The European Union now faces perhaps the greatest challenge in its history. It is expanding – dramatically so – with more than 70 million people becoming eligible for new European passports this year. Simultaneously with this expansion, the Union is attempting to transform itself into a new type of political entity, as it radically redefines itself through the process of drafting and ratifying a constitution.

The Union’s expansion, bringing in ten new member countries, also brings into the Union people who are often much poorer and culturally vastly different from the majority of the citizens in the older member states. The vast majority of these new EU citizens, many of whom endured decades of subjugation to Communist regimes, hold thoughts and values indelibly marked by experiences unfamiliar to long-time EU citizens. As a result, economic and cultural differences within the Union have, at a stroke, become much greater and more intense. The constitutional process to define the Union in a more ambitious way fuels this intensity to an even greater degree.

Faced with growing diversity and the rigors of establishing a more demanding kind of unity, what forces can hold the expanded, redefined European Union together? What moral concepts, which traditions, what goals are capable of bringing together the Union’s diverse inhabitants in a democratic structure, and so underpin and anchor the European constitution?

To examine these questions Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission, appointed academics and politicians from a number of Union member countries...
to reflect on the intellectual and cultural dimension of an EU in the process of enlargement – in particular to consider the relevance of this dimension to the cohesion of the expanded and redefined Union.

**Success story of the European Union**

Hitherto the Union has been enormously successful. It established durable bonds which made a European civil war virtually impossible. The Union established a zone of peace founded on freedom, the rule of law, and social justice. Within its member states the Union speeded the task of overcoming the economic consequences of the Second World War, promoting reconstruction and, later, unprecedented affluence across Europe.

Economic integration and the gradual abolition of national economies led the way to this peaceful order. After the First World War, the French army occupied the Ruhr in order to prevent a re-vival of German heavy industry. After the Second World War, the French and the Germans decided to integrate their coal and steel industries. In doing so they laid the foundation stone for a lasting European peace.

A strong political will in the six founding states was needed both to make this development possible and to sustain it. Such a will was possible because of several factors that encouraged integration: the profound and widespread shock of the Second World War; the mounting threat posed by the Soviet Union, and the economic dynamism released by the founding of the Union's precursor, the European Economic Community (EEC), and further enhanced by the integration of national economies.

As memories of the Second World War faded and the risk of conflict between the Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Union receded, the transformation of the EEC into the European Community, and finally into the European Union, pushed the Union's economic goals ever more to the fore. Economic growth, improvement in living standards, extending and enhancing systems of social protection, and ridding off the common market assumed a priority.

**Economic integration is not enough**

But given the growing number of member states, economic and social differences expanded – as did the expectations of EU citizens. Over time, it became increasingly evident that economic integration – no matter how important it and its political consequences may be – is incapable of substituting for the political forces that originally propelled European integration and cohesion.

This is why the aims formulated a few years ago by the Lisbon Council – to make Europe the most competitive economic region in the world by 2010, to establish the labor participation rate of 70%, and to bring about lasting growth, affluence, and social justice – have effectively disappeared from public consciousness. Not only have these goals been overtaken by events; they also do nothing to bring Europeans any closer together. They do not and cannot establish the internal cohesion that is necessary for the European Union; nor, indeed, can economic forces alone provide cohesion for any political identity. To function as a viable and vital polity, the European Union needs a firmer foundation.

It is no coincidence that economic integration is not enough to drive European political reform. Economic integration simply does not, of itself, lead to political integration because markets cannot produce a politically resilient solidarity. Solidarity – a genuine sense of civic community – is vital because the competition that dominates the marketplace gives rise to powerful centrifugal forces. Markets may create the economic basis of a polity and are thereby an indispensable condition of its political constitution. But they cannot on their own produce political integration and provide a constitutive infrastructure for the Union. The original expectation, that the political unity of the EU would be a consequence of the European common market has proven to be illusory.

The question of political unity

Indeed, the current debate over the reform of the Union's Growth and Stability Pact shows once again that economic integration, symbolized by the launching of the euro, can only continue as a basis of Europe's peaceful order if it is followed by a deeper political integration within the Union. A currency union means a common economic policy. But when the forces of cohesion based on shared economic successes wane or are overshadowed by internal competition, a common economic policy requires political integration, i.e. a level of internal cohesion that remains effective even when economic interests diverge.

So Europe's political union demands political cohesion, a politically grounded community bound by the ties of solidarity. Both the future of the Union and the dimensions of its political integration will be decided by whether these political forces of cohesion exist and whether they prove to be adequate in times of crisis.

Recognizing this, the countries of the European Union deliberately set out on the path of political integration. The Union's constitutional process expresses this decision. But how much political integration is necessary and how politically potent should the Union become? To what end does the Union need the political ability to act?

**Why political integration is necessary**

First, because an economic order never evolves in a value-free environment. It needs a legal framework and protection, the development of necessary institutions, and the establishment and enforcement by the state of the standards and duties forged and agreed among the people. An effective and just economic order must also be embedded in the morals, customs, and expectations of human beings, as well as in their social institutions. So the manner in which the larger European economic area – the common market – is in harmony with the values of European citizens, as varied as these may be, is no mere academic problem; it is a fundamental and political one. The constant need to make Europe's political expression reflect the values of Europe's citizens is as significant as the functioning of the common market itself.

Second, this task, the full extent of which became evident with the completion of the common market, requires political institutions with legislative, administrative, and judicial functions. Only by developing such institutions (for example, a structure of economic governance that can manage the currency union) and assuring their political legitimacy, can a viable and vital political entity be created. The Union's constitutional process and the subsequent adoption of the European
constitutional treaty will, it is expected, provide a lasting legitimacy for the institutional framework of a politically constituted Europe. The constitutional treaty is intended to define the Union's political unity.

Third, the Union also needs the political ability to act because it confronts a myriad of new tasks: overcoming the consequences of Europe's aging population; managing, both politically and legally, the desire of people from around the globe to immigrate into the Union; dealing with the increasing inequality that is the direct result of increased immigration as well as the Union's expansion; preserving peace in a globalized world.

Europe's common culture
So where are the forces of cohesion for the new political Union to be found if the common interests produced by economic integration are no longer sufficient? We believe that the older forces that animated European unification are no longer sufficiently powerful to provide genuine political cohesion, and that, therefore, new sources of energy must be looked for and found in Europe's common culture.

This does not, of course, mean that the powers which have served until now will play no role in the future. But what has changed today is the relative significance of the existing forces of cohesion, and their relative contribution to the future unity of Europe. As the old forces of integration—desire for peace, external threats, and economic growth—are losing their effectiveness, the role of Europe's common culture—the spiritual factor of Europe's integration—will inevitably grow in importance as a source of unity and cohesion.

At the same time the meaning of European culture needs to be better understood and made politically effective. A mere list of common European values is not enough to serve as the basis of a common identity through ever-changing conditions.

Europe and its cultural identity thus depend on a constant confrontation with the new, the different, the foreign. Hence the question of European identity will be answered in part by its immigration laws, and in part by the negotiated accession terms of new members. Neither of these—either the immigration laws or the terms of accession—can be determined a priori on the basis of fixed, static definitions, such as a catalogue of “European values”.

Open space instead of fixed boundaries
If Europe is not a fact, but a task, neither can there be any fixed, once and for all defined European boundaries, be they internal or external. Europe's boundaries too must always be renegotiated. It is not geographical or national borders, then, that define the European cultural space—it is rather the latter which defines the European geographical space, a space that is in principle open.

This also means that the common European cultural space cannot be defined in opposition to national cultures. Polish farmers and British workers should not see “European culture” as something foreign or even threatening. For the same reason European culture cannot be defined in opposition to a particular religion (such as Islam). What constitutes the content of “European culture” is not a philosophical question that can be answered a priori; nor is it a merely historical question. It is a question that calls for political decisions which attempt to demonstrate the significance of tradition in the face of future tasks that Europe's Union must address.

European culture, that open space which must be forever redefined, does not, of itself, establish European unity. That unity also requires a political dimension and the decisions that it engenders. But
the common European culture is what gives politics the opportunity to make Europe into a unified political entity.

European civil society

The unity of Europe is not, however, only a political task. Politics can create only the basic conditions for European unification. Europe itself is far more than a political construct. It is a complex - a "cultural" - of institutions, ideas and expectations, habits and feelings, moods, memories and prospects that form a "glue" binding Europeans together - and all these are a foundation on which a political construction must rest. This complex - we can speak of it as "European civil society" - is at the heart of political identity. It defines the conditions of successful European politics, and also the limits of state and political intervention.

In order to foster the cohesion necessary for political unity, European politics must thus support the emergence and development of a civil society in Europe. It is through these institutions of civil society that our common European culture can become a reality. But this also means that politics and state institutions must be ready to recognize their limits.

This self-limitation implies that the political culture of Europe must be compatible with the sense of community rooted in a common European culture. To lay claim to a common European culture and history as the basis of political identity, European political institutions must live up to the expectations engendered by the European cultural tradition. In particular, the exercise of political power must be based on a persuasive and transparent political leadership, rather than express itself as bureaucratic action of questionable legitimacy. Decentralization of public discussion and the processes of decision-making is especially important. Indeed, only decentralization can do justice to the cultural variety and the wealth of forms of social organization that make up the European civil society.

Focus on European solidarity

If the countries of Europe are to grow together into a viable political union, the people of Europe must be prepared for a European solidarity. This solidarity must be stronger than the universal solidarity which binds (or should bind) all human beings together and underlies the idea of humanitarian aid.

European solidarity - the readiness to open one's wallet and to commit one's life to others because they, too, are Europeans - is not something that can be imposed from above. It must be more than institutional solidarity. It must be felt by Europeans as individuals. When individual solidarity is not there, institutionally-based solidarity is not enough to bring a polity into being.

The intellectual, economic, and political tendencies of recent decades - not least the advance of individualism - have led to an erosion of many forms of social solidarity. The crisis of the welfare state may be understood as a consequence of this development. This erosion may also be felt in the context of the recent European enlargement: it is reflected in the diminished willingness - in comparison with earlier expansions - among the citizens of older member countries to lend a hand, economically and politically, to the newcomers.

