der öffentlichen Daseinsvorsorge (wie Wasserwerke, Strom- und Gasversorger), Erhöhung der Mehrwertsteuer, Senkung der Pensionen, Kürzung der Mindestlöhne, Perforierung des Kündigungsschutzes, Verkleinerung des öffentlichen Sektors und Zurückdrängung der Tarifautonomie, kurz: eine kontraktive Sparpolitik zu Lasten der Ärmsten und Schwachen.

## Prekarisierung von Arbeit

Der enorme Handelsüberschuss Deutschlands und die damit direkt zusammenhängende Exportschwäche vieler anderer EU-Länder hat ihre Ursache nicht zuletzt in einer seit fünfzehn Jahren anhaltenden Politik der Schwächung von Beschäftigtenrechten, der repressiven Um-

gestaltung des Sozialstaates und der Prekarisierung von Arbeit in einem drastisch angewachsenen Niedriglohnsektor. Diese Politik kulminierte in den Reformen des Expertengremiums um Peter Hartz, das durch die rot-grüne Bundesregierung eingesetzt worden war. Diese trugen entscheidend dazu bei, den Faktor Arbeit in Deutschland zu verbilligen, primär auf Kosten der Erwerbslosen, der Alleinerziehenden, der Ärmsten. So sicherte der selbsternannte „Exportweltmeister“ Deutschland seine Stellung durch Dumpingbedingungen am eigenen Arbeitsmarkt ab und setzte damit alle anderen Ökonomien in einer Schmutzkonkurrenz unter Druck.

In einem laufenden Forschungsprojekt haben wir die Ausweitung der prekären Arbeit am Beispiel der Hartz-Reformen in Deutschland untersucht: Ein großer Teil der Leiharbeiter darf in den Einsatzbetrieben weder aktiv noch passiv an den Wahlen zum Betriebsrat teilnehmen. Gleichzeitig gibt es in fast allen Verleihbetrieben ebenfalls keine Betriebsräte, d.h. es entsteht eine gravierende demokratische Partizipations- und Vertretungslücke. In nicht wenigen Fällen konnten wir zudem beobachten, dass sich betriebliche Koalitionen zusammenfinden, die die prekär Beschäftigten als Verhandlungsmasse sehen, deren Einsatzzeiten, Entgelte, Arbeitssicherheit möglichst variabel gehalten werden, um der Stammebelegschaft eine größere Sicherheit zu gewährleisten. Eine Kollegin hat dies kürzlich als „Prekaritätsdividende“ (Becker) bezeichnet, die die (noch) Integrierten erhalten. Die Gewerkschaften haben alle Mühe (und scheuen sie zum Glück auch nicht), um dieser betrieblichen Entsolidarisierung bzw. dieser „exklusiven Solidarität“ (Dörre) entgegenzuwirken.

Beide Fälle verdeutlichen: Die mit der Postdemokratisierung verbundene Aushöhlung demokratischer Institutionen und Praxis lässt auch die Solidarität erodieren, auf der die Demokratie stabil stehen muss. Solidarität unter neoliberalen Vorzeichen wird dabei zu einer Fassade, sie wird zur Postsolidarität. So gerät das interdependente Verhältnis von Demokratie und Solidarität in eine Abwärtsspirale, statt sich wechselseitig abzustützen. Offenbar lassen sich Demokratie und auch Solidarität zwar institutionalisieren, sie sind dadurch aber nicht einmal mittelfristig abgesichert. Sie müssen permanent neu errungen und mit Leben gefüllt werden – auch und vor allem gegenüber mächtigen konkurrierenden Interessenlagen. ◀

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# New Fronts

CONFERENCE REPORT BY KATHERINE NEWMAN



The 9<sup>th</sup> Annual conference “On Solidarity” focused attention on vexing issues of inequality and the variety of institutions that buffer its worst impacts to support the social welfare of citizens. Scholars from Eastern and Western Europe and from the United States converged on the Institute for Human Sciences for three days in June to explore the dilemmas emerging within families, forums for political participation, and the social policies that are intended to cushion citizens against the excesses of markets. With the hindsight of the past few months in which the growing refugee crisis in Syria has engulfed the European Union, the topic of this 9<sup>th</sup> gathering has never seemed more relevant.

Claus Offe, a signal voice for the importance of democratic theory in these debates, reminded the conference that the goal for the state should be less a matter of strict equality and more to emphasize what he called a “sufficiency approach.” In his conference keynote address, Offe argued that every member of society should be provided with the minimum means to enable freedom, autonomy and the capacity to participate in the debates that are crucial to a functioning democracy. Devotion to these goals requires accepting a certain level of inequality while focusing attention on the

construction of a floor below which those at the bottom cannot sink. It also trains attention on the need to ensure those at the top are responsive to their obligations, especially taxation. Progressive indirect taxation may be part of the answer, but whatever the policy instruments, preventing the exit of those at the top of the wealth pyramid is critical.

Unfortunately, as Offe reminded the conference, the normative expectations that undergird such a position are far from fully embraced. The poor are routinely the object of suspicion in both the US and Europe, where excessive attention to fraud in social welfare programs and the attempt to tighten rules of eligibility are constant refrains. The flow of migrants into the EU is likely to exacerbate these concerns, with the concomitant danger of segregation from mainstream institutions like the labor market, which only aggravates the problems of inequality besetting advanced economies. Variations within the EU in reactions to the crisis, from extreme right wing xenophobia besetting Hungary, to a more open and sympathetic approach in Germany, where migrant labor would be a welcome antidote to low fertility, will put additional strain on normative precepts that are not fully cemented to begin with.

Generational differences in pov-



# in Modern Inequality



Photo: urbanow / iStock.com

erty present additional challenges. The oldest citizens, those over 75, have seen rates of hardship decline in the United States and much of Western Europe over the last thirty years. Those exiting the labor market in the 66–74 age group have also benefitted from a history of relatively stable employment and the growth in the value of their property. For all other age groups, the story is reversed. This sets in motion divergent interests and the spectacle of “pulling the ladder up” behind the more fortunate generations who are, as well, more powerful from an electoral point of view.

From the post-war period until the present, these trends have been building while the welfare state has scrambled to adapt. In the decades that followed on the heels of WWII, social justice and the development of a strong safety net were embraced as a cross national imperative in Europe and, in the form of the War on Poverty, the GI Bill of Rights, and the development of Medicare and Medicaid, in the US as well. After 1973, the galloping growth of inequality and the oil shocks that rocked the international markets, put these systems under economic strain on both sides of the Atlantic and under political assault in the US. It took another decade for those strains to surface in the UK. In Germany and

France, as well as elsewhere in the EU, a stronger social compact ensures redistribution through tax and wage systems that guaranteed the social peace.

The discord that surrounded American politics in the Nixon era and beyond, and in the UK, the Thatcher revolution, has spread to inter-state critiques of social spending as cushions to weak labor markets in the EU of the 2010's. The divide that sets Germany and the other rich states of the EU against the poorer periphery nations (Greece, Portugal, and increasingly Spain) has grown into a crisis that threatens everything from the banking system to the institutions of governance.

Against this troubling backdrop, the conference considered the impact these trends have had on institutions a little closer to the ground. **Frank Furstenberg** and **Kathleen Gerson** focused attention on the family. They highlighted dramatic changes in the fortunes of generations that have, in turn, put pressures on the private realm visible in forms of “doubling up” (multi-generational households), the slowing of household formation through marriage or cohabitation, declining fertility, and the consequent aging of American and European societies. Yet the macro level inequalities that were at the heart of the conference

surface at the micro- or household level in the form of privileges that can be passed down through families or become entirely off limits among poor and working class households that lack the resources (from financial to cultural) to foster the mobility of youth.

**Brigitte Aulenbacher** and **Mike Hout** looked at how employment and wage growth reflects growing inequalities by gender and education. Aulenbacher's emphasis on the role of critical theory leads her to emphasize the discounting of care work and the unpaid labor of women in advanced postindustrial societies. Hout reminded the conference that advantages are increasingly accruing to those at the very highest end of the education spectrum (Master's degrees and beyond), while leaving those not only at the bottom (school drop outs) but even those with high school diplomas in the dust as higher education becomes more ubiquitous.

**Henry Brady** and **Ivan Krastev** looked carefully at political participation in the West and the East. Brady noted the substantial inequality in political participation by both socio-economic status and by age in the United States, and he argued that this decreases the legitimacy of the political system—thus leaving it open to the kind of politics that has become increasingly apparent in the last six months of the current U.S. Presidential race. Krastev focused on crises of legitimacy and made it clear that public confidence in Eastern Europe in the promise of democratic institutions is waning in the face of corruption and the apparent inability of government to deliver on economic stability. The wave of protest movements from Occupy Wall Street to street battles in Eastern Europe and North Africa, have laid bare a rising distrust of democratic institutions and open suspicion of the market and the state.

Finally, the focus on social policy in the US and Europe made it clear that the cushioning of free markets by instruments of redistribution and social protection is wearing thin. **Jonas Pontusson** and **Katherine Newman** examined the ways in which public support for the welfare state itself is under assault and the fault lines that expose those at the bottom to weaker protections while protecting to a greater degree through systems of insurance, workers and retirees, is opening up new fronts in modern inequality.

The Conference continues to play a critical role in sustaining dialogue across distant points in the academic and policy communities. <

**Katherine Newman** is provost and senior vice chancellor for academic affairs at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. She previously served as a Professor of Sociology at Johns Hopkins University.



Photo: Michael Jeuter

## Conference On Solidarity IX: The Issue of Distribution June 11–13, 2015, IWM / Albert Schweitzer Haus, Vienna

### Program

June 11, 2015

*Welcome and Introduction:*  
**János Mátyás Kovács**

*Keynote Speech:*  
**Claus Offe**  
**Varieties of Inequality:  
What Can Be Done About Them  
and Why it Must Be Done**  
Video on: [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

June 12, 2015

### Session I: The Family

*Introduction:*  
**Frank F. Furstenberg**  
**Kathleen Gerson**  
**Ivan Krastev** (Chair)

### Session II: The Market

*Introduction:*  
**Brigitte Aulenbacher**  
**Mike Hout**  
**János Mátyás Kovács** (Chair)

### Session III: Citizenship

*Introduction:*  
**Henry Brady**  
**Ivan Krastev**  
**Katherine Newman** (Chair)

June 13, 2015

### Session IV: Social Policy

*Introduction:*  
**Katherine Newman**  
**Jonas Pontusson**  
**Claus Offe** (Chair)

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# Will China Replace Europe as Russia's Main Gas Customer?

BY THOMAS S. EDER

*The EU sanctions regime adopted in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has prompted the Russian government to once again play the 'China card' on energy. To fall for this, is to fundamentally misunderstand both the facts on the ground and Chinese strategy.*

Last year the Chinese and Russian presidents signed an agreement for a first gas pipeline connecting the two countries (Power of Siberia), along with a non-binding framework agreement for a second pipeline (Altai). The *Power of Siberia* pipeline, which is due for completion in 2018, will have a capacity of 38 billion cubic meters per annum (bcm), with a potential expansion to 61 bcm later on. The *Altai* pipeline will have a capacity of 30 bcm, though the parties have yet to agree on pricing and set a start date for construction.

To put this in relation: In 2013, the EU consumed 430 bcm, China 162 bcm. Both produce gas themselves and also import it via pipeline and tanker in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG). The EU imported 63% (270 bcm) of its needs, mostly via pipeline, while China imported only 32% (52 bcm), evenly distributed between pipeline and LNG. Russia delivered 124 bcm to the EU (29% of its needs) and nothing to China. Overall Russian exports amounted to 225 bcm, with 93% going to Europe via pipeline (mostly to the EU, Turkey and Ukraine) and 7% to Japan and South Korea as LNG.

To answer the question set out in the title, we need to examine both Chinese demand and Russian supply in more detail, that is, how China currently does, and in future intends, to satisfy its demand for natural gas, and whether Russia will be both willing and able to supply the volumes China is looking to purchase at a price acceptable to China.

## The Central Asian Factor and International Players

A meeting between the corporate representatives of *CNPC/Petro-China* (market capitalization \$350 billion) and *Gazprom* (market capitalization \$55 billion) in Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) in 2013 illustrates the first fundamental problem with Russia's "energy pivot to Asia":<sup>1</sup> Accustomed to taking their 'backyard' for granted, the Russians looked on with consternation as their Chinese counterparts declared "that Central Asia was China's turf when it comes to energy." Such confidence is based on hard facts: the People's Republic is now the clear leader in investment in the Central Asian energy industry, in foreign ownership of Central Asian gas fields, and in imports of Central Asian gas. Among other major implications, this means that Russia has arrived late to the game

when it comes to the Chinese gas market. The Russian government overplayed its hand in the 2000s, prompting China to turn to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Pipelines were built and extended, and the network continues to grow. Between China and Central Asia, not Russia.


The Central Asia-China gas pipeline, so far consisting of three lines, has a transport capacity of 55 bcm. In 2013, it delivered 24 bcm from Turkmenistan and 3 bcm from Uzbekistan. A fourth line will go into operation next year and add another 30 bcm capacity. Construction of the *Beyneu-Bozoy-Shymkent* pipeline has also now been completed and will add up to 15 bcm of Kazakh gas to the Central Asia-China pipeline system. In addition to the pipelines from Central Asia, China has started importing natural gas from Myanmar through a 12 bcm pipeline (which delivered 3 bcm in 2014). It is also planning a pipeline to the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, and is considering a connection to Iran.

The second fundamental problem with Russia's "energy pivot to Asia" is the fact that China satisfies almost half of its gas import demand through LNG sourced from producers all over the world, thanks to an impressive array of LNG conversion (re-gasification) facilities built along its coast. Qatar, Australia, Malaysia, and Indonesia are the major sources, with African exporters on the rise and Russia not yet registering. China is set to almost double its re-gasification capacity in the next three years—from 54 bcm to 99 bcm—with LNG prices expected to decrease considerably.

## Chinese Energy Security Strategy

The third and decisive obstacle to China accommodating Moscow's 'turn to the east' is the Chinese energy security strategy. China only became a net gas importer in 2007; since then, imports have increased to meet a third of its demand. Domestic production, however, has also been tripled in the last decade and continues to rise rapidly. Thanks to what are estimated to be the world's largest shale gas reserves, China aims to stabilize the proportion of its imports to overall consumption, while at the same time boosting gas as a factor in the total energy mix (from 5% to 10% by 2020). Moreover, Chinese scholars are fully aware of Rus-

Source: Simon Pirani "Central Asian and Caspian Gas Production and the Constraints on Export", *Oxford Institute of Energy Studies NG*, 2012, No. 69, 1.



sia's use of energy as foreign policy weapon, and openly cite its 'gas crises' with Ukraine (2005, 2009) and Turkmenistan (2009) as cautionary tales.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, China has embarked on a general strategy of diversification in its gas imports since becoming a net importer. It aggressively pursued overland pipeline imports to offset vulnerability to a potential naval blockade by the US, and it has been establishing the pipeline network with Central Asia partly to show Moscow that it can work around it. In the coming years, it will seek to maintain a balance between the two import methods, and to use inter alia Russian gas to reduce Turkmenistan's and Qatar's rather dominant positions as pipeline gas and LNG suppliers respectively. Rather than allowing itself to become dependent on its northern neighbor, China will attempt to avoid dependence on any one supplier for more than a fourth of its import needs (9% of consumption).

## Geography, Investment, and Pricing

Turning to the supply-side of the equation, even if Chinese demand were sufficient in size to replace for it to absorb current Russian exports to Europe, other issues would remain. The *Power of Siberia* pipeline would draw on Eastern Siberian fields, while the EU purchases gas from Western Siberian and European Russian gas fields. It would therefore be an addition to, rather than a diversion of exports, i.e. it would not allow Russia to export gas from production sites currently supplying Europe to China

instead. Furthermore, Eastern Siberian fields are much less developed and more difficult to exploit, while Russian energy companies are currently cash-strapped and cut off from access to international financial markets and western technology. China may offer further loans, but only in exchange for ownership of Russian gas fields, and it cannot replace western technology.

There are still further considerations that could weaken Russia's hand even more. First, negotiations on the *Power of Siberia* pipeline lasted for over twenty years and were delayed numerous times by disagreements over pricing. If the drastic drop in global oil prices since the agreement leads to renegotiations, Russia could be forced to accept worse conditions, under which the project's profitability could become questionable. Second, if the *Altai* pipeline was built, it would draw on the Western Siberian fields currently supplying Europe, but deliver gas to a region several thousand kilometers away from China's industrialized East. China will therefore push for a lower price in order to compensate for the resultant higher domestic transportation costs. Finally, China will have a large import over-capacity—pipelines and LNG regasification facilities will amount to 249 bcm in 2020, with current import demand at 52 bcm. This makes it even less likely that Russia will obtain European prices for its deliveries to China.

## Reframing the Issue

If all the pipeline and LNG projects between Russia and China go ahead, and if Russia accepts much greater dependence on China as well

as a lower price for its product, then Russia might be able to export current EU-level volumes of gas to China in 2030. However, if China sticks to its energy security strategy while demand continues to grow, it will be interested in importing only half of that amount. The Russian government has talked up the issue of energy trade with China in order to gain political leverage in its negotiations with the EU. Its grand designs have misled and confused the European debate, both in the media and the Foreign Ministries. In reality, however, Russia will need to work hard to keep up current export volumes, while suffering under lower price levels. Gas deliveries to China in 2020 will at best compensate for the reduction in Ukrainian imports (40 bcm in 2011 to 8 bcm in 2015). If, by 2030, supply to China makes up for losses caused by the EU's efforts towards greater energy efficiency, increasing the share provided by renewables (see Germany's *Energiewende*), intra-EU interconnectivity and import diversification, that would already count as a success for the Russian government. <

<sup>1</sup> Alexandros Petersen: "Central Asia's New Energy Giant: China", in: *The Atlantic*, 28 June 2013.

<sup>2</sup> Wang Haiyun: "Favorable Factors and Restraints in Sino-Russian Energy Cooperation", in: *Russian Studies*, 2011, No. 3, 5–9 [Chinese]; Zhou Yanli and Wang Bingyin: "Analysis of Sino-Russian Energy Relations", in: *Siberian Studies*, 2009, No. 6, 5–9 [Chinese].

