Population Displacement and the Global Refugee System

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Executive Summary

The world is facing a global refugee crisis unprecedented since the 1945-1952 period, when nation-state formation and the shifting of national borders provoked the flight or expulsion of tens of millions of people. There are currently at least 19.5 million refugees globally; by 2014, 3.8 million people had fled Syria alone. Overall, there were by mid-2015 59.5 forcibly displaced persons worldwide, a historical high. It is a humanitarian disaster of immense proportions; this report explores its causes and what might be done to resolve it.

The report reviews existing efforts to solve the refugee crisis – through resettlement, repatriation, and asylum in the west – and shows that, in the light of the numbers, none is adequate. It then makes a series of recommendations which, if implemented, may not solve the crisis but will go a long way to improving the lives of refugees. They are as follows:

I. Resources should be concentrated where refugees in fact are: the global south. Those resources should be used to underpin:

II. Meaningful local inclusion. Though most want to, few refugees will return to their countries of origin or obtain asylum in the west. They should be given economic, political, and social opportunities in the countries to which they flee. For inclusion to work, several elements have to be in place.

III. Nascent efforts to encourage refugee self-sufficiency should be expanded. Beyond getting the local rights framework in place, comparative research may shed more light on when refugee self-reliance is achieved, when it is not, and why.

IV. Every effort should be made to expand refugee access to education and to improve the quality of education. Ideally, refugees should be trained in areas that complement rather than compete with local populations.

V. Finally, in all cases of support, donor states, NGOs, and IOs should attempt to improve, through funding better teachers, better schools, better transportation and other infrastructure, life for both refugees and locals. To the degree they do, refugees may come to be seen not as an intolerable burden but an economic and political asset.

Implicit in these proposals is the acceptance of Hathaway and Neve's (1997) recommendation in favor of "common but differentiated" responsibilities for refugees. There is a strong moral case for each country to accept refugees in numbers commensurate with their size and wealth, but such an outcome is not going to obtain and accidents of geography will continue to determine where most refugees arrive. Nonetheless a concentration of resources in the global south; the institution of work and mobility rights for refugees; the involvement of all stakeholders – governments, NGOs, IOs, and the private sector – in solutions; the raising of educational standards for refugees and citizens; and above all an effort to improve the lives of both refugees *and* nationals in the global south holds out the promise of, if not fully just outcomes, at least better ones for some of the world's poorest and/or most persecuted people.

Across the globe, men, women, and children are fleeing war, institutional breakdown, persecution, and poverty.[1] The distress calls, capsized boats, and all-too-common drownings in the Mediterranean are a small part of a global phenomenon of flight and expulsion. In 2014, almost 14 million people were displaced from their homes and, in total, there are now *at least* 59.5 million displaced persons globally. This figure includes 19.5 million refugees (including 5.1 million Palestinians), 38.2 million internally displaced persons, and 1.8 million asylum seekers (UNHCR Global Trends 2015: 2). Yet even these numbers do not capture the scale of the displacement. There are millions of people who flee state breakdown, climate change, natural disaster, famine and drought,[2] but who do not, because they are not fleeing persecution as such, benefit from the international refuge regime (Betts 2009: 13). Many of those fleeing fragile or failed states – Zimbabwe, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Afghanistan – are not fleeing persecution as such (Betts 2009: 2-3). As they are forced to escape the violence, chaos, and general insecurity of collapsing states, however, they look very much like refugees. Yet they enjoy few of the protections offered to those who are, legally speaking, refugees and, in the words of one commentator, the "help they occasionally receive is patchy and inconsistent and, even at best, terribly inadequate (Betts 2009: 3)."

The same is true for climate change. In 2014, 22 million people (19 million of them in Asia) were displaced by natural disasters (Global Estimates 2014: 19). Displacement will only increase with climate change (Global Estimates 2014: 36). Even the most conservative estimates predict that, by 2050, tens of millions of people will be displaced by climate change (Lazcko and Agazarm: 2009).[3] This report focusses on refugees, as they are the most visible category of

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[2] The last four may be wholly, partly, or not at all affected by climate change.
[3] Estimates of people forcibly displaced by climate change vary widely, from 25 million to 1 billion. Oxford-based scientist Norman Myers made an influential prediction in 1995 of 200 million climate change refugees by 2050 (Myers 1995). Two hundred million has become the accepted figure, cited in many respectable publications (Brown 2008: 11). But equally respected scholars have dismissed the figure as apocalyptic: Castles (2004) and Hugo (2009).

displaced migrants and the ones for which we have the most reliable data, but its conclusions apply to all forced migrants who are unable, for the foreseeable future, to return to the country from which they fled.

Refugees as a particular category of the globally displaced

Legally, a refugee is one with a "well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, [who] is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."[4] Refugees are defined as such by 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The Convention was negotiated in the aftermath of World War II; the mass displacement that preceded, accompanied, and followed it; and perhaps above all the Holocaust. Flight makes one a refugee: the moment a person with a well-founded fear of persecution crosses a border, they become a refugee (Hathaway 2007: 98). The Convention was originally limited both geographically and temporally: to Europe and to precipitating causes that occurred before January 1, 1951. The 1967 Protocol, however, removed both these limitations (Convention and Protocol 2011, 2). Currently, 145 states have signed the 1951 Convention, 146 states have signed the 1967 Protocol, and 142 have signed both.[5] Failing to sign the refugee convention or the protocol does not, of course, insulate a country from flows of refugees. India,

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Hugo (2009: 31) argues that the inflation in numbers results from equating populations at risk with populations displaced.

[4] Naturally, the concept has a prewar history. For a discussion of the idea and practice in pre-colonial India, and how colonial administrators, with a visceral hostility to mobility, provided the conceptual and legal basis for controlling migrants and refugees, see Banerjee (2000).

[5] Madagascar and Saint Kitts and Nevis are only parties to the 1951 Convention; Cabo Verde, the United States of America, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are only parties to the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR April 2015). When it comes to adjudicating an individual's claim for refugee status, there is a distinction between asylum seekers and refugees. An asylum seeker is a person who is seeking refugee status. An asylum seeker becomes a refugee when he or she is recognized by either a sovereign state (following the lodging of an asylum application upon reaching national soil) or by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The state-based determination occurs following the results of an asylum determination process within the nation-state that receives the individual. The latter occurs when UNHCR itself undertakes "refugee status determination" (RSD), which it does when nation-state procedures do not exist; when those procedures are insufficient; or when a state has restricted the application of the 1951 Convention (UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2005: chapter IV). In 2014, UNHCR staff adjudicated 99,600 cases, or 10% of the total substantive decisions (UNHCR Global Trends 2015: 33). Globally, around 45% of refugees are awarded Convention or a complementary status.

for instance, has not signed the Convention but has been confronted with the challenges of mass influx and accepted large numbers of refugees.[6]

The global governance of refugee flows is a matter of international law, international norms, and international politics. Asylum and refugees are thus deeply embedded in the international system. Indeed, the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol constitute one of the greatest constraints on nation-state sovereignty in international law. The core of the international refugee system is one right—the right of all individuals to apply for asylum—and one obligation—that countries respect the principle of *non-refoulement*: no state should return an asylum seeker to a country where he or she faces a well-founded fear of persecution.

There are many categories of the displaced beyond those who are, from a legal point of view, refugees. There are, as noted above, tens of millions of people who fled drought, famine, natural disasters, and state breakdown. Many members of the public and commentators think of and discuss such people as refugees, but as they fall outside the main international legal instruments designed for refugees, they are not technically such. All the recommendations of this report nonetheless apply to these people as well. There are also internally displaced persons (IDPs): individuals whom states drive from their homes or who flee persecution, violence, and/or political breakdown, but who do not cross a border. In 2014, 2.6 million Iraqis fled ISIS but remained within Iraq, thus becoming IDPs (UNHCR Global Trends 2015: 25). IDPs outnumber refugees two to one worldwide and certainly deserve attention in their own right. The recommendations of this report, however, do not in the main apply to IDPs.

Behind the staggering numbers of displaced peoples are endless tales of human misery: fleeing violence, abandoning homes and families, and too often becoming beholden to traffickers who extort funds, torture migrants, pack huge numbers of human beings onto dangerous ships, and remove and sell their victims' organs.[7] For most of these refugees, there is no simple solution to their plight. They are in what the legal community calls "protracted situations:" they spend years, sometimes decades, as refugees with little chance for building anything approaching

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[6] In coping with asylum flows, the country has worked bilaterally with source countries and with UNHCR (for the details, see Samaddar 2000, chapters 7, 9-10).

[7] As of June 2014, there were 18,000 known cases of organ trafficking among Syrian refugees. Interview with an IOM official, Ankara, June 12, 2014.

a decent life. It is a humanitarian disaster of immense proportions; this report explores its causes and what might be done to resolve it.

The report proceeds in three steps: first, it briefly examines the institutional causes of contemporary refugee flows; second, it reviews traditional efforts to secure durable solutions to refugee crises and highlights their inadequacies; and, third, it provides a series of recommendations for addressing the current challenge. It is a challenge of massive proportions, and no one solution will constitute a magic bullet. The recommendations nonetheless suggest ways of mitigating it.[8]

Before proceeding, it is essential to say a few words about gender. In a necessarily short report, I speak of refugees as an aggregate. They are of course highly differentiated: the young and the old, men and women, children and adults, the healthy and or ill, the able-bodied and the disabled. Gender cuts across all categories. The root causes of many forced population movements – war and ethnic nationalism – are heavily gendered (Asha 2000), and refugee women face additional burdens and additional discrimination as they seek refuge. They are disproportionately responsible for refugee children. They are often denied the right to work, and given less food within refugee camps. They are provided with inferior or no educational opportunities. They are subject to sexual exploitation by traffickers, camp guards, police, and corrupt officials. And they are forced into exploitative labor relationships in the country to which they are trafficked (with or without added sexual exploitation). Gender is not at the center of the analysis here, but the policy recommendations outlined should, in the implementation, be sensitive to both gender and, more broadly, the differentiated situations and needs of refugees.