Strengthening of pan-European solidarity is one of the most important long-term tasks of European politics. In trying to accomplish this task, we should not labor under the illusion that the need for solidarity can be satisfied by institutional measures alone. Rather, all institutional measures must be sustained by the readiness of the population to manifest their own spirit of solidarity. It is thus important to give solidarity an active and prospective, rather than passive and retrospective, dimension: we must define it in terms of the new common tasks that Europe must address - rather than with respect to past achievements in sharing our wealth with the existing members of the Union.

Enlargement as a challenge

A particular challenge for European solidarity arises from the expansion of the Union to countries previously forming part of the Soviet empire. How do we deal with this challenge will be decisive for the future of Europe.

How will this expansion alter the conditions of European solidarity? What do the new members bring to the common table? Will they, as many fear, be mainly spoilers, and will they - traumatized by totalitarianism and lacking a strong Enlightenment tradition - slow down, or even bring to a halt, the process of the Union's democratization? Will they, because of their historically and strategically determined closeness to the United States, frustrate Europe's aspirations to a common foreign policy? Or will the new members not only expose the Union to new dangers but also open up new opportunities?

The year 1989 ushered Europe into a new age. It did not just make possible the enlargement of Europe to the former Communist East. It also enriched Europe. That is why the new members, despite their economic weakness, should be taken in as equal partners in the Union. They should be able to shape the new union together with the old members. But we must look also for other links, for the European face of their traditions and experiences.

That the European Union was given, in 1989, a historic opportunity of rebirth was in large part due to the revolutionary uprisings of people in the Communist-ruled Eastern Europe. The East European revolutions were proof of the strength of the solidarity of a civil society. They are the best evidence that true political realism must take the existence of these bonds into account - and not only the interests writ in stone and mortar of political institutions.

The public role of Religion

In the search for the forces capable of establishing cohesion and identity in the European Union, the question of the public role of European religions is particularly important.

Over the last few centuries, European democratic societies, learning from tragic experience, have attempted to remove religion from the political sphere. Religion was considered, with good reason, to be divisive, not conciliatory. That may still be the case today. But Europe's religions also have a potential to bring people in Europe together, instead of separating them.

We believe that the presence of religion in the public sphere cannot be reduced to the public role of the churches or to the societal relevance of explicitly religious views. Religions have long been an inseparable component of the various cultures of Europe. They are active "under the surface" of the political and state institutions; they also have an effect on society
and individuals. The result is a new wealth of forms of religion entwined with cultural meanings.

Even in Europe, where modernization and secularization appear to go hand in hand, public life without religion is inconceivable. The community-fostering power of Europe’s religious faiths should be supported and deployed on behalf of the cohesion of the new Europe. The risks involved, however, should not be overlooked. These include a possible invasion of the public sphere by religious institutions, as well as the threat that religion may be used to justify ethnic conflicts. It must be remembered that many apparent religious conflicts have political or social causes, and that they may be solved by social measures before they become religiously charged.

The questions concerning the public role of religion in Europe resurfaced recently because of the Balkan wars, the Muslim immigration into Europe, and (so far less dramatically) the prospect of Turkey’s becoming an EU member. The question of the political relevance of Islam comes to the forefront in this connection.

It is, to be sure, hard to deny that the increasing presence of the various forms of Islam in Europe’s public space poses both new opportunities and new dangers for European integration. It potentially calls into question the prevailing current ideas about Europe’s public space. Among European Muslims as well, there is a tendency to detach their religion from the specific cultural and social context of their homelands, and this may have potentially dangerous consequences. But the only feasible path toward a solution of the problems posed by Islam in Europe consists in understanding the consequences of transplanting Islam into a European context, not in a frontal confrontation between the abstractions of “Christian Europe” and “Islam”.

Europe’s role in the world
What is the impact of the intellectual and cultural meaning of Europe on Europe’s role in the world? To the extent that Europe acknowledges the values inherent in the rules that constitute the European identity, those very same values will make it impossible for Europeans not to acknowledge the duty of solidarity toward non-Europeans. This globally defined solidarity imposes on Europe an obligation to contribute, in accordance with its ability, to the securing of world peace and the fight against poverty. But despite this global calling, there can be no justification for attempting to impose, perhaps with the help of the institutions of a common European foreign and defense policy, any specific catalogue of values on other peoples.

The fundamental dilemma of European foreign policy is the tension between the logic of peace and the logic of cohesion. Europe sees itself as both a zone of peace and a community of values. This dilemma cannot be solved a priori. There is no essence of Europe, no fixed list of European values. There is no “finality” to the process of European integration.

Europe is a project of the future. With every decision, not only its zone of peace, its institutions, its political, economic, and social order, but also its very identity and self-determination are opened for questioning and debate. In principle this has been the case throughout Europe’s history. Europe’s capacity for constant change and renewal was and remains the most important source of its success and its unique character. This source must always be recognized anew and given an institutional form: through European politics, through civil society, and through the force of European culture.

In the end, it all comes to this: we must sustain and use our European heritage, and not allow it to perish.

Reflection Group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe

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Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw and at Boston University; rector of the Institute for Human Sciences; editor of Transit-Europäische Revue.

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Michel Roccard
Member of the European Parliament; chairman of the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport; member of the Delegation for Relations with the United States; Prime Minister of France (1988-1991).

Simone Veil
Member of the French Constitutional Council; president of the Foundation for the Memory of the Shoah; President of the European Parliament (1979-1982); former president of the European Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee; former French Minister for Health and Social Affairs.
The IWM research project ACCESS focused on the question, if Eastern European economic cultures constitute an asset or rather a liability in the enlarged Union. The main conclusions were discussed at a conference in Vienna (September 30 – October 1) where Sorin Antohi from the Central European University, Budapest, gave a keynote speech.

Spacing the Spirit of Capitalism
A Symbolic Geography of Europe’s Economies and Societies

As I was invited by Janos Matyas Kovacs, IWM Permanent Fellow, to participate in a conference whose topic – “An Asset or a Liability? Eastern European Economic Cultures in the EU” – seemed totally beyond my grasp, he also told me I could stick to my areas of historical and cultural expertise, and simply reach out to an audience of fellow scholars (economists, yes, but also anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists), diplomats, politicians, students, and journalists. Encouraged by this alibi for vagueness, and by the conference key notion, ‘economic culture’ (I have struggled with the equally promising and problematic ‘historical culture’, and ‘political culture’), I took advantage of this opportunity and started to think about a connection between my current work in the field of symbolic geography, and one of the most controversial discussions in the social sciences (as well as in various coffee houses) around the world: Max Weber’s ruminations on the Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism.

Thus, my question became, more specifically: Can one space capitalism? Or, in a more intuitive language: Can one link capitalism to (a) territory?

Once such first questions are accepted, a slippery slope leads one to even more questions, rather than to answers. In the following lines, I will try to briefly concentrate on such questions, and situate them in (or at the intersection of) the fields where we might start looking for some answers.

These questions, which may be ideal for occasional, passionate (if abstruse) scholarly disputations or cold-blooded heuristic exercises in the West, are matters of serious existential concern in the East, as many would like to find out whether or not capitalism can be exported/imported to places other than its historic cradle. For instance, weary Romanian citizens (still waiting to join the European Union in 2007) have decided to vote it back home in a ‘piecemeal’, rather than ‘Utopian’ way (to use Popper’s famous distinction). Similar questions, focusing on the centuries-old nexus, genius loci/(Zeitgeist), were in fact asked in connection with other models, creeds, cultural forms, lifestyles, beliefs, social and political systems (Christianity, market economy, the novel, symphonic music, Socialism, Communism, Feudalism – a retrospective question with significant contemporary consequences –, etc.). In a radical way, such huge questions, as well as the smaller ones which lead back to them, mobilize the entire inventory of concepts, methods, and theories in the human sciences.

The spirit of capitalism

While there is no need for yet another detailed discussion of Max Weber’s classic, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, a century after the first article advancing the ‘Protestant ethic thesis’ we could still use its summary, and an assessment of its present-day usefulness. The best summary is still that offered by Max Weber himself, in the second chapter of his book, devoted to the (hesitant) definition of the ‘spirit of capitalism’. After warning the reader that he was merely offering a ‘provisional description’, rather than a definition, of the somewhat pretentious phrase, the spirit of capitalism’, Weber quoted a rather long text by Benjamin Franklin (which he misunderstood, some critics claim) in which this ‘description’ was to be found, and in which an ethos, and not ‘mere business asceticism’ was the motive force of modern capitalism; this ‘ethos’, this ‘attitude of mind’, was shaped by Calvinism, and can be ‘provisionally’ defined as ‘that attitude which seeks profit rationally and systematically’. And let me simply download a rather commonly shared assessment, Donald Frey’s “The Protestant Ethic Thesis” (http://www.eh.net/encyclopedia/article-frey.protestant.ethic): “Max Weber’s thesis has attracted the attention of scholars and researchers for most of a century. Some (including Weber) deny that the Protestant ethic should be understood to be a cause of capitalism – that it merely points to a congruency between [a] culture’s religion and its economic system. Yet Weber, despite his own protests, wrote as though he...
believed that traditional capitalism would never have turned into modern capitalism except for the Protestant ethic – implying a [a] causality of sorts. Historical evidence from the Reformation era (sixteenth century) does not provide much support for a strong (causal) interpretation of the Protestant ethic. However, the emergence of a vigorous capitalism in Puritan England and its American colonies (and the case of Norway) at least keeps the case open. More recent qualitative evidence supports the hypothesis that cultural values count in economic development. The cultural values examined in recent studies are not religious values, as such. Rather, such presumably secular values as the need to achieve, intolerance for corruption, respect for property rights, are all correlated with economic growth. However, in its own time Puritanism produced a social and economic ethic known for precisely these sorts of values."