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# Das andere Europa im Angesicht seiner Widersprüche

VON JACQUES RUPNIK

*Freizügigkeit war eine der großen Errungenschaften der Revolutionen des Jahres 1989. Warum sich heute ausgerechnet die osteuropäischen EU-Mitglieder dagegen sträuben, dieses Prinzip auf Nichteuropäer anzuwenden, erörtert der Historiker und Politologe Jacques Rupnik.*



Photo: Tim Lueddemann

Europa sieht sich mit einer enormen Flüchtlingsbewegung konfrontiert – der größten seit Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs und dem Beginn des Kalten Kriegs. Die neuen Migrationsrouten verlaufen just durch jene Länder Zentraleuropas, deren Bevölkerungen Freizügigkeit bis zum Mauerfall entbehren mussten. Die Frage, wie mit dieser Situation umzugehen ist, hat zu bislang ungekannten Spannungen innerhalb der Europäischen Union geführt.

Das Land, das exemplarisch für das Ende des Post 1989 Zeitalters steht, ist Ungarn. Es war das erste Land, das im Sommer 1989 zusammen mit Österreich den Eisernen Vorhang öffnete. Zehntausende DDR Flüchtlinge „stimmten mit ihren Füßen ab“ und überquerten die Grenze zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Ausgerechnet die-

ses Ungarn errichtete im Laufe des Sommers 2015 einen 175 Kilometer langen Zaun entlang der Grenze zu Serbien, um Migranten – ohne großen Erfolg – daran zu hindern,

zu schützen, brachte der serbische Außenminister Iwica Dačić die Lage auf den Punkt: „Die Balkanländer sehen sich einer Flüchtlingswelle gegenüber – einer Flüchtlingswelle

schen den Ländern des „Westbalkans“ und den mitteleuropäischen Ländern zu unterscheiden, die EU Mitglieder sind. Erstere sind sowohl Ausgangspunkt von Wirtschafts-

gleichermaßen zu schützen. Während Migranten in Serbien größtenteils freundlich empfangen und mit Nahrung oder in manchen Fällen sogar mit Zangen versorgt wurden, um den ungarischen Stacheldraht zu überwinden, stehen ihnen die Bevölkerungen Mitteleuropas deutlich feindseliger gegenüber. Das betrifft nicht nur Ungarn, wo gerade einmal 10% der Bevölkerung die Aufnahme von Asylbewerbern befürworten. Auch 80% der Slowaken sind gegen die Aufnahme von Migranten aller Art. In Polen beträgt dieser Anteil annähernd 75%. Dementsprechend haben sich sämtliche Regierungen Mitteleuropas gegen Verteilungsquoten für Flüchtlinge ausgesprochen. Polen und die Slowakei erklärten sich lediglich dazu bereit, einige Hundert Christen aus Syrien aufzunehmen. Die drei baltischen Länder akzeptierten in Sum-

*Während sich im Westen Europas ein liberales Modell multi-kultureller Gesellschaften herausbilden konnte, blieben die Gesellschaften in Osteuropa auch nach 1989 weitgehend isoliert.*

ungarisches Territorium zu betreten. Der serbische Premierminister meinte dazu kürzlich auf dem Westbalkangipfel in Wien: „Die Lösung besteht nicht darin, Mauern zu errichten. Wir sind in erster Linie ein Transitland.“ Während Ungarn behauptet, nur eine EU Außengrenze

aus der EU!“ In der Tat, die Flüchtlinge, die Serbien und Makedonien erreichen, kommen zu überwiegen den Teilen aus Griechenland, also einem Land, das Mitglied der Europäischen Union und des Schengen Raums ist.

Es ist daher angebracht, zwi-

gration, vor allem aus Albanien und dem Kosovo, als auch Transitzone für Flüchtlinge aus dem Nahen Osten, die in Richtung EU unterwegs sind (deren Zahl ist auf dieser Route im Vergleich zu 2014 um 600% gestiegen). Die mitteleuropäischen Länder versuchen sich gegen beide Gruppen



me nur etwas mehr als 700 Asylbewerber.

Daraus ergibt sich das erste Paradoxon: Jene Länder, die nach einem halben Jahrhundert der Abschottung die Freizügigkeit als die größte Errungenschaft der Revolutionen des Jahres 1989 betrachten,

nen dabei helfen, die Situation aus Sicht des „anderen Europa“ besser zu verstehen. Historisch betrachtet waren die Länder Mittel- und Osteuropas seit Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts Auswanderungs- und keine Einwanderungsländer. So sind seit 1989 mehr als 1 Million Polen, Slo-

genwart: Während sich im Westen Europas ein liberales Modell multi-kultureller Gesellschaften (mit speziellen Ausprägungen) über das letzte halbe Jahrhundert herausbilden konnte, blieben die Gesellschaften im Osten Europas auch nach 1989 weitgehend isoliert. Eine nennenswerte Migration aus dem Süden hat zumindest bis heute nicht stattgefunden. Die östlichen EU-Staaten waren ihrerseits kolonisiert worden und teilen daher nicht den postkolonialen Komplex des Westens. Vor allem aber herrscht im Osten weitgehend der Eindruck, dass das „multikulturelle“ Modell des Westens gescheitert ist. Es dient daher vielmehr als abschreckendes Beispiel. Im gesellschaftlichen und allzu oft auch im politischen und medialen Diskurs herrscht die verkürzende Sichtweise vor, dass Einwanderung aus dem Süden heute „islamisch geprägte Vorstädte“ morgen bedeutet. Wer im Namen des europäischen Humanismus an die Pflicht zur Solidarität und Aufnahme von Flüchtlingen appelliert, bekommt von Viktor Orbán zur Antwort, dass er gerade diese „europäische Zivilisation“ verteidige. Der sozialdemokratische Premier der Slowakei, Robert Fico, meinte in diesem Zusammenhang: „Die Slowakei hat keinerlei Verpflichtung. Schließlich ist sie nicht schuld an dem Chaos, das durch die Bombardierung Ghaddafis in Libyen entstanden ist.“

Die Flüchtlingsbewegungen, mit denen sich Europa gerade konfrontiert sieht, zeigt eine klare Diskrepanz: So spektakulär die Erfolge bei der Angleichung der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Systeme in Ost und West während der letzten zwanzig Jahre auch sein mögen, im Umgang mit anderen Kulturen und bei der Beurteilung gesellschaftlicher Entwicklungen gehen die Meinungen und Auffassungen stark auseinander. Die enge wirtschaftliche und politische Bindung an Deutschland, das sich für die Integration der ost- und zentraleuropäischen Länder in die EU stark gemacht hatte und nun rund 800.000 Flüchtlinge aufgenommen hat, könnte jedoch dazu beitragen, dass diese ihre Haltung in der Flüchtlingsthematik überdenken. Das klare Bekenntnis von Kanzlerin Merkel, Flüchtlinge offen aufzunehmen und Solidarität innerhalb der EU einzufordern, werden auf die politischen Eliten der benachbarten Länder nicht ohne Auswirkung bleiben.

Andererseits haben die Spannungen angesichts der Flüchtlingswelle aus dem Süden auch Auswirkungen auf die Reise- und Niederlassungsfreiheit von Osteuropäern innerhalb der EU. Das ist vor allem in Großbritannien zu beobachten, wo neben der Forderung, die Einreise von Nicht-EU-Bürgern aus dem Süden zu beschränken, gleichzeitig auch über Restriktionen im freien Per-

sonenverkehr aus den osteuropäischen Mitgliedsländern diskutiert wird. Die EU wird sich gerade bewusst, dass eine kohärente Migrationspolitik notwendigerweise auch den Raum zwischen Griechenland und Ungarn, also die Westbalkanländer, umfassen muss. Zur Integration dieser „Zwischenregion“ werden weitere Schritte notwendig sein.

Der letzte, wenn nicht sogar wichtigste Faktor ist jedoch die Instabilität rund um Europa. Nicht nur im Süden, sondern auch im Osten der EU – Stichwort Ukraine-Krise – drohen ganze Regionen in sich zusammenzufallen und weitere Flüchtlingsbewegungen auszulösen. Wenn die Länder Zentraleuropas Wert darauf legen, dass Europa sich weiterhin gegen die Bedrohungen aus der östlichen Nachbarschaft engagiert, werden sie akzeptieren müssen, auch die Herausforderungen aus dem Süden gemeinsam zu bewältigen. <

Haben wir es heute mit Amnesie oder einer Vorstellung von Solidarität zu tun, die an den Grenzen Europas endet?

weigern sich nun, dieses Prinzip auf Nichteuropäer anzuwenden. Nachdem sie zwanzig Jahre lang begeisterte Globalisierungsanhänger waren (der Slogan der tschechischen EU-Präsidentschaft im Jahre 2009 lautete „Ein Europa ohne Barrieren“), plädieren sie heute für „Ein Europa, das schützt“ (so der Slogan der französischen EU-Präsidentschaft im Jahre 2008).

Zweites Paradoxon: Die einst von Moskau unterdrückten demokratischen Erhebungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa haben damals ebenfalls Flüchtlingswellen hervorgerufen. Mehr als 200.000 Ungarn, die im November 1956 vor den sowjetischen Panzern geflohen sind, haben zunächst in Österreich und dann im

waken und Balten nach Großbritannien und in die nordeuropäischen Länder ausgewandert. Aus Rumänien und Bulgarien sind zirka 15% der Bevölkerung in die südlichen EU Mitgliedsländer emigriert. Vor allem aber haben diese Nationen auf den Trümmern von Vielvölker-Imperien (dem Habsburger-Reich, dem Osmanischen Reich oder dem russischen Zarenreich) Nationalstaaten errichtet, die eigentlich keine waren.

Die Vernichtung der Juden durch Hitlerdeutschland und die Vertreibung der Deutschen unter Stalin hatten zur Folge, dass sich das „ethnische Puzzle“, in Mitteleuropa der Nachkriegszeit vereinfacht hatte: Aus Polen und der Tschechischen Republik wurden homogene Na-

Die EU wird sich gerade bewusst, dass eine kohärente Migrationspolitik auch die Westbalkanländer umfassen muss.

übrigen Europa Aufnahme gefunden, ohne dass es nennenswerten Widerstand gegeben hätte. Dasselbe gilt für tschechische und slowakische Staatsbürger nach dem Einmarsch der Truppen des Warschauer Pakts im August 1968, oder für Polen nach 1981, zur Zeit der Repressionen gegen die Gewerkschaftsbewegung *Solidarność*. Was ist seither passiert? Haben wir es heute mit einer Amnesie oder einer Vorstellung von Solidarität zu tun, die an den Grenzen Europas endet?

Zwei Erklärungsansätze kön-

tionalstaaten. Westeuropa hingegen durchlief seit den 1960er-Jahren – nicht zuletzt aufgrund seines postkolonialen Erbes und der Wirtschaftsmigration aus den südlichen Mittelmeerländern – einen gewissen Wandlungsprozess. Während man hier versuchte, Neuankömmlinge zu integrieren, blieb in Mittel- und Osteuropa das alte Problem im Umgang mit den nationalen Minderheiten bestehen.

Dieser historische Hintergrund ist eine mögliche Erklärung für die unterschiedlichen Positionen der Ge-

# Russland Nacheuropa Religion

Mit Beiträgen von Alexander Agadjanian, Ludger Hagedorn, Pantelis Kalaitzidis, Vasilios N. Makrides, Jakub Majmurek, David Martin, Krzysztof Michalski, Karl Schlögel, Victor Shnirelman, Sławomir Sierakowski, Kristina Stoeckl, Olga Tokarczuk, Nicolas de Warren, Anna Zvyagintseva



**Russland Nacheuropa Religion**  
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## Refugee Crisis in Focus

The current refugee crisis turned out to be a major test not only for the institutions of the European Union, but also for the European consciousness. Thousands of people arriving at EU borders every day provoked questions at multiple levels—from personal to geopolitical. In order to make sense of quickly unfolding events and analyse aspects of the crisis that most media tend to overlook, Paweł Marczewski, IWM's head of publications, launched a series of articles in *Transit Online*, inviting scholars and commentators affiliated with the IWM to provide some answers. Below we present a selection of five articles from an ongoing series which show a variety of perspectives proposed by contributors: [www.iwm.at/transit-online](http://www.iwm.at/transit-online)

### Central Europe and the Refugees

André Liebich



Viktor Orbán, who has styled himself as the defender of Europe's "Christian civilization" against an Islamic invasion, has encouraged other eastern European governments to follow his example in violating EU norms. If Hungarians ultimately opt for an illiberal democracy, as Prime Minister Viktor Orbán publicly advocated over a year ago, they must accept certain consequences. These include parting from the European Union and the wider community of liberal democracies.

### Where Do We Want the EU's Borders to Lie?

Luiza Bialasiewicz



The centres and camps that already exist at Europe's borders (and those being proposed) are not simply de-territorialized, exceptional, 'waiting spaces' where European rights do not (yet) apply. They are rather sites that are crucial to the sorting and organization of the right to European rights, through a principle of differentiated inclusion. Access to the right to asylum is thus no longer regulated through physical presence on national territory, but determined in geographically-dispersed locations.

### Syrian Origins of the Refugee Crisis: The Cost of No Policy?

Adam Baczko



Europe's to Syria means it now has to deal with the refugees. This could have been anticipated in 2013, yet European countries choose to ignore it time and time again. More gravely, by taking a marginal role in the crisis, Europe has let Turkey, the Gulf states, Iran, Hezbollah and Russia determine Syria's future. It has allowed the most liberal and moderate-minded rebels to be excluded from Syrian politics.

### The Refugee Crisis that Europe Solved

Sara Silverstein



The refugee crisis in Europe after the Second World War was far worse than the EU faces today, but a successful structure arose in 1945 because the world assumed it could solve the refugee problem. Today, we accept refugees as a permanent consequence of modern global affairs and respond to each individual crisis without looking for long-term solutions.

### Hungary's Response to the Refugee Crisis: An Orchestrated Panic

Akos Rona-Tas



Why is Hungary, the first communist country to dismantle the Iron Curtain, now busy building a fence in order to keep refugees out? The answer is: domestic politics.

Photos: sadilguec / iStock, Radek Procyk, Adrian Hancu, Claudia Dewald, stockmouse

NO. 116 • FALL / WINTER 2015



# Diasporic Terrorism

REPORT BY VERONIKA PEHE

On April 8, Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman delivered the Jan Patočka Memorial Lecture 2015 in the Wien Museum focusing on diasporization, the need for dialogue and the fear of being proven wrong.




Photo: Klaus Ranger

The proximity of strangers breeds terror—so the opening statement of Zygmunt Bauman's lecture who himself was forced to exile twice: In 1939 he fled the advancing German troops to the Soviet Union and in 1968 he left Poland due to the anti-semitic campaign of that time. Diasporic terror, to which he referred in his lecture, can take the form of actual acts of terrorism, committed by individuals who feel themselves to be 'in a place but not of a place'. Easy access to arms and media interest in terrorist acts coalesce to create, according to Bauman, a strong temptation to enter history through atrocity (the lecture took place just months after the attack on the offices of the French satirical magazine *Charlie*

*Hebdo*). Such terrorist acts, however, are in Bauman's view part of the risk we take when living in modern societies.

## A Strange Kind of Terror

The proximity of strangers arises out of the phenomenon of diasporization, which in Bauman's definition involves groups of people resettling in new countries but not relinquishing their original identity. This is a new development in comparison to migration, which has always been a part of human life. Traditionally, migrants tended to integrate into their host society, whereas today, Bauman argues, there is less pressure on them to surrender their own identity and this breeds a new kind of terror.

The stranger who does not wish to assimilate, according to Bauman, presents an uneasy and ambivalent category that sits between the familiar poles of friend and enemy. Strangers provoke feelings of uncertainty, as they disrupt sedentary societies like those of contemporary Europe. In a debate at the *Republikanischer Club* held two days after his lecture at the Wien Museum, Bauman noted that this uncertainty is heightened by the experience of the fragmentation of time, where we perceive our lives in episodes—a condition that Bauman calls 'pointillist time'—but can no

longer envision a clear future. The fragmentation of time however prevents reflection, which according to Bauman is not like 'instant coffee'—conversely, it takes time which modern life does not provide.

Modern life is a 'factory for redundant people', i.e. individuals who find themselves without a place in society and who threaten the security of a settled life that contemporary Western societies value. In Bauman's words, migrants are 'walking dystopias' who put terror into our hearts because they remind us of our own precariousness. Together with a feeling of political impotence, this forms one of the central frustrations of our times. Baumann used one of his well-known metaphors to liken the modern condition to an airplane

without a pilot attempting to land at an airport which is still in the process of construction. Furthermore, as Bauman pointed out, what distinguishes the experience of the current younger generation is that, for the first time since World War II, many of its members will not reach the standard of living enjoyed by their parents. However, a class that is no longer able to reproduce itself ceases to function as a class and becomes a category—in this case the category of the precariat. According to Bauman, the fears of an uncertain future created by our condition of precariousness find their focus in the figure of the migrant or stranger. For this reason, anti-immigration rhetoric is gaining so much currency at present: migrants as the walking embodiments of our fears remind us that if it could happen to them, it could happen to us, too.

## Modest Solutions for Uncertain Times

Multiculturalism has been seen as one possible response to the challenges of diasporization. However, according to Bauman, it is a mere cosmetic solution, in which people seemingly engage with other cultures (for instance, by enjoying foreign cuisines) but do not really engage in an in-depth dialogue with the other. Bauman sees gated com-

munities as the embodiment of this phenomenon. Rather than increasing (feelings of) security, however, such measures only increase the terror of the stranger as people lose the ability to deal with those who may have different views and backgrounds to their own. Such distancing mechanisms perhaps offer temporary respite, but no long-term solutions. On top of this, they have the unfortunate consequence that nations which were until recently convinced of the need of a common European project are now being swayed by what Bauman called the 'primitive demagoguery' of anti-immigration nationalism. At the *Republikanische Club*, Bauman similarly criticized the concept of tolerance as essentially a pronouncement of indifference; it allows people of different cultures merely to live side-by-side, without taking any interest in each other. Bauman therefor argued that we need to go beyond tolerance towards solidarity.

The solution that Bauman proposed is a modest one—not novel, but necessary: we need to engage in serious dialogue. To illustrate how such dialogue might be conducted, Bauman offered the example of Pope Francis, who gave his first interview as pope to an openly anti-clerical newspaper. Only willingness to cooperate is the way to resolving some of the problems of diaspora's terrors. Indeed, the condition of multiculturalism in which we live would seem to create fertile ground for such dialogue. With migrants no longer expected to integrate into their host society, there is a multi-directional dynamic at play: newcomers and locals are no longer neatly divided into givers and takers, but are instead engaged in exchange. This, however, is a situation for which our societies are unprepared. The prospect of living constantly with difference, taking on the role of both teacher and disciple, brings with it the risk of being proven wrong. It is only by taking on this risk that we can begin to overcome the terror that the figure of the stranger awakens in us. <

**Zygmunt Bauman**, Professor Emeritus of Sociology at the University of Leeds, is regarded as one of the most influential, critical theorists of the present. His publications comprise more than 40 books including: *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989), *Intimations of Postmodernity* (1990), *Postmodern Ethics* (1993), *Liquid Modernity* (2000), *Society Under Siege* (2002), *44 Letters from a Liquid Modern World* (2010) and *Collateral Damage* (2011).

