

IWM *post*

Newsletter of the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna, and the Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University

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Expectations

What's Left
of '89?

Respect

An Essay on
Religion

Borderland

Explaining
Pakistan



Managing Diversity

A Conference on Secularism



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NO. 101 • APRIL – AUGUST 2009

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Aranyani Bhargav is a performer of classical Indian dance and studies at the School of Interdisciplinary Area Studies, University of Oxford. She participated in the conference “Modes of Secularism” (see pages 4 and 5). The picture shows her performing a pure dance movement from “Varnam,” a piece in Bharatanatyam, a classical dance from South India.



Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen
Institute for Human Sciences

Imprint: Responsible for the contents of the *IWMpost*: Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (IWM), Spittelauer Lände 3, 1090 Wien, Austria, Phone: +43/1/313 58-0, Fax +43/1/313 58-30, iwm@iwm.at, www.iwm.at; **Editor/Product Management:** Andrea Roedig, Sven Hartwig; **Design:** steinkellner/zotter, www.steinkellner.com. The *IWMpost* is published three times a year. Current circulation: 6.200, printed by Grasl Druck & Neue Medien GmbH, Bad Vöslau. Copyright IWM 2009. An online archive of the *IWMpost* is available at the Institute's website www.iwm.at; all newsletters, dating back to no. 57 (summer 1997), can be downloaded in pdf format.

Editorial

Managing Diversity“ ist die Formel, mit der der kanadische Philosoph und Permanent Fellow des IWM, Charles Taylor, eine wünschenswerte Form von Säkularität umschreibt. Sie steht für einen akzeptierenden Umgang mit der Vielfalt von Religionen. Am IWM war das zweite Quartal des Jahres 2009 stark durch dieses Thema und durch den längeren Aufenthalt von Charles Taylor in Wien geprägt. Unter seiner Leitung fand die Konferenz „Modes of Secularism“ statt, und was dort diskutiert wurde, können Sie auf den Seiten 4 und 5, sowie im Gastbeitrag von Tariq Modood nachlesen. Klar wurde im Laufe der Diskussionen, dass Religion im 21. Jahrhundert verstärkt eine Rolle spielen wird, und zwar nicht nur im Sinne einer Re-Spiritualisierung, sondern als handfester politischer Faktor in der Gestaltung multiethnischer Gesellschaften.

Was nach der „Wende“ von 1989 geschehen ist, wie die Welt sich veränderte, wissen wir im Großen und Ganzen. Was aber ist nicht eingetreten? Die Konferenz „The ‘Brave New World’ After Communism“ stellte die Frage einmal anders, nämlich nach den Erwartungen von damals, und nach dem, was sich nicht erfüllte. Es ging um die „ungeschehene Geschichte“ sozusagen, und die Konferenz am IWM brachte die Perspektiven der ehemaligen DDR mit denen anderer osteuropäischer Länder zusammen. Der Beitrag von Yaroslav Hrytsak in diesem Heft (Seite 11) zeigt exemplarisch, in welcher paradoxen Situation sich die Ukraine in diesen Jahren befand, und wie das Land durch eine sehr spezielle Mischung aus Unwissenheit, Angst und Hoffnung überleben konnte.

Neben den zwei großen Themen „Säkularismus“ und „1989“ liefen, nicht weniger wichtig, zahlreiche andere Veranstaltungen am IWM: Zu Gast waren Cees Nootboom, Ian Buruma und Bob Silvers. Bernhard Waldenfels eröffnete eine Konferenz mit einem bewegenden Vortrag, der die alltäglichen Formen und die „Schleichwege der Gewalt“ ausbuchstabierte. Als Langtext zu dieser Konferenz finden Sie auf den Seiten 13 und 14 den Beitrag von Debra Bergoffen darüber, wie die rechtliche Ächtung von Vergewaltigung im Krieg die immanente Geschlechtslogik dieser Taten in Teilen zumindest umzudeuten vermag. Weitere längere Essays in dieser *IWMpost* sind eine politische Analyse von Faisal Devji zu Pakistan und eine philosophische Analyse von Susanne Lettow über den Umgang mit Biologie als einer neuen „Leitwissenschaft“. All diese Themen bieten hoffentlich genug Anregendes und im guten Sinne des Wortes *diversity* für Ihre Lektüre. ◀

Andrea Roedig

Managing diversity“ is the formula used by the Canadian philosopher and permanent fellow of the IWM, Charles Taylor, to describe a desirable form of secularism. It encompasses an accepting stance towards the diversity of religions. The IWM's program during the second quarter of 2009 was largely devoted to this theme and heavily influenced by the lengthy stay of Charles Taylor in Vienna. The conference “Modes of Secularism” was held under his direction. You can read about it on page 4 and also in the guest contribution by Tariq Modood. During the course of these discussions it became clear that religion would play an increasingly significant role in the 21st century, not only in the sense of a return to spirituality but also as a tangible political element in the formation of a multi-ethnic society.

We are all broadly familiar with the changes that have occurred in the world since the fall of the Iron Curtain but what about what hasn't eventuated? This question was posed somewhat differently at the conference “The ‘Brave New World’ After Communism” – namely, what were the expectations of the time and how haven't they been fulfilled. The conference brought together viewpoints from both the former East Germany and other Eastern European countries in the search for an alternate history. The article by Yaroslav Hrytsak on page 11 of the newsletter shows, by way of example, the paradoxical situation of Ukraine during this time and how the country survived through a unique mixture of uncertainty, fear and hope.

The IWM held a number of other important events alongside those devoted to the two principle themes “Secularism” and “1989,” with special guests Cees Nootboom, Ian Buruma and Bob Silvers. Bernhard Waldenfels opened one conference with a moving lecture about “creeping violence” and spelled out the everyday forms that it can take. Debra Bergoffen has written a detailed piece relating to this conference on page 13. It concerns the legal proscription of rapes committed during wartime and how this appears to reinterpret, at least in part, the intrinsic sexual logic of such acts. Other long essays in this edition of the newsletter include a political analysis of Pakistan by Faisal Devji and a philosophical piece by Susanne Lettow which places new approaches to biology at the forefront of science. Hopefully all these articles offer some stimulating and, in the best sense of the word, *diverse* reading. ◀

Andrea Roedig

Müssen Revolutionen scheitern?

VON RALF DAHRENDORF

On June 17, Lord Dahrendorf – renowned sociologist, former Director of the London School of Economics, Member of the British House of Lords – died. He had been a personal friend for many years, a member of the Institute’s Board of Patrons and a regular contributor to Transit. The “fierce intellectual,” as Jürgen Habermas referred to him, had been engaged with the problems of freedom, solidarity and democracy for his entire career. Shortly after the peaceful upheavals of 1989, he wrote a clear-sighted article on whether revolutions have to fail, a work that seems particularly revealing today, 20 years after the Fall of the Iron Curtain. On the occasion of Dahrendorf’s decease, we present here an abbreviated version of his text, which was first published in Transit no. 3.



Lord Dahrendorf 1929–2009

Photo: IWM

Es ist November 1991. Vor zwei Jahren gingen die Stürme der Revolution über die Länder Ost- und Südosteuropas hinweg und fegten die sattsam bekannte Nomenklatura-Herrschaft von der Bildfläche. Die tiefhängenden Wolken der Welt Breschnews, in der stumpfsinnige Unterwerfung und tristes Elend an der Tagesordnung waren, rissen auf und gaben den Blick auf einen offenen Himmel frei. Doch heute, zwei Jahre später, ist nicht etwa alles in Ordnung. Die Entdeckung, daß viele der alten Partiefunktionäre noch immer auf ihrem Posten sitzen und es sogar geschafft haben, ihr Mäntelchen sofort nach dem Wind zu hängen, um sich unersetzlich zu machen, gehört sogar noch zu den geringsten Sorgen. Die Führer der Revolution, die sich früher in ihrem Ziel einig waren, sind miteinander in Streit geraten; Solidarität verkehrte sich in Zwist, das Forum in eine Arena. Staatsbürger, die gerade erst das Wahlrecht wiedererrungen haben, halten dessen Ausübung plötzlich für müßig und begeben sich in so geringer Zahl an die Urnen, daß sie nicht einmal ein bescheidenes Quorum zustandebringen. Die wirtschaftliche Lage verschlechtert sich so sehr, daß das *Ancien régime* für viele den Glorienschein der „guten alten Zeit“ annimmt. Statt einer *civil society*, die triumphierend vor uns ersteht, verfolgen archaische Stammesbindungen selbsternannte Wortführer zu einem bedrohlichen Hervorkehren von Homogenität. Allgemeine Staatsbürgerrechte, die Unterschiede und Heterogenität anerkennen, bleiben dabei auf der Strecke. Fast überall liegt Gewalt in der Luft.

Das ist zweifellos nicht die ganze Wahrheit. Die Menschen haben alles in allem die Freiheit, ihre Meinung zu äußern. Sie können freizügiger reisen. Es gibt Anzeichen für

neue wirtschaftliche Möglichkeiten. Zeitungen und Stiftungen, weltliche und religiöse Organisationen, kleine Unternehmen und politische Parteien, dezentralisierte Verwaltungsorgane und andere Elemente einer *civil society* sind im Entstehen begriffen. Zudem sind die Länder in Ostmittel- und Südosteuropa und erst recht die innerhalb der alten Sowjetunion höchst unterschiedlich. Deshalb wäre es offensichtlich mehr als verfrüht, auch nur einigermaßen zuverlässig etwas darüber aussagen zu wollen, ob die Revolution von 1989 erfolgreich war oder nicht. Dennoch mag die Frage erlaubt sein, ob der Morgen danach sich in den neuen Demokratien Europas als ebenso deprimierend erweisen kann wie dies in Frankreich nach 1790 und überall dort der Fall war, wo seither eine Revolution die Möglichkeit hatte, ihren Weg zu vollenden. Denn überall sind ausnahmslos zwei Folgen eingetreten: Ansätze einer politischen Demokratie wurden alsbald von neuen Diktaturen verdrängt,

Offenbar schaffen Revolutionen ebensoviele Probleme, wie sie lösen

und die wirtschaftliche Lage verschlechterte sich auf Jahrzehnte hinaus. Offenbar schaffen Revolutionen ebensoviele Probleme, wie sie lösen – in den Augen mancher sogar noch mehr. Woran liegt das? Gibt es Ursachen im revolutionären Prozeß selbst, die dieses Ergebnis unausweichlich oder zumindest sehr wahrscheinlich machen?

Wir sollten vielleicht noch hinzufügen, daß Gewalt nicht notwendig zu einer Revolution gehört, zumindest nicht in deren An-

Wir verdanken Ralf Dahrendorf sehr viel. Vor Jahren, als das Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen nur eine Idee von einigen wenigen jungen Menschen ohne Geld und Einfluss war, hat er – damals Direktor der London School of Economics – uns seinen ermutigenden Rat und seine helfende Hand geboten. Später dann, als unsere Idee Realität geworden und das IWM gegründet war, blieb er ein regelmäßiger Gast und Weggenosse: als Vortragender, als Autor, als Leiter von intellektuellen und politischen Projekten, die die Identität unseres Instituts gestaltet haben. Vor allem aber war er ein Vorbild: er zeigte uns wie man Einsicht in die Ideenwelt mit öffentlichem Engagement, wie man Verständnis der geistigen Tradition mit aktiver Zukunftsgestaltung verbinden kann.

Wir vermissen ihn.

Krzysztof Michalski
Rektor des IWM

fangsphasen. Besonders verhaßte Vertreter des alten Regimes wie Rumäniens *conducator* Ceausescu werden möglicherweise umgebracht, doch im großen und ganzen ist die erste Phase der Revolution gekennzeichnet durch Massendemonstrationen oder die triumphale Besei-

den Mitteln des Terrors von oben, der Guillotine etwa.

Es ist noch die Frage, ob jede Revolution sämtliche Phasen durchlaufen muß, die Crane Brinton als Bestandteile ihrer „Anatomie“ diagnostiziert hat: „die Herrschaft der Gemäßigten“, „das Mitregieren der Extremisten“, „die Herrschaft des Schreckens und der Tugend“ und schließlich den „Thermidor“. Im Interesse unserer europäischen Nachbarn steht zu hoffen, daß dieser Ablauf nicht zwingend ist und daß es andere Wege in die Zukunft gibt. Ich werde jedoch an dieser Stelle zu zeigen versuchen, daß der revolutionäre Prozeß bestimmte Aspekte aufweist, die es sehr schwierig machen, dessen Abgleiten in Extremismus und Terror zu verhindern.

Bislang habe ich Revolution fast ausschließlich formal definiert, als eine rasche Zirkulation von Eliten, begleitet von einer tiefgreifenden Änderung des politischen Systems. Im Rahmen der Frage, um die es mir hier geht, läßt dies eine wesentliche Schlußfolgerung zu. Soweit das Ziel jeder Revolution in der Beseitigung eines alten Regimes be-

steht, scheitern vollendete Revolutionen nicht – der Begriff selbst impliziert fast den Erfolg. Daran ändert auch das eingefügte Adjektiv „vollendet“ nichts, mit dem das Problem keineswegs umgangen werden soll. Gelegentlich werden Revolutionen durch den Einsatz brutaler Gewalt, im allgemeinen von außen, niedergeschlagen, bevor das alte Regime unwiederbringlich vernichtet worden ist. Ungarn 1956 und die Tschechoslowakei 1968 sind hierfür Beispiele. Das alte Regime überlebte, auch wenn es danach nie wieder ganz dasselbe war wie vorher. Die Revolution von 1989 dagegen war vollendet. Das alte *Nomenklatura-Regime* ist nicht einfach dahin, es ist ein für allemal dahin. Niemand wird mehr in der Lage sein, es wiederherzustellen oder wiederaufleben zu lassen. In dieser Hinsicht war die Revolution von 1989 in einer Weise von Erfolg gekrönt wie nur wenige vor ihr.

Dennoch ist der formale Aspekt von Revolutionen nur einer von mehreren und für die Beteiligten selbst sogar der am wenigsten bedeutende. Sie wollen nicht nur ein verhaßtes Regime beseitigen, sondern auch eine neue Welt errichten. Aber wie soll diese beschaffen sein? Demokratie. Kein anderes Wort erfaßt bündiger die Träume von Revolutionären in Europa und anderswo während der vergangenen zweihundert Jahre. Demokratie kann zwei ganz verschiedene Bedeutungen annehmen. Die eine ist konstitutionell: ein Verfahren, das es ermöglicht, Regierungen ohne Revolution abzusetzen, durch Wahlen, Parlamente und alles, was sonst noch dazugehört. Die andere Bedeutung von Demokratie ist wesentlich fundamentaler. Demokratie muß ursprünglich sein; die Regierung muß zum Volk zurückkehren; die Gleichheit muß wirklich werden.

Fortsetzung auf Seite 16

Politik des kritischen Respekts

VON OTHMAR KASTNER

Wie gestaltet sich das Verhältnis zwischen dem Staat und Religionen? Sind die beiden Standardmodelle des Säkularismus, der französische Laizismus und die us-amerikanische Trennung von Kirche und Staat, nach wie vor die geeigneten Modelle, um dieses Verhältnis zu bestimmen? Wie steht es um die Säkularisierung in anderen Teilen der Welt, wie Indien und China? Welche Herausforderungen erwachsen für Gesellschaften mit kultureller und religiöser Diversität? Um diese Fragen ging es bei „Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses“, einer Konferenz des IWM, die unter der Leitung von Charles Taylor vom 4.–6. Juni am Französischen Kulturinstitut in Wien stattfand.

Das Ziel dieser präzise komponierten Konferenz bestand darin, die Vielfalt des Begriffs der Säkularisierung zu diskutieren, mit der es die Soziologie und die Philosophie gegenwärtig zu tun haben. Damit knüpfte die Veranstaltung an Charles Taylors Forschungen zum Entstehen der modernen säkularen Gesellschaft in der westlichen Welt an, wie er sie zuletzt in seinem Buch *A Secular Age* unternommen hat. Zudem wollte man den Gründen für das erneute wissenschaftliche Interesse an der Religion nachgehen. Auch stand zur Debatte, inwiefern westliche Erklärungsmodelle der Säkularisierung auf globaler Ebene reformuliert werden müssen.

Rajeev Bhargava (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi) hob hervor, dass solche Säkularisierungsmodelle nicht für die Analyse der Entwicklungen in der multireligiösen indischen Gesellschaft taugen. Umgekehrt aber könne die Art und Weise, wie sich das Verhältnis zwischen Staat und Religionen in Indien gestaltet, durchaus als Denk- und Erklärungsmodell für westliche Gesellschaften von Interesse sein. Denn auch diese würden sich zunehmend zu multireligiösen Gesellschaften entwickeln. Die Aufgabe moderner Staaten sei es, so Bhargava, „inter- und intrareligiöse Dominanz zu reduzieren, ohne jedoch Religion in toto aus dem öffentlichen Leben zu verdrängen“. Eine „Politik des kritischen Respekts“ gegenüber Religionen sei vonnöten.

Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (Northwestern University, Evanston) stütze die Vermutung, dass die europäischen Kategorien zur Analyse außereuropäischer Säkularisierungsphänomene nicht zureichen, mit dem Hinweis, dass Säkularisierung ein interkultureller Prozess wechselseitiger Beeinflussung sei. Es bedürfe daher Überlegungen „außerhalb nationaler Methodologien“.

Global gesehen, so meinte Shlomo Avineri (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), sei das europäische Modell der Trennung von Kirche und Staat ein „Provinzialismus“. Seine Wurzel habe es im Protestantismus, der die Religion als eine rein persönliche Beziehung zwischen dem Glaubenden

und Gott auffasst. Der Protestantismus übersehe aber, dass Religion nicht nur eine private Angelegenheit ist, sondern eine Frage der persönlichen Identität. Diese Identität, so Avineri, „stößt notwendigerweise mit öffentlichen, rein säkularen Richtlinien zusammen“. Avineri stimmte mit Bhargava darin überein, dass es kein universell gültiges Modell für die Schlichtung von Konflikten zwischen persönlicher religiöser Identität und öffentlichem Staat gebe.

Eine klare Trennung von säkularen und religiösen Teilen der Gesellschaft kann nicht gelingen, so führte Charles Taylor (McGill University, Montreal; IWM Permanent Fellow) aus, weil Säkulares und Religiöses wechselseitig aufeinander verweisen und sich auch in gegenseitiger Abhängigkeit voneinander definieren. Daher könne es heute auch nicht mehr um eine strikte Trennung von Religion und Staat gehen, wie sie das französische und das amerikanische Modell des Säkularismus vorschlagen. Taylor insistierte jedoch darauf, dass dieses Ungenügen nicht zu einer Abschaffung des Terminus „Säkularismus“ führen dürfe, sondern vielmehr eine neue Definition notwendig sei. Taylor schlägt vor, Säkularismus als Einübung in den Umgang mit kultureller und religiöser Diversität („managing diversity“) zu verstehen. Dieser Umgang müsse sowohl ein „Maximum an Frei-

heit“ als auch ein „Maximum an Gleichheit religiöser Ansichten“ zum Ziel haben.

Daran knüpfte Saskia Sassen (Columbia University, New York) mit dem Hinweis an, dass die Soziologie mittlerweile erkannt habe, dass die herkömmliche methodologische „Schublade der Trennung von Religion und Staat“ nicht mehr alle Phänomene der religiösen „Pluralität“ in säkularen Gesellschaften zu fassen in der Lage sei.

Dass diese zunehmende religiöse Pluralität in westlichen Gesellschaften mit einem parallel erfolgenden Rückgang bestimmter dominierender „religiöser Lebensformen“, nämlich den christlichen, einhergeht, hob Danièle Hervieu-Léger (Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris) hervor. Sie schlug für die Untersuchung dieses Rückgangs eine Verbindung dreier Analysefäden vor, nämlich (1) Analogien herzustellen zum politischen Prozess der Emanzipation seit der Aufklärung, (2) eine Analyse der gegenwärtigen Kultur und ihrer Prägung durch Religion und (3) eine anthropologische Analyse der zunehmenden Detranszendentalisierung westlicher Gesellschaften. Erst eine Verbindung dieser Fäden, so Hervieu-Léger, könne eine soziologische Antwort auf die Frage geben, was wir unter einer säkularen Moderne zu verstehen haben. <

Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses

Panel Discussion: Modes of Secularism and Religious Responses

Shlomo Avineri, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Rajeev Bhargava, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi; Saskia Sassen, Columbia University, New York; Charles Taylor, McGill University, Montreal; IWM Permanent Fellow

Session One: What is Secularization?

Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois; Peter van der Veer, Max

Planck Institute for the Study of Religious & Ethnic Diversity, Göttingen


Session Two: What is Secularism?

Jean Baubérot, Ecole pratique des hautes études, Paris; Jocelyn Maclure, Laval University, Québec; Tariq Modood, University of Bristol

Session Three: Religious Responses

Peter L. Berger, Boston University; Craig Calhoun, New York University; Souleymane Bachir Diagne, Columbia University, New York

The conference was organized in cooperation with Institut Français de Vienne



From above: C. Taylor, S. Sassen, T. Modood, R. Bhargava, K. Stöckl

Photos: IWM

Secularism for the 21st Century

BY JUSTIN RAINEY

From left: J. Baubérot, P. L. Berger, C. Calhoun



The conference “Modes of Secularism” gathered some of the world’s foremost thinkers on the hotly debated topic, who had pioneered, deconstructed, and reformulated contemporary secularization theory. While the first part of the conference challenged mainstream conceptions of secularization and exposed its inadequacy in describing today’s expansive pluralistic scene, the second part focused on clearing up the semantic baggage of secularism, relating its political implications and describing multifaceted modern religious responses.

If one thing became clear through the course of the debate, it was that secularism, properly understood, is less of what Charles Taylor chided as an “obsession with religion” as it is an astute management of diversity. The modern democratic, secular state can no longer be seen as a hegemonic ideological force, which preserves its neutrality through a self-buffering of all things religious. In rethinking the concept, two questions were pursued: How can we conceive of a properly unified secular state in light of an ever-increasing plurality of ideological options? And secondly, since it seems there is no one-way, downward slope for religion, how do we adequately describe religions’ responses and adaptations to the conditions of modernity?

Jocelyn Maclure at Laval University, presented his philosophical contribution to a report commissioned in Quebec, which investigated accommodation practices for religious purposes in 2007. The quandary of a sovereign secular state managing an increasingly multicultural Que-

bec had often been simplistically encapsulated in pithy assertions of the “separation of church and state” or the “neutrality of the state” in public affairs. These two terms, however, according to Maclure, are only two means or values – a counterpart to the two political ends of the moral equality of persons and the freedom of conscience. Because these values allow for the maximum amount of freedom in a peaceful democracy, agreement can be reached through a wide range of belief structures, from the Christian faith to an exclusive humanism. Each route supplies their own “fundamental reasons” to build what American philosopher John Rawls calls an “overlapping consensus.” The interaction of these values in public space, however, creates a necessary tension, out of which springs an array of dilemmas, characterized by the particular state’s social and historical context.

Jean Baubérot, Professor emeritus at the Ecole pratique des hautes études, Paris, elucidated the French case. He submitted that though “laïcité” is a narrative of separation, and

though there are significant differences in empirical, historical manifestations between it and “Judeo-Christian” secularism, the ideal structural foundations of both terms are equivalent. Both ideally support the freedom of conscience, non-partisan citizenship, and the separation of church and state. It would be more useful, according to Baubérot, to focus on separating secularism/laïcité from their historical development, in which a further distinction could be made between the secularization of civil society and the laicization of a broad political field. In this way it becomes possible to distinguish between, say, de facto regimes of church-state separation and the waning cultural influence of a clergy.

Tariq Modood, Director of Bristol University’s Research Centre for the

defined religiously or otherwise – to be equally recognized. The result of such an “extended multiculturalism” could assert a revitalized Britishness through a more treasured plurality, in which religion is seen as a public good.

Building on the previous distinction of secularization as a socio-historical evolution from secularism as the ideology which arises from that evolution, Peter L. Berger, Professor of Sociology and Theology at Boston University, described western and central European secularism as the exception to the experience of most of the world. Outside the Continent, secularism is an elite phenomenon. He elaborated on the strange disconnect between these elites, who identify with secular Europe, and the relatively un-

versity. Religious organizations no longer “wield their power in temporal reality,” political action happens in an immanent frame where participation in the greater economy, and nationalistic goals provide alternatives for engaging in collective life, thus contributing to a plurality of belief options. This very plurality undermines certainty and what Durkheim called the “collective conscience.” Responses to these moral tremors range from the extremes of ecumenical rallying against common cultural threats to secular involvement in humanitarian efforts with religious reasons.

Fundamentalism is, of course, another striking response. Tracing intellectual encounters of European secularism with the Muslim world, Souleymane Bachir Diagne, a French and Philosophy Professor at Columbia University, New York, recounted the official end of the Caliphate with the Republic of Turkey’s proclamation of 1923. The event forced a paradigm shift of Islamic political thought as it seemed to relativize religious political engagement. One reaction, which has been taken up by many extremists, saw the Quranic notion of Khalifatullah (lieutenant of God) in terms of an “implicit constitution,” which attempted to construe Islamic government in a continuous line with the Prophet’s politics. Another, more encouraging strain of argumentation, however, has been put forward by thinkers and political activists like the Egyptian, Ali Abderraziz (1888–1966), who reasoned that the prophet of Islam never intended to create a state, choosing instead to leave such questions to human judgment. From this perspective, Islam is compatible, and even a possible source of a secularist policy.

With an illuminating quote from a prominent Muslim thinker, Diagne solidified the conference’s imperative for a democratic, secular political engagement through one’s own fundamental reasoning: “As a Muslim,” writes Abdulla Ahmed An Na’im, “I need a secular state in order to live in accordance with Shari’a out of my own genuine conviction and free choice ... which is the only valid and legitimate way of being a Muslim” (*Islam and the Secular State, Negotiating the Future of Shari’a*, 2008). The urgent message for secular states is clear: remain in the space between a relativism that destroys a moral motivating force and a fundamentalism that undermines social unity. To that end the work must go on to discover new ways of speaking about the ever-changing reality of religions in the flux of modernity: a task for which Taylor’s conference certainly represents a considerable nudge in the right direction. ◀

Outside the European continent, secularism is very much an elite phenomenon

Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, concretized these concepts with examples from the UK. As it has sought to navigate through its own unique social situation and apply interpretations of separation, Britain has felt the brunt of botched trans-cultural policies – particularly in relation to Muslim communities – because of a failed recognition of the significance of religion for political identities. Modood’s concept of “accommodative secularity” suggests a way forward for group identities – those

affected religious movements under their radar. A paradigm example, and the classic anomaly of North Atlantic secularism, is the USA. Berger quipped that “it is a land of a Swedish elite and an Indian population” – the latter having been relatively unaffected by the former’s European secularism.

Such religious movements may be one of the results of a “crisis of authority” from within secular regimes, added Craig Calhoun, Professor of Sociology at New York Uni-

Neither Right nor Wrong. Paradoxes of Historical Memory in Post-Soviet Ukraine

Monthly Lecture: **Yaroslav Hrytsak**, April 2

Discussions on historical memory in Ukraine resemble reports from the front line. One is presented with the picture of a deeply divided society of “two Ukraines” (the Ukrainophone West versus the Russophone East) mobilized by rival political parties on the basis of two mutually exclusive historical narratives (Ukrainian national versus Russian/Soviet). This picture becomes more ambivalent and varied when confronted with surveys on the popular historical consciousness: not only are the seemingly clear-cut dividing lines blurred, but there is a large space for national consensus



Photo: IWM

Yaroslav Hrytsak is Director of the Institute for Historical Research, Lviv University; Professor of History, Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv; Recurrent Visiting Professor, CEU, Budapest. An English Translation of his book *A Prophet in His Country: Ivan Franko and the Community 1856–1886* (2006, in Ukrainian) is forthcoming.

and compromise. In his presentation Yaroslav Hrytsak focused on the various politics of history that both ruling and oppositional elites are trying to develop in response to this ambivalence to get maximum electoral support and on the reasons and the limits of their success. <

See also Hrytsak's contribution on page 11

Master Narratives of Secularity

Monthly Lecture: **Charles Taylor**, June 9

In his lecture, Charles Taylor spoke about the polysemy, i.e. the multiple meanings of the “secular.” He first examined the changing meaning of the “secular” in Western modernity which goes along with a shift from a “transcendent” to an “immanent” order. In modern times, explanation of the world – be it nature or society – no longer requires reference to a “higher” realm.

As for secularism today, Taylor distinguished two completely different forms. On the one hand, there is the “religion control model,” which conceives faith more or less as a threat to the state, and therefore seeks to confine it by a separation of church and state, state neutrality, and by creating a public sphere where religion is not visible. The model may be more or less strictly operated; an example would be the French conception of *laïcité*. On the other hand, there is the “diversity model,” exemplified in the early history of the United States. It is based on three goals: equal respect, freedom of conscience and




Photo: IWM

democratic debate. Taylor didn't deny that these goals often conflict, but that “we should design a society in order to maximize them.” The “diversity model” has a positive attitude towards religion, which therefore has not to be “controlled” or banned from public life.

Although it is extremely important to understand the motives and feelings behind the “control model, we cannot follow them,” Taylor

Charles Taylor is Professor emeritus of Philosophy at McGill University, Montréal, and IWM Permanent Fellow. Recently he published *A Secular Age* (2007). The German translation is forthcoming.

argued. “Since our societies are diversifying in a galloping way,” only the “diversity model” of secularism has a chance to survive. Secularism therefore should be seen as “managing diversity.” <

„Perspektiven des Todes“ „Viele Religionen – eine Vernunft?“

Buchpräsentation mit **Cornelia Klinger**, **Ludwig Nagl** und **Herta Nagl-Docekal**, 12. Mai

Seit 1986 besteht die „Wiener Reihe: Themen der Philosophie“ im Böhlau-Verlag, herausgegeben von Herta Nagl-Docekal, Cornelia Klinger, Ludwig Nagl und Alexander Sömek. Das Konzept der Reihe ist es, jeweils aktuelle Themen der philosophischen Diskussion aufzugreifen, so zum Beispiel mit *Wo steht analytische Philosophie heute?* (1986), *Postkoloniale Philosophieren: Afrika* (1992), *Feministische Philosophie* (1994), einem Band zu *Filmästhetik* (1999) oder zu *Religion nach der Religionskritik* (2003). Viele der Bände



Photo: IWM

Herta Nagl-Docekal Professorin für Philosophie, Universität Wien

fassen Ergebnisse von Tagungen und Konferenzen zusammen.

Bei der Präsentation am IWM stellten die Herausgeber/innen die Bände 14 und 15 vor: *Viele Religionen – eine Vernunft?* (2008) diskutiert, ob und wie Hegels Religionsphilosophie als Theorie der Moderne zu verstehen ist und *Perspektiven des Todes* (2009) fragt nach den gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen des Sterbens heute, das heißt in einer Welt, die dem Tod gemeinhin keinen Sinn mehr zu geben vermag. <

www.boehla.at (Suchbegriff: Wiener Reihe)

Spirituality and Secularity in India and China

Monthly Lecture: **Peter van der Veer**, May 7

In his lecture, Peter van der Veer discussed the globalization of the Western concept of “spirituality” putting special emphasis on Asia and its relation to “secularization” and “secularity.” Globalization is often regarded as a “westernization of the world,” a process whereby Western culture is – more or less voluntarily – adopted by other societies. Yet globalization is, in fact, not a one-way street, but an interaction of various cultures of the world. The concept of spirituality, for instance, was invented in the West in the 17th century, but is nowadays largely influenced by Asian thought and practices like Yoga, Tai Chi, Chi Gong or Feng Shui. These originally Asian spiritual techniques are even employed in business schools and management seminars, “with the goal of being happy while doing business,” as van der Veer put it.

In order to make the concepts of “spirituality” and “the secular” and their interaction more transparent, van der Veer distinguished “secularization” as a process from “secularism” as an ideology. The former stands for a privatization of religion, a decline in belief and a distinction of the religious from other social spheres such as politics, science or the economy. The latter is the promotion of the idea of secularity, i.e. the separation of church and state.

Spirituality is more difficult to define. It often refers to a worldview



Photo: IWM

Peter van der Veer is Professor of Anthropology at Utrecht University and Director of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Ethnic and Religious Diversity in Göttingen. During May and June he was a guest at the IWM. Among his publications are: *Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China* (2008); *The Modern Spirit of Asia. The Secular and the Spiritual in India and China* (forthcoming).

that opposes materialism and consumerism and is understood as separate from the established church. Spirituality and religion are not the same; one need not be religious in order to be spiritual, as van der Veer emphasized. To a certain extent spirituality even replaces the role of religion in modern societies and is therefore deeply connected to secularism. <

Roter Regen

Lesung: **Cees Nootboom**, 15. April

Manchmal stelle ich es mir vor, das absolute Gedächtnis. Wie es wäre, wenn man alles wieder zurückbekäme (sähe, hörte, läse), was man gemacht hat, alle ausgefüllten und alle leeren Momente. Doch dafür brauchte man ein zusätzliches Leben, genauso lang wie das bereits gelebte, und das ist unmöglich. Wo aber sind dann alle diese Momente geblieben? Wenn ich mich nicht an sie erinnere, existieren sie vielleicht anderswo? Am 15. April las der niederländische Schriftsteller Cees Nootboom – auf Einladung des IWM, der Niederländischen Botschaft und des Institut Français de Vienne – aus seinem Erzählungsband „Roter Regen“, in dem es vornehmlich um Erinnerungen und die Rolle des Erinnerns geht.

Nootboom ist bekannt für die Variationsbreite seiner Stile (er schreibt Prosa, Lyrik, Essays), durch seine Romane wie *Rituale* (1980) und *Allerseelen* (1999), besonders aber durch seine Reisebeschreibungen. Er erlebte und beschrieb den Ungarnaufstand 1956, das Paris des Jahres 1968 und Berlin im Jahr 1989. Auf die Frage, warum er bei seinen Rei-



Photo: IWM

Cees Nootboom ist Romanautor, Lyriker und Reiseschriftsteller. Er lebt in Amsterdam. Zuletzt erschien von ihm auf Deutsch: *Nachts kommen die Füchse. Erzählungen* (2009)

sen immer zur rechten Zeit am rechten Ort gewesen zu sein schien, sagte er, die Erfahrungen seiner Kindheit hätten ihn zu einem Flaneur werden lassen: „Ich habe mir die ganze Welt zur Stadt gemacht.“ <

In Kooperation mit der Niederländischen Botschaft und dem Institut Français de Vienne

Der muslimische Schleier in der Gegenwartskunst

Reihe: Kunst – Gesellschaft – Politik mit **Viktoria Schmidt-Linsenhoff**, 22. April

Das Bild der verschleierte, muslimischen Frau wurde in den westlichen Medien seit der islamischen Revolution im Iran 1978 und nach dem 11. September 2001 politisch aktualisiert und mit Affekten aufgeladen, die die erotisch-sinnlichen Konnotationen des orientalistischen Stereotyps überlagerten. Zudem unterstellt der Ausstellungsbetrieb Künstlerinnen aus muslimisch geprägten Gesellschaften auf Grund ihres Geschlechts und ihres Herkommens eine besondere Zuständigkeit für das Thema islamischer Weiblichkeit und schreibt ihren Arbeiten den Wert des Authentischen zu.

In ihrem Vortrag untersuchte Viktoria Schmidt-Linsenhoff die Zusammenhänge zwischen den kulturindustriellen und künstlerischen Diskursen über den Schleier und stellte vor allem die Frage nach ihrem kritischen Potenzial. Dabei vertrat sie die These, dass die vordergründige Dekonstruktion von Stereotypen, wie sie etwa Shirin Neshat ins Werk setzt, nicht unbedingt „kritisch“ wirkt. Eine Ironisierung oder Dekonstruktion – etwa



Viktoria Schmidt-Linsenhoff ist Professorin em. für Kunstgeschichte an der Universität Trier. Im kommenden Jahr erscheint von ihr *Ästhetik der Differenz. Alternativen zum kolonisierenden Blick*.

in einem Bild, das eine verschleierte Frau mit einem mit Koranversen beschriebenen Gesicht zeigt – hat eher eine unfreiwillig bestätigende Wirkung. Künstlerische und kuratorische Strategien der Ironisierung laufen ins Leere, so Schmidt Linsenhoff, weil Stereotypen per se „aufklärungsresistent“ sind, „man perpetuiert nur, was man kritisieren will.“ Als Beispiele einer tiefer gehenden und wirkungsvoller kritischen Kunst dagegen könnten Arbeiten von Mona Hatoum und Gülsün Karamustafa gelten. Ihr Potential liegt nicht im Arrangement und der Dekonstruktion orientalistischer Stereotypen, sondern in der „Intensität der ästhetischen Erfahrung“. Vielleicht weisen sie in die „Zukunft einer postkolonialen Kunst, die vom Zwang der Repräsentation und Alterität befreit ist.“ <

In Kooperation mit dem Renner Institut

Klima und Demokratie

Reihe: Umweltpolitik und Solidarität mit **Claus Leggewie**, 14. Mai

Kaum eine Naturwissenschaft bestreitet mehr die Tatsache des anthropogen verursachten Klimawandels. Die Vorhersagen einer globalen Erwärmung werden sogar beständig negativ übertroffen, und der Zeitraum zu handeln und die Erderwärmung zumindest einzudämmen, spitzt sich auf 10 bis 15 Jahre zu. Es scheint selbstverständlich, dass demokratische Systeme der Klimakrise eher gewachsen sind als Diktaturen. Erlebt man nicht gerade, wie autoritäre Systeme in China und anderswo Modernisierung brutal auf Kosten von Umwelt und Lebensqualität durchsetzen, während im Westen Unternehmen und Regierungen unter Druck geraten, wenn sie klimapolitisch unsensibel sind?

Evidenz gibt es inzwischen aber auch für die gegenteilige Annahme: dass Demokratien auf den Umgang mit dem Klimawandel ebenso schlecht vorbereitet sind wie Autokratien, ja dass sie aufgrund ihrer Abhängigkeit (Lobbygruppen) und Kurzatmigkeit (Legislaturperioden) Lösungen weniger effizient umsetzen können als ökologisch aufgeklärte Autokratien.

In seinem Vortrag beschrieb Claus Leggewie eine radikal verstandene zivilgesellschaftliche Demokratie als einzigen Weg, mit dem Klimawandel effektiv umzugehen. Die klassischen Instrumente der Regulierung reichten dazu bei weitem nicht aus: „Kein Gott, kein Staat, kein Markt, keine Technik wird uns retten, aber die Demokratie.“ Leggewie setzt auf einen durchgreifenden Mentalitäts- und Lebensstilwandel, der nur als ein Prozess „von unten“ schnell ge-



Claus Leggewie ist Direktor des Kulturwissenschaftlichen Instituts in Essen (KWI) und Mitglied des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats der Bundesregierung Globale Umweltveränderungen (WBGU). Von ihm erscheint demnächst, gemeinsam mit Harald Welzer: *Das Ende der Welt, wie wir sie kannten*.

nug in Gang gesetzt werden könne. Der Bewusstseinswandel habe längst begonnen, es bedürfe aber einer Politisierung der Zivilgesellschaft und strategischer Gruppen von Aktivbürgern („Klimagenossen“), um einen neuen Lebensstil als Rollenmodell zu etablieren. Für Leggewie ist „der Klimawandel keine apokalyptische Vision, sondern die Chance, aus einem Zivilisationsmodell auszuweisen, das sowieso keinen Sinn macht.“ Er sieht einen auf wesent-

lich weniger Energieverbrauch eingestellten Lebensstil nicht als Verlust, sondern als lang ersehnte Befreiung von einem uns einzwängenden und gängelnden Konsumregime. „Mir ist egal, wie das Klima sich verändert“, sagte er, „wichtig ist, wie der Wandel in unseren Köpfen aussieht.“ <

In Kooperation mit der Grünen Bildungswerkstatt

Im Anschluss an den Vortrag diskutierten mit Claus Leggewie bei einer *Transit*-Präsentation:

Christiane Brunner
Umweltsprecherin der Grünen

Karl Kienzl
Stv. Geschäftsführer
des Umweltbundesamts

Moderation: **Armin Thurnher**
Herausgeber des Falter

Virtues and Limits of Cosmopolitanism

Jan Patočka Memorial Lecture: **Ian Buruma**, June 10

Cosmopolitanism, at first sight, seems to be a positive term, pulsating with glamour and sophistication, but it also bears a negative aspect, as it is always under suspicion of being merely a rootless bourgeois „masquerade.“ A cosmopolitan is never „one of us.“

A cosmopolitan shifting and drifting is not always a question of choice, Buruma pointed out at his lecture in Vienna's Börsensälen: „Jews were the first cosmopolitans.“ Referring to his own biography, however, Buruma described the virtues that may derive from a migrational lifestyle. Distance, he said, „can enrich



Ian Buruma is a writer, journalist, and Henry R. Luce Professor of Democracy, Human Rights and Journalism at Bard College, New York. Recently he published *Bad Elements. Chinese Rebels from Los Angeles to Beijing* (2009)

one's view of the world,” and „familiarity with different cultures creates a capacity to put oneself in the place of another.“ Its limits, however, must also be mentioned: „Empires may be cosmopolitan and liberal“ Buruma said, „but they are not democratic.“ And Europe may also become a „cosmopolitan union,“ but lack democracy: „There is no European demos.“ „Cosmopolitanism is a fine thing,“ Buruma concluded, „but people must have something to belong to.“ <

In cooperation with the Royal Netherlands Embassy and Grüne Bildungswerkstatt

FORTHCOMING

Panel Discussion

The Advantage and Disadvantage of Memory for Life

Kann es ein vereintes Europa ohne eine gemeinsame Geschichte geben? Der Schwerpunkt „Vereintes Europa – Geteilte Geschichte“ am IWM analysiert die oft widersprüchlichen nationalen Narrative der europäischen Länder in Ost und West, und möchte eine Synthese schaffen, die unterschiedliche Perspektiven und unbekannte Kapitel der europäischen Geschichte integriert. Im Rahmen der Konferenz „Tomorrow's Yesterday: Memory Politics in Europe“ findet am 25. September eine öffentliche Podiumsdiskussion statt. Publizistin und Pulitzer-Preisträgerin Anne Applebaum, Ivan Krastev von der bulgarischen NGO Centre for Liberal Studies und Timothy Snyder, Professor für Geschichte in Yale und Permanent Fellow des IWM, sprechen darüber, wie Geschichte „geschrieben“ und Erinnerung politisch instrumentalisiert wird. <

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Kunst, Geld und Politik

Politischer Salon mit **Karlheinz Essl** und **Bogdan Zdrojewski**, 27. April

Bei 140 Millionen Euro fiel im September letzten Jahres im Auktionshaus Sotheby's der Hammer für 220 Kunstwerke von Damien Hirst. Am selben Tag, an dem in London Werke wie „Moments of Madness“ zum dreifachen Schätzpreis ihren Besitzer wechselten, brach in New York die Bank Lehman Brothers zusammen. Seitdem ist die weltweite Krise der Finanzmärkte auch eine Krise der Kunstwelt. In den USA ist Kunstförderung vorwiegend Privatsache, in Europa hingegen eine Angelegenheit des Staates. Doch auch die großen europäischen Museen klagen bereits, dass die Kulturbudgets nicht mehr ausreichen.