My take on these issues suggests we should use Max Weber’s ‘spirit of capitalism’ as tentatively as he was using it. Putting this in the epistemological language of Hayden White, we deal with a ‘figure’, rather than a ‘concept’. Not merely a figure of speech, a trope (a metaphor, a metonymy, etc.), but rather a cognitive figure that allows us to deal with a very ambiguous, heterogeneous, dynamic reality. On the other hand, Max Weber’s cultural and historical examples need to be read very carefully, in order to detect other figures that might help us. It is exactly at this stage that one discovers the elements of a Weberian symbolic geography of (the spirit of) capitalism, quite consistent with other post-Enlightenment ‘philosophical geographies’ of Europe; thus, the ‘spirit of capitalism’ is mapped on a number of symbolic sites (or chronotopes, i.e. inextricable fusions of space and time, of geography and history), and not on others. For instance, while in Franklin’s native Massachusetts “the spirit of capitalism [...] was present before the capitalistic order”, it was absent from other parts of America, especially in the South; outside Europe, and in Europe’s past, this spirit was even less present. In Weber’s own time, with the “most important opponent” of the spirit of capitalism, “traditionalism”, on its way out of history, the symbolic geography of Europe’s economies and societies was not homogenous: “[T]he Pole, the further East he comes from, accomplishes progressively less than the German”; the European South doesn’t fare better on this diagram of (work) ethic, as “the lack of coscienziosita of the labourers of such countries [where, Weber says, ‘bourgeois-capitalistic development, measured according to Occidental standards, has remained backward’,] for instance Italy as compared with Germany, has been, and to a certain extent still is, one of the principal obstacles to their capitalistic development”.

**Symbolic geographies**

Over the last two decades or so, old and new visions and representations of the world(s) we live in have come (back) to haunt us. While Marxist prophecies about the ‘withering away’ of the state, like most other prophecies, have not been fulfilled, the Cold War organization of the world (both cognitive and geopolitical) did eventually wither away. Globalization, as well as new local and regional dynamics, from (cross-border) ‘regionalization’ to (intentional, non-territorial) ‘localization’ to ‘glocalization’, have radicalized the questioning, critique, and contestation of traditional Weltanschauungen and practices of spatialization. Recovering at long last after their associations with the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century, fields such as geopolitics, cultural geography, human geography, cultural morphology, and the like have been reshaped and have generated a huge new corpus, as well as lively scholarly and public debates.
At the center of these debates, late modern or postmodern critiques of what we all call discourses or discursive practices since Barthes or at least since Foucault, have devastated most hegemonic representations of the world, and of its various fragments. Edward Said’s seminal Orientalism. Western Conceptions of the Orient (1978) is probably the single most influential such work; in the 1980s and 1990s, similar works have analyzed, extended to other parts of the world, or tried to recuperate and politicize the notion of Orientalism. Combining Foucault’s and Said’s inspirations with painstaking research in the archives and libraries of other parts of the world, scholars such as Larry Wolff and Maria Todorova have produced an impressive and influential series of works on Eastern Europe, Venice and Dalmatia, and the Balkans, respectively.

All in all, the discussion on globalization in the early third millennium seems ready to tackle such issues in a transdisciplinary, intercultural way: geographers have renewed interest in the traditions of cultural/mental/philosophical geography (from Carl Ritter to Vidal de la Blache and beyond); the comeback of geopolitics in the field of international relations (from List to M. R. Ackhinder); the ‘revelation’ of culture in American political science (since Huntington, and frequently against his neo-Spenglerian visions), which re-launched the conservative idea of a ‘clash of civilizations’ (embraced by many after September 11, 2001); the insistence on space, (dis)location, locality, and territoriality in the study of individual and collective identities; the challenges facing the paradigm (from its constitutional philosophy to its very claim to organize collective existence), scholarly relevance (e.g., for comparative history, now shifting towards sub- and supranational frames), legitimacy (e.g., as a site and agent of social justice), and even the very existence of nation states (old and emergent); the general emphasis on space in most humanities and social sciences, from literary theory to cultural theory to subaltern and postcolonial studies; the ‘discovery’ of the symbolic sphere by major economists; and so on.

Thus, symbolic geography and its related fields have become a pivotal intellectual and academic approach to the world(s) we live in, both ‘real’ and ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’.

### European fault lines: endemic or historical?

What cuts across Weber’s vision of the ‘spirit of capitalism’, and the growing body of writing on symbolic geographies is another gigantic question: How is it to understand the various fault lines that seem to break down various regions, for instance Europe? Are these fault lines endemic or historical? Are they imaginary or real? How did they emerge, change (if they ever changed), or last? From the Roman lines to the Great Schism (and the subsequent confessional divisions), from the Curzon Line to the Hajnal Line, from the Iron Curtain to the borders of the European Union, Europe has always been organized along lines of rupture, of difference, occasionally of opposition. Are they spiritual, theological, ontological, anthropological, environmental, etc.? Or merely historical, i.e. economic, military, geopolitical, technological, etc.? Are they man-made or natural? And in any case, can they be transcended, redrawn, abolished?

While scholars tend to agree on the constructed and temporary character of all divisions and differences, politicians and their constituencies seem to be more persuaded by the (ahistorical, ‘natural’) character of fault lines, especially of those that seem to coincide and last for centuries in one form or another.

All these questions seem to call for a comprehensive answer. And, indeed, comprehensive answers are frequently offered, revolving around the cardinal problem of determinism. Paul Vidal de la Blache, the French classic of human geography, and Weber’s contemporary, was asking similar questions, struggling with the riddle of human agency and its relation to environmental factors. Are human societies determined by their natural habitat? The question also dominated the German school of Kulturmorphologie, various philosophies of culture and history, geopolitics, as well as many other interwar intellectual traditions. Vidal de la Blache offered a very elegant way out of this quandary, by suggesting the notion of possibilities, as opposed to determinism. We could take it to be a kind of soft/weak/debole connection between human agency and larger causal mechanisms, and thus go back to Max Weber’s Protestant ethic thesis on a different plane. Thus, while refusing to see causal necessity in every pre-condition of an historical development, we may still be able to account for the impact of elusive notions such as the ‘spirit of capitalism’ in a ‘disenchanted world’ which may seem entirely at the mercy of material forces.

### Concluding remarks

When looking at the post-1989 dynamics of Central and Eastern Europe, one could detect a process of unmaking, of radical reorganization and substantial transformation. The region, once one of the favorite sites of symbolic geographical ruminations (does anybody remember Kundera’s fantasy of a tame, culturally sophisticated Mitteleuropa, kidnapped by the barbaric Soviets?), drifts into the banality of EU posthistoire. Slightly less than a generation has elapsed since the Fall of the Wall (hardly remembered in Germany itself, I noticed this November 9), and already most of that former Soviet satellites are safely in NATO and the EU. Whereas some would still qualify Fukuyama’s vision of triumphant liberalism, many would still qualify Fukuyama’s vision of triumphant liberalism, and capitalism, with or without its ‘spirit’, spreads over our continent. However, as globalization unfolds in other parts of the world, we still need to ask ourselves questions pertaining to the spacing of capitalism, especially since territoriality seems to be resilient in our time of de-localization, mass migration, virtual space.

The conference was organized by the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) in cooperation with the Diplomatic Academy and Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
**New Project DIOSCURI to follow ACCESS**

Following ACCESS the IWM together with the Central European University (CEU) in Budapest has launched a new project: DIOSCURI will focus on cultural encounters in the European economy and society after the Accession to predict the ways of cohabitation between the twin economic cultures of the “East” and the “West”. The research fields – entrepreneurship, governance and economic knowledge – will be explored in four East-Central European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) and in four countries of South-Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Serbia and Montenegro).

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**Neues IWM-Projekt DIOSCURI**


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**Opening by**

Ernst Sucharipa  
Diplomatic Academy

Georg Lennkh  
Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Keynote speech**

Sorin Antohi  
Central European University, Budapest

**Spacing the Spirit of Capitalism: A Symbolic Geography of Europe's Economies and Societies**

**Introduction by**

János Mátyás Kovács  
Institute for Human Sciences

**Entrepreneurship**

General overview  
Violetta Zentai  
Center for Policy Studies, Central European University, Budapest

The case of Romania  
Vintila Mihaiescu  
National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest

**Governance**

General overview  
Dragos Aligica  
National School of Political Studies and Administration, Bucharest; Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Washington DC

The case of Bulgaria  
Petya Kabakchieva  
Department of Sociology, University of Sofia; Center for Advanced Studies, Sofia

**Economic Knowledge**

General overview  
Jacek Kochanowicz  
Department of Economics, University of Warsaw; Department of History, Central European University, Budapest

The case of Poland  
Jacek Kochanowicz  
Department of Economics, University of Warsaw; Department of History, Central European University, Budapest

**Case Studies**

“Small Farms in Bulgaria: Four Decades Outside Legality”  
Ilia Iliev  
Department of Ethnology, University of Sofia

“It's hard for chicks to take to the sky! Establishing an Organic Agro-Business in Serbia”  
Slobodan Naumovic  
Department of Anthropology, University of Belgrade

“East-West Business Encounters: The Serbian Repatriates”  
Vesna Vucinic-Neskovic  
Department of Anthropology, University of Belgrade
East-Central Europe is about to bring its welfare reforms to the European Union. Nevertheless, in the course of the Accession, one could hardly fix the European standards of social policy or examine to what degree the newcomers may have approached them. Evidently, there has always been a variety of welfare regimes in the EU. Moreover, today’s experts in post-communist countries do not find stable policies and institutional arrangements in the West but rather another reform process, the “domestication” of the classical welfare states. True, the general trends are not dissimilar: partial retrenchment, decentralization, marketisation and privatisation of public welfare services, as well as an upsurge of the voluntary sector, are the main characteristic features of regulating welfare on both sides of the former Iron Curtain.

These issues are addressed by the authors of this volume, leading representatives of their professions, in an unprecedented way. In avoiding the convenient cliché of “Western invention” versus “Eastern imitation”, they provide original results in abstract and empirical analysis, and engage in sharp discussions on the virtues of the third sector, the privatisation of the pension system or the role of the trade unions. And nothing demonstrates the end of communism better than the fact that the frontlines between them usually intersect the Yalta divide.