**Veronika Pehe** is a PhD candidate in Cultural Studies at the University College London. From January to June 2015, she was a Jan Patočka Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM, generously supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic.

## Jan Patočka Memorial Lectures

Since its foundation in 1982, the IWM has promoted the work of Czech philosopher and human rights activist Jan Patočka (1907–1977). Since 1987, the Institute regularly organizes lectures in his memory, a selection of which has been published in German by Passagen Verlag, Vienna. Previous speakers include Jürgen Osterhammel (2014), Nancy Fraser (2013), Martin Walser (2012), Pierre Rosanvallon (2011), Claus Offe (2010).

## Events with Zygmunt Bauman

in cooperation with the IWM in Vienna 2015:

**April 8, Wien Museum**  
*Diasporic Terrorism*, Jan Patočka Memorial Lecture 2015

**April 9, Kreisky Forum**  
*The Fate of Enlightenment in the Era of Diasporisation*

**April 10, Republikanischer Club – Neues Österreich**  
Debate with Zygmunt Bauman



# Events in Retrospect 01–06 2015

## January

January 11



### The Return of Geopolitics in Europe

Venue: Burgtheater, Vienna

**Carl Bildt**

Former Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden

**Ivan Krastev**

IWM Permanent Fellow; Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

**Fyodor Lukyanov**

Editor-in-chief, *Russia in Global Affairs*

**Ana Palacio**

Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain

**Alexandra Förderl-Schmid** (Chair)

Editor-in-chief, *Der Standard*

Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

January 14



### The Depoliticization of Religion and the Nature of European Integration

**Michał Maciej Matlak**

PhD candidate in Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Florence

January 15



### After the Fall of the Berlin Wall: New Tensions between North and South in Europe—and New Opportunities

**Wolf Lepenies**

Professor of Sociology, Permanent Fellow (em.), Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin

January 19



### War and Peace in Ukraine

**Katya Gorchinskaya**

Managing Editor for Investigative Programming, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (REF/RL), Kiev

**Fredrik Löjdquist**

Ambassador, Swedish OSCE Delegation, Vienna

January 21



### Russian Nationalism and the Russian Orthodox Church in South-East Ukraine

**Nikolay Mitrokhin**

Academic Researcher, Research Centre for East European Studies, Berlin

January 22



### Die metaphysische Bewegung: Das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Politik: Rancière, Platon

**Sandra Lehmann**

Assistentin, Fachbereich für Philosophie, Katholisch-Theologische Privatuniversität, Linz

**Ruth Sonderegger**

Professorin für Philosophie und ästhetische Theorie, Akademie der bildenden Künste, Wien

January 27



### What Is in Store for the “Siberian Movement?”

**Stanislav Zakharkin**

Post-graduate student of Sociology, Novosibirsk State Technical University

January 28



### Eine Enklave in Jerusalem: Der Skopusberg 1948–1967

**Yfaat Weiss**

Professor of Jewish History, Department of the History of the Jewish People and Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

## February

February 11



### The Concept of Rational Civilization: Reading Patočka in the Framework of Civilizational Analysis

**Jakub Homolka**

PhD candidate in Sociology, Charles University, Prague

February 12



### ‘The Captive Mind’ of the Anticommunists

**Stawomir Sierakowski**

Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Warsaw; Founder, Krytyka Polityczna

February 17



### Engendering Democracy in Turkey? Participation and Inclusion of Women’s Civil Society Organizations under AKP Rule

**Huercan Asli Aksoy**

PhD candidate in Political Science, University of Tübingen

February 18



### “We were stupid”: Self-Criticism in Post-Communist Times

**Magdalena Nowicka**

Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Łódź

February 19



### Malraux’s Quest: Fraternity and the Death of Humanism in the First World War

**Nicolas de Warren**

Professor of Philosophy, Husserl Archives, Catholic University Leuven

February 20



### Gutes Leben für alle – Kongress zum Neudenken von Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Politik

Ort: Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien

In Kooperation mit der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien

February 23



### Phänomenologie und Religion in der Sowjetunion: Leben und Werk Vladimir V. Bibikhins

**Vera Ammer**

Freiberufliche Übersetzerin, Euskirchen

**Vladimir Bliznekov**

Philosoph, Religionswissenschaftler, Jurist und Autor

**Ludger Hagedorn**

Head, Patočka Archive and Program, IWM

**Sebastian Lederle**

Externer Lehrbeauftragter, Institut für Philosophie, Universität Wien

**Alexander Michailowski**

Ao. Professor, National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moskau

**Kristina Stoeckl** (Moderation)

IWM Research Director; ÖAW APART-Fellow, Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien

February 26



### Why are Today’s Social Protests not Turning into Social Movements? From Havel to Žižek and back

**Stawomir Sierakowski**

Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Warsaw; Founder, Krytyka Polityczna

## March

March 3



### Entrechtung und Verrechtlichung: Entpolitisierung der Demokratie?

Ort: Festsaal, Rathaus, Vienna

**Shalini Randeria**

IWM Rektorin; Professorin für Sozialanthropologie und Soziologie, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Genf (siehe IWMpost 115)

March 4



### How Free Are the Media in Hungary? Thoughts About the New Media Landscape

**Judit Klein**

Freelance journalist, Pécs

March 5



### Russian Nationalism in the Late Soviet Union and Its Critics

**Alexander Michailowski**

Associate Professor, National Research University–Higher School of Economics, Moscow

March 10



### 25 Years of Democratic Freedom—What Is Left from Charter 77 and the Velvet Revolution?

**Martin Cajthaml**

Lecturer in Philosophy and Patrology, Theologic Faculty, Palacký University, Olomouc

**Jakub Homolka**

PhD candidate in Sociology, Charles University, Prague

**Veronika Pehe**

PhD candidate in Cultural Studies, University College London

**Ludger Hagedorn** (Chair)

Head, Patočka Archive and Program, IWM

March 11

### Russia against Anti-Christ—The Believers’ Fears, the Age of Aquarius and Conspiracy Theories

**Victor Shnirelman**

Chief Researcher, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow



# Events in Retrospect 01–06 2015

## March

March 12



### Democracy, the Internet and Transparency

Venue: Old University Library, Warsaw  
**Ivan Krastev**  
 IWM Permanent Fellow; Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia  
**Evgeny Morozov**  
 Expert in the field of internet and democracy (*The Net Delusion*)  
**Katarzyna Szymielewicz**  
 President, Panoptikon Foundation; Vice-President, European Digital Rights  
**Aleksander Tarkowski**  
 Director, Digital Center Project: Poland; coordinator, *Creative Commons Poland*  
**Marcin Król** (Chair)  
 Professor of History of Ideas; Dean, Faculty of Applied Sciences, University of Warsaw  
**Shalini Randeria** (Chair)  
 IWM Rector; Professor of Social Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute, Geneva  
 (see p. 17)

March 12/13



### HERODOT: Zeitkarten als Werkzeug der Geschichtswissenschaft

**Hans Rudolf Behrendt**  
 Mathematiker, Softwareentwickler; Teilhaber, Büro W GmbH  
**Thomas Burch**  
 Informatiker; Teilhaber, Büro W GmbH  
**Simon Kleiner**  
 Geologe, Belgien  
**Martin Weinmann**  
 Philosoph; Teilhaber, Büro W GmbH

March 15



### How Much Transparency Does Democracy Need?

**Júlia Király**  
 Head of Department, International Business School Budapest; Former Deputy Governor, Central Bank of Hungary  
**Evgeny Morozov**  
 Expert in the field of internet and democracy (*The Net Delusion*)  
**Aruna Roy**  
 Indian social activist fighting against corruption  
**Max Schrems**  
 Austrian lawyer and privacy activist; founder, *Europe versus Facebook* group  
**Shalini Randeria** (Chair)  
 IWM Rector; Professor of Social Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute, Geneva  
 (see IWMpost 115, p. 9–10)  
 Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

March 17



### Practices of the Self and Spiritual Practices: Michel Foucault and the Eastern Christian Discourse

**Sergey S. Horujy**  
 Professor of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow  
**Michael Staudigl**  
 Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Vienna  
**Arpad Szakolczai**  
 Professor of Sociology, University College Cork  
**Kristina Stoeckl** (Chair)  
 IWM Research Director; ÖAW APART-Fellow, Political Science Department, University of Vienna

March 18



### Sowing the Seeds of Hate—The Antisemitism of the Orthodox Church in Interwar Romania

**Ionut-Florin Biliuta**  
 PhD candidate in Theology, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca

March 19



### Kapitalismus ist nicht demokratisch und Demokratie nicht kapitalistisch – Krisen und Chancen

**Jürgen Kocka**  
 Professor em. für historische Sozialwissenschaften, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin; Vizepräsident, Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften

March 23



### Burnout – Das gesellschaftliche Leid der Erschöpfung

**Sighard Neckel**  
 Professor für Soziologie, Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/Main

March 24



### Was bleibt vom Mythos Galizien?

**Jurko Prochasko**  
 Ukrainischer Autor, Übersetzer und Psychoanalytiker  
**Martin Pollack**  
 Autor und Übersetzer, Wien

March 25



### Contesting Slavery—Toward an Entangled History of Eastern European “Backwardness”

**Paweł Marczewski**  
 Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Warsaw

March 26



### The Perils of Moralism: Russian Orthodoxy and Russian Politics

**Alexander Agadjanian**  
 Professor of Religious Studies, Russian State University for Humanities, Moscow  
**Konstantin Mikhailov**  
 Lecturer in Religious Studies, Russian State University for the Humanities; Moscow  
**Kristina Stoeckl**  
 IWM Research Director; ÖAW APART-Fellow, Political Science Department, University of Vienna  
**Dmitry Uzaner**  
 Associate Professor, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow

March 27



### Eurasianism: Evolution and Relevance

Generously supported by Open Society Foundations.

## April

April 8



### Diasporic Terrorism

**Zygmunt Bauman**  
 Professor em. of Sociology, University of Leeds (see p. 13)  
 Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

April 9



### The Crisis of European Values and Democracy

**Aleksandra Jasińska-Kania**  
 Professor em. of Sociology, University of Warsaw

April 15



### Cossack Officials in Sloboda Ukraine: From Local Elite to Imperial Nobility?

**Svitlana Potapenko**  
 Senior Researcher, M. Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv

April 15



### And Europe Will Be Stunned

**Yael Bartana**  
 Israeli artist, Amsterdam, Tel Aviv and Berlin  
**Sławomir Sierakowski**  
 Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Warsaw; Founder, *Krytyka Polityczna*  
**Friedemann Derschmidt** (Chair)  
 Viennese artist and filmmaker

April 16–18



### EURIAS 2015 Annual Meeting—NetIAS Annual Business Meeting

April 20

### Understanding the Rise of the Islamic State

**Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou**  
 Deputy Director and Academic Dean, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Adjunct Professor, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

April 22



### Is Democracy in Decline?

**Marc Plattner**  
 Editor, *Journal of Democracy*; Vice-President for Research and Studies, National Endowment for Democracy; Co-Chair, Research Council, International Forum for Democratic Studies, Washington

April 24–26



### Between Bukharin and Balcerowicz: The History of Economic Thought Under Communism

Keynote Speech: *The Political Economy of Making an Authoritarian Constitution: The Case of China*  
**Chenggang Xu**  
 Quoin Professor of Economic Development, University of Hong Kong

April 26



### Der Wiener Kongress und die Folgen

**Johannes Hahn**  
 EU-Kommissar für Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik  
**Adam Krzeminski**  
 Polisher Journalist, Publizist  
**Sebastian Kurz**  
 Österreichischer Bundesminister für Europa, Integration und Äußeres  
**Hazel Rosenstrauch**  
 Englisch-österreichische Kulturwissenschaftlerin  
**Heinrich August Winkler**  
 Professor für Neueste Geschichte, Humboldt-Universität, Berlin  
**Alexandra Förderl-Schmid** (Moderation)  
 Chefredakteurin, *Der Standard*  
 Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

April 29

### Do We Still Need Early Modern Political Philosophy to Describe Political Reality?

**Aleksandr Filippov**  
 Professor of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities, Moscow



Events Colorkey

Monthly Lectures

Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.

Jan Patočka Memorial Lecture

Since 1987, the Institute regularly organizes lectures in memory of the Czech philosopher and human rights activist Jan Patočka (1907–1977).

IWM Lectures in Human Sciences

This series of public lectures was launched in 2000 on the occasion of the 100<sup>th</sup> birthday of Hans Georg Gadamer, supporter of the Institute since its inception.

Russia in Global Dialogue

This series of events, supported by Open Society Foundations, aims at intensifying intellectual debate between Russia and Europe.

Debates at the Burgtheater

*Debating Europe*, organized in co-operation with the Vienna Burgtheater, ERSTE Foundation and *Der Standard*, is a matinée series of public debates.

Tischner Debates

This series of public debates in Warsaw was jointly launched by the IWM and the University of Warsaw in 2005 in memory of IWM's founding President Józef Tischner.

Political Salons

The Political Salons, jointly organized with *Die Presse* and the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance, are a discussion forum on current political and social questions.

Conferences and Workshops

The IWM frequently organizes international conferences, workshops and debates related to the Institute's research interests.

Fellows' Meeting

Each year, the IWM invites its fellows, friends and supporters to an informal meeting, featuring a lecture by a well-known friend of the Institute.

Books in Perspective

Books written or edited by fellows or related to the Institute's research fields are presented to a wider public.

Films in Perspective

Occasionally, the IWM library turns into a cinema when movies directed by fellows or related to the Institute's work are being presented and discussed.

Fellows' Seminars

In the course of the semester, Junior and Senior Visiting Fellows present their research projects in the Fellows' Seminars.

Seminars Faces of Eastern Europe

This seminar series is a forum to discuss issues connected to the economies, politics and societies of Eastern Europe in an interdisciplinary, comparative perspective.

Events in Retrospect 01–06 2015

May

May 5



**What Does it Mean to Be a Great Thinker Today?**

Slavoj Žižek  
Slovenian philosopher and cultural critic  
Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

May 6



**The Day After... Polish Society After World War II**

Marcin Zaremba  
Professor of History, University of Warsaw

May 7



**Ukraine Between Corruption and Reform**

Sergii Leshchenko  
Member, Ukrainian parliament (see p. 17)

May 12



**Russian Higher Education and Research in the 2000s**

Igor Fedyukin  
Associate Professor and Director, Center for History Sources, National Research University-Higher School of Economics, Moscow

May 13



**Putin and more**

Masha Gessen  
Russian-American journalist, author and activist

May 18



**Putins Sirenen**

Jurko Prochasko  
Ukrainischer Autor, Übersetzer und Psychoanalytiker


May 20



**Democracy Re-tweeted? Digital Media and Civic Engagement**

Maria Bakardjieva  
Professor of Communication, University of Calgary

May 26



**Beyond Autonomy and Periphery: The "Pragmatic Turn" as a Framework for Symmetrical Studies of Modernities**

Ekaterina Nemenko  
PhD candidate in Philosophy, Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg

May 27



**Brezhnev's Women: The 'Woman Question' in the Soviet Union during the 'Era of Stagnation'**

Olga Baranova  
Lecturer in Modern and Contemporary European History, Gonzaga University, Florence

May 29



**How Women Survived Post-Communism (and Didn't Laugh)**

Slavenka Drakulić  
Croatian fiction and non-fiction writer

June

June 3



**From Dissidence to Scientific Anticommunism: The Romanian Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship**

Natalia Buier  
PhD candidate in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University, Budapest

June 8



**Overregulated Government-Sources of Inefficiency in Russian State Agencies**

Ella Paneyakh  
Senior Researcher, Institute for the Rule of Law; Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Sociology, European University, St. Petersburg

June 10



**Love, Hate, Joy: Towards a Phenomenology of Affective Consciousness**

Martin Cajthaml  
Lecturer, Theologic Faculty, Palacký University, Olomouc

June 11–13



**Solidarity IX: On Distribution**

Keynote Speech: *Varieties of Inequality—What Can Be Done About Them and Why It Must Be Done*  
Claus Offe  
Professor of Political Sociology, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin; Member, IWM Academic Advisory Board; IWM Non-Resident Permanent Fellow  
Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

June 16/29



**Ukraine, Russia, and Europe, Past and Future**

Timothy Snyder  
Bird White Housum Professor of History, Yale University; IWM Permanent Fellow

June 17



**Imagining State Socialism without Communists—Post-Socialist Nostalgia in the Czech Republic**

Veronika Pehe  
PhD candidate in Cultural Studies, University College London

June 24



**Resilient Neoliberalism? Policy Responses and Innovation after the Great Recession in Europe's Periphery**

Dorothee Bohle  
Professor of Political Science, Central European University, Budapest

June 26–27



**HUNGARY 2015—Mapping the "System of National Cooperation"**

Keynote Speech: *Illiberal Democracy*  
Stephen Holmes  
Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law; Faculty co-director, Center on Law and Security, New York University (see p. 5)  
Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)



# Ukraine, Russia, and Europe, Past and Future

IWM Lectures in Human Sciences by **Timothy Snyder**, June 16/29, 2015

The crisis in Ukraine has provoked a number of unhelpful intellectual responses in Russia and the West, notably the resort to ethnic and linguistic definitions of identity and destiny. Yet the Ukrainian revolution might be seen instead as an occasion for broadening the categories of our historical understanding. In his first lecture on *Modern European History: A Glob-*

*al Framework from Eastern Experience*, Timothy Snyder thus argued that only the view from beyond the eastern border of the European project can help us to see what is historically exceptional about the European Union—and also its essential vulnerabilities. The second lecture *What Was Wrong with the Hitler-Stalin Alliance of 1939?* explained the consequences of the Molotov-

Ribbentrop pact, the agreement between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union that began the Second World War in Europe, and its rehabilitation by the Russian invasion of southern and southeastern Ukraine which involves a vision of the European future that might surprise many Europeans. <

Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

red

## Timothy Snyder

Bird White Housum Professor of History, Yale University; IWM Permanent Fellow; Author of *Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin* (2010) and *Black Earth: The Holocaust as History and Warning* (2015, see p. 26)



Photo: IWM

## Understanding the Rise of the Islamic State

Political Salon with **Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou**, April 20, 2015



Photo: IWM

## Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou

Deputy Director and Academic Dean, Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Adjunct Professor, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

## Discussants:

### Viola Raheb

Independent consultant on development cooperation and cross-cultural dialogue

### Christian Ultsch

Head of the Foreign Politics Department, *Die Presse*

In cooperation with *Die Presse* and generously supported by EVN.

