


Readers may redistribute this article to other individuals for noncommercial use, provided that the text and this note remain intact. This article may not be reprinted or redistributed for commercial use without prior written permission from the author. If you have any questions about permissions, please contact Klaus Nellen at IWM, Spittelauer Laende 3, A - 1090 Vienna, Fax +(431) 31358-30, e-mail <nellen@iwm.at>.

Preferred Citation: Wrobel, Szymon. *Power, Subject and the Concept of Rational Action*, in: *A Decade of Transformation*, IWM Junior Visiting Fellows Conferences, Vol. 8: Vienna 1999



Power, Subject and the Concept of Rational Action

Szymon Wrobel

When I have found an interesting flower or herb I try to figure out how it will fit together with others, whether it can create a bouquet or pattern. This is constructive puzzle-work.

Jürgen Habermas

The author is the principle of thrift in the proliferation of meaning... The author is therefore the ideological figure by which one marks the manner in which we fear the proliferation of meaning.

Michel Foucault

1. The concept of Rational Action in the Enlightenment Tradition - An Attempt of Explication

1.1. Primal Story

The rationality of beliefs and actions is naturally a timeless topic of philosophical investigations. "One could even say that philosophical thought originates in reflection on the reason embodied in cognition, speech, and action; and reason remains

its basic theme."¹ In the Enlightenment tradition, rationality is typically seen as a concept that is well defined and context-independent.² We know what rationality is, and rationality is supposed to be constant over time and place. Philosophy in this tradition often presents rationality as independent of social, cultural and historical context, especially in universal philosophical, ethical or scientific imperatives. If these imperatives are followed, the result is supposed to be rational and generally acceptable actions. For example, in the field of science we could find such an imperative like this that is typical for the empiricist point of view: if you want to be a good empiricist you must be prepared to work with only one theory (i.e., with a single point of view and "experience"). In other words, all theoretical predicates should be translatable into observational predicates. It is also supposed that there are simple forms of inference, which all rational persons find compelling.³ Similarly on the moral ground, Immanuel Kant tells us that a good action toward another person does not count as a moral action unless the person is thought of as a rational being rather than as a relative, a neighbor or a fellow citizen. So, Kant saw respect for "reason," the common core of humanity, as the only motive which justifies the moral sense.⁴

But what does it mean exactly to say that persons behave "rationally" in a certain situation or that their expressions can count as "rational?" The question is important because we often tend to reach for a characterization of the concept of rationality merely in formal terms. Can rationality be seen only as logical consistency? And in this sense can someone who acts in violation of her own interests be considered irrational? In this way of questioning, I would like to touch not only on the foundational issues of how the social sciences should proceed, but also on the much more troublesome issue of how we, as men and women, should properly understand ourselves.

¹ Habermas (1984: 2).

² The "Enlightenment tradition" is understood here as the modernity tradition from the Reformation as manifested in efforts to strengthen the domains of cognitive rationality, moral autonomy, and social and political self-determination.

³ Lukes (1984: 195-213); Lukes (1982: 261-305).

⁴ Strictly speaking, according to Kant, a human action is moral not because it is done from immediate inclination - the reason of this action lies in self-interest - but because it is done for the sake of duty. However, an action done from duty has its moral worth not from the results it seeks to attain, but from formal principles or maxims. Kant (1993: 54-135); Paton (1993: 13-49); Deleuze (1984: 28-45); Rorty (1989: 191-196).

I am going to argue that rationality is a context-dependent concept and that the context of rationality is simply power. This is my basic *thesis* - that power not only blurs the dividing line between rationality and rationalization, but more power establishes the essential limits of the expression of one's rationality.

Let me repeat the question: What does it mean to say that a person behaves rationally? Here is the *typical story* one often sees in this context:⁵ An agent (some person) finds herself in a certain situation *S* and believes that a certain set of behavioral options is available to her in this situation. The set of behavioral options is the set of actions the agent believes that she can do. In the next step, the probable consequences of performing each action (behavioral options) are predicted; i.e., an agent computes a set of hypotheses of roughly the form: if action *A* is performed in situation *S*, then, with a certain probability, one may expect a consequence *Q*. Subsequently, a preference ordering is assigned to the consequences. In sum we have the *result*: the person's choice of action is determined as a function of the preferences and the probabilities assigned. Briefly then, an agent chooses and produces behavior which would probably lead to a highly valued consequence for her. In other words, who wills the end wills the means.

Yet there is a problem here. The problem lies with the *normativism* of this model. We do not always contemplate each (or indeed any) of the behavioral options we believe to be available to us in a given situation. Nor do we always assess our options in light of what we take to be their likely consequences. Existentialists, like Jean-Paul Sartre, make a point of never doing so.⁶

Furthermore, the model presupposes a completely free *will* of a person. According to the model, an agent has unconstrained freedom of will, which among others explains the possibility of error. Thanks to the will, a person is able to control her effects and her behavior in an absolute way. "Freedom," in this theoretical context, means the possibility of making different choices.

⁵ For a more precise explication of the concept of rationality in terms of computational theory of mind, see Fodor (1976: 21-26).

⁶ Sartre (1956).

1.2. *The Idea of Enlightenment*

This point is entirely in harmony with the fundamental idea of Immanuel Kant's concept of *Enlightenment*. Being an adult person is equal with being the Master of the Self. Enlightenment, according to Kant, is "... man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding without the guidance of another person...Have the courage to use your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment."⁷ "Understanding without the guidance of another person" means "guided by *reason*." "Another person" is, in the life cycle, replaced by "reason." Every adult person ought to make her own decisions and take full responsibility for them since when achieving a kind of maturity at some point of her life, she also achieves a sense of an inner locus of control.

But the paradox is that in this theoretical context self-control is only a consequence of the fact that society at first established its own control - the control of someone else over me. The power someone else has over me is the basic condition and premise of the establishment of power of me over myself. The very sense of *autonomy*, as in an individual as in a social development, comes later than the sense of *heteronomy*. Similarly, the sense of the *external* locus of control comes earlier than the sense of the *inner* locus of control.

From Nature's point of view, I stopped being a child when I became able to have children, but from Culture's perspective I am still a child since I have no job and still have a lot to learn. By "immaturity," Kant means a certain state of our will. We are in the state of "immaturity" when, for example, a book takes the place of our understanding, when a spiritual director takes the place of our conscience, and even when a doctor decides for us what our diet should be. At the moment, I am eager to ask: Do we establish so much discipline in society that we do not yet need more external authority which would be obligated to control and examine the moral sense of our actions?

Because for Kant, the Enlightenment is not a world era to which one belongs, but rather is a process, a task and an obligation that releases us from immaturity - an immature status for which man himself is responsible. The Enlightenment means achieving mature responsibility; it is the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use without subjecting itself to any authority. But the concept of authority is important because it also generates further puzzlement.

⁷ Kant (1996: 58).

