

*Ivan Krastev*

The Political Logics  
of Disintegration

*Evgeny Morozov*

The Death of the  
Cyberflâneur

*Kristina Stoeckl*

Russian Orthodoxy  
and Human Rights



*Claus Offe on*

## Post-Democratic Capitalism



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NO. 109 • JANUARY – APRIL 2012

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The cover picture is based on a photography by artist and Harvard scholar Svetlana Boym taken during her stay at the IWM in May. We shall report on her new project in the next IWMpost. More about her work at [www.svetlanaboym.com](http://www.svetlanaboym.com).

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**Imprint:** Responsible for the content: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM), Spittelauer Lände 3, 1090 Vienna, Austria, Phone: +43/1/313 58-0, Fax +43/1/313 58-60, [iwm@iwm.at](mailto:iwm@iwm.at), [www.iwm.at](http://www.iwm.at); **Editorial Committee:** Ivan Krastev, Klaus Nellen, Dessy Gavrilova; **Executive Editor:** Dessy Gavrilova; **Editorial Assistance:** Manuel Tröster; **Design:** steinkellner/zotter, [www.steinkellner.com](http://www.steinkellner.com). The IWMpost is published three times a year. Current circulation: 7,000, printed by Grasl Druck & Neue Medien GmbH, Bad Vöslau. Copyright IWM 2012. An online archive of IWMpost is available on the Institute's website at [www.iwm.at](http://www.iwm.at).

# 2½ Theories

BY CLAUD OFFE

*Governments have lost their grip on fiscal and budgetary policy, and are driven instead by the financial markets. They have also lost much of their control over public services in the name of deregulation and efficiency. As a result, more and more citizens consider democratic participation a pointless activity. What we lack is a theory accounting for the new preponderance of markets over social rights and public policies. The problems arising from this were addressed in Claus Offe's presentation at the 7<sup>th</sup> conference **On Solidarity**.*

In the following, I shall contrast three theoretical approaches to both *understanding* and *justifying* the realities of democratic capitalism and its (desired) mode of operation. Each of these theories specifies in a consistent and empirically validated way how the state, policy-makers, market actors in the economy, and citizens act and should act. The three theories are the social democratic-cum-social market economy theory, the market-liberal theory, and an (as yet incomplete) theory that, for want of a better name, will here be sketched out under the clumsy title of “global financial market-driven post-democracy.” The latter is incomplete because it is well able to describe the “logic” that governs the realities of contemporary markets and politics but lacks the *normative* argument (an argument to the effect that the arrangements of the political economy and its mode of operation are actually universally beneficial) to demonstrate why these realities are justified and sustainable.

### One: The social democratic theory of democratic capitalism

At the legal and constitutional level, democratic political rights guarantee *civic* equality—not, of course, the equality of socio-economic *outcomes*. Civic equality is normatively premised upon a strict separation and disjunction of (unequally distributed) socio-economic resources and (equal) political rights according to the principle of *nonconvertibility* of the former into the latter. Ownership of economic assets should not be allowed to translate to privilege, political power, or a shortcut to access either. Correspondingly, inferior socio-economic status should not be allowed to deprive citizens of their political voice and its effectiveness. At the same time, it can trivially be observed that the actual use of political resources can *have a major impact upon the relative socio-economic status and status security of citizens*, as any democratically legislated tax law can serve to illustrate. This is the *asymmetrical* linkage between economic and political resources, or spheres of action:

with the former being to some extent *banned* from being converted into the latter, yet the latter being *allowed*, in fact *intended*, to have an impact on the former.

This formula is the normative bedrock of the “social democratic” or “social market economy” normative theory of capitalist democracy: political power, reflecting prevailing conceptions of social justice and claiming *primacy* over the dynamics of markets, can legitimately shape the distribution of economic resources, *but not the other way around*. The social democratic theory shares two assumptions with the precepts of the “social market”. First, the economic process is one that is entirely shaped by and embedded in institutional arrangements and political decisions that have been framed at the political and constitutional levels. It is public policies that set into motion, license, regulate, and thus provide an institutional framework for market forces, such that the democratic state can then steer the economic process in ways that reliably avoid the twin dangers of devastating economic crises and disruptive social conflict.

The second assumption of the social democratic theory amounts to a theory of worker-citizens' participation and “voice”: it claims that, given this confidence in the state's regulatory and steering capacities and given the uneven distribution of life chances of capitalist social structures, there will be a “natural” tendency in all segments of the population, and in particular the less privileged ones, to make active use of the political resources that are granted to them as political rights. In such an institutional arrangement, there is a built-in incentive for citizens to make full use of their rights, as such use offers the prospect of cumulatively limiting socio-economic inequalities on the “output” side of state policies. More specifically, the less privileged strata of the population will have good reason to *actually voice* their complaints and demands for redistributive policies and greater (job and social) security. This is meant to result in a self-correcting dynamic that generates policies to reduce inequal-



# on Democratic Capitalism




Illustration: David Bromley, Financial Times

ity and thus provide for social and political stability.

## Two: The market liberal theory of democratic capitalism

An alternative theory of capitalist democracy, the “market liberal” theory, describes and prescribes a strictly symmetrical separation of markets and politics. As market power should not translate into political decision-making power, neither should the state and politics be allowed to intervene (more than marginally) into the market-generated distribution of resources. All liberal theories, particularly if combined with “pluralist” political theory, assume that under such symmetrical differentiation of political and economic spheres, neither of the two will have legitimate reasons to claim primacy over the other. While neither the state nor the market is fully autonomous, the mutual relations and inputs required cannot possibly amount to any relationship of dependency or robust prevalence. This theory, which found its most sophisticated elaboration in the work of sociological theorists, such as Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann, describes a relationship between the democratic state and the capitalist economy as one of interdependence without primacy. The input that the political system provides to the economic systems is the legal guarantee of property rights, the enforcement

of contracts, and the provision of infrastructural facilities and services. Conversely, the inputs coming from the economy are taxes on the one hand, and pluralist group pressures on the other. Given a highly diversified socio-economic, none of the organized groups that can mobilize political pressure is strong enough to impose binding demands on the political system; pressures also generate counter-pressures so as to cancel each other out, leaving the government free to give in and cater to this or that group.

Moreover, not all citizens in a “mass society” will actually belong to or identify with *any* particular group; yet many will belong to *more* than one group, however loosely (e.g., a trade union and the Roman Catholic church)—a situation that gives rise to the healthy phenomenon of “cross-pressure” at the micro level of voters and serves to mitigate the intensity of societal conflict. Nor does the pressure that one particular group can generate pertain to *all* policy areas equally, which further increases the freedom of discretion enjoyed by the governments of pluralist societies.

What does this stylized liberal theory have to say about patterns of political participation and its motives? Here the prevailing concern is with the systemic dangers of “excessive” mobilization and participation, which—according to the social-science doctrines of the fifties and sixties—was suspected as a source

of instability, if not of “totalitarian” dangers (Huntington 1975). A political culture that leads people to stay passive or indifferent to most issues most of the time, combined with a sense of diffuse loyalty and support for the political system as a whole, is widely considered to be desirable for the sake of stability.

A further reassuring feature of liberal pluralist political theorizing is the axiomatic assumption, derived from Schumpeter, of a deep divide between political elites and non-elites that is modeled on the market transaction. Just as there is the hiatus between producers and consumers in markets, there is a divide between elite suppliers and non-elite consumers in politics. As dissatisfied consumers would never in their right mind consider invading the place of production in order to make their dissatisfaction heard, but would instead rationally switch to a competing supplier who better catered to their needs and tastes, so the democratic citizen is categorically assumed to be able to “exit” by changing to another supplier rather than engaging in verbal (or other) types of conflict with an unsatisfactory supplier/political elite.

## Two and a half: Postdemocratic capitalism?

Both the social democratic and the liberal pluralist theories, as well as their implications concerning lev-

els, kinds, and social distribution of participatory practices, are now a largely obsolete matter of the past in both their analytical and normative aspects. They reached their expiration dates following the historical turning points that democratic capitalism experienced in the second half of the 1970s and again after 1989. What we are entirely lacking, however, is a theory or normative justification of the current realities, when economic resources do determine the agenda and decision-making of the political process, while the owners of those resources themselves, and the distributional outcomes caused by markets, are less and less being significantly constrained by social rights and political interventions. On the contrary, the latter are to a large extent put at the disposition of economic “imperatives.” Note that compared to the social democratic model, the present condition of globalized financial market capitalism-cum-endemic fiscal crisis is tantamount to an *inverted* asymmetry: *markets* set the agenda and (fiscal) constraints of *public policies*, but there is little that public policies in their turn can do in terms of constraining the realm and dynamics of the ever-expanding market—unless, that is, political elites are suicidally prepared to expose themselves to the second-strike capabilities of the “markets.” Yet it is this logic of a pervasive preponderance of accumulation, profit, efficiency, compet-

itiveness, austerity, and the market over the sphere of social rights, political redistribution, and sustainability, as well as the defenselessness of the latter sphere against the former, that governs the contemporary version of capitalist democracy (or rather “post-democracy,” Crouch 2004), and will probably do so for many years to come (Streeck 2011a). This logic, as it unfolds before our eyes and on a global scale, is sufficiently powerful and uncontested, it seems, to prevail through its sheer facticity and in the absence of any supporting normative theory—as a stark reality, stripped of any shred of justification.

In brief, the operation of this logic begins with the categorical denial of any tension between the rights of people and the rights of property owners, of social justice vs. property and market justice. To the extent the governments of nation states are in charge of the former and the addressee of respective demands and complaints, i.e. of “voice,” they are largely deafened by the overpowering and ubiquitous “noise” of the austerity imperative. The urgency of this imperative, and at the same time the difficulty to comply with it, is determined by three factors. First, there is a need to bail out failed (or potentially failing) financial institutions who count governments among their preferred clients. Second, governments cannot

*continued on page 4*



continued from page 3

manage their financial troubles by raising taxes, because that would constitute a burden on private investors in the “real” economy and would disincentivize their continued (domestic) investment. Third, expenses cannot be cut because increasing parts of the social security system, so far mostly covered by the “para-fiscal” mechanism of contributions, need to be covered out of general revenues (to the extent that transfers cannot be cut) in order to decrease the burden on employers. Cornered in this triangle of constraints, the state is no longer a plausible supplier of what all kinds of demand-side actors may desire it to provide. To gain any room for maneuver at all, it is undergoing a creeping permutation from a classical (Schumpeterian) “tax state” into a “borrowing state.” That is, expenditures are not being covered out of present revenues, but out of (anticipated) *future* revenues—the prospective tax base of which, however, is itself being decimated by the increasing parts of state budgets that are spent on servicing debt (rather than on providing services and infrastructure). With Streeck (2007: 32, 34) we can speak of “emaciated state capacity” and the “attrition of its disposable resources.” The endemic fiscal crisis “preempts democratic choice” (Streeck 2010: 5); citizens simply have to get used to the fact that a fiscally starved state is the wrong interlocutor when it comes to demands concerning “costly” policies.

#### What are citizens likely to do? Four conceivable developments

This configuration of constraints leaves little space for the processes and institutions that supposedly make up the core decision-making site of democracy, namely party competition, elections, and parliamentary representation and legislation. After all, if decision-making on taxing and spending is off the agenda, a core function of parliamentary government is largely suspended. Instead, policy-making moves to other sites that are typically out of reach of the participant agents of normal democratic politics. All kinds of government-appointed commissions and fiduciary institutions (including central banks) are being endowed with *de facto* policy-making competencies, often of a supranational kind, as has occurred in ad hoc peak meetings of European (or G-20) heads of government. These bodies, including the European Commission, are non-partisan in their composition and involved in transactions behind closed doors that put them by and large outside the democratic loop of transparency and accountability, as is the case for other instances of multilevel and multi-actor governance that tend to systematically obscure and anonymize the locus of political responsibility (Offe 2009).

Public authorities are seen as having lost their grip on key issues of fiscal and budgetary policy, and are driven instead by rating agencies and other forces of the financial markets. Since the neoliberal turn of

the 1980s (when symptoms of participatory distortion began to show up in the data), they have also lost much of their control over the quality, price and distribution of public services in the name of efficiency, austerity, privatization, deregulation, private-public partnership, new public management, artificial voucher-driven markets, etc. As a result, growing numbers of the citizenry (particularly those who are interested in and depend on government social spending and services) have come to understand that participating in democratic politics is largely a pointless activity. We might speak of a *dual control gap*: governments lose control over taxation and the financial sector, and in response citizens lose their confidence that the idea of democratic control over government policies is a credible one.

The obvious question that worries political elites as well as social scientists today is what citizens are likely to do *instead*. Obviously, it would be risky to expect that citizens’ retreat from politics into a mental state of alienated silence could be a steady state, although the media market does its utmost to make it so. Alternatively, *there are four conceivable developments* which commentators and analysts have been debating on the basis of recent political phenomena that can be read as early symptoms.

*The first* is what I call non-institutional “DIY politics” within civil society. Symptoms range from individuals engaging in critical consumption and consumer boycotts, to protest movements such as the Mediterranean *indignados*, to initiatives of civic engagement that organize through movements, donations and foundations, self-help, and private charity, in part as substitutes for inadequate public services. These forms of political participation, while highly selective in their (largely educated, urban, middle-class) social base, can achieve a great deal of sympathetic public attention and even the rhetorical support of political and economic elites.

*The second* is ephemeral eruptions of mass violence in metropolitan cities, as we have seen in the early years of this century, originating from (mostly) poor urban areas of London, Paris, Athens, and elsewhere. In contrast to the rebellions of 2011 in Cairo and other MENA cities, these eruptions are politically entirely unfocused and have provided partial cover for the unleashing of acquisitive and aggressive mass instincts. Recent events have put the “return of the violent mob” (Walter 2010: 214) on the social-science agenda. Wolfgang Streeck (2011b: 6) warns “that, where legitimate outlets of political expression are shut down, illegitimate ones may take their place, at potentially very high social and economic cost.”

*A third* alternative is further growth of the right-wing populism that has strongholds in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe (Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece) and has surfaced, to a somewhat lesser extent, in France, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries. Key elements of the formula that has been used with remarkable success by right-

ist populist movements and parties are the *strengthening of borders* (against foreign goods, foreign migrants, and foreign political influence, e.g. from the EU) as a means to protect the “weak”; the intolerant and often aggressive *denial of difference* (from ethnic difference to differences of political views and opinions) in the name of ethnonational homogeneity; and the strong reliance on charismatic leaders and successful political entrepreneurs. These parties and movements are the only political agents in the decades since 1990 that have managed to broaden their political base and enhance participation, if not the kind of participation envisaged by liberal democratic theory.

*Finally*, there is the intense, sometimes even desperate search, both in the social sciences (Smith 2005, 2009) and among various political parties, to deepen and enhance political participation through the introduction of new institutional and procedural opportunities that allow and commit people to raise their “voice” more directly, more often, and on more matters than representative institutions and political party competition have so far allowed them to do. While such projects of making democracies more democratic clearly deserve great scholarly attention and imaginative experimentation, political theorists should also look into the social conditions under which interest and political preferences are *formed* before they are voiced. After all, new procedures may not be sufficient to increase and broaden participation by citizens unless the *supply* of public policies and its “possibility space,” as perceived by citizens, is prevented from becoming ever more restricted, as in Lindblom’s (1982) “prison” of the market, in which the author saw political life incarcerated. ◀

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# On Solidarity: The Character of the Public

CONFERENCE REPORT BY MILLA MINEVA



Photo: Philipp Steinke

Conference On Solidarity at ERSTE Lounge

In the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, Ronald Reagan challenged opponents with the memorable phrase: “Mr Gorbachev, tear down this wall”. A few years later the wall collapsed indeed, the global market interconnected countries as it had never done



Photo: IWM

Kenneth Prewitt

before, and the frontiers of the ‘free world’ were pushed further on. Despite these dramatic changes, however, no new political imagination has been born. Reagan’s legendary quote outlived historical events though, and has recently been rephrased by the Occupy Movement as “Tear down this Wall Street”.

Why has democracy become the only game in town, yet ever fewer people feel enthusiastic about it? Can representative democracy survive the crisis of its founding premises? The 7<sup>th</sup> conference in the series *On Solidarity* co-organized with Columbia University was devoted to “The Character of the Public” and gathered academics, public intellectuals, experts and politicians from both sides of the Atlantic to analyze the status quo, to search for answers to the questions posed by the present global crisis, and to reflect on their own theoretical assumptions.