More than one year after the proclamation of a 'caliphate', the Islamic State has shot at the top of international security affairs. Straddling two countries, Iraq and Syria, where it swiftly conquered large swathes of territory, the organization previously known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS) has continued to represent the primary threat to regional stability

in the Middle East and North Africa and has increased its influence towards Asia and Africa. This political salon with Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, leading international expert on new forms of transnational terrorism, discussed the accelerated rise of the IS, its roots and ambitions as well as how to combat its terror. <

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## Ukraine Between Corruption and Reform

Political Salon with **Sergii Leshchenko**, May 7, 2015



Photo: IWM

his regime's corruption. However, even after the fall of Yanukovich, oligarchs have remained powerful in Ukraine. They influence politics through puppet parties, private media assets, football teams and volunteer battalions used to protect their business interests. Therefore Leshchenko demanded measures to limit the influence of the oligarchs by launching an Anti-Corruption Bureau, building up public television and establishing the public financing of political parties. <

Video on [www.iwm.at/video](http://www.iwm.at/video)

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## Sergii Leshchenko

Member, Ukrainian parliament (Petro Poroshenko Bloc); former deputy editor-in-chief, *Ukrainska Pravda*

## Discussants:

### Carl Henrik Fredriksson

Co-founder and President, *Eurozine*

### Christian Ultsch

Head of the Foreign Politics Department, *Die Presse*

In cooperation with *Die Presse* and generously supported by EVN.

Corruption is Ukraine's main internal problem. Crony capitalism, biased media and unfair government procurement procedures are even more dangerous than the Russian aggression in the East of the country, said Sergii Leshchenko. The "Revolution of Dignity" was not only directed against Yanukovich, but also against the oligarchs who were the main beneficiaries of

## IWM Lectures in Human Sciences

Selected lectures of this event series, launched in 2000, are published in English (Harvard University Press), German (Suhrkamp Verlag) and Polish (Kurhaus Publishers). Previous speakers include: Dipesh Chakrabarty (2014), Jan-Werner Müller (2013), Peter Brown (2012), Vincent Descombes (2010)

## Political Salons

Since 2004, renowned scholars and politicians are invited to discuss questions of current political and social relevance at the IWM. Organized in cooperation with the Austrian newspaper *Die Presse* and generously supported by EVN.

## Tischner Debates

The Józef Tischner Debates, a series of public debates in Warsaw, were jointly launched by the IWM and Warsaw University in 2005. Previous panelists include: Giuliano Amato, Ralf Dahrendorf, Joschka Fischer, Bronisław Geremek, Simon Peres, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Adam Zagajewski

## Democracy, the Internet and Transparency

Tischner Debate, Warsaw, March 12, 2015



Photo: Maciej Spychal

Have Facebook and Twitter opened up new possibilities of civic self-organization? Or have they merely created the illusion of being empowered? What impact do mass

identity theft and data leaks have on democratic governments? The panelists of the 22<sup>nd</sup> Tischner Debate discussed the influence of new technologies on democratic insti-

tutions and societies worldwide as well as in Poland. <

Report by **Karolina Jesień** on [www.iwm.at/events/tischner-debates](http://www.iwm.at/events/tischner-debates)

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## Evgeny Morozov

Expert in the fields of Internet and democracy; author of *The Net Delusion* (2011) and *To Save Everything, Click Here* (2014)

## Ivan Krastev

Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia; IWM Permanent Fellow; author of *In Mistrust We Trust* (2013)

## Katarzyna Szymielewicz

President, Panoptikon Foundation; Vice-President, European Digital Rights

## Aleksander Tarkowski

Director, Digital Center Project: Poland; coordinator, Creative Commons Poland

## Chairs:

### Marcin Król

Professor of History of Ideas and Dean, Faculty of Applied Sciences, University of Warsaw

### Shalini Randeria

IWM Rector; Professor of Sociology and Social Anthropology, Graduate Institute, Geneva

The debate was jointly organized by the University of Warsaw, Kultura Liberalna, and the IWM, and generously supported by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education.



# Fellows and Guests 01–06 2015

**Alexander Agadjanian**  
*Guest (March 2015)*

Professor, Center for the Study of Religion, Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow

**Sources and Limits of Pluralism within Russian Orthodoxy: Negotiating, Accepting, Contesting**

**Huercan Asli Aksoy**  
*Junior Visiting Fellow (January–March 2015)*

PhD candidate in Political Science, University of Tübingen

**Beyond Protests and Corruption Scandals: Turkey's Democratic Future and Changing International Relations**

**Vera Ammer**  
*Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (January–March 2015)*

Freelance translator, Euskirchen

**Vladimir V. Bibikhin:**  
*Ein anderer Anfang, philosophische Aufsätze* (Russian > German)

**Maria Bakardjieva**  
*EURIAS Visiting Fellow (February–June 2015)*

Professor of Communication, University of Calgary

**The Structures of the Lifeworld Revisited: A Critical Phenomenology of the Internet**

**Olga Baranova**  
*EURIAS Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2014–June 2015)*

Lecturer in Modern and Contemporary European History, Gonzaga University, Florence

**Historiography and Politics of Memory of World War II and the Holocaust in the Soviet Union**

**Natalia Buier**  
*CEU Junior Visiting Fellow (April–June 2015)*

PhD candidate in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Central European University, Budapest

**European Visions—National Infrastructures: The Challenge of a European Railway**

**Martin Cajthaml**  
*Jan Patočka Visiting Fellow (January–June 2015)*

Lecturer of Philosophy and Patrology, Theologic Faculty, Palacký University, Olomouc

**Die Wurzeln Europas in der Reflexion der Phänomenologie**

**Paolo Costa**  
*Visiting Fellow (May–July 2015)*

Senior Researcher, Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Trento

**The Post-Secular City: Religious Pluralism, Global Consumerism, and the Future of Democracy**

**James Dodd**  
*Guest (June 2015)*

Associate Professor of Philosophy, New School for Social Research, New York

**Europe, Critique, and Religious Life. Jan Patočka's Reflections on Christianity**

**Devi Dumbadze**  
*Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (May–July 2015)*

Professor of Philosophy, School of Visual Arts, New York

**Theodor W. Adorno:**  
*Ästhetische Theorie* (German > Georgian)

**Thomas Stephan Eder**  
*Junior Visiting Fellow (May–September 2015)*

PhD candidate and Research Associate in International Law, University of Vienna

**Eurasia Re-Negotiated: Chinese Academic Discourse on International Dispute Resolution and Sovereignty**

**Igor Fedyukin**  
*Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (May 2015)*

Associate Professor and Director, Center for History Sources, National Research University-Higher School of Economics, Moscow; Former Russian Deputy Ministry of Education and Science

**Russian Higher Education and Research in the 2000s: Taking Stock of 15 Years of Modernization Efforts**

**Aleksandr Filippov**  
*Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (April–May 2015)*

Professor of Sociology, Faculty of Humanities; Head, Laboratory Centre for Fundamental Sociology, Moscow

**Do We Still Need Early Modern Political Philosophy to Describe the Political Reality?**

**Katya Gorchinskaya**  
*Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (January 2015)*

Deputy editor-in-chief, *Kyiv Post*

**Saving a Bird of Prey. A Book About Revolution**

**Jakub Homolka**  
*Jan Patočka Junior Visiting Fellow (November 2014–April 2015)*

PhD candidate in Sociology, Charles University, Prague

**Jan Patočka's Concept of "Rational Civilization"**

**Sergey S. Horujy**  
*Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (March 2015)*

Professor, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences; Director, Institute of Synergetic Anthropology, Moscow

**Nietzsche's Man and Freud's Man: Two Revolutionary Anthropologies in Modern Perspective**

**Doris Kaltenberger**  
*Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2014–February 2015)*

Doktorandin der Religionswissenschaft, Universität Wien

**Phenomenology of Religion 2.0: A Chance for a Contemporary Method in Science of Religions?**

**Adil Hasan Khan**  
*Junior Visiting Fellow (June 2015–February 2016)*

PhD candidate in International Law, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

**Temporality and Coloniality in International Legal Discourse**

**Judit Klein**  
*Milena Jesenská Visiting Fellow (January–March 2015)*

Freelance journalist, Pécs

**Where Do We Stay? The Role of Journalists in Post-Socialist Countries**

**Karla Koutková**  
*CEU Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2014–January 2015)*

PhD candidate in Political Science, Central European University, Budapest

**Politics of Informality: Navigating Statehood in (Post)Socialist Central and Eastern Europe**

**Paweł Marczewski**  
*Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2014–July 2015)*

Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Warsaw

**Enlightened Sarmatians. Polish Noble Republicanism and the Quest for Alternative Modernity**

**Michał Maciej Matlak**  
*Junior Visiting Fellow (January 2015)*

PhD candidate, Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Florence

**The (De-)Politicization of Religion and Secularism and the Process of European Integration**

**Alexander Michailowski**  
*Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (February 2015)*

Associate Professor, National Research University-Higher School of Economics, Moscow

**Russian Nationalism in the Late Soviet Union and Its Critics**

**Konstantin Mikhailov**  
*Guest (March 2015)*

Lecturer of Religious Studies, Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow

**History and the Modern Situation of the Russian Orthodox Church**

**Nikolay Mitrokhin**  
*Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (January 2015)*

Academic researcher, Research Center for East-European Studies, University of Bremen

**Russian Nationalism and the Russian Orthodox Church**

**Lidia Nádiri**  
*Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (April–June 2015)*

Freelance translator, Budapest

**Moritz Csáky:**  
*Das Gedächtnis der Städte* (German > Hungarian)

**Bulat Nazmutdinov**  
*Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (March 2015)*

Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Theory and Comparative Law, Higher School of Economics, Moscow

**Legal Aspects of Classical Eurasianism**

**Sighard Neckel**  
*Visiting Fellow (March–April 2015)*

Professor of Sociology, Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/Main

**"Refeudalization": Analyzing a Paradoxical Mode of Social Change in Present-Day Capitalist Societies**

**Ekaterina Nemenko**  
*Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow (January–June 2015)*

PhD candidate in Philosophy, Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg

**The Engagement of Modern Artists and the Circulation of the Idea of the "Left" between the USSR and Eastern Europe**

**Olga Nikolova**  
*Visiting Fellow (January–May 2015)*

Freelance translator, editor, and writer, Sofia

**Stefan Popov:**  
*Wittgenstein's Analytic of the Mystical* (Bulgarian > English)

**Magdalena Nowicka**  
*Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2014–July 2015)*

Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Łódź

**Public Acts of Self-Critique in Poland and Central Europe: From Totalitarian Regimes to Mediocracy**

**Iván Ortega Rodríguez**  
*Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (May–July 2015)*

Teaching Assistant of Philosophy, Universidad Pontificia Comillas, Madrid

**Jan Patočka:**  
*Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History* (Czech > Spanish)

**Ella Paneyakh**  
*Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (May–June 2015)*

Senior Researcher, Institute for the Rule of Law; Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Sociology, European University, St. Petersburg

**Overregulated Government—Sources of Inefficiency in Russian State Agencies**

**Gleb Pavlovsky**  
*Guest, Russia in Global Dialogue (February 2015)*

President, Center of Effective Policies; Member, Public Chamber of the Russian Federation; Editor-in-chief, *The Russian Journal*, Moscow

**Veronika Pehe**  
*Jan Patočka Junior Visiting Fellow (January–June 2015)*

PhD candidate in Cultural Studies, University College London

**Socialist Retro: Discourses of Post-Socialist Nostalgia in the Czech Republic**

**Marc Plattner**  
*Guest (April 2015)*

Editor, *Journal of Democracy*; Vice-President, Research and Studies, National Endowment for Democracy; Co-Chair, Research Council, International Forum for Democratic Studies, Washington

**Is Democracy in Decline?**

**Svitlana Potapenko**  
*Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2014–June 2015)*

Senior Researcher, M. Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Sources Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv

**The Elite of Sloboda Ukraine and Russian Empire-Building: Integration and Transformation**

**Kaloyan Pramatarov**  
*Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (January–March 2015)*

PhD candidate in Archaeology, St. Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia

**Paul Ricœur:**  
*Temps et récit. Tome I: L'intrigue et le récit historique* (French > Bulgarian)

**Jurko Prochasko**  
*Visiting Fellow (October 2014–July 2015)*

Researcher, Iwan Franko Institute, Academy of Sciences, and Institute for Psychoanalysis, Lviv

**Krieg und Mythos**

**Albena Shkodrova**  
*Milena Jesenská Visting Fellow (April–June 2015)*

Editor-in-chief, *Bacchus Magazine*; freelance writer, *Zhanet 45* Publishing House

**Kitchen Dissidents and Other Communist Gourmet Stories**

**Victor Shnirelman**  
*Alexander Herzen Visiting Fellow (January–June 2015)*

Chief Researcher, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow

**Anti-Christ is Coming: Religion and Xenophobia in Contemporary Russia**

**Marci Shore**  
*Visiting Fellow (June–July 2015)*

Associate Professor of History, Yale University

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Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Warsaw; Founder, *Krytyka Polityczna*

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**Kristina Stoeckl**  
*Visiting Fellow (February–March 2015)*

APART-Fellow, Austrian Academy of Sciences; Department of Political Sciences, University of Vienna; IWM Research Director

**Orthodox Christianity and Politics: Multiple Secularisms, Liberal Norms and Traditional Religion**

**Dmitri Uzaner**  
*Visiting Fellow (February–July 2015)*

Director, Centre for the Study of Religion and Society, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Moscow

**The Perils of Moralism: Russian Orthodoxy and Russian Politics**

**Nicolas de Warren**  
*Guest (February 2015)*

Professor of Philosophy, Husserl Archives, Catholic University Leuven

**Malraux's Quest: Fraternity and the Death of Humanism in World War I**

**Martin Weinmann**  
*Guest (February–March 2015)*

Philosoph; Teilhaber, Büro W GmbH

**HERODOT: Zeitkarten als Werkzeug der Geschichtswissenschaften**

**Yfaat Weiss**  
*EURIAS Visiting Fellow (September 2014–January 2015)*

Professor, Department History of the Jewish People and Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

**German Tradition and Jewish Knowledge: The Cultural History of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem**

**Katarzyna Wężyk**  
*Visiting Fellow (March–April 2015)*

Journalist, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, Warsaw

**Something Gender This Way Comes**

**Stanislav Zakharkin**  
*Alexander Herzen Junior Fellow (September 2014–February 2015)*

Post-graduate student of Sociology, Novosibirsk State Technical University

**Social Networks as a Tool of Developing Civil Society and Democracy in Russia**

**Marcin Zaremba**  
*Bronisław Geremek Visiting Fellow (September 2014–June 2015)*

Professor of History, University of Warsaw

**The Gierek Decade: The Social Origin of the Solidarity Revolution**

## Fellows and Guests

The IWM offers a place for research and scholarly debate across borders and disciplines. Its various fellowship programs are thus a fundamental part of the Institute's work. Each year, 50–60 Visiting Fellows and Guests—mainly from Eastern and Western Europe as well as from North America—are awarded fellowships to pursue their individual research projects at the IWM. Since its inception in 1982, the IWM has hosted more than 1,000 scholars, journalists and translators.



# The Surreal Power of the Communist Waiter

BY ALBENA SHKODROVA

*"The power of the waiter in communist Bulgaria exemplified the way that core economic concepts and social engineering distorted civic culture," writes Albena Shkodrova.*

He excelled in ruining your day. He could slam the door in your face. Or he could make you wait for hours, leave you hungry, hone his sarcasm on you. He could bring you food left by another customer, or food that wasn't what you ordered. He could overcharge you heavily. He could... and often he did. And he went unpunished, mostly.

Few roles in Eastern European communist societies were more notoriously distorted than that of the waiter. Disproportionally empowered and evading control, waiters were elevated from servants to masters through a combination of ideology, system failure and central management.

The relatively mild and fairly resilient Soviet-type regime that existed in Bulgaria between 1944 and 1989 worked hard to develop an extensive network of restaurants. Some had to provide an affordable alternative to home cooking for the millions of Bulgarians employed in state industry. Others had to cater for international tourists. Producing restaurants that would impress foreign visitors was one of the regime's goals. And indeed, communist restaurants have a firm place in the collective memory. Though perhaps not quite for the reasons intended.

Both Bulgarians' and foreigners' memories of restaurant service in communist restaurants seem to be predominantly negative.

"I don't recall any service," reflects Alexander Eppler, an American who spent several years as a music student in Bulgaria at the end of the 60s. "The waiters were just very pissed off. I was amazed. How come they don't have black eyes? Or broken noses? Because if you met someone on the street and he acted like that, there wouldn't be a long discussion."

Foreigners who visited Bulgaria around that time describe the attitude they encountered as "passive aggression", the service as "terrible", and the waiters as "nasty". They recall ordeals, misunderstandings and, above all, being ripped off. "As they said in Bulgaria back then, the date was also added to the bill," says Raymond Detrez, a Belgian who has visited Bulgaria regularly since 1972.

According to the records of the state tourist company *Balkantourist*, in 1975 the British trade unionist Arthur Scargill publicly denounced the trickery that went on in Bulgarian restaurants as criminal. Around the same time, a man threw a stone through the window of the Bulgar-



Photo: Unknown

ian Tourist Committee in London, expressing the outrage felt by many British and other European travellers. Even the censored Bulgarian press repeatedly criticized practices such as forcing customers to order the most expensive items on

distance. Unlike their predecessors, neither their income nor their jobs depended on the commercial success of their establishments. On the contrary, in an economy of persistent shortages, it was customers whose wellbeing depended on waiters and

cally obliterated from the cities and tourist areas.

The Bulgarian regime was well aware of the problem, which it shared with other Soviet-style states. The archives and press from the period document various efforts at improving

## *How come that serving in a restaurant, suddenly acquired such extraordinary powers under communism?*

the menu, adding water to alcohol, serving smaller portions, passing off cheap drinks for more expensive ones, etc. etc.

Bulgarians' recollections are just as negative, though without the amazement or bitterness. To establish a good relation with a key waiter was rule number one if you wanted to visit a certain restaurant frequently. Rule number two was to avoid irritating this waiter at any cost. While generally scorned, waiters were also seen to possess power. A good relation with them was regarded as *vruszki*, that is, part of the network of connections, crucial for making life bearable.

Why, then, did serving in a restaurant—generally a humble profession—acquire such extraordinary powers under communism?