The book is based on a long-term cooperative venture of Western and East-European scholars in the framework of IWM’s research program on the Social Consequences of Economic Transformation in East-Central Europe (SOCO).
On October 8, 2004 the French scholar Gilles Kepel, well renowned for his knowledge of the Islamic world, held a lecture at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, in which he presented his new book *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*.

**War in the Heart of Islam**

Kidnappings, bombings, and executions are spreading terror in the Middle East almost on a daily basis. Concerning these acts of violence, Gilles Kepel does not want to give any prognoses, as he explained in his lecture. Instead, he sees the challenge of “proposing concepts that will make this difficult to understand situation intelligible”. According to the French scholar, what we now see is a “war for Muslim minds, a war in the very heart of Islam.” To explain his central thesis, Kepel referred to a pamphlet, “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner”, published on the Internet in December 2001 and attributed to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian physician who is Al Qaeda’s principal ideologue and mentor of Osama bin Laden.

This manuscript explains that the jihadist strategy of the 1990s was to attack the “nearby enemy” – Arab regimes compromised by friendly relations with the West. But as Zawahiri concludes, the jihadists have failed in Chechnya, Algeria, Bosnia, Egypt, and the like, mainly because the masses of the Muslim World could not be mobilized by the vanguard of the “Umma”, the community of believers. Zawahiri therefore proposes a radical shift of strategy: Instead of the “nearby enemy”, the “far-away enemy” should be attacked, namely, the United States. The suicide operations of 9/11 were a spectacular expression of this new strategy, said Kepel. As the French scholar further explained, 9/11 was not planned because the radical Islamists really believed they could destroy the United States, but because they wanted to expose the weakness of America – and thus mobilize the masses. Their main aim was “spectacular terrorism with maximum exposure on the media” to appear as the “heroes and heralds of the Umma”.

The ultimate goal is the same, according to Gilles Kepel: the jihadists’ hope was that – seeing the strike against America – the masses would rise in revolt and follow the lead of the vanguard of the Umma. Terrorism is therefore used as a means to address and access the masses. The aim of terrorism is to bring about political action: “That is to mobilize the masses against the impious regimes, to create an Islamic state that would implement Sharia on the ruins of the apostate rulers”, said Kepel. As the scholar elucidated in his lecture, the background of 9/11 is to be found in Israel, in the “Intifada al-Aksa” proclaimed by Jasser Arafat in September 2000. More and more suicide attacks were targeting civilians. Those attacks – called “martyrdom operations” – were perceived as legitimate in the Arab world. Thus 9/11 appeared as a “magnifier of the bombings in Palestine”. Bin Laden and his group make it explicit that 9/11 is designed to broaden sympathy for the Intifada. “The issue is to widen the constituency and to drive the sympathy in the Muslim world for the jihadists who had failed to win such a constituency in the 1990s.”

The economy of terrorism is plain, as Kepel further analyzed: investment – be it financial or human – is minimum, but the return in attention can be enormous. And even though, up to now, radical Islamists have not managed to translate terrorist violence into political victories, they nevertheless managed to put terrorism on the central agenda – both domestic and international. But how should the West deal with that danger? “At the end of the day the only means to get rid of terrorism is to have civil society mobilize against it”, is Kepel’s answer. But the stake is the same from Al Qaeda’s point of view: “The issue of violence, of terrorism is meant to mobilize the masses of the Umma against the impious rulers and the West.”

In his book, Gilles Kepel also raises hope by pointing to the new generation of young European Muslims, most of whom are born in Europe, educated in European schools, raised with European languages, and familiar with the social customs of European societies. As representatives of a modernity they could, according to the scholar’s argumentation, communicate this knowledge into the Islamic home countries of their parents. They could represent the new face of a Muslim world reconciled with modern times.

Gilles Kepel holds degrees in Arabic, English, and Philosophy, a diploma from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (IEP) and doctorates in sociology and political science. He is a Professor at the IEP, where he heads the post-graduate programme on the Arab and Muslim worlds. He was Visiting Professor at N.Y.U. in 1994 and at Columbia University in 1995-96.

**Gilles Kepel**

Die neuen Kreuzzüge.

Die arabische Welt und die Zukunft des Westens

*München* 2004, *Piper*

The book presentation was organized in cooperation with *Piper*. 

*Piper*
The Institute for Human Sciences at Boston University was established in 2001 to promote research and debate among European and American intellectuals and policymakers. The following overview on fall 2004 gives an impression of the activities and events regularly organized by the IHS Boston.

**IHS Boston University: Fall Programme**

**The US-European relationship**

In September 2004, with the beginning of the new academic year at Boston University, the Institute for Human Sciences resumed its popular lecture series on the US-European relationship. Launched in November 2002 in response to the growing tensions between the United States and Europe, the lectures and panel discussions have drawn large audiences from area universities and from the public at large, and they have been aired as part of a regular program on New England's largest public radio station.

The first lecture in the fall series took place on September 13, featuring Polish political leader Andrzej Olechowski and, as respondent, John Darnton, Associate Editor at The New York Times. Olechowski, former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993-95) and Minister of Finance (1992), was also a founder of the Civic Platform, a centrist political party in Poland, created after the 2000 Presidential elections in which he was candidate. He is currently serving as European Deputy Chairman of the Trilateral Commission and President of the Central European Forum. His lecture, entitled "The New Atlantic Partnership," was a call for a renewal of the transatlantic alliance. He argued from a Polish perspective, in which the so-called "soft security" offered by the European Union is no guarantor of security.

Poland, Olechowski asserted, is becoming a viable partner in key international ventures after 250 years of absence from the world stage, and as such has the opportunity to influence the outcome of the European debate on the Atlantic partnership, the end of which is deeply worrying, especially given the enormous achievements of the alliance in the years following World War II. One would have thought, argued Olechowski, the September 11 attacks on the United States would have led to increased international cooperation. Rather, tensions have been exacerbated and deep divisions revealed. Europe, it would appear, is no longer an object of US security policy. It must, therefore, become a partner in US strategic decisions. It is fanciful, Olechowski said, to imagine Europe might ever be a counterweight to the United States. Nevertheless, global security depends on a renewed partnership, and the differences between the two sides, while great, are manageable, given a framework of common values and common strategic goals.

Responding to Olechowski, John Darnton, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of the Solidarity Movement and Martial Law in Poland in 1982, agreed that the Atlantic partnership has lost its primary "raison d'etre." He asked not only if the alliance can be preserved, but whether it should be preserved. Darnton expressed concern that Olechowski's prescriptions are not up to the job. Americans are unlikely to manage their hegemony better, he said. Likewise, Europeans will find it hard to sublimate national interests and to speak with one voice on important questions. Finally, both Americans and Europeans are unlikely to agree as to what the future of Europe should look like. The lecture, organized in cooperation with the Polish American Networking Organization, and response were followed by a lively discussion.

**Conference: "The Concave Mirror"**

On September 29, in cooperation with the German Marshall Fund of the United States, National Public Radio journalist Gail Harris moderated a panel discussion in which Asmus was joined by Laurence Bagot, journalist and 2005 Nieman Fellow at Harvard University; Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, Foreign Policy Editor at the Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung; and Jim Smith, Foreign Editor at the Boston Globe. Several interesting observations were made. Laurence Bagot, representing France, noted that the nations of the European Union have been in a negotiating process for nearly 40 years, that multilateralism is, consequently, part and parcel of their everyday experience. European unification is the growing result of a difficult and rewarding process in which the US is not engaged. She also pointed out that from a French perspective, disagreements need not be perceived as threats to the friendship between the two nations, a sharp contrast to the "with us or against..."
The biggest question to emerge from the discussion was how the upcoming Presidential election in the US might alter the pattern of estrangement marked by the survey. Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger voiced the opinion that the two continents were already drifting apart, and that the election of George Bush merely precipitated the break. Jim Smith observed that much of the hostility toward America was in fact directed toward an administration of questionable legitimacy. He worried that a re-election of President Bush would signal an affirmation of his neo-Conservative agenda by the American people and questioned if, as a result, European anti-Americanism would be projected more generally onto the American public.

**Conversation about “Poetry and Politics”**

The next week was a whirlwind of activity for the Boston Institute. On October 4, in cooperation with the Center for Bilingual/Bicultural Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the IHS hosted a poetry reading, at MIT, with one of Poland’s most famous contemporary poets and essayists, Adam Zagajewski. The author of several poetry and prose collections, Zagajewski was recently awarded the prestigious Neustadt International Prize for Poetry from World Literature Today.

The next evening, he joined Boston University Professors Robert Pinsky, former United States Poet Laureate, and Derek Walcott, recipient of the 1992 Nobel Prize in Literature, for a conversation at Boston University about “Poetry and Politics.” The discussion was moderated by IHS Executive Director Irena Grudzinska Gross. Each of the poets read a selection of poems, after which they responded to questions about various political and historical influences on their poetry. The conversation was particularly interesting given the divergent “imperial” contexts in which the three poets grew up: the context of the Soviet empire for Zagajewski, of the British empire for the Caribbean born Walcott, and finally, of the American empire for Pinsky. Their poetry, although not overtly political, was shaped by these very different political and historical realities.

**Michel Rocard on the Franco-American Relationship**

On October 21, IHS board member Pierre Rosanvallon gave a lecture entitled “European Institutions and the Future of Democracy.” Rosanvallon analyzed the paradoxes of the democratic processes faced now by the enlarging European Union and compared them to the history of American democracy. Professor Vivien Schmidt looked at the same problems in the context of the newly created institutions of the European Union.

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**European Institutions and the Future of Democracy**

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TUESDAY LECTURES

Every Tuesday evening the IWM hosts a speaker, often a current fellow or guest, who holds a public lecture related to one of the Institute’s projects or research fields. An e-mail information service on upcoming events is available on www.iwm.at.


Tuesday Lectures

21. SEPTEMBER
Reihe: Bruchlinien der Ungleichheit
Detlev Claussen
Antiamerikanismus – ein global verbindendes Lebensgefühl?


Detlev Claussen ist Professor für Gesellschaftstheorie, Kultur- und Wissenschaftssoziologie an der Universität Hannover.