Two historical examples are mainly used in the attempt to explain the current situation. Ira Katznelson recalled the discourse that prevailed in the interwar period, when democracy was seen as a clash between

private interests. We all know the end of this story: the construction of the welfare state in Europe and the New Deal in the USA. The other period of such a deep crisis took place in the 1970s and ended with a new economic consensus, resulting in renewed trust in the markets. As Ivan Krastev pointed out, both crises were overcome through generating trust in either the state or the markets. The problem of the current crisis, so Krastev, is that there is no new consensus on the horizon, while both the public institutions and the markets keep losing the trust of the people. Could it be that we are experiencing what Pierre Rosanvallon called the democracy of mistrust, and



Photo: Philipp Steinke

Ira Katznelson

thus that the key question is to find ways of managing mistrust, rather than creating trust?

European and American societies have a long historical experience of constructing solidarity; in both Europe and the US, however, social trust and solidarity were built in much more homogenous societies than the ones we have today. No one has the recipe for creating social cohesion in heterogeneous societies, as pluralistic as they are today. It is hardly surprising that European majorities define their main problem as immigration. But Europe nowadays is an immigrant continent, and the influx of people



is vital for its demography. This is the simple truth, which no political actor dares to admit in front of his/her constituency, argued Claus Offe. The discourse on inequality, he proceeded, has shifted in the last decades from the perception of vertical to the perception of horizontal



Claus Offe

inequalities. We have the vocabulary to address ethnic, cultural and gender inequalities, but we have lost the terms to explain (and to fight) social inequalities. Thus “we are as politically free as we were before, if perhaps less socially and economically secure”.<sup>1</sup>

The neo-liberal consensus on trickle-down economics and on the withdrawal of public institutions from redistribution policies has undermined social security and increased social inequalities. And now the economic crisis has seriously injured this consensus and led to the loss of trust in markets. Simultaneously, the same process has undermined the trust in public institutions. Today it is quite obvious that economic growth is not enough, and maybe it is time to rethink old socio-economic paradigms, as suggested by Olivier Zunz. Should we reinvent the welfare state on a transnational level? Katherine Newman reminds us that in the 1930s pub-



María Victoria Murillo

lic authorities regained public trust only after offering effective solutions to the crisis, while in the current crisis states have not been able to offer any such thing so far. The policy of austerity and cuts diminish the capability of the state to conduct effective policies. Austerity policy is not even democratic, for the will of the people cannot change anything, as we can learn from Greece. The important economic decisions are taken elsewhere; governments are no longer perceived as representatives of the people, but of policies made elsewhere, says Claus Offe. Moreover, austerity policies are presented by governments as having no alternative. There is not much space left for inspiring ideas, for political utopias.

Not feeling represented, the citizens tend to see the elites as corrupt; instead of choosing ‘voice’,

in Hirschman’s terms, they opt for ‘exit’. Moreover, ‘exit’ is nowadays just a click away. Society is not simply pluralistic, it is fragmented. In the beginning, the internet brought about a new techno-utopia reinforced by the advent of the social web: we thought we had finally discovered the perfect tool for mass participation in public matters. We all know from the social and political theories how important participation is for social cohesion and for the functioning of democracy. As Sidney Verba demonstrated, the social web proved to be a tool for strengthening the voice of the citizens who already participated in the public debate, but it did hardly give voice to voiceless groups in society.

The social web succeeded in creating new active minorities that perceive themselves as majorities, as Ivan Krastev emphasised. It is easier to find people that share your interests on the web; it is exceptional to stumble upon someone with different ideas. Thus, instead of being a public space where difference-



Paul Dekker

es are negotiated, the web creates small publics of conviction and active interest groups, to whose militant voices public authorities are ever more ready to respond.

And even the social sciences have started to function that way. Kenneth Prewitt argued that while the organisation of social knowledge in the ‘golden age’ of democracy was institutionalized in order to be objective and non-partisan so that it could orient policies without influencing them directly, the new forms of expert and advocacy research strengthen the feeling that public institutions serve private interests. Thus, the important question, posed by María Murillo, is whether representative democracy responds to all interests or acts in a selective and opaque way. Sven Giegold went a step further asking whether we can inoculate democracy against such interest groups. Could the solution be a change of the political frame, a new normative project for a European transnational democracy as proposed by Jürgen Habermas?

After all, we need new institutions and new political imagination to reinvent our world. Or else we are stuck with Jack Nicholson’s famous line: “What if this is as good as it gets?” <

<sup>1</sup> Claus Offe in a public debate on “The EU: The real sick man of Europe?”, [www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-08-05-vienna-en.html](http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2011-08-05-vienna-en.html)

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## Conference

### On Solidarity VII: The Character of the Public

#### March 9–11, 2012, ERSTE Lounge, Vienna

In March, the Institute for Human Sciences held its seventh conference on solidarity. This series has been organized in collaboration with Columbia University since 2005. The purpose of this year’s meeting was to consider whether democracies best thrive when their citizens share a broadly common public space, pursue a broadly common public interest, and are governed by a state with the capacity to sustain these two aspects of collective citizenship.

The conference brought together scholars and policy-makers from (Eastern and Western) Europe as well as from the US to discuss the role of (and the problems with) the public space in today’s democracies.

#### Program

Friday, March 9

*Introduction:*  
**Ira Katznelson** (Columbia)

#### The State and the Public Interest

How can the public interest be defined? Does this rest with the sovereign people, or does it occur in the institutions of popular representation? Is it based on a collective and communal understanding that transcends the partial and particular and expresses itself in common conversations, institutions, and movements—or does it represent the outcome of deliberative and competitive democratic processes?

When are long-term political goals—like intergenerational justice, ecological sustainability, the stability of political decisions, the structure and transformation of energy supply, the design of the welfare system—more likely to be achieved? Which “model” of public interest provides a better space for “reason”, necessary to attain these goals?

*Introduction:*  
**Kurt Biedenkopf** (Former Prime Minister of Saxony, Dresden)  
*Comments:*  
**Ivan Krastev** (IWM, Vienna),  
**Alan Wolfe** (Boston College)

#### Participation and Its Institutions

How people in civil society engage with political life via key institutions and transmission belts, including political parties, social movements, journalism, interest and lobbying groups, and features of public opinion, bears directly on the project’s central issues. The question at stake is how we should understand the character, content, and consequences of the relationship between participation and these various institutional channels.

*Introduction:*  
**Sidney Verba** (Harvard)  
*Comments:*  
**Paul Dekker** (Tilburg University),  
**María Victoria Murillo** (Columbia)

Saturday, March 10

#### The Organization of Social Knowledge

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, American Progressives, English New Liberals, and European Christian and Social Democrats all looked to modern social knowledge, grounded in the new social sciences, as spaces within which to generate useful policy ideas built on putatively objective and factual bases. During the course of the century, totalitarian regimes tightly harnessed and controlled knowledge to explicit ideological purposes. In the democracies, over time, the character of policy ideas also became more tightly linked to advocacy, but in

an open and competitive political universe. What are the implications of this shift?

*Introduction:*  
**Kenneth Prewitt** (Columbia)  
*Comments:*  
**Helmut Anheier** (Hertie School of Governance, Berlin), **Nicolas Lemann** (Columbia)

#### The Capacity of the Democratic State to Govern

With the fragmentation of ideas about the public interest, of the channels of political participation, and the creation of policy-relevant knowledge, has the capacity of the state, as a site of neutrality and effectiveness, diminished? If so, what are the consequences for democratic vitality and success, including success in reproducing a sense of common solidarity?

*Introduction:*  
**Claus Offe** (Hertie School of Governance, Berlin)  
*Comments:*  
**Sven Giegold** (MEP, Greens/European Free Alliance, Brussels),  
**Olivier Zunz** (University of Virginia)

Sunday, March 11

#### The State and the Crisis

Public debate in Vienna’s Burgtheater (see p. 6)

#### Participants

**Helmut Anheier**  
Professor of Sociology at the Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, and the Max-Weber-Institute for Sociology, Ruprecht-Karls-University Heidelberg

**Kurt Biedenkopf**  
Honorary Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin; Member of the IWM Board of Patrons; Former Prime Minister of Saxony, Dresden

**Paul Dekker**  
Professor of Civil Society, Tilburg University, and Head of the Participation and Government Research Group at the Netherlands Institute for Social Research

**Karl Duffek**  
Director, Renner-Institut, Vienna

**Georg Fischer**  
Director, Analysis, Evaluation, External Relations, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs & Equal Opportunities, European Commission, Brussels

**Sven Giegold**  
Member of the European Parliament (Greens/European Free Alliance), Brussels and Strasbourg

**Alfred Gusenbauer**  
Former Chancellor of the Republic of Austria, Vienna

**Ira Katznelson**  
Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History, Columbia University, New York; Vice Chair of the IWM Academic Advisory Board

**János Mátyás Kovács**  
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*In cooperation with Columbia University (New York), Duitsland Instituut (Amsterdam), Renner Institut (Wien), ERSTE Bank, ERSTE Stiftung, Der Standard, and Burgtheater.*



# Der Staat und die Krise

AUSZUG DER BURGTHEATER-DEBATTE VOM 11. MÄRZ 2012

*Nach der Weltwirtschaftskrise der 1930er Jahre vertrauten die Bürger dem Staat mehr als dem Markt. In den 1970er Jahren drehte sich das Verhältnis: die Politik erschien als Hemmnis der ökonomischen Entwicklung, und man setzte auf den Markt. Heute scheinen die Bürger weder der Politik noch dem Markt zu trauen.*

Zum Abschluss der Konferenz *On Solidarity: The Character of the Public* (s. S. 4) fand am 11. März im Burgtheater eine Diskussion über die Rolle von Staat und Politik in der gegenwärtigen Krise statt. Im Zentrum stand die Frage, wie viel Vertrauen die Bürger heute noch in die Demokratie setzen. Wir bringen im Folgenden Auszüge aus der Debatte.

**Ivan Krastev:** Die soziale Ungleichheit wächst nicht erst seit der Krise. Die Krise hat diesen Prozess nur beschleunigt: immer weniger junge Leute haben heute Aussicht auf Arbeit, immer mehr Alte müssen um ihre Pensionen bangen.

**Katherine Newman:** Ja, die Ungleichheit wächst in den westlichen Demokratien seit Mitte der 1970er Jahre. Dafür gibt es viele Ursachen, aber mit der Krise ist die Arbeitslosigkeit auch in den USA sprunghaft gestie-



Katherine Newman

gen, insbesondere der Anteil der Jungen – wir können schon jetzt von einer verlorenen Generation sprechen – und jener der Langzeitarbeitslosen, die nur schwer in den Arbeitsmarkt zurückfinden, auch wenn es wieder aufwärts geht. So etwas gab es zuletzt in der Wirtschaftskrise der 30er Jahre. Ein anderes Problem ist das Schwinden der privaten Rücklagen – bei den meisten Amerikanern ihr Eigenheim, das viele von ihnen in der Immobilienkrise verloren haben, und damit die Möglichkeit, die Ausbildung ihrer Kinder zu finanzieren und für ihr Alter vorzusorgen – Leistungen, die in Europa der Sozialstaat übernimmt. Und das vergleichsweise Wenige, was die öffentliche Hand in den USA an Sozialleistungen und Bildungseinrichtungen bietet, wird nun gekürzt, um das wachsende Defizit zu reduzieren. Die Folgen der Krise werden mehr und mehr der Familie aufgebürdet, die aber längst an die Grenzen ihrer Belastbarkeit gelangt ist.

**Krastev:** Die Krise hat also die westlichen Demokratien bis tief in die Gesellschaft hinein angegriffen. Welche Auswirkungen hat sie auf autoritä-



Photos: Matthias Cerner, Der Standard

re Regime wie Putins Russland, wo wir gerade einen unerwarteten Aufschwung der demokratischen Opposition erleben?

**Lilia Shevtsova:** Wenn wir zurückblicken, so war es stets so, dass sich Russland – vom Zarenreich über die Sowjetunion bis heute – und der Westen feindlich gegenüber standen und einer von der Krise des andern profitierte – zuletzt 1991, als die westliche Demokratien über den Kommunismus triumphierten. Aber was geschieht heute? Die Symptome, die Katherine gerade für die USA diagnostiziert hat, ähneln stark jenen, die wir heute in Russland beobachten. Dasselbe gilt für die Verlierer und Gewinner der Krise. Das verrät nicht nur einiges über unsere Gesellschaft, sondern auch viel über die Schwächen der westlichen Gesellschaften.

Ich muss aber gestehen, dass mir unsere Diskussion auf der IWM-Konferenz Hoffnung gegeben hat: Denn

Bewegung oder der Piraten. Letztere sind besonders interessant, weil sie den Sprung in die demokratischen Institutionen geschafft haben. Ich frage daher den Piraten in unserer



Lilia Shevtsova

Runde: Welche neuen politischen Ideen bringt ihr mit? Was wollt ihr ändern? Wie sehen Sie die Rolle der Piraten in der Krise?

**Christopher Lauer:** Die Generation der Piraten ist mit Krisen aufgewachsen. Und mit dem Internet,

Wir hoffen, daran etwas mit neuen Formen der Partizipation ändern zu können und so auch mehr Bürgernähe herzustellen.

**Krastev:** Herr Gusenbauer, sie bringen eine doppelte Erfahrung mit – als Politiker und als jemand, der heute Politik reflektiert. Wie konnte es geschehen, dass die Sozialdemokratie in letzter Zeit europaweit die meisten Wahlen verloren hat? Ist es die Krise, die den starken sozialdemokratischen Konsens in Europa erschüttert hat?

**Alfred Gusenbauer:** Zum sozialdemokratischen Selbstverständnis gehört, dass Politik die Aufgabe hat, die Kräfte des Marktes zu zähmen. Heute haben die Bürger aber den Eindruck, dass die wichtigen politischen Entscheidungen nicht mehr von gewählten Organen getroffen werden, sondern irgendwo in der Anonymität der Finanzmärkte. Die Krise hat nun nicht dazu geführt, dass der Po-

Dennoch gibt es Fortschritt, auch wenn er nicht spektakulär sein mag. Europa wächst zusammen, wir können heute auf europäischer Ebene gemeinsam Lösungen entwickeln, die noch vor einigen Jahren unmöglich schienen. Freilich kann man die institutionalisierten Legitimationsmechanismen nicht beliebig lange straflos umgehen mit dem Argument, dass die Krise angeblich keine Zeit für demokratische Prozeduren lasse. Die Bürger lassen sich nicht auf Dauer von Entscheidungen ausschließen, die sie massiv betreffen. Sie werden sich ihre demokratischen Rechte nicht nehmen lassen, sie werden keine Wirtschaftsdiktatur akzeptieren. Es geht also darum, die Fortschritte in der Zusammenarbeit auf europäischer Ebene mit mehr Legitimation auszustatten. Zu den Instrumenten dafür gehören im Übrigen auch Referenden. Dass im Falle Griechenlands einschneidende Maßnahmen extern getrof-



Christopher Lauer

fen wurden, ohne das Volk zu befragen, ist problematisch.

**Krastev:** Dann müsste man aber auch das deutsche Volk befragen, ob es bereit ist, für Griechenland zu bürgen, und am Ende stehen wir mit 27 Willensbekundungen da...

Ich möchte zu einem tiefer liegenden Problem kommen: Vertrauen. Nach der Weltwirtschaftskrise der 1930er Jahre vertrauten die Bürger dem Staat mehr als dem Markt. In den 1970er Jahren drehte sich das Verhältnis: Die Politik erschien als Hemmnis der ökonomischen Entwicklung, und man setzte auf den Markt. Und heute? Jüngste Umfragen besagen, dass die Bürger weder der Politik noch dem Markt trauen. Dass die westlichen Regierungen praktisch alle ins Wanken geratenen Banken gerettet haben, scheint ihnen keinen Kredit eingebracht zu haben.

**Newman:** Auch damals in den 30ern herrschten zunächst große Zweifel, ob der Staat die Krise in den Griff bekommen würde. Zu Beginn versuchte die Regierung es mit Sparmaßnahmen, wie heute, und scheiterte.