Wie Kunst, Geld und Politik heute zusammenhängen, diskutierten beim Politischen Salon am 27. April der Kunstsammler Karlheinz Essl und der polnische Kulturminister



Karlheinz Essl ist Direktor des Essl Museums für moderne Kunst in Wien

ter Bogdan Zdrojewski mit Michael Fleischhacker, Chefredakteur der *Presse*, und Krzysztof Michalski, Rektor des IWM. Die Politik müsse den Mu-



Bogdan Zdrojewski ist Kulturminister Polens

seen finanziell unter die Arme greifen, forderte Essl, denn wo Museen ihre Bestände nicht mehr auffüllen können, fehle nachfolgenden Ge-

nerationen ein wichtiger Teil ihres kulturellen Erbes: „Die Politik vernachlässigt das geistige Kulturgut der Gesellschaft.“ Zdrojewski hielt dem entgegen, dass zu viel Geld für die Kunstinstitutionen selbst aufgewendet würde und zu wenig für das, was in ihnen geschieht. So fließen in Polen achtzig Prozent der staatlichen Gelder in den Erhalt von Gebäuden oder die Verwaltung, aber nur zwanzig Prozent werden von den Museen für künstlerische Arbeiten ausgegeben. Die Kulturinstitutionen seines Landes, sagte Zdrojewski, seien wie Panzerkreuzer auf einem Teich: „Ich aber brauche wendige Leichtboote.“ Doch welche Kunst ist überhaupt förderungswürdig? Zdrojewski konstatierte eine enorme Subjektivität bei der Vergabe öffentlicher Gelder. Deswegen lasse er sich von Kunstexperten beraten und achte auf die Besu-

cherzahlen der Museen, um einen Kriterienkatalog für die staatliche Kunstförderung in Polen zu erstellen. Essl äußerte sich skeptisch gegenüber einer staatlichen Feststellung, was „gute Kunst“ sei: „Kunst ist nie mehrheitsfähig.“ Vielmehr müsse der Staat günstigere Rahmenbedingungen für das Engagement von Privatleuten und Mäzenen schaffen. Steuerliche Absetzbarkeit von Kunst könnte ein Anreiz auch für ein breiteres Publikum sein, Kunstwerke zu erwerben. Auf die Frage, was er denn als Kulturminister tun würde, sagte Essl: „Neue, heute entstandene Kunst fördern und vor allem in die Kunstbildung von Kindern investieren. Denn Kunst ist ein Spiegel und ein Korrektiv der Gesellschaft.“ <

In Kooperation mit *Die Presse*

The Dilemmas of an Editor

Fellows Meeting: **Robert B. Silvers**, May 15

Each year, the IWM invites its fellows, friends and supporters to an informal celebration. This year's lecture at the Fellows Meeting was held by Bob Silvers, founder and editor in chief of the famous *New York Review of Books*. Silvers spoke about the history of the magazine and about the threefold dilemma of an editor: First and foremost is the problem of dealing with the influence of owners and shareholders of the newspaper, and keeping control of the editorial content against monetary interests. The incentive to establish the *New York Review of Books* in 1963 had been exactly, "to keep the control to ourselves." The second dilemma, Silvers pointed out, is the relationship between editori-



Robert B. Silvers is editor of the *New York Review of Books*

al writers and journalists (who may write what?) and the third consists in political obstructions. There are

definitive limits to what a newspaper is able to publish. "Why do we know almost nothing about China?" asked Silvers. There are, for example, problems for journalists getting visa if they report too critically. There are clearly constraints, limits and hidden influences on what can be openly published.

Furthermore, a fourth dilemma is on its way: the digital revolution and internet publications will change the editor's work entirely. Maybe the news "paper" as we know it will become obsolete in the near future. Therefore, keeping "objective analysis" and "serious criticism" alive will be the real future challenge of the editor. <

Sex, Race, Reproduction

Workshop on Biological Knowledge Around 1800, June 12–14



From left: S. Lettow, R. Bernasconi, C. Klinger

Around 1800, the life sciences and the human sciences, including philosophy in its modern form, were "in the making." Mechanistic explanations of natural life were increasingly criticized, and new epistemic strategies towards "life" were formulated. In these processes, knowledge concerning "human nature" was configured in different ways and articulated from various political-ethical perspectives. Scientific, philosophical, political-ethical, and economic meanings overlapped in concepts of race, descent, inheritance and reproduction as well as those of generation, procreation, sex and sexuality. However, these concepts were not stable but highly contested in regard to their epistemological as well as socio-cultural status. In the order of knowledge the status of biology as a science and social knowledge was far from being fixed. But the political-epistemological problems of naturalism and biological naturalization that to this day still haunt the social and human sciences, including philosophy, emerged at the horizon. The interdisciplinary workshop analyzed different constellations of biological knowledge, i.e. the formation, circulation and articulation of biological concepts in scientific, philosophical and socio-political contexts. <

See also Lettow's contribution on page 15

Participants

- Robert Bernasconi**,
Pennsylvania State University
- Tobias Cheung**,
Humboldt University Berlin/Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science, Berlin
- Penelope Deutscher**,
Northwestern University, Evanston
- Tristana Dini**,
Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, Napoli
- Waltraud Ernst**,
University of Hildesheim
- Sara Figal**,
Vanderbilt University, Nashville
- Petra Gehring**,
Technical University Darmstadt
- Brigitta Keintzel**,
University of Vienna
- Cornelia Klinger**,
IWM, Vienna
- Susanne Lettow**,
IWM, Vienna
- Staffan Müller-Wille**,
University of Exeter/Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science, Berlin
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Voting with the Fork

IHS Boston Conference: **The Future of Food: Transatlantic Perspectives**, May 8–9



Bryant Terry and Elizabeth Amrien

In May 2009 the Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University (www.euforyou.org) hosted an international conference entitled “The Future of Food: Transatlantic Perspectives.” Panelists included academics, popular writers, and food justice advocates from both sides of the Atlantic. Satish Kumar, peace activist and editor of the ecology journal *Resurgence*, and Michael Ableman, farmer, photographer, and an authority on sustainable agriculture, gave opening and closing keynote speeches. The conference was preceded by a series of ancillary events, including a workshop with fermentation revivalist Sandor Ellix Katz, a cooking demonstration with African American eco-chef Bryant Terry, and a special screening of the documentary film *King Corn*, introduced by filmmaker Ian Cheney and followed by a question-and-answer session with director Aaron Woolf.

The conference was organized in response to the growing concerns of local communities on both sides of the Atlantic over matters of health, the environment, and the economy. Taking the growing global food crisis as a starting point, stakeholders were asked to consider the question how we can foster a global food system that safeguards cultural and biological diversity while providing safe and nourishing food for all citizens. The working hypothesis was that the current food crisis is systemic in nature and solutions from the past (more

market, more regulation, etc.) will not allow the global food system to evolve in a sustainable way. As Aaron Woolf, director of the documentary *King Corn*, pointed out at the film screening preceding the conference, the current situation calls for innovations in policy, and infrastructure, as well as re-thinking how food is grown, shipped, and distributed locally, regionally, and globally. Difficult as the policy dilemmas are, pondering the mechanisms that have caused our food systems to evolve in unsustainable directions raises even deeper questions about the appropriate relationship between humans and nature.

Cultures, historically, have possessed deeply rooted traditions around food, and the industrialization of agriculture and the globalization of the food chain disrupt traditions, obscuring the relationship between humans and their environment. As Eric Schlosser, author of the popular American book *Fast Food Nation*, points out, there has been more change in the way we eat in the last 30 years than in the previous 30,000. The primary goal of the conference, therefore, was to explore the consequences of this sweeping transformation, with particular attention to its implications for culture. We eat today from an unnatural abundance (food is as plentiful in February as in August) and we pay a high price for convenience – whether it’s fresh food eaten out of

season, grown across the world, manufactured food, or fast food – and for our participation in a system so out of synch with nature and nature’s rhythms. Is there a relationship, as the American poet Wendell Berry suggests, between the modernization of agriculture and the degradation of culture? Does the erosion of biodiversity, for example, pose a threat to cultural diversity?

In his opening remarks, Satish Kumar addressed these dilemmas from an ecological perspective. Kumar argued that the food crisis is also a spiritual crisis – factory food does not nourish our bodies or our souls. His remarks served to place the discussions to follow in an ethical framework. The first panel discussion, “From Farm to Fork: The Global Food Chain,” moderated by James McCann, Professor of History at Boston University and author of *Maize and Grace: Africa’s Encounter with a New World Crop*, took up the question where our food comes from. Panelists (Helena Norberg-Hodge, founder and Director of the International Society for Ecology and Culture (ISEC); Henrik Selin, Professor of International Relations, Boston University; and Mark Winne, author of *Closing the Food Gap: Resetting the Table in the Land of Plenty*) traced the increasingly obscure path of food from farm to table in an effort to explore the alignment (or lack thereof) between business and consumer interests. Among the issues they

discussed were the impact(s) of the transformation of our food system on culture, the emergence of parallel food systems for the wealthy and everyone else and the importance of making local, organic, and highly nutritious food available to all citizens.

The second panel, “The End of Cheap Food: Food and Geopolitics,” moderated by Adil Najam, Director of the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University, took up the issue of “food security.” Speakers (Benedikt Haerlin, Foundation on Future Farming – Save Our Seeds; Jim Harkness, President, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy; and Tim Wise, Director of the Research and Policy Program at the Global Development and Environment Institute, Tufts University) addressed the rising cost of food and the “fuel vs. food” debate. Is the growing demand for biofuels responsible for food inflation? Other threats to food security were also explored, namely, fossil fuel dependence, loss of biodiversity, and water shortages.

Adil Najam also moderated the third session, “What’s in What You Eat? Food Safety in a New Ecology,” which was focussed around questions of “food safety” with an emphasis on differing regulation in the United States and Europe – especially around GMOS, recent food scares, and the looming threat of bioterrorism. Speakers included

Benedikt Haerlin; Helen Holder, GM Campaign Coordinator for Friends of the Earth Europe, and Andrew Kimbrell, Executive Director, Center for Food Safety

Henrik Selin, Professor of International Relations at Boston University, moderated the fourth session, “Eating Green: Food and Climate Change.” The focus of this panel was “climate friendly eating.” Speakers (Björn-Ola Linnér, Linköping University, the Tema Institute, and Mia MacDonald, Founder and Executive Director, Brighter Green) looked at the relationship between food production and climate change, deforestation, soil degradation, and factory farms, and considered whether what we eat can make a difference.

The fifth and final session, “What Is ‘Good’ Food? The Ethics of Eating,” moderated by Molly Anderson, an independent consultant on science and policy for sustainability, focussed on our food choices and the health and environmental costs of “cheap food.” Is “good” food healthy, sustainable, delectable or cheap? Speakers in this panel (Sandor Ellix Katz, author of *Wild Fermentation* and *The Revolution Will Not Be Microwaved*; Satish Kumar, Editor, *Resurgence*; Harriet Lamb, Executive Director, Fair Trade Foundation; and Helena Norberg-Hodge, founder and Director of the International Society for Ecology and Culture) highlighted the range of choices outside the industrial food system, including the rise of organic farming, locavorism, and the fair trade movement.

The conference concluded on an optimistic note. In his closing keynote address, farmer and photographer Michael Ableman, a recognized practitioner of sustainable agriculture and proponent of regional food systems, told several stories of people – even in marginalized communities – who are making a difference.

The discussions served to introduce people to some key issues and to encourage them to think more consciously about the food they buy and eat. Food choices, as several speakers emphasized, are increasingly ethical and political choices. Deciding what to eat is therefore one way in which citizens, at least in most of Europe and the United States, can “vote with their forks.” If one message emerged from the discussions it was that the future of food is up to us. <

The conference was funded by the European Commission Delegation in Washington D.C. with additional support from the Ford Foundation, and took place as part of a larger European Commission-funded project of the Institute exploring the intersection of politics and culture.

The “Brave New World” after Communism

BY JANOS MATYAS KOVACS

Much of the history of the 1989 revolutions has been lost or remained hidden until now. A good part of it, however, can be retrieved by reconstructing the expectations (both elite and popular) prevailing at the time. On June 15–16, the IWM organized, in cooperation with the Jena Center of 20th Century History, the Institute of Political Science at Vienna University and the Renner Institut, an international conference on revisiting the pre-1989 visions of the eagerly-awaited world after communism. The conference program was developed in a joint effort by Rainer Gries, Dieter Segert and Janos Matyas Kovacs.



From left: J. M. Kovacs, D. Segert, H. Misselwitz, A. von Plato



Rainer Gries



Thomas Krüger

Photos: IWM

The fact that many of the pre-1989 expectations have been neglected during the past two decades makes the historical assessment of those visions, which were eventually put into practice (or those practices which arose without such visions), extremely difficult. In order to avoid deterministic/teleological explanations, one is advised to also revisit those hopes and fears which did not come true. In doing so, one may even make cautious counter-factual hypotheses to check some of the unexploited opportunities implied by these visions. Of course, reconstructing pre-revolutionary expectations (i.e., writing a “parallel history” of 1989) need not be tantamount to their justification.

By “expectations”/“visions” the participants referred to both popular hopes, beliefs and prophecies as well as systematic predictions, programs and scenarios put forward by the elites. The conference exposed at least two kinds of ideological/emotional interpretive extremes, which lend themselves to an inadequate historical description of 1989’s revolutionary expectations. On the one hand, quite a few analysts tend to consider those images of the future as simply utopian (and therefore useless), which

have not been implemented during the past twenty years; on the other, a number of scholars prefer to focus on “innocent and colorful visions” of the time, and contrast them with the “corrupted and grey reality” of today. Evidently, the former are inclined to endorse what has actually happened in the region since 1989, while the latter would rather reject it. Instead of indulging in these rival approaches, the conference papers provided a balanced view of the expectations in their own contexts, and set them against the emerging types of “really-existing capitalism” in the region.

In this way, the conference tested a few of those hypotheses, which have nearly become truisms. They portray the elite expectations as unnecessarily pessimistic compared to the actual weakness of the communist regimes, and the popular ones as too optimistic as compared to the actual socio-economic advantages of post-communist societies. Both kinds of visions include a lengthy transition based on lasting compromises with the remnants of the communist regimes. According to these assumptions, the transition has proven more radical/liberal in terms of capitalist development than initially expected by a great majority

of people in Eastern Europe. Allegedly, the economies have turned out to be more privatized and marketized, the politics more party-based and business-centered, and the societies more polarized and less solidary than originally predicted. Civil society is weaker, and the populist/nationalist pressures are stronger than anticipated. *Realpolitik*, furthermore, has overshadowed the social imagination, risk-taking and innovation; and the project of a (more) direct democracy with strong communitarian, ecological, cultural, etc., commitments, including self-management, profit-sharing, cooperative regimes, basic income schemes, non-profit organizations, etc., have faded away. Imitation replaced experimentation.

Is the gap really so large between the pre-89 expectations and post-89 realities? Were the above-mentioned visions clearly articulated (and largely “innocent”)? What kind of discourses and symbols did they use? How did they vary in terms of countries (types of communism), social strata, generations, etc., and how did they affect each other? What led to their success/failure? Have they disappeared for good? To what extent do the current varieties of capitalism in the region comply with the

expectations? Do present-day realities preserve the traces of past hopes and fears? Questions like these were asked by the participants who responded with in-depth analyses of the various pre-revolutionary transition programs and/or of the current capitalist arrangements.

The 20th anniversary of the revolutions may tempt those who want to remember to indulge in nostalgia or, on the contrary, to pass quick judgments with the “unbearable lightness” of hindsight. Our conference took another approach by choosing a concept (expectations) that is rather difficult to study, especially when it comes to the popular mind under late communism, and asked the participants to collect new historical material, and/or revise the interpretation of the old one. In the hope of generating research in the near future, we focused on a few crucial fields in four sessions. The first three discussed popular expectations, the elite programs with an emphasis on those aiming at a socialist renewal (the “Big Loser”), as well as the alternative views of German unification. The fourth session compared the pre-1989 expectations with the social realities of Eastern Europe in our time.

Of course, the conference was not able to answer all the questions

raised. Nevertheless, it pointed to an interesting cycle in researching the post-communist transformation. In the early 1990s, research projects were preoccupied with the strength of the communist legacy in shaping the transition. The idea of path dependency, however, faded away by the end of the century as the analysts witnessed a surprisingly rapid progress of liberal institutional change in most countries of the region – a fact that seemed to devalue the historical prerequisites of nascent capitalism. Capitalist development throughout Eastern Europe in the past couple of years has not eradicated the national varieties of the new regimes, whose past(s) have been brought back into research. And the expectations, radical or moderate, exaggerated or realistic, were an integral part of those past(s) ... <

The conference was generously supported by the Bundesstiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED Diktatur, Berlin.

The Blessing of Ignorance

BY YAROSLAV HRYTSAK

In Ukraine, the 1989 expectations were a peculiar mixture of unawareness, overrated hopes, and substantiated fears. This led elites to compromise in avoidance of escalated tensions.

Since this text is bound to be subjective (but, I believe, not biased), I would like to start with a personal story. Twenty years ago I was a junior research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences

USSR. Their texts were read as if they were written by “intellectual Robinson Crusoes” – without the slightest awareness that the topics they were discussing had generated a mountain of scholarly litera-

conspicuously absent in the official discourses of *perestroika*. It seemed that Gorbachev was willingly scarifying *perestroika* in Ukraine for the sake of political stability in the Soviet Union. In the imagination of the

ern Ukraine and Donbas workers in Eastern Ukraine. The developments two decades later confirmed the 1968 fears of the Soviet leadership. In 1988–90, Western Ukraine witnessed the mass rallies, emergence of civic organizations, and, finally, the coming to power of the anticommunist opposition in the wake of the spring 1990 elections. Donbas became the turf of an independent worker movement. It made its debut in July 1989 with mass strikes, and by 1990 worker leaders removed communists from management in local mines and factories.

endum voted for preservation of the USSR (though in a “renovated form”), a few months later, 90 percent expressed their will for the political independence of Ukraine. What made them change their minds so drastically was a total collapse of the central power in the wake of the aborted coup d’état of August 1991. In any case, Ukrainian elites, along with the rest of society, were in a more reactive, rather than an active position. In the newly independent Ukraine, these leaders were former communists who’d secured their dominant position. This was reflected, among others, by victory of Leonid Kravchuk, a former communist secretary of ideology, in the 1991 Ukrainian presidential elections.

