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After the Consumption Frenzy

Paul Miller
Yugoslav
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Maria Lipman
The Besieged
Fortress

Kristina Stoeckl
Religion
and Pluralism

Stefan Eich
The Politics
of Money

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NO. 114 • WINTER 2014/2015

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Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen
Institute for Human Sciences

Imprint: Responsible for the content: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM), Spittelauer Lände 3, 1090 Vienna, Austria,
Phone: +43/1/313 58-0, Fax +43/1/313 58-60, iwm@iwm.at, www.iwm.at; **Editorial Committee:** Ivan Krastev, Klaus Nellen; **Editor:** Marion Gollner;
Editorial Assistance: Simon Garnett, Elisabetta Ganesini, Fiona Livey, Julian Pokay, Christina Pössel; **Design:** steinkellner/zotter, www.steinkellner.com.
IWM*post* is published three times a year. Current circulation: 7,500, printed by Grasl FairPrint, 2540 Bad Vöslau, www.grasl.eu. Copyright IWM 2014.
An online archive of IWM*post* is available on the Institute's website at www.iwm.at.

Editorial

Der Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs, der Fall der Berliner Mauer und die Osterweiterung der Europäischen Union: Das Jahr 2014 war reich an Gedenkveranstaltungen – auch am IWM. Nachdem sich die erste Burgtheaterdebatte des Jahres mit den weitreichenden Folgen des Ersten Weltkriegs auseinanderzusetzen hat, kehrt Paul Miller im Eröffnungsartikel dieser Ausgabe an jenen Ort zurück, an dem das Schicksal Europas mit der Ermordung des österreichischen Thronfolgers Franz Ferdinand seinen Lauf nahm. Die Fußabdrücke Gavrilo Princip's stehen dabei bis heute symbolisch für die Spuren, welche dieses Ereignis in der kollektiven Erinnerung des ehemaligen Jugoslawien und darüber hinaus hinterlassen hat. Welche Schwierigkeiten die Aufarbeitung der gemeinsamen Geschichte Osteuropas bis heute mit sich bringen, wurde auch im Rahmen der diesjährigen IWM Sommerschule diskutiert, die sich u.a. mit der Gewalt in der Region in der Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts und den Umbrüchen von 1989 beschäftigte.

Ein weiteres Ereignis von großer Bedeutung für die Geschichte und Zukunft Europas – der Beitritt mehrerer Länder Zentral- und Osteuropas in die Europäische Union – war Gegenstand einer Konferenz im April, die vom IWM mitorganisiert wurde. 10 Jahre nach der Osterweiterung 2004 wurde Bilanz über bisherige Erfolge und Hindernisse gezogen sowie über zukünftige Herausforderungen nachgedacht.

Vor dem Hintergrund der anhaltenden Ukraine-Krise und der zunehmenden Isolation Russlands, setzen sich drei Beiträge dieser Ausgabe mit der Frage auseinander, welche geopolitische Strategie Vladimir Putin verfolgt und wie der Westen darauf reagieren kann.

Ein anderer Themenkomplex dieser Ausgabe illustriert an zwei konkreten Beispielen, wie sich das Konsumverhalten zu Zeiten des Kommunismus und danach verändert hat. Während im Ungarn der 60er Jahre versucht wurde, Menschen unter anderem mit Propagandafilmen vom Kauf eines Autos abzuhalten, zeigt eine Bestandsaufnahme in der tschechischen Stadt Liberec heute, wie Privatisierung, Korruption und fehlgeleitete bzw. nicht vorhandene Stadtplanung zum Sterben der Innenstädte und Leerstehen zahlloser Einkaufszentren geführt haben.

Abschließend werden in dieser Ausgabe zwei große Philosophen gewürdigt, die bis heute nichts von ihrer Bedeutung eingebüßt haben: Jan Patočka, dessen Religionsbegriff in einem Forschungsprojekt am IWM untersucht wurde, und Bernard Bolzano, dessen umfangreicher handschriftlicher Nachlass in einer Gesamtedition erscheint. <

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The start of the First World War, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the EU's Eastern enlargement—2014 was a year of anniversaries and commemoration, which the IWM also marked by various events. Whereas the first of the Burgtheater debates discussed the manifold and lasting consequences of the First World War, this edition's opening article by Paul Miller returns to the place where it all began, to Sarajevo and the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne. For Miller, Gavrilo Princip's footprints stand symbolically for the traces which this event has left in the collective memory of the former Yugoslavia and beyond. This year's summer school also focused on exploring historical narratives and cultural memories by looking at problems in 20th-century modern East European and Soviet history, including the violence of the mid-century, and the transformative events of 1989.

Another event of great importance for Europe—the accession of several central and eastern European countries in the EU—was the subject of a conference in April 2014, co-hosted by the IWM, which reflected on achievements and lessons learnt and discussed possible future political and economic developments.

Against the background of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and the increasing isolation of Russia, three articles in this edition attempt to understand Vladimir Putin's geopolitical strategy, and propose how the West might respond.

This issue also addresses the transformation of consumerism over time in two articles, discussing examples from the communist and post-communist era, respectively. The first shows how Hungary's state apparatus class of the 1960s tried to discourage people from buying a car, using the genre of the 'dissuading film'. The second article is a reportage on the current situation in the Czech city of Liberec, where the combined effects of privatization, corruption and the absence of urban planning have resulted in desolate city centers and empty shopping malls.

Finally, this issue pays tribute to the philosophical work of two influential European thinkers who have remained relevant to this day: Jan Patočka and his concept of religion, which was the subject of an IWM research project which ended this year, as well as Bernard Bolzano's extensive literary estate which is published in a collected edition. <

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Yugoslav Eulogies: The Footprints of Gavrilo Princip

BY PAUL MILLER

The changing cultural memory of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Yugoslav nationalist Gavrilo Princip provides a useful window on how Yugoslav, and subsequently post-Yugoslav, elites sought to create collective identities for their respective polities, writes Paul Miller.



Photo: Edward Sarcia

Less than two years after World War I, a revealing ceremony took place in Terezín, in the new state of Czechoslovakia: the exhumed remains of the Sarajevo assassins were given a heroes' send-off; they were going home. And for the first time since the Middle Ages, *home* for Bosnians meant something other than foreign governance—an affiliated existence in an independent south Slavic state. Gavrilo Princip and his accomplices did not anticipate world war when they assassinated Franz Ferdinand, heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Yet millions of destroyed lives later their ideals had, in a literal sense, been realized.

Of course, the reality was more complicated, as the struggle for a south Slavic (Yugoslav) state that began in the 19th century was hardly made easier by the assassination and war that heralded the 20th.

After all, many Bosnians and Croats reacted to the Archduke's murder with violence against Serbs. Still more fought in the imperial-royal (k. u k.) armies that ravaged Serbia. Yugoslavist agitation certainly persisted during the war years, yet what

the Serbian regent proclaimed the south Slavic Kingdom.

From a political standpoint, the new country was a product of war-time exigency. While Habsburg Yugoslavists and Greater Serb nationalists each sought a common state,

the Serb capital, and were reigned over by the Serb king. "It was a beginning," writes the historian Margaret MacMillan, "from which Yugoslavia never recovered."¹

Serbian dominance may not have been most Yugoslavists' ideal, but their

propagated this multicultural idea through publications, celebrations, and exhibitions such that by 1918, argues the Slavist Andrew Wachtel, there was an upswell of support for Yugoslav unity.²

Wachtel's study of how the intellectual arbiters of Yugoslavism strove to give South Slavs a "horizontal sense of belonging to a single nation" is crucial for my own work. For in his consideration of such processes as the cultivation of a Yugoslav literary and artistic canon, Wachtel reminds us that nations flourish or fail foremost as cultural artifacts rather than political acts. Even if the war shaped the outcome of south Slavic unity, the indispensable "invented" ingredients of any national undertaking—standardized print language and communalized history/customs—remain cultural.

Thus the fact that the first Yugoslav state favored Serbs is not the

*Yugoslavists were constructing the assassination
as a heroic liberation narrative that transcended ethnicity,
nation, religion, and history.*

ultimately secured its victory was, in fact, defeat. As revived Serbian armies moved into Habsburg territory, the Croatian Parliament ceded its power to the newly-formed National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. On December 1, 1918,

they had hoped to achieve this in ways consistent with their own historical agendas. Instead, Serbian power redounded to a one-sided unification in which all major military and government functions remained in Serb hands, resided in

role in creating the state went well beyond politics. It was in the cultural realm that Yugoslavists articulated a national vision that blended the ethnic riches of the south Slavic peoples into a single, seductive *Yugoslav* culture. During the war, Yugoslavists

harbinger of doom for Wachtel that it is for MacMillan. While significant in that national tensions overshadowed the “far more creative ways” in which cultural unitarism developed, political leaders generally left the cultural sphere alone. How else could the authoritarian Kingdom, which needed to preserve internal peace while upholding its international standing, have allowed prominent citizens and its national newspaper to glorify an assassination that had led to interethnic violence and would always be linked to the world war? Of course, this question is more complicated since multinational Yugoslavia was so complicated, with two forms of government, and phases of civil war, during its short history. Yet while scholars have studied the two Yugoslavias’ problems from political and economic perspectives, there has been little work on this issue of cultural cohesion and virtually no effort to interrogate the long-term discursive construction of Yugoslav identity by means of collective memory.

Sarajevo as a “Site of Memory”

Sarajevo has a crucial place in that memory. From the time the south Slavic state was created, Yugoslavists were constructing the assassination as a heroic liberation narrative that transcended ethnicity, nation, religion, and history. In my own work, I treat it as a “site of memory” to study the challenges Yugoslavists faced in forging the kind of meaningful, cultural unitarism necessary to sustain statehood. By asking what the evolving manifestations of this narrative and official responses to it can tell us about the Yugoslav national project, my research offers a new way of thinking about Yugoslavia’s struggles and, finally, demise.

As for my findings, they are less predictable than one might expect. Certainly the memory of the assassination has split along ethno-national lines, with Serbs at the forefront of promoting Princip as a national hero. Yet in the interwar era, intellectuals of every background stressed the “all-Yugoslav” political/cultural leanings of the young Bosnian “martyrs”. They did so, moreover, without any government support. The regime sent no representatives to Terezín or Sarajevo for the remains’ transfer and reburial; did not fund commemorative activities, including the construction of a memorial-chapel; and downplayed the dedication of the first plaque on the assassination site, which only occurred in 1930. For the ethno-nationally fragile and economically dependent Kingdom, Sarajevo was sensitive on two fronts: many non-Serbs never felt “liberated” in the new state; and outside its local context, the assassination was less associated with south Slavic subjugation than the outbreak of a world war.

After World War II, the victorious Partisans approached the problem more confidently: 1945 became the fulfillment of all that 1914 had stood for—liberation from the “Germanic” oppressor and the spirit of “brotherhood and unity” embodied in the mixed ethno-national identities of the Young Bosnians and Par-



Corpse transfer ceremony, Terezín (July 1, 1920).

Photo: courtesy of the Terezín Memorial

tisans alike. The socialist era thus saw streets named for the assassins; a museum honoring the “noble rebels”; and Princip’s footprints pressed into the sidewalk on the site where his shot expressed “the national protest against tyranny and our nations’ centuries-long aspiration for free-

is untenable, as both Yugoslav regimes recognized. Sarajevo became a “site of memory” for Yugoslavism since World War I, in a roundabout and ruthless way, fulfilled the goal of most Yugoslavists. But the assassination could also be seen as a site of memory for the 20th century, since

atian fascists, Serbian nationalists and, at war’s end, Tito’s Partisans. Correspondingly, Terezín today receives far more visitors than it ever did in the interwar era. Few, however, go to honor the Sarajevo assassins. Most do not even realize that this famous Nazi “camp-ghetto” had,

*Our fascination with the Sarajevo assassination
is also based in irony: a single, sloppily planned,
and barely successful political murder
ended in apocalypse.*

dom,” as the new memorial read. During the 50th anniversary, the government did try to diminish the event’s meaning for foreigners. Yet on the cusp of the country’s collapse in the 1990s, newspapers brimmed with praise for the “national liberators.” And the museum was open for business until the wars of secession broke out.

Those conflicts, as the ones between Croatian fascist Ustaša, Serbian royalist Četniks, and leftist Partisans in World War II, affirmed just how symbolically meaningful Sarajevo was for South Slavs. For once the strong leadership and socialist ideology that bound Yugoslavia came apart, so too did the positive assassination narrative. Today Princip is a hero mainly to Serbs, while Muslims and Croats regularly decry him as a “terrorist”. Many now even praise Habsburg rule as a golden age of national development. The “Serb” Princip, in this construal, impeded Bosnia and Croatia’s path towards European integration. It is an ironic reading considering the active and at times violent resistance to Austria-Hungary among many Habsburg South Slavs, particularly in the period just prior to the world war.

Our fascination with the Sarajevo assassination is also based in irony: a single, sloppily planned, and barely successful political murder ended in apocalypse. Clearly Princip and his accomplices were not responsible for the war’s outbreak. Yet untangling it from their action

it spawned the crisis that culminated in the era’s “seminal catastrophe.”

History, Ideology and Identity

Princip’s memory affords a useful cultural window onto the challenges Yugoslavists faced in forging a nation. Yet until now, it has been overshadowed by what World War II wrought upon ethno-national memory, especially in terms of the murderous crimes of the Cro-

in an earlier era, been the fortress-prison where Princip spent the last years of his life.

One such visitor was Martin Jay, who described stumbling upon Princip’s prison cell in Theresienstadt as a “rude intrusion” into the familiar Nazi narrative. Yet the experience jolted the historian to a new understanding: the Holocaust, that incomprehensible core of modern Western “civilization,” was not so distinct after all. Indeed the two world wars,

through the far-off towns of Terezín and Sarajevo, were improbably yet eternally linked, and history is no more self-contained than our individual lives and communal identities.³

And so it was with my own visit to Terezín, when I learned that Dr. Jan Levit, the Prague surgeon who cared for Princip, ended up an inmate himself in Theresienstadt—not, naturally, for killing an archduke, but for having been born Jewish. In October 1944, Dr. Levit was deported to his death in Auschwitz. There’s a photo of him in a Terezín museum.

Dr. Levit’s face, like the faces of millions of fallen in World War I, reminds us that no amount of ideology can erase the lived reality with which we all must engage. Yugoslavists who promoted the assassination as a common cultural narrative of national liberation also insisted, and rightly so, that Franz Ferdinand’s political murder did not cause the Great War—the Great Powers did. Yet Yugoslavia’s creation occurred how and when it did only as a consequence of that conflict, the outcome of which was still unpredictable when Princip died in prison.

It thus seems paradoxical, though somehow too poignant, that a forgotten monument marked “To the Yugoslav National Martyrs” still stands today in Terezín’s town cemetery. After all, the divisive action of those “martyrs”, however righteous their cause, will always be associated with the millions more martyred in the World War I. And, obviously, there are no longer any Yugoslavs. <

¹ Margaret MacMillan: *Peacemakers*, London: John Murray, 2001, p. 127.

² Andrew Wachtel: *Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation*, Stanford University Press, 1998, pp. 63–66, 21, 7, p. 79.

³ Martin Jay: “The Manacles of Gavrilo Princip”, in: *Salmagundi*, 1995, pp. 14–21.

Paul Miller is Associate Professor of Modern European History at McDaniel College (USA). This piece, adapted from his article of the same title recently published in *The Carl Beck Papers* (No. 2304, June 2014), is part of a larger book project on the memory of the Sarajevo assassination: *28 June 1914: A Day in History and Memory*. In May 2014, Paul Miller presented his work within the IWM seminar series *Faces of Eastern Europe* (see p. 13).

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3 WOCHEN GRATIS TESTEN!

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Don't Waste the Gas!

BY GYÖRGY PÉTERI

What can the study of everyday life tell us about the way in which modernity spread in post-1956 communist Hungary? By analyzing a “dissuading film” of the early Kádár era György Péteri describes the emergence of a “consumer society” under state socialism and its ambiguities.

Among students of the social and cultural history of East Central Europe during the Cold War, there has lately been a lively interest in issues of everyday life and what at the time was termed “the socialist way of life”. In my own work, I am joining these efforts by studying certain aspects of Hungary’s communist party-state apparatus class. I believe the study of everyday and private life in the apparatus class can provide significant knowledge about the way in which modernity reached the shores of and spread in state-socialist societies in areas such as mobility, the mechanization of housework, bringing up the next generation, leisure activities and vacationing. Even in fields out-

director. It was produced in 1964 and shown in movie theatres from January 1965 onwards.

The Great Hungarian Dissuading Film

Don't Waste the Gas! had a self-declared genre: “the great Hungarian dissuading film” that, for the modest price of a movie ticket, promised to convince its public that it is foolish to invest the salaries of several decades into buying a car. While the posters in Budapest advertised it as a comedy, the film was, in fact, composed of four episodes, each in a different genre.

It starts with a *burlesque* about the bad fortunes of a dentist who



The film's poster depicts the dentist with his preowned Topolino

jealousy by a mediocre actor envious of the successes of his wife, who is a true celebrity.

The State Car

Don't Waste the Gas! is worth seeing, especially for anyone trying to comprehend the contemporary reception of budding automobilism and the emergence of a “consumer society” under state socialism. But even in this regard, what really makes it a highly interesting and intriguing film is its third episode and the role and character of the narrator appearing in the transitions between episodes and in the epilogue.

The third episode is a *satire* about the state-owned car. In most of the film, wider issues beyond the particular story and its “lessons” are never raised. In the state car episode, however, the story is placed within a larger perspective by the narrator’s commentary, radically modifying the message conveyed. The particular story of the episode seems to offer the rather trivial proposition that the party-state apparatus class comprises a lot of honest, incorruptible puritans who may be counterproductively pedantic but who abstain, as a rule, from pursuing private self-interest. The newly-appointed factory director never uses the state car put at his disposal: he commutes to his job by bus. He also rejects his minister’s request to go on an official trip to London and Paris because duty, as he understands it, calls him to be present at the opening ceremony of the new shower room for the factory’s employees. If the character of the communist factory director requires a great deal of believing on

They could not both enjoy the comforts of private automobility and at the same time deny this pleasure to the rest of society.

side social history proper, it might be useful to know what made the salaried functionaries of the party-state “tick”.

While I base much of my empirical work on archival documents, I am also curious about contemporary commentaries in various public media. I find it especially instructive to study texts and works of art (cartoons, feature films, etc.) in which artistic representations of the advances of the modern everyday and of the party-state functionary coalesce.

An example of this is a feature film of the early Kádár era: *Kár a ben-*

buys a pre-owned, over 20 year-old Topolino. He is then forced to deal with a never-ending series of bad surprises concerning his car, where intermittent breakdowns of the engine are followed either by a door flying off or a wheel running away from the car on its own. In addition, he has to face the anger and aggression of the other drivers, provoked by the disturbances caused by him (and his ramshackle car). One of these angry drivers, himself an experienced owner of an old car, chases the dentist through the outskirts of Budapest to teach him a lesson.

Kár a benzinért
(Don't Waste the Gas!)
Hungarian Film, 1965
Director: Frigyes Bán
Script Writer: Imre Bencsik
Selected Cast: Katalin Berek,
Dezső Garas, Ferenc Kállai,
Ervin Kibédi, Tamás Major,
Sándor Pécsi, Imre Sinkovits,
Éva Vass
Music: András Bágya

by the need to repair the Topolino.