1.3. *The Concept of Power*

Of course, I realize that the concept of power is one of those concepts that is unavoidably value-dependent and even more essentially contested. Power might well be an instance of what Ludwig Wittgenstein famously termed a "family-resemblance concept" - a loose grouping of individuals, each characterized by one or another set of overlapping features or similarities, no one of which pervades them all.⁸

Moreover, every definition of a concept of power also is inextricably tied to a given set of value-assumptions which predetermine the range of its empirical application. But as the point of departure we may take for our purpose perhaps the most simple so-called *intuitive concept of power*, which was *inter alia* described by Robert Dahl. According to this concept, *A* (i.e., a person or a group of persons) has power over *B* (i.e., another person or other group of persons) to the extent that she causes *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do. In other words, in this theoretical context the concept of power refers to all forms of control by *A* over *B*. In the simplest interpretation, *A* exercises power over *B* when *A* affects *B* in a manner contrary to *B*'s interests.⁹

In this way we are able to define another set of concepts connected with power.¹⁰ For the extension of the concept of power is very vast; it embraces coercion, influence, authority, force and manipulation. *Coercion*, for example, exists where *A* affects *B*'s compliance by threatening deprivation or other unpleasant sanctions. *Influence* exists where *A*, without resorting to either a tacit or an overt threat of deprivation causes *B* to change her course of action. An example of the case of influence is, perhaps, authority. In a situation involving *authority*, *B* subjects *A* because she recognizes that *A*'s command is reasonable in terms of her own values or because its content is legitimate. The power of *A* over *B* is, in legitimized form, the "right" of *A*, as a decision-making unit involved in a collective process. These decisions are made, of course, in the interest of the effectiveness of the collective as a whole. In the case of *force*, *A* achieves her aims by stripping *B* from the preference order and free will. "Naked" force (i.e., violence) in this sense is the "top" boundary of power. The simple example of this case is tyranny. The "naked" freedom, however, perhaps is the bottom boundary of power; pure anarchy is the simple example of this case. Democracy in this architectural order is in the middle. Its

⁸ Wittgenstein (1958: 43).

⁹ Dahl (1957: 201-205).

¹⁰ Lukes (1984: 17-20).

basic feature is a kind of equilibrium between power and freedom. For power is exercised only over a free subject because "to govern" means "to structure" one's order or preference. Maybe this is the reason why Hannah Arendt wrote that "violence can always destroy power" and "power and violence are opposites."¹¹

1.4. *The Paradox of Rationality and Power*

Now that we have been acquainted and prepared, we again may come back to our primal problem, and, chiefly, to deliberate our paradox in other ways. The concept of acting, in which one realizes the will of someone else, is involved in some *important paradox* in the significant antinomy. On the one hand, the act of fulfilling the other's command is a kind of intentional action. Most people yield to public authority not from fear of punishment or in hope of a compensatory reward, but because they are *law-abiding* citizens. There is a great number of such situations in which submission comes because the individual believes or has been persuaded that this is somehow the better course for her. It is a submission that derives from belief. Power, as Bertrand Russell many years ago observed, is derived to some extent from prepositional attitudes. Armies are useless unless the soldiers believe in the cause for which they are fighting. Law is impotent unless it is generally respected. Economic institutions depend upon respect of the law.¹²

But, on the other hand, as we know, acting intentionally means acting according to one's own plan or program. Being rational is being intentional.¹³ It means that one is able to design one's behavior. But when one submits to the power of someone else, performing another person's command, then one's activity seems to be designed by the other person and *not* by herself. However, someone who acts in violation of her own interests can be considered irrational. Thus, does the act of submission indeed reveal the will and intention of an acting agent? Is submission to authority compatible with the exercise of reason? Is authority by definition legiti-

¹¹ Arendt (1970: 44-56).

¹² Russell (1938: 136).

¹³ I recall Dennett's intentional-system theory which depends upon what he calls "stances." Stances are strategies that one may adopt to predict the behavior of a person or machine. From the *physical stance*, objects are described and their behavior predicted on the basis of physical constitution. From the *design stance*, objects are described and their behavior predicted in terms of normal operation or function. From the *intentional stance*, objects are described and their behavior predicted by attributing rationality to them - that is, by ascribing to them a system of the possession of certain information and supposing it to be directed by certain goals. From the intentional stance, one can assume that the agent will select an optimal strategy to reach his or her or its goals. Dennett (1983: 384-390).

mate? And is it by definition consensual? In other words, an agent, while submitted to someone else's will, produces behavior that would probably lead to a highly valued consequence not for her but for her commander. In this case, one may have some doubts whether such behavior is rational in the above-mentioned concept of rationality.

Perhaps this antinomy is the central question of all political philosophy since it concerns the nature of the authority of the state. As Peter Winch showed, the concept of such authority is similar to the above-mentioned philosophical puzzle. On the one hand, it seems to involve a power "to kill" (or better "to override") the will of the individual citizen. While on the other hand, the existence of power in a certain sense seems to depend on the wills of the individuals who are subject to it. For they can decide whether or not to acknowledge it as *legitimate*. Where there is not such an acknowledgement, one feels hesitant in saying that one is dealing with an instance of political authority at all.¹⁴

In my opinion there exist only two different kinds of philosophical reactions to this paradox. The first reaction, which may be called *anarchical*, makes an assumption that the approbation of power is an irrational act since power is the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior of other persons.¹⁵ Consequently, power is also the ability of imposing one's preference order, which is the essence and the guarantee of individual rationality.

The second treatment of power, which may be called *legitimise*, makes an assumption that the approbation of power may be (and indeed often is) a part of wider rationality (i.e., power may be understood as a means of the achievement of some oversingular social good). And in this context one may, or rather even must, sometimes renounce her own rationality (i.e. preference order) to realize the very idea of social rationality. Indeed, when power, as seen here, requires the prior consent of those over whom it is exercised, then it will also be recognized that power can never be exercised by means of the use of violence.

¹⁴ Winch (1972: 90-109).

¹⁵ Max Weber, while deeply fascinated by the complexity of the subject of power, contented himself with the definition close to everyday understanding, which I use here. Bendix (1960: 294-300).

1.5. Searching for Solutions

In the next step I will argue that Michel Foucault's and Jürgen Habermas's dispute about the normative distinctions between the legitimate and illegitimate uses of power resulted from different "solutions" to this paradox of "rationality and power" as well as from different treatments of the very concept of the Enlightenment.¹⁶

Foucault's point of view is closer to the anarchical "solution" of this paradox (as I shall call the point of view which believes in the concept of individual rationality against the concept of the oversingular social rationality). He also stresses the idea of the *autonomy* of the Enlightenment tradition in that he expects modern man not to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden truth, but rather try to invent himself. From this point of view, the Enlightenment does not liberate man in his own being; rather it compels him to face the task of producing himself.¹⁷

Habermas, in contradistinction to Foucault, is closer to the legitimate "solution" of the paradox of the "rationality and power" (as I shall call the point of view that assumes that coherence of society is the consequence of *consensus omnium*) and maintains that only *responsible* persons can behave rationally.