In Zusammenarbeit mit dem Renner Institut

5. OKTOBER
Reihe: Die Rolle des Staates
Claus Offe
Soziale Sicherheit im Nationalstaat
Herausforderungen der europäischen Integration

12. OKTOBER

Andrew C. János

Ideology, Identity, and Political Community: Journeys from Particularism to Universalism

The ethnically homogeneous nation state has been regarded by the majority of social scientists as the paramount form of political organization in the modern world. Yet, almost from the beginning, both concept and practices of the nation state have been challenged in succession by rival concepts. In his lecture Andrew C. János examined the concept of ethnicity through the prism of four ideologies: nationalism, socialist internationalism, racialism and liberal universalism. The exercise was one in historical sociology. Presenting these four systems of thought (and organization) within a single narrative focuses on causal relationships among the individual types. Internationalism and racialism are seen as reactions to the “inadequacies” of nationalism in an age of expanding national states. The liberal universalism of our own days meanwhile is a negative reaction to earlier forms of aggressive particularism, according to János. What social science could do for the study of ideologies was to take much of the passion and sting out of the discourse about these subjects. For the social scientist no ideological system is perfect: all are riddled with contradictions. The inadequacy of the national state was its drive toward homogeneity that exacerbated, yet ignored, minority sentiment in an egalitarian age. Soviet internationalism fostered manifestations of ethnic sentiment, though attempting to curb its excesses by the idea of building a new socialist world. When the objective was abandoned in the 1980s, the whole design fell apart into competing national states. Prior to it, race was the idiomatic ideal of imperial aspirations both in the US and on the Continent. The main project of liberal universalism is the emancipation of hitherto ignored or oppressed minorities, which its critics are inclined to see as an attack on democratic majoritarianism and on the principle of equality among cultures and ethnicities.

Andrew C. János is Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, and Guest of the IWM in October in the framework of the Fulbright Senior Specialist Program.

19. OKTOBER

Peter Burke

Purifying Language in Early Modern Europe

Certain forms of language have often been considered more or less pure than others. Morally pure, as opposed to “talking dirty”, insulting; socially pure, high rather than low; or ethnically pure, native versus foreign. As the British cultural historian Peter Burke pointed out in his lecture, there were many campaigns for purifying language in the 19th and 20th century in Europe (linguistic nationalism) - to be found in Greece, Germany and elsewhere. For example, the scholar referred to the English language in the late 19th century when the elimination of Latin and French borrowings was discussed; “Latinate English” was considered as undemocratic because “common people” could not understand it. The French on the other hand were used to export words, a situation that only changed after 1945 followed by a movement for the defense of the French language. But the concept of and concern with pure language goes back much further: It can already be found in ancient Rome and the Hellenistic world, seems to be absent in the Middle Ages, but reappears all over Europe from the 15th century onwards. Burke accordingly differentiates between two “phases” – before and after the rise of nationalism, and he also distinguishes between two kinds of purism – called “separatist” and “defensive”. In his lecture the scholar examined those movements trying to explain them in cultural and social terms. According to his argumentation the concept of language purifying on the one hand served to separate between the elite and popular culture; defensive Purism on the other hand can be explained as a reaction against cultural hegemony. As Burke pointed out, the early concepts of pure language cannot be defined as linguistic nationalism in the modern sense. In contrast he offered several explanations, e.g. a social one: linguistic separation as a symbol of social separation (Pierre Bourdieu). And the Gutenberg Revolution, for example, was followed by a domination of written printed over spoken language.

Peter Burke is Professor of Cultural History, Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge.

In Zusammenarbeit mit dem Renner Institut.
The Institute for Human Sciences looks back on more than two decades during which it has fostered the exchange of ideas between scholars and intellectuals from Eastern and Western Europe as well as North America. It has become an international intellectual center in the midst of Vienna – with an impact reaching far beyond the borders of Central Europe.

We not only want to reflect on the societies examined in our numerous research programs, but we also aim to change them for the better. Today we ask you to actively support our work. Join the circle of *IWM friends* – your contribution will help us to continue and extend our manifold activities.

Amongst the most important aims of the IWM is the dialog with an interested public. The Institute thus organizes numerous conferences, workshops, public debates and lectures each year. The quarterly Newsletter provides information about our scholarly activities. In addition, it contains commentaries by scholars and intellectuals on pertinent contemporary issues.

Das Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen blickt heute auf mehr als zwei Dekaden zurück, in denen es den Ideenaustausch und die Diskussion zwischen Forschern und Intellektuellen aus Ost- und Westeuropa sowie Nordamerika entscheidend mitgeprägt hat. Es ist zu einem intellektuellen Zentrum inmitten Wiens geworden – mit einer Wirkung, die weit über die Grenzen Mitteleuropas hinausgeht.

Wir wollen die Gesellschaft und ihre Entwicklungen, die am IWM in zahlreichen Stipendien- und Forschungsprogrammen untersucht werden, nicht nur reflektieren, sondern auch verändern. In Zukunft möchten wir allen Freunden des IWM die Möglichkeit geben, unsere Arbeit aktiv zu unterstützen. Werden auch Sie ein *IWM friend*. Ihr Beitrag hilft uns dabei, die vielfältigen Aktivitäten des IWM fortzuführen und zu erweitern.


All donations to IWM friends are greatly appreciated. Donors who contribute Euro 100 or more will receive an issue of „Transit“, as a gift from the Institute.

The IWM is registered as a non-profit organization according to Austrian law. Financial contributions are tax deductible. Donations can be transferred to the following account:

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Erste Österreichische Sparkasse
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Account number: 28056986103

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With Your Support, We Can Make a Change

"The IWM has created an exceptional, perhaps a unique synthesis. It is at once an institute for advanced study, a think tank, a forum for informed discussion – and a bridge between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Europe.”

*Lord Dahrendorf*

Lord Dahrendorf, member of the British House of Lords, professor of sociology and former director of the London School of Economics, has been a close friend and supporter of the IWM for many years.
Visiting Fellows

All IWM Fellows are asked to briefly present their research projects in the Institute’s quarterly Newsletter. Some of the current Fellows have already given this insight into their work in Newsletter 85.

July to December 2004

Pavel Barsa
Associate Professor of Political Science, Charles University Prague; Andrew W. Mellon Fellow

July – September

National Identities and European Migration Policies. The Challenge for Central European Countries

Ivan Chvatik
Director, Patocka Archive at the Center for Phenomenological Study, Prague; Research Associate, Patocka Project

November

Projekt Europa: Die politische Philosophie Jan Patockas

Benjamin Frommer
Assistant Professor of History, Northwestern University, Evanston/IL

Project:

Research:
Having recently completed his first book, National Cleansing: Retribution against Nazi Collaborators in Postwar Czechoslovakia, Frommer is currently writing a comparative history of the frontier on both sides of the former “Iron Curtain.” By investigating paired regions and towns in the former Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, and Bavaria and Upper/Lower Austria, on the other, his new project considers the social, economic, environmental, and political aspects of policy-making at the local and national levels. In particular, Frommer aims to evaluate how individuals, communities, and governments experienced and managed the borderlands in the context of the Cold War and its aftermath. His working thesis is that there existed (and still exists) a shared frontier problematic, despite great differences in the three political and economic systems that once ruled the region.

Ludger Hagedorn
Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Johannes-Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz; Research Associate, Patocka Project

Project:
Projekt Europa: Die politische Philosophie Jan Patockas

Sandra Lehmann
Post-doc Scholar, Österreichische Forschungsgemeinschaft; Research Associate, Patocka Project

Project:
Projekt Europa: Die politische Philosophie Jan Patockas

Susanne Lettow
Lehrbeauftragte Gender Studies, Institut für Philosophie, Freie Universität Berlin; Lise Meitner Fellow des Fonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung (FWF)

Project:
Gender in the Philosophical Debates on Biotechnology

Research:
At the beginning of the 21st century many authors agree that information- and biotechnology will be the key technologies of the future. The notion of the genetic code in which the language of computer science is transposed to the realm of biology, indicates that these technologies tend to fuse to one “technological paradigm”. As Susanne Lettow points out, this paradigm emerged during the 1960s and 1970s with the microelectronic revolution and the simultaneous development of gene technology and introduces multifold social and cultural transformations. The technological revolutions of biological reproduction, food production and of medicine are far-reaching processes with consequences, especially concerning gender relations, not yet to foresee. Lettow’s project centers on the question how in philosophical discourse the processes outlined above are articulated. It is geared towards a systematical reconstruction of the philosophical interventions on modern biotechnology in order to analyze a) contemporary processes of negotiating gender relations and b) shifts and transformations of the field. Thus, her research project is meant to contribute to the self-representation of contemporary philosophy and, consequently, to a redefinition of philosophical competence in a changing order of knowledge. The analysis focuses on the re-articulation of traditional philosophical categories such as “man/human being”,...
“nature”, “mind”, “consciousness”, “matter”, “time” and “space”. Concentrating on dominant lines in the contemporary philosophical field, the leading question is how these categories are implicitly or explicitly articulated in terms of gender relations.

Marci Shore
Assistant Professor of History, Indiana University

Project: The Wonder of Words: Cosmopolitanism and the Avant-garde in East-Central Europe, 1919-1930

Timothy Snyder
Associate Professor of History, Yale University

Project: Brotherlands: A Family History of the Slavic, German, and Jewish Nations

Michael Staudigl
Habilitand (Phänomenologie, Politische Philosophie), Universität Wien; APART-Stipendiat der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

Project: „Phänomen Gewalt“: Perspektiven phänomenologischer Forschung


Maria Szmeja
Associate Professor of Sociology, Jagiellonian University Krakow; Andrew W. Mellon Fellow

Length of stay: October - December

Research: The research problem, which Maria Szmeja approaches using multilevel historical analysis, is the continuance of partition borders in the consciousness of Poles. She focuses on the loss of independence at the end of the 18th century after which the territory of Poland was divided between three countries: Austria, Prussia and Russia. Poland remained under partition for 123 years, regaining its independence only in 1918. The Polish State then attempted to level out the differences between the three parts. The administrative unification of education, communication and law became a priority and the leveling was carried out irrespectively of financial problems. As Szmeja points out, the material aspect turned out to be the easiest one – though the civilization abyss between the former Prussian part and the Austrian and Russian one lingered for generations. It was much more difficult in the sphere of Poles' consciousness that had been shaped by three different state structures. Different attitudes towards the state, law, private property, other men, different systems of values, and life goals were not easily unified or modified. Following Szmeja’s reasoning, presently - though 80 years have already passed - the former political and social structure is still a part of Poles' consciousness. People not only remember under which partition their family lived but can even say a lot about the conditions and routine of life. For Maria Szmeja this knowledge seems important for the formation of both their individual and group identity. As she wants to show, the interpretation of history since the time of partition is different at present: It yields a lot of antagonisms, contributes to continuance of stereotypes and ill-will between various groups.