*Wenn nichts getan wird, wird es in Europa bald eine Generation ohne Rechte und ohne Zukunft geben...*

wie jede, so birgt auch die gegenwärtige Krise Chancen für einen Wandel, oder, im Falle Russlands: Es wird bei uns keinen Wandel geben ohne vorangehende Krise. Die gegenwärtige Krise in Russland ist wie ein Fieber, das zeigt, dass der Patient noch lebt.

**Krastev:** Die Krise hat in Russland neue zivilgesellschaftliche Energien ins politische Spiel gebracht, aber auch anderswo: nach dem „Arabischen Frühling“ sind wir nun auch im Westen Zeugen neuer Formen politischen Protestes wie der „Occupy“-

das unsere Welt verändert hat. Während sich in der Wirklichkeit kaum mehr etwas bewegen lässt, hat das Internet einen Raum mit unendlichen Möglichkeiten eröffnet. Die Piraten versuchen, etwas von diesem Potential in die politische Wirklichkeit zu holen. Aber das ist nicht nur so in den westlichen Ländern, auch im Nahen Osten und anderswo beansprucht unsere Generation ihren Platz in der Gesellschaft. In Berlin haben wir den Sprung ins Parlament geschafft. Aber dort begegnen wir einer schwerfälligen Bürokratie.

litik ein stärkeres Mandat verliehen wurde, sondern Politik ist in ganz Europa im Gegenteil nur noch damit beschäftigt, das Staatsbudget auszugleichen und Sparmaßnahmen durchzusetzen. „Es gibt keine Alternative“ ist zur Parole der heutigen Politik geworden – nicht gerade eine Inspirationsquelle für demokratische Politik, denn Demokratie heißt doch: wählen können... Die Folge ist, dass viele Parteien auf ein neues Feld ausweichen: Identitätspolitik – eine Arena, in der die Sozialdemokraten nie stark waren.



Erst damit eröffnete sich für Roosevelt die Chance, den New Deal einzuführen – wie wir wissen, mit großem Erfolg. Und erst dann begannen die Bürger, Vertrauen in die Politik zu fassen. Es ist wahr, in den USA von heute, wie auch anderswo, scheint es, dass die Politiker, und die Elite insgesamt, jeden Kredit verspielt haben. Es ist aber inzwischen so, dass z. B. die Maßnahmen zur Rettung der Autoindustrie greifen – tausende neuer Arbeitsplätze wurden geschaffen. Die Konservativen haben heute Schwierigkeiten zu erklären, warum sie gegen diese Maßnahmen gestimmt haben. Leider ist es den Demokraten bisher aber nicht gelungen, ihre Erfolge zu nutzen und den Bürgern klar zu machen, dass der Staat durchaus in der Lage ist, angesichts von Marktversagen zu intervenieren, ja, dass eben dies seine Rolle ist. Ich hoffe, es wird Obama im bevorstehenden Wahlkampf gelingen, Politik als etwas darzustellen, das Achtung verdient, das Verantwortungsbewusstsein auf die Bedürfnisse der Bürger reagiert und ein unersetzliches Instrument in Zeiten der Krise ist.

Übertragen auf Europa frage ich: Wo sind z. B. die Diskussionen über die Verantwortung der EU gegenüber der wachsenden Jugendarbeitslosigkeit? Ich bin überzeugt, dass eine Demokratie nicht funktionieren kann, wenn Hunderttausende aus der Gesellschaft herausfallen. Wenn nichts getan wird, wird es in Europa bald eine Generation ohne Rechte und ohne Zukunft geben, und folglich



Alfred Gusenbauer

auch ohne Vertrauen in die Politik. Es geht eben nicht nur um den Ausgleich von Haushaltsdefiziten und die Regulierung von Märkten, sondern auch um die Dinge, die die Bürger, die Familien angehen: Haben sie Arbeit, sind sie in der Lage, selbst für sich zu sorgen und die nächste Generation aufzuziehen?

**Gusenbauer:** Sie haben recht, aber wenn wir diese Ziele in Europa verwirklichen wollen, muss sich etwas an unserer Wahrnehmung verändern. Es besteht gar kein Zweifel, dass etwas gegen die dramatische Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in Spanien getan werden muss. Aber die spanische Regierung allein wird dieses Problem nicht lösen können. Es geht darum, dass die Überschussländer Gelder für Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Arbeitslosigkeit in den Mittelmeerländern bereitstellen. Der große Unterschied zu den USA besteht darin, dass die EU keine Regierung hat, die solche Maßnahmen beschließen könnte. Dennoch müssen wir so etwas wie eine europäische Solidarität entwickeln.

**Newman:** Und genau darin besteht

die Bewährungsprobe für die EU: Wird die Union zu einem Gemeinwesen, in dem Probleme der schwächeren Mitglieder als Probleme für alle verstanden werden?

**Krastev:** Gehen wir zurück in die Straßen von Moskau. Was bewegt die Demonstranten dort – viele von ihnen verbringen ihre Zeit sonst eher auf Flughäfen und im Ausland?

**Shevtsova:** Bevor ich auf die Frage antworte: Vielleicht wird man unter den Protestierenden in Russland ja bald auch Piraten ausmachen; jedenfalls sollten wir von ihren Erfahrungen etwas lernen. Dem Protest, der sich in den letzten Wochen in Russland artikuliert hat, liegen andere Motive zugrunde als jenem etwa der Occupy-Bewegung. Es ist vor allem der Ruf nach der Anerkennung als Bürger, es geht kaum um soziale oder ökonomische Forderungen. Allerdings müssen solche Forderungen in die Bewegung aufgenommen werden, wenn sie Erfolg haben will.

Was sind die Perspektiven für Russland? Es gibt zwei Szenarien: Vielleicht gelingt es uns, über unseren Schatten zu springen und eine politische, ja zivilisatorische Alternative zum status quo zu entwickeln. Wir können aber nicht ausschließen, dass Russland scheitert. Das Land kommt mir manchmal vor wie eine Titanic auf der Suche nach ihrem Eisberg.

**Krastev:** Kommen wir zur Schlussrunde. Herr Gusenbauer, wird die EU es schaffen?

**Gusenbauer:** Ja. Ich glaube, Europa wird in Zukunft eine gemeinsame Haushaltspolitik haben, als ökonomisches Fundament für die politische Einheit. Trotz oder gerade wegen der gegenwärtigen Herausforderungen sind die proeuropäischen Kräfte nach wie vor stark.

**Krastev:** Das Schicksal der USA hängt nicht allein davon ab, wer der nächste Präsident sein wird. Was viele beunruhigt, ist die gegenwärtige politische Polarisierung in den USA. Wie sehen Sie die Chancen zu ihrer Überwindung?

**Newman:** Was wir derzeit beobachten, ist der Zerfall der Republikaner. Für die Demokraten wird es wichtig sein zu zeigen, dass sie die Probleme der Gesamtbevölkerung im Auge haben. Dasselbe gilt für die Europäische Union: Sie muss die Europäer überzeugen, dass sie nicht nur eine Veranstaltung für die Elite ist, sondern auch eine Hoffnung bedeutet für die Benachteiligten. Denn die werden sonst von den Populisten eingesammelt.

**Shevtsova:** Was Russland betrifft, so bin ich skeptisch gegenüber Voraussagen, aber was mir Hoffnung gibt, sind die jungen Leute. Sie wollen einen Wandel.

**Lauer:** Das ist bei uns nicht anders. Die Piraten werden nicht den nächsten Kanzler stellen, aber wir bringen frischen Wind in die Parlamente, und wir arbeiten an einer Vision für die künftige Gesellschaft. <

## Europa im Diskurs / Debating Europe

### January 22 / February 26 / March 11, 2012

#### Burgtheater, Vienna



v. l.: Peter Eigen, Heiner Geißler, Alexandra Förderl-Schmid, Christoph Kardinal Schönborn, Gesine Schwan

Photo: Matthias Crenner, Der Standard

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Die Matinee-Serie bringt seit 2008 führende Politiker, Wissenschaftler und Intellektuelle auf die Bühne des Wiener Burgtheaters, um aktuelle europäische Fragen zu diskutieren. Die Reihe ist eine Kooperation von IWM, Der Standard, ERSTE Stiftung und Burgtheater.

*Since 2008 this series of public debates brings leading politicians, scholars and intellectuals together on stage of Vienna's Burgtheater to discuss pressing European questions. The series is a cooperation between IWM, Der Standard, ERSTE Foundation and Burgtheater.*

Sonntag, 22. Januar 2012

#### Ist die Einheit Europas in Gefahr?

Die Krise rund um den Euro hat zu einer tiefen Kluft geführt. Deutschland und Frankreich geben die Richtung vor, die anderen Staaten fühlen sich an den Rand gedrückt. Nicht alle Mitglieder sehen ein, warum sie für finanzielle Probleme anderer Staaten zahlen sollen. Die Eurokrise erzwang einen Wechsel der Regierungen in Griechenland, Italien und der Slowakei. Droht ein Bruch innerhalb der EU?

**Daniel Cohn-Bendit**  
Fraktionschef der europäischen Grünen im EU-Parlament

**Dimitris Droutsas**  
ehem. griechischer Außenminister, nunmehr EU-Abgeordneter (Pasok)

**Peer Steinbrück**  
ehem. deutscher Finanzminister (SPD)

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**Alexandra Förderl-Schmid**  
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Mehr auf [www.iwm.at](http://www.iwm.at)

Sonntag, 26. Februar 2012

#### Geld und Moral: Ist Europas Wertesystem in Gefahr?

Die soziale Marktwirtschaft war seit dem Ende des 2. Weltkriegs das vorherrschende Modell in Kontinentaleuropa. Seit der Finanzkrise 2008/2009 und den Turbulenzen rund um den Euro ist das derzeitige System ins Wanken geraten.

Die sozialen Sicherungssysteme sind durch Fehlspekulationen gefährdet; Regierungen bringen Milliarden an Steuermitteln auf, um Banken zu retten; Korruption und Zahlentricksereien stellen das europäische Solidarmodell vor eine Zerreißprobe. Nicht mehr das Gemeinwohl steht im Mittelpunkt des politischen Handelns, sondern Rating-Agenturen geben Entscheidungen vor. Hat die Politik noch das Primat des Handelns, oder wird alles der Ökonomie untergeordnet? Was heißt das für unser Wertesystem in Europa? Kann Transparenz künftig Fehlinformationen und – Entscheidungen verhindern? Ist die Politik korrupt? Wer gilt noch als moralische Instanz?

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Mehr auf [www.iwm.at](http://www.iwm.at)

Sonntag, 11. März 2012

#### Der Staat und die Krise

Die gegenwärtige wirtschaftliche und politische Krise Europas ist von beunruhigenden Paradoxien gekennzeichnet: Die demokratischen Institutionen sind transparenter als je zuvor, aber noch nie war das Vertrauen in sie auf einem solchen Tiefpunkt. Noch nie war die demokratische Elite so leistungsbestimmt und zugleich unbeliebt wie heute. Unsere Gesellschaften sind offener und demokratischer denn je, aber immer weniger in der Lage, soziale und ökonomische Probleme zu lösen.

Zur Zeit der Weltwirtschaftskrise in den 1930er Jahren verloren die Menschen ihr Vertrauen in den Markt und setzten es in den Staat. In den 1970er Jahren war es umgekehrt – sie wandten sich vom Staat ab und verließen sich lieber auf den Markt. Heute scheinen beide, Markt und Staat, das Vertrauen der Bürger zu verlieren – mit dem Versagen des Marktes ist das Ansehen der Politik gesunken. Wird der Staat die gegenwärtige Krise in den Griff bekommen, oder wird sie einen neuen politischen Konsens hervorbringen, wonach die Rechte gegen den Sozialstaat opponiert und die Linke gegen den Sicherheitsstaat, am Ende aber niemand mehr auf den Staat setzen will?

Über diese Fragen diskutierten zum Abschluss der IWM-Konferenz *On Solidarity VII: The Character of the Public* im Wiener Burgtheater:

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Ausschnitte aus der Debatte s. S. 6

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# The European Dis-Union: Lessons from the Soviet Collapse

BY IVAN KRASTEV

*Europe's crisis is being felt at multiple levels, from the future of the Eurozone and divisions between member-states to the rise of populist forces. But is the crisis likely to lead to the European Union's disintegration? The precedent of the Soviet collapse offers some lessons, says Ivan Krastev.*

In 1992, the world woke up to find that the Soviet Union was no longer on the map. One of the world's two superpowers had collapsed without a war, alien invasion or any other catastrophe. And it happened against all expectations. True, there was strong evidence to suggest that the Soviet system had been in irreversible decline since the 1970s, but this was anticipated to unfold over decades; nothing preordained its collapse as the climax of a "short 20<sup>th</sup> century".

In 1985, 1986 and even in 1989, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was as inconceivable to contemporary analysts as the prospect of the European Union's disintegration is to experts today. The Soviet empire was too big to fail, too stable to collapse, had survived too much turbulence simply to implode.

But what a difference a decade can make! An outcome that was perceived as unthinkable in 1985 was declared inevitable in 1995. And it is exactly this twist of fate, this leap from the "unthinkable" to the "inevitable" that makes the Soviet disintegration experience a useful reference point in current discussions on the future of the European crisis and the choices that European leaders face.

After all, the EU's present crisis has powerfully demonstrated that the risk of disintegration is much more than a rhetorical device—a toy monster used by scared politicians to enforce austerity on unhappy voters. It is not only European economies but European politics that are in turmoil. The financial crisis has sharply reduced the life expectancy of governments, regardless of their political color, and opened space for the rise of populist and protest parties. The public mood is best described as a combination of pessimism and anger.

This is reflected in the most recent "Future of Europe" survey, funded by the European Commission and published in April 2012. It shows that while the majority of Europeans agree that the EU is a good place to live in, their confidence in the economic performance of the Union and its capacity to play a major role in global politics has declined. More than six of any ten Europeans believe that the lives of today's children will be more difficult than those of people from their own generation. Even more troubling, almost 90% of Europeans see a big gap between what the public wants and what governments do. Only a third of Europeans



Photo: REUTERS / Stringer, Italy

feel that their vote counts at the EU level, and only 18% of Italians and 15% of Greeks feel that their vote counts even in their own countries.

Against this background, how unthinkable is the EU's disintegration? Here, Europe's capacity to learn from the Soviet precedent could play a crucial part. For the very survival of the EU may depend on its leaders' ability to man-

age the same mix of political, economic and psychological factors that were in play in the process of the Soviet collapse.

history. The mid-19<sup>th</sup>-century codifier of the British constitution, Walter Bagehot, attributed monarchy's strength to the fact that "it is an intelligible government. The mass of mankind understand it". The EU in contrast is an unintelligible government that the mass of Europeans cannot understand.

People across the EU cannot grasp how the union functions, and thus find it even more difficult to grasp

Union itself, amount to "disintegration"? Or would other trends be enough of an indicator: the decline of the EU's global influence or the reversal of some major achievements of European integration (such as the free movement of people or institutions, such as the European Court of Justice)?

In answering these questions, the Soviet experience offers some useful lessons.

*The belief that the Union cannot disintegrate is one of the major risks of disintegration.*

age the same mix of political, economic and psychological factors that were in play in the process of the Soviet collapse.

The Soviet order "collapsed like a house of cards", wrote the eminent historian Martin Malia, "because it had always been a house of cards". The EU is not a house of cards, and the great differences between the Soviet and the EU projects must always be kept in mind. But if the EU has never been seduced by the temptations of communism and central planning, it is not immune to the vices of complexity. It is the most sophisticated political puzzle known to

what "the collapse of the Union" would mean. In the case of the Soviet Union, collapse meant that a state disappeared from the map and a dozen new states came into being across a vast territory from north-central Asia to southeast Europe. But the EU is not a state, and even if it collapsed nothing would change on the maps. Moreover, even if the EU disintegrates most (if not all) of the member-states will remain market democracies.

So, how can its disintegration be defined or conceptualized? Would the departure of at least one country from the Eurozone, or from the

The first lesson is also a paradox: namely, the belief (backed by economists, and shared by Europe's political class) that the Union *cannot* disintegrate is also one of the major risks of disintegration. The last years of the Soviet Union are the classic manifestation of this dynamic. The perception that disintegration is "unthinkable" could tempt policy-makers to embrace anti-EU policies or rhetoric for short-term advantage, in the belief that "nothing really bad can happen" in the long term.