Refugee Distribution & Resettlement

The burden of coping with refugees falls on some of the world's poorest countries. The major hosting countries are all in the global south:

TABLE 2: COUNTRIES HOSTING THE LARGEST NUMBER OF REFUGEES (UNHCR data as of June 2015)

      1)   Turkey: 2.3 million

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[8] The research is based on primary and secondary sources as well as two dozen interviews with IO and NGO officials and academic specialists in Istanbul, Ankara, and Gaziantep (Turkey).

2)   Pakistan: 1.51 million

3)   Lebanon: 1.15 million

4)   Islamic Republic of Iran: 982,000

5)   Jordan: 700,000[9]

These countries host 36% of all refugees worldwide (UNHCR Global Trends 2015: 11). 86% of the world's refugees are in developing countries; this figure represents an increase from 70% ten years ago (UNHCR Global Trends 2015: 15; UNHCR 2013a: 7).[10] The refugee population is disproportionately young: in 2014, 51% of refugees were children.[11] Although the refugee camp is among the dominant images (along with boats) associated with refugee crises, only 35% of refugees live in camps: 58% live in non-camp settings, mostly in cities (UNHCR 2013a: 9). Part of the problem is numbers: camps simply cannot adequately house almost 19 million people.[12] But motivation also plays a role, as many refugees wish to escape the insecurity and monotony of the camps. Even in Turkey, which built refugee camps of an extremely high relative standard, large numbers of refugees leave the camps in order to try their luck in Istanbul and other Turkish cities.[13]

Developing countries not only host the greatest numbers of refugees; they also produce them. The top six refugee source countries (2014 data; figures represent the total numbers fleeing):[14]

1. Syrian Arab Republic (4,086,760)

2. Afghanistan (2,593,368)

3. Somalia (1,106,068)

4. Sudan (659,395)

5. Jordan (654,000)

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[9] These numbers are based on UNHCR statistics and do not include hundreds to thousands of refugees which have not been registered or otherwise counted by UNHCR. They also do not include Palestinians, of which Jordan alone hosts two million. s

[10] These percentages may change slightly in light of Germany's decision to accept hundreds of thousands of refugees. The data are not yet available.

[11] In Turkey alone, two to three Syrian children are being born every day. Interview with an official from the International Catholic Migration Commission office, Istanbul, June 10, 2014

[12] This figure includes Palestinian refugees, which this paper addresses only indirectly.

[13] Interview with an official from IHD (the Human Rights Association), Ankara, June 11, 2014.

[14] All data from UNHCR Global Trends (2014) except the Syrian data, which come from UNHCR Syrian Regional Response (2015). Afghanistan held the top position for decades until being displaced recently by Syria. The Iraq figure is contested given the fluidity of the situation. Jordan alone claims to host 400,000 refugees from Iraq.

6. Democratic Republic of Congo (516,562)

7.   Central African Republic (410,787)

Refugee movements have complex causes. At different times, decolonization and state formation, inter-ethnic conflict, western interference, and of course state and non-state persecution have all driven refugee flows. Popularly, one tends to think of state persecution of minorities as the key cause of refugee movements: Nazi Germany's treatment of the Jews remains the most powerful and haunting image of a refugee-producing event. Since the end of the Cold War, however, there has been a simultaneous decline in the number of repressive authoritarian states and an increase in the number of fragile states (Betts 2013: 2; Way and Levitsky 2010). Today, the top six refugee-producing countries are all weak, divided, and/or fragile states. Direct western intervention destabilized two of these states – Iraq and Afghanistan – and errors of omission and commission (particularly encouraging a rebellion that the West had little intention of supporting materially) have contributed to the Syrian disaster. Western military intervention also destroyed Libya, making it a great transit and refugee producing-country, as well as a site of lawlessness and Jihadist violence. The West, or at least major states from it, bears much responsibility for the current record number of displaced peoples.[15]

Current Responses to Refugee Outflows

When thinking about the refugee crisis, and the crisis of displaced peoples generally, it is useful to distinguish responsibilities from solutions. Whenever a state accepts refugees and does not return them to a country where they face a well-founded fear of persecution, it is respecting its obligations under the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol. Since most displaced peoples in the global south are not forcibly repatriated to countries where they face a well-founded fear of persecution, this basic principle of international law is being respected, often under extremely difficult conditions for the host country. It is not, however, a solution, as it promises neither the end of a refugee's insecurity nor the provision to him or her of a permanent home, income, or hope for prospects of personal and financial advancement. The vast majority of refugees are, in fact, in highly insecure situations. This can take the form of long-term residence in a refugee camp or a precarious existence in cities, both of which concentrate in the global south and in the

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[15] It is an irony that the states that did least to undermine the Middle Eastern state system - Germany and Sweden – have accepted the majority of refugees from it.

poorest countries therein: over one half of refugees live in countries with a per-person GDP of less than US$5,000. As of 2007, over two thirds of refugees were in "protracted situations," defined as a "long-standing" (five years or more) "and intractable state of limbo (Milner 2007)." The average duration of a refugee situation, meaning life in a refugee camp or as an urban refugee, was over seventeen years (Milner 2007). The Syrian crisis, which as of October 2015 has produced almost four million refugees, will have reduced the first statistic to something closer to 50% and will also have reduced the average time in refugee camps.[16] As there is no prospect of an early end to the Syrian crisis, however, most Syrian refugees will likely find themselves in protracted refugee situations.

For refugees, there are three prospects for a permanent solution to their plight. The first is the grant of refugee status by a Western country. The second is resettlement in a wealthy liberal democracy. And the third is return to their country of origin following an improvement in the conditions that led to flight or expulsion in the first place. At a minimum, the last would require an end to the causes that led to the flight as well as the establishment of conditions guaranteeing "basic rights," a "fundamental and durable" change in the home country as well as "effective protection."

All of these putative solutions are, in the light of the numbers, wholly inadequate. Only a minority of the world's refugees is granted Convention refugee status, resettled in the West, or returned.

Refugee Status in the West

On the first, the chart below summarizes refugee status determination results in the global north over a thirteen-year period (the bottom line shows positive decisions):[17]

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[16] Interview with Alexander Aleinikoff, Deputy Head of UNHCR, June 2, 2015.

[17] The "global north" includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Global North Refugee Status Determination Rates 2000-2013

A stacked bar chart titled "Global North Refugee Status Determination Rates 2000-2013." The vertical axis is labeled "Total Population" ranging from 0 to 2000000. The horizontal axis is labeled "Year" with values from 2000 to 2013. The legend indicates three categories: Pending at Years' End (grey), Negative (orange), and Positive (dark blue).

Only a fraction of refugees, in short, have any hope of securing protection in the West.

On one level, the German government's decision to suspend deportations of asylum seekers and to accept unprecedented numbers of refugees alters the regional picture. Germany's decision was among the most generous and forward-looking made by any European government since the Indochinese refugee crisis (and, indeed, possibly since World War II). But, again, the scale of the refugee crisis means that it will do little to alter the global picture. If we assume that Germany recognizes one million refugees over two years, and a few other countries accept another 200,000, the total would constitute only 30% of the refugees that fled a single country: Syria. And there is mounting evidence that even a country as wealthy and well-organized as Germany cannot cope with large-scale influxes. Germany's brief open-door policy towards refugees was abandoned when over 13,000 refugees – equal to the *total* figure processed by Canada in 2014 – arrived in Munich on a single day. Under intense pressure from German mayors and members of her own coalition, Angela Merkel agreed to re-introduce border controls between Germany and Austria. Austria, Slovakia, and the Netherlands followed suit. And the German public, initially enthusiastic, is losing confidence in Merkel and the German government.

The constraints faced by Germany are partly political, but they are also infrastructural and financial. European countries do not build refugee camps, and they often have insufficient accommodation. Faced with a severe housing shortage, the city of Berlin took the radical step of

forcing owners of empty properties to rent them to refugees. Such moves will do little to encourage the view that refugees are an asset. What's more, European governments provide food, medical care, and housing to refugees at no charge. This is laudable in itself, but it can become extremely expensive in the context of mass influxes. The German government is setting aside six billion euros to cope with refugees. Such expenditure is not sustainable, and it can serve as a magnet effect. Until recently, the largest group of asylum seekers in Germany came from the Balkans – chiefly Albania and Kosovo. Such individuals are fleeing poverty and an absence of opportunity, but they are not refugees.

Resettlement – bringing refugees directly from refugee camps and urban areas to Western countries – is another durable solution, but in practice it helps even fewer people (van Selm 2014: 513). Approximately 90,000 to 100,000 refugees are resettled each year, of which the vast majority is resettled by the United States (some 70,000 per year), Australia (some 6,000-12,000), and Canada (some 12,000-14,000, mainly by private actors) (UNHCR Global Trends 2015: 21-22). In theory, 14 out of the 28 EU member states operate resettlement regimes (Kumin 2015), but they resettle a paltry number: 750 in the UK, 500 in the Netherlands, and a few hundred in Scandinavia (van Selm 2014: 516-517). In the wake of the Syrian crisis, some European countries – again, mainly the Scandinavian – have expanded their programs, but the numbers remain very low.[18]

The implementation of these modest programs has been unimpressive: coordination between NGOs and IOs (and among each other) is poor; UNHCR resettlement programs have been implemented with glacial speed; and the United States has added further delays by implementing extensive security checks.[19] In this last respect, it currently takes two years to settle a single Syrian refugee.[20] Following public outcry over the images a drowned Syrian boy, Alyan Kurdi, the US government agreed to increase resettlement to 10,000 this year, a trivial

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[18] In 2014, Sweden resettled 2000 refugees; Norway 1,300 and Finland 1,100. UNHCR Global Trends (2015): 22. Under pressure from both the German government and public and press opinion at home, the UK Conservative Government agreed to resettle 20,000 Syrians.