The second episode is a *comedy* about an industrial worker who faces an unbearably long commute from his home to work every day


in this case the car is in relatively good shape, the social pressure on the car owner in a society in which the overwhelming majority of the population was still carless turns the dream-come-true into a nightmare: every morning people from his neighborhood line up outside his house, quarrelling with one another and expecting him to offer them a ride.

The film’s fourth and final episode is a *slapstick* in which a married couple of actors engage in child-

State cars, on a hot summer day, hurrying to deliver the party-state's functionaries to the Balaton Lake ...



Volga cars serving the comfortable mobility of the party-state's functionaries



zinért! (*Don't Waste the Gas!*). The script was written by Imre Bencsik together with Frigyes Bán, the film’s

Eventually, however, we leave the episode as both of them are lying under the dentist’s car in an idyllic scene of male bonding occasioned

and dreams of being able to spend more time with his three children. The prize he receives for an innovation at his factory enables him to buy a pre-owned car. Even though

ish rivalry over “who is the smartest driver”. Eventually, and after crashes into stone fences and one another’s cars, their conflict over driving proves to have been but a manifestation of vanity and professional

behalf of the viewer, his chauffeur, Comrade Gál, with his unlimited appetite for public resources is all the more credible. First, he is shocked to discover that his new boss is a weird man who, unlike the previous director, has no mistress; nor does he

Photos: MAFTUM 3, Jákófilmstúdió

demand to be driven to Lake Balaton by car—with or without a mistress—in summer. Gál then quickly proceeds to “privatize” his director’s state car for his own benefit, using it for everything that—and even more than—his previous boss used to do: he even uses the passenger car to transport building materials to the house which is being built for him and his newly-wed wife (whom, by the way, he got to know by picking her up along the highway, and whom he also married using his boss’s car as the wedding limousine).

But the puritan boss whose naïveté creates opportunities for the corrupt chauffeur is obviously a case constituting, as the saying goes, “the very exception that confirms the rule.” This is what we are given to

state cars by special license plates so that everybody should be able to see what a large number of people hurry to do their job in this country in important state affairs. To realize this, one merely needs to observe all those state cars that pass us by along the highway towards Lake Balaton on a hot Saturday afternoon in summer.”

During these passages spoken by the narrator (or, as he is called in the film: the “Dissuader”), the script includes instructions which make it clear that this tale is actually about the party-state’s apparatus class, rather than white-collar clerks working in small companies. The instructions require the producers to get “beautiful, black state cars (Mercedes or, at least, Volga)” for the shots and are

ty emerging in the field of mobility in Hungary was all too reminiscent of what was regarded as characteristic of capitalist societies: it emphasized individualism as opposed to collectivism, and privileged passenger cars over collective (mass) transportation. There was certainly precious little “socialism” in the kind of mobility patterns which emerged in the wake of modernization in Hungary. Secondly, the upsurge of private automobilism in the 1960s caused some shorter-term economic headaches too: Hungary did not produce passenger cars and the increasing car imports weighed heavily on the balances of foreign trade and international payments, thus constantly

Stalinist counterpart had been. He lifts a finger of warning, he tries to teach, but he himself is too weak to resist the temptations of the “good life”, as he publicly admits. Indeed, and most importantly, this new Kádárist Kucsera is even capable of self-irony, as is demonstrated by the epilogue of the movie: the team of actors and actresses, having been engaged in the production of a long hour’s dissuasion, are leaving Studio 3 of MAFILM. Each one of them is getting into and driving off in her/his own car. Even the narrator (Ervin Kibédi) walks to a car and, in a moment of clarity, as he realizes that the camera is still follow-

dom” of the narrator is signaled in the film also by the fact that he wears a dark suit, white shirt and tie—at the time, unmistakable markers of the functionary.

No doubt, *Don’t Waste the Gas!* is a movie that, with a critical edge, makes us, the viewers, laugh at the prevalent socio-political order and at its typical beneficiaries (as well as some of its losers). We tend to put artistic work of this sort from the communist era either into the category of “subversive weapon” or in that of “pressure valve”. But *Don’t Waste the Gas!* fails to be an obvious fit for either of these boxes. What the Hungarian public was forgivingly laughing at here was the profound complicity between themselves and the apparatus class of the reform-communist social order: they both shared the desires of the modern individualist consumer and both craved for the lifestyle enabled and embodied by modern, car-based personal mobility. Consumerism and, in general, the modern everyday as it was emerging in post-1956 communist Hungary were thus not merely a story about the Kádarian “carrot” gradually replacing Rákosi’s “whip” but also about an understanding of the “good life” shared, accepted and pursued by ruled and rulers alike—and this is an embarrassing fact that the official history writing of Hungary today would rather want us to forget about. ◀



understand by the commentary introducing the state car episode. At the end of the second episode, the narrator tells the audience that the foolishness of desiring a car had already been proven beyond doubt. After what has been shown, he says, “... you can only have one argument for the use of the passenger car, Sir—ahem, excuse me—Comrade!, and that is the state car. For the state car is run on state gas. The state car is driven by a state chauffeur, it is repaired at the state’s costs and it is taken care of by the service station run by the state. It is washed and cleaned every day even if only a few drops from disrespectful sparrows can be found on it. Consequently, nowhere else in the world are there as many state cars as in our country. In this respect, we have not only caught up with the leading capitalist countries but even left them behind. There, the state car is resorted to only under exceptional circumstances and only by those who are entitled to it: the top leaders of the state. In our country, the state car is used even by the manager of the smallest company, its clerks, its couriers, and their families too. [...] We distinguish our

generally emphatic about their preference for “representative” black or “dark cars with state license plates”. In the early half of the 1960s, Mercedeses, and to some extent even Volgas, served the comfort of the higher levels of the party and state apparatus only, while the lower echelons had to make do with Pobedas, Warszawas and even Moskvitches.

What the opening sequences of the film and the accompanying commentary allude to and reveal is that in the first decade of the Kádár era, at the very beginning of mass automobilism in socialist Hungary, it was the party-state’s apparatus class (and its work-related and private needs for mobility) that accounted for the majority of passenger car traffic on the country’s streets and roads. Indeed, it was only in 1959 that the number of cars in private ownership exceeded that of the state. During the first half of the 1960s, the share of state-owned cars gradually reduced to 20 % of the total stock, and thereafter continued to decline. The relatively large fleet of state-owned passenger cars had brought the beginning of modern, “motorized” mobility to Hungary, and its first beneficiaries of the “good life” offered by modernity and built on individual, passenger car-based mobility had been the members of the country’s party-state apparatus class. Thanks to their incomes and privileges, however, they were also the prime beneficiaries of the subsequent explosion-like growth of private automobilism.

Temptations of the “Good Life”

These developments were, of course, far from unproblematic. Firstly, the particular variant of modern-

challenging communist reflexes that tended to prioritize the interests of production and productive investments as opposed to consumption.

Now we may return to our film and ask who thinks the Hungarian consumer should be dissuaded from buying a car, and why? Whose genre is “the great Hungarian dissuading film”? Of course, it is the paternalistic socialist state (and its apparatus class) talking to the consumer citizen, telling him/her: “Don’t waste your money and nerves on a car!” But, as almost all the contemporary reviewers noticed, the film as a propaganda piece of dissuasion proved a spectacular failure. This was not caused as much by sub-standard craftsmanship in agitation-and-propaganda as by the profound ambiguity prevalent in the attitude of Hungary’s ruling apparatus class towards automobility: they could not both enjoy the comforts of private automobility in their public (and, increasingly, private) cars and at the same time deny this pleasure to the rest of society. This ambiguity, however, is not inherent in the film-makers’ attitude, as suggested by some contemporary critics—but rather part of the “subject matter” of the film, of the world it attempted to make us laugh at, and thus part of the insights it tried to communicate to its viewers.

The narrator/“Dissuader” then is a Kádárist mutant of *Comrade Kucsera*, the much-hated functionary of the Rákosi era created by Gyula Háy in his February 1956 essay. Whilst the ‘Dissuader’ is, perhaps, not much more likable—because still pretty corrupt and egoistic—he is, nevertheless, certainly more generous and tolerant towards the common people than his Rákosist-

ing him, he turns towards us, looks into our eyes with slight embarrassment, then shrugs his shoulders and puts his finger to his lips as if telling us “OK, you caught me, but please, don’t tell anyone ...!”

To my mind it is also significant here that the car the ‘Dissuader’ is driving is a 1957 Chevrolet Bel Air. There were altogether 73 cars of this model in Hungary at the time: 66 of them were state cars, and the remaining 7 were used by foreign diplomats working in Budapest and a couple of private owners. Of those 66 state cars, the single largest contingent (13) belonged to the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. The “official-

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The “Kádár era” (1956–1988) was the second phase of Communist rule in Hungary, starting with the counter-revolution triumphant with the help of Soviet tanks in 1956–1958, and ending with the abdication and death of the country’s communist ruler, János Kádár, in 1988–89. Following the initial counter-revolutionary terror, Hungary established itself as one of the most liberal regimes in the communist bloc, for which it was interchangeably referred to either as “Goulash Communism” or as the “Happy Barrack in the Socialist Camp”.

After the Consumption Frenzy

BY RENATE ZÖLLER

Czech cities are choking on an excess of retail space. Now citizens are starting to resist, as this reportage by Renate Zöller shows.

Friday afternoon in the northern Bohemian city of Liberec: Neptune leans lazily on his trident, looking down on an empty Beneš Square and the majestic neo-Renaissance town hall opposite. Liberec was once the centre of the Habsburg textile industry, and Beneš Square used to be its busiest gathering point. In the 19th century, the adjacent Pražská ulice was a showcase for the ascendant middle class, with cafés, expensive shops, and restaurants. Nowadays, no more than the occasional pedestrian hurries past. The public has deserted the town centre, and with it the shops, cafés and restaurants. Even McDonald's has closed; the windows of its former restaurant are coated with dust. Yet Liberec does not lack customers—its problem is rather an excess of retail space. The small mountain city with its 100,000 residents has been suffocated by four big shopping malls.

The situation in Liberec is symptomatic of the neoliberal malaise affecting the whole of the Czech Republic. After the Velvet Revolution, consumption increased with breath-taking speed. As wealth steadily grew, people could afford the newly accessible western products. Naturally, this was noticed by the developers of shopping malls, mostly from the West. The markets in their own countries were mostly saturated. In the former socialist countries, however, shopping malls were a new investment. According to Jana Spilková, lecturer in social geography and regional development at Prague's Charles University, foreign investors "also wanted a piece of the pie". The first mall was built in Prague in 1993; today, two decades later, the Czech capital has 19 malls larger than 5,000 square meters. That means 68 square meters of selling space per 100 inhabitants. That is nearly twice as much as in Berlin.

At the time, nobody thought about tightening regulations. Cities were relieved if developers took over their urban planning responsibilities. "There is still no controlling body, no law, no one to take decisions at a higher level", says Spilková: "The city authorities alone decided what was built. And often they decided on the investor who offered them the most." To secure contracts, investors would build roads or even train stations; sometimes they gave large donations to a local hospital or kindergarten. In most cases there were no plans for balanced land-use that would have structured commercial zones and recreation areas. Occasionally, however, existing zoning plans were altered to allow space for another mall or hypermarket.

This was what happened in Liberec in 2009. When plans were re-



Photo: Renate Zöller

*Liberec does not lack customers—
its problem is rather an excess of retail space.*

vealed for a fourth shopping mall to be situated directly next to the town hall, the citizens of Liberec rebelled. Zuzana Kocumová, an energetic, sporty-looking young woman and former Olympic skier, is a member of the Liberec council. In 2009, she used her local celebrity status to start a petition against the project, proposing that a recreation zone be created instead. She had the law on her side, since the original land-use plan stipulated a "green zone" for the site. But the plan was changed and later disappeared. "A law is only as good as the people who defend it," says Kocumová. "I'm convinced that here in Liberec no one had the will

to control this site." Her initiative failed and the construction of the Plaza Liberec, a functionalist cube, went ahead.

Though accusations of corruption could not be proven, suspicions never vanished. It is still unclear why the city authorities failed to consider town planning when they sold off the city's properties. Liberec was originally a German city called Reichenberg; when the Germans were expelled in 1945, their land passed into state ownership. However, after 1989 the city failed to handle its wealth prudently. In most cases, properties were sold below value, says Kocumová. "Private corpora-

tions bought the land as green-field sites or parks. But then the development plan was changed and the plots became commercial zones—which were worth much more. The city lost billions."

When plans for a fifth mall were revealed, the shopping-mall excess was finally halted. It was not Kocumová and her initiative who achieved this, however. The new mall was to have been erected next to an existing mall, the Forum. Its owners, Multi Development, took legal action: as immediate neighbours, they could veto planning permission. Today the site is derelict, an open pit filled with ground water, mounds of earth

and bushes, an eyesore right in the middle of the city. For the developer ECE, the deal had ended in disaster. Its claim for compensation on the basis of the German-Czech investment protection treaty was rejected by the international court in Paris in October 2013.

Yet the scandal failed to bring legal consequences. Nor did the persons responsible learn from their mistakes. Asked about intentions to regulate developments in the future, deputy mayor Jiří Rutkovský shrugs his shoulders. The bulky 47-year-old cannot see that the administration did anything wrong. "Our shopping malls have several empty lots," he says. "That probably means that for the time being we have enough malls. And in Pražská ulice, two or three shops are untenanted—that's great! If a salesman wants to start a new business in Liberec, he can choose if he wants his shop to be situated in a mall or in the city centre. That's an ideal situation."

Kocumová is not the only one to get angry when confronted with such ignorance. The marketing director of the Plaza Liberec, Nancy Haisová, also disagrees with Rutkovský's opinion. From the start, the Plaza was short of customers and tenants. Haisová works hard to lure them into the mall. She invited an art gallery to use the unused shops and organized events; currently, the third floor of the building hosts the Czech Republic's biggest Dino-Park. "Constant low occupancy has taught us to be open to all options for using and filling this big building", she says.

Plaza Liberec is just one example of a wider tendency in the Czech Republic. Consumption has slowed down. Cities are suffocating from overdevelopment of retail space. According to a survey by the consultancy firm Cushman and Wakefield, a fifth of Czech malls complain about a lack of retailers. Statistics show that numbers are continuing to decline. Local communities discuss how to deal with the problem. Some want to get rid of the malls, blame them for dragging customers away from the inner cities; others say that decreasing demand can only be stopped by building new malls—bigger, more modern and more comfortable. Cushman and Wakefield also suggest that several Czech cities still don't have enough shopping malls, for example Kladno, Ceske Budejovice, Brno and Plzeň.

The Broken Window Phenomenon

It is surprising that the west Bohemian city of Plzeň should be on this list, since it is a city where consumption has clearly passed its prime.

In the last twenty years, a number of shopping malls have been erected in the green belts out of town—despite western European cities having discovered in the 1990s that this spelled the end for shops in the city centre. One would have expected Plzeň's town planners to be more aware, too. Free parking, all the shops you need under one roof, restaurants and a play area—citizens of Plzeň got used to driving in at the weekends and doing the shopping for the week. Fewer and fewer customers were attracted to the city centre, more and more shops had to close, and discount retailers like *Levné knihy* (Cheap books) and *Bankrot* (Bankrupt), along with cheap Vietnamese shops, moved in. Today, the centre looks devastated. “This is the so-called broken windows phenomenon”, explains Jana Spilková. “When

Karolina was built there, his own venture went bankrupt. “And who needs pedestrian zones?”, he says. “The local authorities should rather create more parking lots!”

Currently, there are two pedestrian zones in Plzeň, each located on a tiny street intersected by busy roads. Jiří Ondřejíček has his toyshop in one of them, Smetany ulice. It is four o'clock on a regular working day, yet no customer comes along. “Look around. There's nothing that would attract people to spend time here, not even a few plants, or benches to rest on”, he says. Wearing a white, well-ironed shirt, Ondřejíček belongs to a very different generation than Puchta; however, he too is tired of the authorities' planning policies. “Retailers in the inner city have been systematically disadvantaged for the past twenty years”, he says. The big-

The biggest challenge we are now facing is how to get these shopping malls back into the city.

the first shop went bankrupt, people started to avoid the area. As a result, the stores in the vicinity were confronted with problems. Under these circumstances, you need very good ideas to bring people back.”

Good ideas for Plzeň are in short supply. Since 1992, the liberal-conservative Civic Democratic Party (ODS) has been in charge there. Having presided over the crisis, the ODS is now responsible for solving it. Irena Vostracká, head of city planning and development, admits that the municipality got its policy wrong. “The biggest challenge we are now facing is how to get these shopping malls back into the city.” She had set plans in motion for a new, modern shopping mall in the inner city called “Corso Americka”; it was to have 34,500 square meters of shopping space and border on an extended pedestrian zone. The site had been sold, the former arts centre demolished and building was about to start. Then, however, a citizen's petition forced the developer Amadeus to stop construction. In a referendum, 35,500 people voted against the Corso Americka. In 2012, three years after Kocumová's failure in Liberec, a citizens' initiative succeeded in Plzeň.

Disillusionment with Market Liberalism

One of the most successful ventures in Plzeň is a sports retailer. Lukaš Puchta, the owner, receives his guests on a sofa on the second floor, behind the ski jackets. He is wearing a blue hoodie, his jeans sit very low on his waist. The 35-year-old businessman owns 17 more shops across the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, he belongs to a new generation who are disillusioned by unrestrained market liberalism. “In the end, no one benefits from too much retail space”, he says. He experienced this firsthand in the Moravian city of Ostrava. After the Forum Nová

gest florist in town used to be next door; further down the road there was a tea and coffee shop, an electronics store, a butcher and a sports retailer which had been there for sixty years. All gone. Ondřejíček also feels the pressure: he has had to reduce his staff from fourteen to six.

Martin Marek, born in 1982, is the link between Ondřejíček and Puchta. This amiable-looking law student is the head of the resistance. He launched the campaign together with a few friends, collected signatures and organized the referendum. Nowadays, his biggest worry is that the municipal authorities might cheat the citizens and seek a compromise with the investor Amadeus. Indeed, planning chief Vostracká has not given up on the idea of a new shopping mall; nowadays, however, she sees it more as a big office building. Marek insists that “we want a public tender for projects for the derelict zone and we want the public to decide about it”.

In the Czech Republic, Marek has become something of a celebrity. He has his own telecast called “Troublemaker” with the internet broadcasting company Stream, where he gives practical advice on writing complaints, reporting offences and organizing referendums. Marek is optimistic that more and more Czech cities will follow Plzeň's example and throw the big investors out of their historic centres, together with the neoliberal politicians in the town halls. He describes his advice as “theories of civil disobedience”. <

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International Conference The 2004 EU Enlargement—Ten Years After: Achievements and Next Steps April 24–25 April, 2014, Vienna



Photo: Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (wiw)

On 1 May 2004 ten countries—mostly from Central and Eastern Europe—became new members of the European Union. In celebration of the 10th anniversary of this event, the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) and the IWM jointly organized an international conference in Vienna. Most sessions of the conference took place on the premises of the Austrian Central Bank; an additional evening panel was hosted by the Austrian Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs and was co-sponsored by the Federation of Austrian Industries.

The conference reflected on achievements and lessons learnt and discussed future challenges which policy-makers in the European Union will have to face over the coming years. Since 2004 various strains and stresses seem to have accumulated, in particular following the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2008 and culminating most recently in the crisis in Ukraine.