But the EU's disintegration need not be the result of a victory by an-

ti-EU forces over pro-EU forces; the Soviet experience is a potent warning to Europe that collapse can be the unintended consequence of the Union's long-term dysfunctioning (or perceived dysfunctioning), compounded by the elites' misreading of national political dynamics. The respected historian Stephen Kotkin, reflecting on the disintegration of the Soviet Union, holds that the real question to be asked is: "why did the Soviet elite destroy its own system?" The process he analyses shows that the rise of anti-integration forces can be the *outcome*, not the *cause* of collapse.

Moreover, the assessment of the disintegration risk should not be left to economists, who have a blind spot when it comes to collapse. The Soviet case suggests that the enormous economic costs of disintegration are not a reason for it not to happen. In this sense to believe that the EU cannot disintegrate simply because it is costly is a weak reassurance for the stability of the Union.

The second lesson of the Soviet Union's demise is that *misguided* reforms—even more than the *lack* of reforms—can result in disintegration. It is during crises that politicians search for a "silver bullet", and quite often it is this bullet that is the cause of death. A central factor in the end of the Soviet system was Mikhail Gorbachev's failure to grasp its nature (by persisting in the illusion that it could be preserved without complete reform, and his misguided belief in its superiority). The European Union and its member-states have their own history of efforts to produce a single brave policy that is meant to solve almost all of their problems. The idea of the referenda on the European constitution that backfired so spectacularly in France and the Netherlands is a reminder of the dangers of such a course of action.

The third lesson of the Soviet experience is that the major risk to the political project—in the absence of war or other extreme circumstances—comes not from destabilization on the periphery but from revolt at the center (even if the crisis in the periphery can be infectious). It was Russia's choice to get rid of the Union rather than the Baltic republics' desire to run away from it that determined the fate of the Soviet state. Today, it is Germany's view of what is happening in the Union that will more decisively affect the future of the European project than the troubles of the Greek or Spanish econo-





Pierre Hassner and Aleksander Smolar



Robert Cooper

mies. When the “winners” of integration start to view themselves as its major victims, then it is certain that big trouble is imminent.

For the moment, Europeans do not have reasons to doubt Germany’s devotion to the EU; yet increasingly, the debt-ridden southern countries’ horrifying inability to “translate” their concerns into German is matched by Germany’s fail-

threats of disintegration political actors should bet on flexibility and constrain their natural urge for rigidity and enduring solutions (which, if and when they fail, can accelerate the momentum towards disintegration). Unfortunately, at present, European decision-makers are trying to save the Union via policy solutions that radically limit both national governments and the public’s choices. Accordingly, voters in countries like Italy and Greece can change governments, but they cannot change policies: economic decision-making is *de facto* removed from electoral politics.

The expectations are that the new politics of fiscal discipline will reduce political pressure on the EU. But while experts can agree or disagree on the pros and cons of the austerity policy package, what is more important is that the failure of rigidity will automatically accel-

*The Soviet case suggests that the enormous economic costs of disintegration are not a reason for it not to happen.*

ure to “translate” her proposed solutions into the languages of most other member-states. And what is most worrying here is less the divergence of interests than the lack of empathy.

The fourth lesson is that if the dynamic of disintegration prevails, the result will look more like a “bank run” than a revolution. Thus, the most important factor affecting the chances of the Union to survive is the trust of the elites in its capacity to deal with its problems. To quote Kotkin’s apt observation on the Soviet case: “it was the central elite, rather than the independence movements of the periphery, that cashiered the Union”. Whereas people can be unhappy about Europe without revolting against it, national elites could abandon it for fear of losing control—and even at the moment they start questioning its prospects, their actions (by inciting general panic among those who fear they will be the last to ask for their money, as in bank runs) can contribute to its eventual collapse.

The last and most disturbing lesson coming out of the study of Soviet collapse is that in times of

Ivan Krastev is Chairman of the Board of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and Permanent Fellow at the IWM.

Conference  
The Political Logics of Disintegration I: The Soviet Experience  
January 12–13, 2012, IWM, Vienna

The EU’s recent crisis has shown that contrary to what the classic notion of the “ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe” suggests, the process of Europe’s integration is not irreversible. The specter of disintegration is haunting the European Union. In light of the eminent challenges facing the integration project, the IWM organizes, under the auspices of its *Future of Democracy* research focus, and in cooperation with the Open Society Institute, a series of conferences bringing together policy-makers, political scientists and public intellectuals. The first conference was devoted to the Soviet experience of disintegration and the relevant lessons that European policy-makers might learn from it.

Program

Session I: Why the Soviet Union Disintegrated

Introduction: Stephen Kotkin

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was considered inconceivable before it occurred and unavoidable after it happened. When, how and why did the “unthinkable” become the only logical thing to happen?

Session II: Soviet Disintegration: Actors, Perceptions and Unintended Consequences

Introduction: Stephen Hanson

Most of the actors that contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union never aimed at the dissolution of the Soviet state. How did they end up contributing to an objective they did not pursue?

Session III: Europe’s Disintegration Moment

Introduction: Pierre Hassner

What is at the heart of the current European crisis? Is this a systemic crisis? What are the likely scenarios for the EU’s disintegration: uncontrolled collapse?

Session IV: The EU Crisis in the Context of the Soviet Experience. Some Practical Lessons

Introduction: Robert Cooper

Comparing the Soviet experience from two decades ago with the crisis that the EU faces today is a tricky exercise. The EU is not the Soviet Union, and even useful comparisons have their limits. But what can European policy-makers learn if they read closely the Soviet experience?

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- Svetlana Boym**  
Curt Hugo Reisinger Professor of Slavic and Comparative Literature, Harvard University
- Sandra Breka**  
Head of Department, Berlin Office, Robert Bosch Stiftung, Berlin
- Robert Cooper**  
Counsellor, European External Action Service, Brussels
- Thomas de Waal**  
Senior Associate, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Washington, D.C.
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Associate Professor, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
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Research Director Emeritus, Sciences-Po (CERI), Paris
- Stephen Holmes**  
Walter E. Meyer Professor of Law, New York University School of Law

- Stephen Kotkin**  
Rosengarten Professor of Modern and Contemporary History; Vice Dean, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University
- János Mátyás Kovács**  
Permanent Fellow, IWM; Member, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Science, Budapest
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# How Gogol Explains the Post-Soviet World

BY THOMAS DE WAAL

*Thomas de Waal took part in the IWM conference on the dynamics of disintegration which looked at parallels between the stresses in the European project and the break-up of the Soviet Union. At the time, he was working on a study of three post-Soviet states, Russia, Ukraine and Georgia, seen not as political models but through three works of literature by Nikolai Gogol, Anton Chekhov and Fyodor Dostoyevsky. De Waal believes that great writers can offer at least as much insight into the way the world works as do political scientists.*



Photo: IWM, Illustration: Yuri Norstein

Twenty years ago, 15 new states emerged from the wreck of the Soviet Union, uneven shards from a broken monolith. One story turned into 15. Most Soviet watchers have been struggling to keep up ever since. How to tell these multiple stories?

In retrospect, it is evident that Western commentators have failed to predict or explain what has happened to these countries: their lurches from one crisis to another, weird hybrid political systems, unstable stability.

Commentators have long tried to project models from the rest of the world (“transition to a market economy,” “evolution of a party system”) onto countries that have very different histories and cultural assumptions from the West and often from one another. What I take away from such comparisons is a nicely constructed model or two, but not the insights I seek into a living society.

So here is a not entirely frivolous suggestion: how about skipping the political science textbooks when it comes to trying to understand the former Soviet Union and instead opening up the pages of Nikolai Gogol, Anton Chekhov, and Fyodor Dostoyevsky? My idea here is to draw a brief sketch of how three great works

of Russian literature can be mapped onto the stories of the three post-Soviet countries in which Western commentators take the keenest interest: Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia. These classics, each more than a century old, provide both the specific detail and the grand panorama that are lacking in a shelf full of over-modeled political analysis.

## Russia as Nikolai Gogol's *The Government Inspector*

A great burden of Russia is that it has never rid itself of the habit of feudalism, of personalized power. Up until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, lowly serfs constituted a majority of the Russian population. Nor were the landowners who ruled the serfs independent—they served the state and owned property at the mercy of the tsar. The Soviet system reconstituted that hierarchy, this time with centralized ownership of property and the monopoly of the Communist Party. In recent years, Putin has repackaged it yet again for the post-Soviet era, imposing a so-called “power vertical” even while allowing his citizens a much greater degree of private space.

But, as Putin has recently dis-

covered, the system is surprisingly brittle. It requires constant maintenance, as it is built on a chain of dependencies that are oiled by favors and kickbacks and riddled with suspicion and duplicity.

Which brings me irresistibly to Nikolai Gogol's *The Government Inspector*. Gogol is the master cartoonist of Russian life. You could say he is savagely affectionate about Russia. His only full-length play is Russia's greatest stage comedy and its most devastating satire, a mirror of Russia's habit of replicating petty despotism from tsar to serf. When Nicholas I watched an early performance in 1836, he famously exclaimed, “We all got it in the neck—and me most of all.”

In Putin's Russia, as in that of Nicholas I, everyone knows his or her place and colludes in corrupt practices, out of self-interest or inertia or both. But it all depends on the man at the top—the tsar, the mayor, the president. When the illusion of authority evaporates—the inspector is a fraud, the president overreaches—everything can crumble quickly. In the play, order is re-established quickly too: the new inspector will impose his will. In the play's celebrated closing “dumb scene,” though,

the characters are struck speechless, and we glimpse a moment of existential terror.

Russia's recurring predicament is to swing between autocratic order and societal breakdown, which is how most Russians experienced the post-Soviet 1990s. *The Government Inspector* poses the same dilemma. If Gogol has a lesson here for Russia's current civic protesters, it is that they must strive to change the system itself, not just the man at the head of it.

## Ukraine as Anton Chekhov's *The Cherry Orchard*

Ukraine is a large, peaceful country that does little to make an impression on the world. It lacks its big neighbor's great power complex and nuclear weapons, playing a sort of Canada to Russia's United States.

Certainly, Ukraine's post-Soviet statehood is now real and irreversible. In the two decades of its independence, it has twice achieved what Russia has failed to: the handover of power from government to opposition.

It has failed, however, to deliver tangible material benefits to the common people. Top-level corrup-

tion is a fact of life. Ukrainian politics, too, have veered from the brave civic activism of the 2004–2005 Orange Revolution, when protesters overturned a rigged election after Viktor Yanukovich had wrongly been declared to have defeated opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, to a Yushchenko presidency so disappointing that in 2010 voters elected Yanukovich anyway. The country seems to be, in Lilia Shevtsova's phrase, “lost in transition.”

This sends me back to the wonderful Anton Chekhov, the poet of the mundane. Maybe we can better understand Yushchenko's underwhelming presidency if we compare him to the eminently likable Lieutenant Colonel Vershinin in *Three Sisters*, who spends much of the play dreamily predicting how, “in two or three hundred years, life on Earth will be unimaginably beautiful, marvelous”—while utterly failing to act in the present.

But it is Chekhov's last play, *The Cherry Orchard*, which best evokes the dilemma of being Ukraine.

A mixed inheritance, missed opportunities, the triumph of new money, transition without arrival—this is the story of Ukraine, a modern European country of 45 million



people that is not really going anywhere. Through the poetic veil of *The Cherry Orchard*, we can see that one of Ukraine's key problems is that the thinkers who dream of a brave new life—in their case, a destiny for their country as part of Europe—do not actually know how to make it happen. Yet Chekhov called *The Cherry Orchard* a comedy. He wants us to understand that no one is in terminal suffering. At least Ukraine today is still more comedy than tragedy. But can its citizens start to have a proper conversation with one another about their future?

Georgia as Fyodor Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*

All 15 republics of the Soviet Union that gained independence on Dec. 25, 1991, save Russia, were patricides: they killed their Russian father to gain their freedom. In 1991, Georgia slew both Russia and its own Stalin complex after an intense outbreak of nationalism, when it threw off Soviet rule. Two presidents succeeded each other in years of drama and civil war. Then in Georgia's peaceful 2003 Rose Revolution, U.S.-educated lawyer Mikheil Saakashvili, only 35 years old at the time, engaged in another act of patricide, ousting the man who had once been his patron, veteran Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze. Now take a look at Fyodor Dostoyevsky's final novel, *The Brothers Karamazov*. In this novel a tyrannical father is murdered, and even if none of the man's three sons actually committed the deed, each must confront his secret patricidal desire to see the old man dead. Dostoyevsky's most fascinating creation is the fiercely intelligent 24-year-old student Ivan Karamazov. He is obsessed with utopian theories about how to end suffering in the world and ready to contemplate extreme measures to make it happen. Ivan is a close fit for today's young Georgian reformers: intense, arrogant, and philosophical.

The new Georgian generation has certainly done impressive things. In many ways Georgia has been transformed since 2004. The tax and customs systems have been overhauled, public service streamlined, and new cities and road systems planned. But there has been a cost. The new elite is perceived as arrogant and unaccountable—one reason it got dragged into a war with Russia in the summer of 2008. Corruption and criminality, which had plagued Georgia for a generation, have been suppressed—but at the price of the creation of a new, feared police force seemingly answerable to no one. According to U.S. State Department cables published by WikiLeaks, the Georgian governing elite's most articulate spokesman, Giga Bokebia, told the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi in 2008 that the Georgian president "believed that he did not have the luxury of developing consensus in order to bring irreversible democratic change to Georgia" and that "reform would stop" if the opposition did well in the elections. This idea of "reform before democracy" (some would call it the ends justifying the means) has a philosophical lineage that goes beyond the 20th-century Bolsheviks and further back to the Russian radical thinkers of the mid-19th century. Dostoyevsky spells out how dangerous that can be: in his novel, Ivan Karamazov's single-minded pursuit of a rational utopia and the strain of his father's death lead him to hallucinations and the brink of a nervous breakdown. The Georgian government is some way from that point. But the warning is there. ◀

Thomas de Waal is Senior Associate, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Washington, D.C.

Junior Fellows' Conference  
Re-thinking European Politics and History  
March 1, 2012, IWM, Vienna



Photo: IWM

Each semester, IWM Junior Fellows present their work at a conference organized by themselves. The proceedings are published online at [www.iwm.at/JVF\\_conferences.htm](http://www.iwm.at/JVF_conferences.htm)

Program

Session I

Chair: Agnieszka Pasięka

**Olha Martynyuk**  
*Sacred Hills and Commercial Downtown: Ethnic Meanings of Urban Spaces in Late Imperial Kiev*  
Discussant: Markian Prokopovych

**Julia Komleva**  
*Instilling the Idea of 'Double' Identity: The History Curriculum in the Schools of Austria-Hungary*  
Discussant: Andrey Levitsky

**Philip Howe**  
*Imperial Austria as a Precursor to Consociational Democracy*  
Discussant: Tamara Banjeglav

Session II

Chair: Andrey Levitsky

**Irina Dolgoplova**  
*Quantitative Assessment of the Democracy-Economic Development Relationship*  
Discussant: Markian Prokopovych

**Victoria Vasilenko**  
*The British Policy Towards the Polish-Czechoslovak Federation Project*

**Mihaela Herbel**  
*The Architecture of European New Governance: What Role for Social Movements?*

Session III

**Agnieszka Pasięka, David Petruccielli and Elizabeth Robinson**  
*Comparative Methodologies: an Interdisciplinary Discussion*

Session IV

Chair: Olha Martynyuk

**Ben Roth**  
*Confessions, Excuses, and the Storytelling Self: Rereading Rousseau with Paul de Man*

**Azat Bilalutdinov**  
*Shaping Politics of History in Contemporary Russia: Institutional Aspects*

**Tamara Banjeglav**  
*Memory of War or War over Memories? Politics of Remembering and Forgetting in the 1990s in Croatia*  
Discussant: Tihomir Cipek

Session V


Chair: Philip Howe

**Tom Junes**  
*Forging the Future Socialist Elite: the Case of Poland*

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*Building the Socialist City: the Case of Sofia*

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
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## Wagner's *Parsifal* and the Discourse of Regeneration

Monthly Lecture with **Karol Berger**, February 21, 2012



What is the sense we can make of *Parsifal*, of the opera's significance for Wagner, perhaps even of the composer's whole oeuvre, given that *Parsifal* may be seen as something of a testament? <

See also Berger's contribution on page 15.