The seeds of the problem were sown in the early years of the communist regime. By the early 50s, private restaurateurs and shop owners had been replaced by communist managers, who were appointed by a central authority and controlled from a

salesmen—on their providing one with some sub-standard product or other, or in giving one a coveted table or a decent meal.

On top of this, the transformation of service culture in Bulgaria was also a byproduct of communist social engineering. Between 1944 and 1959, the regime created a workforce for the new state industry by means of a rapid and at times coercive policy of urbanization and 'collectivization' of the country's agriculture. Social groups changed places and millions of people, new to the city and its culture, became influential participants in urban communication.

A new service style, characterized by hostility, rudeness and indifference, spread across the big cities. Friendliness came to be seen not only as a waste of time, but as an act of humiliation contrary to the communist principle of equality. No longer a requirement for keeping a job in the service sector, good service was a matter of personal choice. And while it could often still be found in villages and small towns, it was practi-

cally obliterated from the cities and tourist areas. The Bulgarian regime was well aware of the problem, which it shared with other Soviet-style states. The archives and press from the period document various efforts at improving service in restaurants. These included training, regulation and control, together with ideological appeals for enthusiasm and responsibility. The latter, unsurprisingly, were borrowed from the Soviet Union. A telling early example was the "Gusin and Voroshilov initiative". A brainchild of Soviet activists, workers were organized into taskforce groups that would run state enterprises "with excellence". The implication was that all other workers felt liberated from such an obligation. In 1953, the idea was applied in the famous Hotel Bulgaria in Sofia. Employees formed brigades for "excellent restaurant service", "exemplary washing of the porcelain", "excellent maintenance of the heating system" and "excellent handling of the laundry".

Members of the government and the Party, and even Todor Zhivkov himself, repeatedly appealed, urged, scolded, advised. But ideological pleas and regulatory patches weren't enough to correct systematic failures. Often, they only exacerbated them.

Tipping, for example. Nominal-

ly, accepting tips was illegal. But the rise in international tourism led to the notion that tips might encourage waiters to behave nicely towards their customers. The state, however, failed to devise clear regulations legalizing gratuities. Rather like other countries dealt with euthanasia, so communist Bulgaria dealt with tipping: it remained illegal but, when practiced, went unpunished.

In the communist economy, this semi-solution had a semi-effect. It benefitted waiters, who started providing good service exclusively to customers who paid hefty tips. These were mainly travellers from Western Europe, unaware of the existing ban, who were extremely generous by Bulgarian standards. Sales and restaurant personnel who worked with Westerners recall not bothering to collect their salary for months, so dramatic was the discrepancy with what they earned in tips. At the same time, customers who didn't tip heavily continued to be humiliated and abused. Waiters who didn't serve Westerners compensated by maltreating their customers in other profitable ways.

Another major contribution to communist waiters' notorious arrogance was their frequent involvement in intelligence operations, which further enabled them to avoid control and punishment. Waiters were often hired by the secret services to carry out spying operations in restaurants. Restaurant managers remember having limited powers over their staff.

All this caused the waiter's profession to be held in wide contempt. The arrogance that derived from their surreal power was generally the norm. Waiters themselves had an explanation of their own: "As long as the rich cater for the poor, it will be so." <

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# Putin's Sirens

BY JURKO PROCHASKO

*Relationships fail, friendships end, the world stops making sense. Vladimir Putin's sirens, the Kremlin's propaganda songbirds, are dividing Europe. Large parts of European societies have succumbed to their call, others reject the cacophony and refuse to be seduced. Not that the song is especially beautiful. Indeed, on closer hearing, it could even be described as ugly. At any rate, it is full of hatred. So why fall for this hatred, when it is so blatantly directed at the West? Where does it come from, this masochistic urge for self-castigation? Pleasure at being humiliated? A desire to be lied to?*

It would be wrong to see in this phenomenon the temporary aberration of an insignificant minority. Equally unhelpful is to dismiss the enthusiasm for Putin increasingly voiced in western web-commentary as the product of Kremlin-sponsored trolls. No, it isn't so easy to understand those who "understand" Putin. Of course, there's no single explanation for Putin's attraction, especially since there are important cultural and historical differences between European societies. However, we won't be able to comprehend the strange appeal of the Kremlin's propaganda if we don't seek common denominators.

Most striking is that Putin's messages are made up of contradictions. Usually, this would be seen as a major weakness in any propaganda, however in practice it proves to be its greatest virtue. Three thematic blocks need to be identified, which function only in this context. First, the unwavering glorification of greater Russia and its past, present and splendid future. Second, the damning criticism of western values and state systems (whose contrast to Russia's civilizational perfection couldn't be greater). Finally, the programmatic defamation of Ukraine—or rather, anything Ukrainian that sees itself as Ukrainian and not as just Lesser Russian.

This all happens from an artificial perspective of otherness, of non-belonging to the rotten, perfidious world of the present. This perspective lets Vladimir Putin appear to be offering disinterested system-critique. All your systems have failed, he says; all your models are out-dated, the only thing that still rules in the West is emptiness, meaninglessness. Those who have an interest in keeping this system going have conspired against the rest. These people, dear Europeans, are systematically lying to you, manipulating and exploiting you, and we Russians have seen through it. Of course, it won't be long before this doomed world sees that there is only one possible alternative if it wishes to achieve salvation. This lies in Moscow, in the Third Rome (though no one in the Kremlin can say what this alternative actually consists of). The conclusion: if your politicians systematically lie to you, if they reveal themselves as impotent and incompetent, then why should they be telling you the truth about Ukraine?

So what is going on in Ukraine? Very, very few Europeans living west of Ukraine, perhaps with the excep-



Photo: Herbert James Draper "Ulysses and the Sirens", ca. 1909; Wikimedia Commons

tion of the Poles, can answer this question. Very few know just how much the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians yearn for democracy and national sovereignty. Despite the east-west divide, very few western Europeans have tried to understand Ukrainian nationalism. The inability to say anything about Ukraine, to imagine it in any way, is compensated for by a need to talk about Ukraine—or rather, to repeat what Kremlin propaganda claims. This is the case not only for contemporary events, the apparent complexity of which many equate with incomprehensibility, but for Ukraine as a whole, including its history. This habitual incomprehension is, I think, connected to Putin's sirens. The Berlin historian and journalist Karl Schlögel was right when he said that "understanding" Putin is only possible in the context of the failure to understand Ukraine.

During the Maidan revolution, there was a brief, emotional, superficial interest in Ukraine. However, this subsided as soon as the situation got more complicated. A bitter conclusion can be drawn from western Europeans' failure over the past twenty-five years to inform them-

selves about Ukraine: that in the West, only what is powerful is important; only what has a post-imperial aura is attractive; only what is sufficiently exotic is sexy. Ukraine is none of those things. That's why people doubt whether it is a nation at all, but just a periphery of other empires, above all the Russian one. But everybody knows about Russian Culture, with a capital "C". That's what makes it possible to speak to Russians on equal terms—what makes them trustworthy.

## Western Imperialism and Anti-Americanism

This attitude has a lot to do with the West's own imperialism, which hasn't been overcome so much as repressed. Moreover, it seems to me that what's at work isn't just passive disinterest in Ukraine, but also active repression of what the Maidan revolution opened up.

Ukraine's existence wasn't the sole issue at the Maidan. A number of questions crucial to the present day were being asked: about participative democracy, civil responsibility and solidarity, the legitimacy of power, the future of post-ethnic

nations, the future of neoliberalism. However, incomprehension of Ukraine is only the context for the efficacy of Putin's propaganda, not the explanation. It appeals to the primitive in people; it promises a crystal-clear world. The hidden extremism of this worldview finds its echo on both the Left and the Right. Radicalisms attract.

Putin's anti-Americanism is another reason for his worldwide popularity. Anti-Americanism can be an expression of anti-capitalism, anti-globalism or anti-neoliberalism. However, it can also be straightforward envy of hegemonic power, which one either would like to be, or which one still would be, if only one hadn't dismantled one's own empire. Often, anti-Americanism is a guise for anti-Semitism.

The melody of Putin's sirens is composed contrapuntally. It reaches two groups of recipients, which otherwise have very little in common. One group is motivated by fear, the other by resentment. The first suffers from Stockholm syndrome and identifies with its aggressor. For this group, the main thing is that a new, even bigger war doesn't break out. The sacrifice must be limited, wheth-

er to Georgia or to Ukraine. Standards of living must not decline. The demands of the perpetrator are acknowledged as reasonable, "historical reasons" are invoked. The victim, on the other hand, is seen as a provocateur and even the object of just punishment.

Those motivated by resentment listen to Putin either out of sheer fury at their own government or because they see in him the confirmation of their own extremism and populism. Putin's loyal audience includes the supporters of the National Front in France, Jobbik in Hungary, and Golden Dawn in Greece. These are citizens unable to deal with modernity, who demand the end of the open world. The first group wants to preserve the status quo at any cost (which indeed turns out to be very high), the second wants to destroy it at all costs.

Putin's recent speech at the UN General Assembly gave renewed occasion to marvel at his rhetorical repertoire. At one moment Putin spoke as a wise, thoughtful statesman worried about world peace, at the next moment he threatened and spat venom.

The assumption underlying his speech was that the world neither knows nor wants to know Ukraine, and that therefore his learned public could be told anything at all: The Americans supported a *coup d'état*; the country is essentially anything other than civilized; however that's secondary, what's important is that together we're fighting global terrorism. This, coupled with the overwhelming desire—disguised as criticism of US hegemony—to be a world power oneself. Size is everything in this value system, the rest is irrelevant. Force beats strength.

Not only must this siren song be resisted—it must also be countered. In Greek mythology we find both routes, the first taken by Odysseus, the second by Orpheus. Open societies can't afford to close their ears. All that one can do is sing better. Singing better doesn't mean stifling propaganda with counter-propaganda. It means doing what Sigmund Freud recommended: remembering, repeating, processing. ◀

**Jurko Prochasko** is a translator, essayist and psychoanalyst. He lives in Lemberg. From October 2014 to July 2015 he was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM. This text, translated by Simon Garnett, is based on his Monthly Lecture on May 18, 2015. A German version of this essay was first published by *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on October 1, 2015.



# Foreign Agents and Undesirable Organizations

BY DMITRY DUBROVSKY

*How the Russian academic community got embroiled in the Kremlin's battle against civil society, explains Dmitry Dubrovsky, expert on human rights in Russia.*

Over the last few years, new legal tools have been created by Putin's regime in order to put Russian civil society under the state's control. The "foreign agent law" is the most known of these. Adopted in July 2012, it forces NGOs that are involved in public activity and accept international funding to register as "foreign agents". The punishment for violation of this law is a serious fine, from 300,000 to 500,000 rubles (about 4500–7500 Euro), imposed on both the leader of the organization and the organization itself. Since the law was implemented, around 84 organizations, mostly those involved in human rights advocacy, have been added to this list, including Memorial, the Center for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg, and the Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies (Saratov).

As a follow-up to the 2012 foreign agents law, the Parliament adopted new legislation in May 2015, which gives prosecutors the power to declare foreign and international organizations working in Russia "undesirable" and shut them down without a court ruling.

Now known as the "undesirable organizations law", it introduced amendments to the Russian legal code, including the Criminal Code and the Code on Administrative Offenses. The law was co-authored by members of parliament Alexander Tarnavsky of the left-wing party A Just Russia and Anton Ishchenko of the far-right nationalist LDPR. The law introduced both administrative and criminal liability for "leading" the activities of international or foreign non-governmental organizations, as well as for simply "participating" in such activity.

The resulting legal mechanism operates in this way: First, a person is fined 5,000 to 15,000 rubles (roughly 75–220 Euro) if he or she breaks the law twice in the span of a year. On the third offense, Article 284.1 of the Criminal Code foresees a punishment ranging from a hefty fine of up to 500,000 rubles (about 7500 Euro) to a prison sentence of up to six years.

In the explanatory note to the new law, the authors are quite open about the bill's intended purpose: "To prevent the activities [...] of organizations that pose a threat to the basic values of the Russian state." The National Endowment for Democracy became the first organization to be officially blacklisted by the Russian authorities. Among shortlisted organizations are the Open Society



Illustration: Propaganda Poster of the USSR

*The Kremlin uses legal mechanisms to "prove" that the US is interfering in Russia's internal affairs.*

Institute and the MacArthur Foundation. In response, the latter announced the closing of its Russian division, which had been in operation since 1992.

## Perfect instruments

With their legal ambiguity and the wide scope of possible interpretations, the foreign agents law and the undesirable organizations law are perfect instruments for the government to deal with the current situation. Indeed, these laws solve several problems confronting the regime.

First of all, by cutting the funding lifeline of Russian NGOs they allow the authorities to reinforce their control over civil society, particularly those segments that cooperate with western donors. On the heels of the pressure on "foreign agents," the undesirable organizations law in essence puts an end to civic activism sponsored from abroad. Internal sources of funding, with few exceptions, are linked to government organized non-governmental or-

ganizations (so-called GONGOs). Consequently, Russian human rights NGOs and groups have the option of either continuing their work as unregistered projects, i.e. in what then would be a legal grey zone, or simply shutting down their operations altogether.

The second aim of the laws is to nurture anti-American hysteria within the country, a powerful tool for pro-Putin mobilization. The list of "undesirable organizations" is apparently meant to serve as yet another justification for the regime's paranoia over "colour revolutions". In other words, the Kremlin uses legal mechanisms to "prove" that the US is interfering in Russia's internal affairs.

Thirdly, both laws contribute to an atmosphere of uncertainty, fear, and self-censorship. This atmosphere has been created primarily by the media, which depicts the country as being "surrounded on all fronts." The assertion of the existence of "internal enemies" that are financed by

the West is very convenient, as it allows the media to present constant proofs of the "pernicious influence of the West."

It is obvious that the undesirable organizations law will be applied selectively towards organizations that according to the authorities are working against the "basic values of the Russian state"—which by no means include human rights, free speech, and freedom of peaceful assembly and association. In fact, you don't even need to blacklist all the "usual suspects"—once they have understood the message coming from the Kremlin, they will stop or alter their activities in Russia.

## Impact on the Russian academic community

An issue which is often overlooked in Russian and Western media is the impact of these laws on the Russian academic community. Apart from the widespread manipulation of common sense, a disastrous side effect of the new legislation is the widespread manipulation of common sense and the undermining of scholarly reputation by involving academic experts in the administration of justice.

Even a brief look at the current "foreign agent" court cases allows us to identify the core issue with this legislation, namely the deliberate uncertainty of "political activity" as a legal term. An overview of these court cases by the Human Rights Resource Center (led by Maria Kanevskaya) shows that the prosecutor's office tends to treat every public activity as a political one.<sup>1</sup> In a number of cases, such as those against the Center of Independent Social Research (St. Petersburg, director Victor Voronkov) and the Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies (Saratov, director Elena Yarskaya-Smirnova) it seems that the only reason for including these academic organizations in the list of "foreign agents" is the fact that they have the word "political" in the titles of some of their research projects.

The Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies was punished for simply discussing social policy in the post-Soviet space, and the Center for Independent Social Research for an expert publication aimed at improving the impartiality of the Russian judicial system. According to the Ministry of Justice the publication engenders "negative public opinion," and "the judgments of the authors are aimed at generating

a negative public response".

One is tempted to think that the prosecutor's office just searches the Internet for NGO projects and publications containing the word "political", after which "experts" are invited to give proof that the identified educational and research activities must be considered "political activities".

Since new amendments to the foreign agents law were introduced the Ministry of Justice has held the right to identify foreign agents according to its own internal procedure, without involving the courts. Previously, proving the "political activity" of an NGO under investigation required testimony from a special expert. For this purpose the prosecutor's office used experts from academia, mainly various Russian universities.<sup>2</sup> To defend NGOs against being blacklisted as "foreign agents", the defense attorneys also invited their own scholarly experts. Thus, court hearings often turned into controversial debates which deepened the split in the Russian academic community between conservatives and liberals.

These trials, intended to prove the "political" preoccupation of NGOs shortlisted as "foreign agents", were a new phenomenon in Russian judiciary: they involved academics with a specialization in political science or political philosophy as expert witnesses. The arguments of conservative academics, who supported the prosecutor's case, were often more convincing to the court, even if their testimony sometimes fell short of professional standards and was stylistically similar to the anti-Western discourse of the yellow media, such as *Life News* or *NTV*. At the same time, in defense of the accused, a small number of liberal academics tried to counter the conservative experts' claims with rigorous scholarly arguments. They sought not only to prove the "non-political" character of the respective NGO's activities, but also questioned the legal validity of the term "political activity" itself.

Interestingly, the experts from the prosecutor's office were often affiliated in some way with the *siloviki*, representatives of the security services, mainly from the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For example, before his academic career, the political science professor Vladimir Rukinov, who currently is an Associate Professor at St. Petersburg State University, was the director of the Regional Public Foundation for Support of the Officers and Veterans of the FSB and Military Counterin-



telligence. During the trial of the Memorial Anti-Discrimination Center Professor Rukinov insisted that “objectively speaking” and from the legal perspective writing and publishing human rights monitoring reports is a form of “political activity”.

Two other professors from the same university, Aleksei Sachenko and Igor Kokorin (the latter, by the way, is an alumnus of the Tyumen Law Institute of the Ministry for Internal Affairs of Russia), who offered expert testimony at the same trial, proffered yet another argument: although there is no definition of “political activity” in the law, an NGO could be compared “by association” with a political party, and therefore any civil rights activity is per se a political one. In other words, NGOs are unavoidably political actors, and if they receive funds from abroad, they automatically must be considered “foreign agents”.

These examples demonstrate that there are academics who are ready to risk their academic reputation (if such a notion makes sense in the Russian humanities and social sciences fields today) to serve as experts in court in order to “protect Russian sovereignty” from alleged “enemies” in the West.

At the same time, liberal academics hesitate to defend NGOs in court, pointing to a trap in the legislation. According to the definition established in the foreign agents law, political activity is “the organization of political actions with the goal of influencing the decision-making process and shaping public opinion with the same intentions”. Russian political scientist Vladimir Gelman has confessed that this definition of “political activity” would force him to answer in the affirmative if asked about the political activity of an NGO because influencing politics is what any NGO is intended to do. The mission of any NGO is to improve state policy in a particular field, and therefore, according to the foreign agents law, it is a political actor by default.

Elena Belokurova, a political scientist from the European University at St. Petersburg who was involved in the defense of several NGOs in court (including opposing Professor Rukinov in the above-mentioned trial of Memorial in St. Petersburg), has put forward the follow argument: yes, NGOs have a mission to influence state policy, but they do not have the tools to interfere in decision making as their only instruments are public debate and information. Hence, in contrast to political parties, their activities cannot be part of the decision making process, which is to say, politics in the narrow sense. Although well thought out, this argument has never been accepted in court.