[19] Interview with an official from the Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants (ASAM), Ankara, June 11, 2014 and a Researcher at the International Strategic Research Organization, Centre for Social Studies (USAK), Ankara, June 12, 2014.

[20] Gardiner Harris, David E. Sanger, and David M. Herszenhorn, "Obama Increases Number of Syrian Refugees," *New York Times.* Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/world/middleeast/obama-directs-administration-to-accept-10000-syrian-refugees.html?_r=0. *Interview* with an official from the International Catholic Migration Commission office, Istanbul, June 10, 2014

figure given the scale of the crisis.[21] Like all solutions, resettlement should be continued, though there are serious questions of resource allocation given the very high costs involved, especially in the United States.[22]

Repatriation us in many ways the most desirable solution since most refugees want to return home. Over the decades, millions of refugees have returned home: between 1974 and 2013, just over 28 million refugees were repatriated (UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2013: 49). These apparently impressive figures appear less so when broken down by year: during 2013, a year in which 2.5 million refugees fled beyond their borders (another 6.5 million were internally displaced), approximately 414,000 refugees returned to their countries of origin (UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2013: 50; UNHCR June 20, 2014). [23] In 2014, the number of returnees fell further to 126,800, the lowest figure since 1983 (UNHCR Global Trends 2015: 3 and 20). As total refugee populations have increased, repatriation has decreased: whereas 14.6 million refugees returned to their countries between 1993 and 2003, only 6.5 million did so between 2003 and 2013 (UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2013: 50).[24] UNHCR, which supports return as a solution, admits that repatriation will only be isolated and idiosyncratic.[25] Voluntary return will and should remain a solution, and indeed an overarching goal, but repatriation alone will not suffice given the enormity of the current challenge.

In summary, under the most generous measure of the statistics, the granting of refugee status in the West, repatriation, and resettlement are wholly insufficient to cope with current

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[21] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/world/middleeast/obama-directs-administration-to-accept-10000-syrian-refugees.html?_r=0

[22] Resettlement costs are notoriously difficult to estimate. The report includes some appendices outlining published US costs.

[23] Repatriation can be either unassisted or assisted, and the assisted variant may in turn be voluntary or forced. Unassisted return occurs even in some of the world's most dangerous conflict zones: 200,000 people returned to Ethiopia while a civil war still raged there, and 500,000 refugees returned from Zaire/DRC to Rwanda in 1996, shortly after the genocide (Hammond 2004, Hammond 2014: 503). Voluntary assisted repatriation involves member states or international organizations (UNHCR, IOM) providing advice, information, funds, and/or transport that aids refugees who wish to return home. Forced return is more commonly referred to as deportation, though the term remains controversial because of its associations with the events of the 1930s. As ever, there is a blurry line between some forms of forced and some forms of assisted voluntary repatriation. Repatriated refugees are often returning to countries they fled years, if not decades, earlier. Even large-scale returns leave great residual populations. Some 1,150,000 Afghans residing in Iran returned to Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, but that still left 862,000 Afghani nationals in Iran (2012 figures, UNHCR 2012: 120). In the greatest current refugee crisis, the Syrian, NGOs that were originally optimistic about repatriation possibilities now view it as impossible for the foreseeable future

[24] These data are borne out in case studies. Despite fifteen years of bilateral negotiation over the repatriation of Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, not a single refugee went home (Das 2000). Repatriation also has to be understood in the context of the overall refugee populations—that is, it should not be defined by outflows in any one year

[25] Interview with UNHCR officials, Gaziantep, June 13, 2014.

flows of asylum seekers. The failure of traditional solutions is evident both in the gap between the global number of refugees and those for whom a solution is found (outlined above) *and* in the time it takes for most asylum seekers to secure a durable solution, if they ever secure one at all.

Reconfiguring the Architecture

Developing new and alternate approaches to the refugee crisis will not be simple, and no one approach will serve as a magic bullet. There are nonetheless, as the rest of this report argues, a series of steps that could make the current situation for refugees less miserable. In developing these measures, I have made two assumptions. First, international norms and international law (including the UN Convention) are taken seriously, but they face serious fiscal and political constraints.[26] Chief among the political constraints is security. Following 9/11, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and above all the Syrian civil war, refugee politics and policy have become highly securitized, and many nation-states fear—not entirely without reason—that refugee camps are hideouts and breeding grounds for terrorists. President Uhuru Kenyatta's threat, since withdrawn, to close the Dadaab refugee camp and to expel 350,000 Somalis was based on Nairobi's belief that Dadaab is a breeding ground for Al-Shabaab terrorism (Kushkush 2015).

Second, no solution will work without substantial state buy-in in *both* the global north, which has the necessary resources, and the global south, which hosts most displaced persons. The significance of the global south underpins the first policy recommendation.

Policy Recommendation I: Concentrating resources where the refugees are

The current refugee regime is unbalanced. The majority of refugees is in cities (58% of them) or camps (35%) in the developing south, but many more resources per refugee are spent on the minority of asylum seekers that manages to reach the wealthy north and lodge asylum applications there. This imbalance underpins Policy Recommendation I*: Western states should concentrate resources on and in the global south.* The global north has two interests in doing so. The first is that using funds to find solutions to the refugee crisis in the global south could mean fewer refugees in the north, and fewer refugees is what most northern governments want. The second is that protracted refugee situations entail much more than widespread human suffering and a tremendous waste of human potential and talent. They also represent a security threat to

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[26] On asylum as a public good, see Betts (2011).

other states. Qualitative research has demonstrated that long-term stays in isolated and insecure camps often result in illicit and anti-social activity, particularly among young men (and refugee populations are generally disproportionately young) (Crisp 2004: 6). Recent quantitative studies have demonstrated an even closer and more worrying link: between refugee populations, on the one hand, and violence, rebellion, and political turmoil, on the other. Because of harsh camp conditions and often poor treatment of refugees, the existence of refugee flows, and particularly refugee camps, correlates positively with increased terrorism (Milton, Spencer, and Findley 2013). Similarly, the presence of large refugee stocks and flows can allow the spread of weapons, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict; disrupt local balances of power; and increase economic competition within host countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). The result can be great inter-state conflict, more frequent civil war and—as we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Libya—the creation and/or empowerment of terrorists (Salehyan 2008a; Salehyan 2008b).

The causal chain of development here is exactly the opposite of what many Western politicians fear. At the time of writing, there is great opposition among conservative politicians in the United States to admitting more Syrian refugees on the grounds that terrorists may slip in through the asylum and resettlement process. The evidence suggests that, in fact, keeping refugees out may be the greatest danger, as protracted refugee situations make terrorists out of those who, were they admitted and provided with reasonable life chances, might otherwise be productive citizens.

If resources are to be concentrated in the global south, donor states will have to come up with them. Since some of those donor states are complicit in creating the refugee outflows – almost entirely in the case of Iraq and Libya, in a less direct manner in the case of Afghanistan and Syria – there is a strong moral case for such an increase. To be sure, increasing spending is always difficult given competing domestic priorities, but northern states have shown little hesitance in spending massive sums on border enforcement and the detention of refugees. The American border-security budget is a staggering US$12 billion, and Republicans regularly propose bills doubling or even tripling it, including militarized measures such as fantastically expensive drone patrols (Alexander 2015; Salzmann 2015). Australia, a country of 23 million, spends $A2.963 billon on detention and another $A957.9 million on border enforcement

(Refugee Council of Australia 2014).[27] These sums dwarf those devoted to refugees: the Australian figures roughly match UNHCR's total budget in 2013: US$3.384 billion. Spending less on detention and border-control enforcement, which has disputed effects on actual asylum flows, would free up funds for likely more effective spending in the global south. Politics often trumps economics (as well as common sense), so it is likely that states will for political reasons be unwilling to reduce detention/border-control enforcement.[28] It is hard to imagine a US Congressional candidate risking his or her career on the savings associated with reduced border control. If so, there nonetheless remain political advantages in drawing attention to the discrepancy, as well as to the human costs of neglecting funding for refugees.

Humanitarian vs. Development Aid

A further avenue for expanding financial support for refugees lies in linking aid for refugees with development aid. The demands of both finance and logic support such a linkage. Financially, humanitarian budgets are small relative to development budgets. Logically, humanitarian budgets are premised on the idea of temporary, emergency aid (following an earthquake, for instance, or in the case of refugees a sudden mass influx) (Betts 2009a). Most displaced populations are not, however, temporary: they are longstanding and often permanent. The outdoing Deputy Head of UNHCR, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, has suggested just such a linkage. "The task," Aleinikoff writes, "is to reconceptualize the middle space of *shared* responsibility for humanitarian and development actors. For this to happen, development actors must see themselves in that space; they must come to recognize that they have a vital role to play in improving the well-being of the long-term displaced (Aleinikoff 2015; also see Betts 2009)." Humanitarian agencies must also change their approach; they must view their end-game as not simply delivery assistance but, rather, ending the need for assistance by making refugees self-sufficient (Aleinikoff 2015).

Such a reconceptualization requires three overlapping partnerships: between northern and southern governments, between humanitarian and development agencies, and between all of these actors and the private sector. If the refugee crisis is to be resolved, northern and southern governments should use *increased* development funds to improve the lives of both refugees and citizens (on this, see Betts 2009). Development and humanitarian agencies should expand

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[27] The detention figures include both detention centers and community detention.

[28] And, indeed, such reductions might create new problems. See Hansen and Papademetriou (2014).

education budgets for both. They should work together to help ensure the self-sufficiency of refugees in the global south. And wherever possible, and subject to appropriate regulations, the private sector should be brought in to help create the jobs that both refugees and citizens will need to improve their lives. The task is a mammoth one and would involve an initial infusion of new resources, but over time, as refugees (and citizens) are more able to help themselves, it would both save money and, most importantly, make the lives of some of the world's most wretched populations at least somewhat better. I explore these points in greater detail in the rest of the report.