**Karol Berger** is Osgood Hooker Professor in Fine Arts at Stanford University and EURIAS Visiting Fellow at IWM (September 2011–June 2012)

### Monthly Lectures

Once a month Visiting Fellows and invited scholars give public lectures in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.

## On the History of the Global Financial Crisis. The Hungarian Case

Monthly Lecture with **Julia Király**, March 28, 2012



Photo: Magyar Nemzeti Bank

The first part of the lecture provided a broad survey of the global financial crisis: the pre-crisis era of the "great moderation", the subprime crisis and the contagion effect

as well as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Király examined the 2009 recession and the nonconventional monetary and fiscal policies aimed at crisis management, and completed the global overview with an analysis of the ongoing Eurozone crisis.

In the second part, she discussed the consequences of the repeated waves of crisis in Central and Eastern Europe, with special regard to Hungary. First, the accumulation of economic imbalances (FX lending, "fiscal alcoholism" of the governments, etc.) was put under scrutiny, then she focused on the "decoupling or recoupling" debate in 2007, the meltdown after the Lehman shock, and the 2009 Spring "mini CEE crisis". Finally, Prof. Király explained why economic recovery in Hungary is still slow, and gave a brief assess-

ment of what is called the "unorthodox" Hungarian economic policy in our days.

The lecture emphasized the fact that both the crisis and its management in Hungary are deeply rooted in the economic history of the country. Without criticizing the current economic policies of the Hungarian government, Király described the ways in which the Central Bank of Hungary suggests to overcome the present difficulties. <

**Julia Király** is Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Hungary, and honorary professor at Corvinus University of Economics, Budapest.

## Between Cyber-Optimism and Cyber-Pessimism: The Impact of the Arab Spring on the Debate about Internet & Democracy

Monthly Lecture with **Evgeny Morozov**, April 24, 2012

In his recent book, *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom* (2011), Morozov argues that the Internet is not exactly the universal "democratization machine", as is prevalently believed today, particularly after the unfolding of the Arab Spring. Apart from analyzing the intellectual sources of the widespread inability to see the Internet's darker side, he criticizes the growing propensity to overestimate the role of the Internet in political and social change.

In his lecture, Evgeny Morozov discussed the impact of the Arab Spring on the debate about the In-



Photo: IWM

ternet and democracy in general and on the future of the so-called "Internet freedom agenda" in particular. His claim was that the role of social

media in the Arab uprising of last spring is constantly being overrated, thus leading our understanding of the nature and potential of social

media in a wrong direction. Is there a way of finding a workable middle ground between cyber-utopianism and cyber-dystopianism? Can we go beyond praising or condemning Internet and social networking platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and the like, in an attempt to articulate a more culturally-sensitive approach to studying Internet and democratization? Speaking of "the Internet" and the social networks with a capital "I", "F", or "T" is deeply misleading, claimed Morozov, and argued for the growing relevance of a contextualized and individual approach to the different technological

phenomena as a way to avoid essentialist attitudes towards contemporary technology. <

See also Morozov's contribution on page 20.

**Evgeny Morozov**, born 1984 in Salihorsk, Belarus, is writer, journalist, and expert on the political and social aspects of the Internet. He is currently a visiting scholar at Stanford University, a fellow at the New America Foundation, and a contributing editor of and blogger for *Foreign Policy* magazine.

## The French Presidential Election: What Is at Stake for France and for Europe?

Political Salon with **Christine Ockrent**, March 29, 2012

A month before the French presidential elections, columnist and writer Christine Ockrent discussed the campaigns of the two main presidential candidates, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande, in a *Political Salon* at IWM.

A central topic in her analysis was the role of the European Union in the campaign and the potential impact of an eventual victory of Hollande. Although the draft for a European Constitution was rejected in France in 2005 and the current crisis deeply affects the French economy, the majority of French citizens still has a positive attitude towards the EU, not the least because they know that without the EU France



Photo: Charles Platiau / Reuters

would lose much of its international weight. At the same time, the alliance with Germany is crucial for preserving France's position as a leading power in the world—a fact that also François Hollande cannot ignore. In case he wins (ed. note: in

the second round of the elections, held on 6 May, François Hollande did win over Sarkozy), it remains to be seen how much of his call for re-negotiating the fiscal pact is just rhetoric, Ockrent stated. As for Europe's future, she was sure that the Franco-

German political duo would remain a key factor after the elections. <

**Christine Ockrent** is a columnist and writer based in Paris. She writes regularly for leading international newspapers. Previously, she was COO of the French Radio and TV World service (France 24 and RFI). She was also editor-in-chief of the weekly news magazine *L'Express*. She is on the board of ECFR (European Council on Foreign Relations), CER (Center for European Reform), and Human Rights Watch France.

Discussants:

**Ivan Krastev**, Chair of the Board, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia; Permanent Fellow, IWM

**Christian Ultsch**, Foreign Editor, *Die Presse*

In cooperation with *Die Presse* and with the support of the Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance.

### Political Salon

The *Political Salon* is a discussion forum on current political and social questions that is organized in cooperation with the Austrian daily newspaper *Die Presse*. Started in 2004, the discussions with renowned politicians and scholars take place in the Institute's library and are hosted by journalists of *Die Presse* and Permanent Fellows of the IWM.





❶ Reihe: Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben

Mit der kapitalistischen Industriegesellschaft entstand eine Trennung zwischen Arbeit und Leben. In der Folge wurden die Aufgaben der Lebensführung, namentlich der Für- und Vorsorge für Kinder und Jugendliche, die Pflege der Kranken, Behinderten und Alten als „unproduktiv“ aus dem Wirtschaftssystem ausgegliedert und in die Privatsphäre, das heißt an die Familien, überwiesen. Konkret wurde das meiste davon zur unbezahlten Arbeit von Hausfrauen.

Auf diese Weise wurden die Kosten für das Leben der Menschen, für das Entstehen und Vergehen sowie für die Fährnisse des Lebenslaufs externalisiert. Damit waren große, sich überschneidende Probleme von Ungleichheit zwischen Geschlechtern und Klassen verbunden: der Ausschluss von Frauen vom gesellschaftlichen Prozess, die Pauperisierung des Proletariats im 19. Jahrhundert.

Um diese Probleme zu lösen, wurde im Verlauf des 20. Jahrhunderts das wohlfahrtsstaatliche Modell entwickelt, das die Aufgaben der Lebenssorge zumindest teilweise in öffentliche Regie nahm. Diese von Anfang an in allen Hinsichten behelfsmäßige Lösung ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten aus verschiedenen Gründen unter Druck geraten (Stichwort: Krise des Sozialstaats unter dem Eindruck von neoliberaler Globalisierung). Gleichzeitig entwickeln sich Ansätze zur privatwirtschaftlichen Organisation dieser Aufgaben. Das bedeutet eine Umstellung von bislang als Belastung aufgefassten Lebensführungskosten auf Profitorientierung.

Die 2011 in Zusammenarbeit mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt begonnene Reihe *Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben* beschäftigt sich mit diesen Wandlungsprozessen und insbesondere mit der Frage nach Alternativen, da alle bislang entwickelten Modelle unzulänglich sind.

# Rationell für sich und andere sorgen – geht das? Über die widersprüchliche Rationalisierung der Selbst- und Fürsorge

Reihe: Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben mit **Brigitte Aulenbacher**, 28. Februar 2012

In der sozialen Arbeit und der Pflege wird kontrovers diskutiert, inwieweit Ökonomie und Ethik miteinander vereinbar sind. Im Alltag werden einerseits Arbeiten der Selbst- und Fürsorge rationalisiert, um sie effizienter zu gestalten. Andererseits

stehen Rationalisierung und Effizienzdenken zu den für die Sorgetätigkeit notwendigen Orientierungen im Gegensatz. Der Vortrag beleuchtete ausgewählte historische und gegenwärtige Konstellationen in der Rationalisierung der Selbst- und Fürsorge und beantwortete die Frage, in welcher Weise und um welchen Preis sie erfolgt und wo sich Widersprüche und widerständige Momente zeigen. <

**Brigitte Aulenbacher**, Professorin für Soziologische Theorie und Sozialanalysen, Johannes-Kepler-Universität Linz

*Kommentar:*

**Sigrid Pilz**, Grüne Sprecherin für Gesundheit und Pflege im Wiener Gemeinderat

red

# Ökonomisierung der Sorgearbeit – fürsorgliche Praxis: Konflikte um nachhaltige Gesellschaftsentwicklung

Reihe: Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben mit **Eva Senghaas-Knobloch**, 13. März 2012

In ihrem Vortrag analysierte Eva Senghaas-Knobloch den Begriff Arbeit als Schlüsselbegriff für nachhaltige Gesellschaftsentwicklung und zeigte gleichzeitig die ambivalenten Folgen auf, die eine Verallgemeinerung der Idee „des Erwerbsbürgers“, laut der alle Erwachsenen unabhängig vom Geschlecht an der Erwerbsarbeit teilhaben sollen, mit sich bringt.

Den Arbeitsbegriff im Zusammenhang mit fürsorglicher Praxis sieht sie in einem Spannungsverhältnis zu dem Begriff der ökonomi-



**Eva Senghaas-Knobloch**, Professorin für Arbeitswissenschaft mit dem Schwerpunkt sozialwissenschaftliche Humanisierungsforschung an der Universität Bremen und im interdisziplinären Forschungszentrum Nachhaltigkeit (artec)

*Kommentar:*

**Karl Öllinger**, Grüner Sozial- und SeniorInnensprecher im Nationalrat



# Sorge: Wandel und Alternativen

Reihe: Sorge – Arbeit am guten Leben, Podiumsdiskussion, 17. April, 2012

In der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft wurden Arbeit und Leben getrennt und die „unproduktive“ Sorge in die Privatsphäre verbannt. Die Folge ist eine Ungleichheit zwischen Geschlechtern und Klassen, für die bis heute Lösungen ausstehen. Welche Folgen hat das für das Leben der Individuen und das gute Leben der Gesellschaft als ganzer? Welchen Einfluss hat diese Entwicklung auf die Ungleichheitsproblematik? Welche Alternativen gibt es? <

*Diese Fragen diskutierten:*

**Elisabeth Conradi**, Professorin für Gesellschaftstheorie und Philosophie, Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg, Stuttgart

**Beate Littig**, Leiterin des Fachbereichs Soziologie, Institut für Höhere Studien, Wien

**Cornelia Klinger**, apl. Professorin für Philosophie, Universität Tübingen und Permanent Fellow, IWM

**Birgit Schatz**, Grüne Arbeitnehmer- und KonsumentInnenschutzsprecherin im Nationalrat

*Moderation:*

**Andreas Novy**, Obmann der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt, Wien

sierten Arbeit im gesellschaftlichen Leistungsaustausch, da letzterer den rationellen und effizienten Einsatz von Mitteln bzw. eine Effizienzsteigerung miteinschließt. Durch allgemeine Veränderungen in der Erwerbsarbeit wie auch der beruflichen Sorgearbeit wird dieses Spannungsverhältnis gegenwärtig noch verschärft. Dies führt dazu, dass auf der einen Seite Menschen unversorgt oder unterversorgt bleiben, während andererseits besonders in Pflegeberufen psychische Erkrankungen zunehmen. Hinzu kommen weitere neue Konflikte, die sich durch die Ökonomisierung der Sorgearbeit ergeben, wie die „Grenzkonflikte“ in Hinblick auf Zeit und Engagement der Einzelnen zwischen der Sphäre der Erwerbsarbeit und der Sphäre der unbezahlten Sorgearbeit als alltäglicher fürsorglicher Praxis.

In ihrem Ausblick auf eine fürsorgende Gesellschaft sieht Senghaas-Knobloch Chancen in der Beachtung lebensnotwendiger fürsorglicher Praxis: Da sich Über- und Unterordnung der bezahlten und unbezahlten Arbeitssphären und die Externalisierung

der Kosten von Sorgearbeit offenbar nicht als nachhaltig erweisen, müssen praktische Lösungsmöglichkeiten gefunden werden, die eine Anerkennung der sozialen Dimension nachhaltiger Gesellschaftsentwicklung einschließen. <

Louise Kubelka

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# The Human Rights Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church: Its Ideological Context and Political Implications

Colloquium on Secularism with **Kristina Stoeckl**, February 29, 2012

**Kristina Stoeckl** is APART (Austrian Program for Advanced Research and Technology) Fellow of the Austrian Academy of Sciences with a research project on Orthodox Christianity and multiple secularisms. She is based at the University of Vienna and the IWM and collaborates as Visiting Fellow with the Robert Schuman Center at the European University Institute, Florence.

See Stoeckl's contribution on p. 14.

## Colloquia on Secularism

In this series, directed by IWM Fellow Clemena Antonova, scholars from various disciplines discuss questions related to Charles Taylor's research field at IWM *Religion and Secularism*. The Colloquia are generously supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF).

# Toleration in the Early Enlightenment: The Religious Roots of a Secular Idea

Colloquium on Secularism with **Diego Lucci**, March 5, 2012

In his presentation Diego Lucci challenged the widespread thesis that the modern idea of toleration developed merely from a process of secularization, devoid of religious attitudes, views and concepts. By focusing particularly on Spinoza and Locke, he demonstrated that the most prominent theories of toleration in the Early Enlightenment originated within a theological framework. In this respect, Lucci also concentrated on the two philosophers' debt towards the Eras-

tian tradition and their influence on Enlightenment thinkers such as Bayle and the English deists, whose works had a serious theological dimension. The colloquium showed that the modern idea of toleration, which is crucial to secular societies, originates in an intellectual and cultural context characterized by an essentially religious infrastructure. < red

**Diego Lucci** is Associate Professor of Philosophy, American University in Bulgaria, Blagoevgrad.

# Religious Education and Multiculturalism: Critical Issues across Europe, England, and Russia

Colloquium on Secularism with **Andrey Levitskiy, Barbara Larin** and **Agnieszka Pasieka**, March 22, 2012

The colloquium discussed recent developments in Religious Education across Europe with regard to the issues of multiculturalism and state secularism. A particular emphasis was placed on the cases of England and Wales, Russia, Germany and Poland. Andrey Levitskiy presented an overview of the policies on religious education in the United Kingdom and Russia, comparing both the institutional arrangements as well as the content and the very understanding of 'religious education'. Barbara Larin shared her own experiences of work as a teacher of religious education in Bavaria, while, Agnieszka Pasieka discussed the issue of religious teaching in the context of church-state relations in

contemporary Poland and presented findings from an ethnographic study of a multireligious and multiethnic grammar school.

The discussion focused on a wide variety of interrelated issues ranging from the religious and ethnic aspects of education in the multicultural world to the pedagogical paradigm shift in teaching religion in state and private schools, the role of politics in religious and citizenship education, and the impact of religious communities on the school religious education curriculum. At the same time, the discussion was much more than a debate on religious teaching; through the prism of religious teaching, it permitted to address some fundamental questions

# Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights

BY KRISTINA STOECKL

*Human rights and traditional morality are important issues in the political discourse of the Russian Orthodox Church. Over the last ten years, the debate on human rights and morality has changed from a 'clash of civilizations' with Western secular values towards a more conciliatory stance.*



Photo: Georgi Kojucharov, Dnevnik.bg

In 2008, the Episcopal Conference of the Russian Orthodox Church published *The Russian Orthodox Church's Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights*. The document constituted a novelty in the history of Orthodox Christianity: for the first time an Orthodox Church had defined in an authoritative manner its understanding of

fundamental human rights and had taken a clear position vis-à-vis the modern human rights regime. The *Human Rights Doctrine* was presented by the Russian Orthodox Church as a 'contribution' to an ongoing global debate on the meaning and content of human rights: 'Without seeking a revolutionary reconstruction of the world and acknowledging the rights of other social groups to participate in social transformations on the basis of their own worldview, the Orthodox Christians reserve the right to participate in building public life in a way that does not contradict their faith and moral principles. The Russian Orthodox Church is ready to defend the same principles in dialogue with the world community and in cooperation with people of other traditional confessions and religions.' This principled endorsement of the concept of human rights, paired with a strategic political effort to influence the meaning and content of human rights in international debates, was the fruit of several years of internal debates in the Russian Orthodox Church. During the preparation phase of the *Human Rights Doctrine*, the self-positioning of the Russian Orthodox Church vis-à-vis human rights changed from clear opposition to human rights as a 'Western' idea to a more conciliatory approach.

