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Editorial


Das erste Vienna Humanities Festival, das mit 40 Veranstaltun- gen an einem Wochenende im Sep- tember erfolgreich über die Bühne gegangen ist, machte zudem deut- lich, wie wichtig Dialogbereitschaft und eine offene Gesprächskultur sind, um zentrale Herausforde- rungen unserer Zeit wie die Aufnah- me und Integration von Flüchtli- gen zu bewältigen. Das unterstrich- en der indischen Globalisierungs- theoretiker Arjun Appadurai, der beim Festival ebenso zu Wort kam wie die Historikerin Holly Case. In ihrem Beitrag geht es um das Kon- zept der Unzurechnungsfähigkeit so- wie dessen Auswirkungen auf Polit- ik und Rechtsgeschichte.


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The Shipwrecked Mind

BY MARK LILLA

We live in an age when the tragicomic nostalgia of Don Quixote for a lost golden age has been transformed into a potent and sometimes deadly weapon, writes Mark Lilla, one of America’s foremost intellectuals, in his new book. The revolutionary spirit that inspired political movements across the world for two centuries may have died out. But the spirit of reaction that rose to meet it has survived and is proving just as formidable a historical force.

Hope, said the philosopher Francis Bacon, is a good thing, but not so good as despair. Only a quarter century ago, hope was an active force in world politics. The Cold War ended peacefully and de-spit ethnic war in the Balkans func-
tioning constitutional democracies took root in Eastern Europe. The Euro-
porean Union was formally estab-
lished and membership was steadily extended eastward. Politicians and com-
mentators spoke confidently of “transitions to democracy” in states around the globe. Economies were deregulated and free trade agree-
ments were approved. China opened up and India became more prosper-
ous. The Oslo accords between Isra-
el and the Palestinians were signed, and Nelson Mandela became presi-
dent of South Africa after spending three decades in prison.

Do we even remember what hope looked like? Today politics worldwide is being driven instead by anger, despair, and resentment. And, above all, nostalgia. “Make X Great Again!” is the demagogic slogan of our time, and not just in the United States. What is political Is-
lamism but the violent translation of a fantasy of return, in this case to an imagined era of religious purity and military might? Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan succeeds by spread-
ing a Turkish version of it, invoking the grandeur of the Ottomans. Prime-
minister Narendra Modi made his ca-
rrier by propagating Hinduutva, a fan-
ciful Hindu nationalism that extols Indian civilization before the arrival of Muslims. Far-right parties across Europe traffic in similar imagined pasts. We can measure how far we have come since 1949 by the fact that both Russian president Vlad-
imir Putin and Chinese president Xi Jinping now garner support by appealing to symbols of the glori-
ous Communist era.

We live in a reactionary age. Revolutionaries traffic in hope: they believe, and wish others to believe, that a radical break with the past is possible and that it will inaugurate a new era of human experience. Re-
actionaries believe that such a break has already occurred and has been dis-
astrous. While to the untrained eye the river of time seems to flow as it always has, the reactionary se-
es the debris of paradise drifting past his eyes. He is time’s exile. The rev-
olutionaries see the radiant future and it elects them. The reaction-
ary sees the past in all its splendor and he too is electrified. He feels
himself in a strong position because he is the guardian of what actually
happened, not the prophet of what

might be. “This explains the strange-
ly exhilarating despair that cours-
es through reactionary literature and political rhetoric, the palpable
sense of mission. As the editors of
the right-leaning magazine Nation-
el Review put it in its very first issue, the mission is to “stand alert and
history, yelling Stop!” Hurricanes come
in many forms.

Reactionaries are not conserva-
tives. This is the first thing to be un-
derstood about them. Conservatives
have always seen society as a kind
of inheritance we receive and are re-
sponsible for. This means, contrary
to liberal thinking, that our obliga-
tions take priority over our rights. But it also means that we are the me-
dium through which society chang-
es, as it is always doing. The health-
liest way to bring about change, the
conservative believes, is through con-
sultation and slow transformations in custom and tradition, not by an-
nouncing bold reform programs or de-
defending supposedly inalienable
individual rights. But the conserva-
tive is also reconciled to the fact that
history never stands still and that we
are only passing through. Con-
servatism seeks to instill the hum-
ble thought that history moves us
forward, not the other way around.
And that radical attempts to master
history never stands still and that
reactionaries themselves—see what
happened. Whether the society re-
duces direction or rushes to its ul-
timate doom depends entirely on its
resistance.

Revolutionaries are to be found
only on the right. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and of revolu-
tionary hopes for the post-colonial
world, the European left has trad-
ed the rhetoric of hope for that of
nostalgia. Nostalgia for its own past.

The story the reactionary left tells itself begins with the revolutions of
centuries past, the uprisings, the
general strikes. And also the liter-
ary of revolt, the manifestos, the
ten-point programs, and the mem-
ors of noble defeats, which on the left always count as victories. How
did that whole world disappear? Once again, alien ideas are blamed.

An international cabal of “neoliberal” economists, we are told, man-
aged to convince governments and
formally working class voters that to
get rich is glorious and that every-
one would benefit from growth. Rac-
ists then convinced them that their
durin problems were not due to
the inherent injustices of capitalism,
but to immigrants and minorities.

The only way out of the contempo-
rary catastrophe is to Make the Left
Great Again.

This past summer nostalgia for the old left swept over Paris. It was the
18th anniversary of the Popular
Front, the left-wing coalition that
led a massive general strike in 1936
that succeeded in gaining workers
many new rights, including to paid
vacations. It is, with good reason, a
memorial state where people willing-
ly share a common destiny. Then
alien ideas promoted by intellectu-
als and outsiders—writers, journal-
ists, professors, foreigners—under-
mined that harmony. (The betray-
l of elites is central to every reaction-
ary myth.) Soon the entire society,
even the common people, were taken in. Only those who have preserved
memories of the old ways—the re-
actionaries themselves—see what
happened. Whether the society re-
duces direction or rushes to its ul-
timate doom depends entirely on its
resistance.

The only way out of the contempo-
rary catastrophe is to Make the Left
Great Again.

...
Controversies are instrumentalized by political and religious extremist on both sides.

BY MILOŠ VEC

The politics of the body carry a high symbolic value and may lead to heated discussions. This goes for current conflicts over instances where Muslims have refused to shake hands with non-Muslims, which particularly in 2016 have caused discussions. These controversies have escalated beyond the local context not only because of the behavior of those involved, but also because of the reactions of institutions and civil society. The result is a complex challenge that poses both state and society with an apparently insoluble dilemma. Should the cultural identity of the majority society and its social conventions be actively defended or does the western concept of democracy not also include a liberal, constitutionally anchored freedom of religion, which entails tolerance towards deviations? The fact that majorities now demand the social and cultural conformity of migrants and refugees makes the issue all the more contentious and theoretically interesting.

Much Ado About Nothing?

Essentially it is about different understandings about what constitutes an “appropriate” greeting between men and women. In an inter-cultural context, these understandings are apparently irreconcilable. Social conventions, religious precepts and moral scruples are invoked to explain and justify individual behavior, yet ultimately the law is expected to solve the conflict. Minoritarian demands in society are the reasons for these disputes, however multiculturality might also be the key to a more considered handling of the differences.

Nevertheless, the question remains to what extent media coverage has contributed to a public over-reaction. As far as is known, it is a matter of a series of isolated incidents. In autumn 2015, an Imam working at a refugee home in Rhineland announced that he would not extend his hand in greeting to the CDU politician Julia Klöckner, whoupon Klöckner cancelled the meeting. On 1 November 2015, the beginning and end of lessons (a school ritual). They were 14 and 15 years old and their father is an Imam. At the end of June 2016, a private school in Berlin, a Shiite Imam from Turkey refused to shake hands with his son’s headmistress. In July 2016, a Muslim pupil in Hamburg refused to shake hands with his teacher, who wanted to congratulate him on passing his final exams. In a much older case in Carinthia in Austria, an Islamic religious teacher and Sufi order citizen refused to greet women by shaking hands. Despite the different local contexts, in all these cases the individual refusal to shake hands led to far-reaching social discussions about cultural and religious identities. The many press reports, glosses and commentaries published on the issue now indicate that there exists a liberal, constitutionally anchored freedom of religion, which entails tolerance towards deviations. The case of Carinthia led to a tremendous amount of media coverage, which in turn triggered a high symbolic value and ry a high symbolic value and can cause irritation or insult to others.

The right hand is also highly symbolic in cultural-historical terms. One raises it only when greeting, whether close by or from a distance, but also to swear an oath, in other words a metaphorical seal. It is used, particularly in connection with legal and cultural conformity of migrants and refugees makes the issue all the more contentious and theoretically interesting.

Right Hand Symbolism

Although the real figures are probably much lower, as is known it is a case of isolated incidents in schools, with public authorities and in the public sphere, and by no means—as is sometimes suggested—a mass social phenomenon. Moreover, media reporting primarily concentrates on debates in German speaking countries. Experiences from other European countries, not to mention other continents, very rarely make it into the headlines, if at all. There is no mention of the widespread convention among Muslims and Orthodox Jews throughout the Middle East not to shake a woman’s hand out of politeness. In view of the many various conflicts worldwide, some external observers find these debates strangely trivial. Even people who were refused a handshake deliberately and demonstratively have so far not claimed to be injured in a legal sense (e.g. as a violation of criminal law). The lack of respect they experienced thus counts as no more than a breach of good manners. It is primarily a question of disregard for social protocol, a classic case of insolence, and not a breach of a legal norm. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that refusing to shake hands can cause irritation or insult to other people. The handshake as a ritual of greeting is symbolically loaded, particularly in connection with the right hand. It expresses friendliness, commitment, physical proximity, and the consensual nature of the social contact. At the same time, unlike the hug, it signals a formalization, in which polite distance is involved. For many, the handshake embodies the self-conception of civil society, in which reciprocal social relations are not to be mistaken for friendship. The right hand is also highly symbolic in cultural-historical terms. One raises it only when greeting, whether close by or from a distance, but also to swear an oath, in other words a metaphorical seal. It is used, particularly in connection with social protocol, a classic case of insolence, and not a breach of a legal norm.

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and “hand rub” in the lexicon. How far the norm of handshakes reaches back in time and space is a question probably best answered by etymology. If such elementary rituals are re-
 fused, an equally elemental coun-
ter-reaction is to be expected. More-
over, since the handshake is more or
less represented throughout all con-
tinents, it is all the more astonishing
that the current conflict seems to ex-
ist only in Europe. Today’s political
and social implications have their
share in escalating these incidents—
a circumstance, which the actors are
even more conscious of when they pub-
licly insist on their principles. Immu-
notation, flight from war and power-
ly agreed that this constitutes a spe-
cific interpretation not shared by all
Muslims. The refusal to reach out for
the hand of the other sex is based on
a specific interpretation concerning
the prohibition on physical contact
in the Koran. According to one fat-
wa (the legal pronouncement of a Mus-
lim authority; binding only for those
that recognize this authority), it is
forbidden to offer one’s hand to a
woman who is not Malian, in oth-
er words not a family member. This
interpretation is in turn based on a
Hadith (an account from the life of Mohammed) that states that “For one
of you to be stabbed in the head
with an iron needle is better for him
hanging or the traditional Iustin greet-
ing kaikou involves kissing or rubbing
nooses and foreheads, which to modern
Africans would seem too close for comfort.