Philipp Ther
Junior Professor of Polish and Ukrainian Studies, Europa-Universität Frankfurt/Oder; Körber Visiting Fellow

Length of stay: October 2004 – March 2005

Research: Philipp Ther’s research project focuses on the 20th century as an age of ‘ethnic cleansing’. Over its course, about 50 million people have been forced to permanently leave their homelands within Europe alone. In the Balkans, the legacy of ethnic cleansing is very
It has also negatively influenced international relations within Central Europe, in particular between Germany and its eastern neighbors. Different interpretations of contemporary history have heavily contributed to the deep crisis of Polish-German relations since the summer of 2003. Philipp Ther therefore sees an urgent need to publish a book which goes beyond the national(ist) interpretation of this process. Ethnic cleansing was a European phenomenon which affected all countries in Central and Eastern Europe. But according to Ther this is hardly shown in monographs on this topic. The second issue addressed in the project goes beyond the factual level. As he points out public discourses about memory in Europe, and in particular the memory of ethnic cleansing, are still mainly conducted on a national level. However, since 1989/91 the repercussions of these national discourses have gone beyond the boundaries of nation states and national societies. Memory has increasingly become a European issue. This is demonstrated by the recent debate about the German victims of World War II, in particular the Germans expelled from East Central Europe between 1945 and 1948. This debate began as a public discourse in Germany, but the attempts of redefining the memory about World War II have aroused very critical reactions in Poland and in the Czech Republic. Through its European perspective the project aspires to produce a textbook which can be used in Germany and its eastern neighbor countries.

Junior Visiting Fellows

July to December 2004

Christoph Bärenreuter
Doktorand (Politikwissenschaften, Universität Wien); DOC-Stipendiat der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

Project: Researching the European Public Sphere. Theory of democracy and empirical evidence.

Uner Daglier
Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Boston College

Project: Mill’s Argument for Free Expression

Michal Luczewski
Ph.D. candidate in Sociology, Warsaw University; Chairman of the Polish Invisible College; Józef Tischner Junior Visiting Fellow

Project: National Experience. Practice and Theory of the Nation in Everyday Life

Maria Moser
Doktorandin (Institut für Fundamentaltheologie, Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät, Universität Wien); DOC-Stipendiatin der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften


Thomas Nesbit
Ph.D. candidate in Religion and Literature, Boston University

Project: Gender and Violence in "Wiener Aktionismus" (Viennese Actionism)

Justin Steinberg
Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy, Boston University

Project: The Concept of Freedom in Spinoza’s Political Writings

Mathias Thaler
Doktorand (Philosophie, Politikwissenschaft, Universität Wien); DOC-Stipendiat der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften

Project: Gründen, Fundieren, Rechtfertigen. Eine Archäologie moralischer Argumente im Feld des Politischen

Grenzen durch einen universellen Moral aufgeho-  
ben werden. All diese Tendenzen zeigen nach Thaler  
eine Krise des Politischen an, für die er theoretische  
erklärungsansätze zu finden versucht. Einerseits  
interessieren ihn die ideengeschichtlichen Ursprü-  
ngen der Ausdifferenzierung zwischen Politik, Moral  
und Recht, denn ganz offensichtlich besitzen die  
zeitgenössischen Debatten zu diesem Themekomplex 
historischen Index. Zum anderen möchte sich Thaler mit der Frage auseinander-  
setzen, warum es gerade jetzt zu einem Paradigmen- 
wechsel kommt und wie diese Umwälzungen zu  
beurteilen sind.

Matthias Till  
Doktorand (Soziologie, Technische Universität  
Wien); DOC-Stipendiat der Österreichischen  
Akademie der Wissenschaften

Iryna Vushko  
Ph.D. candidate in History, Yale University  
Austrians in Galicia: Social Transformations of the  
Former Polish Territories in the Austrian Empire

Guests

Jack Russell Weinstein  
Assistant Professor of Philosophy and  
Associate Member of Graduate Faculty,  
Department of Philosophy and  
Religion, University of North Dakota,  
Grand Forks

Andrew C. Janos  
Professor of Political Science, University of California,  
Berkeley; Fullbright Senior Specialist

Thomas Nesbit, Justin Steinberg
Publications

Benjamin Frommer
Visiting Fellow 2004

Cornelia Klinger
Permanent Fellow

Rebecca Knight
Mila Jeenská Fellow 2004

Sandra Lehmann
Junior Visiting Fellow 2004

Susanne Lettow
Visiting Fellow 2004

Timothy Snyder
Visiting Fellow 2004

"War is Peace", in: Prospect, Number 104 (November 2004).

Maria Szmeja
Visiting Fellow 2004

Mathias Thaler
Junior Visiting Fellow 2004
Timothy Snyder
Visiting Fellow 2004


Michale Staudigl
Visiting Fellow 2004
Forschungsaufenthalt am Zentrum für phänomenologische Forschung der Universität Prag und der tschechischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (September 2004).


Maria Szemja
Visiting Fellow 2004

Conference „Poland after June 2002 - The Outcome of National Census: Do We Have a Silesian Nation?“, Opol e (September 15, 2004).

Mathias Thaler
Junior Visiting Fellow 2004
Participation in an expert workshop on "Differentiated Equality", D department of Cultural Anthropology, University of Vienna (October 9, 2004).


Phillip Ther
Visiting Fellow 2004

Mathias Till
Junior Visiting Fellow 2004


Mieke Verloo
M AGEEQ Research Director


Varia

Sabine Aßmann betreut seit Oktober 2004 den Bereich Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit am IWM. Sie hat zuvor mehrere Jahre als Redakteurin für science.ORF.at gearbeitet.

Barbara Baumann ist seit September 2004 für die Projektkoordination am IWM zuständig. Zuvor lebte sie vier Jahre in Ungarn, wo sie als Stipendiatin der Robert Bosch Stiftung zwei Jahre lang im Rahmen eines Völkerverständigungsprogramms tätig war. Im Anschluss wechselte sie an ein Wirtschaftsunternehmen in Budapest.

Georg Brunner, Student der Soziologie und Philosophie an der Universität Wien, absolvierte von September bis November 2004 ein Praktikum am IWM.

In October, Marci Shore, Visiting Fellow 2004, was awarded the 2004 Fraenkel Prize in Contemporary History for her manuscript „Caviar and Ashes: A Warsaw Generation’s Life and Death in Exile, 1918-1968“ which will be published by Yale University Press.

Claudia Stadler, Studentin der Hispanistik und Musikwissenschaften an der Universität Wien, absolvierte von Oktober bis Dezember 2004 ein Praktikum am IWM. Erste Erfahrungen am Institut sammelte sie bereits im März dieses Jahres als Redaktionsassistentin bei der Erstellung des Jahresprogramms.
its own limitations when it approaches questions of the identity of the speaker because the concept of ‘identity’ itself demands ontological considerations. Nekula, with much justification, warns against any easy way out, substituting, e.g., Kafka’s Jewish identity for what may be missing in his language allegiances. Kafka was always unusually modest about his knowledge of Jewish traditions or his place among the Jews (especially in his letters to Max Brod); and his early turn to Yiddish (1911-1912) which he came to know through an itinerant theater troupe in the old Café Savoy, and his later studies of Hebrew (1917-), exactly when the first wave of Yiddish speaking refugees from the East reached Prague, demonstrates that his path to Zionist ideas was far more tortuous than that of many of his friends. He probably would have gone with Dora Diamant to Palestine, many believe, in the later twenties (if he had not been mortally ill) but his change of interest from Yiddish to Hebrew reveals much of his ambivalence and hesitations.

Nekula rather concentrates on German and Czech and justly believes that Kafka’s awareness of his primary German language did not involve any national self-identification, as little as his secondary Czech competence, of many elements, does not push him closer to the Czech-Jewish movement. Kafka’s identity cannot be established on the basis of one language only but rather on a “bilingual or rather plurilingual” foundation of alternating and changing languages. But his identity? I believe that he had more than one – one as a historical individual in time and place but, assuming that Roland Barthes has not argued in vain, another one as an author, and that other identity may change from novel to novel and from story to story. Be that as it may, Nekula’s important book strengthens our belief that Kafka was one of the early citizens of our multilingual world in which Babylonian towers, or entire new Babylonian cities, rise like mushrooms after the rain, and “chauvinists”, as Max Brod remarked to his friend, will be thoroughly “confused”. Nothing better can happen to us.


Marek Nekula
Franz Kafkas Sprachen: “... in einem Stockwerk des inneren babylonischen Turms...”
Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen 2004
Can Islamic fundamentalism be explained as the reaction of a traditional religion under threat – in this case asserting itself against the Christian West? As the French scholar Olivier Roy explains, it is rather a consequence of globalization and the decoupling of culture and religion.

Islamic Evangelism

Many believe that religious revival and political radicalism among Europe’s Muslims reflect the traditions and conflicts of the Middle East or the wider Muslim world. But Islamic Salafism (fundamentalist religious radicalism) is above all a consequence of the globalization and Westernization of Islam, and of the decoupling of culture and religion more generally.

All forms of religious fundamentalism rely on the notion of a “pure” religion independent of cultural variations and influences. Today’s Islamic revival shares the dogmatism, communitarianism, and scripturalism of American evangelist movements: both reject culture, philosophy, and even theology to favor a literalist reading of the sacred texts and an immediate understanding of truth through individual faith.