The human rights debate in the Russian Orthodox Church was initiated in 1999 by today's Patriarch and then Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad Kirill, who was, at that time, head of the Department for External Relations of

the Moscow Patriarchate. One particularly poignant example for the sea change in the Russian Orthodox human rights debate is the use of article 29 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in speeches by Kirill: in an article published in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* on 26 May 1999, Kirill expressed the conviction that liberalism was a natural result of the Western cultural development, which he outlined as follows: Renaissance, i.e. the return of ancient paganism—Reformation—Enlightenment—materialism—atheism and, at the end, the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*: the victory of anthropocentrism. Since the Russian Orthodox tradition did not share this history, such was the basic tenor of Kirill's article, it could also not share the concept of human rights. Shortly after the appearance of this rather drastic article, on 16 February 2000, Kirill published a second article in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, in which he distanced himself from two possible readings of his original analysis: he did not think that Russia should unconditionally adhere to the Western modern and secular trajectory, as liberal secularists would argue, nor, however, did he want to find himself on the side of the religious zealots, who would not even address the question of human rights because they condemned the intellectual universe that created the idea in the first place. On the contrary, Kirill argued in this second article, one ought to find a third way of confrontation. For this reason, the critical and creative engagement with liberal values was among

regarding the very understanding of secularization, religion, and ethics. < red

**Andrey Levitskiy** is Senior Lecturer at Russian State Vocational Pedagogical University, Yekaterinburg; and Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow at IWM.

**Barbara Larin** is University Assistant at the Institute for Liturgical Studies, University of Vienna.

**Agnieszka Pasieka** has recently defended her PhD at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale. Currently she is Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow at IWM.

Further in this series:

*Religion and Public Space in Post-Communist Romania* with **Cosmina Tănăsioiu**, May 23, 2012



the most important tasks of Orthodox theology.

A further shift in the argumentation occurred in 2005, in a speech which Kirill gave at a conference on 'Religion and International Relations' in St Petersburg. There he cited for the first time—and would do so again and again subsequently—Article 29 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which states: '(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible. (2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recog-

dividual human rights—rights of the community, nation and family. These pairs of conceptual opposites remain intact throughout the debate; what changes is the self-positioning of the Russian Orthodox Church in their respect. Statements of Metropolitan Kirill around the year 2000 suggest that initially he regarded these conceptual opposites as the foundations of a clash of cultures between East and West. In this clash the West stands for liberalism, secularism and individual human rights, while the East, that is Orthodox Christianity, is the place of traditionalism, religion and the rights of the community, nation and family. However, in the course of the

... the critical and creative engagement with liberal values was among the most important tasks of Orthodox theology.

inition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.' The 'discovery' of Article 29 of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* had an important effect on the human rights debate in the Russian Orthodox Church. It led to a new argumentative strategy, allowing the Russian Orthodox Church no longer simply to place itself in opposition to a Western individualistic understanding of human rights, but instead to present itself actively as the vanguard of a more original understanding of human rights according to article 29, an understanding which emphasized the importance of morality and duties to the community.

This new strategy was particularly visible in Kirill's contribution to the seminar 'Moral principles and human rights in multicultural societies', held in Strasbourg, 30–31 October 2006. There he described the concept of human rights as a tool for strengthening ethics and values in modern societies: 'I am convinced that the concern for spiritual needs, based moreover on traditional morality, ought to return to the public realm. The upholding of moral standards must become a social cause. It is the mechanism of human rights that can actively enable this return. I am speaking of a return, for the norm of according human rights with traditional morality can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.' The same view was expressed in his speech in front of the UNESCO on 13 March 2007: 'The Orthodox Church invites the world to return to the understanding of the role of human rights in social life that was established in 1948. Moral rules can put limits to the realization of human rights in public life.'

From the outset, the Russian Orthodox Church's debate about human dignity, rights and individual liberty has been structured by conceptual opposites: liberalism—tradition; secularism—religion; in-

human rights debate from 2000 onwards, we have seen how the monolithic image of a liberal, secular and individualistic West is replaced by a more realistic assessment that takes into account the tensions within the Western modern experience. In the course of this debate, the Russian Orthodox Church has continued to hold true to its established role as a defender of tradition, religion, community, nation and family, but has ceased to understand itself as the only force that pursues this goal. Instead, Kirill finds allies in the Catholic Church and in conservative political circles: 'We found out that most religious traditions and several currents in secular thought agree with our assessment of the importance of moral values.' At the same time, the Church takes a distance from liberal tendencies within contemporary Russian society. In this way, the scenario of a 'clash of civilizations' is changing from an alleged fight between two cultural and civilizational units (between the 'Latin West' and the 'Orthodox East') to a confrontation between a secular-liberal-individualistic ideology and a religious-communitarian and traditionalist world-view, regardless of whether these ideological positions manifest themselves in the West or in the East. <

*This contribution is based on the author's article "The Human Rights Debate in the External Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church", in: Religion, State and Society, vol. 40, no. 2 (2012).*

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# Wagner's *Parsifal* and the Discourse of Regeneration

BY KAROL BERGER



Illustration: Caricature of Wagner by Karl Cich in the Viennese satirical magazine "Humoristische Blätter" (1873)

is that, if a Nazi wanted for whatever reasons to claim *Parsifal* as his own, such claim might be built on the common foundation of the regeneration discourse and would require that he overlook the specific content the opera gave to the notion of regeneration.

Hitler's own attitude to the opera was ambiguous. On the one hand, he thought sufficiently well of it to plan a performance in celebration of the expected final war victory. Hence it is possible that he did see in *Parsifal* a symbolic image of Germany's "awakening." On the other hand, he disliked the opera's Christian symbolism and hence may have sensed that the reality to which he wanted Germans to awaken did not fully correspond to what was advocated by Wagner. Accordingly, he advised his youthful Bayreuth protégés, the composer's grandsons Wolfgang and Wieland, to tone down the religious symbols in future productions (it was Wolfgang who conveyed Hitler's ideas to the budding opera director, Wieland). Whether conscious that he was following "Onkel Wolf's" advice or not, this is precisely what Wieland Wagner did in the celebrated 1951 production with which he re-opened the Bayreuth Festival after the war—arguably the most important and influential staging in the whole history of Wagner performance, a staging designed at once to set the way Wagner operas were to be presented free of literal adherence to the composer's stage directions and to purge Bayreuth of its politically tainted past. If the war itself did not turn out quite as Hitler had hoped, the opera's production, at least to some extent, did. Wagner's work was presented in a highly abstract fashion, emphasizing timeless myth and psychology and playing down most historical and cultural associations, its Christian symbols much attenuated. It is an ironic twist characteristic of the whole convoluted reception history of Wagner's oeuvre that this artistically and politically important production, designed to wipe Wagner's work clean of the fingerprints left on it by the Nazis and thus make both this work and the Bayreuth Festival culturally palatable in the new liberal democratic Germany, may have been partly inspired by the memory of conversations with the fallen dictator. <

Richard Wagner's last opera, *Parsifal* (1882), promotes an ethical ideal the specific content of which is what Wagner saw as the Schopenhauerian kernel of truth in Christianity—the compassionate insight into the inescapable and unjustifiable suffering of all will-driven nature and the resulting renunciation of all willing as the only sensible answer to the senselessness of the world. But it is clear that Wagner goes beyond Schopenhauer to a certain extent. No less than Wagner himself, his *Parsifal* too does not withdraw from the world in the end. On the contrary, he assumes the role of a leader to a revitalized, regenerated community. There is no place for any hope of social regeneration in Schopenhauer, but there is one in late Wagner.

The composer articulated this hope not only in the opera, but also in a series of four so-called "regeneration essays" he put forward in his house organ, the *Bayreuther Blätter*, as he was working on the score in 1880–81. Since the last of these essays is marked not only by the composer's long-standing anti-Semitism, but also by his newly found enthusiasm for Arthur de Gobineau's "scientific" racism, and since the central concerns of all four essays are obviously related to those of the opera, a suspicion has arisen that the opera contains a hidden, anti-Semitic and racist, agenda.

Be that as it may, there is no evidence that the opera's putative racist or anti-Semitic subtexts were properly decoded by those who should have been most skillful at hermeneu-

tic exercises of this sort. Instances of racist or anti-Semitic interpretations of *Parsifal* stemming from Nazi Germany or from the Bayreuth circle are uncommon. In general, the Nazis did not need such interpretations to make the high-quality Furtwängler-Tietjen-Pretorius productions in Bayreuth and Berlin work in their favor by providing the regime with a prestigious sheen of cultural legitimacy. Given the widespread nationalist reception of Wagner's oeuvre already before 1933, additional anti-Semitic or racist emphases after the Nazi assumption of power were simply not needed.

For an affinity between the opera and Nazi, or more generally Fascist, ideology we would have to look elsewhere than to specific more or less veiled racist or anti-Semitic messages. Students of Fascism have long singled out the discourse of regeneration as its essential feature: Fascist identity is built on the narrative of the society's degeneration that can and should be reversed by using extreme measures, in particular redemptive violence, to produce a regeneration of national and racial unity and purity. It is this discourse of regeneration that links *Parsifal* to later Fascist ideologies. The family resemblance is far from perfect (neither *Parsifal* nor the regeneration essays can be accused of advocating violence) and its significance should not be exaggerated: the history of opera does not lack stories of endangered communities that successfully overcome their crises (think of *Idomeneo* or *The Magic Flute*). All that can be claimed here

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# Is There a Polish Generation of '89?

BY TOM JUNES



The photo shows young workers and students standing atop the gate of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk (in between the letters denoting the name of the shipyard) during the strike in May 1988. The lower-left banner stating “NZA i Robotnicy” (“NZA and the workers”—the latter written in a style inspired by the *Solidarność* logo) referred to the solidarity of students and workers in the strike. The bulk of the striking workers were age-peers of the students. The May 1988 strike wave was the first of two—the second taking place in August 1988—which would result in the regime initiating a dialogue with the opposition that ultimately led to the demise of communism in Poland.

also being more exposed to the alternative worldview provided by the strong and active Catholic Church. Above all, they were aware that life elsewhere and in particular in the West was much better, the latter being a side effect of the relatively open policies of the Gierek era.

Ironically, many of these youths manifested their rebellion and rejection of the surrounding reality of the time by retreating and immersing themselves in their private lives. Nevertheless, the spirit of rebellion was there and it was near total. It was reflected in the youth counter-culture and especially the music of the era, with rebellious styles such as punk, reggae, new wave and heavy

land's cities during the decade. Anarchist tendencies became influential as they facilitated an expression of rebellion against both the regime and the failed parental worldview. At the same time, for many of the radicals then US president Ronald Reagan gained an iconic hero status for his anti-Communist rhetoric. Furthermore, new concrete issues arose in relation to pacifist and environmental concerns, which facilitated political mobilization, and this was complemented by new types of action such as ‘happenings’ in which the regime was criticized publicly in satirical street theater. Despite their ideological heterogeneity, the young radicals united in action against the regime fueled by radical anti-Communism. These young people took to the streets shouting ‘*Precz z Komuny*’ (Down with Communism) as their rallying slogan.

Two of the social movements that emerged were exclusively composed of these youngsters, the *Federacja Młodzieży Walczącej* (Federation of Fighting Youth) and the *Niezależne Zrzeszenie Studentów* (NZS—Independent Students’ Association), the latter being a nearly defunct student organization from the *Solidarność* period, which was revived by young radicals who often

Generations make history, but history makes generations too. Throughout history the impact of certain important events not only transcended a national or regional scope, but came to signify specific generational experiences that shaped young people's consciousness. In this way, the ‘revolution of the long sixties’ gave rise to the formation of a ‘generation of 68’, and the notion became engraved in the popular perception of the era. As time has gone by, though, the question arises if more recent watershed events, such as the end of the Cold War and the demise of Communism, gave rise to similar phenomena and thus if it is possible to speak of a ‘class of 89’ in

ical category in the sense that it denotes a phase of an individual's life in between childhood and adulthood while also relating to a group in society defined by its age status. This can further be qualified by the criterion of a certain degree of political maturity, which, depending on the societal and historical context, can mean the right to vote in elections as a marker of political empowerment. A *generation* is analytically identified here in its political manifestation—as initially proposed by Karl Mannheim—on the basis of a specific set of ideas and correlated actions, i.e. a generational style that can be ascribed to a certain group of age cohorts. These are bound together, as a generation, by collective

the population, while their teenage years were in turn characterized by the *Solidarność* crisis of 1980–1981 and the subsequent period of martial law and normalization until the middle of the decade, when these youths came of age.

The latter two phases are of special relevance to the age cohorts in question as they represent a significant difference in experience compared to the rest of contemporary Polish society. *Solidarność* was officially a trade union, but in reality it soon represented a mass social movement involving workers, peasants and students, thereby encompassing about one third of the population. Martial law effectively destroyed this movement, but in doing so it simultaneously delegitimized Communism and gave rise to a potent myth of *Solidarność*. Nonetheless, it did represent a significant defeat, instilling fear and demoralizing the population, who became weary of politics during the following gloomy period of normalization. However, this did not ring true for the above youth cohorts. Their lives were not touched to the same extent by martial law while the bleak perspectives of the normalization period instilled in them a spirit of rebellion leading them to reject the realities of the outside world. This was also fueled by their specific experience of the *Solidarność* crisis, which they had not been exposed to directly as had their older contemporaries—a fact that made them more susceptible to its myth. Moreover, as teenagers they had also profited from the increasing degree of freedom during this period, which made them less prone to regime indoctrination, as did their natural distrust towards adults in general. They had significantly less belief in socialism while

*They had significantly less belief in socialism while also being more exposed to the alternative worldview provided by the strong and active Catholic Church.*

*Anarchist tendencies became influential as they facilitated an expression of rebellion against both the regime and the failed parental worldview.*

analogy with the 68ers. In 1989, it was Poland that became the initial focal point of a series of events that led to the implosion of the Communist regimes throughout East and Central Europe, and therefore the Polish context provides the logical starting point in an attempt to answer the above question.

The question of whether there was a ‘generation of 89’ in Poland relates to the specific experience of the country's youth during the events in which Communism came to its end in the late 1980s. *Youth* is interpreted here as both a social and biolog-

socialization and the decisive experience of an event within a specific time frame, i.e. a generational event.

The core group of youth with which my study is concerned consists of individuals who were somewhere between 18 and 25 years of age when the Communist regime fell in 1989 and thus born between 1964 and 1971. This means that they spent the bulk of their childhood in the 1970s, which were perceived as a ‘golden age’ under Gierek's incumbency as Party leader and gave rise to great overall expectations among

metal becoming extremely popular. Although a majority of these youths were inclined to detach themselves from the hardships of the 1980s, in which they came of age, a significant minority sought to give out to their revolt by becoming politically active in the new social movements that emerged after the imposition of martial law and the defeat of *Solidarność*.

These movements represented a decisive break in the hitherto prevailing traditions of opposition in Poland. Fueled by their resentment of the widespread political passivity of the population and encouraged by a relaxation of the regime's repressive policies, the young radicals developed a more confrontational approach to political action. The *zadyma* (smoke-screen) became an almost cult-like ritual of violent clashes between radical youth and riot police in Po-

had been active in former events. These movements played an important role in the demise of the Communist regime in Poland in 1988–1989, which would eventually become a decisive experience in the sense of a generational event. With the benefit of hindsight, one can identify two events in 1987 that set the scene for the vanguard role these youths were going to play. In June of that year, John Paul II's third visit to Poland had seen a massive turnout of young people who suddenly witnessed their potential strength in numbers. This was compounded when, in November, the regime held a referendum on economic reform, which was rejected by the populace, thus revealing strong sentiments of economic protest. The combination of these two factors would provide fuel for the events of the following year, which turned out to be the be-



ginning of the end of Communist rule in Poland.

