The Political Economy of Making an Authoritarian Constitution: The Case of China

Friday, 24 April 2015, 6:30pm - 8:00pm, IWM library
This opening lecture of the project workshop “Between Bukharin and Balcerowicz:
A Comparative History of Economic Thought under Communism” aims to analyze, both theoretically and empirically, the rationale of the Chinese Communist Party in transforming the constitution of both party and state from totalitarian to authoritarian in the early years of the 21st century. Its key hypothesis is that an authoritarian constitution was considered more conducive to the Party’s maintenance of power at a time when it became increasingly dependent on the support of the country’s economic elites. This assumption will be tested using empirical data at firm level, city level and national level from the period of the 2002/2004 party/state constitutional changes.

Chenggang 400_600Chenggang Xu is Quoin Professor in Economic Development at the University of Hong Kong, Special-term Visiting Professor at the School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University and World-Class University Visiting Professor of the Seoul National University. He is Associate Director of the Institute for China and Global Development (University of Hong Kong) and also the President of the Asian Law and Economics Association (AsLEA). He is Co-editor of several journals including Journal of Asian Law and Economics, China Journal of Economics, Annals of Economics and Finance and Chief-Economist of 《中国改革》(China Reform). His latest articles are Political Economy of Private Firms in China (2014), The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development (2011) and Political Economy Origins of Financial Markets in Europe and Asia (2011).

The conference itself is not open to the public.