Scarcity of reliable sources (Soviet rule was notorious for its reluctance towards opinion polls) does not allow the reconstruction of a general “public opinion” at that time. The only sound generalization is about a good deal of ambivalence that was characteristic for each of the major actors of 89 – defecting communists, oppositional *Rukh* and worker leaders – which, *mutatis mutandis*, represented a general mood, as it was confirmed by surveys in the early 1990s. As a Ukrainian social scientist put it:

“[a] person in an ambivalent state of mind, while mentally sound, may simultaneously go for a multi-party system and against all ‘new-baked’ parties, for both freedom of movement and restrictions in border control, for an increase of market economy and state regulation of prices, [...], for the independence of his or her state and the restoration of the Soviet Union.”

Another generalization could be drawn upon the ways in which the opposite poles of public opinion were worded. On one end there was “a system,” or, in the words of a Donbas worker leader, “the bureaucratic dictatorial system, created by... [the] communist party... Everyone has long understood that it is dangerous, that it destroys the people, and the country.” Judging by the 1989 interviews, for many, the “system” had lost its legitimacy. The main reason was its failure to provide decent living standards. Certainly in the USSR there had always been segments of the population that didn’t share the basic tenants of the Soviet system, and, before 1985 they were still a minority. The majority held that these were rather isolated shortcomings, which could be amended. Not so in 1989. By that



Photo: IWM

in Lviv, Western Ukraine. It was a strange kind of institution. On the one hand, it hosted humanitarians who were not trusted enough to teach at the university; on the other, it functioned under auspices of the regional communist party committee. By spring 1989 the Institute’s fellows, for the first time in their lives, were granted a permission to go abroad. After laborious efforts to get a foreign pass, we boarded the bus and in six hours reached the final point of our destination, which was the ... neighboring town Przemysl across the Polish-Soviet border.

This story serves as a reminder that in 1989, apart from the Berlin Wall, there was another Iron Curtain that separated the Soviet Union from the rest of the communist bloc. Judging by the disallowed travel for communist citizens, Soviet republics and communist countries of Central Europe were two worlds apart. Soviet Ukraine was extremely isolated. It was a kind of Albania of the size of France. The isolation affected everyone, including the oppositional camp. The Ukrainian dissidents had contacts with the opposition in other Soviet republics, but not with *Solidarność* or any oppositional movements *outside* of the

ture in the West. Isolation from the outside world was a general Soviet tendency. It seems, however, that it was applied differently in different republics, and that Ukraine represented an extreme case. One may risk a generalization that if 1989 was “an uneventful revolution,” than it was also a non-event in Ukraine. The fall of the Berlin Wall was not discussed much or reflected upon since it bore

Kremlin leaders, Ukraine has been prone to nationalist deviations, so it was wiser to keep it at bay.

Their concerns were well grounded. The 1989 Revolution is sometimes seen as a continuation of 1968. Taking this point as a clue, one has to look into the political developments of 1968. The decision of the Kremlin to repress the Prague 1968 spring

The fall of the Berlin Wall was not much discussed or reflected upon since it bore little relevance for Soviet Ukrainians

little relevance for Soviet Ukrainians. Within the Soviet Union, in terms of political ferment brought by *perestroika*, Ukraine lagged behind Moscow, Leningrad, the Caucasus and the Baltic republics. The local communist party was headed by a hardliner, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky. He was the last member of the Brezhnev Politburo, whom Gorbachev kept in power. With probably the only exception of the Chernobyl disaster (1986), major Ukrainian issues were

had an explicit Ukrainian dimension: these were Soviet Ukrainian leaders who were the most aggressive proponents of military intervention in Czechoslovakia. They were deeply concerned with “pernicious effects” that the Prague spring might have on Ukraine. There were basically two large groups that were seen as the most responsive to the impact of Czechoslovakian “nationalist and revisionist elements.” Greek Catholics (*Uniates*) of neighboring West-

wars – victorious or failed insofar as they lead to extreme exhaustion of resources – or from political crises in the center. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw the both factors at work: the Kremlin was defeated in the Cold War outside and weakened by the power struggle inside.

This scheme helps to understand the “strange politics” of Ukrainians in 1991. While in March 1991, 70–80 percent in an all-Union refer-

time the defects were so numerous, that, in the view of many, an entire “system” had to be removed. This change of attitudes came largely as an effect of *glasnost*, with its numerous revelations about the Soviet past and present.

In contrast to the “system” was a “normalcy,” or a “normal civilized society.” More often than not it was conceptualized in the notion of “the West” as an embodiment of “normal,” “modern,” or “civilized” life. The celebration of Western standards was universal. It is easily discerned from countless statements of a broad range people – *Rukh* leaders, workers, managers, intellectuals, business-people, and communists. Needless to say, the image of the West was highly idealized. Ironically, to a large extent it was created by Soviet propaganda. Since accounts of the West in the Soviet media were overtly anti-Western, it provoked a persistent counter bias against any negative information about the West.

Though by the end of the 1980s there seemed to be widespread discontent with the failed “system,” there was no clear understanding on how to get to “normalcy.” Programs of *Rukh*, as well as the first political parties (1990) were conspicuously tacit on that issue. In the best cases, they confined themselves to vague generalities which can be reduced to



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Rukh and Donbass workers) were becoming increasingly antagonistic. By the end of 1993, the CIA announced a prognosis of civil war in Ukraine, and the 1994 presidential elections seemed to confirm that alarming scenario. The 1994 deep split between the Ukrainian “catholic” west and “orthodox” east amounted to what Samuel Huntington called “the clash of civilizations.” In his book, Ukraine served as a classic example of a cleft country. This image has chased Ukraine ever since, and is largely corroborated by later political developments, including the 2004 Orange Revolution.

with a low level of interethnic conflicts and violence when compared with other post-Soviet countries. Moreover, Ukraine is the only non-Baltic country of the former USSR that has been qualified by the Freedom House as “free.” In the words of a Russian political analyst, “Ukraine passed an exam on democracy that we [Russians – Y. H.] really failed... and it is still not clear when we are going to do it over again. And the fact that Ukraine did it against a background of terrible economic hardships... only increases Ukrainian merits (the exam was passed on an “empty stomach”).”

This presents an obvious paradox: how can it be that a country with such a high potential for conflicts has managed a relative smooth transition from communism to democracy? To be sure, there is more than one answer to that question. Still, one of them, I believe, is rooted in a characteristic facet of 1989 expectations: it was a peculiar mixture of imposed ignorance, overrated expectations, and substantiated fears that forced elites to compromise rather than escalate tensions. All the major 1989 political actors have disappeared from the Ukrainian political landscape long ago, having been displaced by (or dissolved into) new parties and fractions. Still, the spirit of the compromise lingers. Post-communist history of Ukraine could be presented as a long line of deep political and economic crises; each of which were concluded by a certain compromise. The real problem of Ukraine is that most of these compromises have been, so far, of a strictly tactical character when what the country badly needs is a compromise of a strategic character around issues of identity, such as the status of the Russian language, foreign orientation and historical memory. But

against the background of ambivalence that characterizes the public mood in Ukraine since the late 1980s, one wonders whether any at-

tempts “to make things clear” would not further destabilize the Ukrainian situation. <

The “Brave New World” after Communism. 1989: Expectations in Comparison

Session One:

Irina Papkov, Central European University, Budapest
Evolving Expectations: The Russian Orthodox Church and the Collapse of Communism

Yaroslav Hrytsak, Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Lviv
Ukraine 1989: Blessing of Ignorance

Thomas Ahbe, Leipzig
Die DDR im Rücken. Ostdeutsche Generationen und Milieus in den Dekaden vor und nach dem Umbruch

Sona Szomolanyi, Comenius University of Bratislava
November 1989: Unrealistic Expectations without Revolution

Session Two:

Michal Kopecek, Institute for Contemporary History, Prague
“New Socialism” or “New Politics”? Dissidence, Human Rights and Liberal Nationalism in East Central Europe 1975–1989

Dieter Segert, University of Vienna and Academy of Sciences, Lviv
Retaining Socialism by Reforming it. GDR-Discourses in Autumn 1989

Pawel Spiewak, Warsaw University
What Matters More: Economic or Political Reforms? Attitudes to Overcoming Communism

András Bozóki, Central European University, Budapest
Hopes or Illusions? Idealism in Politics: The Case of Hungary

Session Three:

Edelbert Richter, Bauhaus University Weimar
Deutsche Identität zwischen Ost und West

Jan-Werner Müller, Princeton University and Central European University, Budapest
Another Tale of Two Utopias: The Failure of Post-Nationalism – and Nationalism

Hans Misselwitz, East-German Forum for Social Democracy, Berlin
Alternatives within the Process of German Unification and the So-Called Window of Opportunity

Alexander von Plato, University of Hagen
Internationale Vorbedingungen der Wiedervereinigung und die Zukunftsvisionen ihrer Protagonisten

Session Four:

Roumen Avramov, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia
Fuzzy Expectations, Hybrid Realities, Moving Targets

Jacek Kochanowicz, Warsaw University
Bewilderment, Hopes, Anxiety: Poles and Capitalism in 1989

Janos Matyas Kovacs, IWM, Vienna
Taste of the Goulash. Understanding the Hungarian “Variety of Capitalism”

Mladen Lazic, Belgrade University
Workers in and after the “Workers’ State”: the Case of Serbia and Croatia

Panel Discussion:
Die „Schöne Neue Welt“ nach dem Kommunismus: Was blieb von 1989?

András Bozóki, Central European University, Budapest

Martin Bútorá, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava

Thomas Krüger, Federal Agency for Civic Education, Bonn

In cooperation with the Jena Center of 20th Century History, the Institute of Political Science at Vienna University and the Renner Institut. Generously supported by the Bundesstiftung zur Aufarbeitung der SED Diktatur, Berlin.

Let’s be clear: empires do not collapse because of centrifugal movements on the periphery

three points: Ukrainian sovereignty, market economy and social security. Their rhetoric was very much socialist, which is not surprising, given that the ideal of “socialism with human faces” was very popular then. The “system” was treated, not as an implementation of Marxism, but rather as its crude “Stalinist” aberration. “Socialism with human faces” was identified either with the Soviet’s new economic politics of the 1920s or with the “Swedish model” (obviously the social costs of that model were not mentioned). But then, the model of Sweden in popular imagination went along together with Japan or the US, as if they were compatible.

There was a general romantic mood about fast and positive developments. Ironically, this mood found confirmation in signals coming from “the West:” in 1991, Deutsche Bank claimed that among all of the Soviet republics, Ukraine had the best chances for self-sufficient economic development. On the other hand, naïve expectations of economic affluence were accompanied by overwhelming fears that political developments might lead to an explosion of violence. There were even rumors about forthcoming anti-Russian and anti-Jewish pogroms. These and other fears faded away with the fall of the Soviet Union, but then they reemerged in the early 1990s when former allies (communists,

And yet, Ukraine is shaking, but not breaking. It proved to be a relatively stable political community



Rape as a Weapon of War

BY DEBRA BERGOFFEN

Um eine Phänomenologie der Formen von Gewalt und einen integrativen Gewaltbegriff ging es vom 18. bis 20. Juni am IWM in der Konferenz „Gesichter der Gewalt – Faces of Violence“, die der Philosoph Bernhard Waldenfels mit dem Vortrag „Metamorphosen der Gewalt“ eröffnete. Jede Gewalt, so stellte er klar, ist eine Verletzung. Sie verletzt nicht nur physisch oder psychisch, sondern immer auch einen universalen Anspruch des Menschseins. Im Akt der Gewalt wird das Opfer von einem selbstbestimmten Subjekt in ein Objekt verwandelt, was Waldenfels einen „performativen Widerspruch“ beziehungsweise das „Paradox der vernichtenden Gewalt“ nannte. Wie Menschen von Gewalt betroffen sind und Gewalt einsetzen, wurde in der Konferenz an den Konflikten im postkolonialen Simbabwe, dem Ausbruch blindwütiger Gewalt in einer peruanischen Dorfgemeinschaft, oder dem modernen, globalisierten Terrorismus diskutiert. Hier nachzulesen ist der Konferenzbeitrag der amerikanischen Philosophin Debra Bergoffen über die systematische Vergewaltigung von Frauen als „Waffe“ und genozidale Strategie in den Kriegen der Gegenwart.

War-time rape is as ancient as war itself. Until recently, however, this crime was a crime in name only. Accusations were scarce. They were seldom taken seriously enough to be brought to trial. If brought to trial they rarely resulted in convictions. That changed dramatically when The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) convicted the Rwandan and Bosnian-Serb soldiers who raped civilian women and girls of war crimes, the ICTY on February 22, 2001 taking the dramatic step of categorizing these rapes as a violation of the women's human right to sexual self-determination and as a crime against humanity, the most egregious international criminal offense. These convictions transformed the act of raping civilian women and girls from an ignored, tolerated or trivialized crime into a real and punishable crime. They also reflected the reality of the wars in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia; for in these wars rape was deployed as a genocidal tactic. It was a weapon of war. It could not be dismissed as collateral damage or as the undisciplined act of rogue soldiers.

Before the ICTY indictments rape was considered a species of torture. In focusing on the unique violation of rape as a war weapon, however, the ICTY determined that the human right violated in the ethnic cleansing rapes was not an effect of inflicting pain as in torture, but of denying the women's right to sexual self-determination. By decoupling rape from torture, the court challenged traditional non-gendered approaches to human rights claims; for it directed us to consider the ways in which as human we are always sexed and gendered and to the ways in which the sensuous, desiring, sex/gendered body is as constitutive of our integrity as other bodily dignities.

To adequately understand what is at stake in a human rights offense, we cannot reduce any human rights violation to a matter of the material body. Though the body of human rights law is a law of bodies insofar as it criminalizes certain forms of bodily abuse as destruc-



tive of our humanity, to adequately understand how and why certain forms of bodily abuse violate our humanity we must take account of the ways in which the human body is always the embodiment of a meaning-making subject. We must be alert to

this desire, and the communal effects of destroying our trust in this desire (by forgetting that the lived body is always a lived meaning-making body) we will not be able to understand the effectiveness of rape as a weapon of war.

Perpetrators of rape as a weapon of war rely on the fact that there are social worlds where a woman's body carries the honor of her community. Her raped body shames and humiliates the body politic; for insofar as the honor of the woman's commu-

The gender coding of women as weak and vulnerable and of men as invulnerable and strong, whose strength is in part measured by their ability to protect "their" women is not limited to honor societies. Gender is a fundamental structuring principle of societies around the globe. Central to this structuring is the sexed allocation of protector and protected roles. This allows the effectiveness of war-time rape tactics to cross cultural lines. Thus the war-time rapist can rely on the raped woman's body to destabilize men's protector identities – identities said to be essential to their morale as fighters. This destruction of masculine identity was said to be one of the objectives of the Bosnian-Serb genocidal rape strategy. It was certainly the point of staging the genocidal rapes as public spectacles. The genocidal effect of the rapes depended on the presence of fathers, husbands, sons, and brothers who in witnessing the sexual abuse of their mothers, wives, sisters and daughters were witness to their own symbolic destruction as men.

A raped woman's body stigmatizes her and the men who failed to protect her

the ways in which as human we are necessarily ambiguous – to the ways in which we are both subjects who bring meaning to the world and material objects within the world. If we forget this and identify the human rights violation of rape as a weapon of war with the crime of forced intercourse (accounting only for the way it abuses the material body) and ignore the ways in which it destroys the body's desire for intimacy, the meanings it creates in articulating

Those who use rape as a weapon of war manipulate their victim's ambiguity in two ways. First they destroy her subjectivity by reducing her to a hyper-visible pleasure object available for their use and subject to their power. Then they exploit her subjectivity by transforming her meaning-giving powers from anchors of her people's communal bonds of intimacy into tools to destroy the ties that sustain the integrity of her community.

nity is carried on/in her body, her honor is both her responsibility and the responsibility of the community's men: she is charged with guaranteeing it, they are charged with protecting it. A raped woman's body stigmatizes her and the men who failed to protect her. Her raped body carries, and is intended to carry, a message to the men of her community: You are not men. Like your women who are now ours, you too are subject to our power.

The gendered distinction between those who need protection and those who provide it creates a world where women are required to carry the vulnerability of the human condition as a burden so that men can imagine that they can escape the vulnerabilities of being human. It creates a fantasmatic social order where the myth of masculine invulnerability is aligned with heroic military ideals to position men as the protectors of the body politic. War time rape strategies take aim at

he cannot protect. To someone he loves he cannot fulfill his duty. For this he knows he is never forgiven. This knowledge of fathers, this knowledge of condemnation, is more than he can bear." Speaking of the daughter, he writes: "I think of one ... who was brought in here and hurt before her father's eyes: who watched him being humiliated before her and saw that he knew what she saw ... After that she had no father. Her father had annihilated himself, he was a dead man." This father's death is not

The rape strategy transfers power over women from one group of men to another

this fantasy. They use women's bodies to destroy it.

It is tempting to be cynical about social structures which equate masculinity with the power to protect. The statistics documenting the pandemic of violence against women, where the power to protect becomes

a matter of lost heroic masculinity. It is a matter of love.

Need we say more about the ways in which the Bosnian Serb tactic of public rape worked its genocidal force?; about why it was deployed to destroy the will and morale of Muslim men?; about why a structural



Bernhard Waldenfels



Photos: IWM



Photo: IWM

From left: R. Bernasconi, S. Nowotny, K. Neundlinger, M. Staudigl

a protection racket and a licence to kill certainly warrants this cynicism. The power to protect, however, is also a lived intimate desire. As often as not, it cannot be reduced to/contained within/adequately explained by disciplinary social codes. As an expression of intimacy this desire is not necessarily perverted by the patriarchal structures of domination and submission.

J. M. Coetzee's novel *Waiting for the Barbarians* can teach us something about this desire and the ways in which the Bosnian Serb's exploited it in pursuing their genocidal objectives. Coetzee depicts the scene of a daughter being tortured and abused in front of her father. He attempts to capture the father's experience of witnessing his daughter's abuse in the following words: "All I see is a figure named father ... who knows a child is being beaten whom

analysis cannot tell the full story of the power of these rape spectacles?; about how the raped women's bodies were used to destroy the bonds of intimacy and the sense of self respect so critical to the life of any viable community?

In finding that the soldiers who carried out the Bosnian-Serb rape strategy were guilty of a crime against humanity Judge Florence Mumba of the ICTY invoked two principles. The first, "In time of peace as much as in time of war, men of substance do not abuse women," as Mumba formulated in a *New York Times* Interview, challenges the silence surrounding the war crime of rape. It does not, however, challenge established gender codes. It reminds men of their obligation to protect women and insists that the conditions of war do not absolve them of this obligation. It (unsuspectingly) rein-

forces the gender protector-protected codes which allow the spectacle of war time rape to do its genocidal work.

The second principle, however, upsets the gendered status quo; for it links women's dignity to their "fundamental human right to sexu-

patterns of women's subordination. The court's ruling, however, challenges social orders where the conditions of sexual self-determination are absent. It undermines the hierarchical ways in which gender codes structure our intimate lives.