I have chosen these two philosophers not incidentally since I think they represent in very spectacular ways two views, or perhaps even two schools of thought of Western political society. Both these views are intended to explain what has been, and, I am afraid, what will continue to be the most puzzling problem of social philosophy - how it is that human societies *cohere*.¹⁸

In my opinion, Habermas develops a school of thought according to which social order results from a general agreement of values, a *consensus omnium* which outweighs all possible or actual differences of opinion and interest. Foucault, in contradistinction to Habermas, develops another school of thought which holds

¹⁶ A formal debate between Foucault and Habermas never took place. Some Americans proposed a conference in the early 1980s to allow them to air their differences in the public sphere. One major reason why neither event materialized was, of course, Foucault's death. But the more philosophical reason was that the two thinkers could not agree on the topic for the conference which would have set stage for their debate. According to Foucault, the Americans suggested a conference on the topic of modernity. But he claimed not to understand what problems modernity represented. He saw himself as a modernist, where modernism is understood as more of an attitude than a historical period. Habermas has a different account, saying that Foucault would argue that modernity should be abandoned rather than competed. Kelly (1994 B: 2-3).

¹⁷ Foucault (1984 c: 32-50).

¹⁸ For an offering of some interesting and important answers to this question, see Dahrendorf (1959: 158-240), Dahrendorf (1990: 25-34).

that the coherence and order in society are founded on force and constraint, on the domination of some and the subjection of others. According to the first school, society in some sense and to some extent is a kind of *contract of cooperation*, meaning that every functioning social structure is based on a consensus of values among its members. According to the second school, society is in some sense and to some extent a kind of *contract of domination*, meaning that every society is based on the coercion of some of its members by others.

The principle distinction between Habermas and Foucault lies in the answer to the following question: Are there social norms claiming legitimacy which are genuinely accepted by those who follow and internalize them *or* do they merely stabilize the relations of power? Habermas tells us that there are such norms that are (and even should be) genuinely accepted. Foucault, on the contrary, demonstrates that such a set of values merely stabilizes the relations of power.

2. Jürgen Habermas's Point of View (The Side of the Contract of Cooperation)

2.1. First Differentiations

The idea of *cognitive-instrumental rationality*, from Habermas's point of view, is the simple consequence of an atomistic perspective of thought, according to which the subject stands over and against a world of objects to which it has two basic *relations*: representation and action. The concept of purposeful-rational action is based on the assumption that the subject is capable of gaining knowledge about an environment and putting it to effective use in intelligently adapting and manipulating that environment. So, the cognitivist version of rationality asserts that goal-directed actions can be rational only if the actor satisfies the conditions necessary for realizing her intention to intervene successfully in the world. In this model rational actions basically have the character of goal-directed, feedback-controlled interventions in the world of existing states of affairs.

Habermas reckons that the concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality can (or rather should) fit into the more *comprehensive* concept of *communicative rationality*. If the rationality of one's person is measured by the success of goal-directed interventions, it suffices to require that a person be able to choose among alternatives and control some conditions in her environment. But if rationality is measured by whether the processes of reaching understanding are successful, such capacities do not suffice.

In this context it is also clear why Habermas is eager to shift to the *paradigm of language* - but not language as a syntactic or semantic system or engine, but "language-in-use." According to Habermas, the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members, and this coordination is established through communication. From this premise Habermas moves to the conclusion that the reproduction the species requires satisfying the conditions of rationality inherent in communicative action. Language is a means of communication which serves *mutual* understanding, whereas actors, in coming to an understanding with one another so as to coordinate their actions, pursue their *particular* aims. Hence the problem of how communication in general is possible.

2.2. *The Idea of Successful Communication*

Communication is *successful* only when the hearer infers the speaker's intentions from the character of the utterance she produces. Therefore, communication between speaker and hearer requires that the hearer should be able to infer what the speaker believes from what she says. When the speaker's beliefs are true, the hearer will also be able to infer how the world is from what the speaker says. Someone uses her language coherently when there is certain correspondence between what she believes and the form of words she uses to express her beliefs. In the case of public languages this correspondence holds true because the speaker knows and adheres to the conventions that govern language. Such conventions fundamentally are the rules which pair prepositional attitudes, such as beliefs, with the forms of words that express those attitudes.

Language, according to Habermas, is the medium of the socialization process. There are two basic moments of the movement of the development of Subject - *individualisation* and *universalization*, subjective freedom and rational community - that Habermas wants to integrate in one medium (i.e., in the language).¹⁹ Habermas makes the same move as George Herbert Mead in *Mind, Self and Society* when he tries to construe reason as the internalization of the social norm rather than as a built-in component of the human self.²⁰

As the author of *Die Einbeziehung des Anderes*, Habermas seeks to defend the values of the Enlightenment by replacing the "philosophy of subjectivity" with a

¹⁹ Habermas's reflections always point to the thesis that "the unity of reason only remains perceptible in the plurality of its voices - as the possibility in principle of passing from language into another..." Habermas (1992: 117).

²⁰ Mead (1965).

"philosophy of intersubjectivity" - by *replacing* the old traditional "subject-centred conception of 'reason'" with what he calls "communicative reason;" he thinks that the lack of sense of rationality as social rationality was the basic lack of the philosophy of the subject.²¹ So, Habermas has sought to examine how language brings us together into a community with others. "Our first sentence," he wrote in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, "expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus."²² In the act of speaking, we enter into an implicit and unavoidable contract with others that commits us to clarifying, discussing and reformulating what it is we have said. Our language is extraordinarily well stocked with devices for initiating further discussion. For it works in the way it must implicitly contain within itself the promise of a community bound together by mutual understanding and agreement.

2.3. *Argumentation*

The rationality inherent in the communication practice is seen in the fact that the achieved agreement must be based on some reasons. A person whose behavior may be acknowledged as rational should provide reasons for her expressions. For this reason the concept of communicative rationality can be adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of argumentation. On this point Habermas is inclined to claim that we call persons rational who can *justify* their actions, who are not "deaf to argument" and who are "open to argument." Argumentation already plays an important role in the learning process. A rational person should be able to learn from his mistakes, from the refutations of hypotheses and from the failure of interventions.

This point approaches Habermas's theory to the *genetic epistemology* of Jean Piaget. In the tradition of Piaget, cognitive development is conceptualized as the internally reconstructable sequences of stages of competence. This is the process of embodying rationality, which cannot be interpreted as a learning process in the strict sense, but at last as an increase in adaptive capacities. Habermas is interested in the procedural concept of rationality, which can be worked out in terms of the pragmatic logic of argumentation. "Rationality" refers in the first instance to the disposition of speaking and acting subjects to acquire and use fallible knowledge.

