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Development of Underdevelopment: State and Modernization Project in the post-Leninist Ukraine

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This paper seeks to analyze the interrelation and interpenetration between major societal spheres critical for successful handling of the post-Leninist modernization/developmental project Ukrainian state formation and political regime developments. The state is understood in this article as „a set of organizations through which collectivities of officials may be able to formulate and implement distinctive strategies and policies“ (Skocpol 1985, p.20-21). In my conceptualization of political regimes I draw upon Highly and Burton who define them as „basic pattern of organization, exercise, and transfer of government decision-making power“ (Highly and Burton 1989, p.18). It should also be taken into account that the transformation of Ukrainian society - the country with a seventy-year rule of a Leninist regime - differs dramatically from ostensibly similar events in the polities involved into the socialist international system for forty years. This distinction was made by Ernst Gellner who has observed that „there is a perceptible difference between the areas that have been parts of the union since the Revolution, and those that were incorporated in it only at the end of the Second World War. The difference between seventy and forty years seems to affect the nature of social memory profoundly: the

forty-year-ers have a sharp sense of what the other world is like, and the seventy-year-ers have largely lost it. They know no other“ (Gellner 1990, p.31).

Machiavelli formulated the universal challenge facing any undertaker of sweeping socio-political change in the following terms: „It ought to be considered that there is nothing more difficult to plan, more unlikely to succeed with, or more dangerous to manage than to take the lead in introducing new methods of *government*, because the introducer has as enemies all those who profit from the old method, and as only lukewarm defenders all those who will profit from the new ones. This lukewarmness results partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws on their side, partly from the incredibility of men, who do not really trust a new program unless they learn by experience that it is firmly established“ (Machiavelli 1946, p.110). Ken Jowitt, a brilliant student of Leninist societies, advances Machiavelli's argument further with the following statement about post-USSR states in the immediate wake of the disintegration of the communist regime: „The central question in the Soviet Union today is *political*, not economic, technological or military.“ (Jowitt 1993, p.220). The same statement is a relevant diagnosis of the current socio-political constellation in now post-Leninist Ukraine. In a light of this, it is puzzling how little attention scholars have paid to the issue of the *political regime* with its embeddedness in and elective affinity with a new societal (dis)order. The lack of a general theory capable of formulating and dealing with presuppositional issues has produced vague particularistic accounts of post-Leninist regimes, thus assisting the transformation of Sovietology - a discipline with a solid theoretical background - into an a-theoretical „transitology“. Moreover, the latter has become akin rather to investigative journalism than to academic endeavor. In this respect it is worth noting that the choice of the terms 'Leninist' and 'post-Leninist' regimes has been made deliberately. The notion of the „Leninist Phenomenon“ is of critical importance for a correct understanding and definition of both the societies under the Leninist party rule and those after its demise. Elaborate development of this point can be found in Ken Jowitt's brilliant account in his seminal „New World Disorder“ (Jowitt 1993, pp.1-49). I am referring to transformation, rather than transition. The latter concept linguistically implies a smooth, evolutionary and unproblematic - i.e., basically 'technical' - shift from one type of societal organization to another. Criticism of Western Sovietology and transitology and stress on evolutionary aspects of the social change in Leninist and post-Leninist countries can be found in Jowitt's illuminating paper (Jowitt 1997). Both regimes have to „attack the institutional bases“ (Jowitt 1993, p.27) of peasant and (post)socialist society respectively. Contrary to their Leninist predecessors, post-Leninist polities are characterized by the total lack of a clear vision of transformation strategy. This is par-

ticularly the case of the Ukraine which is suffering from an inadequate leadership incapable of handling the task of transforming social, economic, and political institutions as well as the cultural system of the society. The distinction between policy choices and alternatives of historical development has been suggested by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his pioneering account of the then Soviet political system developmental dilemmas (Brzezinski 1966, p.7).