While one side activates religion and respect for women outside the family, Mohammed A., of was refusing to
shake hands, the other side invokes a different set of normative argu-
ments to demand that this most common expression of good and man-
ners be upheld. The most frequent reference is to social reference, ac-
cording to which “in this country”
the handshake is to be rejected on
two other sides: the deliberate refusal
to shake someone’s hand thus equals
an affront. However, particularly in
recent debates refuse to shake
hands also have gender dimen-
sions: The handshake, as an appro-
 priate way to greet a woman, is not
only good manners but also a recog-
nition of equality between the sex-
es. A refusal to shake hands with a
woman draws associations with contagious and historical forms of discrimination. The idea that the
handshake as form of physical con-
tact between the sexes should be pro-
hibited because of its unchaste im-
plications is considered a sexualized
interpretation of a normal physical
rural. To insist on the handshake is
therefore also to defend hard-won
progress that should not be called
into question.

Multinormativity in Practice
The fact that, out of the billions of
greetings that take place yearly, these
diverse and sporadic mi-
tro-conflicts have been turned
into a fundamental issue shows the
importance of an own standpoint on
one’s own. In the reported cases, the
people in-
volved or those to whom they have
cashed the handshake, have both sides
invoked lack of respect and discrim-
nation. School or school supervi-
sory bodies regularly get involved.
General norms are discussed and in
some cases regulations are passed.
Interestingly, in the Swiss case, the
school initially ruled that the hand-
shake should temporarily not be re-
quired. This ruling was later over-
turned by a directive from the Basel
Directorate of school, culture and
sports. The directive meant that all
pupils could be obliged to shake hands.
If they re-
 fused, they or their parents would
be liable to receive verbal warnings,
written warning or fines. In the
Berlin handshake affair, the Imam
has eventually announced that he
will sue the teacher for insult and
violating religious customs. The
normative quality of the con-
flicts has thus been altered in a num-
ber of ways: what was performative
desi rat ion for him was an initiative
only recall only one’s own botched fare-
well s or congratulations—became
legally relevant. In Austria, the con-
stitutional court dealt with the case
of a Sudanese teacher of religion,
Mohamed A., whose application for
Austrian citizenship had repeatedly
been refused by the regional au-
thorities over the period of “significant
shortcomings in integration”. The
upset denied for basic Euro-
pean values that the authorities ac-
corded. Mohammed A. of was
almost solely on the fact that he al-
legedly refused to shake hands with
women. The breach of a “fundamen-
tal principle of the European cultural
realm” outweighed consideration of all
Mohammed A’s efforts to integrate.
The constitutional court suspended
the refusal of being granted inter-
facial of the handshake as a “custom
of the European cultural realm”, and
referred to other fundamental Eu-
ropean values such as freedom of
speech. Thus laws are protected in foundational legal
documents. Nevertheless, in Austrian
legal praxis, the willingness to shake
hands continues to be treated as an
indicator of integration and a west-
ern attitude (most recently BVwBG
W 128 142/95–5 of 1 June 2014). The
rulings were strongly condemned in
the media, from two different points
of view: some of them tried, and via
directives partially e noise. In oth-
er words, a jurisdiction has taken place
and court rulings have been issued. Here, parallels to the dis-
cussion on the veil are also evident.
Forms of public behavior become legal
questions. Of course, there is no
ting as a general legal obliga-
tion to shake hands. At best, highly
specific fields, like for example the
social space of the school, feature
norms on handshaking. The court
judgments in turn provide opportu-
nities for exegesis on how the shak-
ing or not shaking of hands is to be
interpreted in connection with rul-
ings on naturalization. The right to
a reciprocated handshake is still not
stipulated anymore.

Will the law now bring peace?
There is no single thing as a “ ACLU or
ought to tolerate deviations.
The Frankfurt school’s classic cri-
ique of law is that a juridifica-
tion of the social would entail a
propagation of the mechanisms of
social self-regulation. This cri-
tique acknowledges society as a so-
cial space of the school, feature
norms, rather than creating norms
long to social mores, which are not
normed by laws. Conduct manu-
als also merely reproduce existing
erms, rather than creating norms
institutions themselves. Instead, what is happen-
inging is a conflict nego-
tiation, in which collective rules not
imposed by an authority are central.
Their transformation is subject to
predictable trends, formal san-
ctions play no part.

Hence, disregard for the dictates
of polite behavior is rarely seen as
legal infringement. Incidents of this
kind are mostly classified in the
public sphere as curiosities. One might
ever consider whether there is not
a rule of conduct stating that the polite
response to bad manners is to pay
no attention—rather than explicitly
consider both of the conflicting
parties and the setting. To
be “improperly” in society by
disregarding particular conven-
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A Backlash Against Women’s Rights?

INTERVIEWS BY AGNIESZKA WĄDOLOWSKA

The IWM marked Women’s Day 2016 with a panel discussion on new threats to women’s rights and gender justice. Issues addressed by the four panelists included reproductive rights, anti-discrimination law, migrant and refugee women as well as patriarchalism on the far-right. In all these fields, feminism is losing ground and being forced to defend its past achievements. But can we speak of an anti-feminist backlash? María do Mar Castro Varela, Elisabeth Holzleitner, Katha Politt and Mieke Verloo in conversation with Agnieszka Wądolowska. With an introductory statement by Shalini Randeria.

Shalini Randeria

The famous Jewish telegram saying “Start worrying—details follow” aptly summarizes the worrying developments concerning women’s rights today. So many victories, which we took for granted, are under massive attack in almost all parts of the world. An ultraconservative crusade has been mounted in Germany and Switzerland recently not only against the very word ‘gender’, or gender studies at universities, but even the idea that gender is a socially constructed category is being questioned. Hardwon achievements like the right to abortion are under attack in the US as well as in many parts of Eastern Europe. The push-back shows that constant political mobilization, and even legal struggles, may be necessary to guard against losing already won rights.

Who Are the ‘WE’, Who Had Won Women’s Rights?

However, enjoying these rights is a privilege that only some women in a few countries of the world share. Class, caste, race matter, when it comes to the exercise of women’s rights. In many societies, fundamental women’s rights, which especially young women in the West take for granted, are not even recognized as such. In other countries, they are enshrined in law but are unattainable in practice. In yet other states, including most Western European democracies, these rights are only available to those, who enjoy citizenship rights, but may not apply to migrant women, refugees, undocumented workers as well as asylum seekers. This makes the question of belonging to a political community, and with that the issue of migration, a pertinent one as women’s rights are often inextricably intertwined with citizenship rights.

NGOization of Women’s Rights

The struggle for women’s rights was a collective, national one and on some issues a transnational one too. The absence of a national or transnational women’s movement today in the face of the backlash is a matter of concern. In the paradoxical world we live in, women are on the move, and these paradoxes have grave consequences that need to be addressed. And since these negative developments can be observed at all levels from that of the state to that of the household, we also need to understand better what is happening in the familial context.

Class, caste, race matter, when it comes to the exercise of women’s rights.

Advances in Identity Rights

Finally, let me point to the larger structural changes within which these trends need to be situated.

The IWM marked Women’s Day 2016 with a panel discussion on new threats to women’s rights and gender justice. Issues addressed by the four panelists included reproductive rights, anti-discrimination law, migrant and refugee women as well as patriarchalism on the far-right. In all these fields, feminism is losing ground and being forced to defend its past achievements. But can we speak of an anti-feminist backlash? María do Mar Castro Varela, Elisabeth Holzleitner, Katha Politt and Mieke Verloo in conversation with Agnieszka Wądolowska. With an introductory statement by Shalini Randeria.

While gay and lesbian rights enjoy wider public support than ever before in many European, and in some non-European, countries, economic rights for women are being dismantled rapidly with the whittling down of the welfare state. Thus the backlash against women’s rights is not merely a political one, but we need to analyze the structural conditions under which women’s rights are at risk today. Neoliberal restructuring in Europe and beyond affects women highly negatively as work conditions become precarious and childcare, as well as care of the elderly become more expensive and less accessible even for women, who otherwise enjoy full citizenship rights.

Shalini Randeria

The IWM marked Women’s Day 2016 with a panel discussion on new threats to women’s rights and gender justice. Issues addressed by the four panelists included reproductive rights, anti-discrimination law, migrant and refugee women as well as patriarchalism on the far-right. In all these fields, feminism is losing ground and being forced to defend its past achievements. But can we speak of an anti-feminist backlash? María do Mar Castro Varela, Elisabeth Holzleitner, Katha Politt and Mieke Verloo in conversation with Agnieszka Wądolowska. With an introductory statement by Shalini Randeria.
It is enough to look at the declining number of potential allies for feminism to see the backlash. Dominant discourses—such as on efficiency and competition—make it increasingly difficult to argue for justice. In Europe, socio-democratic, left-leaning parties with social justice at their core are no longer as strong as they used to be. Unfortunately, many moved to the center and now try to accommodate the market, rather than focusing on exploitation in capitalism. They believe that the market provides some kind of fairness. However, the market does not care about social justice. In order to be heard, you have to speak the language of mercantilism, competition, growth and efficiency. That is why so much attention is given to the glass ceiling. Women are not given a free pass, as the argument goes, but are prevented from using this argument, you lose the point. Women are just as good as men, so the argument goes, but are prevented from making their situations. Furthermore, Leftist movements go, but are prevented from making it increasingly difficult to argue for social justice. In Europe, socio-democratic, left-leaning parties are forced to take a stance along those lines. The power of gender studies to construct truth is very limited. Years ago, I did a training course for the academic directors of a Belgian university. They were outraged at me for saying that gender isn’t sex, and that there is a very complicated relationship between the two. They were ready to dismiss me on the spot and go home, because for them it simply wasn’t true. They had a deep-seated belief in the existence and rightfulness of biological differences between men and women. They weren’t even prepared to discuss it. If this is the way educated people think, you know you’re in trouble.

I think that gender studies needs to become more aware of the political nature of the knowledge it generates. That means you have to engage with opponents, who simply don’t believe what you are saying. Confrontations are necessary. You can then try to educate and defend your knowledge, and make people engage with that. With that in mind, the efforts in France and Italy to fight gender stereotyping in education is spot on. They are right: it is crucial what you teach children. We need to increase our efforts for gender equal- ity in education.

Mieke Verloo is Professor of Comparative Politics and Inequality Issues at Radboud University, Nijmegen, and a Non-Resident Permanent Fellow at the IWM. Her research interests include the analysis, development and design of gender equality policies in Europe.

**Feminists have to engage with opponents who simply don’t believe what you are saying.**

**Mieke Verloo**

**Is this a backlash or more of a case of stagnation?**

We should not exaggerate. Anti-discrimination law is not a dead letter and law-and-order discourse focused on penalizing and sanctioning people. Feminists could say there is a growing belief that certain—othered—groups should be monitored and sanctioned for ‘out’ safety. In the Netherlands, radical social-ist parties have returned to old-school thinking and the idea that class is everything, and hence all other in- equality issues should be excluded. As a result, they advocate protect- ing those, who are already in work, but care little about migrants or the unemployed, which is a step back- wards in terms of social solidarity. Some people narrow their focus even further, which has nothing to do with social justice. By using this argument, you lose the opportunity to talk about the many underprivileged women—victims of the system, people who are exploit- ed and abused. The problem is that only a few, weak parties seem still to care about exploitation.