This beginning took place in March 1988, when oppositional student activists openly demonstrated and began campaigning for the re-legalization of the above-mentioned nzs. A few weeks later, in May, worker strikes against the regime’s plans for reform broke out and spread throughout the country, inspiring support and solidarity from the students. Moreover, the strikers demanded the re-legalization of *Solidarność*. This was a remarkable claim in the sense that the bulk of the strikers, who were of the same age group as the students, had no first-hand recollection of the 1980–1981 period. Above all, although the regime was the actual target of the strike, both the Episcopate as well as the oppositional elite, many of whom had played leading roles in *Solidarność*, were caught by surprise and appeared alienated from the strikers, and this not only due to their age difference. Although the strikes were unsuccessful at first, a second wave of strikes in August, which was again organized by radical young workers and students, did result in the regime opening a dialogue with the oppositional elite, which in turn led to the Round Table talks of the following year and the subsequent semi-free elections won by *Solidarność*, thus marking the demise of the regime.

The radical youths’ actions and their collective experience of the events of 1988–1989 finally forged them into a distinct generation, the ‘generation of 89’. However, although this generation had provided the spark that set in motion the process leading to the downfall of Communism, the radicalized youths that had constituted the backbone of the strikes in 1988 were eventually sidelined, and many became disillusioned during the negotiations in 1989. This left a bitter aftertaste in their perception of these events, and gradually compounded a feeling of resentment and betrayal that many still hold today and that over time has resulted in a political grudge of sorts, fueling radical politics in present-day Poland. In 2005 many among this generation supported the electoral victory of Jarosław Kaczyński’s *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Law and Justice) party, with the aim of setting up a right-wing coalition to ‘cleanse’ the state and society from the consequences of the alleged aberrations after 1989 and create a Fourth Republic. Although this project failed then, the question remains if the former spirit of rebellion among the ‘generation of 89’, whose members are now gradually coming to the fore in the country’s elite, will arise again and manifest itself in the years to come. ◀

**Tom Junes** is Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow at the IWM; he has a PhD in History from Warsaw University where he is a Visiting Researcher.

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**Katerina Josifoska**

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (January–March 2012)

Freelance Translator, Skopje

**Hannah Arendt: The Origins of Totalitarianism (English > Macedonian)**

**Tom Junes**

Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow (December 2011–September 2012)

Visiting Lecturer in History, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven; Visiting Researcher, Warsaw University

**Rebellion, Hope, and Frustration. Coming of Age When the Cold War Ended**

**Julia Komleva**

Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow (January–June 2012)

Assistant Professor of History, Ural State University, Yekaterinburg

**Forming the ‘Supra-national’ Consciousness. The Experience of Educational Policies in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Russian Empire during the 19<sup>th</sup> Century**

**Simon Kordonsky**

“Russia in Global Dialogue”-Fellow (April 2012)

Professor of Economics, Higher School of Economics, Moscow

**Louise Kubelka**

Junior Visiting Fellow (November 2011–February 2012)

öAW DOC-Team Fellow, PhD candidate in Law, University of Vienna

**Women at Work—Economic, Legal, and Philosophical Dimensions of Parental Leave in the European Union**

**Andrey Levitskiy**

Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2011–March 2012)

Senior Lecturer in Theology and Education, Russian State Vocational Pedagogical University, Yekaterinburg

**Religious Education, Multiculturalism, and Secularism. International Comparative Perspectives**

**Sokol Lleshi**

CEU Junior Visiting Fellow (April–June 2012)

PhD candidate in Political Science, Central European University, Budapest

**Archiving Communism. Institutional Memory Production in Central and Eastern Europe. The Case of the Czech Republic and Romania**

**Olha Martynyuk**

Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

PhD candidate in Ukrainian History, National Technical University of Ukraine “Kyiv Polytechnic Institute”

**Ethnic Conflict, Urban Development, and the Rise of the Bourgeoisie in Late Imperial Kiev**

**Khrystyna Nazarkevych**

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (January–March 2012)

Lecturer in German Philology, Ivan Franko University, Lviv

**Anna Veronika Wendland: Die Russophilen in Galizien (German > Ukrainian)**

**Agnieszka Pasieka**

Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2011–July 2012)

PhD candidate in Social Anthropology, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle/Saale

**Seven Ways to God. The Dynamics of Religious Pluralism in Rural Southern Poland**

**David Petruccelli**

Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

PhD candidate in History, Yale University (Connecticut)

**International Criminal Policing in Europe, 1890–1950**

**Stefan Popov**

Visiting Fellow (September 2011–February 2012)

Executive Director, RiskMonitor Foundation, Sofia

**Policy Metaphors, Policy Failures. Organized Crime, Anti-Corruption, and Good Governance**

**Elizabeth Ann Robinson**

Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

PhD candidate in Philosophy, Boston University (Massachusetts)

**Speaking in Circles. Metaphysics and Mathematics in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason**

**Ben Roth**

Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–June 2012)

PhD candidate in Philosophy, Boston University (Massachusetts)

**The Narrativizing Self**

**Julia Rudolph**

Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2011–January 2012)

öAW DOC-Team Fellow, PhD candidate in Philosophy, University of Vienna

**Women at Work—Economic, Legal, and Philosophical Dimensions of Parental Leave in the European Union**

**Natalia Skradol**

Junior Visiting Fellow (March–August 2012)

Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Center for German Studies, European Forum, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

**Discursive Framing of Zones in Europe**

**Elitza Stanoeva**

Tsvetan Stoyanov Junior Visiting Fellow (November 2011–April 2012)

PhD candidate in History, Technische Universität Berlin

**The Socialist City Center of Sofia. Disciplining Architecture and the Monumental Body (1944–1989)**

**Wojciech Starzyński**

Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (April–June 2012)

Adjunct, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw

**The Correspondence between Jan Patočka and Irena Kroińska (1958–1973) (French > Polish)**

**Martina Steer**

Visiting Fellow (February–June 2012)

öAW APART-Fellow (History)

**Memory Transnational. The Moses Mendelssohn Jubilees, 1829–1986**

**Victoria Vasilenko**

Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellow (October 2011–March 2012)

Assistant Professor of Contemporary History and International Relations, Belgorod State University

**The Polish Question and 1945 as a Transitory Period**

## Fellows and Guests

The IWM offers a place for research and scholarly debate across borders and disciplines. Its various fellowship programs are thus a fundamental part of the Institute’s work. Each year approximately fifty Visiting Fellows, Junior Visiting Fellows and Guests—mainly from Eastern and Western Europe as well as from North America—are awarded fellowships to pursue their individual research projects while working in residence at the IWM as members of an international and multidisciplinary academic community. The IWM strives to provide conditions that allow the fellows to make significant progress in their research and to profit from the intellectual stimulation of the Institute’s seminars, lectures and other events. Since its inception in 1982, the IWM has hosted more than 1,000 scholars, journalists and translators.



Guest contribution by Evgeny Morozov  
continued from page 20

goes, arguably, so goes the Internet.

It is easy to blame Facebook’s business model (e.g., the loss of online anonymity allows it to make more money from advertising), but the problem resides much deeper. Facebook seems to believe that the quirky ingredients that make flânerie possible need to go. “We want everything to be social,” Sheryl Sandberg, Facebook’s chief operating officer, said on “Charlie Rose” a few months ago.

What this means in practice was explained by her boss, Mark Zuckerberg, on that same show. “Do you want to go to the movies by yourself or do you want to go to the movies with your friends?” he asked, immediately answering his own question: “You want to go with your friends.”

The implications are clear: Facebook wants to build an Internet where watching films, listening to music, reading books and even browsing is done not just openly but socially and collaboratively. Through clever partnerships with companies like Spotify and Netflix, Facebook will create powerful (but latent) incen-

do: articles we read, music we listen to, videos we watch. It goes without saying that frictionless sharing also makes it easier for Facebook to sell us to advertisers, and for advertisers to sell their wares back to us.

That might even be worth it if frictionless sharing enhanced our online experience; after all, even the 19<sup>th</sup>-century flâneur eventually confronted advertising posters and murals on his walks around town. Sadly, frictionless sharing has the same drawback as “effortless poetry”: its final products are often intolerable. It is one thing to find an interesting article and choose to share it with friends. It is quite another to inundate your friends with everything that passes through your browser or your app, hoping that they will pick something interesting along the way.

Worse, when this frictionless sharing scheme becomes fully operational, we will probably read all our news on Facebook, without ever leaving its confines to visit the rest of the Web; several news outlets, including *The Guardian* and *The Washington Post*, already have Facebook

“We want everything to be social.”

tives that would make users eagerly embrace the tyranny of the “social,” to the point where pursuing any of those activities on their own would become impossible.

Now, if Mr. Zuckerberg really believes what he said about cinema, there is a long list of films I would like to run by his friends. Why not take them to see “Satantango,” a seven-hour, black-and-white art-house flick by the Hungarian auteur Béla Tarr? Well, because if you took an open poll of his friends, or any large enough group of people, “Satantango” would almost always lose out to something more mainstream, like “War Horse.” It might not be everyone’s top choice, but it will not offend, either—that’s the tyranny of the social for you.

Besides, isn’t it obvious that consuming great art alone is qualitatively different from consuming it socially? And why this fear of solitude in the first place? It is hard to imagine packs of flâneurs roaming the streets of Paris as if auditioning for another sequel to “The Hangover.” But for Mr. Zuckerberg, as he acknowledged on “Charlie Rose,” “it feels better to be more connected to all these people. You have a richer life.”

We have become sandwich board men

It is this idea that the individual experience is somehow inferior to the collective that underpins Facebook’s recent embrace of “frictionless sharing,” the idea that, from now on, we have to worry only about things we do not want to share; everything else will be shared automatically. To that end, Facebook is encouraging its partners to build applications that automatically share everything we

applications that allow users to read their articles without even visiting their Websites.

As the popular technology blogger Robert Scoble explained in a recent post defending frictionless sharing, “The new world is you just open up Facebook and everything you care about will be streaming down the screen.”

This is the very stance that is killing cyberflânerie: the whole point of the flâneur’s wanderings is that he does not know what he cares about. As the German writer Franz Hessel, an occasional collaborator with Walter Benjamin, put it, “in order to engage in flânerie, one must not have anything too definite in mind.” Compared with Facebook’s highly deterministic universe, even Microsoft’s unimaginative slogan from the 1990s—“Where do you want to go today?”—sounds excitingly subversive. Who asks that silly question in the age of Facebook?

According to Benjamin, the sad figure of the sandwich board man was the last incarnation of the flâneur. In a way, we have all become such sandwich board men, walking the cyber-streets of Facebook with invisible advertisements hanging off our online selves. The only difference is that the digital nature of information has allowed us to merrily consume songs, films and books even as we advertise them, obviously. <

A version of this op-ed appeared in print on February 5, 2012, in *The New York Times*.

Evgeny Morozov is a writer and researcher; currently a visiting scholar at Stanford University, California.

# Awarded Fellowships

Several Fellows for the academic year 2012/2013 have been selected. Below please find the names of the successful candidates.

Józef Tischner Fellowship

**Helena Jedrzejczak**  
PhD candidate in Sociology/History of Ideas, University of Warsaw  
**The Political Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer**

Milena Jesenská Fellowships for Journalists

**Annemieke Hendriks**  
Freelance journalist, Berlin  
**Biography of the Tomato**

**Stela Jelincic**  
Columnist at *Lider*, Zagreb  
**Divided Cities—a Frozen Conflict**

**Maciej Nowicki**  
Columnist at the Polish edition of *Newsweek*, Cracow  
**Dimensions of the European Crisis**

**Barbara Torunczyk**  
Editor-in-chief of *Zeszyty Literackie*, Warsaw  
**Where Do We Come from? What Are We? Where Are We Going? Or The Autobiography of the Mind**

Alexander Herzen Junior Visiting Fellowships

**Nikolay Tarabanov**  
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Tomsk State University  
**Jan Patočka’s Concept of Truth in the Context of Modern Philosophy**

**Yulia Kovalchuk**  
Post-doctoral researcher of Ethnology, Institute for Archaeology and Ethnography, Russian Academy of Science, Novosibirsk  
**Secular and Religious Policy-Making in 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> Centuries in Europe and Beyond: Social and Educational Aspects**

**Mikhail Semenov**  
Senior Lecturer in Russian History, Belgorod State University  
**Urban Culture in Provincial Towns of Central and Eastern Europe at the End of the XIX and Beginning of the XX Centuries**

**Olesya Zakharova**  
Senior Lecturer in Law, Irkutsk State University  
**Deficits of the Human Rights Discourse in Russian Society and in Russo-European Relations: A Socio-Philosophical Analysis**

**Evgenia Kocheva**  
Post-graduate student in Contemporary History and International Relations, Tomsk State University  
**Walter Hallstein—an Architect of United Europe**

Paul Celan Fellowships for Translators

**Una Bauer**  
Translator and Lecturer for Acting, Media and Culture, University of Rijeka, Croatia  
**Auctores varii: Responsibility for Things Seen (Croatian and Serbian > English)**

**Margus Ott**  
Translator, PhD candidate, University of Tallin, Estonia  
**Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Selected Writings (French/Latin > Estonian)**

**Katalin Teller**  
Assistant Professor, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

**Theodor W. Adorno: Ästhetische Theorie (German > Hungarian)**

**Petr Urban**  
Research Fellow at the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague  
**Virginia Held: The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global (English > Czech)**

**Stilian Yotov**  
Professor of Philosophy, St. Kliment Ohridski University, Sofia  
**Siegfried Kracauer: Der Detektiv-Roman; Die Angestellten (German > Bulgarian)**

Bronisław Geremek Fellowships

*Senior Visiting Fellow:*  
**Maria Sadowska**  
Assistant Professor for Polish and German Philology, University of Warsaw  
**“Critical” Lwów (1890–1914) in Relation to Vienna**

*Junior Visiting Fellow:*  
**Karolina Wigura**  
Assistant Professor for the History of Ideas, University of Warsaw  
**Fear and the Politics of Fear in Post-Communist Countries: the Case of Poland, Ukraine and the Former GDR**

# New Calls for Application

The majority of IWM fellowships are awarded in open competition, involving calls for application and evaluation by expert juries. Research proposals are currently invited for the following fellowship programs.



Photo: Transil / Julia Vishnietzkaya



Robert Bosch Fellowships on South-Eastern Europe 2013—Call for Applications

Applications for Senior and Junior Fellowships are accepted from scholars from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia.

*Deadline for application:*  
**September 20, 2012**  
For more information, please refer to [www.iwm.at/fellowships.htm](http://www.iwm.at/fellowships.htm)

Tsvetan Stoyanov Fellowship for Bulgarian Scholars 2013—Call for Applications

Applications for one Junior Fellowship are accepted from younger Bulgarian scholars

*Deadline for application:*  
**September 20, 2012**  
For more information, please refer to [www.iwm.at/fellowships.htm](http://www.iwm.at/fellowships.htm)



## Varia

Following an international Call for Applications with more than 600 proposals submitted in 2010, the first group of 28 EURIAS (European Institutes for Advanced Study) Fellows took up their ten-month research residencies—mainly in the Humanities and Social Sciences—in one of the 17 participating institutes in September 2011 ([www.eurias-fp.eu](http://www.eurias-fp.eu)).

The EURIAS Fellowship Program, co-sponsored by the European Commission, builds on the strong reputation of the Institutes for Advanced Study for promoting the work of excellent researchers within the stimulating environment of a multidisciplinary and international group of fellows. The Programme was initiated by NetIAS (Network of European Institutes for Advanced Study). The Institute for Human Sciences is a member of this network, whose President is Krzysztof Michalski, Rector of IWM.

With the aim to build a EURIAS Fellows community across the host institutes located in 12 countries, the first **EURIAS Annual Meeting** took place at the Collegium Helveticum in Zurich on April 20–21. Presentations of some of the fellows' projects—including IWM-based EURIAS Senior Fellow Karol Berger—exemplified the broad range of disciplines, academic contexts and research interests covered by the group. Lively ex-

change between the IAS representatives and the fellows was a valuable opportunity to get insight into motivations, expectations and perspectives on both sides.

**Clemena Antonova**, Lise Meitner Fellow at IWM, initiated the *Colloquia on Religion and Secularism*. For this year, six speakers have been invited. The series is supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF).