The fact that no social theory has so far produced valid long term predictive insights does not undermine the centrality of the theoretically oriented discourse for the inquiry into the nature of post-Leninist societal systems and political communities. The total absence of clear theoretical perspective often produces false accounts which appear to be a chaotic mis-mash of various incompatible concepts. By assuming „coherent, durable monads rather than contingent, transitory connections among socially constructed identities“ (Tilly 1995, p.1595) scholars fail to appreciate the fact „that regularities in political life are very broad, indeed trans-historical, but do not operate in the form of recurrent structures and processes at a large scale“ (Tilly 1995, p.1601). For instance, one of the attempts at defining the political regime of contemporary Ukraine arrived at the conclusion that it can be characterized as a „mixed one“, combining „elements of *all* (sic!) major „pure“ political regimes: a) democratic, b) authoritarian, c) autocratic, d) dictatorial, e) totalitarian, f) anarchic, and g) ochlocratic“ (Political Thought 1993, p.119). This paradigmatic example of an inadequate application of the so-called „multi-factor“ interpretation of the phenomena of social and political life is something critically different from Max Weber’s concern about how to distinguish culturally significant causes of social action and identifying „whether they are „adequate“ or „inadequate“ in relation to one another“ (Weber 1978, p.341).

Having sacrificed social and political theory in favor of an „explanatory“, pseudo-practically oriented paradigm, social scientists have deprived themselves of the analytical tools for explaining social facts. Perhaps, the best example of such confusion caused by the lack of theoretically informed discursive argumentation is Linz and Stepan’s volume on democratic transition and consolidation of post-authoritarian and post-Leninist regimes. Having identified the volume’s subject-matter and even conclusions in the book’s title, the authors, in fact, mostly deal with the threats of the *breakdown* of democracy and market failures in the post-Soviet socio-cultural and political setting (Linz and Stepan 1996). It is here worth recalling Weber who insisted that „it is, not of course, my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic casual interpretation of culture and of history. Each is equally possible, but each, if it does not serve as the *preparation*, but as a conclusion of an investigation, accomplishes equally little in the interest of histori-

cal truth“ (Weber 1958, p.183). The same conclusion holds for the interpretation of the phenomenon of the extinction of Leninism and subsequent developments - both the transition to market democracy model and the societal transformation/degeneration approach are valid provided that they are sensitive to the singularity of social and political processes as well as to their cultural milieu. The more recent attempt of the Kyiv-based author Volodymyr Polokhalo to draw a line between - in fact to insulate - allegedly already adequate and rich empirical research and theoretical conceptualization (Polokhalo 1998, p.12) fails to utilize findings of post-positivist philosophy and methodology of the social sciences which go beyond the ontological opposition „fact-theory“ as stipulating its analytical nature. Contemporary theorists of sociology and politics assert that „the empirical data of science are theoretically informed. The fact-theory distinction is neither epistemological nor ontological. It is an *analytical* distinction. Scientific commitments are not based solely on empirical evidence. Fundamental shifts in scientific beliefs occur only when empirical changes are matched by the *availability of convincing theoretical alternatives*“ Alexander 1987, p.17). Seeking „salvation from unfamiliar phenomena in familiar terms“ (Trotsky 1965, p.245), usually has a false account as its result. Polokhalo labels the current Ukrainian socio-political arrangement as post-communist neo-totalitarianism which combines features of authoritarianism and oligarchy (Polokhalo 1998, p.17) while failing to explain why a neo-totalitarian polity is being defined in terms of an authoritarian regime. Thus, his false account fails to appreciate the continuity and change in the development of Leninist systems and dynamics of Leninist legacies. To deny the Leninist extinction and argue that the Soviet rulers masterminded the transition from Leninist party-state rule to post-Leninist neo-totalitarian dictatorship as Polokhalo does is to ignore the singularity of the developmental stages of the Soviet regime - from totalitarianism (or transformation and consolidation stages in terms of Jowitt's typology) to a post-totalitarian arrangement (or an inclusion stage achieved through the social mechanism of neo-traditionalism) and gives too much credit to purposive activities of the ruling establishment of Leninism in its late stage. Polokhalo tends to forget Weber's observation that „the yardstick of the moralist is not a yardstick of the politician“ (Weber 1958, p.389) -- nor is it that of a scholar, we may add. Polokhalo also accuses Ukrainian post-Leninist society of a submission to and „pathological solidarity with former nomenklatura“. Unfortunately, moralizing criticism rarely contributes to our understanding of societal dynamics. What has been labeled pathological solidarity and immoral „compromise“ has been a result of a removal of limits imposed by the Leninist regime on a Soviet scavenger society which was very much akin to Marx's ideal type of 19th century atomic and egoistic civil society. Thus,