No less worrying is that right- wing parties are getting stronger by the day. They say that the government has been misleading citizens for too long, that instead of demanding rights people should shoulder their duties and work harder. They also embrace ideas, carrying around a huge bag of anti-egalitarian policies. I guess that perhaps one of the explanations for the success of the right-wing parties is that they understand what the public wants to hear, and which arguments will make them appear less radical. For example, the leader of the right-wing party program commission of the AFD is a lawyer who, in accordance with German law, lives in a registered partner- ship with another woman. They also have a child together. And her par- ty is deeply against gay rights! How come she feels their rights are protected? How does she disassociate her private life from the party program? I believe this is something we have good reason to fear. Far-right parties represented in the public eye by at-tractive people standing for very ugly ideas, carrying around a huge bag of anti-feminist policies.

**Elisabeth Holzleitner**

In the 1990s, there was a boom—the EU supported initiatives to transpose directives into national laws and create bodies to ensure that the directives are actually implemented. It suggests the AFD stands for equality and modernity though the party’s pro- gram says something utterly different.

In the debates after Cologne, many claimed that the radical right had won the public argument and feminism. They couldn’t be more wrong! Those whose world-view includes anti-im- migrant sentiments are not remotely feminist. They resort to reactionary ideas about protecting ‘white wom- en’ from the ‘non-white men’, which is nothing but an age-old patriarchal motif. If these voices are the ones that are heard most, we will end up with a simplistic discourse without any nuanced discussion.

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LGBTI rights are often male-centered. While we discuss the rights of women, we are only talking about the lesbos. The feminists join hands with the ultra-conservatives, they see these feminists as a threat. They ignore the fact that gender mainstreaming proves to be a test for women. They see the diversity policy as a threat, they also see the role of women in the universities as a threat. They ignore the fact that in the 90s, migratory women have been portrayed as victims, but in the 2000s, they are portrayed as a threat. They ignore the fact that the anti-abortion movement was aggressive and that over time that gave it a base, and over time that base became strong and aggressive. It became a crucial part of the political party's base, and over time that gave it the strength to go against the court's decision in Roe vs. Wade.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the anti-abortion movement was aggressive and that over time that gave it the strength to go against the court's decision in Roe vs. Wade. This also applies to the field of women's rights and heteronormativity in Europe. In the US, women are already being punished for having abortions. In Indiana, a 23-year-old woman who tried to abort herself with a coat hanger was charged with a first-degree felony. In Tennessee, a woman who tried to abort herself with a coat hanger was also charged with a first-degree felony. In Pennsylvania, a woman who tried to abort herself with a coat hanger was arrested. In Florida, a woman who tried to abort herself with a coat hanger was also arrested. In Texas, a woman who tried to abort herself with a coat hanger was also arrested. In North Carolina, a woman who tried to abort herself with a coat hanger was also arrested. In South Carolina, a woman who tried to abort herself with a coat hanger was also arrested. In Georgia, a woman who tried to abort herself with a coat hanger was also arrested.

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ple don’t realize is that most abortion law is enacted at the state level, and that in many states the pro-life movement is very strong. Back in the 1980s, the movement focused on getting an abortion ban into the Constitution—the Human Life Amendment. That failed, as have attempts to ban abortion in state constitutions. The new strategy is to pass regulations that force clinics to close. They have been pretty successful: dozens of clinics have been put out of business. Five or six states have only one clinic left. There’s a case from Texas currently before the Supreme Court that may determine how far states can go in forcing clinic closures. One possibility is that the country becomes a patchwork, with abortion almost unavailable in large parts of the country and readily available in others. If you want an abortion in New York City, you can get one easily. But not in Montana, North Dakota, Arkansas, Missouri, Texas and large swathes of many states, including some that are Democrat, such as Pennsylvania. We could become a legally divided nation, which was the situation before Roe v. Wade. Effectively, this is where we are already.

Is there a united feminist movement that could prevent a backlash like this?

The fight to preserve reproductive rights is nation-wide. For forty years, it has consumed enormous amounts of feminist energy. Other feminist issues may have been neglected as a result, such as government-funded childcare. Both sides realize that reproductive rights is the key topic. It’s almost as if those opposing women’s progress said: Aha, if we can only keep them stuck on this issue, they won’t get anything else. Reproductive rights is the ground zero. If you can’t control your fertility, you can’t control your life. The right to decide when and if to have children is based on a totally different picture of what it means to be a woman. It’s not just about being a mother or wife, or someone who exists relative to men and children. It says that women, like men, are full human beings. ◁

Katha Pollitt continued from page 10

Political Salons

In 2016, the IWM organized five Political Salons in cooperation with the Austrian newspaper Die Presse and generously supported by EVN. The event series, established in 2004, hosts renowned scholars and politicians in order to discuss questions of current political and social relevance.

The distinguished guests of this year included former US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Lubomir Zaoralek, the former Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Rotfeld, the Russian journalist Zhanna Nemtsova as well as the social anthropologist and migration expert Alessandro Monsutti from the Graduate Institute in Geneva. The topics addressed the so-called refugee crisis and its impact on national, European and global politics, the rise of nationalism as well as the emergence of new divisions in Europe and between the EU and its neighbors.

With the exception of the Political Salon on April 18, moderated by Gerald Knaus, founding Chairman of the European Stability Initiative (ESI), all debates were chaired by Christian Ultsch, head of the Foreign Politics Department at Die Presse, and IWM members Pawel Marczewski (Head of Publications) or Ivan Krastev (Permanent Fellow). ◁

Zhanna Nemtsova, January 17
New Russian Nationalism
Alessandro Monsutti, February 22
Beyond the ‘Refugee Crisis’: Afghan Asylum Seekers in Europe
Madeleine Albright, April 18
Global Responsibility: Europe, the US and the Refugee Crisis
Adam Daniel Rotfeld, October 10
Russia, Ukraine, Poland: Difficult Past, Uncertain Future
Lubomir Zaoralek, November 24
Escaping the Trap of Radicalism: Reflections on Central Europe

Videos of all Political Salons on: www.iwm.at/video
A Majority of ‘Deplorables’?

BY JAN-WERNER MÜLLER

Barack Obama was right to say that democracy itself was on the ballot in the just-concluded US presidential election. But, with Donald Trump’s stunning victory over Hillary Clinton, do we now know for certain that a majority of Americans are anti-democratic? How should Clinton voters relate to Trump’s supporters and to the new administration?

Had Clinton won, Trump most likely would have denied the new president’s legitimacy. Clinton’s supporters should not play that game. They might point out that Trump lost the popular vote and hence can hardly claim an overwhelmingly democratic mandate, but the result is what it is. Above all, they should not respond to Trump’s populist identity politics primarily with a different form of identity politics.

Instead, Clinton supporters ought to focus on new ways to appeal to the interests of Trump supporters, while resolutely defending the rights of minorities who feel threatened by Trump’s agenda. And they must do everything they can to defend liberal democratic institutions, if Trump tries to weaken checks and balances. To move beyond the usual clichés about healing a country’s political divisions after a bitterly fought election, we need to understand precisely how Trump, as an arch-populist, appealed to voters and changed their political self-conception in the process. With the right rhetoric, and, above all, plausible policy alternatives, this self-conception can be changed again. Members of today’s Trumpenproletariat are not forever lost to democracy, as Clinton suggested when she called them “irredeemable” (though she is probably right that some of them are resolved to remain racists, homophobes, and misogynists).

Trump made so many deeply offensive and demonstrably false statements during this election cycle that one especially revealing sentence went entirely unnoticed. At a rally in May, he declared, “The only important thing is the unification of the people, because the other people don’t mean anything.” This is tall-tale populist rhetoric: there is a “real people,” as defined by the populist, and another that is supposedly single authentic will he deduces from that construction; then he claims, as Trump did at the Republican convention in July: “I am your voice” (and, with characteristic modesty: “I alone can fix it”). This is an entirely theoretical process: contrary to what admirers of populism sometimes argue, it has nothing to do with actual input from ordinary people. A single, homogeneous people who can do no wrong and need only a genuine representative to implement their will properly is a fantasy—but it is a fantasy that can re-spond to real problems. It would be a mistake to think that Venezuela and Turkey had been perfect pluralist democracies before Chávez and Erdogan came along. Feelings of dispossession and disenfranchisement are fertile ground for populists. In Venezuela and Turkey, parts of the electorate that one especially revealing sentence went entirely unnoticed. At a rally in May, he declared, “The only important thing is the unification of the people, because the other people don’t mean anything.” This is tall-tale populist rhetoric: there is a “real people,” as defined by the populist, and another that is supposedly single authentic will he deduces from that construction; then he claims, as Trump did at the Republican convention in July: “I am your voice” (and, with characteristic modesty: “I alone can fix it”). This is an entirely theoretical process: contrary to what admirers of populism sometimes argue, it has nothing to do with actual input from ordinary people. A single, homogeneous people who can do no wrong and need only a genuine representative to implement their will properly is a fantasy—but it is a fantasy that can re-
China is Ready to Build Putin’s Firewall

BY IRINA BOROGAN AND ANDREI SOLDATOV

Disencharmed with its approach of silencing social media via intimidation, and failing to build an effective filtering system, the Kremlin turns to China. The Russian authorities are looking for technology and Beijing is ready to lend a hand.

In the early morning of April 27, 2016, a group of Chinese officials in business suits headed towards a huge concrete building on Zubovsky boulevard: the headquarters of Russia Today, Russia’s main propaganda outlet.

On that day it hosted the First Russia-China Cyber Forum with top Internet officials from both countries in attendance. The Chinese brought Lu Wei, the head of China’s State Internet Information Office, and Fang Binxing, the architect of the ‘Great Firewall’. They were warmly welcomed by Irina Sychyoglo, Putin’s assistant on Internet-related issues and former Minister of Communications, as well as Alexander Zhavor, chief of Roskomnadzor, the Russian Internet censorship agency.

They gathered to find a solution to a problem Russian authorities have been struggling with for five years: bringing the Internet and social media under their control. The Kremlin was awakened to the problem posed by Twitter’s and Facebook’s potential for mobilization after the Arab Spring and the protests against Vladimir Putin in Moscow in 2011.

In 2012 the Kremlin introduced a blacklist of banned websites that were to be blocked by the country’s Internet Service Providers, but that effort was not that successful. Russian users began using circumvention tools like TOR and VPN to get access to the blocked websites and online media outlets.

Russia’s Approach to the Internet: 2012–2015

The strategy the Kremlin came up with was based on intimidation rather than technology: the Russian authorities chose to put pressure on companies rather than users. Beginning in 2012, all sorts of tricks were employed to lure companies, both domestic and international, into closer cooperation with the Kremlin—introducing national, into closer cooperation with the Russian authorities. But the offensive stalled. Fall of 2015 was one of the first signs that a new approach was under development.

The goal was not only to make the companies’ servers accessible to the Russian secret services for wiretapping, but also to get the three Internet giants landed in Russia.

In short, the Kremlin wanted to force global Internet giants into a situation where they would be treated just like domestic ones—ready to get a call from the Kremlin, open to cooperating to remove and block content, with their servers directly connected to the Russian security services. But the offensive stalled. Fall and winter passed, with contradictory statements made by Russian officials, and in the fall of 2015, the authorities began jailing users for posting critical comments on social media, but in most cases it was users of the Russian social network Vkontakte, not Facebook or Twitter.

On April 27, 2016, when it was Alexander Zhavor’s turn to come to the podium at the Russia-China Cyber Forum, he was in no position to avoid the most pressing topic, data localization. He had to say something, and he did: he praised Chinese companies for being quick to relocate their servers to Russia. But the entire point of data localization had nothing to do with China: nobody uses Chinese social media in Russia.