Communicative reason is expressed in a decentered understanding of the world. Thus for Piaget, cognitive development signifies in general the *decentration* of an

²¹ Habermas (1992: 149-204).

²² Habermas (1971: 314).

egocentric understanding of the world. Whereas contact with external nature, which is established through instrumental action, mediates the constructive acquisition of the system of *intellectual norms*, interaction with other persons opens the way for growing constructively into the socially recognized system of *moral norms*. Piaget draws a distinction between dealing with physical objects and dealing with social objects, that is a reciprocal action between a subject and objects and reciprocal action between a subject and other subjects.²³

Objections to this style of thinking have frequently been brought by thinkers in the hermeneutic tradition, most notably Hans-Georg Gadamer, who, in his important debate with Habermas in the 1960s, accused Habermas of being unconsciously guided by the image of an "anarchistic utopi" insofar as he believed it possible to submit all inherited authority to a demand for rational justification.²⁴ For Gadamer, "It is not so much our judgements as it is our prejudices that constitute our being."²⁵ In other words, "tradition" reaches deeper than any possible explicitly attained consensus, even if the consensus rests on rational argumentation. According to this idea, history does not belong to us, but rather we belong to history. "Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society and state in which we live."²⁶ *Prejudices* are the grounds of our knowledge; they are only judgements made before all the elements of a situation have been ascertained. But Gadamer does not answer the question as to which way we could distinguish between blind prejudices and those which are justified, since both equally constitute our being.

2.4. *A Case of Distorted Communication*

In conditions of normal (undisturbed) communication, intelligibility (understanding) is guaranteed by the linguistic competence of the participants of interaction. Noam Chomsky theoretically reconstructed this competence. Starting from his own research, Chomsky asked: How is it that on the basis of a partial and fragmentary set of experiences, individuals in every culture are able not only to learn their own language, but also to use it in a creative way? The *creative aspect of language use* is the distinctively human ability to express new thoughts and to understand entirely new expressions of thought within the framework of an

²³ Piaget (1930), Habermas (1984: 68-70).

²⁴ Gadamer (1976a: 42), How (1995).

²⁵ *Ibid.* p. 9.

²⁶ Gadamer (1989: 276-277).

"instituted language." For Chomsky, there was only one possible answer; there must be a bio-physical structure underlying the mind which enables us, both as individuals as a species, to deduce from the multiplicity of individual experiences a unified language.²⁷

Intelligibility is, however, only one of requirements made of the language which may be immanently fulfilled by it. According to Habermas, this is why linguistic competence being "a monologue ability" must be supplemented with socio-culture elements in order to assume only in this way that we may obtain a form of full *communicative competence*. The main source of the latter is the theory of speech acts whose basic intuitions are borrowed by Habermas from John L. Austin and John R. Searle.²⁸

According to Searle, speaking a language is engaging in a highly complex rule-governed form of behavior. To learn and master a language is *inter alia* to learn and to have mastered these rules.²⁹ But the unit of linguistic communication, as generally has been supposed, is not the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbols, words or sentences, but rather the production or issuance of the symbols or words or sentences in the performance of the *speech act*. Speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions and making promises.³⁰

Speaking a language is performing acts according to rules, but not contingency rules. The semantic structure of language may be regarded as a conventional realization of a series of sets of underlying constitutive rules. In general we might say that *constitutive* rules create or define some forms of behavior. The rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or chess, but they create the very possibility of playing such games. In contradistinction, *regulative* rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior. For example, many rules of etiquette regulate interpersonal relationships which exist independently of the rules.³¹

But every day we have to deal with notoriously "systematically distorted communication" which makes it impossible to reach an agreement. In order to free communication from disturbances, one should submit it to criticism (i.e., to the process

²⁷ Chomsky (1974: 140).

²⁸ Searle (1969).

²⁹ *Ibid.* p. 12.

³⁰ *Ibid.* p. 16.

³¹ *Ibid.* p. 33.

of understanding and explaining symbols and causes of deviation). According to Habermas, reason can be defended only by way of the *critique of reason*. He believes that a particularly effective role in the process of freeing communication from disturbances may be played by psychoanalysis by using effective methodological assumptions, and within them the procedure of "explaining understanding." From some point of view, Habermas is inclined to repeat Sigmund Freud's well-known dictum that "the *ego* is not master in its own house," meaning that we often act in ways that could not have been predicted on the basis of our introspective beliefs and desires.

The grammar of ordinary language governs not only the connection of symbols but also the interweaving of linguistic elements, expressions and action patterns. In the case of undistorted communication, these three categories of expressions are *complementary* so that linguistic expressions "fit" interactions as well as both language and action "fit" experienced expressions. In the case of distorted communication, a language game can *disintegrate* to the point where the three categories of expressions no longer agree. Then actions and non-verbal expressions belie what is expressly stated. But the acting subject belies herself only for others who interact with her and observe her deviation from the grammatical rules of the language game. The acting subject herself cannot observe the discrepancy, or if she does observe it, she cannot understand it; for she both expresses and misunderstands herself.³²

Psychoanalytic interpretation is concerned with those connections of symbols in which a subject *deceives* itself about itself. For Freud, language is not only a means of the expression of thoughts in words, but also the *language of gestures* and every other mode of expression of psychic activity. "Then it may be pointed out - we may read in Freud's work - that the interpretations of psychoanalysis are primarily translations from a mode of expression that is alien to us into one with which our thought is familiar."³³

In the methodically rigorous sense, "*distorted communication*" means every deviation from the model of the language game of communicative action in which motives of action and linguistically expressed intentions coincide. In this model, split-off symbols and need dispositions connected with them are not allowed. They exist not without consequences on the level of public communication. "This model, however, could be generally applicable only under the conditions of non-

³² Habermas (1971: 215-245).

³³ Freud (1967: 176).

repressive society. Therefore deviations from it are the normal case under all known social conditions."³⁴ The institution of *power relations* necessarily restricts public communication.

The disturbance of communication does not require an interpreter who mediates between partners of divergent languages, but rather one who teaches the very same subject to comprehend her own language. "Thus psychoanalytic hermeneutics, unlike the cultures sciences, aims not at the understanding of symbolic structures in general. Rather, the act of understanding to which it leads is *self-reflection*."³⁵ According to this view, maturity will consist in the ability to seek out a new re-description of one's own past, in an ability to take an ironic view of oneself.

3. Michel Foucault's Point of View (The Side of the Contract of Domination)

3.1. The Nature of Power

In the first approximation we could say that Michel Foucault exchanges Jürgen Habermas's idea of the "contract of co-operation" for the idea of the "contract of *domination*." Foucault says that in practice it is difficult to think of human association without an element of domination. Where there is society there is a power. A society without power relations can only be an abstraction. But according to Foucault, power is very specific instrument. Power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus. There are not reconstituted "above" societies as a supplementary structure whose effacement one could perhaps only dream of. Whereas Habermas sees language as a medium of socialization, Foucault sees power as a precondition of social life.