thinking theoretically about post-Leninist regimes in general and the Ukrainian case in particular helps address issues relevant to both academic commentators and policy practitioners. Theorizing about the alleged democratic nature of recently emerged post-Leninist regimes is densely intertwined with a discourse on the state and the development of the societies in question. Ukrainian state formation has so far born a great resemblance to the absolutist Europe's mode of state making as organized crime (Tilly 1985). Absolutist state tax policies, discussed by Tilly, are strikingly akin to those employed by the government of the independent Ukraine. Tax police seizures and customs levies and duties--policies enjoyed by absolutist states at their mercantilist stage--is a favorite policy instrument of Ukraine's government. State Customs Committee of Ukraine „succeed“ in filling the empty state treasury--its contribution accounted for approximately 20% of the budget revenues for 1998--and while it helps resolve short term policy goals it makes the Ukraine a nightmare for prospective investors in a long run. A recently conducted DHL survey of European customs agencies efficiency ranked the Ukraine fourth from worst, ahead of only Bosnia, Yugoslavia and Moldova (Korshak 1999, p.6B). New institutions of Ukrainian state and political society attempt to recapitulate Western liberal democratic patterns of political organization and policy choice, but the resemblance of structures does not automatically lead to a similarity of values and patterns of behavior, let alone the institutions' legitimacy. This pattern of activities is far from the Weberian procedural rationality of the methodical acquisition of economic and political resources. According to Weber, the impersonal practices and norms of the modern rational-legal state have been greatly influenced by the experience of ascetic Protestantism because the Protestant „sect opposes the charisma of office and insists upon „direct democratic administration“ by the congregation and upon treating the clerical officials as servants of congregation“ (Weber 1978, p.1207-1208). These activities can be understood at best as a striving for regime justification since, as Offe and Preuss have insightfully noted, the „democracy“ has become a universal formula of legitimation for a broad range of radically different societies and their respective models of governance and participation. By the mid-1970s, there was virtually no regime between Chile and China that did not rest its claims to legitimacy upon being „democratic“ in some way, or at least upon its being in the process of a transition to some version of democracy. Thus the term „democracy“ seemed to have lost its distinctiveness: it failed to highlight significant differences between socio-political arrangements“ (Offe and Preuss 1991, p.143). Stripped of its social and economic content, democracy in the Ukraine has been reduced to mere procedural electoralism - itself an

efficient tool of manipulation in the hands of those with a privileged access to a „generalized means of exchange“, to employ Parsons' terminology. Differently stated: Money and power. As Ken Jowitt spells it out „the institutional framework, the practice and habits of elites, and the sociocultural constitutions in these countries assign critically different meaning to events in Western democracies and Eastern European countries“ (Jowitt 1993, p.291).

President Kuchma has recently credited himself for creating a stable society in the Ukraine (Facts and Commentaries 1999, p. 2). This may well have been true - the social, political and economic arrangements of the post-Leninist Ukraine are strikingly stable, especially in light of the dismantling of the Soviet system of *laissez faire* and continued economic decline, which doesn't even find a parallel in the Great Depression. As the Brazilian scholar Francisco Weffort has correctly noted „the process of political democratization occurred at the same moment in which those countries suffered the experience of a profound and prolonged economic crisis that resulted in mass social exclusion and massive poverty. Some of these countries are building a political democracy on a top of a minefield of social apartheid.“ (quoted in Lipset 1994, p.17). Most „advanced“ transitologists, drawing upon African and Latin American experiences of „democratic consolidation“ have formulated the challenge to developmental agenda as follows: „How can structural adjustment in the economy, which imposes so much short-term pain., be reconciled with democracy?“ (Diamond 1992, p.41). In the Ukrainian case the question must be reformulated: How can the collapse of the economy which imposes *long-term* pain be reconciled with a relative stability (understood for the sake of clarity and simplicity as a lack of violent conflicts and civil unrest) of regime? This question is particularly puzzling since the population at large shows no trust in state institutions while exhibiting increasing dissatisfaction with catastrophically deteriorating life standards. Students of post-Leninism often come up with a one-sided physiological-aggregated explanation stressing the population's fear of „social chaos under the radicalization of societal changes“ (Holovakha 1994, p.10) which fails to conceptualize the rationale behind regime existence and stability. This problem resembles the puzzle of the Soviet regime stability so vigorously discussed by Sovietologists not so long ago. The most plausible answer has been suggested by Ken Jowitt: „The Soviet Union lasted as long as it did, because it disciplined (often through terror) most, rewarded many, and attracted a strategically loyal few for at least fifty of those seventy-four years. Being for a certain period totalitarian, and always dictatorial did not prevent the Soviet party from being what is now fashionably referred to as socially „embedded“ (Jowitt 1997, p 45). Employing the analogous style of reasoning we will arrive at the following set of conclusions - first of all, even elites in „precarious posi-