Seen from this perspective, the ICTY affirmation of the human right to sexual self-determination may be read as transforming the raped woman's body from a site of her shame to his criminality. In effecting this transformation, it may also be read as an attempt to create a world where the authority of international law, in dignifying the sexual vulnerabilities of our intimate lives, is influential enough to counter the seduction to deploy rape as a weapon of war, and powerful enough to challenge social orders that, by creating gender systems where invulnerable men are made responsible for protecting their vulnerable women, invite the use of rape as a weapon of war. <

Gesichter der Gewalt – Faces of Violence

June 18:
Keynote Lecture

Bernhard Waldenfels,
Ruhr-Universität Bochum,
Deutschland
Metamorphosen der Gewalt

June 19:

Debra Bergoffen,
George Mason University,
VA, USA
Exploiting the Dignity of the Vulnerable Body: The Case of Rape as a Weapon of War

Kathryn T. Gines,
The Pennsylvania State University, PA, USA
Arendt's Violence/Power Distinction: The Phenomenology of Violence in Colonial Algeria and Post-Colonial Zimbabwe

James Mensch,
St. Xavier Francis University,
Nova Scotia, Canada
Violence and Blindness: The Case of Uchuraccay

Robert Bernasconi,
University of Memphis,
TN, USA
Systemic Violence

June 20:

Ilja Srubar,
Universität Erlangen,
Deutschland
Gewalt als a-semiotische Kommunikation

Klaus Neundlinger,
Wien, Österreich
Die Arbeit der Gewalt

James Mensch,
St. Xavier Francis University,
Nova Scotia, Canada
Violence and Blindness: The Case of Uchuraccay

Alfred Hirsch,
Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen, Deutschland
Zur Genese des Terrors in der Moderne. Vom Partisan zum Terroristen

Stefan Nowotny,
EIPCP, Wien, Österreich
Sprechen aus der Erfahrung von Gewalt. Zur Frage der Zeugenrede

Supported by FWF/
Austrian Science Fund

Die Rückkehr der Biologie

VON SUSANNE LETTOW

Die Philosophie hat nicht nur ein neues Verhältnis zu den Naturwissenschaften sondern auch zu sich selbst nötig.

Biologische Erklärungen von Sozialem haben Konjunktur. Seien es Lebensglück, Geschlechterkampf, Gewaltbereitschaft – die Wissenschaften vom Leben scheinen einen unmittelbaren Zugang zu diesen Phänomenen zu haben, der es ihnen erlaubt, ihre Wahrheit zu enthüllen. Auch die Philosophie, so heißt es, habe diesen privilegierten Zugang anzuerkennen und ihre Ignoranz gegenüber den Naturwissenschaften zu überwinden. Die endlose Debatte um Hirnforschung und Willensfreiheit etwa, in der Philosophen und Philosophinnen sich an der Behauptung abarbeiten, das „Ich“ und der „freie Wille“ seien neurowissenschaftlich erklärbar und somit nicht wirklich existent, ist ein Beispiel dafür, wie Philosophen sich in den letzten Jahren an Problemvorgaben aus den Naturwissenschaften anlehnen. Ein anderes Beispiel ist das Vordringen von Versatzstücken der Evolutionstheorie zusammen mit ihrer Schwester der Soziobiologie im philosophischen Diskurs. So ist etwa die Rede von den „natürlichen Anlagen des Moralwesens Mensch“, die zur Konkurrenz um „knappe Ressourcen wie Nahrung, Territorium und vermutlich Frauen“ führen (Christian Illies). Auch gar davon, dass die Soziobiologie „unseres Kenntnis des Menschen“ vertiefe, „wenn sie uns lehrt, dass wir genetisch dazu disponiert sind Verwandte und Angehörige der eigenen Rasse zu bevorzugen und besonders Mütter dazu ihre Kinder zu lieben“ (Bernd Goebel).

Was aber fehlt in diesen Anleihen an biologisches Wissen? Sie bleiben meist vage und allgemein und fragen nicht nach ihren eigenen Voraussetzungen. Grundsätzlich fehlt ihnen eine wissenschafts- und erkenntnistheoretische Rahmung. Denn statt schlicht die Wahrheit über das Sein zu enthüllen, sind auch die Erkenntnisse der Naturwissenschaften – wie alles wissenschaftliche Wissen – Resultate von Erkenntnisprozeduren. Sie sind entstanden im Kontext spezifischer Forschungsfelder, die wiederum durch konkurrierende Forschungsansätze, -projekte und -methoden strukturiert sind.

Theorien, und also auch die Evolutionstheorie, sind Entwürfe, die einzelne Erkenntnisse und Annahmen in einen mehr oder weniger kohärenten Zusammenhang bringen. Sie können plausibel sein, sie können empirische Forschung leiten, sie können weitere Theoriebildung anregen und zuweilen auch theoretische Revolutionen auslösen.

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Sie können jedoch nicht ein „erstes Wissen“ liefern, in dem sich Realität unmittelbar offenbart. Menschliches Wissen ist konstruiert. Die Einsicht in die Gemachtheit wissenschaftlichen Wissens aber fehlt all jenen Ansätzen, die sich unter dem Namen „Naturalismus“ versammeln. Mit diesem Begriff ist nicht eine Orientierung an Natur schlechthin gemeint, sondern an den – methodisch ausgezeichneten – Naturwissenschaften, ein „Szientismus“. Die Quintessenz der verschiedenen Spielarten des naturalistischen Programms haben Herbert Schnädelbach und Geert Keil – zwei prominente Kritiker des Naturalismus – prägnant auf die Formel gebracht: „Wherever science will lead I will follow“. Doch statt Gefolgschaft wäre eine Wissenschaftstheorie gefragt, die darauf zielt, die spezifischen Formen wissenschaftlichen Wissens und die Weisen, auf die es hervorgebracht wird, theoretisch zu fassen. Eine solche Wissenschaftstheorie beginnt damit, dass man „wissenschaftliche Objekte“, von den Dingen des Alltagslebens, mit denen wir es gemeinhin zu tun haben, unterscheidet. „Wissenschaftliche Objekte“, so formulierte es der französische Wissenschaftstheoretiker Gaston Bachelard schon in den 30er Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts, „existieren nicht in der Natur, sie müssen hergestellt werden“. Zu dieser Herstellung tragen sowohl die Proze-

duren in Laboren, die spezifischen Denk- und Frageweisen innerhalb von *scientific communities* aber auch politische, ökonomische und kulturelle Bedingungen von Wissenschaften bei. Die gegenwärtige Philosophie aber, in der Bekenntnisse zum Naturalismus vorherrschend sind, ignoriert dies weitgehend.

Gerade in Hinblick auf die Biologie und ihren seit dem 19. Jahrhundert prekären Status zwischen Naturwissenschaften und sozialem Ordnungswissen aber wäre eine solche umfassende wissenschaftsphilosophische Perspektive notwendig. Dass schon Darwins Formulierung der Evolutionstheorie von gesellschaftlichen Vorstellungen von Konkurrenz und Durchsetzungsvermögen, über männliche Sexualität und weibliche Sittsamkeit geprägt war, ist weithin bekannt. Darüber hinaus ist die Struktur der Evolutionsbiologie vor-relativistisch. Das heißt, es fehlt die Reflexion auf das Wechselverhältnis von Beobachter und Beobachtetem, durch das die Physik sich am Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts von einem naiven Objektivismus befreit hat. Über „vergangenes, vor der Entstehung des Menschen als Spezies abgelaufenes Geschehen“, so der Wissenschaftsphilosoph Peter Janich, „handelt die Biologie als wäre man persönlich dabei gewesen“. Dies alles ist freilich längst keine „Widerlegung“ der Evolutionstheorie, wohl aber ein

Hinweis auf ihren Entwurfscharakter und ihre kulturelle Verankerung, die sie mit jeglicher Theoriebildung teilt. Von einem privilegierten Zugang der Biologie zum menschlichen und nichtmenschlichen Sein kann daher keine Rede sein. Gerade Philosophie sollte hier hellhörig werden. Sie selbst hatte ja lange Zeit beansprucht, mit der Metaphysik ein „erstes Wissen“ zu liefern, hat sich aber nach dem ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert aus guten Gründen von diesem Absolutheitsanspruch verabschiedet. Soll jetzt biologisches Wissen oder zumindest eine biologisch fundierte Anthropologie als Metaphysikersatz dienen? Produktiver als die vermeintlich „vakante“ Stelle der Metaphysik zu füllen wäre da allemal eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit den Erkenntnisansprüchen der Naturwissenschaften. Eine interdisziplinäre Debatte etwa über das Zusammenspiel von Macht- und Wissensansprüchen über Wissensordnungen und gesellschaftliche Ordnungen, könnte neues Licht auf Natur- und Technikwissenschaften, Philosophie, Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften gleichermaßen werfen. Wo allerdings vom Streben nach „Fortpflanzungserfolg“, von genetisch bedingter Mutterliebe und Fremdenfeindlichkeit die Rede ist, ist man davon weit entfernt.

Dabei gibt es in den Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften durchaus

gelungene Versuche, mit der überkommenen Trennung der „zwei Kulturen“, d. h. von Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften als grundsätzlich separate Unternehmungen, zu brechen. Wissenschaftsgeschichte, kulturalistische Wissenschaftstheorie, die langsam auch im deutschsprachigen Raum ankommenden *Sociological Studies of Science and Technology* und nicht zuletzt die Geschlechterforschung in Natur- und Technikwissenschaften haben wichtige und interessante Einsichten hervorgebracht. Die Vorstellung, es gebe „reine“ Wissenschaften, die jenseits von Kultur und Gesellschaft wahres Wissen produzieren, ist dabei gründlich erschüttert worden.

Philosophie könnte vor allem auch von sozial- und kulturwissenschaftlichen Nachbardisziplinen lernen, wie sich disziplinäre Grenzen auf die Natur- und Technikwissenschaften hin öffnen lassen ohne die je spezifischen Kompetenzen zu verwischen. Denn dass die akademische Disziplin der Philosophie ihr Verhältnis zur Natur und zu den Naturwissenschaften überdenken sollte, steht außer Frage. Das strukturelle Problem, das die Humanwissenschaften in der Moderne insgesamt prägt, besteht darin, dass sie keine eigene Sprache der Natur ausgebildet haben. Sie schwanken vielmehr zwischen der Naturalisierung von Sozialem und der Kritik an Naturalisierungen. Darauf hinzuweisen, dass es nicht „Biologie“ ist, die uns auf bestimmte Gesellschafts- und Geschlechterformen festlegt, ist aber nicht genug. Denn diese Kritik ist weithin ein Spiegel der Naturalisierungen und verbleibt in einer Abwehrhaltung gegen „Natur“. In den *Gender Studies* ist daher in jüngster Zeit ein gewisses Unbehagen vernehmbar: „Material Feminisms“ klagen ein, sich mit der theoretischen „Flucht vor der Natur“ kritisch auseinanderzusetzen. Darüber hinaus gewinnen angesichts von Klimawandel und Biotechnologien naturpolitische und naturtheoretische Debatten an Wichtigkeit. Kaum zu leugnen, dass neue Formen des Umgangs mit Natur gefunden müssen – und dafür auch neuen Formen des gesellschaftstheoretischen und philosophischen Umgangs mit Naturzusammenhängen. <

Im Juni fand im Rahmen des Forschungsprojekts ein Workshop am IWM statt, s. S. 8

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Es gibt den Rousseauschen Traum von einer *volonté générale*, der die Revolutionäre in Frankreich 1789 beseelte, jenem allgemeinen Willen, der auf geheimnisvolle Weise dazu führt, daß alle ohne die Einwirkung von Zwang oder Gewalt einer Meinung sind. Marx hat diese Vorstellung in seinen seltenen und widerstrebenden Hinweisen auf die Welt nach der letzten Revolution entwickelt, die eine Welt der Verbrüderung statt der Herrschaft und somit der Gleichheit und nicht der Klassen-gegensätze sein würde. Diese Idee lebt bis heute fort, etwa in der Sehnsucht von Jürgen Habermas nach einer Gesellschaft der „herrschaftsfreien Kommunikation“, nach einem in freiwilligem und permanentem Diskurs zwischen Ebenbürtigen hergestellten Konsens.

Doch eine Demokratie in diesem Sinne kann es nicht geben. In menschlichen Gesellschaften geht es um Normen, und Normen setzen Sanktionen voraus, die ihrerseits Sanktionsinstanzen und damit Machtstrukturen zur Voraussetzung haben. Vielleicht ist es ein Fehler, den Traum der Anarchie völlig auszuschließen, aber soweit wir wissen, hat der Gesellschaftsvertrag immer auch einen Herrschaftsvertrag in sich eingeschlossen. Überall, wo Menschen Regeln aufstellen, nach denen sie leben, sind einige gleicher als andere.

Der revolutionäre Traum von einer Regierung, die zum Volk zurückgekehrt ist, muß deshalb unerfüllt bleiben. Das ist 1991 für jedermann sichtbar. Die sanften Revolutionäre des ostdeutschen Neuen Forums und ähnlicher Gruppen können noch immer nicht verstehen, warum sie bei den ersten freien Wahlen am 18. März 1990 nicht mehr als drei Prozent der Wählerstimmen erhielten, doch die Wähler waren möglicherweise klüger als die Kirchenmänner, die die Demonstrationen in Leipzig an jenen denkwürdigen Montagen im letzten Herbst anführten. Nicht anders als Solidarnosc in Polen endet das Bürgerforum in der Tschechoslowakei in Tränen. Die Rückkehr der Regierung zum Volk bedeutet überhaupt keine Regierung; „das Volk“ ist unfähig, eine Änderung zu bewerkstelligen, die über die zerstörerischen Momente der Revolution hinausginge. Kann es sein, daß die „Macht des Volkes“ grundsätzlich negativ ist und eher die Macht bedeutet, etwas zu beseitigen statt zu bewegen? Jedenfalls ist Basisdemokratie ein Irrtum und ein kostspieliger obendrein.

In den meisten Fällen endet der Traum von der reinen Gemeinschaft in reiner Herrschaft. Die Frage ist nicht, wie man Macht abschaffen, sondern wie man sie im Zaum halten kann.

Das ist die Frage des anderen, des konstitutionellen Demokratiebegriffs, und sie wirft das schwierigste Problem von allen auf. Rekapitulieren wir. Der Erfolg von Revolutionen, auch der von 1989, liegt darin, daß sie das alte Regime ein für allemal vernichtet haben. Sie scheitern jedoch an dem Ziel, die grundlegend

andere Welt einer Basisdemokratie zu schaffen. In diesem Sinne müssen sie die übertriebenen Hoffnungen, die sie geweckt haben, enttäuschen. Doch wie verhält es sich mit den Institutionen offener Gesellschaften, die Konflikte regeln und Veränderungen ohne Gewalt ermöglichen?

Revolutionäre Situationen entstehen selten und zeigen an, daß sich das gesellschaftliche Leben in einem ernsten Zustand befindet. Sie treten ein, wenn eine herrschende Schicht während eines längeren Zeitraums nicht nur andere Gruppen, sondern auch ein vorhandenes Veränderungspotential unterdrückt hat. Revolutionäre Situationen sind noch keine Revolutionen. Sie gleichen einem Pulverfaß, das erst gezündet werden muß. Genauer gesagt, ist die Hoffnung der Funke, der eine revolutionäre Situation explodieren läßt. Hoffnung entsteht im allgemeinen mit den ersten Anzeichen der Schwäche der herrschenden Schicht, mit Reformen, die die Menschen ermutigen, vorwärtszudrängen, mit dem Zeichen der Unsicherheit, das die Maske zerstört. Ceausescu Gesicht, als ihm während seiner Rede vor einer großen Menschenmenge bewußt wurde, daß seine „Anhänger“ in Wirklichkeit seine Feinde waren, ist hierfür ebenso ein Beispiel wie der Wirrwarr der Entscheidungen im Vorfeld der Öffnung der Berliner Mauer. Der tiefere Grund für den Hoffnungs-schimmer in den Ereignissen von 1989 war zweifellos Präsident Gorbatschow und seine offenkundige Absicht, nicht zu intervenieren, wenn Menschen sich entscheiden, ihren eigenen Weg zu gehen.

So begann der Prozeß mit all der Euphorie des Außergewöhnlichen, die uns noch so lebendig im Gedächtnis ist. Wochenlang beteiligten sich viele Menschen an gewaltigen Demonstrationen, statt zur Arbeit zu gehen. Mit einem Mal gab das scheinbar unverrückbare Gefüge der Nomenklatura nach. Die Reformkommunisten verdrängten die Traditionalisten, nur um ihrerseits innerhalb weniger Tage entthront zu werden. Das Monopol der kommunistischen Partei zerfiel zuerst an der Spitze und dann, allerdings wesentlich langsamer, auf allen Ebenen. Wahlen wurden geplant, Wahlkämpfe vorbereitet.

Doch während dieses Prozesses und danach traten mehrere Komplikationen auf. Zunächst der Zusammenbruch des Zentrums. Sobald die Partei aus ihrer Monopolstellung entfernt war, wurde der Staatsapparat brüchig oder gar hohl. Im Fall Ostdeutschlands hat die Übernahme durch Westdeutschland nicht sichtbar werden lassen, in welchem Ausmaß die gewählte Regierung an Autorität verloren hatte, sofern sie je welche besaß. Ungarn und der Tschechoslowakei, ganz zu schweigen von Jugoslawien, Rumänien

oder Bulgarien, steht diese Möglichkeit nicht offen. In allen diesen Ländern kommt es weniger darauf an, ob die Regierung das Richtige tut oder nicht, sondern ob sie in der Lage ist, überhaupt etwas zu tun.

Zum Zusammenbruch des Zentrums kommt das wirtschaftliche „Tal der Tränen“ hinzu. Die Folgen der ökonomischen Talsohle sind schon unter relativ günstigen Bedingungen schmerzhaft, wie das polnische und besonders das ostdeutsche Beispiel zeigt; vollends unerträglich werden sie, wenn – wie im Fall der Sowjetunion – die zentralen Behörden gänzlich funktionsunfähig gewor-



Das letzte Aufbäumen des kommunistischen Regimes hat der britisch-polnische Fotograf Chris Niedenthal am 13. Dezember 1981 aufgenommen, jenem Tag, an dem in Polen das Kriegsrecht ausgerufen wurde. Es zeigt Soldaten und einen Panzer vor dem Warschauer Kino „Moskwa“, in dem gerade der Antikriegsfilm „Apocalypse now“ angelaufen war. Niedenthal hat für Newsweek, Time und Der Spiegel gearbeitet. Bekannt geworden ist er durch seine Fotoserien über das Leben mit und hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang.

den sind. Die wirtschaftliche Situation bewirkte eine Ernüchterung in Ungarn, der Tschechoslowakei und in den anderen Ländern, deren Lage irgendwo zwischen den Extremen einzuordnen ist. Es besteht die

Überall, wo Menschen Regeln aufstellen, nach denen sie leben, sind einige gleicher als andere

große Gefahr, daß die Menschen in all diesen Ländern zu der Überzeugung gelangen, Demokratie bedeute hohe Preise, eine hohe Arbeitslosenquote, niedrige Einkommen für die meisten und Spekulationsgewinne für einige wenige. Warum wählen, wenn das dabei herauskommt? Wozu überhaupt eine Demokratie?

Darüberhinaus gibt es die Wiederauferstehung des Stammesdenkens, also von archaischen Bindungen und Gefühlen. Der Kommunismus war unter anderem eine homogenisierende – manche würden sagen, eine modernisierende – Kraft. Jetzt, da er verschwunden ist, kommen ältere, nationale und religiöse Bande zum Vorschein. Da die Menschen kaum etwas haben, an das sie sich halten können und obendrein wenig zu essen, gehen sie Propheten auf den Leim, die ihre Köpfe und Herzen im Namen der Selbstbehauptung mit Haß gegen andere erfüllen.

Es ist durchaus möglich, den einen Weg vom Kommunismus zur Freiheit, von der Herrschaft der Nomenklatura zu den Institutionen der Demokratie vorzuzeichnen. Auch ist ein solcher Weg nicht die Ausgeburt einer Phantasiewelt, die es nie gegeben hat. Die Amerikanische Revolution hat diese Bezeichnung wahrscheinlich nicht verdient, aber sie ist ein großartiges Beispiel für die bewußte Schaffung einer freiheitlichen Verfassung.

Das Problem erfordert Mut, Glück und und ein klares Bewußtsein davon, in welche Richtung der Weg verlaufen soll. Politische Institutionen sind vergleichsweise schnell eingeführt, aber es dauert wesentlich länger, sie in den Köpfen und Herzen der Menschen zu verankern. Vermutlich muß erst der „Zwei-Wechsel-Test“ (Samuel Huntington) bestanden werden, bevor die Bevölkerung sich sicher fühlen kann, das heißt, es müssen mindestens zwei auf demokratische Weise zustandegekommene Regierungswechsel erfolgen. Die Rechtsstaatlichkeit wirft ihre eigenen schwierigen Fragen auf, insbesondere in Ländern, die ein korruptes System der Parteienherrschaft übernommen haben; doch die notwendigen Bedingungen lassen sich angeben. Eine Wirtschaftsreform mit dem Ziel einer marktorientierten Ordnung dauert länger. Sie ist, wie wir heute nur allzu deutlich sehen, mit technischen Schwierigkeiten verbunden. Allein die Reprivatisierung wirft eine Reihe von anfangs fast unüberwindlichen Schwierigkeiten auf. Und abgesehen von den technischen Problemen führt eine Wirtschaftsreform zwangsläufig durch jenes wirtschaftliche Jammertal, von dem ich bereits gesprochen habe. Die Preise steigen, die Löhne fallen, und die Arbeitslosenquote geht in die Höhe, bevor ein Reformprogramm zu greifen beginnt. Vier Jahre sind eine kurze Periode, um eine Wirtschaft aus der Talsohle herauszuführen. Dennoch kann es gelingen. Die politische wie die wirtschaftliche Reform müssen allerdings gleichermaßen in lebendigen *civil societies* verankert sein. Wenn das neue Deutschland auf einer zuverlässigen und demokratischen Tradition aufbauen kann, die über politische Institutionen und wirtschaftlichen Erfolg

hinausgeht, ist dies die bedeutsamste Leistung westdeutscher Entwicklungen seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Noch einmal: Das Beispiel zeigt, daß die Aufgabe zu meistern ist.