Foucault is not inclined to agree with the claim that the class of sovereignty (rulers) is identical to the class of owners (masters) in the measures of pressure and means of production. In other words, he is not eager to agree with Karl Marx's equation that power equals property. Moreover, Foucault asserts that power neither executes only repressive functions, nor performs by means of exclusion, oppression, isolation or censorship, to work as a huge *superego*. In this sense, he is not eager to agree with Sigmund Freud's equation that power equals repression.

³⁴ Habermas (1971: 226).

³⁵ *Ibid.* p. 228.

The course of study that Foucault followed for a long period of time was concerned with the *how* of power. He tried to show the rules of right that provide the formal delimitation of power and the effects of truth that this power produces, transmits and reproduces. In this context he asked: Should we not analyze the concept of power primarily in terms of struggle, conflict and war before we begin to analyze it in terms of a legitimacy to be established? Thus, Foucault proposes to analyze the concept of power according to several methodological precautions.

First, power is exercised rather than possessed (for instance, by individuals in the state of nature, by a class, by the people). Hence, power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a *chain*. It is never localized here or there, never placed in anybody's hands and never appropriated as a commodity or a piece of wealth.

Second, power should be analyzed as coming from the *bottom* level of society up. What this means is that power does not flow from a centralized source from top to bottom (for instance, law, the economy, the state).

Third, power is not primarily repressive, but *productive*. It is quite possible that the major mechanisms of power have been accompanied by ideological productions. There probably has been an ideology of education, an ideology of the monarchy and an ideology of parliamentary democracy. But according to Foucault, power produces much more and much less than ideology. Power, above all, is an effective instrument for the formation and accumulation of knowledge. Its means are methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research and apparatuses of control.³⁶

The specific nature of power constitutes the possibility of acting upon another acting subject; power exists only when it is put into action. Perhaps the term *conduct* is one of the best keys to understanding the meaning of the term "power relations." For "to conduct" means "to lead" others and to determine a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities (individual order of preferences).

³⁶ Foucault (1994: 26); Kelly (1994a: 374).

3.2. *The Force of Interpretation*

Paraphrasing Ludwig Wittgenstein, one could say that "the World is all that is the case," but according to Foucault, "what is the case" is not simply "the existence of states of affairs" but rather the existence of states of affairs asserted by power.³⁷ The freedom to *interpret* and use "rationality" and "rationalization" for the purposes of power is the crucial element in enabling power to define reality and, hence, an essential feature of the rationality of power. Power concerns itself with defining reality rather than with discovering what reality "really" is. This is the single most important characteristic of the *rationality of power*. Defining reality by defining rationality is the principal means by which power exerts itself. This is not to imply that power seeks out rationality and knowledge because rationality and knowledge are power. Rather, power defines what is counted as rationality and knowledge and thereby what is *counted as* reality.

If interpretation was the slow exposure of the meaning hidden in an origin, then only metaphysics could interpret the development of humanity. But if interpretation is the violent appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning, in order to impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a different game, and to subject it to secondary rules, then the development of humanity is a series of interpretations.³⁸ "Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violence in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination."³⁹ We believe that feelings and human values are immutable, but every sentiment has its own history. We believe, for example, that the body obeys the exclusive laws of physiology and that it escapes the influence of history; but even this, too, is false. The body is subjected to a great many distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest and holidays.

This understanding of power is in accordance with a basic Nietzschean insight that *interpretation* is not only commentary, but rather "interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something."⁴⁰ Power does not limit itself, however, to simply defining a given interpretation or view of reality; rather power *defines* and creates concrete social reality. Like Friedrich Nietzsche, Foucault believes that our

³⁷ Wittgenstein (1961: 2).

³⁸ Foucault (1984b: 86).

³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 85.

⁴⁰ Nietzsche (1968: 342); Nietzsche (1969: 77).

need to impose structure upon behavior is derived from a *will to power* that exists apart from the meanings we employ to justify or explain such authority. Nietzsche, in fact, claims that self-delusion to be part of the will to power. For him, rationalization is necessary for survival.⁴¹ According to Foucault, man is not a rational animal, but merely an animal that is sometimes inclined to make rationalization and power a kind of institution (or rather strategy) that presents rationalization as rationality.

3.3. *The Basic Social Technologies*

In any case to live in society is to live in such a way that action upon other actions is possible - and in fact ongoing. Hence Foucault is trying to distinguish power relations from relationships of communication, which transmit information by means of language, a system of signs or any other symbolic medium. No doubt communicating is always a certain way of acting upon another person or persons. But, according to Foucault, communicating relations on the other hand, is not simply an aspect of the relations of power or *vice versa*. Power relations have a *specific* nature. Therefore, power relations, relationships of communication, objective capacities and goal-directed actions should not be confused. However, I am not sure if when Foucault distinguishes among domination, communication, and finalized activity that he indeed has seen them in three separate domains.

In any given society there is no general type of equilibrium between finalized activities, systems of communication and power relations. Rather there are diverse forms, diverse places, and diverse circumstances in which these interrelationships establish themselves according to a specific model. As the point of departure, we may assume that there exist three or perhaps even four major types of "technolo-

⁴¹ Nietzsche's influence is obvious in Foucault's texts. In *Book One of The Gay Science*, Nietzsche spells out some of the "histories" that need to be written in the study of moral matters, explicitly mentioning areas Foucault would later cover: "So far, all that has given colour to existence still lack a history. Where could you find a history of love, of avarice, of envy, of conscience, of pious respect for tradition, or of cruelty? Even a comparative history of law or at least of punishment is so far lacking complete." Nietzsche (1974: 81). Similarly, Nietzsche's focus on the development of "calculable" individuals through "the labour performed by man upon himself" also would be central to Foucault's work. Nietzsche (1969: 59). Part of the *originality of Nietzsche* lies in seeing that studies of such issues need to be carried out. The *originality of Foucault* lies in actually carrying out the studies. Even though Nietzsche's influence on Foucault is apparent. Foucault rarely mentions Nietzsche in his writings. In an interview given a few weeks before his death, however, Foucault explained that Nietzsche was one of the philosophers he had read the most, describing himself as "simply Nietzschean." Foucault (1985: 9).

gies:" (1) technologies of *production*, which permit us to produce, transform or manipulate things; (2) technologies of *signs* systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols or signification; (3) technologies of *power*, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination - an objectivizing of the subject; (4) and maybe also technologies of the *self*, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom or perfection.⁴²

But it should to be kept in mind that these types of technologies hardly ever function separately. Finalizing activities, systems of communication and power relations, therefore, are welded together. Certain situations or institutions give pre-eminence to power relations and abidance (for example, prisons and penal-type institutions), sometimes to goals-directed actions (as in workshops or hospitals), and sometimes to relationships of communication (as in the apprenticeship institutions). And finally, we can find such exiting institutions where a redundancy of signs is strongly connected with power relations and the production of technical effects (as in military institutions). So, in this case it would be difficult to say which level (technologies) is the dominant one.