tion do not have to seek support from everyone“ (Jowitt 1971, p.108). Secondly, such transparency of a government's incompetence is rather a result of unconstrained power which, according to Karl Deutsch, „is the ability to afford not to learn“ (Deutsch 1966, p.111). Relative stability of Ukrainian political arrangement lies in a fact that the state has let the majority of the population struggle for survival by its own means (within the frameworks of virtual and shadow economies), has given many an opportunity for self-expression and possibilities for political and/or economic mobility and in a manner strikingly akin to its Soviet predecessor has attracted a strategically important few. The Ukrainian stratum of a „strategic few“ is composed of those with rooted interests in existing „booty“ capitalism as well as in the patrimonial state which, according to Weber, is quite tolerant „toward social mobility and acquisition of wealth“, but „does not favor rational enterprise“ (Weber 1978, p.1102). Stability, based upon such grounds, cannot hope for the span of the Soviet Union but it is reasonable to entertain the possibility that it may well become a long term pattern of the societal degeneration, given the experience of numerous African and Latin American countries. It should be noted that I am concerned here with regime stability in the narrow sense, i.e. as an endurance which implies the persistence of pattern without references to „decisional effectiveness and authenticity“ (Eckstein 1993, p.184). Therefore, „a system may be stable because of... the ineffectiveness (or bad luck) of its opponents; it may persist as did the Third Republic, for no better reason that it never quite manages even to collapse, despite much opposition and many hairbreadth escapes“ (Eckstein 1993, p.183). This, of course, does not rule out the possibilities of revolutionary surprise. As Timur Kuran has observed „until the Iranian revolution, almost all students of Iran subscribed to the view that the Iranian state was traditionally despotic and the Iranian nation submissive and fatalistic“ (Kuran 1995, p.1536). These considerations lead us to the assertion of a Weberian distinction between feudal and patrimonial polities. Note Machiavelli's paradigmatic discussion of these two ideal-types of political organization to which Weber would have subscribed himself: „principalities of which there is any historical record are managed in two different ways: in the first, one man is a prince and all the other officials are slaves, who act as ministers, and aid in governing the kingdom through his grace and permission; in the second type, there are a prince and barons, and the latter hold their positions not through the grace but through the antiquity of their blood. Such barons have states and subjects of their own, who recognize them as lords and have a natural attachment to them. ... Two examples of these two kinds of government in our times are the Turk and the king of France. The whole monarchical administration of the Turk is controlled by one lord; the others are his servants; and dividing his kingdom into san-

jaks, he sends out different administrators and changes and varies them as seems good to him. But the king of France is placed in the midst of a multitude of lords, long established in their positions... They have their privileges, which the king cannot take away except at his peril“ (Machiavelli 1946, p.104). If the „federalization“ of the Russian state has become akin to the decentralization of early feudalism, where the peripheral centers of power may challenge the authority of the state, the Ukraine’s political development can be perceived in terms of a patrimonial type of domination. According to Weber, the generic feature of the patrimonial state is the ruler’s ability to organize „his political power over extra-patrimonial areas and political subjects just like the exercise of his patriarchal power. The establishment of „political domination“, that is of one master’s domination over other masters who are not subjects to his patriarchal power implies an affiliation of authority relations which differ only in degree and content, not in structure“ (Weber 1978, p.1013). In other words, patrimonial domination fosters the personal dependency of state incumbents and political actors on the ruler (be it an ancient prince or else a „modern“ politician elected through universal suffrage): „Consider for example, the relationship between powerful political patrons and humble Saratsen shepherds. Relations of mutual obligation bind host and guest. What they have to offer each other may be very different: votes on the one side, a degree of security and protection on the other. ...Mutual courtesy marks the clear understanding that loyalty gets protection and protection gets loyalty“ (Herzfeld 1992, p.175). This comment helps us appreciate the obvious orientation of an incumbent regime towards capitalist accumulation intertwined with the self-evident inefficiency of its market reform policies, a puzzle usually explained by pointing to the Ukrainian politicians lack of mysterious quality: political will to push through reforms. Such explanation tends to neglect Weber’s account that „not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct“ (Weber 1946, p.280). A more scrupulous analysis of patrimonial state suggests, that unlike charisma, which rejects as undignified all methodical rational acquisition and, in fact, all rational economic conduct, the patrimonial state implies as the most fundamental obligation of the subjects „the material maintenance of the ruler... With the development of trade and of money economy the patrimonial ruler may satisfy his economic needs no longer through the *oikos* but through profit-oriented monopolism. ...In the course of financial rationalization patrimonialism moves imperceptibly toward bureaucratic administration, which resorts to systematic taxation“ (Weber 1978, p.1014). These developments result in emergence of robber capitalism whose structure and spirit „differs radically from the rational management of an ordinary capitalist large-scale enterprise and is most similar to some old age phenomena: the huge rapacious enterprises in the fi-