Außerdem gibt es äußere Bedingungen, die dazu beitragen, die Freiheit zu sichern. Ostdeutschland hatte die einmalige Chance, sich mit Westdeutschland zu einem demokratischen Ganzen zu vereinigen. Ein demokratisches vereintes Europa gibt es noch nicht und ist auch weniger vordringlich; sicherlich wird es nicht so großzügig sein können. Trotzdem, das glückliche Europa, dem wir angehören, existiert und übt eine gewisse magnetische Wirkung aus, auch wenn es seinen offensichtlichen Verpflichtungen nicht sehr überzeugend nachkommt.

Doch selbst wenn all dies eines Tages unter Dach und Fach ist, bleibt die wesentliche Schlußfolgerung bestehen. Die Revolution von 1989 hat gleich anderen Revolutionen vor ihr eine alte Ordnung erfolgreich beseitigt, die nicht mehr wiederkommen wird. Und die Revolution von 1989 mußte wie andere Revolutionen vor ihr all jene enttäuschen, die übertriebene Hoffnungen auf eine neue Welt der herrschaftsfreien Kommunikation, der Gleichheit und der Basisdemokratie in sie gesetzt hatten. Viele mögen in diesen beiden Ergebnissen einen Grund zur Freude oder jedenfalls nicht zu großer Besorgnis sehen. Doch gleich anderen, früheren Revolutionen macht auch die von 1989 den Weg zur Freiheit extrem riskant. Sie hat Bedingungen geschaffen, die erfolgreichen politischen Reformen, effizienten Wirtschaftsreformen und der soliden Errichtung von *civil societies* entgegenwirken. Die einzelnen Länder mögen die Hindernisse überwinden, doch es bleibt die schlichte Tatsache, daß Revolutionen einfach keine gute Voraussetzung für eine freiheitliche Verfassung sind. Das ist vielleicht keine besonders erhellende Feststellung, da Revolutionen sich erst dann ereignen, wenn die herrschenden Umstände sich so weit verschlechtert haben, daß eine revolutionäre Situation entsteht. Aber diese Feststellung erinnert uns an die Notwendigkeit strategischer Veränderungen zur rechten Zeit, mithin an die Notwendigkeit von Institutionen, die es ermöglichen, ohne Aufruhr oder gar Gewalt den politischen Kurs zu ändern und sogar Regierungen abzulösen. Revolutionen müssen scheitern, und deshalb ist es das oberste Gebot einer freiheitlichen Verfassung, zu gewährleisten, daß sie sich gar nicht erst ereignen müssen. ◀

Aus dem Englischen von Udo Rennert

Politics of the Borderland

BY FAISAL DEVJI

Pakistan should be seen not as a country situated in some geo-political space, but as a fringe area created by the overlapping jurisdictions of a number of spaces.



Alighiero Boetti: *Map*, 1989; Needlework, 127,8 x 231,7 cm; Museo di Arte Moderna e Contemporanea di Trento e Rovereto, Private Collection

While the international media routinely begins any analysis of regional politics in South Asia by referring to the history of warfare between India and Pakistan, now inevitably described as nuclear-armed rivals, their wars have in fact all been models of restraint. Border wars of a textbook kind fought outside civilian areas for the most part and full of instances of old-fashioned honour and respect among enemy soldiers, these conflicts are a far cry from the brutal operations conducted in urban areas that mark modern warfare in the world beyond. This kind of unregu-

prevent Indian Muslims from being victimized and so to clamp down on civil strife. And when Pakistan blames India's domestic enmities for the same attacks it is precisely to intensify internal conflict and evade responsibility for terrorism. The role played by civil strife is therefore crucial in accounting for the behaviour of both countries beyond the geo-political fantasies and war scenarios so beloved of the global press. Pakistan tends to be situated within one of two geo-political landscapes by scholars, journalists and policy-makers alike. In the first it is seen as a South Asian country whose pol-

overlapping jurisdictions of a number of such spaces.

We need only reflect upon the Pakistani army's master doctrine of "strategic depth" to realize how its own military strategy deprives the country of geo-political integrity.

According to this doctrine the country's geography can only sustain a narrow corridor of infrastructure, whether civilian or military, that is strung out along the Indus and its tributaries, and whose vulnerability to attack necessitates the drawing of Pakistan's strategic borders outside its political ones. What is important about this doctrine is not its truth or falsehood, nor even its ability to explain Pakistani actions in India and Afghanistan, but rather the fact that it divests the country of all integrity by rendering its already porous borders strategically irrelevant. Whatever social or economic unity it might possess, therefore, Pakistan does not exist as a country from the military point of view, which thus resolves it precisely into a borderland.

And in fact it is Pakistan rather than the old "buffer-zone" of Afghanistan that has served as the borderland of conflicts across the region as well as the globe. Whereas Afghanistan had in the past constituted a borderland for the imperial rivalry of the Mughals and Safavids or the "great game" of the British and Russians, Pakistan has in our own times formed a political borderland between the Americans and the Soviets or the Indians and the Chinese. But the country has not simply become the site of regional or global conflict as a proxy state. Having significantly outpaced its old enemy economically and politically, for instance, India is now in the curious position of

treating Pakistan as a problem internal to its rapidly expanding sphere of influence. This was made evident once the Asian giant had cemented alliances of one sort or another with all its smaller rival's neighbours, thus encapsulating Pakistan within what are in effect the economic and military borders of British India.

However all of this represents nothing more than the paradoxical fulfilment of Pakistan's doctrine of strategic depth, whose politics of supporting militancy in Kashmir and other parts of India had long ago made the country into an internal problem for its larger neighbour. In this sense Pakistan presents for India almost the same kind of problem as semi-autonomous tribal areas like Waziristan do for the Islamic republic, with both countries interested in preserving these enclaves and containing their fractious politics. But then much of what is today Pakistan had existed precisely as this sort of enclave within British India, a status to which it arguably returned after the violent separation of Bangladesh in 1971, following which Indian policy was dedicated to containing its enemy and even keeping it in place rather than risking the possibility of Pakistan's remaining portion dissolving into anarchy.

Even when Pakistan serves as a proxy for some other state or supplies the site for a war waged by outside forces on its territory, a double role it has played in two global conflicts already, as an American ally during the Cold War and the War on Terror, it does so in an unusual way. After an Islamic republic was established in Iran, for example, Pakistan quickly became an important ideological battlefield between the forces of Shiite revolution sponsored by Iran and those of the Sunni counter-revolution funded by Saudi Arabia. With the Iran-Iraq war another front was added to this battle that saw the emergence of sectarian militias and suicide bombings in Pakistan, from where such forms were introduced to the Middle East. Pakistan became the setting for sectarian struggle because it is the most important Sunni country in the world, with a large population at home and abroad, a skilled workforce, industrial capacity and a sophisticated elite, all of which made it into a significant site of Islamic ideological production.

Yet Pakistan, together with India, is also home to the only important Shiite elite outside Iran, one that

is instrumental in funding sectarian causes worldwide. So it is not surprising that Pakistan should have become the model of sectarian militancy throughout the Muslim world. Indeed this struggle sponsored by states like Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan itself can even be said to have given substance to both the recent wars in Afghanistan, whatever the Russians or Americans thought was happening there. Unlike Afghanistan, however, Pakistan has never been a mere proxy in such conflicts, since it is by no means weak in military or even economic terms, until recently enjoying a growth rate of eight percent despite its continuing political crisis. In fact Pakistan has been embroiled in these conflicts precisely because of its strengths, which include a professional army that has since colonial times been used around the region as a mercenary force, in our days rented out to countries like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait as much as it is to the United States.

While it is the true home of Islamic ideologies, militant as well as moderate, Pakistan is at the same time home to the most powerful civil society in the Muslim world. Indeed these two facts go together, which is why both secular and sectarian protesters were to be found among those demonstrating against military rule in that country during Pervez Musharraf's last days as President, and are today involved in movements for and against the Zadari government. Whether in its civilian or military incarnations, therefore, the state here does not resemble its Middle-Eastern equivalents, being unable even to survey Pakistani society let alone control it. For whatever the strength of its military, this state is a stunted one, which is exactly what one would expect in a borderland. And what we see happening in protests and bombings across the country now is the coming apart of Pakistan's vibrant if contentious civil society from its stunted state. ◀

*Pakistan does not exist
as a country from the
military point of view*

lated violence is in South Asia characteristic of domestic strife, whether among civilians or between them and the state, and has been so since colonial times. Even when instigated from abroad, therefore, such violence fits into or mimics internal forms of conflict, resulting in the rhetoric of a citizenship betrayed rather than the language of geopolitical enmity. In this sense even Pakistan-sponsored terrorism comes to be conceived as fundamentally domestic in nature, not only because of any support it might enjoy among Indian Muslims, but also by reason of the long and intimate history of shared relations that it invokes.

When India blames Pakistan for terrorist attacks it is partly to

itics is directed chiefly by a history of confrontation with India, which determines Pakistan's relations with everyone from China to the United States. And in the second it is viewed as a Muslim country whose relations with both allies and enemies are informed by Islamic solidarities that have become increasingly internationalized. In its South Asian landscape Pakistani politics is defined by reasons of state, while its politics as a Muslim country is informed by popular opinion. It is impossible to put together a "big picture" of the country's political life by combining these incommensurable visions. I would like to suggest instead that Pakistan should be seen not as a country situated in some geo-political space, but as a borderland created by the

Faisal Devji is Reader in Modern South Asian History at Oxford University. He is author of *Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity* (2005) and most recently of *The Terrorist in Search of Humanity. Militant Islam and Global Politics* (2008). Currently he is Visiting Fellow at the IWM.

Fellows and Guests

April–August 2009



Ashley Ahearn
Milena Jesenská
Visiting Fellow
(May–June 2009)

Producer / reporter,
Public Radio International,
Sommerville, USA

The European Greenbelt; From Iron Curtain to Green Corridor

The aim of my project is the compilation of an audio documentary on international conservation efforts along the route of the former Iron Curtain. During the Cold War, development stalled along this border, creating an accidental wilderness corridor. Efforts are underway to preserve parts of this area, while promoting eco-tourism and sustainable development as well. The Cold War destroyed transboundary relationships between Eastern and Western Europe, but now a shared commitment to conservation is bringing people together once again. I plan to look at the successes and challenges of the proposed "European Greenbelt" and how nature might heal the scars of war.



Margherita Angelini
Guest (July–August 2009)

Research Fellow,
University of Siena

Past Progressive: Shaping "Contemporary" Histories in Italy and Germany (1950s–1980s)

The aim of my research project is to analyse the evolution and the shaping of "contemporary" history in Italy and Germany, comparing these two countries within the European and non-European contexts. In particular I deal with Austria as a case study. In the analysis of the simultaneous passage of historians to "contemporary" history it is important to understand what the cultural transitions as well as the political meanings were, which helped in the shaping of recent pasts as history. It is equally vital to understand how divided as well as common memory influenced the conception of Europe's history.



Zoltan Andras Ban
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow
(July–December 2009)

Freier Übersetzer,
Budapest

Hannah Arendt: Rahel Varnhagen. Eine Lebensgeschichte / Rahel Varnhagen. The Life of a Jewess (German/English > Hungarian)

Mit der Biographie Rahel Varnhagens, einer der bedeutendsten Frauen der ausgehenden Goethezeit, ist der Philosophin Hannah Arendt zugleich ein herausragendes Stück Geschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts und eine Analyse des Doppelgesichts der jüdischen Assimilation gelungen. Bislang liegt keine ungarische Übersetzung dieses Buches von Arendt vor.



Michal Biletzki
Junior Visiting Fellow
(January–June 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Political
Science, Boston University

They Shoot Citizens, Don't They? The Case of Palestinian Citizens of Israel

I will investigate the development of the citizenship status of the Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCI) in terms of their equality with regard to both state actions and state distribution of justice. Furthermore, an attempt will be made to expose the inherent deficiencies of the term "citizenship." The misuse of this term in the Israeli case may shed light on other such misuses throughout the world's nation-states. An understanding of the unpredictable meta-morphosis undergone by the status of citizenship of the PCI and their treatment by the state may lead to a better understanding of their future prospects in Israel along with a realization of the type of state Israel actually is.



Lisa Bjurwald
Milena Jesenská
Visiting Fellow
(July–September 2009)

Editorial and opinion
writer, *Dagens Nyheter*,
Stockholm

The Women in Europe's Extreme Right

I am going to continue my research on women in the extreme right. In June 2009 I published a book entitled "God dag kampsyster!", focusing on Sweden, and will now broaden the horizons to Europe. In short, I will look at how and why organized racist groups and networks specifically target European women, and examine the impact of this new strategy on the extreme right movement as a whole.



Christine Blättler
Lise Meitner Visiting Fellow
(August 2009–July 2011)

Lecturer in Philosophy,
University of Potsdam

The Phantasmagoria as a Focus of Modernity: On Genealogy and Function of a Cultural-Philosophical Concept

The phantasmagoria has been called the visual master-trope of the nineteenth century. In the Arcades Project Walter Benjamin placed it at the junction of epistemology and aesthetics, philosophy of history and economy, technology, media and politics. Following Benjamins suggestion the philosophical relevance of the phantasmagoria will be explored historically and systematically, highlighting its specifically modern intertwining of enchantment and disenchantment.



Shelby Carpenter
Junior Visiting Fellow
(January–June 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in
Sociocultural Anthropology,
Boston University

Envisioning Trust: A Study of "Cultural Bereavement" in Sierra Leone and The Gambia

My dissertation asks how trust is established after war, and how Sierra Leoneans cope in their everyday lives both as urban dwellers in Freetown and as international refugees in The Gambia. As Africa undergoes rapid social change as a result of war and political instability, I argue that at times, solutions are found in the most unlikely of places. My findings are the result of 22 months of field research on mental health, social healing, performance, and civil society issues in West Africa.



Faisal Devji
Visiting Fellow
(May–September 2009)

Reader in Modern South
Asian History, Oxford
University

Muslim Zion: Jinnah and the Making of Pakistan

My project deals with the rise to power of the world's first Muslim political party, the All-India Muslim League, which, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, created the world's first Muslim state: Pakistan. While it is a commonplace to attribute the rise of political Islam to clerics and conservative Muslims disgruntled by modernity, I will argue that the roots of political Islam are liberal and secular. Indeed, the creation of Pakistan as a Muslim homeland, like that of its historical twin Israel as a Jewish homeland, represents the emergence of a post-Enlightenment religious modernity in the middle of the twentieth century.



Jan Frei
Guest (July–August 2009)

Research associate, Jan Patočka Archive Prague; Postgraduate student of Philosophy, University of Prague

Bewegung der Existenz bei Jan Patočka

Mein Dissertationsprojekt befasst sich mit Patočkas Konzeption der Lebensbewegungen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt in der dritten der drei Bewegungen (der des Durchbruchs, der Wahrheit oder der Existenz), die der existenzphilosophischen Auffassung der authentischen Existenz nahe steht. Ich will daher versuchen, die Konzeption Patočkas mit entsprechenden Teilen der Philosophie von Karl Jaspers zu vergleichen und aufzeigen, dass sie eine spezifische Gestalt des existentiellen Denkens darstellt.



Sándor Horváth
Andrew W. Mellon
Visiting Fellow
(July–September 2009)

Researcher at the Institute
of History, Hungarian
Academy of Sciences,
Budapest

Youth Movements and Divided Memories: Perception of the "West" and Youth Subcultures in the 1960s

I will investigate the patterns of identity formation of young people in the West and in the East. The process of constructing identities was shaped primarily by the "official discourse" about the "youth question," the so-called "generation gap" and not at least by the differentiation of Eastern and Western patterns of behavior.



Yaroslav Hrytsak
Visiting Fellow
(February–September 2009)

Director of the Institute for
Historical Research, Lviv
University; Professor of
History, Ukrainian Catholic
University, Lviv; Recurrent
Visiting Professor, CEU,
Budapest

Historical Memory Between Conflict, Ambivalence, and Reconciliation: The Case of Ukraine, 1989–2009

The project deals with the transformation of historical memory in Ukraine since the collapse of communism. In contrast to other similar projects, it shifts the focus from sharp political and public debates on history – which have been sufficiently analyzed – to their social perceptions that are largely underestimated and characterized by polyvalence. Such a shift helps to reveal the ways in which a divided society can cope with its traumatic memories and suggests interesting comparisons and generalizations.



Kristof Jacobs
Guest (August 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in
Political Science, Radboud
University of Nijmegen

Who is Behind the Steering Wheel? Democratic Reforms in Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands

In my dissertation I will study democratic reforms, specifically changes in local and national electoral, participatory and referendum legislation in Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria. The focus is on the period from 1987 onwards; the aim of the Ph.D. is to examine how changes since then can be explained. Therefore I will examine the role of political parties, ideological concerns and public demands for such changes.



Ivan Krastev
Visiting Fellow
(June–December 2009)

Chair of the Board,
Centre for Liberal
Strategies, Sofia

The BRIC-Hiker's Guide to the New World Order

The multipolar world has arrived. But a rarely-discussed outcome of the ongoing shift of power and wealth from West to East is that the US and the EU have lost their ability unilaterally to shape the global agenda. The key issue will be how to make the new multipolar world governable. The political rise of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) means that certain ideas and discourses, which were considered as marginal and policy-irrelevant by western observers yesterday, are today becoming critically important. The project is an attempt to re-perceive the world we are living in.



Ivan Landa
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow
(January–June 2009)

Übersetzer und wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter am Philosophischen Institut der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Prag

G. W. F. Hegel: Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (German > Czech)

Die Bedeutung der „Vorlesungen“ liegt vor allem darin, dass in ihnen die Philosophie der Religion als philosophische Theologie verstanden ist, d. h. verschiedene Religionen im Zusammenhang mit der Frage nach der Denkbarkeit Gottes betrachtet werden. Hegels Interpretation des „Todes Gottes“, sein Versuch, die Trinitätslehre mit der Theorie der Subjektivität zusammenzufügen und die Deutung des Verhältnisses zwischen Glaube und Vernunft sind auch für gegenwärtige Diskussionen in der philosophischen Theologie relevant. Die Übersetzung wird das Werk erstmals auf Tschechisch zugänglich machen, und dazu beitragen, die Hegel-Forschung in der Tschechischen Republik zu vertiefen.

Fellows and Guests

April–August 2009



Sandra Lehmann
Visiting Fellow (September 2008–July 2009)

Habilitandin (Philosophie),
ÖAW APART-Stipendiatin

Grundlagen einer Ontologie aus dem Glauben

Ich befasse mich mit dem Wirklichkeitsbegriff im Kontext der philosophischen Moderne. Dabei liegt mein Augenmerk auf dem, was man den „Prozess moderner kritischer Selbsterschöpfung“ nennen könnte. In seinem Verlauf schlägt der dem modernen Wirklichkeitsbegriff eigene emanzipatorische Impuls, der auf „Verwirklichung“ im Sinne einer humanen Gestaltung von Welt zielt, in diverse Diskurse des Wirklichkeitsverlusts um. Gegen diese Diskurse versuche ich zu einer neuen Fundierung der Rede von Wirklichkeit zu kommen. Ich setze hierzu bei der vorprädikativen Relation des Menschen zur Welt, beim so genannten „Wirklichkeitsglauben“ an, den ich systematisch auslege, wobei ich einen utopischen Fluchtpunkt für ihn annehme.



Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow (March 2008–February 2011)

Lecturer in Philosophy,
University of Paderborn;
FWF-project leader

The Symbolic Power of Biology: Articulations of Biological Knowledge in „Naturphilosophie“ around 1800

Biology, established around 1800 as the „science of life,” not only developed in modernity as a specific scientific discipline, but also continually served as a kind of social knowledge. The proposed research project will start from and explore the thesis that the re-configuration of philosophy at the beginning of modernity is crucial for the status that biological knowledge gained in the modern order of knowledge. The research project focuses on the writings in Naturphilosophie by Kant, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer.