3.4. *The Problem of Subject*

Foucault's work has dealt with three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects. The *first* mode is the objectivizing of the speaking subject in linguistics, or the objectivizing of the productive subject in economics, or the objectivizing of the sheer fact of being alive in biology. In *The Order of Things* Foucault seeks to show that it is only quite recently that "man" has emerged as an object of our knowledge. It is an error to believe that he has been the object of curiosity for thousands of years; he is rather the result of a mutation within our culture. Foucault studies this mutation from the seventeenth century onwards in the three domains in which classical language was a privilege in being able to represent the order of things: general grammar, the analysis of wealth and natural history.⁴³

The *second* mode is the objectivizing of the subject in what he calls the "dividing practice." Through this process the subject is divided from others. For example, *Madness and Civilisation* opens with a description of the exclusion and confinement of lepers to a vast network of leper houses scattered at the edges of European cities

⁴² Foucault (1988a: 18).

⁴³ Foucault (1992).

throughout the Middle Ages. The seventeenth century marked the change from the Renaissance to the Classical Age. The leper houses across Europe were suddenly emptied of their lepers and turned into houses of confinement for the poor. Foucault wants to understand the social forces at work throughout Europe, which produced both a dramatic organization of the poor and a cultural classification system of the age, which gathered so many people together into single category.⁴⁴

The *third* mode of objectivizing is the way a human being turns himself or herself into a subject. Foucault's favorite topic is the domain of sexuality. He attempts to answer the question of how men have learned to recognize themselves as subjects of "sexuality."⁴⁵ Foucault suggests that there are three major types of self-examination. First, self-examination with respect to thoughts in correspondence to *reality* (Cartesian type). Second, self-examination with respect to the way our thoughts relate to *rules* of life (Senecan type). Third, self-examination with respect to the relation between the hidden thought and an inner *impurity* (Christian type).

A large part of Foucault's work consists in showing how the patterns of acculturation and socialization characteristic of modern societies have imposed on their members kinds of constraints of which older premodern societies had not dreamed. When Foucault begins *Discipline and Punish* with the detailed, graphic execution of Damians, he knows the readers will react with a sense of the horror of what appears to be a barbaric spectacle of torture. The readers are seduced into taking comfort in the realization that up-to-date methods of punishment are much more humane. But during the reading process, the reader gradually comes to understand what the process of "humanization" involves. For we come to see how "the birth of the prison" is virtually an allegory for the birth of the disciplinary society. In this way Foucault seeks to show us that the inventions of specific types of discourse (for example, psychology and pedagogy) do not liberate us from repression but rather subject us to a new, more subtle control of our body and minds.

Everywhere Foucault looked he found complicity between the Enlightenment and domination. But at times even Foucault took up the banner of the Enlightenment, and in the last decade of his life he announced that he would like to see his work understood as a part of the "critical ontology of ourselves" that Kant's work had opened. But for Foucault the Enlightenment meant above all else having the courage to reinvent oneself.⁴⁶ This is the search summed up in English poet Wil-

⁴⁴ Foucault (1984a: 125-167).

⁴⁵ Foucault (1982: 208).

⁴⁶ Foucault (1984c: 38-40).

liam Blake's exclamation, "I must create my own system, or be enslaved by another man's."⁴⁷

4. *The Final Confrontation*

4.1. *Two Faces of Society*

Neither point of view is merely a point of view; each is a response to something in the social object. In Habermas's case, it is a response to the fundamentally symbolic nature of social action. In Foucault's case, it is a response to the latent and unpleasant functions it fulfills. The alternative between "normative elements in social action" and the factual "substratum of social action" in fact indicates two levels of the social analysis of social structure, which are in no way contradictory. The investigator is free to choose which of these levels she wants to emphasize more strongly. However, in the interest of clarity as well as of comprehensiveness of analysis, she may be well advised not to stress one of these levels to the exclusion of the other.⁴⁸

We may contrast several sets of concepts - stability and instability, integration and conflict, equilibrium and disequilibrium and values and interests - to ascertain that Habermas has apparently chosen only one model of society, namely, the *integration theory of society*. His array of concepts, therefore, is incapable of coping with problems associated with the processes of change, conflicts and the disintegration of the social order. Foucault, on the other hand, has chosen another model of society, namely, the *coercion theory of society*. His array of concepts, therefore, is incapable of coping with problems connected to society's stability, integration structure, functional co-ordination, and consensus of values.

I claim that neither of these models could be conceived as exclusively valid or applicable. They constitute *complementary*, rather than alternative, aspects of the structure of total societies as well as of every element of this structure. We have to choose between them only for the explanation of specific problems. Strictly speaking, both models are "valid," or rather useful and necessary for sociological analysis. We cannot conceive of society unless we realize the interlacing of stability and change, integration and conflict, function and motive force and consensus and coercion.

⁴⁷ Rorty (1991: 193).

⁴⁸ The distinction between normative elements of social action and the factual substratum of action I borrow from Dahrendorf (1959:159).

4.2. Similarities

Habermas and Foucault are similar at least in one point; they both admit that one of the main functions of modern philosophy has been an inquiry into the historical point at which reason could appear in its "adult" form, and that the function of nineteenth-century philosophy consisted of asking the questions: What is the moment when reason accedes to autonomy? What are the consequences of the process of the "disenchantment of the world," as Max Weber calls it? Does this process only mean that the unity of the world has fallen to pieces, and that the gain in control is paid for with the loss of meaning?

They are also similar in other point, namely, in the treatment of the Self-emergence in individual life. When we try to describe how the Self is emerging in individual life we have two possibilities, some kind of tragic alternative. The first solution, the first element of this alternative, assumes that a *social process* or social order is a logical precondition of the appearance of the selves of the individual organism involved in that process (this type of theory I shall call interactionism). The other type of solution, the second element of this alternative, on the contrary, assumes *individual selves* as the logical presuppositions of the social process or order within which they interact (this type of theory I shall call individualism).

The latter theory takes individuals and their individual experiences - individual minds and selves - as logically prior to the social process in which they are involved, and explains the existence of the social process in terms of them. Whereas the former theory takes the social process of experience or behavior as logically prior to the individuals and their individual experiences which are involved in it, and explains their existence in terms of the social process. Foucault and Habermas in contradistinction to Chomsky and Fodor, for example, have chosen the theory which takes social order as prior to the self of the individual organism.

In my opinion, the former theory (i.e., individualism) cannot explain the existence of the minds and selves, that is, cannot explain that which is taken as logically prior at all. Whereas it is not clear to me whether the latter type of theory (i.e., interactionism) can indeed explain that which it takes as logically prior, namely the existence of the social process of behavior, or the social process in terms of such fundamental relations and interactions as reproduction and the cooperation of individuals for mutual protection.