The first session *Overcoming New Chasms in EU's Neighborhood*, chaired by **Gerald Knaus** (Director of the European Stability Pact), discussed recent developments in Ukraine and EU–Russian relationships, explored the deeper roots of the crisis and tried to identify possible solutions. The session included important analysts from Moscow (**Lilia Shevtsova**), Kiev (**Olga Bielkova**), Sofia and Vienna (**Ivan Krastev** and **Herbert Stepic**).

The second panel entitled *Towards Stability in the Balkans* examined the impact of future EU accessions, which are expected to include the remaining countries of the Balkans, on the economic and political stability of the region and the European Union itself. The session was chaired by **Ellen Goldstein** (Country Director for Southeast Europe, World Bank) and gathered well-known academics and activists from Belgrade (**Vesna Pešić**),

Zagreb (**Žarko Puhovski**), as well as experts from Washington (**Susan Woodward**) and Vienna (**Vladimir Gligorov**).

The subsequent session *The Economic Crisis and How to Resuscitate Convergence in Europe* returned to the discussions on the tensions and disparities which developed in the course of the recent economic crisis and which have brought into question the belief in ‘cohesion’ and ‘convergence’ of living and social standards in the European Union. Former EU Commissioner **Danuta Huebner**, **Jan Svejnar** (Columbia University), **Loukas Tsoukalis** (Athens), and former Commissioner and former Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs **Péter Balázs** discussed on the third panel, chaired by **Michael Landesmann** (wiiw), if the policy initiatives which have evolved during the crisis at national and EU levels are capable, and sufficient to resurrect prospects for convergence.

The evening panel, moderated by **Christian Ultsch** from *Die Presse*, was introduced by the Austrian Foreign Minister **Sebastian Kurz** and the head of the Austrian Federation of Industry, **Georg Kapsch**. The participants included the Slovak Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, **Miroslav Lajčák**, the Hungarian Minister of State for EU Affairs **Enikő Győri**, the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia, **Igor Senčar**, as well as **Andrej Mertelj** (Datalab, Slovenia) and **Andreas Treichl** (Erste Bank, Austria) as representatives from the business and banking sectors. This session resumed the overall topic of the conference (Achievements, Lessons Learned and Challenges Ahead) by focusing on the personal perspectives and experiences of acting ministers and representatives from the business community.

On the morning of April 25, the conference was continued with two

special sessions celebrating the 75th *OeNB East Jour Fixe* which had been organized by the Foreign Research Division of the Austrian Central Bank since the start of the transition in 1989.

The sixth session, chaired by **Ivan Krastev** (IWM and Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia), analyzed the ongoing tensions between two major forces which decisively shaped Europe in past and present and resurfaced more prominently in the wake of the economic crisis: nationalism and European integration. Eminent political scientists, politicians and experts on international relations shared their thoughts with the audience: **Alina Mungiu-Pippidi** (Berlin), **Lajos Bokros** (former Finance Minister of Hungary, now MEP), **Soli Özel** (Istanbul) and **Anton Pelinka** (Budapest and Vienna).

The concluding session of the conference entitled *A Century of European Disintegration and Integration: 1914–2014*, chaired by **Timothy Snyder** (IWM and Yale University), aimed at locating current and potential future developments in a historical context. Starting with the second big anniversary of this year, the beginning of WWI in 1914, the discussion forged a century-long bridge to the present and showed that this period had been one of waves of disintegration and reintegration of Europe. Speakers on this panel comprised prominent historians and political scientists from the US (**Holly Case**), Ukraine (**Yaroslav Hrytsak**) and Poland (**Dariusz Stola**).

This summary was generously provided by wiiw.

For more information about the conference (including further reading, videos etc.), see: wiiw.ac.at/n-45.html



Religion and Pluralism

CONFERENCE REPORT BY KRISTINA STOECKL



Photo: IWM

Why is it that a country as secular as France organizes the *hadj* to Mecca for Muslim members of its armed forces? How come that a relatively simple legal adjustment like marriage for gay couples has proved so controversial in many European countries? And why is it that Eastern Orthodox Christianity still finds it so difficult to define its relation to modernity? As different as these questions may seem, they all come down to the same issue: the relationship between religion and pluralism.

Modern secular societies are characterized by the coexistence of a variety of worldviews and normative perspectives on the world by which individuals give orientation to their lives. Some of these worldviews are religious, others are not. For the most part, and certainly in most Western European societies, the religious perspective is no longer the default option that individuals choose. This is the meaning of “secularity III” described by Charles Taylor in his book *A Secular Age*. It acknowledges that *plurality* is the quintessence of modern secular societies. But whereas plurality is a fact pretty much everywhere in today’s globalized world, the commitment to *pluralism* is not. Pluralism

stands for a particular kind of moral attitude with which an individual, a group or, for that matter, a state meets the challenges related to plurality inside society. It is based on the judgment that plurality is a resource, not a threat, and that human flourishing is inseparable from freedom and the possibility to live according to one’s own choices.

How secular states and religious communities relate to plurality as a social fact, and to pluralism as normative commitment, was the topic of a conference that took place at the IWM in June 2014. The conference, organized by IWM Permanent Fellow Charles Taylor, gathered a group of distinguished scholars who discussed the topic of religion, plurality and pluralism in four thematic sessions.

The first session looked at European legal frameworks on immigration and religious plurality. It approached the question of pluralism from an institutional perspective, examining the legal and institutional provisions in countries like France, Germany and the UK. The startling finding of the scholars on this panel chaired by John Bowen: the commitment to pluralism in Western European countries is at risk. In the face of controversial

debates about the accommodation of culturally and religiously diverse migrant communities, Western liberal and secular publics struggle for the right response to plurality. They may even find it increasingly difficult to uphold the liberal commitment to pluralism, to the point that Maleiha Malik spoke of the risk of an emerging “European racism”. This battle over principles stands in stark contrast to a culture of pragmatism widely diffused in European institutions, which allows the accommodation of religious difference at the level of practices. Christophe Bertossi presented his audience with a puzzling example: In France, the alleged fortress of *laïcité*, the French military command has established a Muslim chaplaincy to Muslim members of its armed forces. It organizes the *hadj* to Mecca for French Muslim soldiers, just as the Catholic military chaplain organizes a yearly pilgrimage to Lourdes for French Catholic soldiers. In times of military professionalization, quite pragmatically, the French army has become an equal opportunity employer who acknowledges and supports the individual rights and needs of its soldiers. Pragmatism seems a common strategy for public institutions in Eu-

continued on page 14

Conference Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses VI June 12–14, 2014, Vienna

Program

June 12, 2014

Welcome and Introduction:
Charles Taylor

Session I:
Comparative European Legal
Frameworks on Immigration
and Religious Pluralism

Chair: John Bowen

Introduction:
Christophe Bertossi
Maleiha Malik
Mathias Rohe

June 13, 2014

Session II:
Gender, Sexuality and
Religion

Chair: Michael Warner

Introduction:
Nilüfer Göle
Kathryn Lofton

Session III:
Eastern Orthodox Churches
and the Challenges of
Secularization

Chair: Kristina Stoeckl

Introduction:
Alexander Agadjanian
Pantelis Kalaitzidis
Vasilios N. Makrides
Fr. Vladimir Shmaliy

June 14, 2014

Session IV:
A Secular Age
Outside the West

Chair: Mirjam Künkler

Introduction:
Gudrun Krämer
John Madeley
Shylashri Shankar
Jonathan Wyrzten

Participants

- Alexander Agadjanian**
Professor of Religious Studies, Center for the Study of Religion, Russian State Humanities University, Moscow
- Christophe Bertossi**
Director, Center for Migrations and Citizenship, French Institute for International Relations (Ifri), Paris
- Rajeev Bhargava**
Director, Centre for the Study of Developing Studies (CSDS), New Delhi
- John Bowen**
Dunbar-Van Cleve Professor in Arts & Sciences, Department of Anthropology, Washington University, St. Louis
- Craig Calhoun**
Director, London School of Economics and Political Science
- Fajsal Devji**
Professor of History, University of Oxford
- Alessandro Ferrara**
Professor of Political Philosophy, University of Rome Tor Vergata

- Dilip Gaonkar**
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Archpriest, Pro-Rector of the SS Cyril and Methodius Postgraduate and Doctoral School of the Russian Orthodox Church, Moscow
- Kristina Stoeckl**
Research Director, Religious Traditionalisms and Politics, IWM; ÖAW APART-Fellow, Department of Political Sciences, University of Vienna
- Charles Taylor**
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, McGill University, Montreal; IWM Permanent Fellow
- Michael Warner**
Professor of English and American Studies, Yale University
- Jonathan Wyrzten**
Assistant Professor of Sociology and International Affairs, Yale University

This conference was generously supported by Fritz Thyssen Stiftung.

The Past is a Work-in-Progress: Also in Art History


BY ÉVA FORGÁCS

How art history copes with re-writing the chapters on the cultural production of the interwar years is an important indicator of the discipline's current self-reflective transformation of itself.

The post-1989 historical moment is not unlike that of the post-1918 period, when the newly-minted nation states set out to construct their particular cultural narrative at the same time as they sought to integrate into a new international culture. During the interwar period the emerging reference points were Weimar, then Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the Stalinist Soviet Union. With a nod to one or another of these dictatorial cultures, the interwar art of most of the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well as the Baltic states (re)invented a nationalist, religious neo-classicism featuring motives that blended the cult of national heroes and traditional local peasant ornaments. Such heroic-folkloric neo-classicism was elevated to the rank of official art and was state-sponsored at the expense of modernism and the avant-gardes that had to put up with their “little journals” of a few dozen or hundred copies, and scarce possibilities for public visibility. Nevertheless, they still fared better than under the dictatorships, where they were banned outright.

This changed after 1945, particularly in the Western democracies. For several decades it was a matter of course that post-World War II studies in art and cultural history focused on modernism and the avant-gardes. After the catastrophe of the war, and the cultural catastrophe that had preceded it, one of the most important tasks for art historians, professionally as well as morally, was to pick up the broken shards of modernism that had been lost to Nazism, fascism, Stalinism, and World War II. Studies and publications on modernism strove to reinstate the continuity of the progressive arts of the interwar period with the clear intention of blotting out the visual output of the dictatorships, wiping it out from the pages of art history and cultural history—human history in general. Hungarian art critic Ernő (Ernst) Kállai, for example, wrote in the immediate wake of World War II: “We are abhorred to see the result of subjugating art to ideology and political views.”

The modernism of the *Neuzeit* had been consensually understood to carry on the legacy of Enlightenment rationalism and secularism and the French Revolution's political program of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*. At the same time it was understood to thrive in the political system of parliamentary democracy. Having learned a lesson from World War I,



“Tatlin at Work” by the Russian artist, designer and photographer El Lissitzky (1890–1941)

A new Gleichschaltung is taking place—the bringing of the progressive and dictatorial arts of the first half of the 20th century to a common denominator.

modernism embraced internationalism and the artists' social responsibility—ideals that had been betrayed and abjected by two world wars and the dictatorial regimes.

During and after the interwar period, art in the US was seen through

the lense of America's crucial role in defeating fascism and Nazism. America equaled antifascism, and many artists and critics perceived American Abstract Expressionism, which had been, to a great extent, inspired by European Surrealism, as the expres-

sion of individual freedom. Individual freedom in turn was seen as the fundamental condition not only of democracy, but also artistic creation.

Since about the 1990s, a significant shift can be seen in recent post-World War II art history and cultur-

al studies; a new era and a new value system seem to have been ushered in that tends to be alienated from, or, at least, neutral towards, the modernist values. The anti-modernist trends in the dictatorial regimes' art and culture have been generating increasing interest. There has been a more intense and more detailed inquiry into the origins of totalitarian ideologies, their connections to art, the nuts and bolts of dictatorial cultural politics, and the political use of art in dictatorships. While, as Michel Foucault noted, by the 1970s the term ‘fascism’ was “used as a floating signifier, whose function is essentially that of denunciation”, the visual output of fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism have been, since about the 1990s, subject to rigorous analytical examination in art history, in an effort to fathom them with unbiased professionalism. This Objectivism often overlooks the political background of fascist or Stalinist art. For example, the undoubtedly talented Leni Riefenstahl's photo albums were reviewed positively for their professional photographic merits, detached from her biography that informs us of her unconditional devotedness to the *Führer*; and Italian art historian Enrico Crispolti describes the trajectory of the self-confessed enthusiastically fascist Italian Futurism as “a fruitful moment of creative, youthful immoderation quickly succeeded by a wiser maturity (my emphasis) that restored older values by maintaining a dialogue with the Renaissance tradition.” A recent exhibition at Sotheby's in London, “Soviet Art. Soviet Sport”, targeted what a reviewer called the “new collecting power” directed at Socialist Realist art.

While there is excellent scholarship in the field of the mid-20th century dictatorships' visual culture, a new *Gleichschaltung* is also taking place—the bringing of the progressive and dictatorial arts of the first half of the 20th century to a common denominator. The aesthetic relativism that started with the postmodern appears to establish also an ethical and political relativism that suits a world of many dictatorial aspirations. ◀

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The Politics of Money

BY STEFAN EICH

The history of political thought offers valuable resources for assessing money not just as an economic means of exchange but also as a political institution responsive to questions of justice and justification.



Solon and Croesus (Gerard van Honthorst, 1624)

In July 2012, Mario Draghi, the President of the European Central Bank, uttered three magical words that would prove to be decisive for ending the eurozone's immediate spiral of doom. Draghi pledged to do "whatever it takes" to preserve the euro. His words were backed up by the promise of hardly less magical monetary actions. As Draghi made clear, he was willing to use the vast powers over which central banks have presided since the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system in the 1970s. With money no longer tied to gold, we live in an age of so-called fiat money in which currency can be created without the need to match its value in metal. Central banks can consequently create money at will and place it into circulation in a number of ways. Some of these have recently attracted attention under the label of "quantitative easing" whereby truly staggering amounts of money—around two trillion dollars in the US in the last two years

alone—have been pumped into the financial system over the past years.

These powers of modern central banking inspire awe. But they should also pique our intellectual and political curiosity. What is at stake is both philosophically fascinating and utterly central to the economic and

policy might have more in common with poetry than is initially presumed. In tranquil times, it is all too easy to miss this constructed nature of money because we mistake it for an objective anchor of value and a perfectly neutral means of economic exchange. In periods of crisis, by

mous powers and ask in whose interest they do so. Those toiling under the current yoke of austerity in the eurozone may, for example, be excused for expressing disbelief when confronted with the fact that billions of newly created euros are at the same time used to take assets

of states to create fiat money at will. Inflation not only destabilizes the economic horizon but also erodes trust in the ability and willingness of monetary policy to prevent future inflation. Some have responded with calls for rooting money again in some precious commodity (such as gold) or even an unalterable algorithm removed from human control (as with bitcoins).

But this impulse should make us pause. After all, our political world is full of fictions. As Thomas Hobbes pointed out, the body politic is "a fictitious body". The idea of a democratic people is just as much a fiction as are political rights or indeed the very entity of the state. Neither is any less real for being fictitious. Instead of dismissing the role of opinions and imagination, we should acknowledge their centrality in constructing our social and political reality. Appreciating the fictitious nature of our political institutions does

continued on page 20

In periods of crisis, the veil is pulled from our eyes and money emerges as a construct of our collective imagination.

political well-being of the political communities we inhabit. If nothing else, the financial crisis has allowed us to see that money derives its value not from some shiny metal, but from subjective acts of acknowledgment. Money—like language—becomes a fact only by human agreement. As Draghi's predecessor Jean-Claude Trichet once quipped, monetary

contrast, the veil is pulled from our eyes and money emerges as a construct of our collective imagination that is open to questions of political legitimacy and justice.

If the seeming alchemy of fiat money provokes amazement, many have expressed concern about the ability of states, let alone unelected central bankers, to wield such enor-

off banks' balance sheets. Conventional assurances that 'there is no alternative' to austerity must sound increasingly hollow in this context. Some have indeed begun to ask what exactly prevents central banks from giving the money directly to citizens.¹

Others have expressed a more general suspicion about the fictitious nature of money and the abil-

Events in Retrospect 04 2014–08 2014

April



April 2
Romanies and the Holocaust. Changing Aesthetics of Remembrance

Stawomir Kapralski
Researcher, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw; Senior Fellow, Vienna Wiesenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies (VWI)
In cooperation with VWI



April 4–5
Threats to Scholarly Knowledge

In cooperation with Columbia University, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) and Sage Publications (see IWMpost 113)



April 6
Die Zerstörung des Wissens?

Cornelia Klinger
IWM-Rektorin *ad interim*; Professorin für Philosophie, Universität Tübingen
Lawrence Lessig
Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard Law School; Mitbegründer, *Creative Commons*
Sara Miller McCune
Gründerin, Sage Publications
Armin Nassehi
Professor für Soziologie, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Moderation:
Nicholas Lemann
Professor für Publizistik, Columbia University
In Kooperation mit Der Standard, ERSTE Stiftung, Burgtheater und Sage Publications



April 7
The Disconnect between Religion and Culture. The Triumph of Secularism

Oliver Roy
Professor, European University Institute Florence; Director, ReligioWest Project, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies
Generously supported by the European Research Council



April 9
Unparteilichkeit: Anmerkungen zu Ursprung und Reichweite eines Wissenschaftsideals

Anita Traninger
Fellow, Einstein Stiftung Berlin, Institut für Romanische Philologie der Freien Universität Berlin



April 10–11
History of Economic Thought Under Communism (Between Bukharin and Balcerowicz)



April 16
Before the Totalitarian Paradigm. The Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System

Natalia Laas
Associate Professor of History, National Aviation University, Kyiv; Research Fellow, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine



April 22
Jews and Ukrainians in Russia's Literary Borderlands

Amelia Glaser
Associate Professor of Russian and Comparative Literature, University of California, San Diego; Director, Russian and Soviet Studies Program



April 23
Ukraine between EU and Russia. Dangers and Opportunities

Alexey Miller
Recurrent Visiting Professor, Central European University, Budapest; Senior Research Fellow, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow



April 24–25
The 2004 EU Enlargement—10 Years After: Achievements and Next Steps

Venue: Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB)
In cooperation with the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) and generously supported by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs (BMEIA), the Federation of Austrian Industries (IV) and the OeNB (see p. 8)



April 24–26
Violence and the Gift. Challenging Continental Philosophy of Religion

In cooperation with the University of Vienna (Dep. of Systematic Theology and the Study of Religions and the Dep. of Philosophy) and generously supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF)



April 26–28
Lessons from the Protest Wave in Europe

Venue: Centre de Cultura Contemporània, Barcelona
In cooperation with the Centre for Liberal Strategies and generously supported by Charles Steward MOTT Foundation, Robert Bosch Stiftung, and the Open Society Initiative for Europe



April 28–29
Motherhood and Love
Panel I: Love: A Question for Feminism?
Panel II: Matka Polka Beyond Poland: Discourses and Practices of Motherhood in Contemporary Europe

Venues: IWM / Polish Institute Vienna
In cooperation with the Polish Institute Vienna and the Embassy of Sweden in Vienna



April 30
19th-Century European Encounters with Greek Catholicism

Katharine Younger
PhD candidate in Russian and East European History, Yale University

May



May 5
In the Fog (V tumane)

Film by Sergei Loznitsa, 2012
Followed by a discussion with:
Izabela Kalinowska-Blackwood
Associate Professor of Comparative Slavic Studies, Stony Brook University, New York
Oksana Sarkisova
Associate Research Fellow, Open Society Archive and Dept. of Legal Studies, Central Eastern University, Budapest
Timothy Snyder
IWM Permanent Fellow, Bird White Housum Professor, Yale University



May 6
Times and Morals. What Happens in Russia Now

Irina Prokhorova
President, Mikhail Prokhorov Foundation; Founder and editor, *New Literary Observer*, Moscow



May 7
Philosophical Theology in the Hellenistic Age. Sources, Themes, Reactions, and Influences

Máté Veres
PhD candidate in Philosophy, Central European University, Budapest



May 12
The Dark House (Dom zły)

Film by Wojciech Smarzowski, 2009
Followed by a discussion with:
Izabela Kalinowska-Blackwood
Oksana Sarkisova
Timothy Snyder

Monthly Lectures
Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.