Andreea Maierian
Junior Visiting Fellow (July–December 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Political
Science, Boston University

A Comparative Study of Lustration in Central and Eastern Europe

My Ph.D. project contributes to the academic focusing on the role of lustration in Central and Eastern Europe. In the context of post-communist transitions, the lustration laws are the legal instruments that authorize government action in screening procedures of candidates for high positions in the state. Such laws are a key feature of how the new democracies addressed the question of transitional justice and thus represent a fundamental problem in the literature on democratization. In order to explore the various models of the lustration laws, I will focus on the cases of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Poland.



Jacek Maj
Milena Jesenská
Visiting Fellow (July–September 2009)

Freelance Journalist,
Krakow

Anti-Semitism and the Catholic Church in Poland: The Case of Father Stanislaw Musial SJ

According to Father Stanislaw Musial SJ (1938–2004), who was a pioneer of inter-religious dialogue in Poland and one of the most important figures in the Christian-Jewish dialogue since World War II, anti-Semitism is a Christian disease that Jews die of. Father Musial showed that the centuries old disdain for the Jew's difference and foreignness, sanctioned by the law, left enduring prejudices that can be easily fomented and steered by hatred even today. He had the courage to remind people that there would have been no racist or criminal ideologies if it weren't for the Christian „teaching of contempt.”



Brian Marrin
Junior Visiting Fellow (July–December 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in
Philosophy, Boston
University

Can There Be a Politics of Nature?

Few today would deny the connection between our thinking about the political world and the natural. Our attitudes to the one influence our approach to the other and vice versa. I want to attempt to conceptualize this relation on the level of philosophical analysis through a study of these themes in Plato, whose dialogues suggest an understanding of this mutual interaction without artificially separating or subsuming either term under the other. Ultimately I wish to explore how this relation bears on our understanding of the human being as standing at the intersection of the natural and the political.



Jyoti Mistry
Visiting Fellow (August–October 2009)

Professor of Film and
Television, Wits School of
Arts, University of the
Witwatersrand, South
Africa

Documentary „4 CITIES: Johannesburg, Helsinki, Vienna, New York City”

Cities hold a fascination because they are implicitly about promise. They offer the key to our ambitions, hopes and dreams. But cities also have a secret underbelly of loneliness, alienation and failed dreams. Somewhere between this euphoria of possibilities and soured dreams lie the stories of how people survive or do not survive these spaces. Using four very different cities that represent diverse geographies this documentary series brings together a collection of intimate stories, experiences and reflections of how cities on the one hand exude a particular image and promise and, on the other hand harbor a more mysterious side that is revealed after a slow, long-term relationship.



Paulina Napierala
Józef Tischner
Junior Visiting Fellow (July–December 2009)

Ph.D. candidate in Political
Science, Jagiellonian
University, Krakow

Polish and American Religious Right Movements in the Perspective of Secularization and De-privatization of Religion Theories.

The aim of my research project is to compare religious right movements in the USA and in Poland. I will try to examine the processes which lead to the creation of these movements, placing my analysis in a broader sociological perspective. I will also analyze similarities in both movements' activities, agendas, rhetoric, structures and methods. The case of Poland will be placed in a European perspective and the research will aim at explaining why the religious processes in Poland resemble those in the USA more than those in Western Europe.



Beatrix Novy
Guest (April 2009)

Rundfunkjournalistin und
Publizistin, Köln

Wien ist anders!? Zuwanderungsprozesse und Handlungsansätze sozialräumlicher Integration in der Immigrationsstadt Wien

Wie jede Metropole sieht sich Wien mit der Frage konfrontiert, wie negative Folgen anhaltender Zuwanderung, z. B. sozial-räumliche Segregation, verhindert werden können. Dabei stehen sich zwei Diskurse gegenüber: Wien hält sich für erfolgreich im Umgang mit einer zunehmend heterogenen Bevölkerung. Auf der anderen Seite mehren sich Stimmen, denen zufolge gescheiterte Integration ein Schlüsselproblem geworden ist. Dieser Gegensatz und die Tradition einer multikulturellen Weltstadt bilden den Hintergrund des Projekts, das den Zustand des heutigen Wien als Integrationsstadt und die kommunalpolitischen Strategien untersucht.



Damiana Gabriela Otoiu
Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow (January–June 2009)

Assistant Professor of
Political Science, Bucharest
University

„We Shouldn't Sell Our Country!” Property and Identity Politics in Post-socialist Romania

The aim of this research project is to explore the reconstitution of private property in post-socialist Romania through the investigation of policies concerning Jewish properties. I intend it to be an illustrative case, which may foster wider reflection on how the process of reprivatisation has been intersected with „identity politics” and with „ethno-national” political discourses and projects.



Catharine Richert
Milena Jesenská
Visiting Fellow (April 2009)

Reporter, *Congressional Quarterly*, Washington, D.C.

When It Comes to Biofuels, the European Union is Going Through Some Growing Pains

The EU has enjoyed a booming biofuels market in recent years. But as food prices rise and experts speculate on the environmental value of these fuels, EU officials are questioning their initial plan to increase transportation biofuels. Thus the EU has proposed banning imports of biofuels made from crops grown on environmentally sensitive land, and the Commission is seeking to establish its own criteria for what it means to make a „green” fuel. My project will explore how these changes will impact on the EU's trade relations with the USA and other countries. Are these new rules really a way to keep profits from biofuel production local? Can they improve the environmental value of alternative energy?



Carlin Romano
Milena Jesenská
Visiting Fellow (May–July 2009)

Literary Critic, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*; Critic-at-Large, *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, Washington, D.C.; Lecturer of Media Theory and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania; Fellow at the New York Institute for the Humanities, New York

European Intellectuals and Anti-Americanism

A cliché of recent times in the USA is that Europe's intellectuals and its professional classes are awash in anti-Americanism. Is that true? What constitutes „anti-Americanism?” Is it stoked by intellectuals, or do they mainly reflect it? Are the issues „philosophical,” or best described as matters of policy? What difference will the election of Barack Obama make to the phenomenon? I plan to explore these questions.



Amelie Rorty
Guest (August 2009)

Professor of Philosophy,
Harvard University

On the Other Hand: The Ethics of Ambivalence

Despite its shortcomings, some forms of ambivalence are appropriate, morally and politically worth preserving. Even when choice seems inescapable, considerations for rejected alternatives should remain in the space of action-guiding reasons and values. The skills of maintaining appropriate ambivalence reveal the constitutive function of imaginative thinking in robust practical reasoning. They are among the civic virtues exercised in reflective equilibrium.



Marci Shore
Visiting Fellow (August 2009–August 2010)

Assistant Professor of
History, Yale University

The Self Laid Bare: Phenomenology, Structuralism, and other Cosmopolitan Encounters

This is a project about Central European modernism, which examines encounters among intellectuals occasioned by phenomenology and linguistic structuralism. I begin with the Vienna-based Brentanoschule of the 1870s and 1880s and continue through the phenomenological influence on dissident intellectuals of the 1970s and 1980s. The book is envisioned as an intellectual portrait of Central Europe grappling with modernity and will explore why phenomenology „took hold” in Central Europe; why certain ideas generated at the *fin-de-siècle* proved peculiarly compelling throughout the whole of the dramatic 20th century.



Pawel Sowinski
Andrew W. Mellon
Visiting Fellow (July–September 2009)

Assistant Professor of
History, Polish Academy of
Sciences, Warsaw

Polish Illicit Publications during the Communist Era from an International Viewpoint

The project deals with the so called samizdat publications that were issued by opposition groups in Eastern Europe in communist times. Books and newspapers of this kind helped to create pro-democratic movements in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and East Germany. In this way samizdat made a contribution to the fall of East European communism in 1989. The main objective of my research is to compare Polish samizdat with illegal publications in other communist countries.

Fellows and Guests



Michael Staudigl
Visiting Fellow (November 2007–October 2010)

Head of Research, FWF; Lecturer, University of Vienna

The Many Faces of Violence: Toward an Integrative Phenomenological Conception

Events of extreme violence (suicide attacks, the return of a new archaic violence, etc.) have renewed attention about physical violence, and there has also been a reappearance of interest in social, cultural and structural violence. However, while all these forms of violence have been widely investigated, interdisciplinary research still lacks a unifying approach. We miss a paradigm to address these forms as aspects of one phenomenon. My project uses the phenomenological method to resolve this deficit and elaborate an integrative conception of violence.



Vera Stojarova
Andrew W. Mellon Visiting Fellow (August–October 2009)

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Masaryk University, Brno

The Far Right in the Balkan Politics. A Comparative Study

The aim of this research project is a publication which offers a comparative study of the far right political parties and movements in the area of the Balkans, focusing on those political parties and movements that propagate nationalism, xenophobia, law and order and welfare chauvinism. The study will give an overview of the political situation in all Balkan states but will put special emphasis on the far-right in Bosnia and Herzegovina.



Ferenc Szijj
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (January–June 2009)

Freier Übersetzer und Schriftsteller, Budapest

Hannah Arendt / Martin Heidegger: Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse (German > Hungarian)

Der Briefwechsel von Hannah Arendt und Martin Heidegger ist ein wichtiges zeitgeschichtliches Dokument aus den 1920–30er, sowie den 1950–70er Jahren und trägt zum besseren Verständnis der Persönlichkeit der beiden Philosophen bei. Diese Briefe einer Liebesbeziehung und Freundschaft helfen den psychologischen und geschichtlichen Hintergrund zweier unterschiedlicher und in einigen Aspekten trotzdem verwandter Denkweisen nachzuzeichnen. Die Übersetzung des Briefwechsels wird die in den letzten Jahren belebte Arendt- und die schon längere Zeit andauernde Heidegger-Rezeption in Ungarn ergänzen.



Barbara Thériault
Guest (July–August 2009)

Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Montreal

The “Carriers of Diversity” within the Police Forces in Germany: A Weberian Approach to Diversity

The aim of my research project is to investigate the ways “diversity” is dealt within the civil service in Germany, a country often described as hostile to difference. I do so from the standpoint of police officers who contributed – through their work in recruiting, counselling, and educating – to bringing about change within the organization. Paying particular attention to the officers’ motives, the consequences of their action, and their destiny, I converse with Max Weber on sociology and its limits.



Andras Vari
Robert Bosch Visiting Fellow (January–June 2009)

Associate Professor of History, University of Miskolc

Cross-currents: Ideological Reactions to the First Phase of Globalization in England, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Its Successors, 1873–1929

This project studies anti-modern reactions of societies. It compares different reactions to the first wave of globalization – the trade cycles and the crises of agriculture from the 1870s. These anti-modern reactions were wider based than conservative movements and gained particular strength by combining representations of economic interest with highly ideological issues and by letting social groups redefine their roles.

Travels and Talks

Cornelia Klinger
Permanent Fellow

Teilnahme am Workshop „Anerkennung zwischen Ungleichen?“ bei der Tagung der Studienstiftung Differenz und Dialog. *Anerkennung als Strategie der Konfliktbewältigung?* im Wannseeforum, Berlin (6. April)

Teilnahme an der Podiumsdiskussion zum Thema „Zwischen Elfenbeinturm und Empowerment: Kulturwissenschaften und die Herausforderungen der Gegenwart“ am Institut für Kulturwissenschaften und Theatergeschichte der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien (7. Mai)

Vortrag „Kapitalismus der Bilder. Tiefenstrukturen einer Oberfläche“ im Rahmen der Ringvorlesung *Kapitalistischer Realismus. Ethik, Ästhetik und Ökonomie in der Gesellschaft der Gegenwart* an der Universität Wien (28. Mai)

Vortrag „Selbstbildnisse in entfernter Natur. Zur Konstituierung von Subjekt und Geschlecht im Spiegel der Landschaft“ bei der Tagung *Landschaft, Gehäuser, Orientierung. Territorialisierungs- und Naturalisierungsprozesse in Stadt, Wohnen, Körper* an der Universität Bremen (5. Juni)

Moderation der Enquête „Frauen und Professur – strategische Konzepte für Universitäten im internationalen Vergleich“ des Bundesministeriums für Wissenschaft und Forschung, Wien (9. Juni)

Vortrag „Die Ordnung der Geschlechter und der Prozess der Moderne“ in der Reihe *Kolloquium zur Philosophie* der Universität Paderborn (18. Juni)

Seminar „Die großen Dualismenbildungen im abendländischen Denken I: Kultur – Natur“ am philosophischen Seminar der Universität Tübingen (25.–27. Juni).

Sandra Lehmann
Visiting Fellow

Vortrag „Das Gute als Grenze der Transzendenz“ bei der Tagung *Phänomenologie der Transzendenz* fahrungen, Otterthaler Gespräche (16.–18. April)

Teilnahme an der Session „Patočka’s Reflections on History“, Workshop zur Philosophie Jan Patočkas am Center for Theoretical Study, Prag (4./5. Mai)

Teilnahme an der Session „Some Basic Remarks on the Impossibility of Commitment“, Konferenz *On Commitment and Becoming Committed* am Karman Center for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, Universität Bern (1.–3. Juni)

Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow

Vortrag „Reproduktion – Vererbung – Rasse. Kant und der moderne Rassen-diskurs“, *Kolloquium zur Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften* an der Universität Braunschweig (4. April)

Habilitationsvortrag „Globalität, Naturwissen und Philosophie“ an der Universität Paderborn (19. Juni)

Moderation der Buch-präsentation „Film Avantgarde Biopolitik“ an der Akademie der Bildenden Künste, Wien (25. Juni)

Damiana Gabriela Otoiu
Robert Bosch Junior Visiting Fellow

Chair of the session “Nationalism and Socialism – Ideological Conjunctions” at the conference *Cultural and Political Developments during the Socialist Regimes of Central and Eastern Europe*, Political Science Department, Bucharest University (April 24–26)

Participation in the 5th conference of the International Association for South-East European Anthropology, *Migrations in, from, and to Southeastern Europe: Social Changes, Intercultural Communication, Transnational Ties*, Ankara, Hacettepe University (May 21–24)
> **Lecture** “Ils doivent connaître leurs racines... ‘Le ‘tourisme généalogique’ à Bucarest (Roumanie)”
> **Chair** of the session “Integration of Co-National Migrants”

Participation in expert sessions on “Immovable Property (Private and Communal)” at the *Holocaust – Era Assets Conference*, Prague (June 26–30)

Birgit Sauer
QUING Project

Vortrag „Feministische Perspektiven auf den Wandel von Staatlichkeit und Ökonomie“ (gemeinsam mit Stefanie Wöhl) auf der Tagung *Kapitalismustheorien* der Sektion Politik und Ökonomie der DVPW, Wien (23.–25. April)

Teilnahme an der Podiumsdiskussion „Die Qualität der österreichischen Demokratie – Befunde und Reformperspektiven“ am Symposium *Die Qualität der österreichischen Demokratie – Befunde und Reformperspektiven*, Wien (14. Mai)

Vortrag: „Governing Difference: Issues and Challenges“ (gemeinsam mit Jürgen Wallner) auf der Konferenz *Governing Difference. A Challenge for New Democracies in Central and South Eastern Europe*, Universität Wien (15. Juni)

Michael Staudigl
Visiting Fellow

Vortrag „Gewalt – Transzendenzverlust, Transzendenzverrat und die Möglichkeit einer Wiederaneignung der Transzendenz“ bei der Tagung *Phänomenologie der Transzendenz* fahrungen, Otterthaler Gespräche (16.–18. April)

Vortrag „Gewalt als Zerstörung von Sinn und die Ambivalenz der Transzendenz“ an der Slowakischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bratislava (24. April)

Karin Tertinegg
QUING Project

Teilnahme an der Enquête „Die Macht der Werbebilder – Diskriminierung von Frauen in der Werbung“ im Österreichischen Nationalrat (19. Juni)

Teilnahme am Open Space „Maßnahmen zur Gleichstellung von Männern und Frauen am Arbeitsmarkt“, veranstaltet von der Bundesministerin für Frauen, Urania Wien (24. Juni)

Andras Vari
Robert Bosch Visiting Fellow

Commentator at the workshop “Contested Countryside. Aristocracy and Farmers, Town and Countryside in the 18th and 19th Centuries” Wageningen, Netherlands (June 26)

Vortrag „Landwirtschaft, Agrargesellschaft und die Moderne: österreichisch-ungarische Vergleiche – 1873–1914“ am Institut für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Universität Wien (4. Juni)

Teilnahme an der Konferenz *Agrarismus in Ostmitteleuropa – Bauerngesellschaften auf dem Weg in die Moderne* des Johann-Gottfried-Herder-Forschungsrats und der Forschungsstelle für Ostmitteleuropäische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte, Frankfurt/Oder (16.–19. April)
> **Moderation** der Sektion „Panslawismus zum Dritten Weg“ (16. April)

Varia

In June, **Susanne Lettow** and former Visiting Fellow **Dirk Rupnow** both defended successfully their postdoctoral thesis. Susanne Lettow got her lecture qualification in Philosophy at the University of Paderborn, Dirk Rupnow in History at Vienna University – Congratulations!

The **22nd European Meeting of Cultural Journals**, jointly organized by *Eurozine* and Kulturos barai, was held in Vilnius from 8 to 11 May 2009. More than eighty magazine editors met in the Lithuanian capital to discuss the topic of “European Histories.” In his keynote speech **Timothy Snyder**, Professor of History at Yale University and IWM Permanent Fellow, presented a re-interpretation of the European 20th-century experience of mass killing putting into question the established historical consensus, which reduces war and post-war memory to “Auschwitz” and “the Gulag.” The speech will be published in *Transit* 38. **Marci Shore**, IWM Visiting Fellow 2009, contributed to the panel “Jewish Life and Thought in Eastern Europe.”

Andrea Roedig, previously in charge of the IWM public relations, left the institute in July. In addition to writing and editing texts, publishing events and organising interviews, she has also created a new and fresh look for the Institute’s publications, such as this newsletter. Many thanks and our best wishes for the future. Her colleague Sven Hartwig is now responsible for the IWM’s public relations.

Kurz vor Redaktionsschluss erreichte uns die Nachricht vom Tod des polnischen Philosophen **Leszek Kolakowski**. Er war ein Freund des Instituts und Mitglied des wissenschaftlichen Beirats des IWM. Wir sind tief betroffen. Mehr zur Würdigung dieses außerordentlichen Denkers finden Sie in der nächsten IWMpost und auf unserer website: www.iwm.at

„Anfang der achtziger Jahre habe ich – damals noch Assistent an der Universität Warschau – die Robert-Bosch-Stiftung in Stuttgart aufgesucht, um sie zu überzeugen, mir Geld für die Gründung des IWM in Wien zu geben. Rüdiger Stephan, zu der Zeit für die Völkerverständigung bei der Stiftung zuständig, und **Peter Payer**, der damalige Generalsekretär, haben mich empfangen, mehrere Stunden mit mir geredet – und mir das Geld gegeben! Eine von Natur aus vorsichtige, schwäbische Stiftung! Das war der Anfang einer bis heute dauernden freundschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit beider Institutionen. Jetzt ist Peter Payer verstorben. Wir werden ihn immer in dankbarer Erinnerung behalten.“
Krzysztof Michalski

Publications of Fellows and Guests

Cornelia Klinger
Permanent Fellow

**GAPS. Über alte und neue
Polarisierungstendenzen in
Kultur und Gesellschaft,**
Herbert Willems (Hg.),
*Theatralisierung der Gesell-
schaft. Band 2: Medienthea-
tralität und Medientheatra-
lisierung*, Wiesbaden:
vs Verlag, 2009

Boyan Manchev
*Robert Bosch Junior Visiting
Fellow (from August 2008
to January 2009)*

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Pour une esthétique
radicale**, Fécamp:
Nouvelles Editions Lignes,
2009

Krzysztof Michalski
Permanent Fellow

**The Deeper Sources
of Morality** (Źródła
moralności biją głębiej),
in: *Gazeta Wyborcza*
(May 9/10, 2009)

Holy Man in Flames
(Święty w płwmieniach),
in: *Gazeta Wyborcza*,
addendum at the occasion
of the 9th Tischner Days
(April 22–25, 2009)

Damiana Gabriela Otoi
*Robert Bosch Junior
Visiting Fellow*

**Négocier la (re)consti-
tution de la propriété
privée en Roumanie
postsocialiste. (Nouveaux)
acteurs, (anciennes)
stratégies**, in: *Options
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Grèce,” 2009

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modèle soviétique et le
spectacle de l'autonomie**,
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Amelie Rorty
Guest

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tan Aim** (edited with James
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Birgit Sauer
QUING Project

**Islam im öffentlichen
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Religion**, in: *Comparative
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**Gleichstellungspolitik,
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Institutionelle und
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Theoretisierung von
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Timothy Snyder
Permanent Fellow

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(June 26, 2009)

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Visiting Fellow

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Zur Kritik des Politischen
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Andras Vari
Robert Bosch Visitng Fellow

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2009



Transit 37 (Sommer 2009),
Politik der Vielfalt

„In Vielfalt geeint“ heißt
das Motto der Europäi-
schen Union. Es symboli-
siert ein Programm, das
mit einer Diversität kon-
frontiert ist, die ungleich
komplexer ist als die
schlichte Vielfalt nationaler
Kulturen. Womit sich
die Vereinigten Staaten
schmücken, will Europa
aber immer noch nicht
wahrhaben: dass es längst
ein Einwanderungskonti-

nent ist. Zumindest scheint
Europa vergessen zu haben,
dass es eine Jahrhunderte
lange Geschichte innerer
Arbeitsmigration hat. Es ist
eine Geschichte, in der
ethnische Gruppen, die
heute zum Kernbestand des
Alten Kontinents gehören,
Gewalt und Hass ausgesetzt
waren. Vielleicht wäre es
hilfreich, wenn die
Europäer sich heute daran
erinnerten, wie sie ihre
Ressentiments überwunden
haben. Der Schwerpunkt
dieses Heftes beschäftigt
sich mit den Antworten der
Politik auf die wachsende
Vielfalt unserer Gesell-
schaften.