If I have understood the basic insight of Foucault and the fundamental ideas of Habermas, they both are inclined to assert that the mind can never find expression and could never have come into existence at all, except in terms of the social environment. According to Foucault and Habermas, the mind is only the individual

importation of the social process into the individual organism. What they particularly want to emphasize is the temporal and logical pre-existence of the social process to the self-conscious individual that arises in it.

However, in contradistinction to Habermas, Foucault is moving further because he does not think that his conduct toward other human beings is the most important thing. What is more important is his private search for autonomy; his need to create his own system in order to avoid being enslaved by another man's. But if the mind is, as he himself has settled, only the individual importation of the social process into the individual organism, then I am not certain whether he has the right to demand, on the level of moral reflection, that modern man construct himself rather than discover of the principles to which he must conform. If I myself am only a co-product of the social process, then how can I create it and in which way can I be the producer of my "no-own" mind? It is an impossible task, but perhaps impossible aims were attractive to Foucault.

Opposed to Foucault, Habermas says that without surrendering the differentiation that modernity has made possible in the cultural, social and economic spheres, one can find forms of living together in which autonomy and dependency can truly enter into a non-antagonistic relation; that one can walk tall in a collectivity that does not have the dubious quality of substantial backward-looking forms of community.⁴⁹

4.3. Differences

Without placing Habermas's discourse ethics in the same league as Marxism, it may be said that the problem with his discourse ethics is similar to that of some forms of Marxism in the sense that when it comes to organizing a better society, both Marx and Habermas have no account of how to deal with human evil; both assume that the good in human beings will dominate. In effect, this assumption tends to turn both lines of thinking into dogma. It is also what makes them potentially dangerous. History teaches that assuming the non-existence of evil may instead give free reign to evil. Nietzsche in *The Will to Power* acutely observes, "There has never before been a more dangerous ideology - than this will to good."⁵⁰

In commenting on Habermas, Foucault says that the problem is not one of trying to dissolve relations of power in the "utopia of perfectly transparent communication," but one of giving the rules of law, the techniques of management and eth-

⁴⁹ Habermas (1986: 125).

⁵⁰ Nietzsche (1968: 192-193).

ics to "allow these games of power to be played with a minimum of domination."⁵¹ In this place and in this way, we obtain perhaps a chance to create the "ethic of care for the Self as a practice of freedom." But did Foucault really give us these rules?

On the other hand, I agree with Richard Rorty's claim that Foucault's work is pervaded by a crippling ambiguity between "power" as a pejorative term and as a neutral, descriptive term. In the first sense, the concept of power may be useful because it belongs to a semantic field from which concepts, such as "freedom" and "truth," cannot be excluded. In the second sense, the term is vacant since the study of anything (e.g., playing chess, conversing) will be a study of the "strategies of power."⁵² Similarly, Habermas objects to Foucault's paradigm of critique because of its alleged "presentism," "relativism" and "cryptonormativism." In short, Habermas argues that Foucault's notion of power underlies and undermines his notion of critique.⁵³ The problem he locates is: How can we reconcile Foucault's attempt to suspend all questions of normative foundations with his engaged critique of biopower?

Habermas, however, is influenced by another dangerous seduction. It is often emphasized that moral rules work as a lubricant which reduces friction in the machinery of social coexistence. Those who ascribe the role of the lubricant to moral norms to remove, or at least reduce, friction in social contacts, usually refer to a vision of the future ideal and *conflict-free society*; I am afraid this is the case with Habermas. But I side with those who rather abhor such a vision. They deem that certain conflicts are indispensable for the attainment of desirable personality patterns. In fact, a universal conformity is not recommended, even though it would certainly play a mitigating role. Thus, the task of the moralist may not be a complete elimination of conflicts; his task is to anticipate in the selection of conflicts, and to approve or disapprove, those means by which conflicts would be settled.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Foucault (1988b: 18).

⁵² Rorty (1991: 195).

⁵³ Habermas (1995: 276-286).

⁵⁴ At the moment, I am inclined to agree with Rorty's statement that: "To put the differences crudely: Michel Foucault is an ironist who is unwilling to be a liberal, whereas Jürgen Habermas is a liberal who is unwilling to be an ironist." Rorty (1989: 61). It is however worthwhile to recall that Rorty by the term "*liberals*" means "people who think that cruelty is the worst thing we do," and by the term "*ironist*" he means a "person who faces up to the contingency of his or her own most central beliefs and desire - someone sufficiently historicist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those central beliefs and desire refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance." *Ibid.* p.XV.

4.4. Conclusions

Is this, then, my own text writing in the anti-Enlightenment tradition? The answer to this question is clearly both yes and no. *No*, if by anti-Enlightenment one means being opposed to the central ideas of the Enlightenment, such as freedom, justice and truth. I fully share these ideals, and I find them worth striving for. I have deep respect for Francis Bacon's dictum "Knowledge is power." Bacon's idea is fundamental to modernity, democracy and the Enlightenment. But I sometimes cannot help feeling that modernity's elevation of rationality as an ideal seems to result in an ignorance of the real rationality at work in everyday politics, administration and planning. So, the answer to the question is also *Yes*; and in this sense this text must be seen, therefore, as anti-Enlightenment, if by this term we mean being against the general outlook of the Enlightenment and if we mean being against the instruments that the Enlightenment tradition uses to achieve its ideals. The Enlightenment is sorely lacking in these points. The champion thinkers of the *Enlightenment* are useful for theoretically justifying Enlightenment ideals. However, when we move from justifying ideals to understanding how modernity works in practice and to implementing and practically defending the ideals, these thinkers appear weak. Then, the so-called anti-Enlightenment thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault better help us because they are practical thinkers of power.

I maintain that if one takes Enlightenment ideals seriously, one needs to understand the Enlightenment in anti-Enlightenment terms, that is, in terms of Nietzschean *will to power* and Foucauldian *rationality-as-rationalization*. We should not conclude that because Nietzsche and Foucault criticized democracy and other Enlightenment ideals, we cannot use their thinking to understand democracy better and to work for more democracy. In other words, I would like - as Foucault did - to avoid the "blackmail" of the Enlightenment (a simplistic and authoritarian alternative), that is, the request that one has to be "for" or "against" the Enlightenment. You either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism or else you criticize the Enlightenment and try to escape from its principles of rationality.⁵⁵ I cannot see any necessity and need to pose problems in terms of some "either... or." The moral I want to draw, then, is that democracy is not something a society "gets;" democracy must be fought for each and every day in concrete instances, even a long time after democracy is first constituted in a society. Hence, to be a *Nietzschean democrat* is not a contradiction in terms, but a real and productive possibility.

⁵⁵ Foucault (1984c: 43).

Bibliography

ARENDT, Hannah. *On violence*. London, 1970. ISBN 0-15-669500-6.