Policy Recommendation II: **Making local inclusion work**

Within refugee studies, three options are usually discussed under the rubric of durable solutions: resettlement, voluntary repatriation, and local integration. The first two have been examined here. Although it enjoys strong support in some academic circles, the term "integration" is highly controversial and, at times, a conversation-stopper, above all for host states. For them, it can mean the immediate and extremely expensive grant of full economic, social, and political rights, including citizenship, in situations in which those states cannot meet the needs of existing citizens. For these reasons, local integration remains rare: in the 27 countries that reported the granting of citizenship to refugees, only 32,100 secured citizenship, with one country – Canada – naturalizing 27,200 of them (UNHCR Global Trends 2015: 22).

For these reasons, following Aleinikoff, this report speaks not of integration but of inclusion: the grant of rights, and above all economic rights, sufficient to allow displaced peoples to carve out a tolerable standard of living in – *and to reduce the financial burden on* - host states, where they will likely remain. National citizenship of the new state remains desirable, but is not necessary, and host states would be under no obligation to provide it (Hathaway 2007: 100). The goal is rather to provide refugees with the tools they need to carve out a tolerable, and eventually independent, life.

In all cases, less wealthy states in the global south cannot be left to achieve inclusion on their own. These comments lead to Policy Recommendation II: *donor states and UNHCR should aid host societies in making local inclusion possible*. Inclusion means, simply, allowing and/or aiding displaced persons in rebuilding their lives in the country to which they fled by

getting jobs, starting businesses, buying or renting property, starting families, building social ties, and so on.[29] Like general forms of migrant inclusion, it is a process and a matter of degree: the greater the extent to which a refugee has the same rights, the same economic opportunities, the same social capital, and the same contacts and social interactions as the overall population, the more "included" that person will be (on this, see Crisp 2004: 1). But it is entirely possible to have a better life than one might otherwise have had without enjoying the full range of economic, social, and political rights.

Achieving local inclusion is at once realistic and challenging. It is realistic because local inclusion has already occurred for many refugee communities. Indeed, during the 1950s, integration (as it was described then) was *the* principle solution to refugee crises (Hovel 2014: 491; Meyer 2008), and it was the most widely practiced durable solution in Africa from the 1960s to the 1980s (Crisp 2004: 2). Thus, over 20,000 Angolans fleeing civil war settled in Zambia, and the Zambian government granted permanent residency for up to 10,000 individuals (Bakewell 2000; UNHCR December 31, 2012). At the village level, economic inclusion was quick, and there was no marked difference between refugees' and non-refugees' standards of living or wealth (Bakewell 2000: 362). In Cameroon, a recent US State Department focus-group study of 200-plus refugees from the Central African Republic and a similar number of Cameroonians (the total CAR refugee population in Cameroon is around 500,000) showed high levels of economic inclusion, particularly in the agricultural sector, as well as high levels of social inclusion, with most Central African refugees reporting a welcoming and understanding response from the local population (US State Department 2014). These results, achieved in one of the world's poorer countries, are impressive. In Zambia, the government allowed Angolan refugees to farm land in the western portions of the country, and as in Cameroon they achieved a high degree of productivity; indeed, their eventual repatriation, under the UNHCR's durable solutions model, led to lower productivity, lower incomes, and regret on the part of western Cameroons (Betts 2009a: 8). More broadly, these examples are several of many best practices in the global south, and it is to these that UNHCR, donor states, and NGOs should look for

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[29] It is both *de facto*—actually doing these things in practice—and *de jure*—doing them within the framework of established laws (Hovil 2014: 489). UNHCR or host countries may take an active role in including refugees and/or refugees may "self-settle" (Meyer 2008: 3).

solutions to the refugee crisis. There can be no solution without substantial buy-in among southern states.

As a solution, local inclusion has two advantages. First, it recognizes a political and sociological reality. Most refugees end up in states that neighbor their country of origin, and, because of limited resettlement, most stay there. Including refugees locally, rather than leaving them in a camp or in urban limbo, can serve both the interests of refugees *and* those of the hosting state by reducing violence, increasing self-sufficiency, and allowing refugees to make a contribution to the societies in which they live. Second, in many if not all cases, populations in neighboring states will have common historical, cultural, and linguistic ties with the states from which refugees fled or were expelled.

Local inclusion nonetheless faces serious constraints.[30] Governments in countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt are opposed to large-scale integration on the grounds that they are, at best, middle-income countries and face their own problems of poverty. Lebanon in 2014 faced a budget deficit of 10% of its GDP, public debt of 137%, and an unemployment rate of 12% to 13% (World Bank 2014). Youth unemployment stands at 35% (Jalbout 2015: 7). When host countries are unable to meet the educational, welfare, and economic needs of their own citizens, they cannot address those of refugees. In addition, in the case of fragmented societies – Jordan and Lebanon stand out in this regard – ethnic, religious, and sectarian equilibria are extremely fragile, and the arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees could shift the balance in favor of one group and against the other(s) (Awad 2013: 31). The disadvantaged group(s) in this scenario will, unremarkably, resist such arrivals. Finally, even when governments are in principle welcoming, reception facilities, national welfare and educational systems, and labor markets may be too weak to provide refugees with anything beyond subsistence existence, if that.

Local inclusion will, therefore, only work if it is subject to four conditions. First, in ethnically or religiously divided societies, it should not upset the ethnic, religious, or sectarian balance in the host country. Second, Western donor countries, directly or through UNHCR or other international organizations and/or NGOs, must provide sufficient resources to ensure the inclusion of refugees. Third, governments must provide a right to work for refugees; without

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[30] An email exchange with Professor Ibrahim Awad, Director of the Centre for Migration and Refugee Studies, American University in Cairo, greatly clarified this paragraph.

work, there can be no inclusion.[31] In implementing this right, efforts should be made to improve the lives of both nationals and refugees. In some cases, many nationals, such as women, have no right to work and it will be necessary to tailor programs for women – ideally, both refugees and citizens – in a manner that respects cultural constraints. Fourth, donor governments and the private sector should work with developing countries to ensure that local communities benefit along with refugees; bringing refugees up will be most successful when everyone, refugees and nationals, is brought up (more on this below).

Conditions three and four merit further comment. For everyone everywhere, in market societies as well as the few remaining command economies, work is fundamental to dignity, self-respect, and regular contact with the broader society. Few things are more soul-destroying than forced idleness, and only paid work and the wages it brings offer any hope of improving one's life chances and those of one's family. Depending on the work, it can also have further benefits in the form of training and skills-expansion. Work matters, frankly, much more than citizenship, as people can be socially and economically included through work without citizenship, whereas citizenship without work can still leave individuals isolated and impoverished. *Work must be at the core of efforts at refugee inclusion.*

As stated, there can be no legal work without a right to it.[32] This point applies to refugee camps, but well beyond them: since most refugees exist outside camps, the right to work cannot be limited to them. Refugees need to work wherever they are, and they need to be able to travel to places where there are jobs: in cities or in other rural parts of the country. As Katy Long (2009) has argued, there is a strong case for linking mobility rights with rights to work: when, as in Kenya, refugees are confined to isolated camps with few economic prospects, work and thus inclusion are highly unlikely. Ideally, refugees would also enjoy mobility rights between countries that are part of regional economic associations such as the Economic Community of West African States (on this, also see Long 2009).[33]

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[31] This is true of rich as well as of poor countries, as a recent Bertelsmann-sponsored study of asylum reception in Germany underlined. See Thränhardt (2015).

[32] There can of course be, and often is, undocumented labor.

[33] Where such movement is not legal, refugees are often informally engaging in cross-border mobility: many Afghan and Somali refugees have achieved "*de facto* protection" through temporary work contracts in the Middle East, whereas others – the educated and skilled – become emigrants (Long 2009).

A meaningful right to work also requires the avoidance by states of processing delays, large fees, and other bureaucratic obstacles designed to eviscerate the formal right. For all the credit due to Tanzania (see below), the government has at times done exactly that. It demanded a high processing fee for work permits, proof that no Tanzanian could be hired (which is both difficult and off-putting for employers), and applied fines of US$800, a staggering amount in a developing country (Schoenholtz 2015).

Finally, hosting states, UNHCR, and donor states can incentivize work by offering language training, arranging credit to jump-start businesses, and working with refugees to identify markets. UNHCR has already made a start in this area: it has established a Livelihoods Unit, supported language and jobs training, and experimented with micro-credit schemes (UNHCR undated). It has also intervened at the firm level: UNHCR is currently working with Syrian artisans to identify both international markets for their products and local designers who can offer work to Syrians, particularly in fields that complement rather than compete with local workers (UNHCR 2014b: 36).

Examples of Best Practice in the Global South

Rather happily in a generally unhappy field, there are instances of successful local inclusion. In the early 1970s, Tanzania gave five hectares per family to refugees who fled the 1972 Burundi massacre. Through the judicious use of land grants, the refugees transformed their new property into some of the most productive in the country (UNHCR 2011). It was an excellent example of self-reliance and economic inclusion.

It did not, however, lead to political and social inclusion, and here the picture is more complicated. The Burundians were residentially and socially isolated, tied to the old refugee settlements in which they lived and worked. NGOs lobbied for a grant of national citizenship that would allow, it was hoped, for interaction and inclusion outside current or former designated refugee settlements (IRRI 2013: 8). Tanzania, for its part, believed that by creating a disincentive to repatriate, it would contribute to international stability (by reducing cross-border flows) and support peacebuilding in Burundi (which could be destabilized by mass return) (Milner 2014).