Mit Beiträgen von
Henryka Krzywonos, Alan
Wolfe, Kenneth Prewitt,
Robert C. Lieberman,
Heinz Bude, Beatrix Novy,
Claus Leggewie, Timothy
Snyder.

Außerdem: Krzysztof
Pomian schreibt über
europäische Identität,
Jacques Rupnik zum Ende
des Wirtschaftsliberalismus
in Europa, Jan-Werner
Müller über Christdemo-
kratie als Modell für
muslimische Demokratie
und Ivan Chvatik über das
Prager Jan Patočka Archiv.

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Andreas Elpidorou, Lauren
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Vienna 2009

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Sean Dempsey/David
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Memory, and Cultural
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Respect for Religion

BY TARIQ MODOOD

Pluralism in faith is compatible with and may be a requirement of a democratic political culture.

Religion continues to be uniquely held by some to be an aspect of social life that must be kept separate from at least the state, maybe from politics in general and perhaps even from public affairs at large, including the conversations that citizens have amongst themselves about their society. This religion-politics separationist view, which is clearly normative rather than scientific, can take quite different forms, either as an idea or as practice and can be more or less restrictive, I shall call “secularism.” While acknowledging the variety of forms it can take, I want to argue that one of the most important distinctions we need to make is between moderate and radical secularism. The failure to make this distinction is not just bad theory or bad social science but can lead to prejudicial, intolerant and exclusionary politics. I am particularly concerned with the prejudice and exclusion in relation to recently settled Muslims in Britain and the rest of western Europe but the points I wish to make have much more general application.

In the following I argue firstly at an abstract level that it does not make sense to insist on absolute separation, though of course it’s a possible interpretation of secularism. Secondly I maintain that radical separation does not make sense in terms of historical actuality and contemporary adjustments. Thirdly, given that secularism does not necessarily mean the absence of state-religion connections, I would like to make a case for respect for religion as one of the values that citizens and a democratic state may choose to endorse. This may be a limiting case for secularism but is I think consistent with the norms and goals of a secular polity.

If secularism is a doctrine of separation then we need to distinguish between modes of separation. Two modes of activity are separate when they have no connection with each other (absolute separation); but activities can still be distinct from each other even though there may be points of overlap (relative separation). The person who denies politics and religion are absolutely separate can still allow for relative separation. For example, in contemporary Islam there are ideological arguments for the absolute subordination of politics to religious leaders, as say propounded by the Ayatollah Khomeini in his concept of the *vilayat-i-faqih*, but this is not mainstream Islam. Historically, Islam has been given a certain official



Photo: Andrea Reelg

status and preeminence in states in which Muslims ruled (just as Christianity or a particular Christian denomination had preeminence where Christians ruled). In these states Is-

by saints or spiritual leaders. Moreover, rulers had a duty to protect minorities. Similarly, while there have been Christians who have believed in or practiced theocratic rule (eg.

Religion is a fundamental good and part of our humanity

lam was the basis of state ceremonies and insignia, and public hostility against Islam was a punishable offence (sometimes a capital offence). Islam was the basis of jurisprudence but not positive law. The state – legislation, decrees, law enforcement, taxation, military power, foreign policy, and so on – were all regarded as the prerogative of the ruler(s), of political power, which was regarded as having its own imperatives, skills, etc., and was rarely held

Calvin in Geneva) this is not mainstream Christianity, at least not for some centuries.

Just as it is possible to distinguish between theocracy and mainstream Islam, and theocracy and modern Christianity, so it is possible to distinguish between radical or ideological secularism, which argues for an absolute separation between state and religion, and the moderate forms that exist where secularism has become

the order of the day, particularly Western Europe, with the partial exception of France. In nearly all of Western Europe there are points of symbolic, institutional, policy, and fiscal linkages between the state and aspects of Christianity. Secularism has increasingly grown in power and scope, but a historically evolved and evolving compromise with religion is the defining feature of Western European secularism, rather than the absolute separation of religion and politics. Secularism does today enjoy a hegemony in Western Europe, but it is a moderate rather than a radical, a pragmatic rather than an ideological, secularism.

Having established at an abstract level that mutual autonomy does not require separation I would like to take further the point that while separation of religion and state/politics is a possible interpretation of secularism, it does not make sense in terms of historical actuality and contemporary adjustments. Rajeev Bhargava argues that “in a secular state, a formal or legal union or alliance between state and religion is impermissible” and

that “for mainstream western secularism, separation means mutual exclusion” (Bhargava 2008: 88 and 103 respectively). What does he mean by “mainstream western secularism?” His argument is that the secularism in the West has best developed in the United States and France, albeit in different ways. Americans have given primacy to religious liberty, and the French to equality of citizenship but in their differing ways they have come up with the best thinking on secularism that the West has to offer. “These are the liberal and republican conceptions of secularism. Since these are the most dominant and defensible western versions of secularism, I shall put them together and henceforth designate them as the mainstream conception of secularism” (Bhargava 2008). He is critical of this conception of western secularism which understands secularism in terms of separation and “mutual exclusion;” this is common ground between us and so in my terms he

is a “moderate” not a “radical” secularist. He has principled arguments about the nature of secularism and believes that the Indian polity today better exemplifies them than any western polity. My concern here is with his characterisation of western secularism. I believe he is mistaken in arguing that the US and France are the best that the West has got to offer; and nor are they the dominant/mainstream conceptions. His argument is based on a poor understanding of the British experience (which I know best) and of the western European experience more generally. Most of western, especially north-western Europe, where France is the exception not the rule, is best understood in more evolutionary and moderate terms than Bhargava’s characterisation of western secularism. They have several important features to do with a more pragmatic politics; with a sense of history, tradition and identity; and, most importantly, there is an accommodative character which is an essential feature of some historical and contemporary secularisms *in practice*. It is true that some political theorists and radical secularists have a strong tendency to abstract that out when talking about models and principles of secularism. If this tendency can be countered, British and other European experience ceases to be an inferior, non-mainstream instance of secularism but becomes mainstream and politically and normatively significant, if not superior to other versions.

Accommodative or moderate secularism, no less than liberal and republican secularism, can be justified in liberal, egalitarian, democratic terms, and in relation to a conception of citizenship. Yet it has developed a historical practice in which, explicitly or implicitly, organised religion is treated as a *public good*. This can take not only the form of an input into a legislative forum, such as the House of Lords, on moral and welfare issues; but also to being social partners to the state in the delivery of education, health and care services; to building social capital; or to churches belonging to “the people.” So, that even those who do not attend them, or even sign up to their doctrines, feel they have a right to use them for weddings and funerals. All this is part of the meaning of what secularism means in most west European countries and it is quite clear that it is often lost in the models of secularism deployed by some normative theorists and public intellectuals. This is clearer today

partly because of the development of our thinking in relation to the challenge of multicultural equality and the accommodation of Muslims, which highlight the limitations of the privatisation conception of liberal equality, and which sharpen the distinction between moderate/inclusive secularism and radical/ideological secularism. I have in my work expressly related the accommodative spirit of moderate secularism to the contemporary demands of multiculturalism (Modood 2007).

I would argue that it is quite possible in a country like Britain to treat the claims of all religions in accordance with multicultural equality without having to abolish the established status of the Church of England, given that it has come to be a very “weak” form of establishment and the Church has come to play a positive ecumenical and multi-faith role. Faced with an emergent multi-faith situation or where there is a political will to incorporate previously marginalized faiths and sects and to challenge the privileged status of some religions the context-sensitive and conservationist response may be to pluralise the state-religion link rather than sever it. This indeed is what is happening across many countries in western Europe. In relation to the British case one can see it in a lot of incremental, ad hoc and experimental steps. For example, some years ago Prince Charles, the heir to the throne and to the office of Supreme Governor of the Church of England let it be known he would as a monarch prefer the title “Defender of Faith” to the historic title “Defender of *the* Faith.” More recently, in 2004 the Queen used her Christmas television and radio broadcast – an important national occasion, especially for the older generation, on the most important Christian day of the year – to affirm the religious diversity of Britain. Her message was, in the words of Grace Davie, “[r]eligious diversity is something which enriches society; it should be seen as a strength, not a threat; the broadcast moreover was accompanied by shots of the Queen visiting a Sikh temple and a Muslim center. It is important to put these remarks in context. The affirmation of diversity as such is not a new idea in British society; what is new is the gradual recognition that religious differences should be foregrounded in such affirmations. Paradoxically, a bastion of privilege such as the monarchy turns out to be a key and very positive opinion former in this particular debate” (Davie 2007: 232–33).

If such examples are regarded as merely symbolic then one should note how British governments have felt the need to create multi-faith consultative bodies. The Conservatives created an Inner Cities Religious Council in 1992, chaired by a junior minister, which was replaced by New Labour in 2006 with a body with a much broader remit, the Faith Communities Consultative Council. Moreover, the new Department of Communities and Local Government, which is represented in the Cabinet, has a division devoted to faith communities. This suggests that a “weak establishment” or a reformed estab-

lishment can be one way of institutionalizing religious pluralism. I am not suggesting it is the only or best way but in certain historical and political circumstances, it may indeed be a good way: we should be wary of ruling it out by arguments that appeal to “the dominant and defensible western versions of secularism” (Bhargava 2008: 93). Stronger still: such institutional accommodation of minority or marginal faiths run with the grain of mainstream western European historic practice.

There can be many practical reasons that state policy may support religious groups (eg., partnership in the delivery of healthcare) but in my final section I would tentatively like to suggest a reason that is not merely practical.

There is an image of religion as organisations or communities around competing truths, which are mutually intolerant, which perhaps even hate each other’s guts. There



Tariq Modood is Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol, UK. Details of the work of the Centre can be found at www.bristol.ac.uk/sociology/ethnicitycitizenship

is some truth in that in some times and places but the opposite is more important. Let me illustrate this by reference to my late father’s, a devout and pious Muslim, decision that I should attend the daily Christian non-denominational worship at my secondary school. When I told him that I could be exempted from it, like the Jewish children, if he sent in a letter requesting this, he asked what they did during this time each morning. When I told him that some read comics, some took the opportunity to catch up with homework and some even arrived late, he said I should join the assembly. He said that as Christians mainly believe what we believe I should join in fully but whenever it was said that Jesus was the Son of God, I should say to myself, “no, he is not.” It is a view that can perhaps be expressed as it is better to be in the presence of religion than not and so the value of religion does not simply reside in one’s own religion. One’s own religious heritage is to be cherished and honoured but so are those of others and the closing down of any religion is a loss of some sort.

I would suggest that historically it has been a prevalent view in the Middle East and South Asia, in-

deed where respect for the religion of others has extended to joining in the religious celebrations of others, borrowing from others, syncretism and so on. Respect for religion does not however require syncretism and can be found amongst contemporary Muslims in the West. Reporting on a recent Gallup World Poll, Dalia Mogahed and Zsolt Nyiri write of Muslims in Paris and London that their “expectations of respect for Islam and its symbols extends to an expectation of respect for religion in general” and add that recently “Shahid Malik, a British Muslim MP, even complained about what he called the ‘policy wonks’ who wished to strip the public sphere of all Christian religious symbols” (Mogahed and Nyiri 2007: 2). It is an attitude that the West (where mono-religion has been the historical norm) can certainly learn from, as I think some people of my generation realised and which is evidenced in the interest in the spiritualities of “the East.” Respect for religion is, clearly beyond toleration but also utility for this valuing of religion and respect for the religion of others, even while not requiring participation, is based on a sense that religion is a good in itself, is a fundamental good and part of our humanity at a personal, social and civilizational level: it is an ethical good and so to be respected as a feature of human character just as we might respect truth-seeking, the cultivation of the intellect or the imagination or artistic creativity or self-discipline not just because of its utility or truth. We can think religion as a good of this sort regardless of whether one is a believer or not just as we can think music or science a good whether I am musical or scientific or not. A person, a society, a culture, a country would be poorer without it. It is part of good living and while not all can cultivate it fully, it is a good that some do and they should be honoured and supported by others.

This view is not dependent upon any kind of theism for it can be a feature of some form of ethical humanism. I think it can be justified within a philosophy of human plurality and multi-dimensionality of the kind to be found in for example R G Collingwood’s *Speculum Mentis* (1924) or Michael Oakeshott’s *Experience and its Modes* (1933).

Respect for religion is, however, clearly more than respect as recognition or recognition of religious minorities, and while I am mainly concerned to argue for the latter I am open to the former, especially as I believe that respect for religion is quite common amongst religious believers (the mirror-image of Dawkins) and I worry about an intolerant secularist hegemony. There may once have been a time in Europe when a powerful, authoritarian church or churches stifled dissent, individuality, free debate, science, pluralism and so on but that is not the present danger. European cultural, intellectual and political life – the public sphere in the fullest sense of the word – is dominated by secularism and secularist networks and organisations control most of the levers of power, and so

respect for religion is made difficult and seems outlandish but may be necessary as one of the sources of counter-hegemony and a more genuine pluralism. Hence, respect for religion is compatible with and may be a requirement of a democratic political culture.

I appreciate that this may seem to be, and indeed may be a form of “privileging” religion. For in this idea that the state may wish to show respect for religion I am going beyond not just toleration and freedom of religion but also beyond civic recognition. Nor am I simply pointing to the existence of overlaps and linkages between the state and religion. The sense of “privilege” may not however be as strong as it may seem. After all, the autonomy of politics is the privileging of the non-religious, so this is perhaps qualifying that non-secular privileging. Moreover, it is far from an exclusive privileging. States regularly “privilege” the nation, ethnicity, science, the arts, sport, economy

and so on in relation to the centrality they give it in policy-making, the public resources devoted to it or the prestige placed upon it. So, if showing respect for religion is a privileging of religion, it is of a multiplex, multilogical sort; and it is based on the recognition that the secular is already dominant in many contemporary states. <

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Transit

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Der Schatten des Schlüssels

von Ferenc Szijj

<i>Adalék</i> A kutyasétáltatás is nyelvkönyv, esténként hallok a gyors lapozást, néha elfelejtik. És hogy a villamoson hogyan kell kapaszkodni. A nyelvkönyvek tele vannak obszcén jelentekkel, de nem tűnik fel senkinek. A kémkedés miatt is be kellene őket tiltani. Jönnek-mennek a delegációk, letapossák a turbina körül a virágokat. Aztán jön valami ünnep, anyák napja, mindenszentek, és rögtön amnesztiát hirdetnek. Én meg lemegyek az utcára, csörgetem a kulcsot, próbálom kitalálni, miért is küldtek, de nincs nálam újságpapírral kitömött aktatáska, nem szólnak hozzám. <i>Versatzstück</i> Den Hund ausführen ist auch wie ein Sprachbuch, abends kann ich die Vergesslichen schnell blättern hören. Und wie man sich, unter anderem, in der Straßenbahn festhalten muss. Die Sprachbücher sind voll mit obszönen Bildern, was aber niemandem auffällt. Man müsste sie auch wegen der Spionage verbieten. Delegationen kommen und gehen, und sie stampfen die Blumen um die Turbine herum nieder. Dann kommt ein Feiertag, Muttertag, Allerheiligen, und damit gleich eine Amnestie. Und ich gehe auf die Straße hinunter, lasse den Schlüsselbund klirren, versuche herauszufinden, für was ich denn geschickt wurde, aber ich habe keine Aktentasche bei mir, vollgestopft mit Zeitungspapier, keiner spricht mich an.	<i>A lépcsőházi vágótázó</i> Faltól falig elmondok egy teljes mondatot, ez a módszerem. De nem gondolom ki előre. És utána már nem is emlékszem rá, nincs időm megjegyezni. A mélységen futok keresztül. Az árnyékban álló váza árnyékában fekvő kulcs árnyéka. <i>Der Treppenhaus-Sprinter</i> Von Wand zu Wand spreche ich einen vollen Satz, das ist meine Methode. Aber ich denke ihn nicht vorher aus. Und nachher erinnere ich mich auch nicht an ihn, habe keine Zeit, ihn mir zu merken. Durch die Tiefe laufe ich hindurch. Der Schatten des Schlüssels im Schatten einer im Schatten stehenden Vase. <i>Női hang</i> Növény akartam lenni. Egyetlen levél, és csak a fény. Egy napszak hatalmas munkájában bosszú és jóvátétel. Elv拉斯ztok. Megemészttem az áttetsző dolgokat, és emésztetlenül hagyom a földet. Nagy változásként meghalok. Ez volt a természetes büntetés, magamra fordítottam, hogy lássanak. És a kelendő időt. Az ennivalót kihánytam. Nem is sejtették, milyen szörnyű jel zúdul ilyenkor a város csatornáiba.	Beteg voltam nagyon, és ezt tudtam is, bár talán csak abból, hogy könnyű volt elmesélni. – És aztán a gyógyulás is így kibomlott bennem, mint egy nagy, színes esernyő, aminek csak meg kell nyomni a gombját, és hozzászorítja a felhőt az éghez. Akkor pedig tartani kell, vagy megkérni valakit egy pillanatra, és futás. <i>Weibliche Stimme</i> Ich wollte eine Pflanze sein. Ein einziges Blatt und sonst nur das Licht. In der ungeheuren Arbeit eines Nachmittags Rache und Versöhnung. Absonderung. Ich verdaue alles Durchsichtige und lasse die Erde unverdaut. Wenn ich sterbe, ist es eine große Verwandlung. Das war die natürliche Strafe, ich zog sie auf mich, damit man mich sieht. Und die gärende Zeit. Ich habe das Essen erbrochen. Man hatte keine Ahnung, welch entsetzliches Zeichen damit in die Kanäle der Stadt hinunterströmt. Ich war sehr krank, und das erkannte ich auch, obwohl vielleicht nur daran, dass es leicht zu erzählen war. – Dann ist auch die Genesung in mir einfach aufgegangen wie ein großer, bunter Regenschirm, bei dem man nur einen Knopf betätigt, und die Wolke wird zum Himmel gedrückt. Dann aber muss man ihn halten oder jemanden für einen Augenblick bitten, und nichts wie weg.
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Ferenc Szijj, 1958 in Szombathely geboren, ist Dichter, Schriftsteller und Übersetzer; er erhielt zahlreiche Preise und Stipendien u. a. auch für seine Kinderbücher. Zuletzt erschien auf Deutsch von ihm der Gedichtband *Sturzlicht* (2005), auf Ungarisch der Gedichtband *Kenyércédulák* (2007). Die hier abgedruckten Gedichte stammen aus einem nur in limitierter Auflage hergestellten und von Szijj selbst übersetzten Band *A kulcs árnyéka, Der Schatten des Schlüssels* (2004). Von Januar bis Juni 2009 war Szijj Paul Celan Fellow am IWM und übersetzte den Briefwechsel von Hannah Arendt/Martin Heidegger ins Ungarische. Die Paul Celan Stipendien für Übersetzer werden unterstützt von der *ERSTE* Stiftung.

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