nancial and colonial sphere and occasional trade... The double nature of what may be called the „capitalist spirit“, and the specific character of modern routinized capitalism with its professional bureaucracy, can be understood only if these two structural elements, which are ultimately different but everywhere intertwined, are conceptually distinguished“ (Weber 1978, p.1118). Even the introduction of a universal franchise does not automatically lead to destruction of the system of dependency relationships based on loyalty and fidelity intrinsically inherent to the political system based on patrimonialism. Under the circumstances framed by the patrimonial political structure, the representative, in fact any elected high ranking official, is conceived as „the chosen „master“ of his voters“ (Weber 1978, p.1128). To sum up, patrimonial system „gives free rein to the enrichment of the ruler himself, the court officials, favorites, governors, mandarins, the tax collectors, influence peddlers, and the great merchants and financiers who function as tax-farmers, purveyors, and creditors. The ruler’s favor and disfavor, grants and confiscations, continuously create new wealth and destroys it again“ (Weber 1978, p.1099). The above considerations bring us to the issue of development. In my opinion, Leninist regimes can be best conceptualized as a response to the conditions of national dependency - that was the case of *all* revolutionary system-building regimes guided by consensual ideology. (Consensual ideology, according to Jowitt, demands „internal agreement in terms of shared perspectives, the content of behavior, and the abolition of differences“ (Jowitt 1971, p.22). The strategic developmental agenda of regimes in question included revolutionary breaking-through - industrialization, collectivization, mass education, and forging party cadres as well as national political community building. Because of the grand failure of the Leninist project, post-Leninist political regimes face a similar challenge - they have to make an attempt at becoming modern but under the conditions of rapid post-modernization of the countries belonging to the core of the capitalist world system. Though ambiguous, the notion of post-modernity goes beyond the mere discourse of philosophers and students of culture. Its implications can be traced in all societal spheres of advanced capitalist liberal-democratic countries. This itself is an additional „built-in“ hindrance for post-Leninist developmental project which bears a great resemblance with its Leninist predecessor - while the latter ended up with the over-industrialized economy of the 19th century type, its Western ideological adversaries were preparing for the coming post-industrial, information, knowledge society. At present the former are confronted with a task of pursuing modernization strategies while, the West is leaving this stage behind. Eight years of clumsy efforts at implementing the post-Leninist developmental task, a process which can be termed a 'second edition' of modernization, have proved to be a second failure. Perhaps, the simplest solution