Colloquia on Secularism
This lecture series, jointly organized with the Institute for Political Sciences of the University of Vienna, discusses the fate of religion in a secular age.

Debates at the Burgtheater
Debating Europe, organized in co-operation with the Vienna Burgtheater, ERSTE Foundation and *Der Standard*, is a matinée series of public debates.

Conferences and Workshops
The IWM frequently organizes international conferences, workshops and debates related to the Institute's research interests.

Fellows' Seminars
In the course of the semester, Junior and Senior Visiting Fellows present their research projects in the Fellows' Seminars.

Events in Retrospect 04 2014–08 2014

May June / July August



May 15

Yugoslav Eulogies. The Footprints of Gavril Princip?

Paul Miller
Associate Professor of History, McDaniel College, Westminster
(see p. 3)



May 19

Orthodox Christianity and Politics in Post-Soviet Culture as Depicted in Russian Blogs

Ekaterina Grishaeva
Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, Ural Federal University, Yekaterinburg



May 19

All That I Love (Wszystko co kocham)

Film by Jacek Borcuch, 2009
Followed by a discussion with:
Jacek Borcuch
Actor and Director
Marc Shore
Associate Professor of History, Yale University
Izabela Kalinowska-Blackwood
Oksana Sarkisova



May 21

Interwar Nation-States and the European Integration of Public Health

Sara Silverstein
PhD candidate in Modern European and International History, Yale University



May 22

Continental Encounters. The History of Phenomenology in Eastern Europe

Shalini Randeria
Full Professor and Chair, Dept. of Social Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute, Geneva; designated IWM Rector



May 23

Law and Governance in a Post-Colonial Perspective

Shalini Randeria
Full Professor and Chair, Dept. of Social Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute, Geneva; designated IWM Rector



May 27

S.P.A.R.T.A.—Territory of Happiness / Leninland

Films by Anna Moiseenko, 2013 / Askold Kurov, 2013
Followed by a discussion with:
Askold Kurov
Film Director, Cinematographer and Producer
Izabela Kalinowska-Blackwood
Oksana Sarkisova
Timothy Snyder



May 28

Old Men, State Policies and King Lear's Dilemmas in Socialist Bulgaria

Iliia Iliev
Assistant Professor of Ethnology, University of Sofia



June 2

Evil and Social Sciences

In cooperation with the Centre for Thought of John Paul II, the Institute of Sociology at Warsaw University and the journal State of Affairs



June 3–5

Human Existence as Movement. Patočka's Existential Phenomenology and Its Political Dimension

Keynote Speech:
Exodus, Exile, Existence—A Draft
Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback
Full Professor of Philosophy, Södertörn University
In cooperation with Södertörn University and Murdoch University; generously supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), Östersjöstiftelsen and the Australian Research Council (see p. 19)



June 11

“Acquisitive Society” and State Socialism. Lifestyle Issues and Consumerism in Communist Hungary

György Péteri
Professor of Contemporary European History, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim
(see p. 5)



June 12–15

Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses VI

Generously supported by Fritz Thyssen Stiftung (see p. 9)



June 18

Is Progressive Art “Elitist”? Facts and Concepts about the Avant-Gardes

Éva Forgács
Adjunct Professor of Art History, Center College of Design, Pasadena, California
(see P. 10)



June 25

The Caucasus Region: Security Challenges and Russian Policy

Sergey Markedonov
Associate Professor, Dept. of Regional Studies and Foreign Policy, Russian State University for Humanities, Moscow



June 26

History of Revolutions in the Independent Ukraine (1991–2014)

Mykhailo Minakov
Associate Professor of Philosophy and Political Science, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy; Fellow, Alfred-Krupp-Wissenschaftskolleg Greifswald



July 7–25

Problems in Modern East European and Soviet History

Thomas W. Simons Jr.
Former US Ambassador to Poland and Pakistan; Visiting Scholar, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University
(see p. 17)



August 14

The Russian Annexation of Crimea in 2014

Gulnara Bekirova
Assistant Professor of History, Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University
Refat Chubarov
Chairman of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People



Fellows' Meeting
Each year, the IWM invites its fellows, friends and supporters to an informal meeting, featuring a lecture by a well-known friend of the Institute.

Summer School
This year, the IWM invited ten PhD students and postdoctoral researchers to take part in a three-week Summer School within the research focus *United Europe-Divided History*.

Seminars Faces of Eastern Europe
This seminar series is a forum to discuss issues connected to the economies, politics and societies of Eastern Europe in an interdisciplinary, comparative perspective.

Russia in Global Dialogue
This lecture series, supported by Open Society Foundations, aims at intensifying intellectual debate between Russia and Europe.

Films in Perspective
The IWM film retrospective Past Continuous: Conflicting Historical Legacies in Contemporary East European Cinema at Blickle Kino (21er Haus) was generously supported by the Polish Embassy Vienna

Conference Report by Kristina Stoeckl
continued from page 9

rope when responding to the challenge of religious plurality and devising ad-hoc solutions that uphold the commitment to pluralism. This pragmatism, however, as Mathias Rohe pointed out, is at risk in times of public hysteria about religious and cultural difference and about the emergence of “parallel societies”.

The second session shifted the focus from secular approaches to religious plurality to religious reactions to pluralism. The speakers on the panel (Michael Warner, Nilüfer Göle and Kathryn Lofton) asked how one can explain that the rejection of pluralism by religious conservatives today has crystallized around issues of sexuality and gender. Why is it that conservative religious actors across the confessions have made the opposition to gay rights the quintessence of their expression of anti-liberalism? In many non-Western countries, the rejection of lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender rights, which are denounced as a Western, secular and liberal “invention”, has become part of post-colonial identity politics; this is true for countries as diverse as Uganda, India and Russia. But even in Western societies conservative religious actors have engaged in a battle against gay rights. Nilüfer Göle offered an interesting explanation why sexuality and gender appear to have become the last frontier in debates about secularism and pluralism. In Europe, she said, secularism historically was about the relationship between the state and the church. But in an Islamic country like Ottoman Turkey, secularism, i.e. Kemalism, was, from the start, about the state and the body: about visibility, costume and sexual norms. This debate has now reached Europe, and the negotiations over institutional secularism (which had been settled after a long series of armed conflict in European history) have given way to a much more difficult debate about secularism as a norm of individual equality in public life. In this session, Western Europe appeared, just like in the previous panel, not as a place where secularism and the commitment to pluralism have been accomplished, but rather as the space where the challenges of pluralism are only just unfolding.

The third session zoomed in on one particular case study of religious reactions to pluralism: the Eastern Orthodox Christian Churches. Orthodox Christian Churches today appear particularly challenged by the task to define their relationship with the state and society under conditions of political modernity and plurality. In this session, the speakers discussed the question whether this difficulty was due to the Byzantine (symphonic) legacy of Orthodox Christianity, to historical particularities of nation-state building processes in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, or to a lack of attention to worldly topics in Orthodox theology. The two social scientists on the panel, Alexander Agadjanian and Vasilios Makrides, shed light on the historical resistances to modernization and secularization in the Orthodox world. For many Orthodox Christians, the plurality of modern soci-

eties is a sign of apostasy, i.e. a sign that these societies have fallen away from God. Against such a theological background it is very difficult to imagine how Orthodoxy could arrive at a positive commitment to pluralism. However, the two theologians on the panel, Pantelis Kalaitzidis and Fr. Vladimir Shmalyj, gave examples where Orthodox theology has started to engage in a constructive dialogue with the modern world and has endorsed pluralism. The disagreement on the panel whether these modernizing tendencies in contemporary Orthodox theology are signs of a general opening up of Orthodox Christianity or the work of an isolated liberal elite was most instructive for the audience. In the discussion, one conference participant made the observation that the tension between a conservative tradition and progressive intellectual elites inside Orthodox Christianity are very similar to debates and constellations in the Islamic world.

The last session was dedicated to the results of an ambitious publication project on the impact of secularization in societies outside the West (*A Secular Age Beyond the West*, edited by Mirjam Künkler, John Madaley and Shylashri Shankar, forthcoming). Some of the case studies included in the book and presented at the conference comprised Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Egypt and Russia. These are countries with religious and cultural plurality inside society, but no overall commitment to pluralism. Instead, one belief system tends to be privileged over others, and religions may come to define political and collective identities. The debate on this panel (which included, besides the book's editors, also Jonathan Wrytzen and Gudrun Krämer), revolved around the question of how central the power of the state is in defining the fate of religions in non-liberal democratic settings. Gudrun Krämer suggested that a shift from a state-centred perspective to a focus on civil society could be helpful. She provided evidence from her own research on Islamic countries which suggests that the religious life in a country is less determined by state-defined constitutional provisions than by transnational flows of ideas, piety movements and even market forces.

Conferences like this one do not aim to arrive at one conclusion or at a shared result. In fact, when it comes down to the concrete assessment and interpretation of the phenomena at stake—the French military *hadj*, controversies over LGBT rights, Orthodox anti-Westernism or the quasi-sacralization of the state in many autocratic countries—there was little on which all speakers would have agreed. But one finding common to all the discussions was that conflicts over religion in present-day societies are not exclusively over religion and secularism, but are increasingly concerned with religion and pluralism. The point in question in many of today's debates about religion in the public sphere is no longer the right balance in religion-state-relations, but individual equality in public life. ◀

Eurasian Union: Russia's Failing Quest For Greatness

BY ALIAKSEI KAZHARSKI



Vladimir Putin unveiled his grandiose vision of a “Eurasian Union” in November 2011, shortly before announcing that he would be running for a third term as president. Russia's new geopolitical project would create a common market stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific and, together with the European Union and other regional organizations, would become a building block of the new global architecture.

Official rhetoric was initially full of promises about learning from European integration, combined with ambitious claims about obtaining the same results faster and more effectively. The post-Soviet countries would capitalize on their historical social and economic ties and common cultural background, above all the Russian language, which remains the region's lingua franca.

But if the Eurasian Union was officially about free markets, the Kremlin's underlying calculations were about more than economics. The idea of a Eurasian Union gained momentum at a time when the EU was becoming increasingly active in its “shared neighborhood” with Russia, promoting the Eastern Partnership as its own project for the social and economic integration of the former Soviet republics. Russian politicians' reference to the EU both as role-model and rival demonstrated the persistence of Russia's old love-hate relationship with Europe. They may have admired the Europeans for their success in building the EU, but they wanted Russia to be perceived as an equal and independent player. Because Russian exceptionalism

made it impossible to accept being treated as “just another country” in Eastern Europe, the option of joining the Eastern Partnership program was rejected: being lumped together with its former imperial subjects and bossed around by Brussels was seen as an insult to Russia's dignity as a great power. To demonstrate its geopolitical sovereignty, an alternative regional union had to be created.

Along with permanent membership in the UN Security Council and its nuclear arsenal, the Eurasian Union is a key component of Russia's status in the international arena. By running a successful project of regional economic integration, the Kremlin hoped to gain recognition from other global centers of power, above all the European Union and the United States. The Eurasian project is more about Russia's international identity and self-perception than economic goals.

The problem, however, is the gap between Russia's ambitions and capabilities. Gaining influence over the former Soviet republics has been a constant priority for the Kremlin since 1991. Vladimir Putin, who famously said that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, holds firmly to this foreign policy tradition. Russia's new Eurasianist doctrine envisions the re-integration of the former Soviet space on the principles of economic liberalism and the freedom of movement for goods, services, labor and capital. This formula of the “four freedoms”, which lies at the heart of the EU, is not new to the integration projects of the former Soviet countries.

When the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed in 1991, its members vowed to work towards creating a common European and Eurasian market. Attempts to build an economic union inside the CIS were unsuccessful, however.

After Putin announced a new round of post-Soviet integration in 2011, the question many asked was how Russia would have any chance of competing with the EU in attracting its neighbors. The Russian economy could hardly serve as a model for reforms, given its heavy dependence on revenues from energy exports, and with Russia's public institutions becoming increasingly corrupt and inefficient and its political system more authoritarian. Moreover, the post-imperial syndrome has not disappeared from the region. Fear of domination by Moscow is strong in the post-Soviet countries, both among the political classes and the populations as a whole. Russia, on the other hand, has never learned to treat its neighbors as equals. Moscow's habit of seeing the former Soviet republics as its exclusive “sphere of influence” means that its policies are always about subordination, hierarchy and control, rather than respect for equality and independence. It also means that any European or American involvement in the region—including the Eastern Partnership initiative—is automatically met by Moscow with suspicion and labeled “anti-Russian”.

Eurasian integration was clearly not sufficiently attractive to persuade the former Soviet countries to abandon participation in the Eastern Partnership. However, the Eurasian

Union was a highly sensitive topic for the Russian leadership, and for Vladimir Putin personally, who has built his political future around it. This is where the roots of the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 lie. Ukraine was to have been the jewel in the Eurasian crown, not only because of its size and economic potential, but also its symbolic importance in Russian history. The triumph of the Orange Revolution in 2005 was a personal defeat for Putin, which he sought to avenge. The prospect of Ukraine choosing Europe in favor of Eurasia in November 2013 was therefore politically intolerable.

Ironically, the EU's association agreement with Ukraine included tough economic reforms without any prospect of Union membership—something that many western European politicians had been opposing stubbornly. But if the EU had little to offer, Russia had even less. Despite massive loans and generous energy discounts, Moscow was not even close to having the same attraction—or “soft power”—as the EU for the better-educated and politically active parts of Ukrainian society. The ousting of Viktor Yanukovych by the “Euromaidan” provoked a desperate reaction from Moscow. Yet despite bringing satisfaction to the Russian leadership, the annexation of Crimea and the war in eastern Ukraine have guaranteed that, as long as Ukraine exists in its present form, it will never join any of Russia's Eurasian initiatives.

The treaty on Eurasian Economic Union signed by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in May 2014—just as the Ukrainian drama was unfolding—was therefore an abridged version. Experts argued that without Ukraine, the Eurasian project lacked whatever economic sense it might have had. But even within this smaller tripartite grouping, serious challenges exist. The use of military force in Ukraine has made Belarus and Kazakhstan much warier about how far Russia will go to accomplish its geopolitical goals. Moscow, on the other hand, has refused to provide equal access to its main strategic sector. Energy is the basic substance of economic relations in the post-Soviet space; yet oil and gas tariffs, together with transport infrastructure, have been left out of the Eurasian common market. Russia considers control of this sector too important to be shared.

The mistrust is, then, both deep and mutual. Yet it was the pooling of strategically important sectors of national economies in the European Community of Coal and Steel in the 1950s that established the initial trust between western European countries and secured all further momentum towards European integration. Until Russia's leadership acts on its analogies with the EU, no comparable level of commitment or trust will exist between the future members of the Eurasian Union. ◀

Aliaksei Kazharski is a PhD candidate at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations at the Comenius University in Bratislava. From January to June 2014 he was a Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM, where he gave a seminar on the same topic.

Ukraine: Thinking Together

EXCERPT FROM TIMOTHY SNYDER'S OPENING SPEECH



Those of us who have come from the West are not here because we think we know everything about pluralism and freedom. We have come because perhaps we know something, and are sure that we need to know more. We have come because we want to learn from you, from Ukrainians. We believe, watching from afar, that the Maidan has posed some of the fundamental questions of ethics, politics, and culture. We understand that those who have experienced these last five months in Ukraine have much to offer to us on these great matters of common and indeed universal interest.

We know that many Ukrainians have taken risks, and that many Ukrainians have died, for basic political decency. We see that in taking those risks you have done something we have not, and we come to express our admiration.

We hope that in dialogue with you these next few days we will all gain something, and perhaps create something new. We hope that this is a beginning of new acquaintances and new friendships, and that the conversation that we are starting now will continue over the years and even decades to come.

Whether we understand this or not, we in the West cannot do without you, politically and intellectually. Whether we realize this or not, Ukraine is in the middle of all of our preoccupations. We cannot renew our best traditions without you.

We hope to do something new here, but I believe too that we are working within a certain tradition, a tradition that is worth sustaining. A tradition of thinking about politics without forgetting the difference between thinking and politics. A tradition that arises from thinkers of the past, from whom in our own humble and no doubt inferior way we can learn.

The lesson for example of Hannah Arendt, that we must think at all times, never stop thinking, precisely when thinking seems impossible, and precisely about what seems unthinkable. The tradition of Krzysztof Michalski, the founder of the Institute for Human Sciences who believed that it was ideas, precisely ideas, that could overcome political divides, not all at once perhaps but with time. The tradition of Tony

Judt, the great historian of Europe of his era, who understood that the West made no sense without the East, and politics no sense without ideas. These two men who died too young were my friends and have been much on my mind as I have organized this gathering. The traditions of the great Ukrainian historians, who in their different ways recognized a duty of responsibility: Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi who believed that history must include the downtrodden, Vyacheslav Lypyns'kyi who believed that intellectuals should involve themselves in the civic effort of state building, Ivan Rudnyts'kyi who preserved the intellectual history of Ukraine as a European history. I think as well of the model of Raymond Aron, who understood that intellectuals do not engage themselves for a perfect world, but to prevent the world from becoming worse than it already is. And perhaps, above all, of that incomparable east European intellectual, a child of the Russian Empire, Isaiah Berlin, who recognized that moral goods were real and that moral goods were many, and thus that any realistic ethics must begin from pluralism.

Not only in the subjects that we will discuss but in the way that we will discuss them we hope to exemplify pluralism. We will use the languages of these thinkers—Ukrainian, Russian, French, Polish, German, English. The choices of language have not been made for convenience: on every panel people will be speaking languages that are not their mother tongues, and indeed most of the moderators will not be speaking their mother tongues. We do this as an expression of respect for Ukrainians and other east Europeans who must do the same thing every time they wish to gain the attention of the world. We do this as well as a recognition of the multilingual character of Ukraine. We do this because we believe that plurality is a good thing, including a plurality of languages. This country is the most European of all European countries in its linguistic practices, and I believe that this should be noticed and respected.” ◀

Timothy Snyder is Bird White Housum Professor of History at Yale University and IWM Permanent Fellow.



Conference Ukraine: Thinking Together May 15–19, 2014, Kyiv



Today's Ukraine is a pluralist society surrounded by authoritarian regimes, and home to an extraordinary tradition of civil society. In recent months Ukrainian writers, thinkers, and artists have raised in new ways fundamental questions about ethics, aesthetics, and politics.