It must be mentioned that in a number of cases serious administrative pressure was exercised on experts which influenced the nature of their expert testimony. Quite commonly a university administration will order an employee to serve as an expert witness suggesting in advance how facts should be interpreted and what their conclusions should be. The result of this administrative pressure is sometimes contro-

versial: one of the experts, a faculty member at Herzen State Pedagogical University and former officer of the Open Society Foundation, gave expert testimony in favour of black-listing the “Freedom of Information Foundation” as a foreign agent, after which he moved to the US as a Fulbright Fellow.

Apart from the ideological conflict between liberals and conservatives in the courtroom, there is another tendency, common in cases where academics from the humanities and social sciences are involved as experts. The authors of the brochure “Caution, extremism! An analysis of legislation on counter-extremism activity and its implementation” (ironically published by one of the “foreign agents”, the Mass Media Defense Center in Voronezh) highlight the difficulties of implementing this legislation: its vagueness and inconsistencies make it difficult to rely on common sense and general knowledge. As a result, investigators not only rely on experts to evaluate the facts but also expect them to interpret unclear legal definitions. Trials of foreign agents, similar to counter-extremism cases, seem to demonstrate that passing judgment has been transferred into the hands of an expertocracy: experts don’t only interpret legal questions, de facto they formulate the accusation. Very often judges simply copy the experts’ conclusions into the court decision, sometimes even retaining the original grammatical mistakes.

It seems that a new wave of anti-Western paranoia has seriously affected the academic community in Russia, especially in the humanities and social sciences. The ideological battles between conservatives and liberals have entered the courtroom. Professional ethics in legal expertise have thus become a burning question. <

<sup>1)</sup> “Foreign Agents”: Mythical Enemies and the Real Losses of Russian Society. Analytic Report. St. Petersburg, 2015 (in Russian): [www.hrrcenter.ru/awstats/HRRRC\\_report\\_onFA-NGO-2015.pdf](http://www.hrrcenter.ru/awstats/HRRRC_report_onFA-NGO-2015.pdf)

<sup>2)</sup> After 2014 the Ministry of Justice was granted the right to identify foreign agents following its own internal procedure, without appeal to the court.

**Dmitry Dubrovsky** was Director of the Human Rights Program, St. Petersburg State University, until he recently was expelled for political reasons; he is currently a Visiting Research Scholar at the Harriman Institute, Columbia University. From July to August 2015, he was a Guest at the IWM within the Russia in Global Dialogue Program, generously supported by Open Society Foundations.

# Fabricating a Perpetual Economic Thought

BY JÁNOS MÁTYÁS KOVÁCS

*In 2014, a large group of economists and historians in eight countries of Eastern Europe and China decided to write a comparative history of economic thought under communism. Strangely enough, such a work is still lacking—a quarter of a century after 1989. The research program was conceived at the IWM, and the scholars came together in April to discuss their pilot studies.*



Illustration: diuno / clipdealer

Who reads Boris Bratskus, Oskar Lange or Tibor Liska today? The Russian scholar gave the first in-depth diagnosis of the impossibility of rational planning in a really-existing communist economy as early as 1921. The Polish economist refused Bratskus’ thesis of impossibility in 1936, and constructed a model of “market socialism” to replace the command economy without returning to capitalism. Finally, the Hungarian reformer invented the utopia of “entrepreneurial socialism” in 1965 combining *laissez faire* with a kind of basic income scheme and collective ownership. The three experts gave a large impetus to research on welfare economics, public choice, the economics of information, etc., but above all on rival economic systems in the East and the West. Whilst their ideas continue to influence many scholars and politicians, their names have been forgotten. Bratskus’ work has remained a mainstay of the economic critique of communism; the Langean para-

digm of market socialism, especially its ex-Yugoslav version of worker’s self-management, has always attracted social movements all over the world; and Liska’s quest for entrepreneurship contributed to property rights reforms throughout Eastern Europe and China during the past three decades.

Yet, the scientific discoveries of these scholars, as well as those of many dozens of their contemporaries in the former Soviet bloc do not feature in standard textbooks of economics and its history. The latter lack a vast chapter covering the evolution of collectivist economic ideas in the communist period and their dialogue with the neoclassical mainstream. Although important theories of such luminaries of economics as Friedrich Hayek and Kenneth Arrow cannot be understood disregarding the insights offered by Bratskus and Lange earlier, profound studies of the history of economic thought under communism are still missing. Today, I can surprise my students in Buda-

pest any moment by citing Liska or an even more influential Hungarian colleague of his, the former Harvard professor János Kornai who affected the research programs of a whole series of Nobel Prize winner economists of our time.

While, following the financial crisis, collectivist/interventionist ideas—ranging from the concept of a “sharing economy” and basic income, through that of special taxes on the rich, to the claim of “occupying Wall Street”—reemerge all over the globe, economics is still dominated by the “end of history”-mood of 1989. It seems as if the revolutions in Eastern Europe resulted in a final victory of private ownership and the free market, and thus the century-long debate on the rationality of “economic calculation in a socialist *Gemeinwesen*” (Ludwig Mises) was terminated.

Forgetting may be justified in the case of the tens of thousands of official textbook economists in the Soviet empire and their Western “fellow-travellers”, but it leads to an undeserved



# tuum Mobile: under Communism Revisited

downgrading of the *oeuvre* of radical reformers and dissidents as well as that of the best among those economists in the West (such as Abram Bergson, Evsey Domar and Peter Wiles) who were interested in Soviet Studies, too. Ironically, ignoring their scholarly achievements may harm the current defenders of capitalism more than its critics. Those who want to resist “new collectivism” are unlucky enough to have to do without a great many refined theoretical arguments and empirical proofs against nationalization, decommodification, price controls, self-management and the like, which the non-existent history books of economics under communism could offer. And conversely, those who favor any kind of collectivist transformation of modern capitalism, may be happy not to be reminded of the seamy side of reformism, namely, of the recurrent failures of its representatives in designing the *perpetuum mobile* of the planned economy based on some combination of collective ownership and the market.

Oblivion is perhaps the most surprising in Eastern Europe where state interventionism, even *dirigisme*, is on the rise. In a number of ex-communist countries from Russia to Hungary, i.e., in alleged strongholds of neoliberalism, banks, public utility companies, land, welfare services, etc. are being renationalized, and new public firms established. Foreign investors suffer discrimination, price controls are reintroduced, and income redistribution by the state is increasing. Where business and politics seemed separated and this separation safeguarded by the rule of law, they became intertwined again in informal ways. Both state capture and its opposite, when the government conquers business life, are fundamental features of this old-new political economy. In some countries society is ruled by a quasi-monoparty. Cronyism, kleptocracy, feudal privileges and the like are all clear signs of both surviving and nascent regimes of corruption. The apologists of these mixed regimes make use of the fact that, due to a deep lacuna in intellectual history-writing, one cannot just take a number of books off the shelf, which would evidence the disadvantages of similar attempts at hybridization in the communist past. Also, the success story of the Chinese combination of retaining the party-state while privatizing the economy suggests to many that a *perpetuum mobile* may still exist.

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The research program “*Between Bukharin and Balcerowicz. A Comparative History of Economic Thought un-*

*der Communism*” (*Triple B*) launched by the IWM in 2014 seeks to fill this lacuna. Its title indicates the time-frame of research. Prior to the October Revolution, the Bolshevik thinker Nikolai Bukharin turned his back on his professor, Eugen Böhm-Bawerk in Vienna, which marked the beginning of what proved to be a long detour from the history of Western economic thought. The end of the digression can be represented by the name of the Polish economist Leszek Balcerowicz who converted to neoclassical economics at the end of the 1980s. The program revisits economic thought in eight countries of ex-communist Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia) and in China. In each country prominent economists and their research teams prepare sizeable national monographs and take part in producing a comparative analysis. They concentrate on the evolution of economic ideas but do not tear them out of their contexts in economic, political and social/cultural history; and examine how the East-West dialogue affected economic thinking under communism while not overlooking the East-East exchange of ideas.

Besides the “high culture” of economic thought, including eminent scholars and their findings, the “mass culture” of economic knowledge (e.g., university textbooks, articles in economic newspapers, etc.) are also examined. The *Triple B* national monographs will not only include a thorough analysis of the major themes of communist political economy (ranging from state ownership, through planning to full employment) but also devote chapters to key issues in the sociology of knowledge such as the history of leading research centers, the advisory role of economists and the rules of censorship. The research methods are not confined to a “close reading” of scientific texts. They also include archival research, in-depth interviews, case studies and the like. Once the monographs are completed, the comparative volume will provide a detailed typology of the evolution of economic thought in the selected countries as well as tackle some fundamental methodological issues (e.g., periodization, origins and diffusion patterns of economic knowledge, local traditions and original discoveries, etc.). The comparison will be complemented with an anthology of “hidden treasures” of economic scholarship under communism. The research results will be published in the *Lexington Books* series of the renowned publishing house Rowman and Littlefield. (For

more information on the program, see [triple-b-project.net](http://triple-b-project.net))

*Triple B* has just passed its first, experimental phase. The national teams have completed large pilot studies covering five crucial fields of economic thought: change in concepts of ownership, scenarios of market reform, the breakthrough of mathematical economics, comparison of political economy textbooks, and the relationship between sociology and economics. The participants of the April workshop of the program (see box) discussed the results of the first research phase, and—based on the high quality of the pilot studies—decided to pub-

lish two comparative volumes on ownership and mathematization respectively. The former will trace the twists and turns of the road leading from the idealization of public ownership to a reluctant rediscovery of private property rights while the latter will show how the monopoly of verbal analysis in communist political economy was broken by the influx of mathematical models from the West without resulting in a radical turn to neoclassical economics.

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While preparing these two volumes, the national teams continue library research and interviewing

since they know that—experiencing the rapid erosion of archival materials and the passing away of key eye-witnesses—this is perhaps the last occasion on which the task of the conceptual reconstruction of economic ideas under communism can be accomplished with both empirical precision and intellectual empathy. <

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**János Mátyás Kovács** is lecturer at the Department of Economics at the Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest and Permanent Fellow at the IWM, where he is the director of the *Triple B* project.

### Methodological Workshop

## Between Bukharin and Balcerowicz: A Comparative History of Economic Thought Under Communism

### April 24–26, 2015, IWM, Vienna

#### Program

April 24, 2015

*Welcome and Introduction:*  
**János Mátyás Kovács**

**Session I: Research Proposals of Junior Researchers**

**Ivan Boldyrev**  
**Matthias Duller**  
**Jonas Flury**  
**Chris Miller**  
**András Pinkasz**  
**Dariusz Standerski**

*Keynote Speech:*  
**Chenggang Xu**  
*The Political Economy of Making an Authoritarian Constitution. The Case of China*

April 25, 2015

**Session II: Discussion of Position Papers**

*Bulgaria:* Comment by **Bogdan Murgescu**

*China:* Comments by **Phil Hanson** and **Chenggang Xu**

*Czechoslovakia:* Comment by **Oleg Ananyin**

*GDR:* Comment by **János Mátyás Kovács**

**Session III: Discussion of Position Papers II**

*Hungary:* Comment by **Julius Horváth**

*Poland:* Comment by **Jože Mencinger**

*Romania:* Comment by **Jerzy Osiatyński**

*Yugoslavia:* Comment by **Hans-Jürgen Wagener**

*Soviet Union:* Comment by **Roumen Avramov**

April 26, 2015

**Session IV: General Discussion and Future Plans**

*Introduction:*  
**Piotr Koryś**  
**György Péteri**  
**Maciej Tymiąski**

#### Participants

**Oleg Ananyin**  
Professor, Higher School of Economics, Moscow

**Roumen Avramov**  
Fellow, Centre for Advanced Study, Sofia

**Ivan Boldyrev**  
Associate Professor, Higher School of Economics, Moscow; Researcher, Witten/Herdecke University

**Matthias Duller**  
Researcher, Dept. of Sociology, University of Graz

**Jonas Flury**  
PhD candidate in History, University of Bern

**Philip Hanson**  
Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London

**Julius Horváth**  
Professor and Head, Dept. of Economics, Central European University, Budapest

**Kun Jiang**  
Lecturer, Roehampton University Business School

**Piotr Koryś**  
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**János Mátyás Kovács**  
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**Günther Krause**  
Former Professor of the History of Economic Thought, Humboldt University, Berlin

**Jože Mencinger**  
Former Rector and Professor em. of Economics, University of Ljubljana

**Chris Miller**  
Associate Director, Program in Grand Strategy, Yale University

**Bogdan Murgescu**  
Professor of History, University of Bucharest

**Jerzy Osiatyński**  
Professor of Economics, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw

**György Péteri**  
Professor of Contemporary European History, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim

**András Pinkasz**  
Graduate Student, Dept. of Philosophy and History of Science, Budapest University of Technology and Economics

**Vítězslav Sommer**  
Research Fellow, Institute for Contemporary History, Prague

**Dariusz Standerski**  
Undergraduate Student, College of Inter-Faculty Individual Studies in Humanities, University of Warsaw

**Maciej Tymiąski**  
Head, Department of Economic History, University of Warsaw

**Hans-Jürgen Wagener**  
Professor em. of Economics, Europa-University Viadrina, Frankfurt/Oder

**Chenggang Xu**  
Quinn Professor in Economic Development, School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong

*Further details about the Project:*  
[www.triple-b-project.net](http://www.triple-b-project.net)  
*Project Coordinator:*  
**Christina Pössel**, IWM



# New Program: “Ukraine in European Dialogue”

BY TIMOTHY SNYDER

*As millions of Ukrainians take risks for the sake of a European future for their country, a historic opportunity presents itself to create a platform for dialogue between Ukrainian scholars, intellectuals and activists and their counterparts in Europe and North America.*

For Ukraine, intellectual exchange with the West is crucial for the success of reform efforts and for building a modern, sovereign state governed by the rule of law. But Europe, too, has something to learn from Ukrainians, and not only lessons of civic courage, self-organization and mass volunteer movements. Ukraine is no longer a *terra incognita*; it is a source of insights into politics and civil society that might well be relevant to the European present and future. Understanding Ukraine and the nature of the current conflict with Russia is vital for the future of the European endeavour.

If the Maidan and democratic elections have brought Ukraine closer to Western institutions, now is the time to build the necessary foundations. If reforms fail, the need will be all the greater to create a long-term platform for meaningful exchange. The new project *Ukraine in European Dialogue* seeks to contribute to this exchange.

It will offer both a space for open debate, and practical help. Launched this autumn, the project is based at an institution with a unique record of building relationships that overcome barriers within Europe's intellectual divides and with a long-standing tradition of practical and intellectual solidarity with societies in transition.

In its efforts to support Ukrainian civil society and scholarship the Institute has invited numerous fellows from Ukraine in recent decades. Important Ukrainian intellectuals, including Yaroslav Hrytsak, Jurko Prochasko, Mykola Riabchuk and Oksana Zabuzhko, have come as Visiting Fellows, as well as many young scholars, translators and journalists. Additionally, in 2010 the IWM launched a program for young Ukrainian academics in the field of history; in May 2014 the conference *Ukraine: Thinking Together*, held in Kyiv, brought together intellectuals and scholars from Ukraine with their counterparts from Western Europe and the US; and the Institute's journal *Transit* has published numerous articles on and from Ukraine.

When the Institute was founded in 1982, its essential mission had to do with the deep divisions in Europe due to the Cold War. Now, from the still central and attractive site of Vienna, we consider Eastern Europe to encompass Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Turkey. The Institute is thus committed to an expansive understanding of Europe. In its thirty-year



House of Clothes, the main venue of the Kyiv Biennial



Conference “Ukraine—Thinking Together”, Kyiv, May 2014



The School of Abducted Europe: Panel “Who is afraid of Gayropa?”, October 9, 2015

history, it has served the purpose of connecting East European intellectual life with that of Western European and North American scholarly and political life. It has demonstrated the universality of the East European experience, drawn Western attention to Eastern Europe, and helped East Europeans to influence the terms of crucial academic and political debates around the world—a tradition that arises from people like Krzysztof Michalski, the founding Rector of the IWM, who believed that it was ideas that could overcome political divides; or Tony Judt, a great historian of Europe of his era and at the time head of the IWM's *Rethinking Post-War Europe* research program, who understood that the West made no sense without the East, and politics no sense without ideas.

In particular, fellows from Ukraine at the IWM have profited from the presence of colleagues visiting from leading European and North American institutions. Ukrainian colleagues also contribute to a global conversation that places internal Ukrainian questions as well as Ukrainian-Russian or Ukrainian-European relations

in a larger global perspective. Aside and apart from the valuable research that they carry out in Vienna, for example, the Ukrainians currently visiting or on staff at the Institute have all made powerful contributions to the Western discussion of events on the Maidan and the war.

The purpose of the long-term program *Ukraine in European Dialogue* is to make these activities more sustainable. It will enable us to do more in the present, and to plan for the future. The intellectual premise is that Europe has much to learn from contact with Ukrainians scholars and intellectuals, just as these have much to learn from contact with Europe. Meaningful political contacts must proceed from intellectual and cultural understanding. We believe that an exchange of the kind envisaged is an essential support to the evolution of a sovereign, rule-of-law, rights-respecting Ukraine within a vibrant, open Europe.

**The program is composed of two initiatives:**

**1<sup>st</sup>:** A series of debates, lectures and conferences under the heading,

“Ukraine in European Dialogue,” designed to enable communication between important Ukrainian thinkers and activists and European policy-makers and thinkers of influence in the aftermath of the Maidan. The debates include events to be held in Ukraine as well. The program will also offer publications arising from these initiatives, via the Institute's outlets or elsewhere.

The Institute currently runs a very successful program called *Russia in Global Dialogue*, which brings Russian scholars and intellectuals to Vienna. In the year to come we plan to organize Ukrainian-Russian discussions within this framework.

**2<sup>nd</sup>:** The creation of a new program of visiting annual scholarly fellowships.

■ A Junior Fellowship for Scholars from Ukraine in history and in the social sciences. The heart of the Institute are its junior fellowships. More than one thousand young people have been funded for stays at the Institute, many of whom have become prominent in public and intellectual life. These fellowships will be open to doctoral students and post-


docs who are Ukrainian citizens or resident in Ukraine. This allows us to continue our tradition of inviting promising young Ukrainian scholars to the Institute.