Against this background, Tanzania in 2007 offered naturalization to the 1972 Burundians (Fielden and Crisp 2008: 78). At the time of the offer, fully 79% of those Burundians wanted to

naturalize (Fielden and Crisp 2008: 78).[34] In the end, 162,256 Burundian refugees applied for citizenship (IRRI 2013: 3). The Tanzanian policy was in part a product of past successes in inclusion, in part contributed to them, and in part underpinned (or at least the government hoped) international stability. Developed-country funding provided a decisive role by linking local inclusion with financial support: Tanzania's program followed a donor agreement to a UNHCR request for US$16 million (Fielden and Crisp 2008: 78).

The Tanzanian experience is promising in that a major host country acted when it saw its interests served by inclusion, and developed country financial support provided the right incentives. There were nonetheless problems of conditionality, delay, and implementation (IRRI 2013; Milner 2014). After the original, generous grant of citizenship, the Tanzanian government decided that relocation would be a precondition to naturalization. So doing would have hugely disrupted local economies. Then, Tanzania stopped the whole process in 2010. The Burundians responded by halting agricultural investments and pulling their children out of secondary school (All Africa 2014). Following UNHCR intervention, Tanzania finally agreed in 2014 to a generous grant of citizenship to 162,000 Burundians, with the right to work anywhere in the country (All Africa 2014).

There are multiple lessons to be drawn from the Tanzanian case. Refugees must feel secure in their future if they are to take the steps necessary to ensure self-reliance. As argued above, naturalization completes the process of inclusion, but it is not required for it; Burundians did very well economically with only work permits. And when pursuing inclusion, UNHCR and donor states need to work with all levels of government, understand the political sensitivities and risks associated with inclusion, and ensure buy-in for all levels of government.

Turkey presents another, more recent case. When the Syrian war broke out, Turkey kept its border open and created refugee camps of an extremely high, indeed unprecedented, standard. Erdogan hoped that the Assad regime would fall quickly, and that he would have in the meantime both trained a government in waiting and ensured the gratitude of large numbers of

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[34] Uganda represents a very different yet in some ways encouraging case. The Ugandan government requires refugees to remain within a designated settlement. Despite this, some refugees have opted to "self-settle," that is, simply to live outside the designated areas. Despite no support from UNHCR, the refugees met a warm response, with the majority of local officials (including the police) and the local population welcoming them. Dryden-Peterson and Hovil (2004).

returning Syrian refugees.[35] When this strategy failed and it became clear that most Syrians would remain, the Turkish government, after a short period of hesitation, provided identification cards allowing access to preventive health care and education as well as temporary work permits (Asylum Access 2015; Karasapan 2015a). The work permit offer partly recognized a social and economic reality, as a burgeoning business community had already developed in the border cities of Gaziantep, Kilis, and Ufa and in the Aksaray neighborhood (renamed "little Aleppo") in Istanbul.[36] Implicitly or explicitly recognizing the importance of mobility for work, Ankara also ended visa requirements for another large refugee-producing country in 2014: Iraq (Karasapan 2015a)

As a word of qualification, policy recommendations are inevitably general in character, whereas social reality is marked by a high degree of specificity and, therefore, of variation. Middle income states such as Turkey have a greater capacity for inclusion than others, such as Lebanon. We cannot, therefore, automatically assume that what works in one state will work in another. Donor states should take the varying economic, political, and social realities of states into account, and expend more resources on those states with a lower capacity. Subject to these qualifications, there is sufficient evidence of the benefits to all actors of social inclusion for it to be a central part of resolving the refugee and (other) displaced peoples' crisis.

Policy Recommendation III: Increasing refugee self-reliance

All things being equal, local inclusion of refugees will be smoothest when inclusion costs host states less, and those costs will be lower when refugees are economically self-sufficient. These observations inform a third policy recommendation: *to maximize migrant entrepreneurship and self-reliance.*[37]

Preliminary research suggests that self-reliance is possible given the right regulatory framework. Alexander Betts and his colleagues undertook extensive qualitative and quantitative research in Uganda, where refugees were allowed to work legally. The study included a survey

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[35] Confirmed by multiple interviews with NGOs and academics in Istanbul and Ankara.

[36] Syrians established 489 of the 3,875 foreign-owned firms created in 2013, and 1,222 (26%) of those created in 2014. Many others operate informally (Karasapan 2015a).

[37] UNHCR (2005: 1) defines self-reliance as "the social and economic ability of an individual, a household or a community, to meet essential needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity. Self-reliance, as a program approach, refers to developing and strengthening livelihoods of persons of concern, and reducing their vulnerability and long-term reliance on humanitarian/external assistance."

of 1,593 refugees in Kampala and in the Nakivale and Kyangwali refugee settlements (Betts et al. 2014). They concluded that there is a significant volume of economic exchange between refugees and Ugandan nationals. Refugees serve as customers for Ugandan businesses, both in the refugee camps and in Kampala. Ugandan businesses and wholesalers generally supply shops within refugee camps, and Ugandan themselves come to refugee camps from surrounding towns in order to purchase high quality (and, presumably, cheaper) goods and services (Betts et al. 2014: 11-13). Finally, refugees function both as employers and employees: refugees work as day laborers for Ugandan farmers, while 40% of the employees working for refugee entrepreneurs are Ugandan nationals.

Refugee entrepreneurship and employment have three mutually reinforcing benefits: (i) they reduce costs for UNHCR and for the host state, (ii) they avoid the debilitating effects of long-term dependence on external support, which, like all forms of long-term welfare dependency, destroys autonomy and personal dignity, and (iii) they provide a means for involving the private sector in refugee protection (when, for instance, entrepreneurs create companies and/or build factories in areas of high refugee concentration).

Unsurprisingly, such research has attracted critics. Meredith Hunter has made three criticisms of a policy emphasis on self-reliance (Hunter 2009): (i) the success of self-reliance is greatly dependent on the degree to which host states guarantee rights; (ii) refugee camps are isolated and cut off from essential services, further hindering the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods; and (iii) self-reliance, which has been floated by the UNHCR for decades, is not really about the refugees but, rather, about UNHCR relieving budgetary pressure caused by declining donor interest.

These criticisms are valid to a degree, but they largely miss the point. It is true that host-state hostility will scupper self-reliance, but such hostility can undermine *any* effort at refugee protection and inclusion. Western governments and UNHCR will have to develop ways to incentivize host-state extension of the rights necessary for refugees to pursue employment and entrepreneurship. Refugee isolation is a more serious issue, but the research in Uganda suggests that it is an impediment to, rather than a complete block on, economic activity. More importantly, the grant of mobility rights addresses the issue. Finally, the third criticism is in fact an endorsement of self-reliance, unless other alternatives can be conceived: in the context of

stagnating donor commitment and rising refugee levels, it is essential to find other sources of refugee support.

As so often, these debates are best settled empirically. Betts's study provides an important piece of evidence, but it is not the only one. Other studies have shown that even when refugees are restricted to camps and lack a right to travel and work, some degree of economic self-reliance, increased income, and re-anchored personal dignity are still possible. In 1997, the American Refugee Committee (ARC) began a micro-enterprise development program for Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees in Guinea (details from de Klerk 2004). The program gave refugees a series of small grants to help them start business. ARC rolled the money out in three phases (i) start-up grants of $25 for women, (ii) interest-free loans, mostly to women (80%) but also to men who had managed to start businesses (to be repaid within six months), and (iii) once the loan was repaid, a low-interest loan of $75 to help refugees expand existing businesses (de Klerk 2004).

The results were impressive: 1,200 clients benefitted, some 90% repaid their loans, and 60% of clients reported "increased pride (de Klerk 2004)." The refugees' quality of life improved measurably: 60% reported that they could buy better clothes, 45% better food, and 27% a better variety of food; 47% said they were more self-reliant; 33% reported better health; and 38% were debt free (de Klerk 2004). From a policy point of view, the main takeaway concerned the separation of competencies, transparency, and oversight: agents monitoring implementation were separated from those disbursing funds; the criteria and disbursement conditions were clearly explained to the refugees; and a new monitoring and evaluation department oversaw the whole enterprise (de Klerk 2004).

Another success story, at least until recently, was that of Tibetan refugees in Nepal. Armed with a Refugee Identity Certificate issued by the Nepali government from 1975, Tibetans moved freely throughout the country (Mathur 2014; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). They farmed land purchased for them by the Nepal Red Cross in the 1960s, and in Katmandu they interspersed with the local population (Banki 2004; 7). Drawing on skills and knowledge brought from Tibet, they developed a thriving carpet and jewelry-making industry (Banki 2004: 7). Their success was noteworthy in itself, and it stood in stark contrast to the relative failure of the Bhutanese refugees in Nepal, who are mostly restricted to camps (Banki

2004: 6). As recently as 2009, a UNHCR report stated that the long-staying Tibetan refugees in Nepal had "found adequate protection and de facto economic integration (UNHCR Global Appeal 2009: 288)." The Tibetans' situation has worsened since, partly because of the decline of the carpet industry and partly because, possibly under pressure from China, the Nepali government has taken a more restrictive stance towards the issues of Refugee Identity Certificates (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2015). The Tibetans' past success is nonetheless another illustration of how refugees can carve out a life for themselves given the right legal framework.

At times, refugees appear almost hard-wired for self-reliance: they often use their own initiative *in spite* of host state efforts. Thus, Mexico's self-sufficiency program for Guatemalan refugees in the mid-1980s, based on farming, was hampered by poor land, small plots, and isolation from supplies and markets (Stepputat 1989: 13; Aguayo et al. 1987: 44-45). Refugees, with – it should be noted – some access to finance and funded training schemes, rented extra land from Mexican farmers and, in particular, engaged in extensive wage labor (Stepputat 1989: 19). Still more improved their lot through migration: the majority of Guatemalan refugees sidestepped self-reliance programs and entered the United States illegally (Chen and Chudoba 2003: 10). With a more liberal regulatory regime, mobility rights, and location nearer to markets, the (still successful) the Mexican scheme could have achieved far more.