Go East

The Russia-China Cyber Forum was one of the first signs that a new approach is under development. The organizers of the Forum, which appeared to set the rules for cooperation between the two countries, came up with a joint roadmap. The organizers’ statement has two points. The first concerns the coordination of the two countries’ efforts on the global stage, meaning their activities at the level of the UN. The second point calls for a “joint action to ensure the safety and sustainability of the national top-level domains of Russia and China.”

The Kremlin’s biggest wager was on data localization law that went into effect on September 1, 2015, under the pretext of protecting Russians from surveillance by the US National Security Agency. According to this law, Internet companies that collect personal information from Russian users must store their data on servers within the country. The main targets of the initiative were Google, Facebook and Twitter.

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January 13/14

“Das Rote Bologna” – Revisited—A Communist City in a Capitalist Country
Elena Bettì Research Fellow, Department of History and Culture, University of Bologna

January 13

“Die Vergangenheit ist immer präsent!” – Filmbänden mit Sergei Loznitsa
Ort: Stadt kino, 21er Haus, Wien
Yuliya Kraschak Film- und Medienwissenschaftlerin; Mitglied, Visual Culture Research Center, Kiew
Sergei Loznitsa Weltruhmiger Filmschaffender, Kiew

January 14

South-South? East-East? Chinese Managers and Local Workers in Hungary
Pal Pótyi Professor of Global History from an Anthropological Perspective, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business

January 17

Wozu brauchen wir TTIP?
Ort: Burgtheater, Wien
Ekka Dowsey Professor for International Economics, Bundesbankerammer, Wien
Lutz Gültner Referendär in der Generaldirektion Außenhandel, Europäische Kommission
Pilas Pinter Autorin und Journalistin, Die Zeit
Franz Schiethelm Direktor, Agenda Austria, Wien
dagliere Wirtschaftsjournalist
Pater-Tobias Stoll Rechtswissenschaftler, Institut für Wirtschaft und Europaweit, Universität Göttingen
Shavit Randeria (Moderatorin) Redakteurin, FM: Professorin für Sozialanthropologie und Soziologie, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

January 18

Political Regime Transformation in Russia—The Trajectory of Change
Eladette Schumann Senior Lecturer of Political Science, Institute of Social Sciences, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (see IWM Event 117)

January 19

New Russian Nationalism
Zhurav Nemtseva Russian journalist and activist
Pawel Markowski Head of Publications, WM
Christian Ultsch Head, Foreign Politics Department, Die Presse
In cooperation with the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vienna (see p. 9)

January 20

From Information to Disinformation Age—Russia and the Future of Propaganda Wars
Peter Pomerantsev Publicist, screenwriter and TV producer, London
Adon Shakhovsky Fellow, Legatum Institute, London
In cooperation with Deutsche Verlagsanstalt (DVA)

January 21

Explaining Atrocities
Steven Lukes Professor of Sociology, New York University

January 22

Land and Violence in West Bengal
Rohan Godbole PhD candidate in Development Economics, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

January 27

Zukunft der Demokratie
Ort: Burgtheater, Wien
Rebecca Harms Mitglied der Europäischen Grünen, Europäisches Parlament
Peter Koller Schweizer Journalist, Politiker, Schweizer Fernsehjournalist (SFB)
Adam Krzeminski Polnische Journalist und Publizist
Alexandra Feder-Scheidl (Moderatorin) Chefredakteurin, Der Standard

February 10

Emancipation or Illusion? The Intellectual History of Czechoslovak Democratic Socialism after 1968
Renata Ariansz PhD candidate in History, Charles University Prague

February 11

Intellectuals and (Counter-)Politics: Essays in Historical Realism
Gavin Smith Professor em., Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto

February 14

Russia in Global Dialogue
This series of events aims at intensifying international intellectual debate between Russia and Europe.

February 15

Beyond the ‘ Refugee Crisis’— Afghan Asylum Seekers in Europe
Alessandro Moretti Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology of Development, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
Pawel Markowski Head of Publications, WM
Christian Ultsch Head, Foreign Politics Department, Die Presse
(see p. 9)

February 22

Debates at the Burgtheater
This series of events aims at intensifying intellectual debate between Russia and Europe.

February 25

The Power of the Norm—The Trajectory of Change
Junior Fellows’ Conference: The Power of the Norm—Fragile Rules and Significant Exceptions
Ort: Burgtheater, Wien

Events Colorkey

Seminars 
Faces of Eastern Europe
This seminar series is a forum to discuss issues connected to the economies, politics and societies of Eastern Europe in an interdisciplinary, comparative perspective.

For further information about our fellows and guests see p. 22. More information about all past and upcoming events on: www.iwm.at/events

Films in Perspective
Occasionally, the IWM library turns into a cinema when movies directed by fellows or related to the Institute’s work are being presented and discussed.

For further information about our Fellows and Guests see p. 22. More information about all past and upcoming events on: www.iwm.at/events

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Events in Retrospect 01–06 2016

February

**February 24**

**Being a Foreign Agent—How to Befleeve Under the Pressure of the Law in Russia**

Daria Skibo
Research Fellow, Centre for Independent Sociological Research, St. Petersburg

**February 25**

**Hungary: An Illiberal Democracy in the Middle of Europe**

Gábor Patmá
Professor of Law, Department of European Studies, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

**Vernissage: Stolen Facades**

Cseba Nemes
Hungarian Artist
(see IWM post 1.27)

March

**March 2**

**Postmemory/Bodily Memory: Holocaust at Present**

Ilse Wol
PhD candidate, Department of Media, Culture, and Communication, New York University

**March 8**

**The Backlash Against Women’s Rights**

Maria de Mar Castro Naran
Professor of General Pedagogy and Social Work, Vice-Salamon Hochschule, Berlin

Elisabeth Hofstaßer
Professor, Department of Legal Philosophy, University of Vienna

Katharina Polett
A religious student, poet, and cultural critic

Masa Vette
Professor of Comparative Politics and Inequality Issues, Rostock University

Non-Resident Permanent Fellow, IWM

Shalini Randeria
An Academy of Sciences Fellow, New America Foundation

**March 10**

**Migration Flows and Global Inequalities**

Jeffrey Sachs
Director, The Earth Institute, Quellet
Professor of Sustainable Development, and Professor of Health Policy and Management, Columbia University; Special Advisor, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon; on the Millennium Development Goals

**March 13**

**Flüchtlinge in Europa: Wie schaffen wir das?**

Gottfried Hahn
EU-Kommissar für Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik und Erweiterungsverhandlungen

Rassell Hasen
Professor of Law, Munich School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Melissa Fleming
Spokesperson, UN-Flüchtlingshilfswerk UNHCR

Kilian Kleinnechtmull
Berater der Innenministern bundesregierungs in Flüchtlingsfragen

Franz Karl Priller (Moderation)
Vorstandsvorsitzender, ERSTE Stiftung

**March 14 / 15 / 17**

**The Future of War**

Lecture I: The Transformation of War

Lecture II: War Burdens and Boundaries Counting the Costs

Lecture III: The Future of War and the Future of Law

Rosa Brooks
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; columnist, Foreign Policy; Senior Fellow, New America Foundation

**March 16**

**Martyrdom and Democratic Politics: The Case of the Communist Movement in North Korea**

Lynan Ram
PhD candidate and teaching assistant in Anthropology and Sociology of Development, Quellet Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva

**March 21**

**De-Occupation: Another Take on Donbas**

Olena Styazhkina
Professor of History, Mariupol State University and Donetsk National University, Vinnytsia

**March 30**

**Every Day Practices and Ethnic Markers: Language, City Space and Displays of Nationalism**

Zsuzsanna Varga
PhD candidate in Comparative Gender Studies, Central European University, Budapest

Gandi Yurepas
Assistant lecturer of Sociology, Department of Regional Studies, Kazan Federal University; Research Institute for Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

April

**April 7**

**Voodoo Economics Euro-Style: Neoliberal Resurgence in the Mis(Management) of the Euro Crisis (2009–2012)**

Istvan Czadek Andreff
PhD candidate in Sociology, University of Chicago

**April 12**

**Ukraine: Non-Russia, Novorossia or a “Better Russia”?**

Vladimir Isenzeit
Professor of Economics, Higher School of Economics, Director, Centre for Post-Industrial Studies, Moscow

Anton Liagusha (Discussant)
Associate Professor, Department of World History, Dnepro National University, Vinnytsia

**April 13**

**Framing Sexual Citizenship / Media and Political Discourses in Ukraine and Russia**

Olya Kazakevich
PhD candidate in Cultural Studies, St. Petersburg State University, Krasnoyarsk

Maria Teteriuk
PhD candidate in Mass Communications, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

**April 14**

**Solidarity and Capitalism: Is Solidarity Just a Dream in a Reified Society?**

Gáspár White Tamás
Hungarian philosopher

(see video on www.iwm.at/video)

**April 19**

**Flüchtlinge in Europa: Wie schaffen wir das?**

Gottfried Hahn
EU-Kommissar für Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik und Erweiterungsverhandlungen

Rassell Hasen
Professor of Law, Munich School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Melissa Fleming
Spokesperson, UN-Flüchtlingshilfswerk UNHCR

Kilian Kleinnecht
Berater der Innenministern bundesregierungs in Flüchtlingsfragen

Franz Karl Priller (Moderation)
Vorstandsvorsitzender, ERSTE Stiftung

**April 21**

**The Right to Appear: The (Geo)Politics of Visibility in Today’s Europe**

Laiza Blatevich
Istvan Czadek Andreff
Professor, Department of Media, Central European University, Budapest

**April 28**

**The Backlash Against Women’s Rights**

Maria de Mar Castro Naran
Professor of General Pedagogy and Social Work, Vice-Salamon Hochschule, Berlin

Elisabeth Hofstaßer
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**April 30**

**Migration Flows and Global Inequalities**

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**Books in Perspective**

Books written or edited by fellows or related to the Institute’s research fields are presented to a wider public.

**Art Exhibitions**

Contemporary art exhibitions, curated by Hans Knoll, are presented at the IWM in cooperation with Knoll Galleria Wien-Budapest.

**Monthly Lectures**

Once a month, public lectures take place in the IWM library on subjects related to the main research fields of the Institute.

**Fellows’ Seminars**

In the course of the semester, Junior and Senior Visiting Fellows present their research projects in the Fellows’ Seminars.

**Conferences and Workshops**

The IWM frequently organizes international conferences, workshops and debates related to the Institute’s research interests.
Events in Retrospect 01–06 2016

April

April 14

Pro Patria Mori—Solidarity and Sacrifice in the First World War

April 18

Global Responsibility—Europe, the US and the Refugee Crisis

April 21

Governance of Diversity

April 22

From ‘Is’ to ‘Ought’... and Vice Versa

April 27

Toward a New Paradigm for Modernity and Religion

April 28

The Börne Identity

May

May 4

Employees Who Do Not Work: Reflections on Work, Wage and the Neoliberal State in Jordan

May 9

Vernissage: Parallel Films

May 11

Clumsy Democrats: Moral Passions and Forms of Socability in Postwar West Germany

May 18

Governance Without Hierarchy: Effective and Legitimate in Areas of Limited Statehood?

May 25

Banks, Gold, and Weddings: A Substantivist Perspective on Financial Literacy

May 30

Remembering and Forgetting

May 31

Freedom of Expression in Europe

Events Colorkey

IWM Lectures in Human Sciences

This series of public lectures was launched in 2000 on the occasion of the 100th birthday of Hans Georg Gadamer, supporter of the Institute since its inception.

Ukraine in European Dialogue

Understanding Ukraine and the nature of the current conflict with Russia is vital for the future of the European Union. This series seeks to contribute to this exchange.