Photo: IWM

Für sein Gesamtwerk wird **Peter Demetz** mit dem diesjährigen Georg Dehio-Preis ausgezeichnet, der vom *Deutschen Kulturforum östliches Europa*, Potsdam, verliehen wird. „Peter Demetz hat in seinen literarischen Arbeiten über viele Jahrzehnte hinweg immer wieder auf die besondere kulturelle und historische Rolle und Funktion der mitteleuropäischen Region Böhmen hingewiesen und die deutsch-tschechisch-jüdischen Aspekte (...)

verdeutlicht“, heißt es in der Würdigung der Jury. Demetz ist dem IWM seit dessen Anfängen verbunden, heute u. a. als Mitglied der Jury des Paul Celan-Übersetzungsprogramms und des Beirats von *Transit – Europäische Revue*.

**Dragan Prole**, ao. Professor für Philosophie an der Universität Novi Sad und Paul Celan Fellow 2010, erhielt den Nikola Milošević-Preis für sein Buch über die Phänomenologie des Fremden, *Humanost stranog čoveka. Ogledi o Levinasu* (Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Novi Sad 2011). Mit dem nach dem serbischen Schriftsteller, Philosophen und Politiker benannten Preis werden hervorragende Werke auf dem Gebiet der serbischen Geisteswissenschaften ausgezeichnet.

Am 10. Mai stellte **Timothy Snyder** im Deutschen Historischen Institut Paris sein Buch *Terres de sang. L'Europe entre Hitler et Staline*, Paris: Gallimard 2012, vor – die französische Übersetzung seines 2010 in New York erschienenen Werkes *Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin*, das bereits in über zwanzig Sprachen übersetzt worden ist.

**Leonard Novy**, who served as Director for Research and Development, left the Institute at the end of April to assume new responsibilities. He will continue to

collaborate with the IWM on various international projects.

On April 1<sup>st</sup>, 2012, **Dessislava Gavrilova** has taken charge of the public relations department at the Institute, and the editing of *IWMpost*.

On April 24, **Agnieszka Pasieka**, Bronisław Geremek Junior Visiting Fellow, has received her PhD in Social Anthropology from Martin Luther University in Halle/Saale, Germany. The title of her dissertation is *Seven Ways to God. The Dynamics of Religious Pluralism in Rural Southern Poland*. It analyzes the situation of religious and ethnic minorities in the context of church-state relations in contemporary Poland and investigates the dynamics of religious diversity under conditions of one dominant religion (Roman Catholicism).

**Dipesh Chakrabarty**, IWM Visiting Fellow in 2010 and member of Charles Taylor's working group on Religion and Secularism, has been appointed to the Faculty of the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.

**Julia Rudolph** gave birth to her son **Emil** on March 7, and **Iris Mendel** to her son **Samuel** on February 4. Both mothers worked at the Institute as Austrian Academy of Sciences doc-Team Junior Fellows in 2011.

We wish to thank all of the **IWM Friends** who have already made a donation in the 30<sup>th</sup> year of the Institute's existence, and warmly invite all others to do likewise (IBAN: AT50 2011 1280 5698 6103, BIC: GIBAATWW, ERSTE Bank). Donations are fully tax-deductible under Austrian law. As an independent institution without long-term funding guarantees, the IWM is very grateful for your support.

## Articles and Talks by Fellows and Guests

### Clemena Antonova

“Visuality among Cubism, Iconography, and Theosophy: Pavel Florensky's Theory of the Icon”, *Journal of Icon Studies*, vol. 1, 2012.

“Visual Studies and Iconology at the Russian Academy of Artistic Sciences. Insights from an Unfinished Russian Experiment in the 1920s”, in Baert, Lehmann and Van Den Akkerveken (eds.), *New Perspectives on Iconology*, Brussels: ASP Publishers 2012, p. 80–90.

“Hesychast Influences in Russian Religious Philosophy”, paper presented at the International Conference on St. Gregory Palamas, Thessaloniki, March 7–15.

“The Reception of the Boyana Church Frescoes (1259) in Bulgarian Scholarship”, paper presented at the American Research Centre, Sofia, April 5.

### Karol Berger

“Time's Cycle and Time's Arrow in Music” in Marie-Agnes Dittrich, Martin Eybl, and Reinhard Kapp (eds.), *Zyklus und Prozess. Joseph Haydn und die Zeit*, Wien/Köln/Weimar: Böhlau 2012, p. 15–24.

### Cornelia Klinger

Vortrag „Die überraschende Wiederkehr der schönen und erhabenen Natur in Bildern der Gegenwart“ am Institut für Landschaftsarchitektur ILA, Departement Architektur, ETH Zürich, am 7. März.

Vortrag „Das ‚Auge Gottes‘ oder nur ein ‚Platz ausserhalb der Stadtmauer‘: Welches ‚Außen‘ braucht die Wahrheit?“ am 8. März bei der Philosophischen Gesellschaft Zürich, Universität Zürich.

Teilnahme an der ORF-Fernsehreihe *Kreuz & Quer*, Diskussion zum Thema „Islam in Europa 2025“, 28. Februar.

Interview für das *Radio-kolleg* des ORF „Die Postmoderne. Vom Verschwinden der Eindeutigkeiten“, 23.–26. Januar.

### Ivan Krastev

“When China Rules”, column for *Project Syndicate*, January 2012.

“Europe's Disintegration Moment”, Dahrendorf Symposia Series—Working Paper 2012 – 02. [www.dahrendorf-symposium.eu](http://www.dahrendorf-symposium.eu)

“Europe's Democracy Paradox”, *The American Interest*, vol. 7, nr. 4 (March/April 2012); reprinted in *Tr@nsit\_online* 2012.

“Authoritarian Capitalism versus Democracy”, *Policy Review* nr. 172, Hoover Institution, Stanford

University, March 30, 2012. [www.hoover.org](http://www.hoover.org)

“The Future of European Integration”, interview in *New Eastern Europe*, April 17, 2012.

Keynote addresses: “Challenges and Opportunities for Think Tanks and Advocacy Organizations in the Western Balkans” at the Balkan Peer Exchange Meeting, Belgrade, February 21–23; “Eastern Europe and Europe's Crisis?”, BASEES Conference 2012, Cambridge, UK, March 31.

Lectures: “Europe's Real Crisis”, AUBG, Balkanski Academic Center, Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria, February 9; “Is It Tomorrow, Yet? Visualization of Politics and the Crisis of the Democratic Institutions”, Tanzquartier Wien, April 14.

Speaker: “The Impact of the EU Crisis on the Public and Policy Makers in the Balkans”, AWAY DAY 2012 on *Ethnic and religious identities in the Western Balkans*, Brussels, January 20; Strategy 2012 meeting of the Moscow School of Political Studies Moscow, January 28–31, Moscow; Symposium in Honor of Claus Offe on *Liberal Democracy in Hard Times: Transitions, Dilemmas, and Innovations*, panel “Transitions to Democracy”, March 22; Private roundtable discussion on *Restructuring the Turkey-EU Relationship*, Carnegie Europe office, Brussels, March 23; “Europe's Democracy Paradox”, German Marshall Fund Brussels Forum 2012 on *Global Europe: Game Over?*, Brussels, March 23–25; “The Impact of the Financial Crisis: How Real is the Risk of Political De-stabilization and the Rise of Extremism?”, Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue/Center for Liberal Strategy conference on *Europe at Risk*, Vienna, March 25–26; “Today's crisis communication: strengths and weaknesses”, Club of Venice workshop on *The Crisis Communication*, Sofia, March 30; Gallup International Annual Conference, Istanbul, April 1–2; Round Table Discussion “Talking Turkey: Can Europe get on the same page?”, Institute for Strategic Dialogue, London, April 16; inaugural conference on *The Future of Public Policy Schools in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, School of Public Policy and International Affairs (SPPIA) at Central European University, Budapest, April 23–24; BEPA and OSI-Brussels Workshop on *Populism in Europe: changing drivers and possible responses*, Brussels, April 25.

Participations: Silent Colloquium *The Project RUSSIA\_2020 and RUSSIA\_2025*, Bruno Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue, Vienna, April 12–14; Briefing of President

Barroso and Commissioners on how populist parties are moving from xenophobia to Euroscepticism as their target in attacking liberal parties, Brussels, April 25.

### Stephen Holmes and Ivan Krastev

“The Weakest Strongman. Are Russia's protests the beginning of the end for Vladimir Putin?”, *The New Republic*, January 11, 2012.

“The Sense of an Ending: Putin and the decline of ‘no-choice’ politics”, *Eurozine*, February 2012.

### Krzysztof Michalski

„Cud dobra“ (Das Wunder des Guten), *Gazeta Wyborcza – Magazyn*, 7–9 April 2012, p. 27.

### Agnieszka Pasieka

„Resurrected pigs, dyed foxes, and beloved cows: Religious diversity and nostalgia for socialism in rural Poland”, *Journal of Rural Studies*, vol. 28, nr. 2 (2012), p. 72–80.

### Anna van der Vleuten and Mieke Verloo

“Ranking States: The perverse politics of reputation in the fields of gender equality and anti-corruption”, *Policy & Politics* vol. 40, nr. 1 (2012), p. 71–86.

### Mieke Verloo

“Science and politics in the field of gender”, paper given at the Progress Report Meeting of the Swiss Research Council meeting on the Gender equality program, Basel, March 22–23.

“Changing Gender Relations in the EU: reflections on differences that matter”, paper given at the Sawyer Seminar *Framing Globalization and Citizenship: Perspectives on Gender and Change*, panel “Reframing Gender Politics Internationally: Where do we go from here?”, University of Wisconsin—Madison, April 20.

Participation as expert in the Working Group on the Gender equality Index, European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), Vilnius, March 2.

Herausgegeben am Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen

verlag neue kritik  
Kettenhofweg 53  
D-60325 Frankfurt a. M.  
Tel. 0049 (69) 72 75 76

Preis: Abo € 24,– (D)  
Zwei Hefte pro Jahr  
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### New contributions

**Dessy Gavrilova**, *The Perm Cultural Revolution*

**Timothy Snyder**, *How Democracy Can Save Europe*  
**Ivan Krastev**, *Europe's Democracy Paradox*

**Mykola Riabchuk**, *Raiders' state*  
**Timothy Snyder**, *Ukraine's Last Chance?*  
**Tatiana Zhurzhenko**, *Land of Confusion: Ukraine, the EU and the Tymoshenko case*

[www.iwm.at/transit\\_online.htm](http://www.iwm.at/transit_online.htm)





# The Death of the Cyberflâneur

BY EVGENY MOROZOV

*If today's Internet has a Baron Haussmann, it is Facebook. Everything that makes cyberflânerie possible—solitude and individuality, anonymity and opacity, mystery and ambivalence, curiosity and risk-taking—is under assault by that company. And it is not just any company: with close to a billion active users worldwide, where Facebook goes, arguably, so goes the Internet. A critical reflection by Evgeny Morozov who held the Monthly Lecture in April (see p. 12).*

The other day, while I was rummaging through a stack of oldish articles on the future of the Internet, an obscure little essay from 1998—published, of all places, on a Website called *Ceramics Today*—caught my eye. Celebrating the rise of the “cyberflâneur,” it painted a bright digital future, brimming with playfulness, intrigue and serendipity, that awaited this mysterious online type. This vision of tomorrow seemed all but inevitable at a time when “what the city and the street were to the Flâneur, the Internet and the Superhighway have become to the Cyberflâneur.”

Intrigued, I set out to discover what happened to the cyberflâneur. While I quickly found other contemporaneous commentators who believed that flânerie would flourish online, the sad state of today's Internet suggests that they could not have been more wrong. Cyberflâneurs are few and far between, while the very practice of cyberflânerie seems at odds with the world of social media. What went wrong? And should we worry?

Engaging the history of flânerie may be a good way to start answering these questions. Thanks to the French poet Charles Baudelaire and the German critic Walter Benjamin, both of whom viewed the flâneur as an emblem of modernity, this figure (and it was predominantly a “he”) is now firmly associated with 19<sup>th</sup>-century Paris. The flâneur would leisurely stroll through its streets and especially its arcades—those stylish, lively and bustling rows of shops covered by glass roofs—to cultivate what Honoré de Balzac called “the gastronomy of the eye.”

While not deliberately concealing his identity, the flâneur preferred to stroll incognito. “The art that the flâneur masters is that of seeing without being caught looking,” the Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman once remarked. The flâneur was not asocial—he needed the crowds to thrive—but he did not blend in, preferring to savor his solitude. And he had all the time in the world: there were reports of flâneurs taking turtles for a walk.

## Walking with a turtle

The flâneur wandered in the shopping arcades, but he did not give in to the temptations of consumerism; the arcade was primarily a pathway to a rich sensory experience—and only then a temple of consumption. His goal was to observe, to bathe in the crowd, taking in its noises, its chaos, its heteroge-




Illustration: Erwin Sherman

## Online communities like GeoCities and Tripod were the true digital arcades.

neity, its cosmopolitanism. Occasionally, he would narrate what he saw—surveying both his private self and the world at large—in the form of short essays for daily newspapers.

It is easy to see, then, why cyberflânerie seemed such an appealing notion in the early days of the Web. The idea of exploring cyberspace as virgin territory, not yet colonized by governments and corporations, was romantic; that romanticism was even reflected in the names of early browsers (“Internet Explorer,” “Netscape Navigator”).

Online communities like GeoCities and Tripod were the true digital arcades of that period, trading in the most obscure and the most peculiar, without any sort of hierarchy ranking them by popularity or commercial value. Back then eBay was weirder than most flea markets; strolling through its virtual stands

was far more pleasurable than buying any of the items. For a brief moment in the mid-1990s, it did seem that the Internet might trigger an unexpected renaissance of flânerie.

However, anyone entertaining such dreams of the Internet as a refuge for the bohemian, the hedonistic and the idiosyncratic probably did not know the reasons behind the disappearance of the original flâneur.

In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Paris was experiencing rapid and profound change. The architectural and city planning reforms advanced by Baron Haussmann during the rule of Napoleon III were particularly consequential: the demolition of small medieval streets, the numbering of buildings for administrative purposes, the establishment of wide, open, transparent boulevards (built partly to improve hygiene, partly to hamper revolutionary block-

ades), the proliferation of gas street lighting and the growing appeal of spending time outdoors radically transformed the city.

Technology and social change had an effect as well. The advent of street traffic made contemplative strolling dangerous. The arcades were soon replaced by larger, utilitarian department stores. Such rationalization of city life drove flâneurs underground, forcing some of them into a sort of “internal flânerie” that reached its apogee in Marcel Proust's self-imposed exile in his cork-lined room (situated, ironically, on Boulevard Haussmann).

Something similar has happened to the Internet. Transcending its original playful identity, it is no longer a place for strolling—it is a place for getting things done. Hardly anyone “surfs” the Web anymore. The popularity of the “app paradigm,” where-

by dedicated mobile and tablet applications help us accomplish what we want without ever opening the browser or visiting the rest of the Internet, has made cyberflânerie less likely. That so much of today's online activity revolves around shopping—for virtual presents, for virtual pets, for virtual presents for virtual pets—has not helped either. Strolling through Groupon is not as much fun as strolling through an arcade, online or off.

The tempo of today's Web is different as well. A decade ago, a concept like the “real-time Web,” in which our every tweet and status update is instantaneously indexed, updated and responded to, was unthinkable. Today, it is Silicon Valley's favorite buzzword.

That is no surprise: people like speed and efficiency. But the slowly loading pages of old, accompanied by the funky buzz of the modem, had their own weird poetics, opening new spaces for play and interpretation. Occasionally, this slowness may even have alerted us to the fact that we were sitting in front of a computer. Well, that turtle is no more.

## The fear of solitude and the tyranny of the social

Meanwhile, Google, in its quest to organize all of the world's information, is making it unnecessary to visit individual Websites in much the same way that the Sears catalog made it unnecessary to visit physical stores several generations earlier. Google's latest grand ambition is to answer our questions—about the weather, currency exchange rates, yesterday's game—all by itself, without having us visit any other sites at all. Just plug in a question to the Google homepage, and your answer comes up at the top of the search results.

Whether such shortcuts harm competition in the search industry (as Google's competitors allege) is beside the point; anyone who imagines information-seeking in such purely instrumental terms, viewing the Internet as little more than a giant Q & A machine, is unlikely to construct digital spaces hospitable to cyberflânerie.

But if today's Internet has a Baron Haussmann, it is Facebook. Everything that makes cyberflânerie possible—solitude and individuality, anonymity and opacity, mystery and ambivalence, curiosity and risk-taking—is under assault by that company. And it is not just any company: with close to a billion active users worldwide, where Facebook

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