BENDIX, Reinhard. *Max Weber: an intellectual portrait*. New York: Garden City, 1960. ISBN 0-32-76493-2.

CHOMSKY, Noam. Human nature: justice versus power. In ELDERS, Fons (ed.). *Reflexive water: the basic concerns of mankind*. London, 1974. ISBN 0-232-71243-2.

DAHL, Robert A. The concept of power. *Behavioural science*, 1957, vol.2. pp.201-205.

DAHRENDORF, Ralf.. *Class and class conflict in industrial society*. London, 1959. ISBN 0-34-56234-1.

DAHRENDORF, Ralf.. *Modern social conflict. An essay on the politics of liberty*. Berkeley, 1990. ISBN 0-520-06861-0.

DELEUSE, Gilles. Kant's critical philosophy. The doctrine of the faculties, London 1984. ISBN 0-485-11249-3.

DENNETT, Daniel. Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The 'Panglossian paradigm' defended. *Behavioural and brain sciences*, 1983, vol. 6, pp.343-390.

FODOR, Jerry A. *The language of thought*. Sussex, 1976. ISBN 0-8743-0864-1.

FOUCAULT, Michel. The subject and power. In DREYFUS L. Hubert, RABINOW Paul. *Michel Foucault. Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*, Chicago 1982. pp.208-226. ISBN 0-7108-0450-4.

FOUCAULT, Michel. Madness and civilization. In RABINOW, Paul. (ed.). *The Foucault reader*. New York, 1984a, pp.125-167. ISBN 0-394-52904-9.

FOUCAULT, Michel. Nietzsche, genealogy, history. In RABINOW, Paul. (ed.). *The Foucault reader*. New York, 1984b, pp.76-101. ISBN 0-394-52904-9.

FOUCAULT, Michel. What is Enlightenment? In RABINOW, Paul. (ed.). *The Foucault reader*. New York, 1984c, pp.38-40. ISBN 0-394-52904-9.

FOUCAULT, Michel. Final interview. Conducted by Barbadette Gilles and Scala Andre. *Raritan*, 1985, vol. 4, no.1, pp.4-23.

FOUCAULT, Michel. Technologies of the self. In MARTIN, Luter, GUTMAN, Huck, HUTTON, Patrick H. (ed.). *Technologies of the self*. Massachusetts, 1988a. ISBN 0-645-11198-4.

FOUCAULT, Michel. The Ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom. In BERNAUER, James, RASMUSSEN, David. (ed.). *The final Foucault*. Cambridge, 1988b. ISBN 0-942289-2.

FOUCAULT, Michel. The order of things. An archaeology of the human sciences. London, 1992. ISBN 0-415-04019-1.

FOUCAULT, Michel. Two lectures. In KELLY, Michael. (ed.). *Critique and power. Recasting the Foucault/Habermas debate*. Cambridge, 1994. ISBN 0-262-11182-9.

FREUD, Sigmund. The claims of psychoanalysis to scientific interest. London: The Hogarth Press, 1967.

GADAMER, Hans-Georg. *Truth and method*. London: Sheed and Ward, 1989.

GADAMER, Hans-Georg. On the scope and function of hermeneutical reflection. In LINGE, David E. *Philosophical hermeneutics*. London, 1976a.

GADAMER, Hans-Georg. The universality of the hermeneutic problem. In LINGE, David E. *Philosophical hermeneutics*. London, 1976b.

HABERMAS, Jürgen. *Knowledge and human interests*. Boston, 1971. ISBN 0-80-70-1540-7.

HABERMAS, Jürgen. *Autonomy and solidarity*. London, 1986. ISBN 0-86091-132-2.

HABERMAS, Jürgen. The theory of communicative action. vol. I: reason and the rationalization of society. Boston, 1984. ISBN 0-8070-1506-7 (v.1).

HABERMAS, Jürgen. *Postmetaphysical thinking. Philosophical essays*. Cambridge, 1992. ISBN 0-262-08209-8.

HABERMAS, Jürgen. The philosophical discourse of modernity. Twelve lectures. Cambridge, 1995. ISBN 0-262-08163-6.

HOW, Alan. *The Habermas-Gadamer debate and the nature of the social*. Avebury Brookfield, 1995. ISBN 1 85628 179 5.

KANT, Immanuel. An answer to the question: what is Enlightenment?. In SCHMIDT, James (ed.). *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-century answers and twentieth-century questions*. Berkeley, 1996. ISBN 0-520-20225-2.

KANT, Immanuel. *Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals*. London and New York, 1993. ISBN 0 415 07843 1.

KELLY, Michael. Foucault, Habermas, and the self-referentiality of critique. In KELLY, Michael. (ed.). *Critique and power. Recasting the Foucault/Habermas debate*. Cambridge, 1994a, pp.363-400. ISBN 0-262-11182-9.

KELLY, Michael. Introduction. In KELLY, Michael. (ed.). *Critique and power. Recasting the Foucault/Habermas debate*. Cambridge, 1994b, pp.2-13. ISBN 0-262-11182-9.

LUKES, Steven. *Power: a radical view*. Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1974. ISBN 0-723 08954.

LUKES, Steven. Relativism in its place. In HOLLIS, Martin. LUKES, Steven. (ed.) *Rationalism and relativism*. Cambridge, 1982, pp. 261-310. ISBN 0-262-58061-6.

LUKES, Steven. Some problems about rationality. In WILSON, Bryan R. (ed.). *Rationality*. Oxford, 1984, pp. 194-213. ISBN 0 631 09900 X.

MEAD, George Herbert. *Mind, self, society*. Chicago, 1965.

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *On the genealogy of morals*. New York, 1969.

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *The gay science*. New York, 1974.

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *The will to power*. New York, 1968.

PATON, H.J. Analysis of the argument. In KANT, Immanuel. *Groundwork of the metaphysic of morals*. London and New York, 1993. ISBN 0 415 07843 1.

PIAGET, Jean. *The child's conception of physical causality*. London, 1930.

RORTY, Richard. *Contingency, irony, and solidarity*. New York, 1989. ISBN 0 521 36781 6.

RORTY, Richard. Moral identity and private autonomy: the case of Foucault. In RORTY, Richard. *Essays on Heidegger and others. Philosophical papers volume 2.* Cambridge, 1991, pp. 193-198. ISBN 0-521-35878-7.

RUSSELL, Bertrand. *Power: A new social analysis.* New York, 1938. ISBN 0-415-09456-9.

SARTRE, Jean-Paul. *Situationen: essays.* Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1956.

SEARLE, John R. *Speech acts. An essay in the philosophy of language.* Cambridge, 1969. ISBN 0 521 071844.

WINCH, Peter. *Ethics and action.* London, 1972. ISBN 0 7100 74387.

WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. *Philosophical investigations.* New York, 1958. ISBN 404-08184-X.

WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. *Tractatus logico-philosophicus.* New York, 1961. ISBN 415-05186-X.