Jan Patocka Memorial Lecture


Fellows’ Meeting

Each year, the IWM invites its fellows, friends and supporters to an informal meeting, featuring a lecture by a well-known friend of the Institute.

Tischner Debates

This series of public debates in Warsaw was jointly launched by the IWM and the University of Warsaw in 2005 in memory of IWM’s founding President Josef Tischner.

For further information about our fellows and guests see p. 22. More information about all past and upcoming events on: www.iwm.at/events
IWM Pop-Up

This series of external events, organized in cooperation with the City of Vienna, intends to make scientific research and scholarship more visible at district level.

June 6
No Laughing Matter
Ivan Krastev
Permanent Fellow, IWM; Chair, Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia
Steven Lukes
Professor of Sociology, New York University (also see p. 15)
Video on www.iwm.at/video

June 7
Is Europe Taking a Right Turn?
Gilles Kepel
Professor, Sciences Po and École Normale Supérieure, Paris
Charlott Mouffe
Professor of Political Theory, Westminster University
Professor, Materi (Chair)
Historian, scholar, journalist and translator
Video on www.iwm.at/video

June 8
Experiments in Justice—Translating the ‘Rule of Law’ in Bangladesh
Tobias Berger
PhD in Politics, Free Universität Berlin

June 9
I Have Been Very Slow in Writing this Letter to You, Mahatma!—Buber, Gandhi and the Efficacy of Non-Violence
Jyotirmaya Sharma
Professor of Political Science, University of Hyderabad

June 10
The Ancient Is the Modern: The History of the East Slavic Lands in Light of the Myths of Contemporary War
Timothy Gogol
Permanent Fellow, IWM; Belf White House Professor of History, Yale University
In Kooperation mit der Deutschen-Ukrainischen Historikerkommission (gefördert von DAAD und der Robert Bosch-Stiftung)
Video on www.iwm.at/video

June 11
Junior Fellows’ Conference: Dissidents—Pushing the Boundaries of the Political

June 20
Gute Rechte für alle! Chancen und Gefahren (mensch-)rechtsbasierter Entwicklungsperspektiven
Dr. Volkshochschule Wien Uwe Monheim
Shalini Randera
Rothen, IWM; Professor for Socialanthropologie and Sociology
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Geneva

In Kooperation mit der Dialogreihe Gutes Leben für alle und der Volkshochschule Wien-Umri

June 21
Homo Militans: Paramilitary Individuals’ Motivation in Ukraine
Oksana Michews
Professor and Head, Department of Sociology, Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv

June 22
Science Speed Dating

ERC Mentoring Initiative

E uropean Research Coun-
cil (ERC) Grants are any re-
searcher’s dream, providing funding for the PI and his or her cho-
se team of PhDs and Post-docs to undertake a large-scale fundamen-
tal research project for up to 5 years. For young researchers in particular, an ERC grant offers a unique oppor-
tunity to gain international recogni-
tion and secure a permanent position. From a science policy perspective, these grants can be expected to have significant impact also on the devel-
oment of entire departments, insti-
tutions, disciplines and fields.

ERC Grants are part of the Eu-
ropean Commission’s research fund-
ing framework “Horizon 2020” and are awarded to early-career re-
searchers (Starting Grants), mid-career re-
searchers (Consolidator Grants) and internationally-established research-
ers (Advanced Grants). The success rate for applications is around 10-12%, but the geographical distribu-
tion of these grants is very uneven. Only three countries host over 6% of the 74 social science and humanities projects that were awarded funding in the 2016 Call for Starting Grants (UK 13; Netherlands 11; Germany 10), and only one grant in the so-
cial science and humanities went to Eastern Europe (Estonia).

To tackle the problem of this unequal success rate, the IWM and the Polish Academy of Sciences’ Sci-
entific Centre in Vienna, with the support of the Austrian Ministry of Science, Research and Economy (BMWFV) and the Polish Minis-
try of Science and Higher Educa-
tion (MNiSW), ran four Mentoring Workshops for potential ERC Starting and Consolidator Grant applicants in the social sciences and humani-
ties from Austria, Poland, and oth-
er (South-)Eastern European coun-
tries between November 2015 and December 2016. Around 45 early-
and mid-career researchers benefitted from in-depth advice on the ac-
ademic content and design of their projects by renowned mentors expe-
rienced in the ERC’s rigorous peer-
review and selection procedures.

List of Mentors

Alejandro Cañizares (December 2016)
University Professor of Social Anthropology, University of Vienna

Jens Elster
Professor em. of Economic and Social History, University of Vienna

Antonella Falusiduk (December 2016)
Professor of Social Philosophy, University of Oslo

Thomas König
Strategic Advisor, Institut für Holocaust Studien, Vienna

Shalini Randera
IWM Rector, Professor of Social Anthropology and Sociology,

Graudate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID), Geneva

Sonja Pantzcher Rissmann (February 2016)
Jean Monnet Professor and Director of Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies, University of Salzburg

Balázs Tóthcsapai
Associate Professor of History, CEU, Budapest

Project Coordinator
Christine Piscul
Academic Program Coordinator, IWM

In June, British sociologist Steven Lukes, who was a Krzysztof Schrammel Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology at the University of Vienna, made political jokes at the Kabarett Theater in the City of Vienna. The intention of this innovative concept was to make scientific research and scholar-
ship more visible at district level.

The event was inspired by Steven Lukes’ book “No Laughing Matter—A collection of more than 600 political jokes from all over the world.”

In November, the IWM organized a “Science Speed Dating” event at Vienna’s oldest Heurigen “1. oser Marie” in Ottakring. In this homely surrounding, the current IWM Fel-
loows met around 80 members of the Viennese public to discuss their re-
search in an informal atmosphere. After an evening of face-to-face con-
versations people moved on to an-
other thematic table accompanied by a modern interpretation of Vi-
ennese Schubert by the “Mürtin Spengler & die fröhlichen Wiener.”
The cosmopolitan, intellectually vibrant and artistically innovative Vienna described in Stefan Zweig’s The World of Yesterday is long gone and also forgotten today, or the common perception. But have we simply overlooked, and thus failed to capitalize on, its contemporary cosmopolitan culture? Drawing their inspiration from Vienna’s vibrancy and cosmopolitan past but equally on the large international community of intellectuals, authors, artists and scholars in Vienna today, IWM and Wien Museum organized the first “Vienna Humanities Festival” from the 23rd to the 25th of September. This revival of the city’s tradition of intellectual exchange in public spaces also borrowed elements from the Chica
ggo Humanities Festival, which Matti Bunzl, director of Wien Museum, put it: “We managed to create the atmosphere of an urban salon.” It carried connotations of “elsewhere” or “displacement.” It focused on the theme of the so-called “refugee crisis” in Europe, which has strongly affected public discourse in Austria and Vienna, albeit in a much larger perspective of fluid and multiple identities, flight of capital, flows of goods and images, or of roots and routes. Over the weekend questions of identity, belonging and rights set a counterpoint to the contemporary debate about refugees by relating it to her own experiences of being “out of place.” Other highlights of the program were anthropologist Arjun Appadurai speaking about “Flows of Globalization” (see p. 17), philosopher Ágnes Heller reflecting on “The Divided Society: Gerald Knaus of the European Stability Initiative critiqued the inadequacy of the European response to the so-called “refugee crisis,” while Jan Werner Müller dealt with the rise of populism (see also p. 10).
The title of the talk between Shalini Randeria, Rector of the IWM, and Arjun Appadurai, one of the leading theorists of global cultural globalization, in the first Vienna Humanities Festival on 4th September 2016 was “Flows of Globalization”, a title inviting a theoretical overview of his oeuvre. Appadurai, who holds a professorship in media, culture and communication at New York University and was a fellow at the IWM some 15 years ago, has lived and worked in South Asia, the USA and Europe in the course of his distinguished academic career. The conversation began with his autobiographical reflection on the festival’s theme “Andersorts”, roughly translated as “Out of place?”. “What does it personally mean for you to be out of place? Are you at home anywhere? Or are you out of place everywhere, in different ways in various places?” Randeria asked Appadurai. Having grown up in Mumbai, one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world, Appadurai is familiar with the feeling of being both out of place and in place at the same time. “It is a place where everybody is from somewhere else and so everybody is at home, but everybody is also out of place.”

This experience was also what first sparked his interest in globalization, or, what was initially referred to as transnationalism in the mid-1980s. Partly due to his experience as an Indian scholar in a US university setting he realized that the then still fashionable concept of modernization, which was the key framework for thinking about processes of socio-economic transformation, seemed too simplistic and linear. “It was a kind of one way street, or like a marathon and there were winners and there were people who were going to make it in five hours and people who would never make it.” Reflecting on modernization in light of other transnational processes, and asking himself “who owns modernity? Can anyone be modern?” he and many other scholars realized that modernity was, in the words of Zygmunt Bauman, more liquid. This way of thinking about global processes lead to his highly influential work “Disjunction and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy” (1990) published in Public Culture, a journal he founded. Here he introduced his highly influential notion of “scapes” (mediascapes, financescapes, ethnoscapes etc.) to suggest the fluidity of these different flows that are tied to one another in continually changing ways but whose form varies with the view and vantage point of the observer. He thus argued for the need for perspectivity in the study of cultural globalization as well as the importance of imagination and in the construction of.

The conversation turned to the rise of ethnic nationalisms in the diaspora as well as the pitfalls of transnational processes of political support, a phenomenon increasingly significant but also specific to our times. For Appadurai these processes point to the crumbling of the assumption that the nation state is the natural way of living. What we are witnessing today is a form of global “anxiety” that this system is falling apart. “That sense of dislocation or lack of fit between identity, place, loyalty and so on, has become a part of the anxiety of states, but also of migrants. No one is sitting, as it were, completely secure. So if you take the US, for instance, the people who have entered recently, let’s say undocumented migrants from Mexico, or elsewhere, as well as Donald Trump, the most hyper-privileged, are all anxious.”

It is this psycho-political of globalization that Appadurai analyzes in his second book on globalization “Fear of Small Numbers” (2006). It deals with the “dark side” of globalization: the ethno-nationalism, majoritarianism, populism and rise of violence against ethnic minorities. In contrast, his earlier book Modernity at Large (1998) presents a far more optimistic scenario of the potential for emancipation that globalization brings. Randeria contrasted the two books as representing two aspects of globalization, the aspirational and the structural violent, asking if Appadurai’s work had shifted from one to the other aspect. “It was evident that the kind of optimism that I and others felt when the Berlin wall came down, for Europe, for the world, had to be rethought. Because there were other potentials, actually opposite potentials, of shrinkage of the imagination, of a kind of localization of identity, all this exactly opposed to the opening up, to the communication, to the imagination of bigger spaces and larger possibilities”, he responded.

Appadurai felt that, his most recent book, The Future as Cultural Fact, which draws on his research on grassroots movements of the urban poor in Mumbai, reflects a better co-presence of these two intertwined aspects. “What we can observe today, he remarked, is a ‘global shift to the right’ , from Modi, in Putin, to Trump and so on. In the context of India, he explained, “the questions are only ‘How far right are you? Of ficial politics is right, righter, rightest.” This phenomenon is not exclusive to non-Western countries— in most democracies, both Western and non-Western, the left of today is the right of yesterday and the left of yes terday seems to be coming right out of place.” But at the same time there is a “dramatic tension between official politics, state elites, corporate elites, governments, more and more just debating how far right to be”, and the “grassroots level”, movements like Black Lives Matter, or the slum dwellers in Mumbai whom Appadurai worked with. On this level, “you still see a huge aspirational politics, which is progressive, which is democratic, which is rights-centered.”