In short, there is sufficient empirical evidence to show that, properly organized self-reliance strategies can improve refugee lives. What the research has not as yet established is that refugees make a *net* positive contribution, as the overall economic benefits would have to be quantified and compared with costs imposed by host states. But any positive effect of refugee work and entrepreneurship is to be welcomed, and research on self-reliance provides grounds for optimism in a field in which it is generally in short supply. Given the right preconditions, refugees – who, after all, often show considerable initiative and courage in fleeing their homes and countries – can make economic contributions and perhaps even become economically self-sufficient.

Private Sector Involvement

The private sector can, and should, play a larger role in developing solutions for displaced populations. Indeed, the scale of the refugee crisis means that it cannot be resolved

without private sector resources, above all as public resources are tightly constrained. Private sector involvement can take three forms, most of which have, in a somewhat limited and idiosyncratic way, been applied. The first is through the application of private sector management principles designed to increase efficiency and reduce costs in the delivery of refugee services. World Vision, Medair, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and UNICEF have used "Last Mile Mobile Solutions,"[38] a mobile app designed to track the distribution of cash or in-kind aid to humanitarian victims. Individuals or households who are recipients of funds or who work for aid agencies are registered, given a barcode, and their name is added to a database accessible by multiple agencies. When the recipient receives aid, the transfer is registered on the app. The technology reduces registration time (the same agencies do not register refugees or IDPs multiple times), prevents double dipping across agencies (where refugees, or people pretending to being them, make claims for the same need at multiple agencies), and reduces corruption in both the receiving and the distribution of aid. Thus, the technology streamlines the aid process, reduces costs, and ensures that aid goes where it is needed. The app can be used by and for refugees, other displaced people, IDPs, and anyone else receiving aid. The app has three million registered beneficiaries across twenty six countries, and the registration process appears to be highly efficient: World Vision registered over three thousand people in one afternoon in one of the largest refugee camps in Kurdish Iraq.[39]

Support for the app came from both the public and private sectors. USAID, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, and the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ, a government agency) provided the funds, while Intermec Technologies Corporation[40] donated a package of mobile computers (CN50s) (allowing field registration even before government funding came online), Fieldworker Mobile Technologies provided advice on software design, and ThoughtWorks supplied technical advice that allowed for quicker registrations.[41]

The second form of private sector involvement is through profit-making enterprises that return profits to displaced peoples. Thus, the Ikea Foundation has developed Ikea refugee shelters that, as one would expect from Ikea, are inexpensive, high-quality, and easily shippable.

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[38] http://www.lastmilemobilesolutions.com/
[39] http://www.wvi.org/syria-crisis/article/use-mobile-technology-reduces-time-register-displaced-people-iraq
[40] http://www.intermec.com/
[41] http://www.fieldworker.com/ and https://www.thoughtworks.com/

Once built, the houses have windows, a lockable door, solar lighting, and USB plugs. They are designed to last three years as opposed to the average six months associated with traditional shelters. The houses were first unveiled and tested by forty refugee families in Iraq and Ethiopia, and UNHCR has ordered 10,000 for delivery by the end of summer 2015. And in true Ikea fashion, the houses are user-assembled, so refugees can build or help build them in four to eight hours. All profits from the houses are reinvested in Bettershelter.org (specifically for refugees) or the parent philanthropy, the Housing for All Foundation.

NGOs can also generate their own profits. Potters for Peace developed a ceramic water filter made of terra cotta clay and locally available combustibles (corn or rice husks). The NGO first made them in and for Central America in the mid-1990s following natural disasters, and they are now regularly used by ICRC, MSF, UNICEF, Plan, Oxfam, and USAID.[42] The NGO trains local populations in making the purifier (without the need for kilns), and teams can produce forty to fifty per day, which sell at US$25 per unit (replacement filters cost US$5 to $6). The device provides clean water quickly, prevents illness (and the attendant loss of economic productivity), and fully fifty percent of Potter for Peace's revenue is secured through the sale of the devices (Betts and Bloom 2014: 16). Basic market practices, in other words, reduce costs, decrease human suffering, and expand resources for humanitarian work.

The third, and most controversial, avenue for private sector involvement is through macro-level policy changes. National tax and regulatory policy could be used to create incentives, namely by lowering corporate taxes and reducing the impediments to starting a business in areas of high refugee/displaced person concentration. When discussed under the rubric of "special economic zones" (SEZs), such proposals can provoke outrage among academics, NGOs, and activists.[43] The reaction is understandable, as some SEZs avoid tax, circumvent labor standards, and treat workers like indentured workers (Suchitra 2007). SEZs have other problems: they can become white elephants that replicate the same structural problems as the broader country in which they are nested (World Bank undated).

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[42] For a summary and review, see
https://s3.amazonaws.com/PfP/Review+and+summary+of+studies+and+reports+english-+Jan112.pdf)..
[43] SEZs have three characteristics: (i) they have a single administration; (ii) they offer benefits for investors who lodge their capital in the zone; and (iii) they are separate customs areas with lower tariffs (Zeng 2015: 2). The first modern industrial zone was established not in the developing south but in 1959 in Shannon (Ireland). China's coastal SEZs, first set up in 1980, are the most famous (Zeng 2015: 4-5).

It important to distinguish here between two types of SEZs: industrial parks and regulatory zones. The former require massive capital infusion, involve setting up a factory, and are most associated with exploitative labor practices. The latter aim more at encouraging small businesses and refugee entrepreneurship and have much lower capital requirements. Nothing that might make refugee lives better should be ruled out, but it might be that the liberalized regulatory zones are easier to achieve. On the other hand, they might not create the sort of mass employment prospects envisioned by large-scale capital infusions.

In cases in which refugee labor is employed, a careful balance would have to be struck: labor productivity would have to be high enough to attract private sector interest, but workers' pay and working conditions could not be exploitative. UNHCR might serve as an intermediary, one that lays out the rules of the game on wages and labor practices.

Policy Recommendation IV: Educating refugees

A large body of scholarly literature confirms the fact that education is basic to an individual's economic success. Education boosts both employment and earnings and, over the course of a lifetime, handsomely rewarding the original investment (OECD 2011; Berger and Parkin 2013).[44] Of direct interest to refugees is a further, regional and class bias to these gains: improvements are greatest for low-income individuals and for those living in sub-Saharan Africa (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002: 2, 13, and appendix).

Language acquisition and language skills are the anchor of educational and economic success. Research on Europe has confirmed that migrants' and ethnic minorities' relatively low wages and employment levels can to a large degree be attributed to weak language skills (Beckhusen et al. 2012; Espenshade and Fu 1997; Süssmuth 2001; Thränhardt 2015). There is no reason why it should be different for refugees, and language acquisition (and in particular cases, the acquisition of English) should be seen as an essential component in refugee education; indeed, it is its prerequisite.

Higher levels of education correlate not only with economic success but also with positive attitudes: the more educated a person is, the more supportive they are of civil liberties

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[44] The gains are highest in what we have come to call "STEM" subjects (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) studied at the tertiary level, but the humanities also produce a substantial earnings premium: 38% according to Canadian data in the 2011 study (Tal and Enanajor 2011).

(Bobo and Licari 1989), the more positive their attitudes towards immigration (Freeman, Hansen, and Leal 2013), and the more open they are to sexual minorities (Ohlander, Batalova, and Treas 2005). We can speculate with a fair degree of confidence that educated and successful refugees are less likely to engage in violent behavior (on the recognition of this relationship in refugee circles, see Dryden-Peterson 2011: 17). As historians and Marxist theorists (including Lenin himself) have observed, those most likely to launch revolutions are those with nothing to lose (Enriquez 1997: 157-58).[45]

Were immigrants quickly repatriated or resettled, their education could be briefly interrupted with few, if any, consequences. As it is, one half of refugees are in long-standing protracted situations; there is no end to the Syrian conflict in sight, and one half of the world's refugees are children. Without an education, millions of children have little prospect for anything approaching a decent life. This fourth policy recommendation is thus clear: *every effort should be made to expand refugees' access to education.*

The current state of refugee education is pitiable. The quality of education in both camps and cities, however, varies wildly and suffers from multiple deficiencies:

- *Global averages mask great differences at the camp and city level and across regions.* In Pakistan, some camps had an enrollment rate of 0% (though many children may have been in madrasas instead), whereas others enjoyed rates of over 80%. In Chad, the figures ranged from 40% to 100% (figures from Dryden-Peterson 2011: 27). Whereas 90% of refugee children in the Middle East and North Africa had access to primary school, the figure for most of Africa was only 46%. At the secondary level, only 2% of urban refugees in eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa had access to school, whereas 10% did in Asia and the Pacific, and 47% in the Middle East did (figures from (figures from Dryden-Peterson 2011: 26).[46]

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[45] Education also correlates with healthier lifestyles and wiser choices, which in turn reduce burdens on health care systems. Educated mothers, for instance, are much more likely to know the risks of HIV/AIDs transmission through breastfeeding and needles (Watkins 2011: 5).

[46] In Kenya, 51% of refugee children were enrolled in primary school in Nairobi, 56% in Dadaab camps, and 70% in the Kakuma camp. At the secondary level, the figures were 52% for Nairobi, 21% for the Dabaab camps, and 19% for the Kakuma camp.

- *Teacher training is inadequate.* UNHCR's current definition of the minimum acceptable teacher training is ten days, and there is much inconsistency in the achievement of even this modest goal.[47]

- *Results are variable and overall very poor.* Many children, including those in non-emergency situations (in which a sudden crisis and the need to improvise quickly lower educational standards), fail to read simple texts, to write, and to perform basic arithmetic, despite regular school attendance (Dryden-Peterson 2011: 32).

- *These poor results reflect and compounded by terrible educational systems for nationals themselves.* In Mali, 94% of national, non-refugee children receiving instruction in French were unable to read even a single word of French text, and 83% of children instructed in Bamanankan were unable to read a word in that language (Gove and Cvelich 2011: 12).