In the middle of May 2014, one week before the presidential elections, an international group of intellectuals came to Kyiv to meet their Ukrainian counterparts, to demonstrate solidarity, and to carry out a public discussion about the meaning of Ukrainian pluralism for the future of Europe, Russia, and the world. The discussions featured some of Ukraine's, Western Europe's, America's and Russia's most influential opinion makers and intellectuals. The Ukrainian participants came from all parts of the country—from the west, from Kyiv, but also from the south and east, from Crimea, Odessa, Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv.

The questions raised by the Maidan revolution are at the same time old and universal, and of pressing contemporary urgency. How are we motivated by the idea of human rights? How and when does language provide access to the universal, and how and when does it define political difference? Are some experiences so intense that they alter the character of intellectual exchange as such? How is decency in politics possible amidst international anarchy, domestic corruption, and the general fallibility of individuals? Does revolution renew Europe and revive political thought, or can revolution, like everything else, be consumed by the clichés and abstractions of globalization?

These were only some of the questions that the seven public panels at the Diplomatic Academy and the six public lectures at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy addressed from different backgrounds and disciplinary perspectives. The gathering was the initiative of Leon Wieseltier (*The New Republic*) and Timothy Snyder (Yale University and Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna), locally organized by the journal *Krytyka* with a host of Ukrainian and international partners. All events were broadcast live and covered by international media, including major dailies and television channels from Europe, Russia, and North America.

The conference opened with a public lecture by **Timothy Snyder** entitled

Not Even Past: Ukrainian Histories, Russian Politics, European Futures, followed by lectures given by **Bernard-Henri Lévy** (*La résistible ascension d'Arturo Poutine*), **Ivan Krastev** (*The Global Politics of Protest*), **Slavenka Drakulić** (*Intellectuals as Bad Guys? The Role of Intellectuals in the Balkan Wars*), and **Paul Berman** (*Alexis de Tocqueville and the Idea of Democracy*).

Speakers and Chairs:

- Paul Berman
- Wolf Biermann
- Vasyl Cherepanyn
- Carmen Claudin
- Slavenka Drakulić
- Viktor Erofeyev
- Olga Filippova
- Frank Foer
- Oksana Forostyna
- Carl Gershman
- George Grabowicz
- François Heisbourg
- Ola Hnatiuk
- Agnieszka Holland
- Yaroslav Hrytsak
- Cathrin Kahlweit
- Mark Kingwell
- Bernard Kouchner
- Nikolay Koposov
- Ivan Krastev
- Volodymyr Kulyk
- Andrey Kurkov
- Bernard-Henri Lévy
- Sergei Lukashovsky
- Daniel Markovits
- Myroslav Marynovych
- Adam Michnik
- Mykhailo Minakov
- Alexander Podrabinek
- Jurko Prochasko
- Mykola Riabchuk
- Alexander Roitburd
- Karl Schlögel
- Karel Schwarzenberg
- Ihor Shchupak
- Anton Shekhovtsov
- Marci Shore
- Sławomir Sierakowski
- Konstantin Sigov
- Konstantin Skorkin
- Aleksander Smolar
- Timothy Snyder
- Olena Styazhkina
- Martin Šimečka
- Andrzej Waśkiewicz
- Leon Wieseltier
- Volodymyr Yermolenko
- Serhiy Zhadan
- Tatiana Zhurzhenko
- Josef Zissels

For more information about the conference (including program, participants list and videos) see www.iwm.at/kyiv-conference

Documentation in Ukrainian: krytyka.com.ua/articles/mizhnarodna-konferentsiya-myslyty-z-ukrayinoyu-pidsumky

Commander of a Fortress under Siege

BY MARIA LIPMAN

Sanctions on Russia may tip economic stagnation into recession and widen the country's gap with western nations still further. This time Putin seems to be plying an isolationist course without regard for the consequences, writes Maria Lipman.




Photo: Lucie Debelkova

It is common to think of Putin as a tactician rather than a strategist. Indeed, throughout his years in power he has repeatedly demonstrated tactical skill, effectively handling inauspicious and even calamitous developments, including terrorist attacks, natural disasters, technogenic catastrophes, wars, the economic crisis of 2008–2009 and mass protests of 2011–2012. His foreign policy was mostly reactive, responding to initiatives of the West, first and foremost the United States. If his long-term vision of Russia's future was vague and now simply missing, his tactical maneuvers more often than not enabled him to achieve short-term objectives. He remains immensely popular among the Russian people and has gained the reputation of a tough and cunning player on the world stage. In 2014, guileful and dangerous sounds like a more appropriate description.

It would be wrong to assume, however, that Putin does not have strategic priorities. At least two major priorities can be traced throughout his reign as the supreme leader of Russia: control at home and sovereignty on the world stage.

Control at Home

From the start of Putin's leadership back in 2000, control at home has meant a solid monopoly on political power unconstrained by checks and balances. Politics was soon cleansed of any unwanted players, leaving Putin unchallenged as the top decision-maker. He was supported by an ever loyal bureaucracy that did not have

to worry about public accountability. The economic model matched the pattern of centralized government. Despite repeated pledges of diversification, the economy remained resource-based. The most lucrative industries, first and foremost oil and gas, came under Kremlin control, either through direct state ownership or by entrusting them with loyal owners. If private companies were deemed strategically important, they were denied full disposal over their assets. This way, the government could amass a gigantic resource rent—the high and rising price of oil was an invaluable contribution to the efficiency of Putin's political project. The Kremlin then redistributed the income as it saw fit—in order to secure the loyalty of the bureaucracy, and especially the security elites, as well as to keep the bulk of the population reasonably content.

This model of governance was hardly conducive to economic development. It undermined modernization; it discouraged private initiative; it kept decision-making non-transparent and productivity low; it generated corruption and extinguished even the hope of the rule of law. But Putin was willing to pay this price for his strategic priority. If economic efficiency came into conflict with

domestic control, whether in politics or the economy, over the elites or the broader public, Putin opted for control. Still, his policy remained reasonably balanced and pragmatic: by early 2008, near the end of his second presidential term, he had delivered stability, substantial economic growth and higher living standards.

Sovereignty on the World Stage

Putin's other top priority is securing Russia against unwanted interference from the West, whether in internal affairs or in Russian interests in the former Soviet space. For Putin, Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika*—easing of domestic control and opening up to the West, a policy that eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union—was a national disaster.

This mindset regards the first post-Communist decade, not unreasonably, as a time when Russia suffered humiliation by the West, first and foremost by the United States, which repeatedly took advantage of its weakness.

Putin undertook to counter such policies and force the West to reckon with Russia. Realizing Russia's weakness, he avoided a direct stand-off and instead played the role of the difficult and stubborn partner. Pu-

tin by no means sought isolation. He sought recognition and wanted Russia to benefit from better economic relations with the West. But although attracting foreign investment and engaging in economic cooperation was high on his list of priorities, sovereignty was higher still. As with control at home, if defending Russia's national interests, geopolitical and otherwise, conflicted with beneficial economic cooperation with the West, Putin would never

A Consensus of Emergency

In October 2014, Vladimir Putin's approval rating reached 88%. For seven straight months, over 80% of Russians have approved his course, notwithstanding the economic decline exacerbated by the western sanctions and the falling price of oil. Putin's approval is in sync with the perception of the annexation of Crimea—86% supported it in October. Meanwhile, the Russian people admit that their economic situation has deteriorated or will deteriorate in the near future; 60% shared such expectations in October, 56% said this was related “to the annexation of Crimea, the political and military assistance to the rebels” in Ukraine's east. The euphoria that most Russians shared immediately after the annexation has subsided and has given way to a “consensus of emergency”, a mindset of a fortress under siege (for details see www.levada.ru or www.vedomosti.ru).

compromise on sovereignty. In this sphere, too, he managed to maintain a balance. During the 2000s, despite inevitable setbacks, relations with the West repeatedly returned to business as usual. Moreover, Putin scored a number of important tactical victories: for instance, he effectively opposed NATO expansion to include Georgia and Ukraine, and blocked the deployment of elements of the American missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic. He deftly took advantage of the differences between the United States and Europe as well as between members of the European Union. He could pride himself on winning reluctant recognition on the world stage as a skilled, if unpleasant, political leader.

Putin's Return to the Kremlin

The beginning of Putin's third presidency was marked by mass public protests and the slowdown of economic growth. The former led to tighter controls over politics and society and increased funding for the security agencies. The latter put a strain on the Kremlin's material resources. In order to rally the support of the conservative majority, the Kremlin opted for a harshly anti-western (and especially anti-American) line, which led to a steady deterioration of relations with the West. Putin's policies were losing balance: the rising cost of control and sovereignty were compromising a Russian economy already in decline.

As the crisis in Ukraine was rapidly escalating, Putin's conflict between sovereignty and national development became more acute than ever. He remained adamant, of course, on his strategic priorities, but this time round he appeared totally unconcerned about the costs. Putin's dramatic moves—the annexation of Crimea, the covert assistance to the anti-Kievan rebels in eastern Ukraine accompanied by flat denials and lies in his communication with western leaders, the equivocal stance on the shooting down of the Malaysian airliner—have led to overt confrontation with the West. In 2014 a return to business as usual looks out of the question. The western sanctions are gravely weakening the Russian finances and contribute to the lowering of people's living standards. The restricted access to modern technologies will widen the gap between Russia and the developed nations.

Putin's policy has also deeply damaged his ambition to raise Rus-

sia's global stature. He had sought to achieve recognition for Russia as a great nation of the world, the leader of the former Soviet region and perhaps even further afield. Ukraine was seen as the key member of the "Russian realm", Russia's sphere of influence that Putin aspired to secure. But Putin's policy turned a once brotherly Ukrainian nation into an outright enemy. The Kremlin propaganda condemned the Ukrainian government as "fascist" or a "junta", Russia put its weight behind the rebels in eastern Ukraine and helped them secure control over chunks of Ukrainian territory. After that even those former Soviet countries that had friendly ties with Russia started getting concerned.

The leaders of the West are outraged and alarmed by Putin's policies and consider even deeper and broader sanctions; mainstream western media referred to Putin's Russia as a pariah state. Putin responds with angry defiance and denies that any of his policies are wrong or unlawful. "Russia is fortunately not a member of any alliance", he said. "This is also a guarantee of our sovereignty". Putin's message conveys more than Russia's turning away from the West: it is a statement of national isolation.

Since his return to the presidency in 2012, Putin has altered his generally pragmatic course to one that is increasingly ideological and focused on state nationalism and a siege mentality. Its other elements include a quasi-traditionalism and pitting the paternalistic majority against Russia's small, modernized and westernized minorities. The "new economy" that emerged during the post-Soviet development and the constituencies it had generated were increasingly getting in Putin's way. In 2014 modernization has been removed from Putin's agenda. The combination of isolation by the West and isolationism from within has thoroughly reinforced Russia's anti-modernization course.

Putin's Russia is not facing imminent collapse. The powerful propaganda machine will be used even more aggressively to ensure that the vast majority of the Russian population will continue to rally behind Putin—the leader who defends them against the western enemy and gives them a sense that Russia is again a great and feared power. Thanks to Russia's vast nuclear arsenal and her veto power in the UN Security Council, Putin will continue to have a say in international affairs. But whatever his earlier ambitions for Russia's national development, Putin's choices have been reduced to those of the commander of a fortress under siege. ◀

Maria Lipman was the editor-in-chief of *Pro et Contra*, a policy journal published by the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2003 till 2014. Before joining Carnegie Moscow Center she was co-founder and deputy editor of two Russian weekly magazines: *Itogi* (Summing Up), the first weekly newsmagazine in Russia, published in association with *Newsweek*, and *Ezhenedel'ny Zhurnal* (Weekly Journal). In November 2014 she was a IWM Visiting Fellow within the *Russia in Global Dialogue Program*, supported by a grant of Open Society Foundations. An earlier version of this text was first published by *Eurozine*.

Problems in Modern East European & Soviet History

REPORT BY AMIEKE BOUMA

In July 2014, the IWM invited ten PhD students and postdoctoral researchers from Eastern and Western Europe as well as the US to take part in a three-week summer school within the Institute's research focus on United Europe—Divided History.

This year's summer school was directed by Thomas W. Simons Jr., a former US diplomat specializing in East-West relations who has written several books on Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Simons' personal recollections of East European political events and personalities (he served as a diplomat in Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union, amongst other countries) gave a fascinating insight in the workings of West-East diplomacy during and directly after the Cold War. They also served as a potent reminder of the open-endedness of developments at the time.

In the first week, discussions focused in particular on the way in which the large peasant majority in Russian society set the stage for the October Revolution and determined early Soviet policies of economic development. Both in Russia and Eastern Europe, the challenges to industrial development posed by largely rural populations and subsistence agriculture were enormous. In Russia, however, the 1917 Revolution and the ensuing Civil War bred a strong state that could direct its efforts towards industrialization—yet this happened at horrific and often preventable human cost. The organization and social structure of peasant society likewise posed great obstacles to industrial development in East-Central Europe, which were further exacerbated by the large-scale destruction of infrastructure during WWI. Until the end of WWII, both Western-supported and Soviet-directed industrialization were considered viable options for economic development in Eastern Europe.¹ In the end, East-Central Europe decisively came within the orbit of the Soviet Union—to emerge from it four decades later with societies profoundly changed by Soviet-style industrialization and, in particular, urbanization, just as Soviet society itself had changed under these policies.

Building on this exploration of early Soviet and Eastern European societies and economic developments, the second week's sessions focused on violence during the collectivization campaigns and WWII. What was striking in both historical accounts and literary reflections on this violence was not just the amount but also the normality of excessive violence—as conducted by the state, but also in the absence of the state. Shimon Redlich's account of Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish inter-ethnic relations in the town of Brzezany



before and during WWII² demonstrated that the Polish dominance of the local administration led to increasing frustration and thus radicalization of Ukrainian nationalists, which in turn triggered further radicalization amongst the Polish population. Timothy Snyder's account of Ukrainian ethnic violence against the Polish population in Volhynia³ points to the "triple occupation" of these parts of Ukraine—first by Poland, then by Germany, and finally by the Soviets—as an important factor contributing to the increasing inter-ethnic violence. This happened in particular due to the 'normalization' of extreme violence, growing mutual suspicion and accusations of collaboration with the occupiers, and the unstable political situation leading to strategies of 'annihilating' the opponent in order to 'prepare' for the region's possible future as part of an independent national state. In general, nation-states emerged from WWII more ethnically homogeneous than they had been before, largely because of the destruction of minority groups or their expulsion from the new nations' territories. What became especially clear is how violence, once it was part of daily life, became extremely hard to rein in. In the case of the Kielce pogrom of July 1946, inhabitants killed Jews who had returned after WWII in a "leisurely manner".⁴ Ordinary people or the rank-and-file of the regime also used violence to their own advantage. Local communist party cadres assisted in collectivization campaigns to advance their careers, and people denounced their neighbors to settle old scores, or to benefit from the 'spoils' of expropriation.

The last week of the summer school focused on the developments leading up to the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In particular, we discussed the rise of 'anti-political' opposition movements in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, eventually resulted in an 'anti-utopian' revolution whose main protagonists tried to create political and legal institutions and economic ar-

rangements that were presented either as having existed in the past or as already existing elsewhere (in the form of a "European myth"). The focus on multi-party politics as the model for development also facilitated the uneasy transition from moral opposition movements to political parties needing to make compromises. The example of *Solidarność* demonstrated the difficulties of this transition. Yet the initial willingness of the Polish public to support the movement despite the economic crisis also demonstrates that politics based on morality and politics based on interest cannot be effectively separated: in the end, both are mediated by trust.

Of course, this summary by no means gives a complete picture of the discussions we had during the summer school. In many cases, historical developments were discussed with an eye on more recent events. Questions regarding the possibility of non-violent industrialization or the development of multi-ethnic nations emerged with regards to the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, the current war in Syria, as well as continued global inequality. For obvious reasons, we devoted considerable time to the developing conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Starting each session with a news update from our three Ukrainian participants, we discussed the differences in Ukrainian and Russian, but also Eastern and Western European perspectives on these developments. And although points of view within our small group differed little, the discussion made it clear that the different evaluations of these events are rooted in historical experience. ◀

¹ Paul Rosenstein-Rodan: "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (1943)", in: A.N. Agarwala and S.P. Singh: *The Economics of Underdevelopment*, New York: Oxford U. Press, 1963.

² Shimon Redlich: *Together and Apart in Brzezany. Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919–1945*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.

³ Timothy Snyder: "The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943", in: *Past and Present* 179, 2003.

⁴ Jan Gross: *Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz*, New York: Random House, 2006.

Amieke Bouma is a PhD candidate in History at the VU University Amsterdam, where she researches memory formation and interest representation by organizations of former GDR elites since 1990.

Thomas W. Simons, Jr., is currently a Visiting Scholar at Harvard's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. His most recent book is *Eurasia's New Frontiers: Young States, Old Societies, Open Futures* (Cornell, 2008).