would be to blame the resistance of „obsolete structures of public administration“ that oppress the emergent civil society for bringing the country to standstill (Holovakha 1994, p.10). An opposed explanation has recently been offered by Volodymyr Polokhalo. He has termed the post-Leninist regime post-communist neo-totalitarianism which preys upon non-civil society (Polokhalo 1998). Both approaches are equally one-dimensional and fail to appreciate the singularity of the Ukrainian polity under the stress of transformation. Polokhalo's treatment of the incumbent Ukrainian regime as post-communist neo-totalitarianism is neither explanatory nor analytic--it can hardly even qualify as descriptive. Moreover, the supposedly „novel“ concept of non-civil society has been predated by the concept of scavenger society developed by Ken Jowitt (Jowitt 1993, p.226) long before the appearance of a „seminal“ study of Ukrainian author. The Post-Leninist developmental project could have been based on capitalizing on the achievements of the Leninist transformation mentioned above and, accordingly, should have included reinstating economic growth and the modernization of economic relations that were strikingly primordial under Soviet rule through the introduction of adequate regulations and overall liberalization, and the incorporation of the Ukrainian economy into the global world-system at a level of the periphery with a possible upgrading to the semi-periphery in the foreseeable future. Unfortunately the belief in the institutional weakness of successive post-Leninist states has become uncritically accepted as conventional wisdom among transitologists. It must be said that the Ukraine inherited an elaborated system of administrative institutions from its Soviet predecessor. Though not being an ideal of effectiveness and efficiency, it could have shown much better performance had the interests of policy-makers coincided with the pursuit of developmental strategies. But, as is endemic to a polity of patrimonial bent, „traditionalism and arbitrariness affect very deeply the developmental opportunities of capitalism. Either the ruler himself or his officials seize upon the new chances of acquisition, monopolize them and thus deprive the capital formation of the private economy of its sustenance. On the other hand, the wide latitude of ruler's unrestricted discretion can reinforce the anti-traditional power of capitalism in a given case, as it happened in Europe during the period of absolutism. As a rule, the negative aspect of this arbitrariness is dominant, because the patrimonial state lacks the political and procedural *predictability*, indispensable for capitalist development, which is provided by the rational rules of modern bureaucratic administration“ (Weber 1978, p.1094-1095). Both Marx and Weber and more recently world system theorists have asserted that such conditions are conducive to rapid expansion of merchant capital whose „independent development is in opposite relation to the general economic development of society“ (Marx 1985,

p.360). Rapid marketization of the economy and the development of capitalism more generally can be pursued through application of two mutually exclusive strategies: Encouragement of accumulation and consumption respectively (Neuhouser 1992). The successful accomplishment of the former task is only possible under the condition of already achieved capital accumulation, the process which is now under way in contemporary Ukraine. Therefore, President Kuchma's recent proposal to boost economic growth through the use of consumption policies is a mixture of wishful thinking, conscious manipulation/disinformation and ideological - in the classical Marxian sense - misrepresentation of reality. As Marx's compelling analysis suggested, primitive accumulation can be effective only at somebody's expense when those 'somebodies' - representatives of lower classes as a rule - are deprived of their property and transformed into wage labor. Appreciation of the complexity of Leninist societies with their undeniable achievements in education and industrialization should not be confused with their alleged modernity. As Hungarian political scientist I.Balogh has convincingly shown, industrialization - the major element of the Leninist developmental agenda - if pursued „without launching processes in social and cultural spheres of modernization, eventually undermines itself and transforms into social regress“ (Balogh 1992, p.109). Breaking-through with national dependency under the leadership of a charismatic institution - the party of the organizational weapon type - in countries where the bourgeoisie were almost absent, reduced modernization to the task of industrial transformation aimed against the class of capitalist entrepreneurs. Thus, one of the major challenges for post-Leninist societies is whether they will be able to create conditions conducive to bourgeois modernization through socialization which is a „cultural, economic, and political process ultimately leading to (or possibly leading to) reconstruction of the whole structure of a society, emergence of a structured but united (from the point of view of mentality) system of values, norms, incentives in societal modernization and ensure the success of modernization“ (Balogh 1992, p.120). Pursuit of only marketization policies instead of developing a frame of reference for modern (civil) society will lead to social differentiation cutting across impoverishment and enrichment.

Perhaps the most likely scenario of the direction of the Ukrainian post-Leninist transformation that has already partially begun to be realized is suggested by I.Balogh who, drawing on the experience of the Hungarian transformation: „under the circumstances of distinct polarization, social tension will become the most immediate issue, superseding the alternatives of modernization. No doubt, that there is a threatening tendency of emergence of a type of poor entrepreneurial stratum side by side with a rich one which is not a bourgeois one, as well as accelerated de-

terioration and atomization of a weak middle class coupled with decreasing living standards and increasing wave of immigration of intelligentsia which is capable of playing a decisive role informing and proliferating cultural values and patterns of modernization. Coming years will show whether the tendency of the acceleration of polarization along poverty/wealth line can be changed and reversed and if the revival of a middle class will begin or, despite opposite declarations and programs, polarization of the poverty and wealth will become a defining factor molding the structure of society. In this case, now only under the slogan of „joining Europe“ Hungary will inevitably find itself in a traditional impasse of East and Central European modernization“ (Balogh 1992, p. 122). What was thought of as just one possible alternative among many others of post-Leninist development in Hungary has become the steady pattern of societal decay in Ukraine which fits an ideal type of development of under-development (Frank 1966).

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