Towards the end of the conversation, Randeria described Appadurai’s latest work as a “politics of hope”, in which there is the acknowledgement of potential grounds for the formation of new forms of local and translocal solidarity through flows of globalization. Central to this politics is “cosmopolitization from below”. Whereas transnational elites are cosmopolitan by choice, the urban poor become cosmopolitan out of necessity. In their situation it is essential for survival to “learn the skills of taking on different positions” . As an example, Appadurai discusses tolerance: Tolerance is not something that only those have, who are literate or who are able to theorize about it. For many subaltern people today, for slum-dwellers, for women, it is a survival strategy. “This poses a political question: Will the conditions of shared existence become conditions for this daily collaboration between people, which allows them to expand their imagination, get shrunk by those governing their lives?”

Minus the daily encounter with difference and difference successfully negotiated you can have all the policies in the world, and people in their daily lives will have no interest in them”, Appadurai says. But how to enable such interaction, and not let the politics of segregation and hatred being promoted through state politics or the media hinder the flourishing of aspirational politics, is a question we must all address within our own local contexts. •
Is there a relationship between politics and madness? The history of the legal strategy known as the insanity defense offers some clues.

One thinker, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt, was so haunted by the moral confusion of the insanity defense as to wonder whether there is a way to tell right from wrong without reference to right and left.

In November 2016 before a packed courtroom in Graz, Austria, a man stood trial for three counts of attempted murder. His case—one of a series of targeted assassinations—had generated vast interest throughout the city center of Graz. Witnesses estimated his maximum speed to be over 60 miles per hour. At one point he stopped to attack two people with a knife. Over the five-minute duration of his “mad driving spree,” he killed three people and injured thirty-six, many of them seriously.

The focus of the trial came down to one question: “Is Alen R. so mentally ill that he can assume no responsibility for the apocalyptic drive in his SUV through the pedestrian zones of Graz?” At issue were the conflicting expert assessments of psychiatrists and a psychologist regarding the defendant’s sanity—one had concluded that he was “of unsound mind” and should therefore be referred for psychiatric treatment rather than given a prison sentence, while another believed Alen R. to be very much “of sound mind” and said he should stand trial as an accused criminal. To break the tie, a third (German) psychiatrist was called in who diagnosed him with schizophrenia. In the end, the jury deferred to the testimony of a fourth expert, a psychologist, who declared Alen R. to be of sound enough mind to be criminally responsible for murder and attempted murder. He was given a life sentence (though it is not yet binding) along with a referral for incarceration in a facility for the criminally insane.

One matter that was largely skirted in the trial but hotly debated “on the street” was whether Alen R.’s drive had been politically motivated. Just prior to the attack he deleted all but one of his Twitter posts, and the remaining one suggested the deed was not spontaneous, but planned. Interpretations varied widely: his estranged wife said he was a radicalized Muslim who made her wear a burka; he himself told police he felt he was being pursued by “Turks”; the psychologist who swayed the jury said he was obsessed with “hormonic maleness” in the pattern of Grand Theft Auto. “He sits at the red light, feels himself threatened, then the light turns green and he puts the pedal to the floor,” one juror observed. “Game over.”

Although the Austrian media was legally restrained from revealing some of Alen R.’s personal details during the trial, the British and American media were not. They gave his full name, Alen Rizvanović, and even posted photos of him. When I first saw his full name, a faint echo of association brought the “mad driver” into accidental relation with another media sensation from some years ago: Željko (Arkan) Ražnatović. But the association was absurd. Alen R. is a Muslim whose family fled the war in Bosnia when he was just four years old to settle in Austria. Insofar as anyone associates any politics with him, it is in the context of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism and the possibility that he had been radicalized prior to running amok.

Arkan R., on the other hand, was a Serb. He was also a criminal of international infancy who had organized his own paramilitary group known as Arkan’s Tigers during the Yugoslav war. There is an iconic photo of him in dark-colored military gear, gun in one hand, a tiger cub by the scruff of its neck in the other. Members of the Tigers are ranged behind him atop a tank, all wearing dark uniforms and balaclavas. Only Arkan is showing his face. He had nothing to hide.

The contrast to Alen R. is striking, his face blurred out by the rules of a rule-of-law state, sitting in a white suit, head slightly bowed. Alen R. did not get away with murder. Arkan did. Indicted in absentia on several counts of war crimes by the Hague Tribunal, including torture and mass execution of captured Bosnian Muslims, he never stood trial. In fact, he became one of the wealthiest and most powerful figures in the region, at least, until he was assassinated in the crowded lobby of a Belgrade hotel in 2000. More than 10,000 people attended his funeral.

The association of Alen R. with Arkan R. may be politically absurd, but it makes moral sense. In one of the many comment streams to the Austrian coverage of Alen R.’s trial, I came across the following exchange: “People who run amok and intentionally kill strangers without political or religious motivation have a not inconsiderable personality disorderanything, one that can’t be eliminated by simple therapeutic measures,” wrote one person. Another replied: “So a person is somehow less disturbed if they kill strangers with political or religious motivations?”

Beginning in the twentieth century, as mass politics was just coming into existence, the legal basis for the insanity defense was the determination of whether—at the time a crime was committed—the perpetrator could tell the difference between right and wrong. Introducing moral categories into the insanity defense set it on a collision course with politics. As politics increasingly focused on distinguishing between right and left, its method came to be about aligning this distinction with the one between right and wrong. Small wonder that modern politics is rife with competing claims that the other side is both morally suspect and of questionable sound mind.

Furthermore, the charge of insanity even came to serve as a kind of moral absolusion. A great many movements and ideologies that have come to form states and make laws, laying down their own standards for right and wrong, were once considered insane—democracy, Bolshevism, Nazism/fascism, Islamic fundamentalism. Furthermore, culture and history prime us to view the moral underdog as the champion of a deeper moral truth. Long before the modern era, Socrates famously and repeatedly “said he didn’t know what the better cause,” and Jesus Christ turned the morality of his time on its head (“So the last shall be first, and the first last”). When Christ said on the cross “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,” he was not issuing a blanket assurance of humanity’s collective insanity.

Sometimes it seems a shake-down of the moral order is just what the social order needs. But not always. Perhaps the starkest counter-example is offered by the 1961 trial of Adolf Eichmann. Though he did not kill anyone himself, Eichmann oversaw the logistics behind a significant part of the Holocaust of European Jewry, most notably the transport and murder of 450,000 Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz in the spring of 1944. After the war he assumed a fake identity and joined thousands of other former Nazis and their sympathizers in self-imposed exile in Latin America. Among those present at the trial was the political philoso-
On November 24, Austria’s Foreign Minister Sebastian Kurz was awarded the IWM’s annual Fellows’ Meeting in Prague. The forum has been set up to further intensify relations between Austria and the Czech Republic. In the context of this newly created platform, economists, experts and representatives of government and non-government institutions from both countries will now have the opportunity to engage in enhanced exchange on current social policy issues. At the launch event, discussions focused in particular on dealing with the phenomenon of political radicalization.

On the occasion of IWM’s annual Fellows’ Meeting on May 30, Polish Ambassador Artur Lapkowski profusely acknowledged the “Bene Merenti” honorific distinction to the IWM’s founding rectors Krzysztof Michalski, professor at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, and the late Roman Kantorowicz, professor at the University of Warsaw. This event is all about building new connections between countries and worlds from where we can view the opportunity to engage in enhanced exchange on current social policy issues. At the launch event, discussions focused in particular on dealing with the phenomenon of political radicalization.

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When the country you’re a citizen of is enduring military aggression from its nearest neighbor for a third year running, ignoring the military conflict your compatriots are dying in every day is, at the very least, odd. All the more so if you are a writer or an artist. Reality influences art, puts pressure on it, and it would be odd if it were otherwise. Sometimes it’s pleasant to live in a vacuum, but taking up long-term residence there deprives you of a connection with the obvious. Life crawls through your windows, and if in response you prefer simply to close the window, you risk suffocating from the lack of fresh air.

The war in Ukraine has been going on for three years now. Officially it’s called an anti-terrorist operation. That is, officially the war doesn’t exist. Over these three years, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens have lived through battles, gunfights, occupations, captivity, and liberation. That is, you can say that to a certain degree this war has been managed to avoid everyone. Some people have managed to grow accustomed to it, some people have learned how to avoid it, some people have even figured out how to profit from it. Some people see it as their own individual tragedy, as something personal that you have to react to and that you have to answer for. One way or another, the war is what everyone is talking about. They are trying to talk about it. They are learning how to talk about it. And they are also learning how to write about it.

A lot is written about the war in Ukraine. Somehow or other, art was forced to react to the societal catastrophes that began in the country with the beginning of the revolution, in winter 2013–2014. In a certain way, for Ukrainian art today, the events on Kyiv’s Maidan, as well as the beginning of the Russian occupation and the operations in Donbas, have been a serious test of maturity and responsibility. There was always a lot of politics in the life of Ukrainian society, but in the majority of cases art preferred to exist in isolation from direct socio-political pretensions. On the one hand, this attitude is completely justifiable—grappling with the political sphere can easily lead to serving it, to sinking openly and painlessly gives way to the propaganda. On the other hand, thor- ough and steadfast distancing from the processes that determine the social and societal climate often make art too abstract and detached from reality, marginalizing it and isolating it from public interests. It is difficult to write about politics in a language devoid of political activism. But writing about politics is necessary. And talking about it is necessary. Otherwise propaganda will say it all for you.

There’s another question: how can we write about war? What lexi-icon should be used? In recent histo- ry Ukraine hasn’t fought wars and— let’s be honest—hasn’t prepared for war. This is in contrast to Russia over there, with its traditional militaries. That is, officially the war doesn’t exist. But when operations began the ques- tion arose: how do you write about something that you were personal- ly unprepared for, about something whose appearance you couldn’t even foresee based on your own personal experience and private reflections? War truly changes the intonation and stylistics of speech. It brackets many phrases that were used completely naturally and reasonably before the war. It changes your attitude towards many words, like, let’s say, irony. Or arrogance. Or cynicism. Or pathos. The last one is a really bi- zarre one—when death occupies an increasingly large part of the space around you, lots of phenomena and pursuits that carried an abundance of emotion, wrath, joy, or rapture with them before the war look totally different today.

War changes distance, changes perspective. You are forced to come face to face with many things that earlier seemed abstract and abs- sent from your personal experience. Death, blood, pain and despair have a totally different sound and color- when you find yourself a man’s length away from them. Ref- ugees and exiles stop being simply terms you hear in the media when you run into them on the streets of your own city. The word chaplain, which previously you might only have encountered in fiction or his- tory books, sounds totally differ- ent after you become personally ac- quainted with priests on the front. Obviously you can’t write about these priests like they were portrayed in the fiction or history books of your childhood, because this is not at all fictional and not at all historical—this is your own personal experi- ence, which now you have to come to terms with. War also changes the optics of things. You begin to notice details that were uninteresting before. You pay attention to the wrinkles be-neath your eyes, to the wedding ring on your finger, to the child in the stroller. The tense coexistence of life and death gives weight to ev- eryday things, like those you aren’t used to being thankful for. No, it’s more than that—things that no one taught you to be thankful for. But in the end it is precisely these things that seem the most valuable and pre- cious. Learning to value all of this, learning to talk about all of this— this is difficult both for the reader and for the writer. Difficult, but ex- traordinarily important.