Summer School July 7–25, 2014, Vienna

Program

Session I:
"Backwardness" and the
Legacies of Peasant Society

Session II:
The Persistence and
Multiple Roles of Violence

Session III:
Memory, including the Roles
of Moralism in Politics

Session IV:
Remembered and
"Historical" Events

Participants

Director: Thomas W. Simons

Amieke Bouma (Netherlands)

Marco Bresciani (Italy)

Kateryna Budz (Ukraine)

Violeta Ivanova Tsirova (Bulgaria)

William A. Jenkins (USA)

Ewa Rzana (Poland)

Viktorija Rusinaitė (Lithuania)

Iryna Shyrokov (Ukraine)

Olga Usenko (Ukraine)

Elizabeth Wenger (USA)

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Józef Tischner Junior
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**Psychopolitics: The
Discourse of Psychiatry
and Modernization
Processes in Post-1989
Poland**

Aner Barzilay

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Yale University

**A Journey into the
Limits of Reason: French
Nietzscheanism (1952–
1984)**

Gulnara Bekirova

Guest (August 2014)

Assistant Professor
of History, Crimean
Engineering and Pedagogi-
cal University, Simferopol;
journalist and commenta-
tor, Crimean Tatar TV
Channel ATR

**The Russian Annexation
of Crimea in 2014**

Magda Błędowska

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(July–September 2014)

Editor, *Krytyka Polityczna*
Publishing House, Warsaw

**25 Years of Polish
Transformation: Conditions
of Mainstream Journalism
and Challenges for the
Future**

Benjamin Cunningham

Milena Jesenská
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**Roma and the New
Nationalism**

Herwig Czech

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Widerstandes

**Gesundheit, Krankheit und
Tod. Wien 1944–1948**

James Dodd

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Philosophy, New School for
Social Research, New York

**Europe, Critique,
and Religious Life. Jan
Patočka's Reflections on
Christianity**

Stefan Eich

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Theory, Yale University

**Moments of Monetary
Politics**

Christian Ferencz-Flatz

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Researcher, Alexandru
Dragomir Institute,
Romanian Society for
Phenomenology, Bucharest

**Walter Benjamin: *Das
Passagen-Werk*** (German >
Romanian)

Michał Filipczuk

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Freelance translator,
Cracow

**Judith Butler: *Parting
Ways. Jewishness and the
Critique of Zionism***
(English > Polish)

Éva Forgács

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Adjunct Professor of Art
History, Art Center College
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Re-claiming Modernism

Evgenii Gamerman

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Associate Professor of
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of Entrepreneurship,
Blagoveshchensk

**Representations of
Democracy: The Experi-
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Rhetoric of Contemporary
Russia, India and the EU**

Ekaterina Grishaeva

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Assistant Professor of
Religious Studies, Ural
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**Orthodox Christianity and
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Culture as Depicted in
Russian Blogs**

Ludger Hagedorn

Research Director, IWM
(December 2010–June 2014)

Lecturer in Philosophy,
New York University, Berlin

**Polemical Christianity.
Jan Patočka's Concept of
Religion and the Crisis of
Modernity**

Ilia Iliev

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Assistant Professor of
Ethnology, University of
Sofia

**Old Men at Home:
Bulgarian Eldercare
Policies, Family and
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**Eurasian Regional
Integration and Institution-
alization of Russian
Hegemony in Eastern
Europe and the Post-
Soviet Area**

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Center for Human Values
Film Forum, Princeton
University

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Filmmaking Contra
Hollywood**

Jarosław Kuisz

Milena Jesenská Visiting
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Editor-in-chief, *Kulturna
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**Towards a Central-Eastern
European Liberalism?
Polish Liberal Culture After
20 Years of Democracy**

Agata Anna Lisiak

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June 2014)

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TRANSFORMIG, Institute
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**The Image of Women in
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Occupy Wall Street**

Matthew Maguire

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**From Private Regulation
to Public Policy: The Case
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Reporting**

Ewa Majewska

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**Political Solidarity Within
Contemporary Polish
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Jakub Majmurek

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Editor, *Krytyka Polityczna*,
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Cine-Art

Sergey Markedonov

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Associate Professor,
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**The Caucasus Region:
Security Challenges and
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Kinga Marulewska

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Science, Nicolaus
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***Quis judicabit?* Carl
Schmitt's Early Theory
of Sovereignty in the
Context of Pluralism and
Normativism**

Aleksandr Morozov

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Editor-in-chief, *Russkiy
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**Protests in Russia in
December 2011**

Jan-Werner Mueller

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Professor of Politics,
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in the History of Political
Thought

**On Populism and
Democracy**

Dinara Nevaeva

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Sociology, Altai State
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**Social Exclusion of Older
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Analysis**

György Péteri

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Professor of Contemporary
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Norwegian University of
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**On and Off Class
Relativism. A Social and
Political History of
Economic Research in
Communist Hungary
(1948–1968)**

Roumiana Preshlenova

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow
(December 2013–May 2014)

Associate Professor of
Balkan Studies, Bulgarian
Academy of Sciences, Sofia

**Konrad Clewing, Oliver
Jens Schmitt (Hg.):
*Geschichte Südosteuropas***
(German > Bulgarian)

Irina Prokhorova

Guest (May 2014)

President, Mikhail
Prokhorov Foundation;
founder and editor, *New
Literary Observer*, Moscow

**Times and Morals: What
Happens in Russia Now**

Mykola Riabchuk

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Nationalities' Studies,
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**Muddling Through in a
Grey Zone: Divergent
Trajectories of the Hybrid
Regimes after Communism**

Marcia Sá Cavalcante

Schuback
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(April–June 2014)

Full Professor of Philoso-
phy, Södertörn University,
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Existence in Exile

Anton Shekhovtsov

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PhD researcher in Political
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Slavonic and East European
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**The Two Faces of the
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Far Right, Manipulating
the Far Left**

Marci Shore

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Director, Institute for
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**Accursed Answers:
Communism, Capitalism,
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Czesław Miłosz**

Sara Silverstein

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European and International
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**Before Doctors Without
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Refugees and the Social
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Volodymyr Sklokin

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**The Social Relevance
of History in Poland,
Russia and Ukraine in a
Comparative Context
(1989–2012)**

Konstantyn Skorkin

Guest
(August–September 2014)

Historian and journalist;
co-founder, Ukrainian arts
and literature group STAN

**Eastern Ukraine/
Novorossia: A History of
Suicide**

Ovidiu Stanciu

Guest (July–August 2014)

PhD candidate in
Philosophy, Université de
Bourgogne and Bergische
Universität Wuppertal

**The Problem of Metaphys-
ics in Heidegger and
Patočka**

Anna Sugiyama

Guest (August 2014)

PhD candidate in History,
Central European
University, Budapest

**Underground Seminars in
the Late Socialist Central
Europe: The Cases of
Czechoslovakia and Poland
(1968–1984)**

Anita Traninger

Visiting Fellow
(January–April 2014)

Einstein Junior Fellow,
Institut für Romanische
Philologie, Freie Universität
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**The Genealogy of
Unpartiality**

Maxim Trudolyubov

Guest (August 2014)

Opinion page editor,
business daily *Vedomosti*,
Moscow

Russia's Grand Choice

Máté Veres

CEU Junior Visiting Fellow
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**Philosophical Theology,
the Autonomy of Popular
Religion, and Religion as
Moral Theory in the
Hellenistic Era and Beyond**

Gregory Winger

Junior Visiting Fellow
(September 2013–June 2014)

PhD candidate in Political
Science, Boston University

**Changing Norms of
Political Violence in
Intrastate Disputes**

Katherine Younger

Junior Visiting Fellow
(April–August 2014)

PhD candidate in Russian
and East European History,
Yale University

**The Greek Catholic Church
in Its International Context
(1839–1882)**

Renate Zöller

Milena Jesenská
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(July–September 2014)

Freelance journalist, Hürth

Longing for Heimat

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Religion and the Crisis of Modernity

BY LUDGER HAGEDORN



Photo: Jan Patočka Archive

What is the reason for re-considering religion? What is the philosophical challenge it poses? What can be the meaning of some “return of the religious” when—at least in the European context—religion seems to have ceased giving life and offering “sense”? Addressing questions of religion today, we often seem to be hinting at a mere spectre, the gruesome shadow in an empty cave that Nietzsche speaks about in his *Gay Science*.

Yet it is precisely this shadowy nature of religion in the secular world which might pose a problem. On the one hand, looked at from *inside* of religious worldviews, the public pressure on religion is felt as repression and a denial of its right to exist. This paves the way for all kinds of radicalizations and simplifications. A religion deprived of its cultural rooting is more likely to fall prey to the stubborn insistence on its own dogmatic supremacy and will enforce it by almost any means. French political scientist Olivier Roy has recently described this attitude as “sainte ignorance” (English title *Holy Ignorance. When Religion and Culture Part Ways*).

On the other hand, in the eyes of the secular-scientific worldview, this development once more confirms the reservations against religion. It leads to the outright denial of religion’s meaning for today and pushes religion even further back into its niche of seclusion. This reinforces religion’s dogmatic self-immunization (thereby corroborating

its seeming incompatibility with the modern world and reaffirming the vicious circle of ignorance), but it also deprives the secular world itself of a great deal of its historical and cultural sources. As a result, the dominant intellectual landscape of our globalized world is ever more becoming a “wasteland of sense and truth”, as Jean-Luc Nancy put it from his point of view as a philosopher—not as a believer or non-believer. It seems therefore that it should be the task of philosophy today to work on the

The Czech philosopher Jan Patočka (1907–1977) is considered one of the most important Central European thinkers of the 20th century. Having studied in Prague, Paris, Berlin and Freiburg, he was one of the last students of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. He was a co-founder and speaker of the civil rights movement Charter 77. On 13 March 1977, shortly after the publication of the declaration, he died after a series of police interrogations. His writings include reflections on history and politics, essays on art and literature, studies in ancient philosophy as well as an inspiring history of modern ideas. The research focus *The Philosophical Work of Jan Patočka* at the IWM, initiated in 1984, aims at collecting, exploring and disseminating his oeuvre. For that purpose, an archive was established at the IWM in close collaboration with the Patočka Archive in Prague. It has provided the basis for numerous publications in various languages and projects, such as the current project *Polemical Christianity. Jan Patočka’s Concept of Religion and the Crisis of Modernity* funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF grant no. P22828). Further details on: www.iwm.at/research/patocka

“mutual dis-enclosure” of religious and secular-scientific worldviews.

Over recent years, research at the IWM has increasingly dealt with questions of religion and secularism. A lecture series entitled *Beyond Myth and Enlightenment* aimed at a reconsideration of religion beyond old dichotomies. Speakers included, among others, Islamic scholar Gudrun Krämer, sociologist Martin Endress, as well as philosophers Jean Greisch and Hans Joas. The lectures provided vivid debates on different aspects of the dispersion of religion and challenged the modern, perhaps all-too-secular, self-conception.

This series, which ran from 2011 to 2014, was a cooperation of two FWF-funded research projects directed by Ludger Hagedorn (IWM) and Michael Staudigl (Institute for Philosophy, University of Vienna). Both projects evolved out of a phenomenological perspective that involves “bracketing” ideological debates in order to focus on underlying structures of meaning (*Sinnstrukturen*). Especially in the context of debates on religion, this approach enables us to clarify religious attitudes and implications free of the constraints of the short-sighted dogmas of theism or atheism. It is not only the proximity of the two terms in logics (one is simply the negation of the other), but rather the dogmatic character of both standpoints that retains the essence of what it negates. If, as Jean-Luc Nancy holds, “all contemporary thinking” will once be seen as “a slow and heavy gravitational movement

continued on page 20

Conference Human Existence as Movement Patočka’s Existential Phenomenology and Its Political Dimension June 3–5, 2014, Vienna

Program

June 3, 2014

Keynote Speech:

Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback:
Exodus, Exile, Existence—A Draft

Chair: Ludger Hagedorn

June 4, 2014

Session I

James Dodd:
Deep History

Chair: Klaus Nellen

Session II

Susanna Lindberg:
After the Earthquake. Questions to Patočka’s “Préhistoire du Mouvement”

Ludger Hagedorn:
Without God and Future. Patočka’s Reading of the “Brothers Karamazov”

Chair: Lubica Učňik

Session III

Lubica Učňik:
Dostoyevsky: A Seismographer of Disintegration. Patočkian Reflections

Chair: Sandra Lehmann

Session IV

Gustav Strandberg:
Jan Patočka and the Idea of Politics

Peter Trawny:
Das Unerzählbare. Anmerkungen zu Jan Patočkas Aufsatz „Was ist Existenz?“

Chair: Jan Frei

June 5, 2014

Session V

Ciaran Summerton:
Three Perspectives of Politics and History: Patočka, Hayek, and French Positivism

Chair: Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback

Session VI

Hans Ruin:
Life after Death

Agustín Serrano de Haro:
Arendt’s Idea of Totalitarian Elements after the Defeat of Totalitarianism

Chair: Michael Staudigl

Session VII

Jakub Homolka:
The ‘Spiritual Person’: A Link between the Existential Movement and ‘Non-Political Politics’?

Chair: Klaus Nellen

Session VIII

Ivan Chvatík:
Jan Patočka’s Spiritual Politics—Is It Possible?

Chair: James Dodd

Participants

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This conference, generously supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), Östersjöstiftelsen and the Australian Research Council, was organized in cooperation with Södertörn University and Murdoch University.

Ludger Hagedorn
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around the black sun of atheism,” then this diagnosis mainly aims at the often privative, subtractive and defective character of atheism, which remains blind and deaf to the religious “input” even against its own will. The statement does therefore not entail an affirmation of theism, it rather points at the lack of capability and will to think beyond, or in-between, the old dichotomies. It is one of the concerns of contemporary phenomenology to overcome this biased understanding of religion (as in the works of Marion, Kearney, Steinbock, Caputo and others). But the current debate is also grounded in the phenomenological tradition. Jan Patočka (1907–1977) is one of the most important thinkers in that regard. The IWM project *Polemical Christianity. Jan Patočka’s Concept of Religion and the Crisis of Modernity* was dedicated to his philosophical undertaking to rethink Christianity and aimed at relating his ideas to the contemporary debate.

For Patočka, reflections on the philosophical and political meaning of Christianity represented an important and crucial aspect of his thought. He is one of the few thinkers who already at his time conceived of the crisis of modernity not just in terms of its cultural and scientific dimensions, but explicitly analysed the need for a reassessment of religion and, in the European context, particularly of Christianity. From Patočka’s very early writings until the late *Heretical Essays* there runs a core of untimely thoughts that are as provocative and heretical to the Christian tradition as they are to the triumphant secularism of modern times. This philosophical venture makes him stand out as an important forerunner of, as well as a critical counterweight to, the contemporary resurgence of religion in scholarly and intellectual discourse. More specifically, it is exactly the above-mentioned disintegration of religion and the modern scientific worldview that Patočka explained in his analyses of the two-sided potential for radicalization, pointing at striking examples for such violent disintegration in the European history of ideas.

Patočka’s intimate engagement with Christianity is—as in the case of Nancy—that of a philosopher, not of a believer or non-believer. In his philosophy of history, he speaks about the “Post-Christian epoch” as the European reality from at least the 19th century onwards, and it seems that this is something he simply takes as a given, without any undertone of either triumph or regret. He considers religion, especially Christianity, mainly with respect to its intellectual potential, i.e., as a profound challenge to philosophy and its continuing allegiance to Greek (“metaphysical”) patterns of thinking. Such reflections on the philosophical potential of Christian ideas underlie and permeate his work in general, but they are not elaborated systematically or developed into an explicit doctrine.

The philosophical background of Patočka, a student of both Husserl and Heidegger, is phenomenology. Our research activities aimed at

contextualizing Patočka’s concepts of religion within his own oeuvre as well as in the philosophical tradition that it speaks from, evoking not only the phenomenological debate but also challenging the critique of religion most prominently formulated by Nietzsche. A crucial reference for our research was Patočka’s long study *On Masaryk’s Philosophy of Religion*. This text, the last that Patočka finished in his life-time and which thereby stands out as his philosophical legacy, is dedicated to the quest for meaning in human life amidst the maelstrom of *nihilism* and *dogmatism*. Nihilism and dogmatism defiantly negate or affirm a meaning of life, thereby paving the way for all kinds of political or religious ideologies, yet they both resemble each other precisely in their unwillingness to bear the openness of the question as such. It is precisely the attempt to think beyond such established dichotomies that Patočka advocates and that he projects as a “new phenomenology of meaning”. Looking at today’s debates on the place of religion in (post-)modern society, these considerations address a contemporary intellectual desideratum. It finds inspiring resources in Patočka’s insights.

While the Vienna University project *Beyond Myth and Enlightenment* runs until November 2015, the IWM project on *Polemical Christianity* came to an end in June 2014. Research results will be published in two forthcoming publications: 1) *Religion, War and the Crisis of Modernity*, an issue of the “New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy” that will be exclusively dedicated to Patočka. The issue will be edited by James Dodd and Ludger Hagedorn as guest editors and will comprise the results of the various research activities. Next to 12 scholarly articles analyzing Patočka’s philosophical legacy within the context of contemporary debates, it will also present crucial texts by Patočka himself, including the long study *On Masaryk’s Philosophy of Religion* as well as *Time, Myth, Faith*, one of his most important earlier articles, in which Patočka develops his understanding of faith as an openness towards the future, i.e., as he puts it, a “belief in life.” 2) *Secularization and Its Discontents. A Reconsideration of Religion beyond Myth and Enlightenment*—the volume will be edited by Ludger Hagedorn and Michael Staudigl and present 19 scholarly articles dealing with questions of religion in secular society. The authors are among the best-known scholars and experts in the field of phenomenology of religion. Both volumes will be published in early 2015.

In June, the IWM hosted the project’s concluding conference (see p. 19). It was the last of five conferences organized as part of the project *Polemical Christianity. Jan Patočka’s Concept of Religion and the Crisis of Modernity*. ◀

Ludger Hagedorn directed the FWF funded project *Polemical Christianity. Jan Patočka’s Concept of Religion and the Crisis of Modernity* at the IWM.

Stefan Eich
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not have to incapacitate us but can point us to new possibilities of critically assessing and altering them. Instead of being dazzled or frightened by the fictional character of money, we can and should analyze the political legitimacy and justice of the institutions that govern it.

Today, the sublime powers of money creation are matched by the awkwardness of central banks’ constitutional position. After the inflationary upheaval of the 1970s, a policy consensus formed that has since led to a gradual transformation whereby most central banks have been removed from direct democratic politics. Instead, they were granted a detached status of nominal independence, often combined with a specific inflation target. The effect of this “quiet revolution,” as Alasdair Roberts has described it, is hard to overstate. It has profoundly altered the role of states that now self-consciously constrain themselves in their ability and willingness to politicize economic conflicts. Until the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, the consensus behind this transfor-

attempt to politicize transactions by conducting them in the conventional token of a political community. As the medium through which justice and equity were dispensed, currency asserted the authority of the polis over questions of value.

To point to the ways in which currencies form the bond of political communities already suggests an analogy between a currency and what has come to be known as the social contract tradition. Not unlike a social contract, a currency consists of an initial social covenant understood as an exchange of mutual promises that extend into the future. In *The Elements of Law*, Hobbes highlights currencies (alongside weights and measures) as prime illustrations for the kind of collective covenant based on mutual acknowledgement that was to found the political commonwealth. If the social contract tradition offers resources for grasping the role played by currencies, to study currencies as political institutions also complicates the conventional understanding of social contracts as overly legalistic and static. Central to the promise that undergirds currency is a reli-

sovereign paper money the social cement of circulating trust that constituted the soul of the state. The credit state as a persona ficta was furthermore potentially immortal, so that credit could be extended into an infinite future consisting of an endless chain of mediations. The state had become at once essential and invisible, centralized and circulating.

Only in the course of the last century did the subject of currencies drift away from political philosophy. Turning to today’s normative political theory, one encounters a conspicuous absence of currency as a topic worthy of normative analysis and institutional design. It is barely mentioned by John Rawls and reduced to a mere steering medium by Jürgen Habermas. This absence should strike us as odd and ironic. After all, the centrality of state-administered fiat currency reached unprecedented heights precisely at the same time.

If currencies have today largely disappeared as a topic in political theory, the history of political thought suggests that this is a comparatively recent departure from a long and fertile tradition. From

Instead of being dazzled or frightened
by the fictional character of money, we can and should
analyze the political legitimacy of the institutions
that shape and govern it.

mation was rarely challenged. But since then central bankers have inadvertently found themselves in the political limelight in ways that were not intended and that inevitably raise questions about their supposedly independent status. As a result, monetary politics now again throws up nagging questions of political legitimacy and justice. If the application of these questions to money has become unfamiliar to us, the history of political thought contains an extensive discussion of currency.

The link between currency and the purpose of a political community was a foundational element of ancient Greek political thought. It is a remarkable historical fact that the invention of philosophy and Greek democracy coincided with the invention of coinage in Lydia—as captured by the mythical encounter of King Croesus of Lydia and the Athenian lawgiver Solon. Sometimes it is observed, not without reason, that the Greeks had no word for money. But *nomisma*, the term conventionally translated as currency or coinage, had a meaning that was at once broader and more specific. It denotes a currency as something created and sanctioned by collective acknowledgment. For Aristotle, as for the Athenians in general, currency was a constitutive pillar of the political community in at least two ways. Currency introduced a notion of commensurability that allowed for new habits of reciprocity among citizens, a point greatly stressed by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But political currency also constituted an

ance on a fragile net of beliefs that the promise will be honored. The trust this presupposes, and in turn affirms, is the bond that keeps society together, as John Locke emphasizes in his writings on coinage.