Recent religious books published in the West reflect this, with titles like What is Islam?, What Does It Mean To Be A Muslim?, and How To Experience Islam? It is easy to fast during Ramadan in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Egypt, even if one does not want to. But a Muslim living in Europe is confronted with the necessity of objectifying the religion. The ulamas (religious scholars) are useless for believers who are searching for purely religious criteria that are no longer linked to a given culture.

The real issue is not an intellectual or theoretical question about Islam, but the religious practices of Muslims. The forms of religiosity in Islam today are more or less the same as those found in Catholicism, Protestantism, and Judaism. Contemporaneous adherents insist more on personal faith and individual spiritual experience. Such “born again” believers rebuild their identities from the perspective of rediscovering their religion.

With Islamic fundamentalism, too, we are not witnessing a traditional religion asserting itself against the Christian West. When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, they had an excellent relationship with the Americans, and Westerners could travel freely in Afghanistan between 1996 and 1998.

The Taliban were not fighting Western culture, but traditional Afghan culture. Why forbid owning songbirds? Why ban kites? The rationale was one common to all forms of fundamentalism: this world exists only to prepare the believer for salvation. The state’s role is not to ensure social justice and the rule of law, but to create opportunities – even if they are coercive – for believers to find their way to salvation.

The Taliban’s argument was simple: if your bird starts singing while you are praying, you will be distracted and your prayer will be nullified. If you are a good Muslim, you will start again from the beginning. But, since we are not sure that you are a good Muslim, it is easier to forbid owning songbirds, so that they cannot jeopardize your salvation.

Similarly, kites get tangled in trees, and if you climb the tree to free it, you might look over your neighbor’s wall and see a woman without her veil, which would put you in a sinful state. Why risk burning in hell for a kite? Better to ban them.

Fundamentalism is thus not a protest by original cultures under threat; it is the praise of these cultures’ disappearance. So it is a grave mistake to link modern forms of fundamentalism with the idea of a clash of cultures or civilizations. Young people do not become fundamentalists because their parents’ culture is ignored by Western civilization. Fundamentalist religiosity is individual and generational, a rebellion against the religion of one’s parents.

Of course, religious fundamentalists of whatever stripe often emphasize similar codes, norms, and values. When Pim Fortuyn in Holland decided to wage a campaign against Muslim influence, he was defending sexual freedom, not traditional Christian values. But on this subject and others – such as family and abortion – religious Muslims in Europe side with conservative Christians.

Nevertheless, such commonalities do not explain political and radical Islam. Osama Bin Laden is much more the expression of deracination than of a tradition of political violence in Islam. Muhammad Atta, Zacharias Moussaoui, and Kamel Daoudi were “born again” in Marseilles, London, and Montreal, not in Egypt or Morocco (and they all broke ties with their families).

Moreover, young radicals go to fight in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or Kashmir rather than in their countries of origin, because they do not regard the Middle East as the heart of a Muslim civilization that is under siege by crusaders. They live in a global world, and they do not perceive themselves as Middle Easterners.

The irrelevance of traditional culture explains the growing number of converts in all the recently

discovered radical networks. The members of the Beghal network in France were roughly one-third converts. The French police arrested a German citizen with a Polish name in connection with the terrorist attack on the synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia. Richard Reid, who tried to blow up a British airplane, José Padilla, accused of plotting a “dirty bomb” attack in the United States, and John Walker Lindh, the American Taliban, are all converts.

In Europe, conversion is typically confined to underprivileged neighborhoods, populated by young people with no job prospects and who generally live in a small underground economy of delinquency. The radical and violent left in Europe today has abandoned these zones of social exclusion. Radicals used to learn to handle a Kalashnikov and hijack planes with the Palestinians. Now they learn to handle a Kalashnikov and hijack planes with Al Qaeda.

Their quest for mythic, messianic, transnational movements of liberation remains the same, as does the enemy: the American imperial colossus. They are the product not of Western history or Middle Eastern history, but the fusion of all histories, of globalization. They are at home in a homeless world.

Olivier Roy is Research Director at the CNRS; he teaches at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) and at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Paris. He is the author of “Globalized Islam”, London 2004. This article was written in the context of the Reflection Group on the Spiritual and Cultural Dimension of Europe named by former European Commission President Romano Prodi and chaired by the Rector of the Institute for Human Sciences, Krzysztof Michalski.

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George Orwell Meets George Bush: 1984 Read in 2004

Written in 1948, George Orwell's 1984 has been understood as a fearful description of the power of communism to rule minds. In the actual year 1984, when the novel received renewed attention, no one doubted that its subject was the Soviet Union, the "evil empire" in Ronald Reagan's famous phrase. Yet the setting of the story, reared today, gives one pause. The action of 1984 takes place not in Moscow, but in London. In the story, London and Britain have been absorbed by a larger transatlantic empire, known as Oceania. The heartland of Oceania is today's U.S. In the world Orwell describes, it is not socialism that had failed, but rather modernity and mass democracy. The state has outgrown society, and rulers have found techniques to maintain permanent power while denying prosperity and liberty to their populations. While Orwell is unsparing in his descriptions of torture, violence is not his main subject. In Oceania, people generally believe what their rulers tell them, because they cannot articulate their disagreement, or because they lack the imagination to consider alternatives.

The power of the state to prevent independent thought is Orwell's true subject. Reread by an American in 2004, the novel 1984 finds surprising points of contact with everyday reality. To be sure, the U.S. of today is obviously not the totalitarian society Orwell describes. Yet Orwell wrote the novel as a warning to citizens of democratic societies about possible futures, and some of his concerns seem rather timely. Similarities in political rhetoric may, perhaps, reveal some implicit tendencies. Take, for example, the three slogans of the rulers of his fictional Oceania: War is Peace, Freedom is Slavery, Ignorance is Strength. The current president of the U.S. constantly defines the Americans as a peaceful people. Yet the foreign policy innovation of his administration has been the doctrine of pre-emptive war. The president constantly speaks of freedom; it has become a kind of verbal tic. Yet his has been the only presidential administration to substantially reduce the civil rights of Americans since the 1940s. The word "strong" appears incessantly in official pronouncements of all kinds. The president, it appears, maintains his own strength by purposefully ignoring the world around him. Insofar as this makes him more likable, it is indeed his political strength.

How can such contradictory ideas be persuasive? Part of the answer has to do with the manipulation of the language itself, with what Orwell called Newspeak. In Oceana, Newspeak progressively replaced standard English, reducing the total number of words in the language, and promoting neologisms meant to curb thought. As everyone knows, the official discourse of the U.S. is reckoned by the president's active vocabulary, has declined precipitously. It may well be the case that the press and public have more trouble processing what the president has to say, since it appears in a kind or ersatz English that, when read, often makes no sense. The press almost never literally quotes the president, since what he says works only in the spoken language. But the president's genius for linguistic innovation is only part of the problem. His administration and its congressional allies generates Newspeak on purpose, as well. The USA PATRIOT (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) Act, for example, exploits the positive associations of the words "USA" and "patriot" to name a law that restricts the freedoms of Americans. The war in Iraq is fought by a "coalition," not the U.S. Army, although 90 per cent of the casualties are Americans. The attackers of September 11 were "our enemy," a general term that is then applied to people who had nothing to do with the attack, such as Saddam Hussein.

To live in such contradictions is to engage in what Orwell called "doublethink": the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind and accepting both of them. Without some notion of this kind, it is impossible to follow the American debate on terrorism. High officials of the U.S. government, for years now, have accepted that there is no evidence of any connection between Saddam Hussein and the attacks of 11th September, and argued nevertheless that there was such a connection. As we now know, the president demanded of his intelligence officers that they produce a report demonstrating such a link, even as he was informed that there was no empirical basis for his claim. Administration officials praise the findings of the congressional inquiry that denies any such connection, and then claim that these reports actually support their own position. The contradictory views are expressed by different members of the administration; more interestingly, they are also expressed by the same person, at different moments. Evidence about the world is not entirely denied; but it seems to be held apart from some deeper truth, accessible only by faith. It seems possible that some American leaders, the president and the vice-president in particular, simply have a different conception of truth.
Truth is what they feel to be true at the moment when they are asked. They really do feel it, when they say it, although at some level they know it to be false. This is the essence of doublethink, and it is also perhaps the secret of Bush’s popularity.

In Orwell’s dystopia, the rulers believe that there is no external truth that their methods cannot defeat. Oceania’s population does indeed seem capable of denying external reality in favor of the Party’s message, even when that message changes. These are some of the most terrifying moments in the novel: when it becomes clear that people’s beliefs about the world can indeed be changed at a moment’s notice. When the novel begins, for example, Oceania is at war with Eurasia and at peace with Eastasia. At a certain point, Oceania suddenly makes peace with Eurasia and makes war on Eastasia. Oceania’s population is not expected to endorse this change, since they are not expected to notice it. Instead, they are to actively endorse the new war and to forget the old one. As citizens, they are expected to support war as such. They are not supposed to ask any questions. Now, it might be too much to expect that Americans remember that, during earlier Republican administrations, the US supported mujahadin such as Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan, as well as Saddam Hussein in his war with Iran. To recall these basic facts is to make no accusation of hypocrisy: there is nothing inherently wrong with change, foreign policy must fit the times. These alterations in foreign policy probably made sense. It is nevertheless chilling these earlier policies are rarely recalled in discussions of present ones. More frightening still, though, was the ability of the Bush administration to change the focus of much of the nation’s anger from Osama Bin Laden to Saddam Hussein, from al Qaeda to Iraq. This was indeed like the sudden shift from war against Eurasia to war against Eastasia. No good reason was given, people were expected to go along, and many of them did.