- *Teachers are frequently absent and/or indifferent.* There are frequent complaints among refugee children that teachers too often write materials on the board in lieu of interacting at all with their students and thus make no effort to confirm whether or not the students understand what is written. Worse still, teachers' absenteeism, informed partially by low compensation but also, one might speculate, by poor training, is a serious problem in many refugee schools (though precise numbers on it are hard to come by) (Box 2012: 21-23; Dryden-Peterson 2011: 57; and INEE 2009: 1-2). A need to hold down other jobs for sufficient income drives some degree of this absenteeism, and unsurprisingly, it is also a problem among students, who work to raise money for themselves and their families.

- *Overall, results are worse for girls.* Nine girls are enrolled for every ten boys at primary schools in both camps and cities, though there is again great regional variation. Girls have still less access to school in urban Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, whereas they have greater access in southern and western Africa. At

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[47] In UNHCR priority countries, the figure for minimum training ranged from 100% in locations such as eastern Sudan and Bangladesh to 12% in Kenya (Uganda, eastern Chad, Algeria, and Yemen cluster in the 70%-to-93% range (Dryden-Peterson 2011: 29-31). In one country, Djibouti, the figure was 0%. Student-to-teacher ratios were, at the same time, very high: approximately one third of camps report ratios of 50:1, and ratios of 70:1 are not uncommon (Watkins 2011: 16).

the secondary level, five girls are enrolled for every ten boys in eastern and the Horn of Africa, whereas fourteen girls are enrolled for every ten boys in central Africa and the Great Lakes region (Dryden-Peterson 2011: ***).

As so often, the Syrian crisis has magnified existing challenges: millions of children dropped out of school when they fled or were expelled with their families.[48] In Turkey, only 27% of non-camp refugee children are in school.[49] Across the region, only 34% of school-age Syrians residing outside of Syria are enrolled in school. In other words, 500,000 to 600,000 young people are being deprived of an education (Dorman 2015: 13).

As so often, diagnosing the cause of the problem suggests the solution, or at least part of it. The most basic issue is access: *refugee children must have the right to study in their country of residence.* Urban refugees cannot achieve an education if they are not admitted to local schools. Signatories to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol are formally obligated to provide such access to Convention refugees, though the quality of that education varies widely, and there may be other barriers to access (such as address or registration requirements). Some non-signatory states also provide access to education, though, again, other barriers may block access. In Malaysia, for instance, education is mandatory for all children between six and fifteen years old, but non-citizens are charged a fee to attend schools (Humanium 2015). Other states are more explicit in prohibiting access. Thailand refuses to provide schooling for its longstanding refugee population from Myanmar (Watkins 2011: 16). Such restrictions are in no one's interest. The best policy from the refugees' point of view – and, frankly, from the hosting states' point of view as well, since most of the refugees will not leave – is one of "don't ask, don't tell": children should be given access to schools where they reside without the parents having to produce evidence of a legal right to remain.

To provide education, someone has to pay for it, and current funding levels are simply too low. Despite the overwhelming importance of education for refugees' life chances, only 1.65% of humanitarian aid is allocated for education (down from 2.3% in 2010!). Overall, merely one third of requests for education funding is met, a figure half that for other sectors (Dryden-Peterson 2011: 9; Watkins 2001: I and 19). In some cases, the very requests themselves

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[48] Interview with the Minister of Education, Interim Syrian Government, Gaziantep, June 13, 2014.

[49] Non-camp refugees make up 80% of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Interview with an NGO (anonymity requested), June 9, 2014. Dorman (2014: 3). The figure in camps is 80%.

are discouragingly low, which stands as an indictment of host-country priorities (Watkins 2011: 19). Chad's 2010 humanitarian appeal for education amounted to US$12 million for a country with some 170,000 IDPs, 300,000 refugees, and a reported school enrollment rate for displaced children of 40% (Watkins 20011: 19). The Democratic Republic of Congo's request totaled US$25 million for a country with over two million displaced persons and an enrollment rate for children of around 30% (Watkins 2011: 19).

Financial support for education is thus far too low and constitutes a serious failure of humanitarian aid. Funding levels for education should be increased through two avenues. More funds for education should come through UNHCR, ideally following increased donor support, and this should include better compensation for teachers within camps. Ideally, teachers need to be monitored, and those who shirk their duties should have their pay suspended or be dismissed. In practice, achieving this goal will be difficult: even wealthy countries such as the United States find such a goal elusive. It nonetheless remains a worthy one. Developing countries cannot open their schools to refugees unless they have the funds to do so. The best way to increase educational opportunities for refugees is to increase them for everyone, nationals and refugees, in a host state, and to mainstream refugees into the existing school system rather than building an expensive, parallel one.[50] Doing so will also decrease local resentment towards refugees; indeed, the refugees may be viewed as members of the community. With increased funding from both humanitarian and development budgets, donors and UNHCR should link support for overall education in host countries (the building of new schools, training of new teachers) with guaranteed access for refugees to that education

There has already been some progress in this area. UNHCR has explicitly recognized the challenges faced by Lebanon's overstretched schools, and the organization and its partners have distributed school materials and equipment to both Lebanese and Syrian students (UNHCR 2014a). Similarly, donors have worked with Lebanon to develop the "Reaching all Children with Education" strategy, which aims to provide educational opportunities to both Syrian refugees (including 200,000 Syrian children in public schools) *and* underprivileged Lebanese children (Jalbout 2015: 8). In the Kyenjojo district of Uganda, UNHCR and its implementing partners delivered primary education to both Ugandans and refugees (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2004:

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[50] A conversation with Lama Mourad clarified this point.

33). UNHCR funding for teacher salaries, channeled through government ministries, created a series of virtuous circles: higher pay for teachers, lower student-teacher ratios (which makes both teaching and learning more appealing), and expanded opportunities for local teachers to secure employment (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2004: 31-34). These successful efforts, however, have not been sufficiently expanded, and the situation is often bleak: 400,000 Syrian children (aged 3 to 18) remain out of school (Jalbout 2015: 2).

A further challenge is institutional, though it too is a matter of funding. The education unit at UNHCR is, in the words of one scholar, "shockingly small" (Dryden-Peterson 2011: 35): it employs a Senior Education Officer (responsible for overall coordination), a Tertiary Education Officer (who manages UNHCR's scholarship scheme), and an Education Assistant. The last two positions are funded externally. For many years, these three individuals faced a routine battle to convince their colleagues at UNHCR that refugee education deserved any funding at all (Box 2012, citing a UNHCR interview). Such an institutional design makes UNHCR's often lofty rhetoric on education appear hollow (on the latter, see UNHCR 2003). According to its own comprehensive needs assessment, funding in 2012 only covered 39% of the organization's limited educational services (Dryden Peterson 2011: 36). Unremarkably given the resources at the center, UNHCR education policy is highly decentralized: over two hundred implementing partners are under contract with the organization to deliver education at the local level. There is great variation in the quality of the programs delivered and little oversight from Geneva (Dryden-Peterson 2011: 35).

Costing Education

A university dean once spoke of problems at his institutions. When asked, "Do you mean money problems?" he replied, "Are there any other problems?" Agreeing on the importance of education is the easy part; the challenge is paying for it. And here the good news is that the costs are relatively modest. To calculate them, I used 2013 data on the top fourteen refugee countries, and multiplied each country's population by the estimated per-capita cost (in US dollars) of primary education in each country.

Hosting country	Number of refugees	Per capita cost, 1 year of primary education	Total annual cost
Pakistan	1,505,525	$87.5	$131,733,348
Iran	982,027	$335.50	$329,470,058
Lebanon	1,154,040	$573.10	$661,380,324
Jordan	654,141	$377	$246,611,157
Turkey	1,587,374	$542.88	$861,753,597
Kenya	551,352	$77.76	$42,873,132
Chad	452,897	$14.44	$6,539,833
Ethiopia	659,524	$53.29	$32,146,034
Iraq	271,143	$335.52	$90,973,900
Yemen	257,645	$53.28	$13,727,326
Bangladesh*	232,472	$31.7	$7,369,362
Egypt	236,090	$262.08	$61,874,467
South Sudan	248,152	$74	$18,361,250
Uganda	385,513	$18.72	$7,216,803
Total			**$2,512,030,591**

*Bangladesh hosts 32,472 recognized refugees and an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 people from Myanmar in refugee-like situations.

The total is thus over US$2.5 billion annually. Once this figure is halved (assuming 50% of refugees are children), that yields a total figure of $1.26 billion annually. This, it should be noted, is a generous estimate, as not all children under 18 lack access to education: some refugee children are already in state schools, and others are in private schools. Putting this figure into context, it constitutes 5.7% of total humanitarian aid in 2013 (US$22 billion) (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2014).

Education and the private sector

Nascent efforts are being made to involve the private sector in refugee education, and when doing so lower costs and increases access, such involvement is to be encouraged. A recent

example, still in the initial phases, is the Instant Network Schools Programme, a public-private partnership between the Vodafone Foundation and UNHCR. It is part of a UNHCR's educational initiative aimed at bettering rates of school enrollment and the quality of education provided to refugee youths living in camps in Africa (Ostermann 2015). Launched in April 2013, the main focus of the program is on helping students to develop skills that will enable them to find work (Ostermann 2015). Through the provision of internet connectivity, students and teachers are able to access educational resources that would otherwise be scarce in the refugee camp education system, as well as to connect with other students and professionals outside the camp itself (UNHCR News 2014). The program provides tablet computers for students to use for research and study, as well as interactive whiteboards for teachers to use during lessons (Ostermann 2015). Additionally, students are permitted to use the facilities outside of class time for personal use (Ostermann 2015). Each Instant Network School is provided with 25 tablets (Huawei.com 2015). Initial results have been encouraging: teachers at Kenyan Dadaab refugee camp schools reported that the tablet-based lessons have been so popular that pupil attendance had increased by an average of 15% (Vodafone Group 2015b). In Kenya, Vodafone's local affiliate, Safaricom, provides internet connectivity to the instant network schools via solar power, and students and teachers work on some of the 235 tablets donated by Chinese telecom giant Huawei (Vodafone Group 2015b). At present, the primary site of operation is the Dadaab Refugee Camp, in which thirteen instant network centers have been established in six existing primary schools, three secondary schools, and four vocational skills centres (UNHCR and Vodafone 2014). There are an additional two instant network schools at Ajuong Thok Refugee Camp in South Sudan and one other instant network school at Goma Refugee Camp in the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR and Vodafone 2014).[51] The Instant Network School programme is set to expand in the summer and fall of 2015 to the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya (through the creation of two Information and Communication Technology [ICT] schools); the Inke, Boyabu, and Mole refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo (through the creation of 8 ICT schools); and the Nyarugusu Refugee Camp in Tanzania (through two ICT schools) (Vodafone Group 2015b).