Along with the modern state, the 17th and 18th century brought the rise of public credit. Discussions of monetary experiments moved from the periphery to the center of political thought and discussion. The advent of a system of public credit was, in J.G.A. Pocock’s words, a “traumatic discovery of historical transformation” that brought with it a new sense of historical temporality and secular change. By placing value into a permanently postponed future, the pervasiveness of credit changed both the nature of the state and citizens’ relation to it. Sovereignty and the imagined community mirroring it became temporalized. Money in this sense embodies, affirms, and presupposes a collective faith and trust over time that ties a political community together.

When England introduced paper money backed only by the promise of the state in 1797, the German Romantics were among the first to spot the deep analogies between the fictional constructs of money and language. In creatively updating the longstanding metaphorical link between coins and words for an age of fiat money, they celebrated the poetic and political potential of paper money and the forces of imagination sustaining it. Novalis remarked on the “Poetisierung der Finanzwissenschaften” while Adam Müller saw in

Aristotle’s account of currency as the glue of reciprocal citizenship to modern analyses of the centrality of currency to the political authority of the state, currency has been a central topic in Western political thought. We may disagree about the precise political form and purpose currency should take in our polities today but we would do well to engage with it as a political institution that was long thought to be responsive to questions of justice and justification. ◀

¹⁾ Mark Blyth and Eric Loneragan: *Why Central Banks Should Give Money Directly to the People*, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October, 2014.

Stefan Eich is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Yale University and a Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM. He is writing his dissertation on the political theory of monetary politics.

„Heiterkeit des Geistes“ Bolzanos Erbauungsreden

VON PETER DEMETZ

Weder die kirchlichen noch die weltlichen Behörden waren dem Prager Studentenseelsorger Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) wohlgesinnt. Die verblichenen Bemühungen seiner einstigen Schüler und Freunde, seine wesentlichen Bücher und analytischen Untersuchungen zu Fragen der Religionsphilosophie, Logik, Mathematik und Staatslehre zu sammeln und zu publizieren, reflektierten fast ein Jahrhundert lang die Missgunst der Geschichte. Nach fragmentarischen Versuchen, seine *Gesammelten Werke* zu publizieren, ist es jetzt hoch an der Zeit, die glücklich fortschreitende Edition einer Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe anzuzeigen, welche die Loyalität, die philologische Energie und den wissenschaftlichen Respekt einer neuen Generation bezeugt.

Der Beginn der Bolzano-Gesamtausgabe liegt allerdings schon einige Jahrzehnte zurück. Der Religionshistoriker Eduard Winter und der Philosoph Jan Berg schlossen sich im Jahre 1969 mit dem wagemutigen Verleger Frommann-Holzboog zusammen, um den ersten Band auf den Markt zu bringen. Der sich erweiternde Kreis der Herausgeber (einschließlich Edgar Morschers, Bob van Rootselaars, Jaromír Loužils und Friedrich Kambartels) war bald so international wie die wachsende Bolzano-Gemeinde. Im frühen Herbst 2014 lagen bereits 91 Einzelbände vor; in drei Jahren sollen es 100 sein. Der Abschluss der Gesamtedition wird vermutlich noch 15 bis 20 Jahren in Anspruch nehmen. Steffen Höhne (Weimar) hat ganz recht, von einem „säkularen Ereignis“ der Philosophie- und Verlagsgeschichte zu sprechen. Bolzanos Originalität als Denker und engagierter Bürger, der in seiner Welt (noch vor 1848) die sozialen Spannungen über die Konflikte der Sprachen und Nationen stellte, steht endlich außer Frage.

Die beiden neuen Bände der Gesamtausgabe (Reihe IIA, Bd. 22,1 und 22,2), die jetzt vorliegen, sind von besonderer Bedeutung. Sie setzen – im Auftrag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften – Kurt F. Strassers Editionen der *Erbauungsreden* Bolzanos fort, und zwar für das Studienjahr 1816/17. Damals war Bolzano Studenten-Katechet und sprach in einem politisch labilen und historisch bedeutsamen Augenblick nach den Erschütterungen der Napoleonischen Epoche im Hörsaal des Prager Klementinums zu seinen Studenten über den Zustand ihrer böhmischen Heimat und der großen Welt. Was er damals sagte, erscheint heute noch bedeutender, wenn man seine unmittelbar vorausgehenden *Erbauungsreden* „Über das



Verhältnis der beiden Volksstämme in Böhmen“ (ebenfalls von Strasser ediert) noch nicht vergessen hat – sein zukunftssträchtiger Gedanke, die Verschiedenheit der Sprachen verdunkle die wesentliche Gleichheit aller Bürger, seine Polemik gegen die Regierenden, die versucht sind, nationale Zwietracht zu Gunsten ihrer Macht zu missbrauchen, und seine Mahnung, die Sprache der Anderen, in Schule, Spiel, und Literatur zu lernen.

Es mag heute deutlicher sein als im Jahre 1816, dass der Studentenseelsorger nicht zögerte, seine jungen Hörer zu einer gesellschaftlichen Tätigkeit in einer widersprüchlichen Welt zu erziehen – eine Welt, die an endemischer Armut litt, an Hunger, Habsucht und falschen Rangordnungen; Bolzano erklärte unmissverständlich, dass er sich „durch nichts“ davon abhalten lassen werde („solange ihn sein Amt begleitet“), sein ehrliches Wort an seine Zuhörer zu richten.

Kein „müßiges Gebet“, aber eine Religion der wahren Aufklärung, wie sie Jesus als Lehrer in die Welt brachte, sei notwendig, „Belehrung,

Unterricht, Verbreitung besserer Begriffe“ – die Studenten, als spätere Lehrer, „müssen das Streben nach Wahrheit und die vernünftige Wissbegierde zur Ermunterung anderer

Bernard Bolzano

Der 1781 in Prag geborene Philosoph, Theologe und Mathematiker Bernard Bolzano zählt zu den einflussreichsten Universalgelehrten der Geistesgeschichte. Während er als Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät an der Prager Karls-Universität von seinen Studenten bewundert wurde, fühlten sich Kirche und Staat durch seine liberalen und gesellschaftskritischen Ansichten bedroht. Wegen der Verbreitung von „Irrlehren“ wurde er 1819 seines Amtes enthoben und von der Universität verstoßen. Seine Bücher wurden daraufhin zensiert bzw. auf den Index gesetzt. Später zog er ins südböhmische Dorf Těchobuz und wandte sich vermehrt der Mathematik zu. 1848 starb Bolzano in Prag und hinterließ einen umfangreichen handschriftlichen Nachlass.

Eduard Winter, Jan Berg, Friedrich Kambartel, Jaromír Loužil, Edgar Morscher und Bob van Rootselaar (Hg.)

Bernard Bolzano: Gesamtausgabe (130 Bände)
Stuttgart: frommann-holzboog, 1969 ff.

sichtbar werden lassen“. Der Geist der wahren Aufklärung werde vor allem durch die „Schwärmerei“ bedroht (Bolzano nennt Deutschland als ihr Herkunftsland). Die Schwärmerei begnüge sich mit Bildern, anstatt „über die Dinge nachzudenken, wie sie wirklich sind“, und führe in der Gesellschaft zu einer Überschätzung der eigenen Gruppe, des eigenen Volkes. Anstelle der Schwärmerei plädiert Bolzano für die „Heiterkeit des Geistes“. Diese sei die Voraussetzung für jene Vollkommenheit, die sich für das Gerechte in der Welt einsetzt und jenen „Seelenadel“ bildet, vor dem alle falschen Rangordnungen verblassen. Nichts sei schlimmer als Habsucht und Müßiggang, denn „so viele Millionen darben und gehen elend zu Grunde, weil es zu viele andere gibt, die nicht auf gemeinnützige Art beschäftigt sein wollen“.

Unter den Philosophen unserer Zeit war es Jan Patočka, der Bolzano in den 50er- und 60er-Jahren seine wiederholte Aufmerksamkeit widmete. Er beschäftigte sich nicht allein mit der Frage, wie Bolzano in die Geschichte der europäischen oder tschechischen Philosophie einzuord-

nen sei, sondern auch mit dem genaueren Ort der Prager *Erbauungsreden* im Kontext der böhmischen Emanzipationskonflikte. Patočka sieht Bolzano in der Geschichte der Philosophie in Opposition zu Kant und der deutschen idealistischen Spekulation oder, wie er es formuliert, in seiner „Verwissenschaftlichung der Philosophie“. Er interpretiert Bolzano im Zusammenhang mit Komenskýs pädagogischer Enzyklopädie, aber er weiß auch, dass zwischen den beiden kein „unmittelbarer Zusammenhang“ besteht. Er postuliert die Notwendigkeit, einen vermittelnden Denker zwischen Komenský und Bolzano zu entdecken. Auf dem Wege zu Bolzanos Wissenschaftslehre als Grundlage des philosophischen Denkens ist das für ihn kein geringerer als Leibniz. Ganz im Geiste der Aufklärung, so schreibt Patočka, sehe Bolzano den einzigen Weg in der moralischen Einsicht, die der Erziehung und Bildung zu verdanken ist. Die *Erbauungsreden* seien „das angemessene Mittel im sozialen Kampf“, denn Bolzano begreife die nationalen Gegensätze als soziale und suche nach entsprechenden Lösungen, im Gegensatz zu Herder und Jungmann, die im Sprachlichen verharren. Ich bin versucht zu sagen, dass die *Erbauungsreden* Bolzanos gerade im richtigen Augenblick erscheinen, um uns zu einem analytischen, rationalen und moralischen Blick auf die althergebrachten nationalen Fragen unserer Welt zu ermutigen. <


Peter Demetz, 1922 in Prag geboren, flüchtete 1948 in den Westen. Er promovierte sowohl in Prag als auch in Yale, wo er bis zu seiner Emeritierung deutsche und vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft lehrte. Zu seinen Publikationen zählen u.a. *Formen des Realismus* (1964), *Prag in Schwarz und Gold* (1998) sowie *Mein Prag* (2007). In seinem 2013 erschienenen Buch *Auf den Spuren Bernard Bolzanos* (Wien: Arco Verlag, 2013) widmet sich Peter Demetz dem Spätaufklärer Bolzano in vier Essays: dessen lateinischer *Libussa-Dichtung* von 1796; der Verbannung ins entlegene Dorf Těchobuz, 1823, und deren heutigen Spuren. Darüber hinaus knüpft Demetz an die Debatte um Sprache und Gesellschaft an, die der Philosoph Jan Patočka mit Blick auf Bolzano und den Romantiker Jungmann eröffnete.



Books, Articles and Talks 04–08 2014

Books by Fellows and Alumni

Timothy Snyder and Ray Brandon (eds.) *Stalin and Europe: Imitation and Domination, 1928–1953* New York: Oxford University Press, 2014



The Soviet Union was the largest state in the 20th-century world, but its repressive power and terrible ambition were most clearly on display in Europe. Divided into four parts, the book brings together the results of a multi-year project sponsored by the IWM dealing with Soviet politics and actions mainly in the 1930s; the Soviet invasion and occupation of Poland; German aggression against the Soviet Union as well as plans for occupation and their improvised implementation; and Soviet wartime plans for the postwar period.

Miroslav Beblavý, Ilaria Maselli and Marcela Veselková (eds.) *Let's get to Work! The Future of Labour in Europe* Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2014



Work is both an essential part of our daily lives and one of the major policy concerns across Europe. In this volume, based on a major EU FP7-funded research project, researchers from seven European countries explain the findings from various social sciences and what they mean for the future of labour in Europe. János M. Kovács, who led a subsection of this project at the IWM, examined with his team of researchers the cultural construction of a 'good job' in four European countries: Hungary, Slovakia, Spain and the UK.

Ivan Krastev *Democracy Disrupted—The Politics of Global Protest* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014



Since the financial melt-down of 2008, political protests have spread around the world like chain lightning—from the “Occupy” movements of the United States, Great Britain, and Spain to more destabilizing forms of unrest in Tunisia, Egypt, Russia, Thailand, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Ukraine. In his latest book Ivan Krastev proposes a provocative interpretation of these popular uprisings—one with ominous implications for the future of democratic politics.

Kristina Stoeckl and Olivier Roy (eds.) *Religious Pluralism in a Christian Format: The ‘Muslim Chaplain’ in European Prisons* International Journal for Politics, Culture and Society (Special Issue), 2014



The articles of this themed issue look at the subject of religious assistance in European prisons from the perspective of Islam as a newcomer religion and as a test case for the adaptability of national schemes of religious governance to religious pluralism.


Philipp Ther *Die neue Ordnung auf dem alten Kontinent. Eine Geschichte des neoliberalen Europa* Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014



Als im November 1989 die Mauer fiel, begann ein Großexperiment kontinentalen Ausmaßes: Die ehemaligen Staaten des „Ostblocks“ wurden binnen kurzer Zeit auf eine neoliberale Ordnung getrimmt und dem Regime der Privatisierung und Liberalisierung unterworfen. Philipp Ther räumt mit einigen Mythen rund um „1989“ auf und zieht eine Zwischenbilanz.

IWM Lectures in Human Sciences

Peter Brown *The Ransom of the Soul. Afterlife and Wealth in Early Western Christianity* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015



Marking a departure in our understanding of Christian views of the afterlife from 250 to 650 CE, *The Ransom of the Soul* explores a revolutionary shift in thinking about the fate of the soul that occurred around the time of Rome's fall. The book is based on the IWM Lectures in Human Sciences Peter Brown gave in 2012. It describes how this shift transformed the Church's institutional relationship to money and set the stage for its domination of medieval society in the West.

Paul Celan Translation Program

Luce Irigaray *Speculum de l'autre femme* [Спекулум, другог: жена] Translated by **Sanja Milutinović Bojanić** (French > Serbian) Novi Sad: Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, 2014



A canonical book of French theory by Luce Irigaray, *Speculum de l'autre femme*, failed once to be translated into Serbian. Currently considered a classic reference work in cultural studies, especially within gender and post-feminist disciplines in the Western world, this book addresses students throughout the social sciences and humanities as well as a broad range of intellectuals in Serbia and beyond.

Hannah Arendt *The Origins of Totalitarianism* [Изворите на тоталитаризмот] Translated by **Katerina Josifoska** (English > Macedonian) Skopje: Izdavački Centar TRI, 2014



The Origins of Totalitarianism begins with the rise of anti-Semitism in central and western Europe in the 1800s and continues with an examination of European colonial imperialism from 1884 to the outbreak of World War I. Arendt explores the institutions and operations of totalitarian movements, focusing on the two genuine forms of totalitarian government in our time—Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia.

Generously supported by ERSTE Foundation

Transit – Europäische Revue

Heft 45 (Sommer 2014) Verlag Neue Kritik, Frankfurt a.M.

Maidan: Die unerwartete Revolution

Timothy Snyder *Europa und die Ukraine: Vergangenheit und Zukunft*

Katja Mishchenko „Es gab keine Grenze mehr zwischen Traum und Wirklichkeit“ Interview, geführt von Timothy Snyder und Tatiana Zhurzhenko

Oksana Forostyna *Land der Kinder*

Mykhailo Minakov *Moses und Prometheus: Die Ukraine zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit*

Mykola Riabchuk *Hat der Maidan das Land gespalten?*

Emine Ziyatdinova *Es gibt kein anderes Zuhause* (Photoessay)

Tatiana Zhurzhenko *Im Osten nichts Neues?* [Tr@nsit online: *From Borderlands to Bloodlands*]

Serhii Leshchenko *Hinter den Kulissen: Eine Typologie der ukrainischen Oligarchen* [Tr@nsit online: *Ukraine's Puppet Masters: A Typology of Oligarchs*]

Anton Shekhovtsov *Swoboda: Aufstieg und Fall einer Partei* [Tr@nsit online: *From Electoral Success to Revolutionary Failure: The Ukrainian Svoboda Party*]

Nikolay Mitrokhin *Die Ukrainisch-Orthodoxe Kirche des Moskauer Patriarchats. Zwischen Maidan und pro-russischem Separatismus*

Cyril Hovorun *Die Kirche auf dem Maidan*

Tanya Richardson *Zwei große Unterschiede und ein paar kleine: Das Leben in Odessa nach dem Maidan und dem 2. Mai* [Tr@nsit online: *Odessa's Two Big Differences (and a Few Small Ones): Life After the Maidan and 2 May*]

Tr@nsit online

Annemieke Hendriks Eine Gärtnerfamilie erobert Europa Vierteiliger Epilog zum geplanten Buch „Biografie der Tomate – Vom Samen bis zum Superstar auf dem europäischen Markt“

György Péteri Should We Really Be Surprised by Where Viktor Orbán's Hungary is Heading?

Jan-Werner Mueller Europe's Other Democracy Problem. The Challenge of Protecting Democracy and the Rule of Law within EU Member States

Timothy Garton Ash The 1914 in the Wars of 2014

Marci Shore Birth Certificate: The Story of Danilo Kiš. A Review

Ukraine in Focus With contributions by Timothy Snyder, Ivan Krastev, Steven Holmes, Tatiana Zhurzhenko, Kristina Stoeckl e.a.

Articles and Talks by Fellows and Guests

Łukasz Andrzejewski

“Polish Oncology from the Patient's Point of View” [in Polish], in: Nowotwory—*Journal of Oncology*, Special Volume, 2014.

Herwig Czech

“Abusive Medical Practices on ‘Euthanasia’ Victims in Austria during and after World War II” in: Sheldon Rubenfeld et al. (eds.): *Human Subjects Research after the Holocaust*, New York: Springer, 2014.

„Der Spielgrund-Komplex. Kinderheilkunde, Heilpädagogik, Psychiatrie und Jugendfürsorge im Nationalsozialismus“, in: Reinhard Sieder, Michaela Ralser (Hg.): *Kinder des Staates: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften*, Vol. 25, Nr. 1, 2014.

“The Man behind L-Dopa and His Ties to National Socialism” (together with Lawrence A. Zeidman, Walther Birkmayer), in: *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences*, Vol. 23, 2014.

Éva Forgács

Review of György Galantai and Julia Klaniczay (eds.): *ARTPOOL: The Experimental Art Archive of East-Central Europe*, in: *ArtMargins*, June 2014.

“Art under Dangerous Constellation” [in Hungarian], in: *tranzitblog.hu*, May 2014.

Ludger Hagedorn

„Kenosis. Die philosophische Anverwandlung eines christlichen Motivs bei Jan Patočka“, in: Michael Staudigl, Christian Sternad (Hg.): *Figuren der Transzendenz. Transformationen eines phänomenologischen Grundbegriffs*, Würzburg: Königshausen, 2014.

“Without God and Future. Patočka's Reading of the Brothers Karamazov”, International Conference *Human Existence as Movement*, IWM, Vienna, June 3–5, 2014.

„DEKALOG-Literatur. Drittes Gebot: *Du sollst den Feiertag heiligen*“, Moderation, Guardini Galerie, Berlin, 15. Mai 2014.

“The Gift of Death. Doubts about the Sacrifice”, International Conference, *Violence and the Gift*, University of Vienna, April 24–26, 2014.

Cornelia Klinger „Gender in Troubled Times. Zur Koinzidenz von Feminismus und Neoliberalismus“, in: Anne Fleig (Hg.): *Die Zukunft von Gender. Begriff und Zeitdiagnose*, Frankfurt: Campus, 2014.

„Selbst- und Lebenssorge als Gegenstand sozialphilosophischer Reflexionen auf die Moderne“, in: Brigitte Aulenbacher, Birgit Riegraf, Hildegard Theobald (Hg.): *Sorge: Arbeit, Verhältnisse, Regime – Care: Work, Relations, Regimes. Soziale Welt. Sonderband 20*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014.