How can rulers achieve this kind of instant consent? In Orwell’s novel, the state manages reality by altering public memory of the very recent past. In today’s US, two kinds of media closely associated with the Republican Party and the present administration engage in practices đỏent of those Orwell describes. The first of these is the obliteration of the immediate past when it contradicts the message of the rulers of today. In Oceania, this is the task of the Ministry of Truth. In the US, it is the task of Fox News. When Al Gore gave an important speech criticizing President Bush, for example, Fox News presented its own tendentious “analysis” of the speech rather than its content. Although Gore received more votes in the last presidential elections than Bush, he has in effect no mass media voice in the US. The event was recreated, as it were, before it even reached the consciousness of the typical television viewer. It never happened as such. Only the criticism, which was in fact mockery, happened. A second tactic is the conscious destruction of personalities by repeated ad hominem attacks. In Oceania, the state ordered “Two-Minute Hate,” an exercise in which enemies had to be loudly vilified by the public. In the US, popular right-wing radio talk shows host identify supposed traitors, and expose them to ridicule. After Richard Clarke published his account of the Bush anti-terror policy, talk radio impugned his competence and his patriotism: even though the man was a devoted public servant in four presidential administrations, three of them Republican. Although Clarke was responsible for fighting terrorism under President Bush, he has in effect no mass media voice.

These two examples are not isolated instances; they reveal the workings of a seamless system of Orwellian reality modification. Fox News and talk radio are the most important sources of news in the US today. They have no international resonance, since what they say is of no actual informational value. There can be a CNN International, but there will never be a Fox News International. Rush Limbaugh, the leading American radio hate monger, will never make it in Canada. But what the rest of the world thinks makes no difference as one of the rulers of Oceania puts it: “We can shut them out of existence. Oceania is the world.” This is, perhaps, the most impressive achievement of the Bush administration: the creation of a purely American rhetorical space, all but closed to outside influences. Of course, this American rhetorical space is stratified. Some people did indeed listen to Al Gore’s speech. Many people bought Richard Clarke’s book. There is a segment of American society that has no doubts about some of the basic factual matters under discussion during the current election campaign. To take one important example: it is simply a fact that Bush avoided the draft during the Vietnam war by way of personal connections, while Kerry served in Vietnam with honor. Yet with the help of Fox News, talk radio, and massively financed negative television advertisements, the Bush administration and its supporters have clouded this issue for most of the American public. As far as the president is concerned, it is of little importance that one section of the American population understands facts as facts. A larger section of the population can be persuaded by media campaigns. This, too, resembles the Oceania of Orwell. In 1984, there was still a group that remembered the past, and
was capable of drawing conclusions about facts in the present. They had some understanding of the manipulation of reality taking place around them. They were, however, powerless to change that reality.

At play in both Oceania and America are forces deeper than media techniques. Orwell understood that social pressures can be arranged so that falsehood rather than truth will emerge. Just as people can encourage others to be critical and reflective, they can also create an environment in which passivity and ignorance feel safest. The most chilling and unforgettable image of 1984 are the posters of Big Brother, captioned “Big Brother is Watching You.” In fact, these posters are simply postcards. There is not entirely clear, in the novel, whether Big Brother is indeed a living person. Yet the posters contribute to a moral climate in which people police themselves, and indeed their own thoughts. Václav Havel, writing in communist Czechoslovakia, expanded upon Orwell’s insight in one of his essays. He described a greengrocer who places a sign in his shop that says “Workers of the World Unite.” The greengrocer, who has no ideological preferences himself, does this to avoid unwanted attention from the authorities. In so doing, he communicates the message that it is best to accept the official message of the authorities. Although it pains me (as a former Boy Scout, among other things) to make this observation, the American flag now functions in much the same way. In the months after 11th September, Americans showed the flag as a sincere expression of grief, anger, pride, and solidarity. Today, three years later, high officials of the US government (and leading news casters) continue to wear flag pins on their lapels. These shiny little flags no longer convey a clear message. Some people wear them to intimidate others. Others wear them because they are intimidated. Many people don’t really give it much thought. And no one wants to court accusations of a lack of patriotism, in a time of war.

In Orwell’s Oceania, falsehood and war bring about impoverishment. The state impoverishes its own society by devoting its resources to fighting a useless war. The political economy of the big lie is perhaps Orwell’s most useful insight. In the atmosphere of perpetual war, Orwell suggests, people will accept not only abridgements of their freedom, but also reductions in their standard of living. This appears at first to be a fundamental difference between the Oceania of the novel and the America of reality. Who could accuse President Bush of opposing consumption? Yet on a deeper level, the correspondence between calculated war, calculated falsehood, and calculated impoverishment holds true. It appears that the leading figures of the Bush administration had two main preoccupations before September 2001: tax cuts for the rich, and war in Iraq. In fact, the attacks of 11th September allowed them to carry out both policies. Strange as it may seem, tax cuts for the rich were presented as necessary in a time of war, and criticism of them was presented as unpatriotic. As a result, the less privileged classes of American society pay for the war in Iraq in two ways: with their lives, because the US Army is drawn from the poor, but also, in the long run, with their livelihoods. The result of massive tax cuts during an expensive war has been the creation of record deficits and a truly frightening national debt. The national debt, about $7,400,000,000,000, is currently increasing by about $1,690,000,000 per day. President Bush’s last budget included a yearly deficit of more than $500,000,000,000, a record. More than one in eight Americans is now impoverished by official standards. Over the long run, the increase of government debt means the reduction of government services to the poor.

This resemblance between fact and fiction, like the others, is at most a warning of things to come, a suggestion that Orwell’s warning in 1984 remains timely in 2004. Orwell asked us to be attentive to language, to believe in truth, and to identify the mechanisms by which democracy can be corrupted. The key mechanism, in Orwell’s Oceania as in the contemporary United States, is the conscious manipulation of the sociology of war. The population of Oceania is fed regular reports of great victories in Asia, alternating with alarming reports of new threats to the homeland. Here the comparison with the contemporary US is too obvious to be belabored. Americans are told of great victories in Afghanistan and Iraq (both questionable), and constantly reminded by vague color-coded signals from the department of homeland secu-

**Europäische Verbindlichkeiten I**
Krzysztof Michalski *Editorial*
Bronislaw Geremek
*Welche Werte für das neue Europa?*
Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde
*Bedingungen der europäischen Solidarität*
Kurt Biedenkopf
*In Vielfalt geeint: Was hält Europa zusammen?*

**Europäische Verbindlichkeiten II**
Bronislaw Geremek
*Europa und die Welt*
Timothy Garton Ash
*Was Europa sein kann*

**Osterweiterung als Herausforderung**
Jacques Rupnik
*Amerikas beste Freunde in Europa*
Ivan Krastov
*Dass Jahrhundert des Anti-Amerikanismus?*
Mit zwei Kommentaren:
Janos Matyas Kovacs
*Little America*
Michael Mertes
*Amerikanophilie wider Willen*

**Religionen und europäische Solidarität I**
Danièle Hervieu-Léger
*Religion und sozialer Zusammenhalt*
David Martin
*Religionsmuster in Europa*
Bhikhu Parekh
*Islam – eine Gefahr für die Demokratie?*
Nilüfer Göle
*Neue Muslime und europäische Öffentlichkeit*
Charles Taylor
*Religion und politische Identität*

**Religionen und europäische Solidarität II**
José Casanova
*Der Ort der Religion im säkularen Europa*
Peter L. Berger
*Bemerkungen aus amerikanischer Sicht*
Adidal Abou-Chamat
*Borderlines. Photographien*

**Islam in Europa**
Olivier Roy
*Konflikt der Religionen oder Konvergenz der Religiositäten?*
Tariq Modood
*Muslime und Multikulturalismus in Europa*
Dieter Oberndörfer
*Politische Integration und kulturelle Freiheit*
Farhad Khosrokhavar
*Muslime im Gefängnis. Der Fall Frankreich*


Diese großen Fragen bildeten den Ausgangspunkt des Projekts; seine nun in Buchform erschienenen Ergebnisse bilden nur tentative Ansätze zu ihrer Beantwortung.

Upcoming Events

The following events will take place at the IWM at 6 p.m.

Die folgenden Veranstaltungen finden um 18:00 Uhr in der Bibliothek des IWM statt.

Seminar Series

Europe or the Globe?
Eastern European Trajectories in Times of Integration and Globalization

Why is there a need to choose between the two paths? Should Eastern European societies necessarily abandon the benefits of globalization when joining the European Union? Or is it precisely the EU accession that will help them catch up with global processes? Brussels promises both of the possible best worlds: a refuge for the newcomers against the adverse effects of globalization, as well as a partnership in which they can exploit the advantages of global development more efficiently.

However, as the years passed by, and the gates of the Union opened up rather slowly, the countries of the former Eastern bloc had no other chance but to face global challenges in their own ways. They have been making efforts to adjust to the plethora of EU requirements but also found their societies transforming to global (US?) patterns. By joining NATO, hosting multinational companies, introducing American-style capital markets and welfare regimes, or following global trends of mass culture, etc., many new democracies in Eastern Europe became, in a few important fields, different from the societal model(s) offered by Western Europe. These may, in turn, impede cohabitation between the old members and the new entrants after the Accession, for the former will fear too much, whilst the latter will fear too little “diversity amidst unity”.

10. Dezember
Thomas Laqueur
University of California
Places of the Dead in Modernity
Vortrag im Rahmen des IWM-Projekts:
Die Bedeutung des Todes in der Gesellschaft heute

14. Dezember
Hans-Ludwig Schreiber
Professor em., Universität Göttingen
Wann beginnt menschliches Leben?
Die neue biorechtliche und bioethische Diskussion um den Menschen

18. Jänner
Michael Staudigl
IWM Visiting Fellow; APART-Stipendiat der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
Über Geben und Nehmen.
Eine Phänomenologie der Gewalt

25. Jänner
Buchpräsentation
Ort: Österreichische Beamtenversicherung
Grillparzerstraße 14, 1010 Wien
Zeit: 18.00 Uhr
Avantgarden gestern und heute
Podiumsgespräch mit:
Hans Belting
Direktor des IFK, Wien
Cornelia Klinger
Permanent Fellow, IWM
Vivan Liska
Universität Antwerpen
Wolfgang Müller-Funk
Universität Wien
In Zusammenarbeit mit:

Bernd Bienert
Wolfgang Müller-Funk

15. Dezember
Benjamin Frommer
History, Evanston
The Czechoslovak Gleichschaltung: Retribution Courts in the Aftermath of “Victorious February”