■ A Sheptytskyi Senior Fellowship for international scholars in the fields of public ethics, religion and politics. Its name is meant to remind us of the life and achievements of a European cosmopolitan with a broadly European background, a Polish family connection, a toleration that extended, during the Holocaust, to the rescue of more than one hundred Jews. Sheptytskyi's name also signals strong support for free institutions of higher education in Ukraine today, with which the Institute has many connections already.

■ Solidarity Fellowships for notable scholars from Ukraine whose scholarly and intellectual work has been disrupted by war.

As a prelude to the new project the IWM contributes to the *School of Kyiv Biennial* taking place in the Ukrainian capital from September 8 to November 1, 2015. The Biennial includes an extensive intellectual program organized into “Schools”, with the “School of Abducted Europe” being the focus of the Institute's contributions. More than 30 scholars, intellectuals and writers give lectures or seminars, engage in public conversations or participate in panel debates. Moreover, the IWM serves as one of the international “Departments” of the Biennial and organizes a number of Ukraine-related events in Vienna. <

More information here:  
[www.iwm.at/kyivbiennial](http://www.iwm.at/kyivbiennial)



The project *Ukraine in European Dialogue* is part of the IWM research focus *United Europe—Divided History* headed by **Timothy Snyder**. The project's research director is **Tatiana Zhurzhenko**. More information about the project: [www.iwm.at/research/projects/uied](http://www.iwm.at/research/projects/uied)



# Welcome to the IWM Boards

## NEW IWM BOARD MEMBERS

*The IWM is pleased to announce that several distinguished scholars and friends of the IWM have agreed to deepen their involvement with the Institute by joining its Boards.*

In May 2015, the Board of Trustees gained four new members, who have been involved in the Institute's activities for many years: **Susanne Baer**, Judge of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany and Professor of Public Law and Gender Studies at the Humboldt University of Berlin, **Timothy Garton Ash**, Professor of European Studies at Oxford University and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, **Ira Katznelson**, Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History at Columbia University and President of the Social Science Research Council, and **Ivan Vejvoda**, Senior Vice President for Programs at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

The new Board will be headed by **Helga Nowotny**, Professor em. of Social Studies of Science at the ETH Zurich and former President of the European Research Council as well as Chair of the ERA Council Forum Austria (see interview p. 28). **Annette Laborey**, Global Board Member and former Vice President of Open Society Foundations, will act as Treasurer and **Aleksander Smolar**, Chairman of the Board of Stefan Batory Foundation and co-founder of the European Council on Foreign Relations, as Vice President.

Furthermore, **Dariusz Stola**, Director of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw and Professor of History at the Institute of Political Studies at the Polish Academy of Sciences, has joined the Academic Advisory Board.

The IWM extends an equally very warm welcome to our new Non-Resident Permanent Fellows **Leon Botstein**, **Claus Offe** and **Michael Sandel** (presented below). We greatly look forward to working with them and appreciate their commitment to the IWM. <

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Photo: Klaus Lorenz

Susanne Baer



Photo: Susan Taylor

Timothy Garton Ash



Photo: Philipp Steinkeller

Ira Katznelson



Photo: German Marshall Fund of the United States

Ivan Vejvoda



Photo: Helmo Aga

Helga Nowotny



Photo: Andrew Tista / OSF

Annette Laborey



Photo: BU Photo Services

Aleksander Smolar



Photo: Magdalena Starowiejska / Muzeum POLIN

Dariusz Stola

## New Non-Resident Permanent Fellows



Photo: Steve J. Sherman

Leon Botstein



Photo: Hertie School of Governance

Claus Offe



Photo: Stephanie Mitchell / Harvard University

Michael Sandel

**L**eon Botstein has been the President of Bard College, NY since 1975, where he is also the Leon Levy Professor in the Arts and Humanities. Botstein is music director and principal conductor of the American Symphony Orchestra and artistic co-director of the acclaimed SummerScape and Bard Music festivals. Botstein is also conductor laureate of the Jerusalem Symphony Orchestra, where he served as music director from 2003 to 2011. Beyond that, he serves as the Board Chairman of the Central European University. His many books and essays on music and culture have earned him a reputation as a leading musicologist. <

**C**laus Offe was Professor of Political Sociology at the Hertie School of Governance until 2015. He has been a Fellow and Visiting Professor at the Institutes for Advanced Study in Stanford, Princeton, and the Australian National University as well as Harvard University, the University of California at Berkeley and the New School, New York. His fields of research include democratic theory, transition studies, EU integration, and welfare state and labor market studies. <


**M**ichael J. Sandel is the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of Government at Harvard University, where he has taught political philosophy since 1980. He was a Visiting Professor at the Sorbonne in Paris and delivered the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Oxford University. He served on the American President's Council on Bioethics (2002–2005), and is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His writings on justice, ethics, democracy, and markets have been translated into 27 languages. <



Books, Articles and Talks 01–06 2015

Books by Fellows and Alumni

**Timothy Snyder**  
*Black Earth. The Holocaust as History and Warning*  
New York: Tim Duggan, September 2015



*Black Earth. Der Holocaust und warum er sich wiederholen kann*  
München: C.H. Beck, Oktober 2015



In this epic history of extermination and survival, Timothy Snyder presents a new explanation of the great atrocity of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and reveals the risks that we face in the 21<sup>st</sup>. Based on new sources from Eastern Europe and forgotten testimonies from Jewish survivors, *Black Earth* recounts the mass murder of the Jews as an event that is still close to us, more comprehensible than we would like to think, and thus all the more terrifying. (see p. 3)

**Helga Nowotny**  
*The Cunning of Uncertainty*  
Cambridge: Polity, 2015



Helga Nowotny shows in her new book *The Cunning of Uncertainty*, how science thrives on the cusp of uncertainty. Research builds on what is known, but remains open to the unexpected and the non-predictable. She argues that today's societies, faced with rapid changes due to globalization, digitalization and other technological advances, can learn from science not to feel threatened by uncertainty. In-

stead, we should appreciate that the future is radically open and collude with the cunning of uncertainty and the opportunities it offers. (see p. 28)

**Aleš Debeljak**  
*Smugglers*  
Rochester: BOA, 2015




The poems in *Smugglers* move through rapid historical shifts and meditations on personal experience, exploring the depths and limits of comprehension through the people and geography of the Balkans. Ultimately, Aleš Debeljak's urban imagination creates a mosaic—intimate and historical—of a vanished people and their country.

**Sergey Horujy**  
«Улисс» в русском зеркале [“Ulysses” in a Russian Mirror]  
St. Petersburg: Azbooka, 2015



Well known as translator of James Joyce's novel *Ulysses* into Russian, Sergey Horujy has now published a book of literary criticism on the Irish novelist and his work. Consisting of 18 chapters and 3 parts, the book examines the unique poetics of “Ulysses” and refers to the Russian connection of the writer's work.

**Victor Martinovich**  
*Родина. Марк Шагал в Витебске* [Homeland. Marc Chagall in Vitebsk]  
Vilnius: EHU, 2015



This book, based on 15 years of intensive research, is the first attempt to reconstruct and comprehend the troubled relationship the famous painter Marc

Chagall had with his native town Vitebsk. Compared to previous studies, in which Chagall's years in Vitebsk are presented as a short and relatively unimportant episode in his life, Martinovich argues that exactly this traumatic experience had a huge impact on Chagall's artistic style.

**Mykola Riabchuk**  
*Ukraina. Syndrom postkolonialny* [Polish revised and updated edition of the Ukrainian book *Postcolonial Syndrome*]  
Wrocław: Kolegium Europy Wschodniej, 2015



The undeclared Russo-Ukrainian war brought to the fore not only the complex relations between the two nations but also their internal problems related primarily to the unsettled identity issues. This collection of essays discusses various aspects of Ukraine's postcolonial condition and challenges of the modern nation-state building.

**Renate Zöllner**  
*Was ist eigentlich Heimat? Annäherung an ein Gefühl*  
Berlin: Christoph Links, 2015



Immer mehr Menschen verlassen ihre Heimat: aus politischen Gründen, aus wirtschaftlicher Not, für die Arbeit oder für die Liebe. Ihre Hoffnungen und Erwartungen an das neue Zuhause tragen sie mit sich. Wie gestalten sich die Wege zwischen Verlust und Neuanfang? Was macht es mit Menschen, wenn sie ihre Heimat aufgeben müssen? Davon erzählen Heimatlose, Heimatsuchende und Heimatexperten in diesem Buch.

Paul Celan Translation Program

**Thomas Piketty**  
*Capital au XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle* [Kapital v 21. Stoletju]  
Translated by **Vesna Velkovich Bukilica** (French > Slovenian)  
Ljubljana: Mladinska knjiga, 2015



This seminal book, one of the most influential works on political economy in recent history, aims to enable a more democratic and better informed public debate on socio-economic policies while providing a comprehensive overview of the history of wealth distribution and inequalities.

Transit – Europäische Revue Heft 47 Russland Nacheuropa Religion



Die seit 1990 am IWM herausgegebene Zeitschrift *Transit – Europäische Revue* erscheint zwei Mal jährlich im Verlag Neue Kritik in Frankfurt am Main.

**Karl Schlögel**  
*Museumswelten im Umbruch*  
Russische Museen nach dem Ende der Sowjetunion

**Ludger Hagedorn**  
*Europa da Capo al Fine*  
Jan Patočkas nacheuropäische Reflexionen

**Nicolas de Warren**  
*Deutsche Philosophen im Ersten Weltkrieg*  
Der Fall Edmund Husserl

**Anna Zvyagintseva**  
*Event(gap)*, 2014  
Photoessay

**Orthodoxes Christentum und (Post-)Moderne**

**Kristina Stoeckl**  
(Gastherausgeberin)  
*Einleitung*

**Vasilios N. Makrides**  
*Östliches orthodoxes Christentum und Säkularität*  
Ein Vergleich mit dem lateinischen Christentum

**Pantelis Kalaitzidis**  
*Orthodoxie und Moderne*

**Alexander Agadjanian**  
*Neue Formen der östlichen Orthodoxie*

**Wozu braucht die Philosophie Religion? Krzysztof Michalski** im Gespräch mit **Jakub Majmurek**

**David Martin**  
*Christentum und Gewalt*

**Victor Shnirelman**  
*Russland und die Apokalypse*  
Zwischen Eschatologie, Esoterik und Verschwörungsglaube

**Polen von einer anderen Seite**

**Olga Tokarczuk** im Gespräch mit **Stawomir Sierakowski**

**Olga Tokarczuk**  
*Das Buch des Sands*  
Aus den Büchern Jakob

Selected Articles and Talks by Fellows and Guests

**Maria Bakardjieva**  
“Rationalizing Sociality: An Unfinished Script for Socialbots”, in: *The Information Society: An International Journal*, Vol. 31, No. 3, 2015.

“Do Clouds Have Politics? Collective Actors in Social Media Land”, in: *Information, Communication & Society, Special Issue: Social Media and Protest Identities*, Vol. 18, No. 8, 2015.

“Intersubjectivity Across Media”, Conference *Users Across Media*, University of Copenhagen, May 6–8, 2015.

“Protest as Practice: Investigating Emerging Practices of Democratic Participation in Canada” (with D. Dumitrica), Conference *Protest Participation in Variable Communication Ecologies*, Alghero, June 24–27, 2015.

**Martin Cajthaml**  
„Sorge um Europas Seele“, in: *Die Tagespost*, 2. Februar 2015.

“The Crisis of Means Without Ends: Two Forms of Rationality in the Foundations of Europe”, *Open Democracy*, March 25, 2015.

„Warum pflegen die Christen ihre Seele anders als Sokrates und Plato?“, Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Heiligenkreuz Benedikt XVI., 19. Januar 2015.

“Knowing Values Through Emotions? Kant, Brentano, and von Hildebrand”, Conference *Ethical Values and Emotions*, Olomouc, May 30, 2015.

**Paolo Costa**  
“Spirituality for Atheists. What Remains When Faith is Given Up” [Italian Translation of A. Comte-Sponville’ *L’Esprit de l’athéisme* with an introduction], Bologna: EDB, 2015.

“Realism, Relativism and Pluralism: An Impossible Marriage?“, in: *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Vol. 41, No. 4–5, 2015.

“Where Does Our Understanding of Life Come From? The Riddle About Recognizing Living Things”, in: *PPI—Philosophy and Public Issues*, 2, 2015.

“The Endless City: The Ideal of Urbanity in the Secular Age” [in Italian], in: M. Mariani, A. Bondolfi (eds.): *Dio uomini e città*, Bologna: EDB, 2015.

“Periodizing History: Arbitrary Choices, Pragmatic Constraints, and Realistic Intuitions” [in Italian], in: A. Minelli (ed.): *Descrivere e interpretare il vivente: le unità del discorso*, Roma: Armando, 2015.

“When Does Counter-Democracy Develop into Anti-Democracy? The Future of Democracy from a Peripheral Perspective”, Conference *Philosophy and the Social Sciences*, Prague, May 20–24, 2015.

**Thomas Stephan Eder**  
“Uyghur Religious Freedom and Terrorism in Chinese Criminal Law”, in: *jusletter.ch*, Bern: Editions Weblaw, 2015.

**Alexander F. Filippov**  
“National Interest and International Law: What is Behind the Polemics of Lawful Sovereignty”, in: *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 2, 2015.

**Ludger Hagedorn**  
“Supplement ‘Solidarity’”, in: *Baltic Worlds*, Vol. VIII, No. 1–2, Stockholm: Södertörn University, pp. 86–105 (Contributions by Ludger Hagedorn (ed.), Ewa Majewska, Kateryna Mishchenko, Jean-Luc Nancy, Leonard Neuger, Gustav Strandberg), April 2015

“Solidarity Beyond Exclusion”, in: *Baltic Worlds*, Vol. VIII, No. 1–2, April 2015.

**Sergey Horujy**  
“Eastern Christian Discourse and Russian Philosophy: Basic Structures, Modern Problems”, in: Teresa Obolovitch, Pawel Rojek (eds.): *Faith and Reason in Russian Thought*, Krakow: Copernicus Center Press, 2015.

“Bibikhin, Heidegger, Palamas on the Problem of Energy”, in: *Stasis*, St.-Petersburg, No. 3(1), 2015.

“New Anthropology as the Science of Human Sciences” [in Russian], in: V. Pavlov, A. Savenok (eds.): *Ethical and Anthropological Characteristics of Modern Law in the Situation of the Methodological Pluralism*, Minsk: Academy of the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Belarus, 2015.

“Synergic Anthropology: Foundations, Goals, Results”, *Readings in Human Sciences*, Russian State University for Human Sciences, Moscow, April 3, 2015.

“Virtualization of Communication: Anthropological Risks and Strategies of Their Overcoming”, Conference *Digital Media and Orthodox Pastoral Care*, Athens, May 6–10, 2015.

**János Mátyás Kovács**  
“From Two to One (and Only)? Theorizing Ownership in Communist Hungary”, Workshop *Between Bukharin and Balcerowicz* (see p. 22), IWM, Vienna, April 24–26, 2015.

“The Right Hand Thinks. On the Sources of György Matolcsy’s Economic Vision”, Conference *Hungary 2015—Mapping the “System of National Cooperation”* (see p. 5), IWM, Vienna, June 26–27, 2015.

**Ivan Krastev**  
Several Articles and Comments on Russia, Ukraine and the Balkans in: *The New York Times*, *The Moscow Times*, *The Kyiv Post*, *Foreign Affairs*, *The Guardian*, *The Financial Times*, *Project Syndicate* etc. (for details see [www.cls-sofia.org](http://www.cls-sofia.org))

“Europe Without Europeans? The Condition of the Political Community”, *European Reflection Forum*, Gdansk, May, 14–15.

“Cultural Change, Dialogue and Conflict in Heterogeneous Societies”, *Aspen Seminars for Leaders*, Venice, May 22–24, 2015.

“Exit, Noise and Disloyalty”, 8<sup>th</sup> *Istanbul Seminars, Philosophers Bridge the Bosphorus*, Istanbul Bilgi University, May 25–28, 2015.

“For a Democratic Ukraine—Challenges for Europe’s Policies Towards Eastern Europe”, *Heinrich-Böll Conference*, Berlin, March 2–3, 2015.

“The World of Higher Education in Putin’s Russia”, Conference *The University and the Transformations of Democracy*, CEU, Budapest, June 20, 2015.



# Articles and Talks 01–06 2015

*The Brussels Forum*, March 20–22, 2015.

51<sup>st</sup> *Munich Security Conference (MSC)*, Munich, April 6–8, 2015.

XV<sup>th</sup> *International Academic Conference on Economic and Social Development*, Moscow, April 7–9, 2015.

*Richard C. Holbrooke Forum Workshop*, Berlin, May 11–14, 2015.

*Chatham House London Conference*, June 1–2, 2015.

### Sighard Neckel

„Banking in gesellschaftlicher Verantwortung? Zur Berufsmoral im Finanzwesen“ (gemeinsam mit Claudia Czingon), in: *WestEnd. Neue Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, 12. Jg., Heft 1, 2015.

„Die Ungleichheit der Märkte“, in: Steffen Mau und Nadine M. Schöneck (Hrsg.): *(Un-)Gerechte (Un-)Gleichheiten*, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015.

\*  
“Money Never Sleeps: The End of Greed as ‘Calm Passion’”, *International Conference Financial Times: Economic Temporalities in U.S. Culture*, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main, March 27, 2015.

„Zurück in die Zukunft. Zur Refeudalisierung sozialer Ungleichheit“, *Universität Innsbruck*, Institut für Soziologie, 25. März 2015.

„Scheitern am Scheitern“, *Veranstaltungsreihe Scheitern. Ein Festival des Misserfolgs*, Literaturhaus Stuttgart, 7. März 2015.

### Ekaterina Nemenko

“The Left Idea as a Value and a Legitimate Condition in the Art of Avant-Garde” [in Russian], in: *Transformations of the Left Idea in the Artistic Culture of the USSR and France*. Edition of UrFU, 2015.

### Marc Plattner

“Europe’s Democratic Odyssey”, in: Andrea Radasanu (ed.): *In Search of Humanity: Essays in Honor of Clifford Orwin*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, March 2015.

“Is Democracy in Decline?”, in: *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 2015.

### Kaloyan Pramatarov

“Out of Town: Necropolies at Province of Thrace. The Phenomenon ‘Rich Graves’ and the Continuity in the Burial Customs from the 1<sup>st</sup> Millennium B.C.”, *Römisch Germanisches Zentralmuseum*, Mainz, May 21, 2015.

### Jurko Prochasko

Diskussion „Galicia after Galicia“, *Abschlussstagung zur Ausstellung Mythos Galizien*, Krakau, 6. März 2015.