How does literature react to war? I remember two years ago, in spring 2014, when the first ‘wartime’ texts began to appear. Not necessar- ily ‘professional’ ones, from profes- sional writers. Sometimes it was sim- ply a few lines someone had posted on social media ‘folklore, in a cer- tain sense. Sometimes it was overly emotional, sometimes too publicis- tic, but it spoke to the most impor- tant thing: no one completely under- stands how to talk about something they’ve never encountered before. Accordingly, it is often written about with certain literary clichés, with allusions to the classics. Poetry might have been the first thing to react to the course of the war—back in the very first months of the Don- bas operations, Ukrainian poets’ re- flections began to appear. In the end, this shouldn’t strike us strange—the distance between reality and poet- ry is a fair bit shorter than between, for example, that same reality and prose. But now, however, there are more serious books and serious investigative reports appearing on this subject. The depth of thought and analysis in these books varies, but that’s not so important—what is important is that liter- ature is an extraordinarily effective way to capture and preserve a mul- titude of names and stories. Stories that don’t appear in the propaganda.

And one more thing. Today no one can say how much longer the war will go on. But one thing can already be predicted: in the future there will be literature written by those who have returned from the war. What this Ukrainian ‘trench’ liter- ature will be like is also difficult to say today. This war is changing all of us—as both those who write and those who read. Everything is changing. Literature included. I’d like to hope that it won’t become less humane and open.
IWM’s Ukraine Program—An Interim Report

Responding to the dramatic events of Maidan and its aftermath, in summer 2015 the IWM launched a new research project called Ukraine in European Dialogue (UiED). This project, initiated by IWM Permanent Fellow Timothy Snyder and administered by Research Director Tatiana Zhurzhenco and Project Associate Katherine Younger, is intended to promote dialogue and intellectual exchange between Ukrainian scholars, intellectuals and activists and their counterparts in Europe and North America at a crucial moment for the future of Ukraine.

As a kickoff to UiED, in September-October 2015, the IWM co-hosted The School of Abducted Europe, one of the six main components of the Kyiv Biennial, together with the Visual Culture Research Centre in Kyiv. Many members of the IWM community, including both Permanent and Visiting Fellows, traveled to Kyiv to participate in panel discussions, debates, lectures, and seminars.

In this issue of IWMpost, former IWM Visiting Fellow Kateryna Mishchenko reflects on the significance and lessons of the Kyiv Biennial. Beyond the Kyiv Biennial, the IWM has hosted a number of other UiED events in the program’s first year, including screenings of documents and movies by prominent directors, a poetry reading with Serhiy Zhadan, whose essay on language and war appeared in this issue of IWMpost, and a working meeting of the German-Ukrainian Historical Commission. Additionally, in September 2016, UiED contributed to the Vienna Humanities Festival, whose focus on displacement is relevant to both Europe as a whole and Ukraine in particular.

The UiED program offers a variety of fellowships to Ukrainian scholars, and in the program’s first year it awarded Junior Visiting Fellowships to Maria Titerash (Kyiv) and Oleksandr Matychenko (Donetsk), and Solidarity Fellowships for Ukrainian intellectuals whose lives have been disrupted by war to Olena Styazhnikova (Donetsk/Kyiv), Oksana Mikheieva (Donetsk/Lviv), Anton Lagusha (Donetsk/Vinnitsya), Ibor Todorov (Donetsk/Uzhhorod), and Natali Holoksha (Lviv/Kyiv).

In September 2016, the IWM welcomed the program’s first Andreas Sheptycki Fellow, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, the former Polish Foreign Minister whose personal connection to Sheptycki’s key figure makes him a symbolic figure for the program.

Beginning in July 2016, Ukraine in European Dialogue is part of a partnership with Ukrainian Free University, Munich.

The School of Kyiv Biennial and the Politics of Excess

For two months in fall 2015, Kyiv was turned into a cultural-political laboratory for the study of questions on the future of Ukraine and Europe. The Kyiv Biennial 2015—The School of Kyiv, organized by the Visual Culture Research Center (VCRC), opened its classrooms in twenty different spots around the Ukrainian capital and convened the classes of its six ‘Schools’: the Schools of Realism, Landscape, Image and Evidence, the Displaced, and Abducted Europe. The enlightening intensification of its name had a very real dimension: workshops, seminars and lectures could be said to be the main component of the biennial. If the artistic program took as its starting point the didactic practices of Kazimir Malevich and Alekseandr Ekster, the discursive program (although it must be noted that such a division in the context of contemporary art is often conditional) took a bold intellectual course: it invited Europe to its periphery and suggested learning from Kyiv and in Kyiv for the sake of building an alternative European utopia. The School of Abducted Europe featured 27 events—lectures, conversations and panel debates with prominent intellectuals, academics, artists and journalists, whose participation became possible thanks to a cooperation with the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) and its Ukraine in European Dialogue Program.

And thus, nearly every day the School of Abducted Europe became a vibrant international discussion space—“What Europe does Ukraine need?”, “Mainstreaming the Far Right in Europe,” “How to make a war,” “Who is afraid of Gayropa?”, “Making a space of knowledge: the cities of free Universities” and so on. In the history of independent Ukraine there had decidedly never been such a profound and lengthy consideration of Europe and our country’s place in it. After the space at the center of Kyiv was physically filled with the European idea in the winter of 2015-2016, it became necessary to place this idea in time, or in other words to transform that powerful impulse into an adequate long-term discourse.

This is probably the most urgent and serious task facing the cultural field in Ukraine in general, a task which the School of Kyiv was particularly enthusiastic about taking on—after all, the School sees its roots precisely in the agora of the Maidan. The need to react instantly and act quickly during the protest gave way to the need for more precise concepts and reflection on the socio-political context, a need which—as is well known—still remains acute. The acceleration of Ukrainian life increasingly makes clear the many ways in which Kyiv has failed to make a break with the old status quo two and a half years after the Maidan. Outwardly, Kyiv looks less and less resembles the city of Europe’s hope, as the biennial’s curators, Hedvig Sandgårdh and Gergl Schollhammer, termed it. It is thus all the more important, perhaps, to remember the lessons learned from this, the most interesting cultural event of the post-Maidan era. The first lesson is visual. You overcome your grief over things left undone or invisible by creating new images. The iconoclasm of decomposition, media propaganda, and right-wing and conservative mobilization are radically depleting the arsenal of images at hand, so that it is impossible to speak of new ones. Thus the battle over imagination is as relevant as ever. And the second lesson is more. The biennial’s desire to date the intellectual deficit and slake the cultural thirst of many years was funneled into such a number of events that none of its guests could possibly take them all in. Besides the fervor for the event, which takes us back to the experience of the Maidan, this excess can be read as an attempt to put an end to the local fragmentation of cultural life in general and intellectual expression in particular. Transgressing the horizon of expectation for the local context, the School of Kyiv also went beyond the geographical boundaries of Ukraine: its events have also taken place in Vienna, Leipzig, Athens, Amsterdam, Paris, Sofia, Karlsruhe, and Tbilisi.

The excessiveness and occasional underappreciation of the School of Kyiv strikes me as useful in drawing an enticing parallel: reading Ukraine as its own sort of surplus for a new vision of the European continent. Kyiv was where an event started that sought to become the promise of a restart for Europe. Europe, in turn, must urgently become a bigger and better place for human life. That’s obvious, isn’t it? But how should the contours of this new picture be examined? It seems that its lines are about to wither against a backdrop of crises and fatigue. At a minimum, the next biennial in Kyiv will continue its politics of excess and try to include everyone looking for a new future in our troubled times.
Ishin Czaja-Adrijan
Krzysztof Michalski
Junior Visiting Fellow (March–August 2016)
PhD candidate in History, Charles University Prague

Kristina Andelova
Jan Patocka Junior Visiting Fellow (September 2015–February 2016)
PhD candidate in History, Charles University Prague

Aner Barzilay
Junior Visiting Fellow (February–June 2016)
PhD candidate in History, Yale University

Tobias Berger
Junior Visiting Fellow (February–June 2016)
Lecturer in Politics, Freie Universität Berlin
Transnational Law in Translation

Rima Bertiucˇiutė
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (January–March 2016)
PhD candidate in Philology, Université de Paris (French > Slovenian)

Eliana Bettì
EURAS Junior Visiting Fellow (September–June 2016)
Post-Doctoral Fellow of History Culture Civilization, University of Bologna
Gender and Precarious Work in a Historical Perspective: The European Context

Ashita Bhardwaj
Visiting Fellow (February–May 2016)
Research Professor of Anthropology and Sociology, Graduate Institute Geneva
Red Revolution: The Emergence of Stem Cell Technologies in India

Luiza Blajeviciuc˘
Bronislav Groenem Visiting Fellow (October 2015–July 2016)
Jean Monnet Professor of EU External Relations, University of Amsterdam
Other Empires, Other Europe: Europe, Beyond Territory

Jan Bih˘a
Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Charles University in Prague
Nadia Urbaniuc˘
Democratic Disqualification: Opinion, Truth, and the People (English > Czech)

Maria de Mar Castano Varios
Visiting Fellow (October 2015–June 2016)
Professor of General Science of Education and Social Science of the Alice Salomon Hochschule Berlin
Democracy, Education, and Epistemic Change

Claudia Fornari
Junior Visiting Fellow (February–July 2016)
PhD candidate, Depart- ment of Social and Political Sciences, Graduate Institute, Geneva
Phenomenology and Politics in the Naxoshe Kingdom of Jordan: Re-shaping Rules—Reduction Relation- ship under Nostalgic Capitalism

Rohan Guindanik
Junior Visiting Fellow (December 2015–February 2016)
PhD candidate in Development Studies, Graduate Institute, Geneva
The Challenges of Land Redistribution and Violence—Endurance from West Bengal

ÖzgeBurcuGüneş
Junior Visiting Fellow (March–July 2016)
PhD candidate in Cultural Studies, Graduate Institute, Geneva
Social Economic and Cultural Integration Strategies of Roma in Turkey

Mark van Hagen
Guest (June 2016)
Professor of History, Arizona State University School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Tempe
Pavel Klyievic˘ in Vienna

Sibil Hasen Khan
Junior Visiting Fellow (January 2015–February 2016)
PhD candidate in International Law, Graduate Institute, Geneva
Temporality and Credibility in International Legal Discourse

Ella Kik
Junior Visiting Fellow (January–June 2016)
PhD candidate, Depart- ment of Media, Culture, and Communication, New University, Prague
Objects to Erase with: A Historico-Philosophical Perspective

Randall Hanson
Guest (April–May 2016)
Director, Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, London School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto

Stephen Holmes
Guest (April–May 2016)
Wage J. Meyers Professor of Law, New York University School of Law
Counter-Revolution: The Result Against the World America Made

Vladislav Insametz
Guest, Russia in Global Politics (September–March 2016)
Professor of Economics, Higher School of Economics, Director, Centre for Post-Industrial Studies, Moscow
Russia in Search for a New Model of Democracy

David Jenkins
Krypì (Michel de Certeau) Junior Visiting Fellow (September–June 2016)
PhD candidate, London School of Economics
Justice as It Has to Be

Iolna Kazacková
Alexander Herzen Visiting Fellow (January–June 2016)
PhD candidate in Film and Media Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation
Framed of War: Who Is Life Giveway? (English > Ukrainian)

Jan Patočka Junior Visiting Fellow (January–June 2016)
PhD candidate in Philosophy of Humanities, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kiev, Member, International Political Science Association, co-editor, Topoi
Euromanias as the Trace of Equality?: Recapitulation of Modern European Values

Yustina Krunchuk
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (January–March 2016)
PhD candidate in Film and Media Studies, National Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation

Olena Styaszhkina
Junior Visiting Fellow (February–June 2016)
PhD candidate in Sociology and Social Studies, St. Petersburg Independent Sociological Research, St. Petersburg
Heroes and Anarchists in National Narratives of GEE Countries in the 20th Century

Anton Liagusha
Paul Celan Visiting Fellow (April–June 2016)
Translator and Literary critic, LvivShyp

Ilia Maksimov
Alexander Herzen Visiting Fellow (September–June 2016)
PhD candidate in Philosophy of Anthropology, University School of Law

Krzysztof Michalski
Senior Fellow (September 2015–March 2016)
PhD candidate, Visiting Fellow of International Relations, Graduate Institute, Geneva
Rethinking Democratic Public, Political, and Communist Politics in North Korea

Jelka Kernev Štrajn
Visiting Fellow (August–November 2016)
Junior Visiting Fellow, Centre for Post-Industrial Studies, University School of Law

Anton Shekhovtsov
Visiting Fellow (January 2015–February 2016)
Lecturer in Comparative Literature, Charles University Prague
Power Relations. A Philosophical Investigation

A Discussed Question

The IRM offers a place for research and scholarly debate across borders and disciplines. Its various fellowship programs are thus a fundamental part of the Institute’s work. Each year, 75–80 Visiting Fellows and Junior Fellows are awarded fellowships to pursue their individual research projects at the IRM. Since its inception in 1982, the IRM has hosted more than 1,000 scholars, journalists and translators.
von walter famler zur emeritierung von klaus nellen

ichrom 1945 und aufgewach-

s in den nord-nei-west-

lichsten velbert hat klaus nellen philosopie und germanis-

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ter der 20-jährige die Möglichkeit einer wissenschaftlichen arbeit am husserl-archiv der universität köln. seine staatsexamenarbeit be-

scheidet sich mit banckmetaphor, eine geplante dissertation mit der le-

benstheoretik bei husserl. er sei, reflektiert nellen im rückblick, im husserl eher hingewiesen, als dass er sich für die wissenschaftliche beschäftigung mit diesem bewusst entschieden hätte. eigentlich fühle er sich mehr mit denkern wie adorno, fossalt oder derrida verbunden.

in den räumlichkeiten des kölner husserl-archivs lernt klaus nellen den philosophischen kryzof malchik kennen. die entste-

hende freundschaft wird zur basis für ein gemeinsames lebensprojekt. nach einer idee von malchik baut nellen gemeinsam mit diesem und der feministisch orientierten phi-

losophin cornelia klinger ein zi-

satz für advanced study auf, das im korn auf dem erfahrungsaus-
tausch mit unabhängigen wissen-
schaftlern und intellektuellen aus dem kommunistischen osteuropa basiert. nach positiven erfahrun-
gen mit der sommeruniversität im jugoslawischen dubrovnik konn-

ten führende europäische gelehr-


ten wie hans-georg gadamer, les-

zek, kolakowski und paul ricœur für das projekt gewonnen werden. die zentralen dreissigische lage und die leichteren einreisebedingungen im

phasischer ökonomie?

was ist ethnisch an der

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Redefining the ‘We’

According to Charles Taylor, integration can only occur if immigrants are permitted to collaborate in the definition of national identity. In this interview, published on the occasion of the philosopher’s 85th birthday on November 5, he proposes an intercultural approach based on shared experience.

Thomas Seifert: Nationality is crucial in a welfare state like Austria, since it determines access to benefits. It is also the central issue for the returns that immigrants can achieve around nationality be overcome?

Charles Taylor: The solution isn’t easy, but it is to re-define what it is to be Austrian. Trying to understand your national identity purely in terms of where you come from is going to become increasingly impossible for all North Atlantic societies, because economics and war has made it necessary that we receive people from outside. This is particularly hard for Europe, which traditionally does not consider itself an immigrant society. We have the same problem in Canada, particularly in Quebec. Until twenty years ago, the French-speaking part of Quebec was made up of people who mostly were descended from original settlers. When immigrants started arriving, we needed to develop an approach to integration. We call this ‘interculturalism’, not ‘multiculturalism’. This concept could be relevant to a country like Austria. Starting from this originally German-speaking Catholic country, with all its particular traditions, you can cooperate, together with the people that have come in, in a new understanding of what it is to be Austrian. Interculturalism means developing the sense, particularly among younger people, that nationality is a work in progress. This can be very difficult in a period of economic pressure and austerity, and that’s why we see a rise in right-wing populism in many—though not all—European societies. The far-right targets the migrant generation and sees it as a kind of threat. Y ou need time and you need patience and innovation to prevent this happening. If all goes well, they come to university and so on. That’s what draws people. If some part of that dream is fulfilled, then they become consolidated.

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It’s easier to blame the immigrant next door than the system.

This is a problem not just for integration, but for democracy as such.

The ‘we’ is. The Scandinavian countries, like Ghandi and Martin Luther King, have a commitment, as well as reasons to be just as absurd to say religion is all the problem, sometimes nationalism. Of course there’s a backslash. It all depends on how quickly you can change the sense of the word ‘we’. It’s starts off as an idea among a ensemble of very different people, who then work together and begin to get a real, concrete sense of a ‘we’ that bridges those differences. Alternatively, if you start off with the idea that there is somebody who does not belong to the ‘we’, then that also takes on its own kind of reality. It’s about the attractiveness of an idea, the idea that you can have whatever one wants in private, as long as religion has no place in the public sphere?

Taylor: That doesn’t work either. It is a misconception that secularism means that the public sphere is free from religion. The key to secularism in the modern West is that public authority is not aligned, whether to a religion or to an anti-religion. People should have the maximum freedom to act out whatever their idea is, whether it is atheist or Christian or Jewish or Muslim or whatever. Before the Enlightenment, we lived in societies that were defined conventionally, in order to do justice to the diversity of the modern world, it was necessary to move from a reified or ideologically defined state to a state that was deliberately non-aligned. In the French speaking world, there is a big fight over how to define laïcité. In Quebec, we have this more open concept. The more closed concept that’s gaining ground in France is creating deep divisions, stigmatization, and not realizing a non-aligned state.

called non-religion just shat ters. There isn’t a single thing called religion, just as there isn’t a single thing called Islam.

Seifert: At the end of the day, we share 99% of our DNA and a common planetary destiny. So why don’t we see a merging of religions? T aylor: Well, we do that too. It’s very complex. There’s definitely a greater planetary consciousness today than fifty years ago. On the other hand, you get these deep hatreds, suspicions. There’s something in human beings that in certain circumstances makes them susceptible to that. You can only beat it by acting out another kind of identity, where reaching out and being part of the larger whole is really valued.

Seifert: Is secularism the answer, the idea that one can have whatever one wants in private, as long as religion has no place in the public sphere?

Taylor: This is a problem not just for integration, but for democracy as such.

Seifert: How can we retain the ethical framework in traditionall welfare states?

Taylor: Only by redefining what the ‘we’ is. The Scandinavian countries are trying to do this, and they are the ones who built a welfare state based on a very high degree of homegenity. Of course there’s a backslash. It all depends on how quickly you can change the sense of the word ‘we’. It’s starts off as an idea among a ensemble of very different people, who then work together and begin to get a real, concrete sense of a ‘we’ that bridges those differences. Alternatively, if you start off with the idea that there is somebody outside that does not belong to the ‘we’, then that also takes on its own kind of reality. It’s about the attractiveness of an idea, the idea that you can have whatever one wants in private, as long as religion has no place in the public sphere?

Taylor: That doesn’t work either. It is a misconception that secularism means that the public sphere is free from religion. The key to secularism in the modern West is that public authority is not aligned, whether to a religion or to an anti-religion. People should have the maximum freedom to act out whatever their idea is, whether it is atheist or Christian or Jewish or Muslim or whatever. Before the Enlightenment, we lived in societies that were defined conventionally, in order to do justice to the diversity of the modern world, it was necessary to move from a reified or ideologically defined state to a state that was deliberately non-aligned. In the French speaking world, there is a big fight over how to define laïcité. In Quebec, we have this more open concept. The more closed concept that’s gaining ground in France is creating deep divisions, stigmatization, and not realizing a non-aligned state.

Seifert: It’s easier to blame the immigrant next door than the system.

This is a problem not just for integration, but for democracy as such.

It’s your own fault, don’t expect me to get you out of your mess. That’s not only the neidless Respect for Dein Werk and von Deiner bereinentenwelt fortgesetzten Produktivität ausdrücken, sondern einen sehr speziellen Dank für unsere weit zurückreichende Beziehung begründen.


Andreas Fahrmeir, Günter Hellmann und Mirjatk (eds.) The Transformation of Foreign Policy. Drawing and Managing Boundaries from Areas of the Post-Communist Centre. Oxford University Press, 2016

The study of foreign policy is usually concerned with the interaction of states, and thus with governance structures which emerged either with the so-called "Westphalian system" in the course of the 17th century. This edited vol-

tumes, however, presents a novel understanding of what foreign policy is today. In a broad perspective stretching from early Greek history to present-day global cities, it offers a theoretical and empirical presentation of this concept by political scientists, jurists, and historians.


Die Publikation widmet sich dem Spannungsfeld zwischen Grenzziehungen und Grenzüberschreitungen in einer globalisierten Welt. Im Mittelpunkt stehen Fragen der Toleration, Religion, Rechtsunabhängigkeit, Migration, Staatsbürgerchaft sowie der Transformation von familialen Beziehungen sowie indivi-

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the Internet filtering system, which would let users “search and find” information, not just block websites and pages. The League was intimately involved in bringing the Chinese to Moscow in April, and Furg Runn- ing launched a Chinese “Society of Information Security” consisting of volunteers, as an imitation of the League’s approach of using volun-
tees to patrol the Internet.  
The second area is technology. In 2016 the Russian officials began a campaign to reshape the critical infrastructure of the Internet—with the goal of putting it under govern-
ment control. In June 2016 Putin also signed a new anti-terrorism pack-
age, which requires communications providers to store user data (includ-
ing calls and messages) for at least six months, while making it acces-
sible to the security services; it also gives the government the power to demand the keys to encrypted traffic.  
This presents a technology prob-
lem. The Kremlin has announced “import substitution” — a thinly veiled attempt to portray West-
ern sanctions as something benefi-
tial to the country, something that could help develop Russian indus-
tries. But the infrastructure of the Russian Internet was built on West-
ern—largely American—technolo-
gies, first and foremost Cisco. Now the government is trying to find a way to replace Western technolo-
gies with something produced in
vice, about licensing its data storage
and server technologies.  
Talks were reportedly held between
China’s capital was on the
by Russian officials to the Huawei
Infoforum in Beijing—and a visit
was also a “general sponsor” of the
China Cyber Forum in April 2016. It
of almost every conference on infor-
mation security. 
In 2016 Huawei was a sponsor
of every conference on infor-
mation security in Moscow, and the
company’s representatives were given
a time slot to speak at the Russia-
China Cyber Forum in April 2016. It
was also a “general sponsor” of the
Infoforum in Beijing—and a visit
by Russian officials to the Huawei
HQ in China’s capital was on the
events agenda. 

A Window of Opportunity?  
For years, the Russian secret
services have been suspicious of Chinese
telecom equipment. They were very
aware of media reports that Beijing
could use the Huawei’s equipment for
spying. But now their search for a solution to the “Internet problem”
could bring Russia into the arms of
Chinese telecom companies. One
can only guess the implications for
the Russian Internet.  

China is Ready to Build Putin’s Firewall
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