Overall, the Instant Network Schools Programme assists some 26,402 students aged seven to twenty years old, of which 19,367 are located in the Dadaab Refugee Camp, 4,735 at

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[51] Spelled alternatively as "Ajuntok" as well as "Ajuon Tok."

Ajuong Thok, and another 2,300 at Goma (Vodafone Group 2015b). Education has been a persistent problem at Dadaab, where out of 279,000 resident children, only 41% are enrolled in primary schools and another 8.5% in secondary schools (UNHCR and Vodafone 2014).[52] So far, a total of 378 teachers have received training for the programme (UNHCR and Vodafone 2014). The overall tablets operation costs $US126,191.

The Vodafone Foundation and UNHCR are rolling out (from March 2015) a second tablet-based learning programme, the Instant Classroom Programme. Though similar in design and intention, the programme differs from the Instant Network Schools Programme in that it has been specifically designed to be set up in under twenty minutes in areas with limited or no connectivity and electricity (Vodafone 2015). This program will provide "advanced teaching aids that are currently only available in a minority of schools in developed nations (Vodafone 2015)." This "school in a box" consists of a laptop, twenty-five pre-loaded tablets that are designed to connect with the laptop, a projector, a speaker, and a hotspot 3G modem that is shipped to the school. The components are designed to be charged in the shipping container, and following six to eight hours of recharging, they can be employed for a full day of use in the classroom (Vodafone 2015). Building on the Instant Network Schools Programme, the box is designed to increase the reach of the programme and to make deployment faster (Collins 2015). The hope is that, in 2015, the Instant Classroom Programme will assist 15,000 students aged seven to twenty at twelve schools located in Kenya (Kakuma Refugee Camp), DR Congo (Equatorial Region), and Tanzania (Nyarungusu Refugee Camp), and another 25,000 students in 2016 (Vodafone Group 2015a). The development of both programmes should be monitored over the next two years with the aim of both evaluating and drawing lessons from them.

Learning What?

That refugees study is one thing; what they study is another. All stakeholders could agree on basic mathematics and language skills (though even many Western countries struggle to ensure that their own citizens acquire them), but a further question concerns which language is learned. Given UNHCR's emphasis on repatriation as a durable solution, language instruction is often in the language of the home country rather than in that of the host country. In 2014, Turkey supported some 120 schools for Syrians, teaching them an adapted Syrian curriculum in

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[52] Elsewhere, UNHCR documents indicate that Daddab Refugee Camp hosts just 180,000 school-aged (3 to 17 years) youth of which 50% attend school; see: Ostermann (2015).

Arabic.[53] If most refugees were to return within a few years, such a policy would be commendable. As it is, this approach is disastrous. Most refugees will remain for many years in the countries to which they fled, so they should be trained in the local or at least regional language (such as Arabic in portions of eastern Turkey).[54] This approach will increase refugees' ability to engage in self-reliance strategies both within and outside of camps, and it will increase their ability to secure jobs in the wider economy if they are allowed to remain in the host country.[55] In the event that they return home, no damage will have been done, as they will continue to learn their home-country language from their families and/or friends. Indeed, knowledge of the host-country language will open many opportunities in border economies, recalling that most refugees flee to a neighboring country. The Turkish government has recognized these facts, and it is now offering Turkish and bilingual Turkish-Arabic education.

As ever in matters of refugees, it is important to avoid making the best the enemy of the good. Any education is better than no education, and in many circumstances, it might be possible to take advantage of refugee teachers who would, naturally, teach in the home-country language. They are an obvious, and largely untapped, source of support.[56]

Beyond language and mathematics, there is no IKEA guide to the curriculum. It should be tailored to local market needs and, to a lesser degree, to maximizing refugees chances of resettlement (to a lesser degree because, even when maximized, those chances are small). In some cases, specific vocational training will be most in demand. In other contexts, such as tourist economies, general skills and language training might be appropriate. In all cases, classes in English, as the world's language, would be an advantage. The essential point is that scarce resources should be concentrated on work-relevant education and training. And in all cases, one of the goals should be certification: refugees need the sort of accreditation that will allow them to obtain a position in the local economy or abroad.

Summary & Conclusion

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[53] Interview with the Minister of Education, Interim Syrian Government, Gaziantep, June 13, 2014. Similarly, all urban schools for Syrian refugees are Syrian schools. In addition, 6,000 Syrians in the 6-11 age group were attending Turkish schools. Dorman (2014): 4, 10-11, and 14.

[54] This is subject to the earlier recommendations on increased, targeted funding for developing countries.

[55] An ideal curriculum might be bilingual and mixed, comprising both home country and host country curricula. But such a curriculum would likely increase costs and coordination problems. Interview with an official from the International Blue Crescent Relief and Development Foundation, IOM Offices, Ankara, June 12, 2014.

[56] I owe this point to Alexander Betts.

The global refugee crisis has overwhelmed the international system. Given the severity of the crisis, it does not admit of a simple solution; indeed, it is likely to complicate domestic and international politics for many more years, if not decades. A package of measures should therefore be adopted to mitigate its worst human and (in matters of security) political effects. This is a not a matter of new brooms. Tested methods of resettlement and (voluntary) repatriation will continue to have their place, but they are simply inadequate in themselves. Similarly, no one solution can be scaled up to the point that it will solve the myriad challenges faced by displaced populations. But by doing many things simultaneously, there is a reasonable chance of making a great difference for refugees' and other displaced people's lives.

This report has recommended a series of measures, which can be summarized as follows:

I.   Resources should be concentrated where refugees in fact are: the global south. Under any realistic solution, states in the global north will need to spend more money, but the most promising scope for doing so lies in linking spending on displaced persons with development budgets. Those resources should be used to underpin:

II. Meaningful local inclusion. Most refugees will not return home or obtain asylum in the west. They must thus be given economic, political, and social opportunities in the countries to which they flee. For inclusion to work, several elements have to be in place.

III. Donor governments, directly or through UNHCR, must provide developing countries with the funds to support refugee inclusion. For inclusion to occur, refugees (and ideally other displaced persons) must enjoy:

  (a)   A right to mobility and work across the country, as well as

  (b)   The education and language and/or vocational training necessary to obtain work.

IV. Donor states should link general donor aid with support for refugees <u>and</u>

V.   They should improve conditions and expand opportunities for both refugees *and* the local population. Bringing everyone up is the best way to bring refugees up as it prevents local resentment and even encourages local populations to view refugees as an asset.

VI. Nascent efforts to encourage refugee self-sufficiency should be expanded. Beyond getting the local rights framework in place, comparative research may shed more light on when refugee self-reliance is achieved, when it is not, and why.

VII. Every effort should be made to expand refugee access to education and to improve the quality of education. Ideally, refugees should be trained in areas that complement rather than compete with local populations.

VIII. Finally, in all cases of support, donor states, NGOs, and IOs should attempt to improve – through funding better teachers, better schools, better transportation and other infrastructure – life for both refugees and locals. To the degree they do, refugees may come to be seen not as an intolerable burden but an economic and political asset.

IX. Where, possible the private sector should be involved (more on this below).

Any of these recommendations is worthy of implementation, but together, they produce positive feedback effects. Better education (Recommendations III(b) and VII) will make refugees more likely to be self-sufficient and, with higher income and more skills, able to contribute positively to local economies (Recommendation VI). The better the conditions for the local population (Recommendation V), the more likely they will be willing to accept refugees' inclusion (Recommendation II). The better the conditions for the local population, the more likely they will be willing to accept refugees and, indeed, to view them as an asset. In the case of democracies, this will key in allowing governments to sell the idea of refugee support to their citizens (Betts 2009: 5).

At all levels, greater private sector involvement holds hope of reducing costs, expanding resources, and most importantly improving the lives of displaced peoples. The report cites several examples, but tech firms in particular can play a central role across different areas: education, job creation, and service delivery. Action Against Hunger (AFC)'s Cash Learning Partnership used ATM cards to organize a cash-for-training program in Lebanon. AFC used the cards to pay displaced persons who registered (and were vetted) for approved work during seven to ten days per month (Cash Learning Partnership 2014). In keeping with best practice, AFC also provided training to women who, for cultural reasons, could not work, and they provided benefits for hosting Lebanese families. AFC does not make much of this, but as in the case of Last Mile Mobile Solutions, the technology also ensured accountability and reduced any temptation to corruption.

Implicit in these proposals is the acceptance of Hathaway and Neve's (1997) recommendation in favor of "common but differentiated" responsibilities for refugees. There is a strong moral case for each country to accept refugees in numbers commensurate with their size and wealth, but such an outcome is not going to obtain and accidents of geography will continue to determine where most refugees arrive. Nonetheless a concentration of resources in the global south; the institution of work and mobility rights for refugees; the involvement of all stakeholders – governments, NGOs, IOs, and the private sector – in solutions; the raising of educational standards for refugees and citizens; and above all an effort to improve the lives of both refugees and nationals in the global south holds out the promise of, if not fully just outcomes, at least better ones for some of the world's poorest and/or most persecuted people.

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