Eröffnungsvortrag „Angriff auf Mitteleuropa“, *Kurzfestival Die besten aus dem Osten*, Volkstheater, Wien, 10. Mai 2015.

Podiumsdiskussion, *Internationale Konferenz Wahrnehmungen–Begegnungen–Verflechtungen*, Polnische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 21. Mai 2015.

Podiumsdiskussion „Österreich in Europa. Spiegelbilder: Ein Abend rund um das Gastgeberland des Eurovision Song Contest“, *Diplomatische Akademie Wien*, 23. Mai 2015.

„Begegnungen. Ein psychohistorischer Dialog“, *Gruppenanalytische Konferenz: Deutschland, Russland, Ukraine*, Potsdam, 28.–31. Mai 2015.

Europa-Forum Wachau „Arbeitskreis 4–Kultur: Die EU und ihre Nachbarstaaten – kulturelle Zusammenarbeit als integratives Bindeglied“, *Europa-Forum Wachau*, Stift Göttweig, 13. Juni 2015.

### Shalini Randeria

„Entrechtung und Verrechtlichung: Entpolitisierung der Demokratie?“, in: *Transit – Europäische Revue*, Heft 46, 2015.

„Zwischen Begeisterung und Unbehagen: Ein anthropologischer Blick auf den Begriff der Kultur“ (zusammen mit Evangelos Karagiannis), in: Holger Zapf (Hg.): *Lexion der Politikwissenschaften*, 2015.

„Wider den Migrationskomplex – Perspektiven auf eine andere Schweiz“ (zusammen mit Rohit Jain), in: Iwona Swietlik, Bettina Friedrich (Hg.): *Sozialalmanach 2015: Das Caritas-Jahrbuch zur sozialen Lage der Schweiz*, Luzern: Caritas Verlag, 2015.

“Colonial Complicities and Imperial Entanglements”, in: Patricia Purtschert, Harald Fischer-Tiné (eds.): *Colonial Switzerland: Rethinking Colonialism from the Margins*, London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2015.

\*  
“Porous Legalities: Paradoxes of Protection for the Poor”, *Conference Protecting the Weak*, Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main, January 23, 2015.

„Wider die Ökonomisierung des Lebens – Leitplanken und Fallstricke der sozialökologischen Transformation“, *Panel Input, Gutes Leben für alle, Kongress zum Neudenken von Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Politik*, WU Wien, 21. Februar 2015.

„Entrechtung und Verrechtlichung: Entpolitisierung der Demokratie?“, *Wiener Vorlesung*, Rathaus, 3. März 2015.

“Decentering Europe”, *Festrede, 70 Jahre Europäisches Forum Alpbach*, MAK, Wien, 21. April 2015.

“Human Rights and the Dispossessed”, *Symposium Human Rights: Constitutive Movements, Intellectual Practices and Shifting Global Contexts*, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, May 26, 2015.

“Normative Pluralism and Non-State Actors of Justice”, *Freie Universität Berlin*, July 9, 2015.

“Glocalization of Law and the World Bank: Dilemmas and Challenges for Human Rights Activists”, *Conference The Glocalization of Development*, Center for Conflict Studies, Philipps-Universität Marburg, July 11, 2015.

### Mykola Riabchuk

Ukrainian Culture after Communism: Between Post-Colonial Liberation and Neo-Colonial Subjugation, in: Dobrota Pucherova and Robert Gafrik (eds.), *Postcolonial East-Central Europe: Essays on Literature and Culture*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2015.

Whose Crisis? Russian Intelligentsia and the Ukrainian Question—Coming to Terms, in: *Porownania* [Poznan], Vol. 15, 2014.

“Two Ukraines” Reconsidered: The End of Ukrainian Ambivalence? *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Vol. 15, no. 1, 2015.

How to Make a “Nowhere Nation” into a National Brand? in: Katarzyna Skorzyńska (ed.), *National Image and Identity*, Warsaw: Polish Institute of Diplomacy, 2015.

“Wonderful Slavonic People.” Russian Stereotypes of Ukrainians: From Imperial Imagination to Post-Imperial Reality, in: Robert Kusek, Jacek Purchla, Joanna Sanetra-Szeliga (eds.), *Nations and Stereotypes, 25 Years After: New Borders, New Horizons*, Cracow: International Cultural Centre, 2015.

Reinventing Galicia, in: *Herito* [Cracow], Vol. 16, 2015.

### Victor Shnirelman

“The End of Times or the Beginning of the New Cycle? Views of the End of Times in Christianity and Esotericism”, *Center for Religious Studies*, Ruhr University Bochum, May 11, 2015.

\*  
“Archaeology, Society and Politics, or How and Why They Invented Ancestors in the North Caucasus”,

*Conference Ethno-cultural Diversity in the Balkans and the Caucasus*, Austrian Academy of Sciences and University of Vienna, March 2–4, 2015.

“Useful Eurasianism, or How the Eurasian Idea Is Viewed from Tatarstan”, *Conference Eurasianism: Evolution and Relevance*, IWM, Vienna, March 27, 2015 / *Conference The Politics of Eurasianism*, Södertörn University, Stockholm, May 14–15, 2015.

### Timothy Snyder

Several Articles, Comments and Interviews on Russia and Ukraine in/on: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *The Guardian*, *Wall Street Journal*, *L’Echo*, *Project Syndicate*, *Eurozine*, *Voice of America* etc. (for details see [www.timothysnyder.org](http://www.timothysnyder.org))

\*  
Keynote Speech, *Education International’s Holocaust Remembrance Event*, Fourth Annual, “Let My People Live!” Forum, Prague, January 26–27, 2015.

“The War in Ukraine: Propaganda and Reality”, *Debate Los Angeles Public Library*, March 10, 2015.

“Europe and Russia”, *Panel Chair, Conflicting Visions of the International State System Conference*, Yale University, Johnson Center, April 10, 2015.

“The Second World War in Europe: Beginnings and Endings”, *Keynote Speech at the Conference War and Peace: 1945–2015*, European Parliament, May 6, 2015.

“Polish-Russian-German Conference Recalling and Researching the Second World War”, *Europejskie Centrum Solidarnosci*, Gdansk, May 7, 2015.

“Ukraine as a Theater of War”, *Keynote Speech at the Bundestag*, Berlin, June 10, 2015.

*Conference Ukraine, Russland und die EU*, Berlin, March 2, 2015.

“OSCE: History as Propaganda: Challenges to Media Freedom”, *Hofburg*, June 15, 2015.

### Charles Taylor

Inaugural Lecture, *GOA Crisis of Religion Lecture Series*, University of Leuven, June 1, 2015.

“Church Renewal in a Secular Age”, *Conference Renewing the Church in a Secular Age: Holistic Dialogue and Kenotic Vision*, Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Rome, March 4–5, 2015.

### Dmitry Uzlaner

“Fifty Shades of Russian Fetishism”, *Eurozine*, May 28, 2015.

“Why Religions Become More and More Dangerous” [in Russian], in: *The Village*, February 6, 2015.

“New Atheists are Fundamentalists” [in Russian], in: *Metropol*, April 13, 2015.

\*  
“Religion and/or Daily Routine”, *Belarusian State University*, Belarus, April 16–18, 2015.

“Power and Politics in Theology and Practice of Russian Orthodoxy”, *Center for Russian Studies*, Uppsala University, May 7–8, 2015.

“Understanding Religious Anti-Westernisms as a Source of Political Conflict: Hinduism, Islam, Orthodoxy”, *IWM*, Vienna, 15 June, 2015.

### Tatiana Zhurzhenko

“Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands: The End of Ambiguity?”, in: Andrew Wilson (ed.): *What Does Ukraine Think?*, London: ECFR 2015.

“Russia’s Never-ending War Against ‘Fascism’: Memory Politics in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict”, *Eurozine*, May 8, 2015.

“The Fifth Kharkiv”, in: *New Eastern Europe*, No. 3–4, 2015.

\*  
“Memory Wars in Post-Soviet Kharkiv”, *Conference Kharkiv—City of Ukrainian Culture*, Harriman Institute—Center for Russian, Eurasian and East European Studies, Columbia University, New York, March 12–13, 2015.

“Eastern Ukraine Between Decommunisation and Decentralization”, *Conference Region, Nation & Beyond*, Kharkiv, June 25–26, 2015.

“Ukraine’s Eastern Borderlands: The End of Ambivalence?”, 7<sup>th</sup> *International Summer School, Ukraine Borders in the Post-Socialist Space: Past, Present, Future*, Chernivtsi, July 3–9, 2015.

# Varia



Photo: Shawn Miller / Library of Congress

We cordially congratulate **Charles Taylor**, IWM Permanent Fellow and Professor em. of Philosophy at McGill University, Montreal, on receiving the prestigious \$1.5 million John W. Kluge Prize for Achievement in the Study of Humanity granted by the Library of Congress. Charles Taylor shares the distinction with German philosopher and sociopolitical theorist Jürgen Habermas. Furthermore, the Broadbent Institute gave Charles Taylor the inaugural awarded named in his honor, *The Charles Taylor Prize for Excellence in Policy Research*, in March 2015. This award will recognize the person or organization that has advanced an exciting and innovative policy solution aimed at making Canada a more equal, sustainable and democratic country.

We are equally proud to announce that **Kristina Stoeckl** was awarded the highly prestigious Starting Grant of the European Research Council (ERC) which opens for the best young researchers a fast track to independence and support to build their own research teams. Some months ago, she had already been awarded a START grant by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF). Kristina Stoeckl has a long association with the IWM, first as a Visiting Fellow and then directing her own project on “Religious Traditionalism and Politics”. Her ERC project, for which the IWM was the host institution, will now be located at the Department of Sociology at the University of Innsbruck. During the next six years, she will scrutinize, which alliances conservative actors agree on when it comes to defending “traditional morals and values” by using the example of the Russian Orthodox Church. We congratulate her on her new appointment at the University of Innsbruck and wish her all the best for the future.

On April 16–18, the IWM hosted the **Annual Business Meeting of NETIAS**, the Network of European Institutes of Advanced Study, followed by the annual conference of the

EURIAS Fellowship program. NETIAS currently includes 23 institutes from 14 European countries and Israel, 16 of which take part in the EURIAS Fellowship program funded by the European Commission under its 7<sup>th</sup> Framework program. EURIAS offers established senior as well as promising junior researchers the chance to spend ten months at a European institute of advanced study. Begun in 2011, the program keeps attracting high-quality researchers from all over the world; in the last call for applications, over 800 applications were received for 43 available fellowships. Part of the fellowship program is an annual conference at which the current participants exchange and discuss the results of their research stays. An evening reception for the NETIAS directors and EURIAS fellows was generously held by the BMWFW. The conference’s keynote speech by Ilja Trojanow was published in IWMpost no. 115.

It is with great dismay and deep sadness, that we received the message of **Aleš Havlíček’s** sudden death in July 2015. Born in Třebíč (Czechoslovakia) in 1956, he was a Professor of Philosophy at the Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem, where he served as the dean of the Faculty of Arts from 2011 until his death. Furthermore, he was the publishing director of OIKOYMENH publishing house. In 1995, Aleš Havlíček was a Visiting Fellow at the IWM and planned to spend another three months as a Jan Patočka Visiting Fellow at the Institute in 2016. He will be sorely missed.



# Interview with Helga Nowotny

Helga Nowotny, new President of IWM's Board of Trustees (see p. 25), on the challenges the humanities and social sciences face in the future, research policies and the cunning of uncertainty.

**IWMpost:** Throughout your academic career your research interests have developed from macro-sociology to social studies of science and technology, more recently to the changing relationship between science and society in an age of uncertainty. What are the challenges the humanities and social sciences in particular have to face in the future? How can they succeed in strengthening their role and emphasizing their social relevance?

**Nowotny:** The social sciences, but also the humanities face challenges that come with at least three large trends. The first is the advent of Big Data, enabled through digitalization and its pervasiveness throughout society. On the epistemological level, predictive analytics based on the traces we leave through phone calls, movements across space and our multiple social interactions are replacing the question why with the question what. Based on these data it becomes possible to foresee future behavior with great likelihood. But data in themselves have no meaning. Data can be stored for very long periods and will be used for very differ-

ent purposes. The question is therefore: how does meaning emerge and how do we assign it to what? Obviously, there are other issues as well. The second challenge comes with the fact that we live in the technosphere and its enormous capacity to transform social reality. Only by understanding how this happens can we invent alternatives. Thirdly, the concept of the anthropocene, i.e. of humans changing the natural environment, has huge implications for the social sciences and humanities. It re-introduces a long-term perspective and focuses on the greatest challenge—a better understanding of the unintended consequences of human action.—The natural sciences become increasingly aware that the social sciences and humanities are needed for these challenges. So, we have to build bridges and facilitate productive interaction based on mutual respect.

**IWMpost:** The IWM is a member of NetIAS, a network of 21 European Institutes of Advanced Study, many of which you have visited yourself. How important is scientific co-operation across disciplinary and na-

tional boundaries and which role does the IWM play in this specific context?

**Nowotny:** Trans-disciplinary and trans-national cooperation play an ever greater role. Increasingly, universities enter such forms of cooperation and European IAS provide a wonderful space for encountering people and ideas that one would rarely meet under normal conditions of academic life. They are also well positioned to reach beyond academia and engage with civil society. Over the years IWM has gained high visibility internationally as well as in Vienna. I am confident that IWM will continue by reaching out also beyond Europe and by engaging in multiple ways with Austrian and Viennese society. It offers a privileged space for experimenting with new ideas and diversity in practice.

**IWMpost:** As president of the European Research Council and now as chair of the ERA Research Council Forum Austria, you have been deeply involved in negotiating and implementing research policy. On the basis of your experiences, what progress has been made so far in promot-

ing high quality research and which obstacles have yet to be overcome?

**Nowotny:** The ERC has become an acknowledged success in funding excellent science in a bottom-up mode focusing on the individual researcher and his or her team. This has given a needed boost of funding and recognition to the social sciences, even if the overall success rate for ERC applications remains around 10%. The humanities are in the process of discovering that they too can work in teams and the advantages team-work offers. The obstacles often arise with the SSH feeling too much in the defensive. This may lead to more closure instead of opening up, both to other disciplines and to the world outside.

**IWMpost:** In your latest book *The Cunning of Uncertainty*, published by Polity Press in October 2015 (see p. 26), you argue that uncertainty is integral to science, where certainty is always provisional, lasting only until new discoveries lead to the formulation of new theories. At a time when many people feel threatened by uncertainty, how can society take its cue from science and become more

open towards an evolving future?

**Nowotny:** Society can learn from science not to be threatened by uncertainty. Science extends the range of predictions but also knows their limitations. It thrives on the cusp of uncertainty and pushes us further into exploring the unknown. Uncertainty provides opportunities, while fear eliminates the future. It is a future which is radically open. Science and society have to work together to better understand the unintended consequences of human action.

**IWMpost:** The IWM hosts more than 60 fellows every year, half of which are Junior Visiting Fellows at the beginning of their career. What advice would you give to them?

**Nowotny:** Don't be afraid of the future which is difficult to plan, not only for you. Follow the research questions that really interest you, while keeping in mind that the ways to answer them must be feasible. Enjoy and believe in what you are doing. But above all—be persistent and don't let failure discourage you. Following the message from my book: collude with the cunning of uncertainty. <

# Upcoming Events 12 2015–01 2016

## December 2015

December 14



**Art and Reality: On the Institutionalization of Contemporaneity**

**Ketj Chukhrov**  
Associate Professor, Department of Art Theory and Cultural Studies, Russian State University for the Humanities

On the one hand, contemporary art claims agency in the social sphere, whilst, on the other, inevitably retaining its modernist anti-realist episteme, forbidding any sensuous bond with reality. This contradiction encourages art to get rid of its conceptual rigidity, and to persevere its social engagement without much societal result, while epistemologically retaining its negative modernist genealogy.

December 15



**Deconstructing the Debates on Investment Treaty Arbitration**

**Zachary Douglas**  
Professor of International Law, Graduate Institute, Geneva; Barrister and Arbitrator, Matrix Chambers, London

International arbitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes between foreign investors and States has come under sustained attack from various quarters in the context of the TTIP negotiations. This lecture will attempt to sort out fact from fiction in the current debates.

December 17



**Economic Policy and the 2016 Presidential Race**

**Peter Boettke**  
Professor of Economics and Philosophy, George Mason University

**Ivan Krastev**  
Permanent Fellow, IWM; Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

**Christoph Prantner**  
Senior Editor Opinion Pages, *Der Standard*

After detailing the critical economic policy issues that the US economy faces, the panelists will discuss the top candidates and whether their proposals address the problems or are merely rhetorical maneuvers to evade the problem and the appeal to populist sentiments.

## January 2016

Januar 17



**Wozu brauchen wir TTIP?**

Seit mehr als zwei Jahren verhandeln EU und USA über ein transatlantisches Freihandelsabkommen (TTIP). Dieses soll die Wirtschaft auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks ankurbeln und zusätzliche Arbeitsplätze schaffen. Kritiker befürchten jedoch, dass damit eine Erosion von Sozial-, Umwelt- und Verbraucherschutzstandards sowie eine Aushöhlung demokratischer und rechtsstaatlicher Strukturen einhergehen.

**Éva Dessewffy**  
Expertin für internationalen Handel, Bundesarbeiterkammer, Wien

**Petra Pinzler**  
Autorin und Journalistin, *Die Zeit*

**Peter-Tobias Stoll**  
Rechtswissenschaftler, Universität Göttingen

**Shalini Randeria** (Moderation)  
Rektorin, IWM, Wien

## Events Colorkey

Monthly Lectures

Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.

Russia in Global Dialogue

This series of events, supported by Open Society Foundations, aims at intensifying intellectual debate between Russia and Europe.

Conferences and Workshops

The IWM frequently organizes international conferences, workshops and debates related to the Institute's research interests.

Debates at the Burgtheater

*Debating Europe*, organized in cooperation with the Vienna Burgtheater, ERSTE Foundation and *Der Standard*, is a matinée series of public debates.

*This is just a small selection of events (subject to change)—a complete list of all upcoming lectures, seminars and debates can be found on: [www.iwm.at/events](http://www.iwm.at/events)*

# Call for Applications: Fellowships 2015/16

The majority of IWM fellowships are awarded in open competition, involving calls for application and evaluation by expert juries. Research proposals are currently invited for the following programs. Further details on [www.iwm.at/fellowship-programs](http://www.iwm.at/fellowship-programs)

## Coming soon:

## Alexander Herzen Junior Fellowships

## Bronisław Geremek Senior and Junior Fellowships

## Józef Tischner Fellowships

## Milena Jesenská Fellowships

## Paul Celan Fellowships