„Selbstsorge oder Selbsttechnologie? Das Subjekt zwischen liberaler Tradition und Neoliberalismus“, in: Brigitte Aulenbacher, Maria Dammayr (Hg.): *Für sich und andere sorgen: Krise und Zukunft von Care*, Weinheim/Basel: Beltz Juventa, 2014.

*, „Gerechtigkeit in einer Welt der Gegensätze“, Interview, *Salzburger Nachtstudio*, Ö1, 14. Mai 2014.

Ivan Krastev

Democracy Disrupted. The Politics of Global Protest, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014.

Translations of *In Mistrust We Trust* into Russian, Albanian, Serbian, Polish.

*, “Putin's Losing Streak. The Malaysia Airlines Disaster and the New Sanctions on Russia” in: *Foreign Affairs*, July 30, 2014.

“1914 versus 1938: How Anniversaries Make History”, in: *Open Democracy*, July 7, 2014.

„Wie historische Jahrestage Geschichte machen“, in: *Die Presse*, 4. Juli 2014.

“Why the World is Filled With Failed Protest Movements”, in: *The New Republic*, June 1, 2014.

“Europe's Tea Party Moment”, in: *The American Interest*, May 29, 2014.

“In Defense of Decadent Europe”, in: *Visegrad Insight*, 1 (5), 2014.

“Orban's European Influence Is Second Only to Merkel's”, in: *Financial Times*, April 11, 2014.

*, Talks at: European Solidarity Centre Gdańsk, Catholic University of Portugal, Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, Bratislava Global Security Forum, Peter-Weiss-Stiftung für Kunst und Politik Berlin, Heinrich Böll Foundation Berlin, Institute of World Politics Kyiv.

Articles and Talks 04–08 2014

Agata Lisiak

“Immigrant Mothers as Agents of Change”, in: *Public Seminar*, May 27, 2014.

“The Ballerina and the Blue Bra: Femininity in Recent Revolutionary Iconography”, in: *View. Theories and Practices of Visual Culture*, No. 5, 2014.

“Hip-Hop Representations of Urban Stillness: The Case of Poznań, Poland”, in: *CITY: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action*, No. 3, 2014.

“Displaying Migrant Motherhood and Urban Superdiversity”, International Conference *Superdiversity: Theory, Method and Practice in an Era of Chance*, Birmingham, June 2014.

“Matka Polka Beyond Poland”, Lecture, Polish Institute, Vienna, April 2014.

“Girification of Revolutionary Iconography”, *EURIAS Fellows Meeting*, Helsinki, April 2014.

Ewa Majewska

“If You Shoot One of Them... Marty Deskur and Manju Pavadaï. A Proposal for Decolonial Art?”, in: Marta Deskur, Manju Pavadaï (eds.): *If You Shoot One of Them*, Kraków: MOCAK, 2014.

“Resistance Sometimes Comes before Oppression”, in: *Obieg Magazine*, April 2014.

“Between Love and Imagination—for a Critical Feminist Analysis”, *Jour Fixe Kulturwissenschaften*, Austrian Academy of Science, Vienna, June 5, 2014.

“Solidarność and Solidarity Today. On the Margins of the Anniversary Euphoria” [in Polish], in: *Praktyka Teoretyczna*, June 4, 2014.

“Majdan. Towards Semi-Peripheral Counter-publics?”, Conference *Critical Theory and Social Sciences*, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, May 23, 2014.

“Love: A Question for Feminism?” / “Mother Poland beyond Poland”, Panel discussion, IWM / Polish Institute, Vienna, April 28–29, 2014.

“Collective Staging of Invisible Labor”, Workshop, Center for Contemporary Art, Warsaw, April 13, 2014.

“From Solidarność to Majdan. A Feminist Perspective” / “What you can see?”, MOMA, Warsaw, March 25, 2014.

Sergey Markedonov

“Municipal Elections in Georgia: The Second Act” [in Russian], July 16, 2014.

“Rebranding Terrorism” [in Russian], in: *Novopol*, July 10, 2014.

“The Tragedy of Shevardnadze: Between National-Communism and New Thinking” [in Russian], in: *Forbes Russia*, July 8, 2014.

“Several articles [in Russian] in: *politcom.ru*.”

Talks at: Austrian National Defense Academy, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre Vienna, University of Vienna.

“The Caucasus: Russia and the West”, on: *Ö1*, September 2, 2014.

“The Russian Foreign Policy in the Near Abroad”, on: *ORF*, August 2014.

Mykola Riabchuk

„Maidan 2.0.: Sich wandelnde Werte und stabile Identitäten“, in: Simon Geissbühler (Hg.): *Kiew – Revolution 3.0.*, Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag, 2014.

„Zerstörte Illusionen“, in: Claudia Dathe, Andreas Rostek (Hg.): *Majdan! Ukraine, Europa*, Berlin: edition.fotoTAPETA, 2014.

„Dreizehn schlimmere Orte auf der Welt“, in: Jurij Andruchowytsh (Hg.): *Euromaidan. Was in der Ukraine auf dem Spiel steht*, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014.

“Coming to Terms with Russian Propaganda”, in: *Russkii vopros*, No. 1, 2014.

„Dezentralisierung und Subsidiarität. Wider der Föderalisierung à la Russe“, in: *Osteuropa*, No. 5–6, 2014.

“A Blessing in Disguise”, in: *New Eastern Europe*, No. 3, 2014.

„Dritter Anlauf“, in: *Dialog*, No. 107, 2014.

Interviews in: *Hardnews*, *Pluska*, *Dnes*, *Euractiv*.

Radio Interviews on: *Australian Radio*, *U.S. Public Radio*, *Polish Radio*, *Ukrainian Public Radio*.

Talks at: College d’Europe Brugge, University of Graz, University of Tartu, University of Regensburg, German Representation Office of the European Commission, University of Warsaw, Diplomatic Academy Kyiv, Aspen Institute Prague, John Cabot University Rome.

Anton Shekhovtsov

„Der Rechte Sektor. Zwischen Polittechnologie, Politik und Straßenkampf“, in: Juri Andruchowytsh (ed.): *Euromaidan – Was in der Ukraine auf dem Spiel steht*, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014.

“Ukraine’s Radical Right” (together with Andreas Umland), in: *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2014.

“The Ukrainian Far-Right before and since the Revolution”, in: *Religion & Society in East and West*, Vol. 42, No. 5–6, 2014.

“The Kremlin Builds an Unholy Alliance with America’s Christian Right”, in: *War is Boring*, July 13, 2014.

“The Extreme Right Loses after the Ukrainian Revolt” [in Swedish], in: *Expressen*, July 3, 2014.

“Several articles in: *Open Democracy*.”

„Die FPÖ und die russische Rechte“, Interview in: *Falter*, Juni 10, 2014.

Talks at: CEU Budapest, University of Cambridge, Oxford Institute for Polish-Jewish Studies.

Marci Shore

“Rescuing the Yiddish Ukraine”, Review of Jeffrey Veidlinger: *In the Shadow of the Shtetl: Small-Town Jewish Life in Soviet Ukraine*, in: *The New York Review of Books*, June 5, 2014.

Ukrainian Translation of “The Bloody History between Poland and Ukraine Led to Their Unlikely Solidarity”, in: *historians.in.ua*, May 10, 2014.

„Dreizehn schlimmere Orte auf der Welt“, in: Jurij Andruchowytsh (Hg.): *Euromaidan. Was in der Ukraine auf dem Spiel steht*, Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2014.

“Philosophers’ Sunday” [in Polish], in: *RDC Radio Trójka*, Warsaw, June 15, 2014.

“The Taste of Ashes” [in Ukrainian/Russian], in: *day.kiev.ua*, May 30, 2014.

“The Communist Past Cannot Be Understood” [in Czech], in: *Pohled zvenku*, May 6, 2014.

Talks at: Charles University Prague, University College London, Center for Urban History of East Central Europe Lviv, Lew Kopelew Forum Köln, Bruno Kreisky Forum Wien, Agenda Austria Denkfabrik Wien, Polnisches Institut Leipzig, Krytyka Polityczna Warsaw, Fundacja Pogranicze Krasnogruda.

Volodymyr Sklokin

“Historians as Public Intellectuals: The Case of Post-Soviet Ukraine”, in: Agata Lisiak, Natalie Smolenski (eds.): *What Do Ideas Do*, IWM Junior Visiting Fellow’s Conferences, Vol. 33, 2014.

„Kein Sieg für Putin“, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, Nr. 102, 5. Mai 2014.

“On Relativism, Scholarly Correctness and Responsibility of Intellectuals” [in Ukrainian], in: *historians.in.ua*, April 30, 2014.

Timothy Snyder

“An Atrocity Waiting to Happen”, in: *Sunday Times*, July 20, 2014.

“Diaries and Memoirs of the Maidan”, edited with Tatiana Zhurzhenko, *Eurozine*, June 27, 2014.

“Ukraine: The Antidote to Europe’s Fascists?”, in: *New York Review of Books*, May 27, 2014.

“Europe’s New Status Quo: ‘Ukraine is Fighting Our Battle’”, in: *Spiegel Online International*, May 23, 2014.

“Ukraine: The Edge of Democracy”, in: *New York Review of Books*, May 22, 2014.

“Fascism Returns to the Continent it Once Destroyed”, in: *New Republic*, May 11, 2014.

“Russia’s Propaganda War is a Danger for Ukraine’s Jews”, in: *The Guardian*, April 27, 2014.

“Ukrainian Extremists Will Only Triumph if Russia Invades”, in: *New Republic*, April 17, 2014.

“Europe and Ukraine: Past and Future”, in: *Eurozine*, April 16, 2014.

“Putins Projekt”, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 13, 2014.

Talks at: Conference *Ukraine: Thinking Together*, Kyiv; Conference *The 2004 EU Enlargement—10 Years After*, Vienna; IWM Film Retrospective *Past Continuous: Conflicting Historical Legacies in Contemporary East European Cinema*, Vienna.

Charles Taylor

Foreword to Hans Schneider: *Wittgenstein’s Later Theory of Meaning: Imagination and Calculation*, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.

Foreword to William A. Barbieri Jr. (ed.): *At the Limits of the Secular: Reflections on Faith and Public Life*, Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2014.

Tatiana Zhurzhenko

“The Geopolitics of Memory”, in: Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik (ed.): *Broken Narratives. Post-Cold War History and Identity in Europe and East Asia*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014.

“Ukraine: Elections without the East”, in: *Al Jazeera*, June 1, 2014.

“The Autumn of Nations 1989 and the Ukrainian Winter 2013–14”, in: *Eurozine*, June 13, 2014.

“Diaries and Memoirs of the Maidan. Ukraine from November 2013 to February 2014”, edited with Timothy Snyder, *Eurozine*, June 27, 2014.

„Kein Sieg für Putin“, in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5. Mai 2014.

»Le déchirement de l’opinion publique ukrainienne«, in: *La Vie des idées*, Mai 26, 2014.

„Ukraine: Umkämpfte Identitäten zwischen West und Ost“, auf: *Ö1 Dimensionen – die Welt der Wissenschaft*, 1. Juli 2014.

“Ukraine’s Crisis”, Seminar *Conflict Resolution and Management Concepts*, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, Doha, April 9, 2014.

“Rebordering the (lost) Empire: Nostalgic Modernization and Reinvention of the Past at Russia’s Western Frontier”, ABS First World Conference *Post-Cold War Borders: Global Trends and Regional Responses*, Joensuu/St. Petersburg, June 9–13, 2014.

Varia

In memory and honor of its founding Rector, Krzysztof Michalski (1948–2013), the IWM has established a new fellowship program consisting of one senior and two junior positions. The first Visiting Fellowship for the academic year 2015/16 was awarded to **Steven Lukes**, Professor of Politics and Sociology at New York University. His research examines how morals relate to politics, economics, law, and religion. Post-doctoral researchers in the field of continental philosophy or religion whose work relates to Professor Lukes’ research areas are invited to apply for one of the two **Krzysztof Michalski Junior Visiting Fellowships** (Deadline: December 17, 2014). Further details and the application form can be found at: www.iwm.at/fellowship-programs/

We are happy to announce that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic decided to continue its generous support for the **Jan Patočka Fellowship Program** which aims to foster research inspired by the Czech philosopher’s thought. The ministry welcomes the Institute’s efforts in keeping a Patočka archive which offers access to the philosopher’s oeuvre to all interested scholars. Hoping that the fellowship program will contribute to the intellectual exchange between Europeans, the ministry further appreciates the opportunity to enrich Czech-Austrian bilateral relations.

Kate Younger, a former Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM, joined the Institute as a Research Associate in 2014 working within Timothy Snyder’s research focus *United Europe—Divided History*. Her own project examines the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church in the 19th century, focusing on the church’s international context.

In May 2014, **Peter Demetz**, Sterling Professor em. of Germanic Languages and Literatures at Yale University and IWM alumnus, was awarded the Jiri (George) Theiner prize at the Prague Literary Festival this year. Furthermore, he received a honorary doctorate from Masaryk University in Brno.

Furthermore, we congratulate **Abram Trosky**, who was a Boston University Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM in 2008, for successfully defending his dissertation on “Moralizing Violence? Reevaluating the Role of Just War in Peace Psychology” at Boston University and wish him all the best for the future.

Professor **Jacek Kochanowicz**, an eminent Polish economic historian and long-time friend of the IWM, passed away on October 2. He took part in many workshops and conferences organized by our Institute, served as head of the Polish national research team in various IWM projects, and published a number of papers in our journal *Transit*. We will remember him as a very knowledgeable, modest and dependable colleague who could mix serious scholarship with a strong sense of irony.

Maidan: Die unerwartete Revolution

Mit Beiträgen von Oksana Forostyna, Cyril Hovorun, Mykhailo Minakov, Nikolay Mitrokhin, Kateryna Mishchenko, Serhii Leshchenko, Mykola Riabchuk, Tanya Richardson, Anton Shekhovtsov, Timothy Snyder und Tatiana Zhurzhenko



Maidan:
Die unerwartete Revolution
Transit – Europäische Revue, Nr. 45
Herausgegeben am Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM), Wien; Verlag Neue Kritik, Frankfurt am Main.

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Upcoming Events 12 2014–01 2015

December



December 9

The Missing Political Theory of Money

Stefan Eich
PhD candidate in Political Theory, Yale University

In his talk, Stefan Eich offers some thoughts on the origins and consequences of the absence of money as a topic in contemporary normative political theory. By considering the historical context in which Rawls and Habermas developed their accounts, he suggests that the neglect of monetary politics points us to an intriguing blindspot of contemporary liberal rights-based political theory.



December 10

The Populist Challenge to Representative Democracy

Nadia Urbinati
Kyriakos Tsakopoulos Professor of Political Theory and Hellenic Studies, Columbia University

Populism is a relevant issue in contemporary politics and a theme subjected to contradictory interpretations. Nadia Urbinati proposes an analytical rendering of populism arguing that the components that make it a recognizable phenomenon are simplification and polarization of political divisions.



December 11

Dimensions of Modernity

At the end of each semester, the Junior Visiting Fellows present their research projects at the Junior Fellows' Conference. Later on the final results are published on the IWM website.



December 17

The Origins of Foucault: a Glimpse into his Course Notes from the 1950s

Aner Barzilay
PhD candidate in History, Yale University; IWM Junior Visiting Fellow

30 years have passed since the untimely death of Michel Foucault. Yet despite this long interval Foucault's thought continues to spur unprecedented interest throughout the world. Based on archival research in Paris, Aner Barzilay dedicates his talk to a neglected period in Foucault's career: his early engagement with phenomenology, psychology, anthropology, and, above all, his discovery of Nietzsche's philosophy.

January



January 11

Die geopolitischen Veränderungen in Europa

Nach dem Fall des Eisernen Vorhangs und der Neuordnung Europas schien eine ruhige Weiterentwicklung vorgezeichnet. Aber in den vergangenen Monaten ist die Unsicherheit in Europa gewachsen. Kehrt der Kalte Krieg nach Europa zurück? Welche geopolitischen Veränderungen stehen bevor? Wie soll Europa auf diese Herausforderungen reagieren?

Carl Bildt
Ehemaliger schwedischer Außenminister
Atifete Jahjaga
Präsidentin der Republik Kosovo
Ivan Krastev
IWM Permanent Fellow; Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia
Fyodor Lukyanov
Chefredakteur, *Russia in Global Affairs*; Präsident des Rates für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
Ana Palacio
Ehemalige spanische Außenministerin



January 14

The Depoliticization of Religion and the Nature of European Integration

Michał Matlak
PhD candidate in Political Sciences, European University Institute, Florence; IWM Junior Visiting Fellow

This seminar focuses on understandings of secularism which have underpinned the process of European integration and links them with the history of secularism as a philosophical idea.



January 15

25 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall: New Tensions between North and South in Europe and New Opportunities

Wolf Lepenies
Professor em. of Sociology, Free University of Berlin; former President, Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin

In this Monthly Lecture, Wolf Lepenies takes the year 1989 as a starting point to reflect on the North-South conflict in the EU and its historical antecedents.



January 22

Die metaphysische Bewegung – Das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Politik: Rancière, Platon

Sandra Lehmann
Lehrbeauftragte, Institut für Philosophie, Universität Wien und Katholisch-Theologische Privatuniversität Linz

Sandra Lehmann führt die politische Philosophie Rancières und die Metaphysik Platons zusammen. Das Politische ist für Platon im Grunde der Konflikt, den Sokrates mit der Polis austrägt und der mit seiner Hinrichtung endet. Auch bei Rancière findet „Politik“ immer da statt, wo öffentlich ein Unrecht moniert und Gerechtigkeit eingefordert wird.

Fellows' Seminars
In the course of the semester, Junior and Senior Visiting Fellows present their research projects in the Fellows' Seminars.

Monthly Lectures
Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.

Conferences and Workshops
The IWM frequently organizes international conferences, workshops and debates related to the Institute's research interests.

Debates at the Burgtheater
Debating Europe, organized in co-operation with the Vienna Burgtheater, ERSTE Foundation and *Der Standard*, is a matinée series of public debates.

Books in Perspective
Books written or edited by fellows or related to the Institute's research fields are presented to a wider public.

This is just a small selection of events (subject to change)—a complete list of all upcoming lectures, seminars and debates can be found on: www.iwm.at/events

Fellowships 2015/16



Krzysztof Michalski Junior Fellowships
Deadline: December 17, 2014



Józef Tischner Junior Fellowships for Polish and Polish-American Scholars
Deadline: December 20, 2014

Coming soon

Alexander Herzen Junior Fellowships

Bronisław Geremek Junior and Senior Fellowships

Milena Jesenská Fellowships for Journalists

Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators

Junior Fellowship for Scholars from Ukraine

The majority of IWM fellowships are awarded in open competition, involving calls for application and evaluation by expert juries. Research proposals are currently invited for the above programs. Further details on www.iwm.at/fellowship-programs

Call for Proposals

History of Economic Thought Under Communism

In April 2014, the IWM launched a long-term comparative research project on the history of economic thought under communism. The project covers nine countries (Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) on which sizeable national monographs will be prepared.

We cordially invite junior researchers (up to 35 years of age) working in various fields of economics and history-writing to submit research proposals to be presented at a project workshop that will take place in Vienna in April 2015.

Deadline for Submissions: **December 31, 2014**

Further Details on: www.iwm.at